Catch share schemes, the theory of dynamic coalition games, and the Groundfish Trawl Fishery of British Columbia

This paper argues that catch share schemes should be analyzed through the lens of game theory to a far greater extent than had been the case in the past. The basic framework is seen to be derived from a 2006 article by Kronbak and Lindroos, in which the resource managers play a von Stackelberg game with the relevant fishers, and in which the fishers play either a competitive or cooperative game among themselves. As such, the paper follows on from a paper that was presented at the IIFET 2012 Conference, in which some of the basic ideas were set forth. A real world example, providing a focus for paper, is the ITQed groundfish trawl fishery of British Columbia. The number of players in the fishery is large, certainly not fewer than 30. The players are seen to be playing a stable cooperative game among themselves, and as a coalition, have played a cooperative game with a second coalition, consisting of a consortium of conservationist NGOs. The two coalition cooperative game, resulting in the B.C. Groundfish Trawl Habitat Conservation Agreement, has as its objective the minimizing of bycatches of threatened sponge and coral species. The Agreement, in its initial stages, was reviewed in the IIFET 2012 paper. This paper will report on progress on the Agreement, which has now completed its first full year of operation, arguing that it has been remarkably successful. The paper does as well bring to light an earlier incident in which cooperating groundfish fishers took the initiative in developing a successful fishery resource re-building program. This paper points to many game theoretic issues, which need to be addressed. Modeling work on these issues is currently underway, although progress is not rapid. Be that as it may, the reported developments in fisher cooperation, leading to improved fishery management, cannot be understood, other than through the lens of game theory.