Abstract
This paper compares the economic incentives created by transferable and non-transferable quotas in a fishery, in particular the incentives to discard fish of certain species or grades when quotas are enforced at the landing site. With a hypothetical efficient allocation of non-transferable quotas, the incentive structure is essentially the same as under transferable quotas. However, in the absence of the information provided by the quota price, outcomes may not be the same under all conditions. Inefficient allocations of non-transferable quotas will tend to reduce discards due to highgrading but increase discards in multispecies fisheries. The impact of discarding on the quota price in a transferable quota fishery is examined.
| Original language | English |
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| Pages (from-to) | 77-99 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Marine Resource Economics |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2005 |