Skip to content
Back to outputs

Regulation in the market for education and optimal choice of curriculum

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Standard

Regulation in the market for education and optimal choice of curriculum. / Eisenkopf, Gerald; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar.

In: Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 71, No. 1, 2012, p. 53-65.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Eisenkopf, G & Wohlschlegel, A 2012, 'Regulation in the market for education and optimal choice of curriculum', Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 53-65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2011.09.001

APA

Eisenkopf, G., & Wohlschlegel, A. (2012). Regulation in the market for education and optimal choice of curriculum. Journal of Urban Economics, 71(1), 53-65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2011.09.001

Vancouver

Eisenkopf G, Wohlschlegel A. Regulation in the market for education and optimal choice of curriculum. Journal of Urban Economics. 2012;71(1):53-65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2011.09.001

Author

Eisenkopf, Gerald ; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar. / Regulation in the market for education and optimal choice of curriculum. In: Journal of Urban Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 71, No. 1. pp. 53-65.

Bibtex

@article{349d91c3eec944268c785729a9d1e11b,
title = "Regulation in the market for education and optimal choice of curriculum",
abstract = "We analyze educational institutions{\textquoteright} incentives to set up demanding or lax curricula in duopolistic markets for education with endogenous enrolment of students. We assume that there is a positive externality from student achievement to the local economy. Comparing the case of regulated tuition fees with an unregulated market, we identify the following inefficiencies: Under regulated tuition fees schools will set up inefficiently lax curricula in an attempt to please low-quality students even if schools internalize some of the externality. On the other hand, unregulated schools set up excessively differentiated curricula in order to relax competition in tuition fees. Deregulation gets more attractive if a larger fraction of the externality is internalized.",
author = "Gerald Eisenkopf and Ansgar Wohlschlegel",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1016/j.jue.2011.09.001",
language = "English",
volume = "71",
pages = "53--65",
journal = "Journal of Urban Economics",
issn = "0094-1190",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Regulation in the market for education and optimal choice of curriculum

AU - Eisenkopf, Gerald

AU - Wohlschlegel, Ansgar

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - We analyze educational institutions’ incentives to set up demanding or lax curricula in duopolistic markets for education with endogenous enrolment of students. We assume that there is a positive externality from student achievement to the local economy. Comparing the case of regulated tuition fees with an unregulated market, we identify the following inefficiencies: Under regulated tuition fees schools will set up inefficiently lax curricula in an attempt to please low-quality students even if schools internalize some of the externality. On the other hand, unregulated schools set up excessively differentiated curricula in order to relax competition in tuition fees. Deregulation gets more attractive if a larger fraction of the externality is internalized.

AB - We analyze educational institutions’ incentives to set up demanding or lax curricula in duopolistic markets for education with endogenous enrolment of students. We assume that there is a positive externality from student achievement to the local economy. Comparing the case of regulated tuition fees with an unregulated market, we identify the following inefficiencies: Under regulated tuition fees schools will set up inefficiently lax curricula in an attempt to please low-quality students even if schools internalize some of the externality. On the other hand, unregulated schools set up excessively differentiated curricula in order to relax competition in tuition fees. Deregulation gets more attractive if a larger fraction of the externality is internalized.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jue.2011.09.001

DO - 10.1016/j.jue.2011.09.001

M3 - Article

VL - 71

SP - 53

EP - 65

JO - Journal of Urban Economics

JF - Journal of Urban Economics

SN - 0094-1190

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 185421