Abstract
We explore economic incentives for third parties to intervene in on-going internal wars. We develop a three-party model of the decision to intervene in conflict that highlights the role of the economic benefits accruing from the intervention and the potential costs. We present novel empirical results on the role of oil in motivating third party military intervention. We find that the likelihood of a third party intervention increases when a) the country at war has large reserves of oil, b) the relative competition in the sector is limited and c) the potential intervener has a higher demand for oil.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-27 |
| Journal | Journal of Conflict Resolution: Research on War and Peace between and within Nations |
| Early online date | 27 Jan 2015 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |
Keywords
- WNU
- Intrastate Conflict
- Third party intervention
Access to Document
- SEKERIS_2015_cright_JCR_Oil above water
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in Journal of Conflict Resolution, by SAGE Publications Ltd, All rights reserved. © [Vincenzo Bove, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Petros G. Sekeris]