TY - JOUR
T1 - Two‐year‐old children but not domestic dogs understand communicative intentions without language, gestures, or gaze
AU - Moore, Richard
AU - Mueller, Bettina
AU - Kaminski, Juliane
AU - Tomasello, Michael
N1 - This is the accepted version of the following article: Moore, R., Mueller, B., Kaminski, J. and Tomasello, M. (2015), Two-year-old children but not domestic dogs understand communicative intentions without language, gestures, or gaze. Developmental Science, 18: 232–242. doi: 10.1111/desc.12206, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/desc.12206/full
PY - 2015/3/1
Y1 - 2015/3/1
N2 - Infants can see someone pointing to one of two buckets and infer that the toy they are seeking is hidden inside. Great apes do not succeed in this task, but, surprisingly, domestic dogs do. However, whether children and dogs understand these communicative acts in the same way is not yet known. To test this possibility, an experimenter did not point, look, or extend any part of her body towards either bucket, but instead lifted and shook one via a centrally pulled rope. She did this either intentionally or accidentally, and did or did not address her act to the subject using ostensive cues. Young 2-year-old children but not dogs understood the experimenter's act in intentional conditions. While ostensive pulling of the rope made no difference to children's success, it actually hindered dogs' performance. We conclude that while human children may be capable of inferring communicative intent from a wide variety actions, so long as these actions are performed intentionally, dogs are likely to be less flexible in this respect. Their understanding of communicative intention may be more dependent upon bodily markers of communicative intent, including gaze, orientation, extended limbs, and vocalizations. This may be because humans have come under selective pressure to develop skills for communicating with absent interlocutors – where bodily co-presence is not possible.
AB - Infants can see someone pointing to one of two buckets and infer that the toy they are seeking is hidden inside. Great apes do not succeed in this task, but, surprisingly, domestic dogs do. However, whether children and dogs understand these communicative acts in the same way is not yet known. To test this possibility, an experimenter did not point, look, or extend any part of her body towards either bucket, but instead lifted and shook one via a centrally pulled rope. She did this either intentionally or accidentally, and did or did not address her act to the subject using ostensive cues. Young 2-year-old children but not dogs understood the experimenter's act in intentional conditions. While ostensive pulling of the rope made no difference to children's success, it actually hindered dogs' performance. We conclude that while human children may be capable of inferring communicative intent from a wide variety actions, so long as these actions are performed intentionally, dogs are likely to be less flexible in this respect. Their understanding of communicative intention may be more dependent upon bodily markers of communicative intent, including gaze, orientation, extended limbs, and vocalizations. This may be because humans have come under selective pressure to develop skills for communicating with absent interlocutors – where bodily co-presence is not possible.
U2 - 10.1111/desc.12206
DO - 10.1111/desc.12206
M3 - Article
SN - 1363-755X
VL - 18
SP - 232
EP - 242
JO - Developmental Science
JF - Developmental Science
IS - 2
ER -