The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data

Georgios Chortareas, Vassileios Logothetis, Georgios Magkonis, Kalliopi-maria Zekente

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    Abstract

    We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)11-13
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume140
    Early online date11 Jan 2016
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Mar 2016

    Keywords

    • Monetary policy
    • Banking supervision
    • Inflation conservatism
    • Panel-data

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