Accuracy of proposers' beliefs in an allocation-type game experiment

Federica Alberti, Anna Conte, Kei Tsutsui

    Research output: Working paper


    In the context of an allocation game, this paper analyses the proposer´s reported beliefs about the responder's willingness to accept (or reject) the proposed split of the pie. The proposer´s beliefs are elicited via a quadratic scoring rule. An econometric model of the proposer´s beliefs is estimated. The estimated proposer's beliefs are then compared with the actual responder's choices. As a result of this comparison, we observe that the proposer tends to underestimate the empirical acceptance probability, especially when the slice of the pie allocated to the proposer is large.
    Original languageEnglish
    Number of pages11
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

    Publication series

    NameJena Economic Research Papers
    PublisherMax Planck Institute of Economics
    ISSN (Print)1864-7057


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