We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been reached, and in the static protocol no feedback information is given about earlier trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements differ across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions.
|Number of pages||24|
|Journal||Journal of Conflict Resolution: Research on War and Peace between and within Nations|
|Early online date||31 Jul 2017|
|Publication status||Published - 1 Oct 2018|
- concession bargaining
- dynamic interaction