Registered report: The effects of incentivized lies on memory

Paul Riesthuis*, Henry Otgaar, Lorraine Hope, Ivan Mangiulli

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

The proposed experiment will examine the effect of deceptive behavior on memory. Participants will be assigned to a “strong-incentive to cheat” or “weak-incentive to cheat” condition and play the adapted Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling paradigm. Specifically, Player A (computer; participants think it is another participant) throws a die and reports it to Player B (participant). Then Player B throws his/her die, remembers the outcome, and reports it to Player A. Participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition are monetarily punished if their die roll outcome differs from Player A's die roll outcome. Participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition are not punished if the die roll outcomes differ. Two-days later, memory for the die-rolling event will be assessed. We predict that participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition will have lower belief and recollection for the die-rolling event and will report more errors than participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages8
JournalApplied Cognitive Psychology
Early online date21 May 2021
DOIs
Publication statusEarly online - 21 May 2021

Keywords

  • deception
  • lying
  • memory
  • unethical amnesia

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