Abstract
We consider a group of agents playing the Hawk-Dove game. These agents have a finite memory of past interactions which they use to optimize their play. By both analytical and numerical approaches, we show that an instability occurs at a critical memory length, and we provide its characterization. We show also that when the game is stable, having a long memory is beneficial but that instability, which may
be produced by excessively long memory, hands the advantage to those with shorter memories.
be produced by excessively long memory, hands the advantage to those with shorter memories.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 13 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | The European Physical Journal B |
Volume | 90 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 18 Jan 2017 |
Keywords
- statistical and non-linear physics