Skip to content

Lying for others: the impact of agency on misreporting

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

We extend the experimental design by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to examine lying behavior on behalf of others, eliminating all possible incentives apart from social preferences. We compare the prevalence of misreporting in situations where the monetary gain either goes to the decision-maker or to an anonymous other participant. Overall we observe lower levels of lying for others compared to for oneself, however, a significant number of participants were willing to lie to increase another participant’s payoff, with no economic incentive to do so. We find no partial lying for others but rather two extremes: either complete honesty or maximal lying.
Original languageEnglish
Article number109677
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume198
Early online date27 Nov 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2021

Documents

  • LUHAN_2020_cright_Lying for Others - The Impact of Agency on Misreporting

    Accepted author manuscript (Post-print), 322 KB, PDF document

    Due to publisher’s copyright restrictions, this document is not freely available to download from this website until: 27/05/22

    Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

Relations Get citation (various referencing formats)

ID: 24751699