The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data

Georgios Chortareas; Vassileios Logothetis; Georgios Magkonis; Kalliopi-maria Zekente

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data

Georgios Chortareas, Vassileios Logothetis, Georgios Magkonis, Kalliopi-maria Zekente

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Abstract

We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	11-13
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	140
Early online date	11 Jan 2016
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021
Publication status	Published - Mar 2016

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities
SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals

Keywords

Monetary policy
Banking supervision
Inflation conservatism
Panel-data

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10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

MAGKONIS_2016_cright_The effect of Banking Supervision on Central Bank PreferencesAccepted author manuscript (Post-print), 278 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176515005388

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title = "The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data",

abstract = "We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate. ",

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author = "Georgios Chortareas and Vassileios Logothetis and Georgios Magkonis and Kalliopi-maria Zekente",

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AU - Zekente, Kalliopi-maria

PY - 2016/3

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KW - Banking supervision

KW - Inflation conservatism

KW - Panel-data

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

M3 - Article

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data

Abstract

UN SDGs

Keywords

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