Lying for others: the impact of agency on misreporting

Georgia Elizabeth Buckle, Sascha Füllbrunn, Wolfgang Luhan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We extend the experimental design by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to examine lying behavior on behalf of others, eliminating all possible incentives apart from social preferences. We compare the prevalence of misreporting in situations where the monetary gain either goes to the decision-maker or to an anonymous other participant. Overall we observe lower levels of lying for others compared to for oneself, however, a significant number of participants were willing to lie to increase another participant’s payoff, with no economic incentive to do so. We find no partial lying for others but rather two extremes: either complete honesty or maximal lying.
Original languageEnglish
Article number109677
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume198
Early online date27 Nov 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2021

Keywords

  • lying aversion
  • decision making for others
  • prosocial lying
  • experiment

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Lying for others: the impact of agency on misreporting'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this