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Corporate environmental disclosure and earnings management -the moderating role of corporate governance structures

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  • Ali Gerged
  • Khaldoon Albitar
  • Lara Al-Haddad
Our study examines whether internal corporate governance (CG) mechanisms moderate the relationship between a firm's engagement in Corporate Environmental Disclosure (CED) and Earnings Management (EM) practices in an emerging economy. Using a sample of 100 Jordanian listed firms from 2010 to 2014 (i.e., 500 firm-year observations), our findings reveal that while the relationship between CED and earnings manipulations is negative, the links between CG arrangements and EM are heterogeneous in that they might have either reduced or increased earnings manipulations in Jordan. Furthermore, some CG structures, such as board size, managerial and institutional ownership structures, have moderating effects on the CED-EM nexus. Our research highlights the significance of considering internal CG mechanisms to explain the link between CED and EM in the context of emerging economies. Our results help to explain and place into setting the earlier mixed results on the association between CED and earnings manipulations and most importantly add to the debate about whether CG structures detrimental to the CED-EM nexus. This study allows for a richer understanding of how managers respond to CED initiatives and CG reforms in relation to reducing earnings manipulations, which offers policymakers, board directors and managers, a set of context-specific recommendations related to the crucial need for more concerted efforts to ensure corporate sustainability in emerging economies.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages22
JournalInternational Journal of Finance and Economics
Early online date18 Feb 2021
DOIs
Publication statusEarly online - 18 Feb 2021

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