Abstract
Gallipoli left a lasting impression upon both the countries that participated and many that did not. It has been argued that the campaign negatively influenced Britain’s interwar amphibious preparations. Instead, this article will show that Britain’s armed forces were largely unaffected by such memories, and maintained their relative global standing in theory, equipment and training exercises for landing operations. The paper also highlights the role of amphibious warfare in fighting the many ‘little wars of Empire’ during the period.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 737-759 |
| Journal | The Journal of Strategic Studies |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Early online date | 31 Jan 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 12 Aug 2021 |
Access to Document
- M.Heaslip_A_Gallipoli_curse
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of Strategic Studies on 31.01.2019, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1570145.