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Reimbursement schemes for hospitals: the impact of case and firm characteristics

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Reimbursement schemes for hospitals : the impact of case and firm characteristics. / Feess, Eberhard; Müller, Helge; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar.

In: Applied Economics, 10.11.2018.

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Feess, Eberhard ; Müller, Helge ; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar. / Reimbursement schemes for hospitals : the impact of case and firm characteristics. In: Applied Economics. 2018.

Bibtex

@article{444e92ace91d4bc79a93d8ea3ffb5996,
title = "Reimbursement schemes for hospitals: the impact of case and firm characteristics",
abstract = "We contribute to the debate on high-powered versus low-powered incentives inregulation by studying their heterogeneous impacts on different subpopulations,using data from the introduction of a high-powered prospective payment system(PPS) for hospital reimbursement in Germany. While no overall effect on qualityor cost saving is found, our results support hypotheses drawn from an incentive and selection perspective: PPS reduces the length of stay of older relative to younger patients, of more severe relative to less severe cases, and in smaller relative to larger hospitals. Hospitals which adopted PPS earlier provide higher quality under PPS as proxied by the case-specific readmission rate. Our study also contributes to the health economic literature on hospital reimbursement as our data permits us to identify the treatment effect via different timings of adoption of PPS and to use a more accurate quality measure by following patients even when readmitted to other hospitals.",
keywords = "Hospital reimbursement, high-powered incentives, readmission, length of stay, embargoover12",
author = "Eberhard Feess and Helge M{\"u}ller and Ansgar Wohlschlegel",
year = "2018",
month = nov,
day = "10",
doi = "10.1080/00036846.2018.1528334",
language = "English",
journal = "Applied Economics",
issn = "0003-6846",
publisher = "Routledge",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reimbursement schemes for hospitals

T2 - the impact of case and firm characteristics

AU - Feess, Eberhard

AU - Müller, Helge

AU - Wohlschlegel, Ansgar

PY - 2018/11/10

Y1 - 2018/11/10

N2 - We contribute to the debate on high-powered versus low-powered incentives inregulation by studying their heterogeneous impacts on different subpopulations,using data from the introduction of a high-powered prospective payment system(PPS) for hospital reimbursement in Germany. While no overall effect on qualityor cost saving is found, our results support hypotheses drawn from an incentive and selection perspective: PPS reduces the length of stay of older relative to younger patients, of more severe relative to less severe cases, and in smaller relative to larger hospitals. Hospitals which adopted PPS earlier provide higher quality under PPS as proxied by the case-specific readmission rate. Our study also contributes to the health economic literature on hospital reimbursement as our data permits us to identify the treatment effect via different timings of adoption of PPS and to use a more accurate quality measure by following patients even when readmitted to other hospitals.

AB - We contribute to the debate on high-powered versus low-powered incentives inregulation by studying their heterogeneous impacts on different subpopulations,using data from the introduction of a high-powered prospective payment system(PPS) for hospital reimbursement in Germany. While no overall effect on qualityor cost saving is found, our results support hypotheses drawn from an incentive and selection perspective: PPS reduces the length of stay of older relative to younger patients, of more severe relative to less severe cases, and in smaller relative to larger hospitals. Hospitals which adopted PPS earlier provide higher quality under PPS as proxied by the case-specific readmission rate. Our study also contributes to the health economic literature on hospital reimbursement as our data permits us to identify the treatment effect via different timings of adoption of PPS and to use a more accurate quality measure by following patients even when readmitted to other hospitals.

KW - Hospital reimbursement

KW - high-powered incentives

KW - readmission

KW - length of stay

KW - embargoover12

U2 - 10.1080/00036846.2018.1528334

DO - 10.1080/00036846.2018.1528334

M3 - Article

JO - Applied Economics

JF - Applied Economics

SN - 0003-6846

ER -

ID: 12245760