Corruption as a Pillar of Regime Stability in Totalitarian States:

: A Case Study of Iran

Abstract

This thesis explores the role of political corruption in sustaining the stability of totalitarian dictatorships, with a particular focus on Iran as a case study.
The study begins by analysing Iran's power structure and the organisational structure of its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). It then compares the Iranian regime to Friedrich and Brzezinski's (1965) characteristics of totalitarian systems, ultimately confirming Iran's classification as a totalitarian dictatorship
Utilising a qualitative approach that includes documentary analysis and in-depth interviews with individuals knowledgeable about the workings of SOEs in Iran, the study unveils how these enterprises serve as vehicles for political corruption. Subsequently, this thesis identifies and introduces the concept of oppressor elites—a new class in Iran, whose members, through their intertwined roles in political corruption and repression, underpin the stability of the totalitarian regime.
Empirical data presented in this research illustrates how the Iranian totalitarian regime has used political corruption to recruit, brainwash, train, and motivate the oppressor elite to commit crimes against humanity—including systematic rape, extrajudicial killings, and torture—against dissidents, as a means to suppress them and prevent the regime's downfall.
The findings of this thesis underscore that political corruption within Iranian SOEs has not only bolstered the stability of the Iranian regime but also serves as the primary obstacle for democratic change in Iran.
This thesis posits that political corruption has the potential to enhance the stability of a totalitarian dictatorship, particularly if the dictator establishes this political corruption as an informal institution to solidify and govern relations between themselves and the oppressor elite. By offering immunity and the privilege to partake in political corruption, the oppressor elite, in turn, enforce the regime’s suppression tactics.
This research explores how totalitarian regimes, exemplified by Iran, may intentionally deepen societal poverty to boost their recruitment of new members for the oppressor elite. This strategic manipulation compels individuals in dire circumstances to join the oppressor elite, a move critical for stifling societal dissent. As the number of oppressor elite increases, so does the regime’s capacity for stricter control. To implement this strategy of recruitment, political corruption plays a vital role for the totalitarian dictator, not merely to cultivate but also to control and command the oppressor elite, securing their allegiance and effectiveness in suppressing any opposition.
In conclusion, by elucidating the critical role of oppressor elites and the strategic use of SOEs in perpetuating political corruption and repression, this thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that sustain totalitarian dictatorships.

Date of Award	11 Nov 2024
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	University of Portsmouth
Supervisor	Branislav Hock (Supervisor), David Shepherd (Supervisor) & John Akerele (Supervisor)