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Responsibility and limited liability in decision making for others: an experimental consideration

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Responsibility and limited liability in decision making for others : an experimental consideration. / Füllbrunn, Sascha; Luhan, Wolfgang.

In: Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 77, 102186, 03.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Füllbrunn, S & Luhan, W 2020, 'Responsibility and limited liability in decision making for others: an experimental consideration', Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 77, 102186. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.06.009

APA

Füllbrunn, S., & Luhan, W. (2020). Responsibility and limited liability in decision making for others: an experimental consideration. Journal of Economic Psychology, 77, [102186]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.06.009

Vancouver

Füllbrunn S, Luhan W. Responsibility and limited liability in decision making for others: an experimental consideration. Journal of Economic Psychology. 2020 Mar;77. 102186. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.06.009

Author

Füllbrunn, Sascha ; Luhan, Wolfgang. / Responsibility and limited liability in decision making for others : an experimental consideration. In: Journal of Economic Psychology. 2020 ; Vol. 77.

Bibtex

@article{09c28530491f49ebadea2f1b8408efd2,
title = "Responsibility and limited liability in decision making for others: an experimental consideration",
abstract = "Agency in financial markets has been claimed to foster excessive risk taking, ultimately leading to bubble formation. The main driving factor appears to be the skewed bonus system for agents who invest other people{\textquoteright}s money. The resulting excessive risk taking on behalf of others would imply that such bonus systems crowds out responsible decision making for others in order to serve egoistic self-interest. To test this implication, we conduct laboratory experiments comparing decision making for others with and without such a bonus system. First, we show that, in the absence of bonus systems, decision makers invested significantly less for others than for themselves. Second, we show that limited liable decision makers—participating only in gains but not in losses—invested substantially more for others than for themselves. Hence, our results suggest that indeed limited liability outweighs responsibility.",
keywords = "financial decision making, responsibility, limited liability, decision making for others, risk preferences, experiment, embargoover12",
author = "Sascha F{\"u}llbrunn and Wolfgang Luhan",
year = "2020",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.joep.2019.06.009",
language = "English",
volume = "77",
journal = "Journal of Economic Psychology",
issn = "0167-4870",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Responsibility and limited liability in decision making for others

T2 - an experimental consideration

AU - Füllbrunn, Sascha

AU - Luhan, Wolfgang

PY - 2020/3

Y1 - 2020/3

N2 - Agency in financial markets has been claimed to foster excessive risk taking, ultimately leading to bubble formation. The main driving factor appears to be the skewed bonus system for agents who invest other people’s money. The resulting excessive risk taking on behalf of others would imply that such bonus systems crowds out responsible decision making for others in order to serve egoistic self-interest. To test this implication, we conduct laboratory experiments comparing decision making for others with and without such a bonus system. First, we show that, in the absence of bonus systems, decision makers invested significantly less for others than for themselves. Second, we show that limited liable decision makers—participating only in gains but not in losses—invested substantially more for others than for themselves. Hence, our results suggest that indeed limited liability outweighs responsibility.

AB - Agency in financial markets has been claimed to foster excessive risk taking, ultimately leading to bubble formation. The main driving factor appears to be the skewed bonus system for agents who invest other people’s money. The resulting excessive risk taking on behalf of others would imply that such bonus systems crowds out responsible decision making for others in order to serve egoistic self-interest. To test this implication, we conduct laboratory experiments comparing decision making for others with and without such a bonus system. First, we show that, in the absence of bonus systems, decision makers invested significantly less for others than for themselves. Second, we show that limited liable decision makers—participating only in gains but not in losses—invested substantially more for others than for themselves. Hence, our results suggest that indeed limited liability outweighs responsibility.

KW - financial decision making

KW - responsibility

KW - limited liability

KW - decision making for others

KW - risk preferences

KW - experiment

KW - embargoover12

U2 - 10.1016/j.joep.2019.06.009

DO - 10.1016/j.joep.2019.06.009

M3 - Article

VL - 77

JO - Journal of Economic Psychology

JF - Journal of Economic Psychology

SN - 0167-4870

M1 - 102186

ER -

ID: 14682058