Sophisticated preference aggregation

M. Remzi Sanver; Ozer Selcuk

doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0346-4

Sophisticated preference aggregation

M. Remzi Sanver, Ozer Selcuk

Tilburg University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

A Sophisticated Social Welfare Function (SSWF) is a mapping from profiles of individual preferences into a sophisticated preference which is a pairwise weighted comparison of alternatives. We characterize Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs in terms of oligarchies that are induced by some power distribution in the society. This is a fairly large class ranging from dictatoriality to anonymous aggregation rules. Our results generalize the impossibility theorem of Arrow (Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York, 1951) and the oligarchy theorem of Gibbard (Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma, University of Chicago, unpublished manuscript,

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	73-86
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	33
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0346-4
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2009

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SELCUK_2007_cright_Sophisticated preference aggregation
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Social Choice and Welfare. The final publication is available at Springer via http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-008-0346-4
Accepted author manuscript (Post-print), 183 KBLicence: CC BY

http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-008-0346-4

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N2 - A Sophisticated Social Welfare Function (SSWF) is a mapping from profiles of individual preferences into a sophisticated preference which is a pairwise weighted comparison of alternatives. We characterize Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs in terms of oligarchies that are induced by some power distribution in the society. This is a fairly large class ranging from dictatoriality to anonymous aggregation rules. Our results generalize the impossibility theorem of Arrow (Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York, 1951) and the oligarchy theorem of Gibbard (Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma, University of Chicago, unpublished manuscript,

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Sophisticated preference aggregation

Abstract

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