Malicious loop detection using support vector machine

Zirak Allaf, Mo Adda, Alexander Gegov

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Abstract

Existing Side-channel attack techniques, such as meltdown attacks, show that attackers can exploit the microarchitecture and OS vulnerabilities to achieve their goals. In this paper, we present the development of our real-time system for detecting side-channel attacks. Unlike previous works, our proposed detection system does not rely on synchronisation between the attackers and victims. Instead, it uses processors’ performance indicators to capture malicious Flush+Reload activities with an accuracy of up to 99%. Moreover, the detection activities can be achieved with minimum time delay in both native and cloud systems with a low overhead performance approximately less than 1% in the host system.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2019 IEEE International Symposium on Innovations in Intelligent Systems and Applications (INISTA) Proceedings
PublisherIEEE
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-7281-1862-8
ISBN (Print)978-1-7281-1863-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 29 Jul 2019
EventIEEE INISTA 2019: International Symposium on Innovations in Intelligent Systems and Applications - Sofia, Bulgaria
Duration: 3 Jul 20195 Jul 2019

Conference

ConferenceIEEE INISTA 2019
Country/TerritoryBulgaria
CitySofia
Period3/07/195/07/19

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