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Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

  • Eberhard Feess
  • Christian Grund
  • Markus Walzl
  • Ansgar Wohlschlegel
We investigate the choice between posted prices and auctions of competing sellers with private valuations. Assuming that buyers face higher hassle costs in auctions, we show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers offer posted prices rather than auctions if and only if they have a sufficiently high reservation value. Posted prices sell with lower probability but yield a larger revenue in case of trade. Using an empirical strategy to compare revenues of posted prices and auctions that takes selling probabilities explicitly into account, we find our theoretical predictions supported by data from eBay auctions on ticket sales for the EURO 2008 European Football Championship.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Early online date11 Aug 2019
Publication statusEarly online - 11 Aug 2019


  • Revision_final

    Accepted author manuscript (Post-print), 1.46 MB, PDF document

    Due to publisher’s copyright restrictions, this document is not freely available to download from this website until: 11/08/21

    Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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