Equivalence and axiomatization of solutions for cooperative games with circular communication structure

Ozer Selcuk, Takamasa Suzuki, Dolf Talman

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    Abstract

    We study cooperative games with transferable utility and limited cooperation possibilities. The focus is on communication structures where the set of players forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph. Single-valued solutions are considered which are the average of specific marginal vectors. A marginal vector is deduced from a permutation on the player set and assigns as payoff to a player his marginal contribution when he joins his predecessors in the permutation. We compare the collection of all marginal vectors that are deduced from the permutations in which every player is connected to his immediate predecessor with the one deduced from the permutations in which every player is connected to at least one of his predecessors. The average of the first collection yields the average tree solution and the average of the second one is the Shapley value for augmenting systems. Although the two collections of marginal vectors are different and the second collection contains the first one, it turns out that both solutions coincide on the class of circular graph games. Further, an axiomatization of the solution is given using efficiency, linearity, some restricted dummy property, and some kind of symmetry.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)428-431
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume121
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2013

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