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Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment. / An, Jiafu; Armitage, Seth; Hou, Wenxuan; Liu, Xianda.

In: Accounting & Finance, 20.08.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

An, J, Armitage, S, Hou, W & Liu, X 2020, 'Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment', Accounting & Finance.

APA

An, J., Armitage, S., Hou, W., & Liu, X. (Accepted/In press). Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment. Accounting & Finance.

Vancouver

An J, Armitage S, Hou W, Liu X. Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment. Accounting & Finance. 2020 Aug 20.

Author

An, Jiafu ; Armitage, Seth ; Hou, Wenxuan ; Liu, Xianda. / Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment. In: Accounting & Finance. 2020.

Bibtex

@article{cc9317d14a264d5293482754c828c314,
title = "Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment",
abstract = "This paper studies the impact on firm value of tighter checks on bureaucrats{\textquoteright} behavior. We use as a natural experiment the revision in 2015 by the Communist Party of China (CPC) of its regulations on disciplinary actions. We document a positive and substantial market reaction following this unexpected policy change that tightened and formalized constraints on bureaucrats{\textquoteright} misconduct. The impact is less pronounced for firms with state ownership, firms having CEOs or directors with CPC membership, and firms that operate in provinces with better institutional quality. The subsequent revision in 2018 that enforced political obedience is not associated with a positive market reaction. ",
keywords = "embargoover12",
author = "Jiafu An and Seth Armitage and Wenxuan Hou and Xianda Liu",
note = "24 month embargo - Wiley This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [FULL CITE], which has been published in final form at [Link to final article using the DOI]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.",
year = "2020",
month = aug,
day = "20",
language = "English",
journal = "Accounting & Finance",
issn = "0810-5391",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment

AU - An, Jiafu

AU - Armitage, Seth

AU - Hou, Wenxuan

AU - Liu, Xianda

N1 - 24 month embargo - Wiley This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [FULL CITE], which has been published in final form at [Link to final article using the DOI]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.

PY - 2020/8/20

Y1 - 2020/8/20

N2 - This paper studies the impact on firm value of tighter checks on bureaucrats’ behavior. We use as a natural experiment the revision in 2015 by the Communist Party of China (CPC) of its regulations on disciplinary actions. We document a positive and substantial market reaction following this unexpected policy change that tightened and formalized constraints on bureaucrats’ misconduct. The impact is less pronounced for firms with state ownership, firms having CEOs or directors with CPC membership, and firms that operate in provinces with better institutional quality. The subsequent revision in 2018 that enforced political obedience is not associated with a positive market reaction.

AB - This paper studies the impact on firm value of tighter checks on bureaucrats’ behavior. We use as a natural experiment the revision in 2015 by the Communist Party of China (CPC) of its regulations on disciplinary actions. We document a positive and substantial market reaction following this unexpected policy change that tightened and formalized constraints on bureaucrats’ misconduct. The impact is less pronounced for firms with state ownership, firms having CEOs or directors with CPC membership, and firms that operate in provinces with better institutional quality. The subsequent revision in 2018 that enforced political obedience is not associated with a positive market reaction.

KW - embargoover12

M3 - Article

JO - Accounting & Finance

JF - Accounting & Finance

SN - 0810-5391

ER -

ID: 22518314