Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence

Wolfgang Luhan, Anders Poulsen, Michael Roos

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    182 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)687-699
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume102
    Early online date14 Mar 2017
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Mar 2017

    Keywords

    • Bargaining
    • Coordination complexity
    • Payoff focality

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this