Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: rules versus discretion

Achim Hauck, U. Vollmer

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    This paper analyzes a government's incentives to provide financial assistance to a public bank which is hit by a liquidity shock. We show that discretionary decisions about emergency liquidity assistance result in either excessively small or excessively large liquidity injections in a wide variety of circumstances. Also, adding a lender of last resort does not generally ensure a socially optimal policy. However, optimal rules exist that align the preferences of the government and/or a lender of last resort with social preferences by either subsidizing or taxing liquidity aid.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)193-204
    Number of pages12
    JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2013


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