Concession bargaining: an experimental comparison of protocols and time horizons

Federica Alberti, Sven Fischer, Werner Güth, Kei Tsutsui

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    148 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been reached, and in the static protocol no feedback information is given about earlier trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements differ across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions.
    Original languageEnglish
    Article number0
    Pages (from-to)2017-2039
    Number of pages24
    JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution: Research on War and Peace between and within Nations
    Volume62
    Issue number9
    Early online date31 Jul 2017
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2018

    Keywords

    • concession bargaining
    • dynamic interaction
    • emotions
    • deadline
    • conflict
    • experiment

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Concession bargaining: an experimental comparison of protocols and time horizons'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this