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Lying for others: the impact of agency on misreporting

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Lying for others: the impact of agency on misreporting. / Buckle, Georgia Elizabeth; Füllbrunn, Sascha; Luhan, Wolfgang.

In: Economics Letters, 27.11.2020.

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@article{c6ffea61267a4f8cbff7b74489c356f1,
title = "Lying for others: the impact of agency on misreporting",
abstract = "We extend the experimental design by Fischbacher and F{\"o}llmi-Heusi (2013) to examine lying behavior on behalf of others, eliminating all possible incentives apart from social preferences. We compare the prevalence of misreporting in situations where the monetary gain either goes to the decision-maker or to an anonymous other participant. Overall we observe lower levels of lying for others compared to for oneself, however, a significant number of participants were willing to lie to increase another participant{\textquoteright}s payoff, with no economic incentive to do so. We find no partial lying for others but rather two extremes: either complete honesty or maximal lying. ",
keywords = "lying aversion, decision making for others, prosocial lying, experiment, embargoover12",
author = "Buckle, {Georgia Elizabeth} and Sascha F{\"u}llbrunn and Wolfgang Luhan",
year = "2020",
month = nov,
day = "27",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109677",
language = "English",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Lying for others: the impact of agency on misreporting

AU - Buckle, Georgia Elizabeth

AU - Füllbrunn, Sascha

AU - Luhan, Wolfgang

PY - 2020/11/27

Y1 - 2020/11/27

N2 - We extend the experimental design by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to examine lying behavior on behalf of others, eliminating all possible incentives apart from social preferences. We compare the prevalence of misreporting in situations where the monetary gain either goes to the decision-maker or to an anonymous other participant. Overall we observe lower levels of lying for others compared to for oneself, however, a significant number of participants were willing to lie to increase another participant’s payoff, with no economic incentive to do so. We find no partial lying for others but rather two extremes: either complete honesty or maximal lying.

AB - We extend the experimental design by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to examine lying behavior on behalf of others, eliminating all possible incentives apart from social preferences. We compare the prevalence of misreporting in situations where the monetary gain either goes to the decision-maker or to an anonymous other participant. Overall we observe lower levels of lying for others compared to for oneself, however, a significant number of participants were willing to lie to increase another participant’s payoff, with no economic incentive to do so. We find no partial lying for others but rather two extremes: either complete honesty or maximal lying.

KW - lying aversion

KW - decision making for others

KW - prosocial lying

KW - experiment

KW - embargoover12

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109677

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109677

M3 - Article

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

M1 - 109677

ER -

ID: 24751699