Skip to content
Back to outputs

The bundling of foreign bribery cases

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Standard

The bundling of foreign bribery cases. / Hock, Branislav.

Tilburg University, 2018. (TILEC Discussion Papers).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Harvard

Hock, B 2018 'The bundling of foreign bribery cases' TILEC Discussion Papers, Tilburg University. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3157532

APA

Hock, B. (2018). The bundling of foreign bribery cases. (TILEC Discussion Papers). Tilburg University. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3157532

Vancouver

Hock B. The bundling of foreign bribery cases. Tilburg University. 2018 Apr 7. (TILEC Discussion Papers). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3157532

Author

Hock, Branislav. / The bundling of foreign bribery cases. Tilburg University, 2018. (TILEC Discussion Papers).

Bibtex

@techreport{e628b51641044767b20be75a466e7b4b,
title = "The bundling of foreign bribery cases",
abstract = "This article is the first that discusses how national enforcement authorities have been using bundling, meaning tying or rolling up a number of things together, to settle with corporations over multiple bribery allegations. These settlements rely on some allegedly illegal acts that defendants would likely reject to settle if they were to decide on them separately. In this context, our understanding of what constitutes and should constitute a foreign bribery case is limited. The article shows that anti-bribery bundling is part of a broad trend that allows, in some cases, the United States (US) enforcement authorities to enforce foreign anti-bribery laws extraterritorially. This trend is illustrated on cases in which the US enforcement authorities punished companies headquartered in Europe for their operations outside the US. The article concludes with a discussion of the significant implications the extraterritoriality of bundling has for foreign anti-bribery law theory and policy.",
keywords = "extraterritoriality, bundling, foriegn bribery, corruption, enforcement, settlement, case",
author = "Branislav Hock",
year = "2018",
month = apr,
day = "7",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.3157532",
language = "English",
series = "TILEC Discussion Papers",
publisher = "Tilburg University",
address = "Netherlands",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Tilburg University",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - The bundling of foreign bribery cases

AU - Hock, Branislav

PY - 2018/4/7

Y1 - 2018/4/7

N2 - This article is the first that discusses how national enforcement authorities have been using bundling, meaning tying or rolling up a number of things together, to settle with corporations over multiple bribery allegations. These settlements rely on some allegedly illegal acts that defendants would likely reject to settle if they were to decide on them separately. In this context, our understanding of what constitutes and should constitute a foreign bribery case is limited. The article shows that anti-bribery bundling is part of a broad trend that allows, in some cases, the United States (US) enforcement authorities to enforce foreign anti-bribery laws extraterritorially. This trend is illustrated on cases in which the US enforcement authorities punished companies headquartered in Europe for their operations outside the US. The article concludes with a discussion of the significant implications the extraterritoriality of bundling has for foreign anti-bribery law theory and policy.

AB - This article is the first that discusses how national enforcement authorities have been using bundling, meaning tying or rolling up a number of things together, to settle with corporations over multiple bribery allegations. These settlements rely on some allegedly illegal acts that defendants would likely reject to settle if they were to decide on them separately. In this context, our understanding of what constitutes and should constitute a foreign bribery case is limited. The article shows that anti-bribery bundling is part of a broad trend that allows, in some cases, the United States (US) enforcement authorities to enforce foreign anti-bribery laws extraterritorially. This trend is illustrated on cases in which the US enforcement authorities punished companies headquartered in Europe for their operations outside the US. The article concludes with a discussion of the significant implications the extraterritoriality of bundling has for foreign anti-bribery law theory and policy.

KW - extraterritoriality

KW - bundling

KW - foriegn bribery

KW - corruption

KW - enforcement

KW - settlement

KW - case

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.3157532

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.3157532

M3 - Discussion paper

T3 - TILEC Discussion Papers

BT - The bundling of foreign bribery cases

PB - Tilburg University

ER -

ID: 10332572