Abstract
We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory length, and as a result, different memory lengths can compete and co-exist in a dynamical equilibrium. Our analytical formulation makes a connection to statistical urn models, and we show that temperature is mirrored by the agent's memory. Our simple model of memory may be incorporated into other game models with implications that we briefly discuss.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 032119 |
Journal | Physical Review E |
Volume | 92 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 14 Sept 2015 |
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Short memory can be good strategy during competition
14/09/15
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