A call for evidence-based security tools

Ewout H. Meijer; Bruno Verschuere; Aldert Vrij; Harald Merckelbach; Fren Smulders; Sharon Leal; Gershon Ben-Shakhar; Par Anders Granhag; Matthias Gamer; Nurit Gronau; Gerhard Vossel; Sean Spence

A call for evidence-based security tools

Ewout H. Meijer, Bruno Verschuere, Aldert Vrij, Harald Merckelbach, Fren Smulders, Sharon Leal, Gershon Ben-Shakhar, Par Anders Granhag, Matthias Gamer, Nurit Gronau, Gerhard Vossel, Sean Spence

International Centre for Research in Forensic Psychology

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Abstract

Since the 2001 attacks on the twin towers, policies on security have changed drastically, bringing about an increased need for tools that allow for the detection of deception. Many of the solutions offered today, however, lack scientific underpinning.
We recommend two important changes to improve the (cost) effectiveness of security policy. To begin with, the emphasis of deception research should shift from technological to behavioural sciences. Secondly, the burden of proof should lie with the manufacturers of the security tools. Governments should not rely on security tools that have not passed scientific scrutiny, and should only employ those methods that have been proven effective. After all, the use of tools that do not work will only get us further from the truth.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-4
Journal	Open Access Journal of Forensic Psychology
Volume	1
Publication status	Published - 2009

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title = "A call for evidence-based security tools",

abstract = "Since the 2001 attacks on the twin towers, policies on security have changed drastically, bringing about an increased need for tools that allow for the detection of deception. Many of the solutions offered today, however, lack scientific underpinning. We recommend two important changes to improve the (cost) effectiveness of security policy. To begin with, the emphasis of deception research should shift from technological to behavioural sciences. Secondly, the burden of proof should lie with the manufacturers of the security tools. Governments should not rely on security tools that have not passed scientific scrutiny, and should only employ those methods that have been proven effective. After all, the use of tools that do not work will only get us further from the truth. ",

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AU - Verschuere, Bruno

AU - Vrij, Aldert

AU - Merckelbach, Harald

AU - Smulders, Fren

AU - Leal, Sharon

AU - Ben-Shakhar, Gershon

AU - Granhag, Par Anders

AU - Gamer, Matthias

AU - Gronau, Nurit

AU - Vossel, Gerhard

AU - Spence, Sean

PY - 2009

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AB - Since the 2001 attacks on the twin towers, policies on security have changed drastically, bringing about an increased need for tools that allow for the detection of deception. Many of the solutions offered today, however, lack scientific underpinning. We recommend two important changes to improve the (cost) effectiveness of security policy. To begin with, the emphasis of deception research should shift from technological to behavioural sciences. Secondly, the burden of proof should lie with the manufacturers of the security tools. Governments should not rely on security tools that have not passed scientific scrutiny, and should only employ those methods that have been proven effective. After all, the use of tools that do not work will only get us further from the truth.

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VL - 1

SP - 1

EP - 4

JO - Open Access Journal of Forensic Psychology

JF - Open Access Journal of Forensic Psychology

ER -

A call for evidence-based security tools

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