Australia’s proposed Banking Executive Accountability Regime: regulatory panopticon or fail-safe?

Michael  Adams; Grace  Borsellino; James McCalman; Angus Young

Australia’s proposed Banking Executive Accountability Regime: regulatory panopticon or fail-safe?

Michael Adams, Grace Borsellino, James McCalman, Angus Young

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Abstract

When looking at banking regulation, disclosure, or standard form contracts, it is clear the self-regulatory system in Australia has failed. Under the BEAR proposed regime, Australia's bank executives would be required to take responsibility for their corporate culture. It is difficult to determine if the proposed BEAR would curb conduct risk of banks and bank executives as it is still too early to point to evidence from other jurisdictions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	528-531
Journal	Governance Directions
Volume	October
Issue number	9
Publication status	Published - 5 Oct 2017

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This article was first published in the October 2017 issue of Governance Directions, the official journal of Governance Institute.
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Cite this

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Australia’s proposed Banking Executive Accountability Regime: regulatory panopticon or fail-safe?

Abstract

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