Quota setting and enforcement choice in a shared fishery

Aaron Hatcher, Linda Nostbakken

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    We model the exploitation of an international (shared stock) fishery which is managed using national quotas determined as agreed shares of an annual total allowable catch (TAC). Given its annual quota, each country employs enforcement effort in order to maximise national social benefits while securing an acceptable degree of quota compliance by its fishing fleet. We examine the determination of the TAC which maximises the present value of the fishery, given the agreed quota shares and each country’s harvest and enforcement best-response functions. Inefficiency may derive not only from non-optimal TAC shares but also from the countries’ implicit preferences for compliance. We illustrate these findings with a set of numerical simulations. Finally, we consider the incentives for countries to bid up the TAC during international negotiations.
    Original languageEnglish
    Article number0
    Pages (from-to)559-575
    Number of pages17
    JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
    Issue number4
    Early online date9 Jul 2014
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2015


    • Environmental Economics
    • Environmental Law/Policy
    • Ecojustice
    • Economic Policy
    • Environmental Management
    • Economics
    • Management Science


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