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Preventing collusive tendering in public markets – the case of framework agreements

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Anti-competitive activities, like bid-rigging, undermine the main objectives of public procurement, such as value for money and efficiency in the procurement process. The magnitude of the problem in Europe is demonstrated by the frequency of bid-rigging cases. As it has already been underlined in the literature, bid-rigging may arise particularly in the context of framework agreements, which are constantly gaining ground in public procurement and are rather popular in Nothern Europe. In light of the framework agreements’ popularity in Europe and their vulnerability to collusion, this article identifies the elements of a framework agreement that make coordination feasible and bid-rigging attractive to the suppliers admitted to the framework agreement. This article also makes a number of suggestions for preventing the problem of collusion in framework agreements, with the aim of introducing new design features that will significantly reduce the scope for collusive outcomes within the procurement function.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages31
JournalEuropean Competition Journal
Early online date26 Feb 2020
DOIs
Publication statusEarly online - 26 Feb 2020

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  • Giosa AAM

    Rights statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the European Competition Journal on 26/02/2020, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17441056.2020.1732681.

    Accepted author manuscript (Post-print), 1.04 MB, PDF document

    Due to publisher’s copyright restrictions, this document is not freely available to download from this website until: 26/08/21

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