Misrepresentations and flawed logic about the prevalence of false memories

Robert Nash; Kimberley Wade; Maryanne Garry; Elizabeth Loftus; James Ost

doi:10.1002/acp.3265

Misrepresentations and flawed logic about the prevalence of false memories

Robert Nash, Kimberley Wade, Maryanne Garry, Elizabeth Loftus, James Ost

International Centre for Research in Forensic Psychology

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Abstract

Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an “upper bound” on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	31-33
Journal	Applied Cognitive Psychology
Volume	31
Issue number	1
Early online date	14 Oct 2016
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3265
Publication status	Published - Jan 2017

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The final published version of this of Nash, R. A., Wade, K. A., Garry, M., Loftus, E. F., and Ost, J. (2016) Misrepresentations and Flawed Logic About the Prevalence of False Memories. Appl. Cognit. Psychol., can be found at doi: 10.1002/acp.3265
Accepted author manuscript (Post-print), 141 KB

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Misrepresentations and flawed logic about the prevalence of false memories

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