Paraconsistent games and the limits of rational self-interest

Arief Daynes, Paraskevas Pagas, David Latimer, Panagiotis Andrikopoulos

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    It is shown that logical contradictions are derivable from natural translations into first order logic of the description and background assumptions of the Soros Game, and of other games and social contexts that exhibit conflict and reflexivity. The logical structure of these contexts is analysed using proof-theoretic and model-theoretic techniques of first order paraconsistent logic. It is shown that all the contradictions that arise contain the knowledge operator K. Thus, the contradictions do not refer purely to material objects, and do not imply the existence of inconsistent, concrete, physical objects, or the inconsistency of direct sensory experience. However, the decision-making of rational self-interested agents is stymied by the appearance of such intentional contradictions. Replacing the rational self-interest axioms with axioms for an appropriate moral framework removes the inconsistencies. Rational moral choice in conflict-reflexive social contexts then becomes possible.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)17-42
    JournalAustralasian Journal of Logic
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - 2015


    • WNU


    Dive into the research topics of 'Paraconsistent games and the limits of rational self-interest'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this