The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data

Georgios Chortareas; Vassileios Logothetis; Georgios Magkonis; Kalliopi-maria Zekente

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data

Georgios Chortareas, Vassileios Logothetis, Georgios Magkonis, Kalliopi-maria Zekente

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Abstract

We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	11-13
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	140
Early online date	11 Jan 2016
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021
Publication status	Published - Mar 2016

Keywords

Monetary policy
Banking supervision
Inflation conservatism
Panel-data

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10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

MAGKONIS_2016_cright_The effect of Banking Supervision on Central Bank PreferencesAccepted author manuscript (Post-print), 278 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176515005388

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title = "The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data",

abstract = "We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate. ",

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author = "Georgios Chortareas and Vassileios Logothetis and Georgios Magkonis and Kalliopi-maria Zekente",

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AU - Magkonis, Georgios

AU - Zekente, Kalliopi-maria

PY - 2016/3

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KW - Banking supervision

KW - Inflation conservatism

KW - Panel-data

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

M3 - Article

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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