Conventional economic models of regulatory compliance focus on an instrumental determination of individual behaviour in which the decision to comply or violate depends upon the perceived monetary costs and benefits. This suggests that compliance can only be achieved by ensuring that the expected costs are greater than the expected benefits, in other words by employing a deterrent effect. The policy implication is that desired levels of compliance must be achieved through enforcement, which is costly. More complete models of compliance behaviour take into account non-monetary factors such as social influences, moral norms and the perceived "legitimacy" of regulations and the regulatory authority. The paper describes a current investigation into the influence of non-monetary factors in determining compliance with quota restrictions among UK fishermen and discusses some preliminary results from the study.
|Title of host publication||Proceedings of the Xth annual conference of the european association of fisheries economists|
|Place of Publication||The Hague, The Netherlands|
|Publisher||Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI)|
|Number of pages||16|
|Publication status||Published - Apr 1998|