An Examination of the Relationship between the
Police Service of Northern Ireland and the
Orange Order since 2001

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degree of Professional Doctorate of Criminal Justice Studies of the University of
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Abstract

This thesis is an examination of the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the Orange Order in Northern Ireland since 2001.

A series of twenty one semi structured interviews took place with three distinct interview groups; the PSNI’s first three permanent Chief Constables, a number of its senior officers, and senior members of the Orange Order. The subsequent data was analysed using a qualitative paradigm.

Despite the extensive amount of literature regarding policing, parading, and the loyal orders in Northern Ireland, this study is believed to be the first that asks the question, ‘What is the current relationship between policing and Orangeism since 2001?’ It is also believed to be the first study that captures the views of senior members of both the PSNI and the Orange Order in such detail and regarding a single issue.

The literature review puts the current relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order into the context of the Orange Order’s historic relationship with the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). It describes how policing changed from its early non-partisan form to become closely entwined with unionism and orangeism. Until political and policing changes gradually put distance between these groups. These changes culminated in, but were no means finished by, the formation of the PSNI.

The thesis considers the relationship at both the local and organisational levels, the various factors that influence this, including the Parades Commission, the rural and
urban “divide” in the Orange Order and the legacy of the RUC. It suggests that the local relationship is a pragmatic and broadly positive one driven by a need to manage large numbers of peaceful and lawful parades. The organisational relationship is more difficult to characterise but it is one more prone to the influence of events and faces a number of challenges, some of which are beyond the gift of either organisation.

The thesis concludes with a number of recommendations.
Declaration

Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award.

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<tr>
<td>ABOD</td>
<td>Apprentice Boys of Derry</td>
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<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNR</td>
<td>Catholic, Nationalist and Republican</td>
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<td>DMSU</td>
<td>Divisional Mobile Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
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<td>GAA</td>
<td>Gaelic Athletic Association</td>
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<td>GOLI</td>
<td>Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland</td>
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<td>PSNI</td>
<td>Police Service of Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>PUL</td>
<td>Protestant, Unionist and Loyalist</td>
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<td>RAP</td>
<td>Royal Arch Purple</td>
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<td>RBP</td>
<td>Royal Black Preceptory</td>
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<td>RIC</td>
<td>Royal Irish Constabulary</td>
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<td>RIR</td>
<td>Royal Irish Regiment</td>
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<td>RUC</td>
<td>Royal Ulster Constabulary</td>
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<td>UDR</td>
<td>Ulster Defence Regiment</td>
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<td>UFF</td>
<td>Ulster Freedom Fighters</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>Ulster Special Constabulary</td>
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<td>UVF</td>
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Introduction

This thesis is an examination of the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the Orange Order since 2001. The researcher is a serving PSNI Superintendent with operational experience of managing Orange parades and the daily relationship with orangeism. Like many from the researcher’s protestant and unionist background he has distant and historic connections to orangeism.

The genesis of the thesis reflects a number of areas of professional interest for the researcher, policing disorder, the PSNI relationship with loyalism and also how the PSNI’s “policing with the community” strategy is operationalised in challenging environments. It is also the researcher’s view that the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order is important. This is evidenced in the frequent and sometimes extensive deployments of PSNI to manage parades (Belfast Telegraph 19/05/14), and the damage that contentious parades do to community relationships and Northern Ireland’s fragile reputation and economy (Belfast Telegraph, 05/07/14). It is however not the purpose of these thesis to offer a solution to the parading issue. If such a solution exists it is more complex and much wider than the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order.

The thesis explores the relationship between two distinct organisations. The PSNI is approximately 6800 (PSNI, 02/05/15) sworn officers strong. It was formed on 4th November 2001 as a result of the Northern Ireland peace process and the Independent Commission on Policing In Northern Ireland (Patten) Report. PSNI is distinguished as a United Kingdom police service by both its governance arrangements and the operational challenges of historic community tensions and paramilitary violence. Due to severe financial pressures the PSNI is reducing in size
and undergoing fundamental restructuring (Northern Ireland Policing Board [NIPB], 2/10/14).

In June 2014 the Northern Ireland Policing Board appointed George Hamilton Chief Constable (UTV, 29/05/14). Hamilton succeeded two Chief Constables appointed from England and is the PSNI’s first permanently appointed Northern Irish Chief Officer. In the course of the research Hamilton has indicated that he intends to put the relationship with the Orange Order on a stronger footing. His first two summers as Chief Constable while far from incident free provide a reasonable backdrop against which to achieve this aim.

Although the Orange Order is a worldwide body (Evangelical Truth, ND), its Irish branch is primarily explored in this thesis. The Order’s precise size is unknown but it is likely to have between 25,000 – 30,000 members across Ireland. Formed in 1795, this Protestant fraternal order exists to defend Protestantism, along with its historical and cultural principals. The Orange Order uses parading to express much of its heritage, christian witness and claim to britishness. It is the largest of the Protestant fraternal orders and also has a small representation in the Irish Republic. It is governed by the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland and a supporting 12 County (4 counties are in the Irish Republic) and 125 District structure. The real power base of this democratic organisation is the private lodges (Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland [GOLI], n.d.). No matter where an Orangeman sits in the hierarchy each remains a member of a private lodge. There are 1334 private lodges approximately. (GOLI, n.d.).

The number of contentious parades in Northern Ireland is extremely small (Parades Commission [PC], 2014, p. 3), and this figure includes the weekly Drumcree protest parades that have taken place since 1998 (PC, 2014, p. 8). In July 2013 the
Parades Commission prevented three North Belfast lodges, the Ligoniel Combine, completing their return route on the 12th of July past the Ardoyne shop-fronts (BBC News, 10/07/13), an interface between local Catholic and Protestant communities. There have been nightly protests about this by the Orange Order since 2013, which have required extensive PSNI deployments. At time of writing the Twaddell situation remains unresolved and is a key factor in the current PSNI and Orange Order relationship (GOLI, 05/11/2013). The 2015 12th July Parades Commission determination replicated that of 2013 and 2014.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter reviews the literature on the relationship between Irish policing and orangeism and highlights an increasing distance between the two bodies, particularly from the end of the Stormont era. The literature review also identifies a clear lacuna in knowledge of this relationship. The second chapter presents the methodological choices made in the thesis and the selection of a qualitative paradigm. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 consider the PSNI and Orange Order relationship from the perspective of three sources. These are Chief Constables, senior PSNI officers and senior Orangemen. The sixth and final chapter concludes the thesis and makes some proposals as to how the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order could be improved.

The challenges of improving the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order are complex, not least because it is influenced by many factors outside the control of both organisations. Indeed simply moving to a point where the Orange Order and the PSNI can deal with the annual challenges of parades and Parades Commission determinations requires a new way of doing business. One of the challenges in changing this relationship is that it exists within the context of the PSNI’s relationship with the Protestant, Unionist and Loyalist (PUL)
and also the Catholic, Nationalist and Republican (CNR) communities. These challenges accepted if this thesis is the basis for a constructive conversation between policing and orangeism it will have been worthwhile.
Chapter 1 - Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

There is no shortage of material, both academic and grey dealing with the Northern Ireland “Troubles” (Neumann, 2003, p. 366). Among this wealth of writing, policing and the Orange Order receive considerable attention, as does the matter of parades and their impacts. Interestingly this material does not extend to criminological consideration of the “Troubles” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 191) (Ellison & Mulcahy, 2001, p. 243), and it is suggested that criminology’s serious academic study of the Troubles is a relatively new phenomenon and primarily from a historical perspective (James W McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p.35). In contrast, the post-ceasefire period has attracted diminishing academic attention, particularly of policing, which for a considerable period had been viewed as one of the causes of the “Troubles” and its reformation part of the conflict’s solution (Ellison, 2007, p. 244). What unites the pre and post-ceasefire period is the absence of any academic engagement with the relationship between the Orange Order and the PSNI, or indeed the Orange Order and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).

The above assessment is based on a search of academic databases using consistent search terms (Appendix A), and also a review of print and online media. These search terms cover the period of Irish policing from the Royal Irish Constabulary’s formation in 1837, and include RUC and PSNI, the main Protestant Orders; the Orange Order, the Royal Black Preceptory (RBP), the Apprentice Boys of Derry (ABOD) and the Independent Orange Order. The search terms did not include the Association of Loyal Orangewomen (McCausland, 2010) or Junior Grand Orange Lodge, as neither body has a distinct relationship with policing. In addition the Parades Commission was a separate search term due to its role in determining
sensitive parade routes. Although Orangeism exists in England and Scotland, these bodies are separate from the Grand Lodge of Ireland and neither has a history, significance, or contemporary influence to make comparison with Irish orangeism relevant to this study.

Existing literature does provide themes from which reasonable deductions can be made about the relationship between the Orange Order and police in Ireland, particularly during the RUC’s existence (1922 – 2001). There are fewer themes that can be deduced from the material regarding the RIC or the PSNI. This is likely due to the historical context of each organisation. The richest source of material regarding the PSNI and Orange Order relationship is the Orange Order’s newspaper, the “Orange Standard”. Other academic material provides detail of wider political changes that altered the relationship between unionism and Government, creating a very different political environment in which the Orange Order had to operate and relate to both State and police. These changes, among them the imposition of direct rule in 1972, the Anglo Irish Agreement of 1985, the 1994 and 1997 ceasefires, and the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998 shifted the balance of power from unionist dominance (Pehrson, Gheorghiu, & Ireland, 2012, p. 112) (Southern, 2007, p. 166) (Wilson & Stapleton, 2005, p. 635) to the current situation where an increasingly confident nationalist community (A. White, 2007, p. 29) is electorally represented in a power-sharing administration.

1.2 Chapter Structure

The chapter is divided into sections. First, the Orange Order’s initial hundred years, its uneasy relationship with the State (Bryan, 1997, p. 380) and the creation of the RIC as a non-partisan force (Griffin, 1999, p. 26), will be examined. This is
followed by a discussion of the “golden era” of Orangeism and the tripartite relationship between the RUC, Orange Order and the Stormont administration. Third, the period of transition from Stormont to direct rule will be considered and subsequently the post 1972 “Troubles” period when the RUC and Orange Order relationship was influenced by political change, police professionalisation and internal changes in Orangeism. The final sections of the Chapter will examine the impact of the Drumcree dispute, the creation of the Parades Commission, and the Patten Report. It will conclude with a consideration of the Orange Order’s reaction to the creation of the PSNI, and assess their relationship with the new service as it delivers civic policing and upholds the determinations of the Parades Commission.

1.3 The Birth of Orangeism and Foundations of Irish Policing.

The Orange Order was founded in 1795 following the Battle of the Diamond on September 21st (GOLI, n.d.) (Batista, 2009, p. 7). This was in effect a skirmish between Catholic Defenders and Protestant Peep O’Day Boys (Brewer & Higgins, 1998, p. 45). At the conclusion of this “battle” the victorious Protestants went to the home of James Sloan to form a defensive organisation (Bryan, 2000, p. 32 & 33), the Orange Society (Kennaway, 2007, p. 3) later to be known as the Loyal Orange Institution of Ireland. A Grand Lodge of Ulster was formed in 1796 (Bryan, 2000, p. 35). Prior to 1795 a tradition of Protestants banding together already existed. Kennaway (2007, p. 2) describes the formation of the Orange Institution as a coming together of various groups, such the Boyne and Enniskillen Societies, formed to keep alive the Williamite tradition. The type of parading which was to become intrinsic to the Orange Order predates their formation and was one element of the yearly celebrations of William III’s birthday since 1690 (Bryan, 2000, p. 31).
The genesis of the Orange Order in communal strife provides an instructive backdrop to its first century and early relationship with law and order which was still local and without national structure (Malcolm, 2006, p. 18). The Order struggled to attain early respectability. It drew its membership predominantly from the labouring and artisan classes. The gentry and professionals were reluctant to join (Dewar, 1967, p. 102) (GOLI, n.d.), possibly on account of orangeism’s links to Protestant agrarian societies and the agrarian troubles of the period (Roberts, 1971, p. 269). Bryan points to “respectability” challenges for the Orange Order, the political Establishment’s difficulty with the Order’s behaviour, and also the Establishment’s conundrum of how to use Orange popular culture to its own advantage (Bryan, 2000, p. 35 & p. 36). The Dublin Evening Post catches the nature of the early Orange Order in a description of a 1796 parade, “a motley group of turncoats, Methodists, Seceders and High Churchmen accompanied by a multitude of boyos and country trolls cheering their lagging heroes” (Bryan, 2000, p. 31).

An early connection between parading and disorder (Bryan, 2000, p. 36) led successive Governments to either ban orangeism and other “Unlawful Societies” (Kennaway, 2007, p. 6) (Haddick-Flynn, 1999, p. 226) or place constraints on “Party Processions” (Jarman, 2001, p. 6) (GOLI, n.d.). Despite the Grand Lodge acquiescing to the legislation (Kennaway, 2007, p. 6) an element of the rank and file was prepared to parade in defiance of both Government and Grand Lodge (Bryan, 2000, p. 36 & 37). This was an early indicator of a willingness to defy attempts to curb parading and also the marginal ability of Grand Lodge to impose its will on the private lodges.

A confrontational relationship with Government continued until the latter part of the 19th century. However by the 1870s 12th of July celebrations had gained increasing importance, to the point where these became “central to the new unionist
helmonym among Protestants in Ulster” (Bryan, 2000, p. 47). As unionist politicians strove to defeat Home Rule proposals, the first Irish Home Rule Bill was defeated in 1886; the Orange Order became a resource for unionist leaders to harness opposition (Bryan, 2000, p. 60). As a result orangeism earned a place in the unionist establishment. Prior to this period Boyce (2010) describes the Orange Order as a “relatively marginal phenomena” (p. 30). It is also worth noting that during this period Ulster began to industrialise and as power was transferred from the country land owner to the industrialist and from the tenant farmer to the labour aristocracy (Bryan, 2000, p. 58) a similar change was reflected in Orangeism (James W McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 36). As well as this transfer of influence to urban orangeism, urban orangeism became more overtly political due to an increasing fear of the Catholic community’s exercise of political, and social power (James W McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 36). In contrast rural Orangeism was less politicised and experienced a less confident and competitive Catholic community.

As the Orange Order evolved and began to display traits that would have significance for its future, the foundations were being laid for the ‘colonial’ style Irish national police force (Smyth, 2002a, p. 110) (McGloin, 2003, p. 125) (Brady, 1974, p. 2). Following previous efforts to formalise policing, (Malcolm, 2006, p. 22) (McGloin, 2003, p. 124) an Irish Constabulary, later Royal Irish Constabulary, was formed in 1836. Three features of the newly created constabulary had implications for the development of the relationship between policing and orangeism in Ireland. First, the RIC was set up as a non partisan police force in contrast to its predecessor the County Constabulary (Brady, 1974, p. 8) (O’Sullivan, 1999, p. 36). Second, again in contrast to the County Constabulary, RIC members were forbidden to join secret societies including the Orange Order (Brewer & Magee, 1991, p. 2) (Allen, 1999, p.
10) (O'Sullivan, 1999, p. 48), although there is evidence of RIC members joining the Orange Order, especially in Belfast. Bryan (2000) writes “The local police [in Belfast] were predominantly Orangemen (p. 40). Third the RIC was genuinely representative of the populace. By 1860, 76% of the force was Catholic, a rising figure (O'Sullivan, 1999, p. 136) (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 16) (Brewer, 1989, p. 83). This representativeness is partly due to the relatively low number of Protestants across the whole Island. It also led the RIC to be viewed with suspicion among some of the unionist community. Dawson Bates, sometime Minister of Home Affairs described the RIC as both “anti Protestant and completely infiltrated by republicans” (Brewer & Magee, 1991, p. 3) (Doherty, 2004, p. 13) and untrustworthy (Ryder, 2004, p. 30). Griffin (1999) summarises his view of the difference between the RIC and the RUC as follows,

“The most important [difference] concerned their handling of sectarian issues. Throughout its history the RIC strove to avoid sectarianism within its ranks and partisanship towards any political or religious groupings” (p. 26).

1.4 Stormont and a Protestant Police

Despite earlier attempts to create a non-partisan force the RUC became during the Stormont era (1922-1972) predominantly Protestant and unionist. It was controlled by a unionist Minister of Home Affairs and provided, in the views of many commentators, with wide ranging powers to protect both the unionist hegemony and its orange culture. Up to the mid 1960s, three themes emerged which both elucidate the RUC and Orange relationship of the time and also form part of the backdrop against which the Orange Order and the PSNI relate to each other.
First the RUC was a Protestant dominated force during the Stormont era. This was despite “remarkable” (Brewer & Magee, 1991, p. 3) attempts by Dawson Bates, Home Affairs Minister, to recruit a 1000 Catholics among the 3000 strong force (Brewer & Magee, 1991, p. 3) when it was established. This complement of 1000 was to be drawn from former RIC, Special Constabulary, Dublin Metropolitan Police members and the general public as necessary (Ryder, 2004, p. 35 & p. 36). Dawson Bates’s ambition was not realised and the number of Catholic’s in the RUC peaked at 23%, a figure which declined as former RIC members retired (Ryder, 2004, p. 71).

By 1969 Catholic membership of the RUC hovered around 11% (B. P. White, 2000, p. 222). Hunt in his 1969 Report commented “the great majority [Catholic RUC members] are probably men whose fathers had served in the police” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 7). A further factor in determining the complexion of the RUC and a predisposition towards unionism was the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC). The USC was established in October 1921 at the insistence of James Craig, unionist parliamentary and financial secretary to the Treasury (Hezlet, 1972, p. 19), to support the regular police (Doherty, 2004, p. 13). Its size outstripped the regulars (Ryder, 2004, p. 29) and they carried out separate duties (Doherty, 2004, p. 21). Similar proposals to recruit Catholics to the USC came to nothing (Hezlet, 1972, p. 25) and the Special Constabulary also became an overwhelmingly Protestant force (Brewer & Magee, 1991, p. 3) (Leavy, 1973, p. 414) (Bryan, 1997, p. 382) (B. P. White, 2000, p. 221) (Cameron, Biggart, & Campbell, 1969, p. 183) (Griffin, 1999, p. 27) (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 8). Bryan (2000) describes the USC as a “part time armed police force drawn from the UVF and the Orange Order” (p. 61) and Hunt commented,
“In practice we are in no doubt that it is almost if not wholly impossible for a Roman Catholic recruit to be accepted. We certainly were given no instance in which this had occurred” (par. 183).

Second RUC members were permitted to join the Orange Order. The previous prohibition on membership was lifted by Dawson Bates within three months of the RUC’s formation and in January 1923 the “Sir Robert Peel Memorial Temperance Loyal Orange Lodge, 1334” (Ryder, 2004, p. 77) was founded for the RUC. It is difficult to assess the numbers of RUC members who joined the Orange Order (Haddick-Flynn, 1999, p. 333) but Bryan quoting Weitzer (1995) suggests, “It is clear that many….policemen were in the Orange Order” (Bryan, 2000, p. 60). Griffin (1999) estimates LOL 1334 had about 300 members. Hezlet (1972), who writes one of the few favourable commentaries on the USC suggests, “A considerable number of the USC did belong to the Orange Order, but this organisation has absolutely no say in the organisation or recruitment of the force” (p. 240). Other commentators less well disposed to the USC echo the links. (Bryan, 1997, p. 382) (Ryder, 2004, p. 29). Prime Minister Craig remarked, “It is also from the ranks of the Loyal Orange Institution that our splendid Specials have come” (B. P. White, 2000, p. 223).

The third theme of the Stormont era is the close relationship between the unionist government, the Orange Order, and the RUC. This close relationship gave the Orange Order a considerable degree of influence in Northern Irish society and created conditions in which they could fulfil their parading aspirations. Haddick Flynn (1999) suggests, “The heyday of the Order was between 1921 and 1968 when it ruled the roost in Northern Ireland” (p. 331). The relationship between the Orange Order and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) is well documented. Kaufmann (2007) describes the unionist political elite as “organically linked with the Order” (p. 21).
The Orange Order had a “leading role” (GOLI, n.d.-b) in the formation of the Ulster Unionist Council in 1905 and continued to enjoy significant representation on the Party’s governing body (Evans & Tonge, 2007, p. 158). Of the 95 Stormont MPs who did not attain cabinet rank, 87 were Orangemen, as were all but 3 cabinet members.

Every eligible senator, 1921 – 1968, and Prime Minister was an Orangeman (Bryan, 2000, p. 60) (Racioppi & See, 2000, p. 7). Consequently until 1965 when the political crisis began, the aspirations of the Orange Order and the government broadly coincided, both standing for the preservation of the Protestant way of life and the Union. It is argued a mutually beneficial relationship was thus created. The Order assisted in creating unity (D. Cairns, 2001, p. 87) among the Protestant working classes diverting them from social and labour concerns (James W McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 39) and the twelfth became a “ritual of State” (Bryan, 2000, p. 60) (D. Cairns, 2001, p. 87) (Wilson & Stapleton, 2005, p. 636). McAuley and Tonge (2007) describe the relationship,

“From the partition of Ireland in 1921 the Orange Order was a crucial instrument by which the Unionist Party maintained itself in power for over 50 years as politics stratified along ethnic rather than class lines” (p. 39).

In return the Orange Order was afforded considerable influence in the Unionist Party (Ryder, 2004, p. 74) (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 122), access to the most senior levels of power (Haddick-Flynn, 1999, p. 332), and the ability to influence government policy, particularly on education (Brewer & Higgins, 1998, p. 91). Although tensions did arise between the Order and Government there was little of substance to trouble the relationship, particularly up to World War Two (Bryan, 2000, p. 67), and any opposition was expressed under the strict control of Grand

The RUC was the third element of the Orange Order and Unionist Party relationship. White (2000), among others (Lawther, 2010, p. 457) (Murphy, 2013, p. 10), characterises the relationship in these terms:

“The Orange Order, the government, and the RUC became closely connected. Laws passed by the unionist-controlled government had the desired effect of rendering the Catholic minority socially and politically powerless. The Orange Order maintained Protestant working class support of the government, in exchange for a system that favoured Protestants over Catholics. And the RUC, susceptible to anti Catholic sentiment, made sure Catholics accepted the arrangement” (p.227).

This close relationship was a by-product of the arrangement by which the RUC Inspector-General reported directly to the Minister of Home Affairs (McGloin, 2003, p. 129). There was no concept of the operational independence of the Chief Constable (Ellison, 2000, p. 89) (Doherty, 2004, p. 93) (Mark & Charlton, 1978, p. 104) (Smyth, 2002b, p. 299). Patten (1999) said, “The RUC was in practice subject to direction by the Minister of Home Affairs in the former unionist government.” (p.23). Equally there was no accountability to oversight bodies which could temper the successive Ministers of Home Affairs (Ryder, 2004, p. 101) committed to maintaining the institutional advantage of the Protestant community. Ellison and Martin (2000) summarise the arrangement and suggest,
“The subordination of the RUC to direct political control by the unionist Minister for Home Affairs meant that they represented in a very concrete sense the umbilical cord of unionism” (p. 691).

Ryder (2004) summarises his view of these impacts,

“There could have been no worse architect for the development of policing in Northern Ireland or more unfortunate mentor for the RUC than Richard Dawson Bates. …For many years he imposed his deeply partisan and discriminatory values on…the police and the way they exercised their varied powers and responsibilities” (p. 33).

This perceived lack of political independence, the “evil of the political control of the RUC” (Callaghan, 1973, p. 90) was compounded, particularly in the late 1960s, by concerns regarding both RUC leadership (p. 56) and discipline (p. 12). Cameron in his 1969 Report says,

“The nature of the relationship of the RUC to the Minister of Home Affairs makes it easy for the criticism to be put forward the RUC is essentially an instrument of party government” (par 230).

Operationally the RUC was provided with what has been described as a “remarkable width” of powers (Cameron et al., 1969, par. 9) designed to favour unionism and to allow the RUC to carry out the Unionist Party’s bidding (Smyth, 2002b, p. 299) (White, 2000, p. 220). It is argued chief among these powers was the 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, “a legal authority that is unexceeded in the non-totalitarian world” (Leavy, 1973, p. 415). In an unsympathetic account of Faulkner’s premiership, Boyd (1972) claims “The Special Powers Act…the unionist Government promised, would never be used against members of the Orange Order..’” (P.74). Public order legislation was also drafted in favour of Orangeism. The Public
Order Act (1951) Act (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 39) exempted the organisers of parades “customarily held along a particular route” from notifying the RUC 48 hours in advance (Nagle, 2009, p. 138), in effect exempting Orangemen from notification (Jarman & Scullion, 2013, p. 8). Also in 1954 (Farrell, 1976, p. 95) Stormont, contrary to the Inspector General’s advice (Doherty, 2004, p. 55), enacted the ‘Flags and Emblems Act’ which made it an offence to interfere with a union flag or raise any flag which might cause a breach of the peace. Although the Irish tricolour was not specified in the legislation, it represented further legislation designed to maintain the status quo.

In contrast to later years there was little to trouble this tripartite relationship other than the occasional parading dispute. Parades were briefly restricted in nationalist Coalisland in 1932 (Bryan, 2000, p. 66) and surprisingly Dawson Bates established a week long parading ban in 1935, which the RUC enforced inconsistently (Bryan, 2000, p. 67). The most controversial parading disputes of the period focused on the Longstone Hill in County Down and Dungiven in County Londonderry (D. Cairns, 2001, p. 90) (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 67) where in 1952, 1953, and 1959 (Robinson, 2012, p. 390) a number of parade bans were enforced by the RUC (Weitzer, 1995, p. 49) sometimes in the face of violence. These bans aside during this period the RUC typically provided physical security for the Orange Order to parade (Cairns & Smyth, 2002, p. 152. Jarman and Bryan (1997) characterise the situation as follows,

“Put simply, unionist control of the legislature and Protestant domination of the police force was reflected in the ability of the Protestant community to hold parades and demonstrations” (p. 31).
Although the Orange Order were at times critical of Government security policy, (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 25) the IRA border campaign of 1956 – 1962 heightened Orange vigilance for threats to their way of life (Robinson, 2012, p. 384) and reinforced dependence on the RUC and USC as a bulwark against republicanism.

1.5 Transition to Troubles, Hunt and Direct Rule

The period from the mid 1960s to the imposition of direct rule in 1972 were tumultuous and began to change the relationship between the Orange Order, state and the RUC. As the Orange Order increasingly lost influence at Stormont and won no favour with Westminster, it is suggested that its “rights” were progressively curtailed by both the state and the RUC. Key to the Orange Order beginning to lose its influence was the appointment of Terence O’Neill as prime minister in 1963. Although an Orangeman O’Neill began to wrestle with some of the economic and other pressing problems besetting Northern Ireland (Bryan, 2000, p. 78) (Purdie, 1990, p. 13) (Coogan, T, p. 474) (Parkinson, A & Phoenix, E, 2010, p. 173) as opposed to focusing on the question of national sovereignty. Partly with an eye to Westminster he took steps previously unthinkable for a unionist prime minister including meeting with the Irish Taoiseach in 1965 (Callaghan, 1973, p. 5) (O'Callaghan & O'Donnell, 2006, p. 205). Kaufmann (2007) suggested the visit “exhausted O’Neill’s stock of Orange capital” (p. 26). This stock declined even further as O’Neill responded inadequately, in Orange Order terms, to the marking of the 1916 rising by nationalists and republicans (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 125).

In all likelihood as a consequence of the shift in unionist leadership the Orange Order also began to change. Its patrician leadership, guaranteed to moderate
more radical elements, is described as slowly being replaced by more “populist” voices (Kaufmann, 2007p. 27 & p. 37) and the middle classes began to leave the Order. The change was reflected in “Twelfth” [July] platform speeches (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 28) (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 125) (Robinson, 2012, p. 393) and a Twelfth platform became a hostile place for the “unionist elite.” (Bryan, 2000, p. 78). A newspaper editorial of the time commenting on the expulsion of O’Neill’s cousin from the Order captured the situation well, “this landmark vote represents a watershed moment in which rebel unionism first came to dominate over the traditional Orange elite” (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 25). Orange Order pressure contributed to O’Neill’s resignation in May 1969 and ended a “seemingly inextricable link based upon warm empathy, the political and shared wealthy patrician background of party and Orange leaders” (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 126).

The direction of travel that O’Neill had begun in banning parades continued with his successors, Chichester Clark and Faulkner (O'Callaghan & O'Donnell, 2006, p. 217) (Boyd, 1972, p. 84). The political situation began to worsen and the unionist government tried to tackle the rising levels of popular unrest and the resulting confrontation and disorder from August 1968 onwards (Ellison & Smyth, 2000, p. 56 & 57) (McCluskey, 1989, 109). In August 1969 Chichester Clark imposed a ban on all parades (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 53). While he retained the support of Grand Lodge he faced the anger of the Orange rank and file. The ban was lifted in early 1970 but revived on 23rd July 1970 and “met with fury and indignation in Orange Order ranks” (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 61). Grand Lodge in December that year signalled to the private lodges that they were legally entitled to defy the ban (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 63), and they joined with the other Loyal Orders in an effort to overturn it (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 64). Chichester Clark’s resignation on March 23rd 1971 brought no comfort to the
Order and his successor, and last prime minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, again an Orangeman, continued to impose parade bans (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 126) (Boyd, 1972, p. 84) in spite of unionist and Orange Order reaction (Kaufmann, 2009, p. 69).

The Orange Order’s loss of political power, their inability to influence government policy or RUC operations was hastened by the increasing intervention of the Westminster Government (Boyd, 1972, p. 84), the army’s deployment and finally the imposition of direct rule in March 1972. It is interesting to note that the then Home Secretary, James Callaghan, refers to Westminster making private plans to prorogue Stormont from 1968 (Callaghan, 1973, p. 23) such was their concern at the inability of the Northern Ireland Government or their under-resourced and overstretched RUC (Callaghan, 1973, p. 18 & 29) to deal with the escalating trouble. Those who held the levers of power in Westminster had no bias towards the Orange cause and as Westminster tightened its grip on Stormont (Warner, 2005, p. 17) the corridors of power, it is suggested, were closed to the Orange Order (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 98) (Cairns & Smyth, 2002, p 154). Bryan (1997) suggests, “The British State was interested in controlling Northern Ireland but it would not necessarily do so utilising orangeism” (p. 382).

Undoubtedly these political dynamics were having an impact on the RUC and Orange Order relationship. As parading bans took effect the RUC were no longer in their traditional role of the protector of orange space and at times the Orange Order and its supporters were coming into direct confrontation with the RUC. For example, in 1971 in Dungiven, (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 69) the RUC used irritants and impact rounds to enforce a ban on an orange parade. It is not suggested that the Orange Order supported violence but it demonstrated a willingness to confront parade bans.
Kaufmann, (2007) points out the Orange Order now had to deal with a Chief Constable whose terms of reference “were set by the British and not a unionist Government” (p. 98).

This period also saw the first attempt to reform the RUC. In August 1969 a Government Committee chaired by Lord Hunt drafted “The Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland.” Hunt (1969) described its recommendations as,

“framed with a view to enabling both the police and the citizens of Ulster to move towards a better relationship with one another in order to achieve this common need and purpose” (p. 4).

The purpose of the report was to remove the RUC’s paramilitary role (Brewer, 1991, p. 5) and create a better-resourced and managed force with greater levels of public accountability and broader community contact (Hunt 1969, p. 4). Hunt also proposed the USC’s disbandment and replacement with part-time RUC and military forces (Hunt, 1969, p.6). Other than the disbandment of the USC, Hunt’s short lived and partially fulfilled recommendations (McGloin, 2003, p. 132) (Ryder, 2004, p. 216) had little impact on the RUC and Orange Order relationship. The Orange Order opposed two of Hunt’s recommendations in particular (Kaufmann, 2007, P. 57), the USC’s disbandment and the disarming of the RUC. Orange Order opposition to Hunt was articulated in Twelfth of July speeches of the time (Bryan 2000, p. 88) and prefigured their later opposition to the Patten reforms.

1.6 Troubles

Parading controversies became increasingly important from the mid 1960s. However as security concerns progressively took centre stage for the Orange Order,
these concerns determined largely the basis on which they judged the RUC. From the Trouble’s outset Orange leaders encouraged their members to join the RUC (regular and part-time) and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) and avoid paramilitarism (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 290). In 1972 Grand Lodge maintained their brethren were ready to defend Northern Ireland and encouraged individual Orangemen to take up this call to defeat what they regarded as Ulster’s enemies (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 75). As a consequence 332 members of the Orange Order died during the Troubles. Of the total 300 RUC officers murdered during the Troubles “around one in five were members of the Orange Order” (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 105) (BBC News, 2010) (G.O.L.I. 02/06/2015).

In effect the Orange Order developed a strong emotional bond with the RUC and viewed its members contribution to the security forces as part of the continuum of Orange service to the crown through the years (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 104) (GOLI, 2007b, p. 1) (Batista, 2009, p. 15). This emotional bond ensured the RUC remained as “their” (O’Rawe, 2002, p. 123) Protestant dominated police force (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 81) (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 2) and that of the broader unionist community,

“From the formation of the Northern Ireland State the RUC has assumed an iconoclastic “sacred status” in the unionist psyche. For many unionists the RUC is more than just a police force – it is their police” (Ellison & Martin, 2000, p. 692).

This strong attachment later informed the Orange Order reaction to the Patten reforms. It was also the backdrop against which they formed their relationship with the PSNI.
This bond between the Orange Order and the RUC is key to understanding their relationship during the troubles. The Force was overwhelmingly Protestant, but the RUC culture was not necessarily Orange. Brewer’s 1991 study of the RUC paints a picture of an organisation that reflected Protestant values (p. 247), but did not exhibit a partisan occupational culture (p. 246).

While the importance of the bond between the RUC and Orange Order should not be underestimated, a number of changes began to take place in policing in the mid 1970s that started to redefine the relationship. The basis for these changes were RUC efforts to deliver a more impartial service and are primarily associated with the tenures of Sir Kenneth Newman (1976-1980) and Sir John Hermon (1980- 1989) as Chief Constables. Both built on the efforts of former colleagues to “professionalise” the RUC and,

“shift the basic mission of the RUC away from the defence of specifically Protestant interests toward winning broad-based popular consent, impartially combatting crime and upholding the rule of law” (Weitzer, 1985, p. 45).

The effectiveness of their approach may be disputed by some, but the RUC as a consequence of the 1976 “Way Ahead” Report (Doherty, 2004, p. 128) set about to reclaim primacy for internal security (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 32). While RUC primacy was driven by a number of factors, chief was a recognition that a structural response to terrorism had to be accompanied by impartiality, accountability, consent and legitimacy (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 34). Hermon championed RUC professionalisation commenting that it “must rest alongside genuine service to the community and enlightened membership of the community” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 35).
There were operational consequences of the professionalisation approach, not least an increasing willingness by the RUC to deal with loyalism and to tackle some parading issues. The revised approach was first seen in the RUC reaction to the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike of 3rd May 1977, where a combined group of loyalist interests tried to paralyse essential services in protest at Government security policy. In contrast to the similar 1974 stoppage, during which it is argued the “clear unwillingness” of RUC to tackle loyalist strikers was evident and their action did “little to convince the nationalist that the ‘reformed’ RUC’ were willing to defend their interests as much as it defended those of loyalists” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 31), the RUC took a strong line. The RUC prevented power outages and cleared disorderly loyalists off the streets (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 36). Ryder (2004) suggests,

“This incident was a decisive turning point, for it showed a new RUC in the making, one that was prepared and competent to deal energetically with trouble on the streets whether the culprits were Catholics or Protestants…Newman hoped this demonstration of strict impartial policing would begin a process of healing the long fractured relationship with the Catholic community (p. 250)

RUC resolve in tackling loyalist violence continued to be tested during the period, not least after the signing of the Anglo Irish Agreement on the 15th of November 1985. Its signing was greeted with fury by the unionist community and (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 36) provoked a wave of violence that lasted for a considerable duration (Doherty, 2004, p. 196). The RUC response was robust and greeted angrily by many sections of unionism. Hermon (1997) notes the significance of the RUC response,
“On later reflection I regarded that day [3rd March 1986] as the turning point: it marked the emancipation of the RUC from the yoke whether real or imagined of unionist/loyalist influence” (p. 191).

It left the unionist community in little doubt of RUC will to tackle civil disorder, regardless of the source. Brewer (1991) notes that the RUC senior management’s response to the Anglo Irish agreement had,

“done a great deal to enhance the RUC reputation for professionalism, both intentionally through the redirection of Orange marches…and unintentionally through the policing of Protestant marches of protest” (p. 141) and

“With Protestant politicians hurling abuse at the force as a consequence of the Anglo Irish agreement it demonstrated to RUC management the “utility of political independence” (p. 270).

Also by the early 1980s some argue the RUC became “less willing to facilitate loyal Order parades in predominantly nationalist areas” (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 67) (Bryan, 2001, p. 48). Early in his tenure, Hermon had signalled concern at the levels of communal violence caused by parading. He reflected,

“It is worth noting that all too often large numbers of police personnel have to be deployed to deal with politically inspired parades and demonstrations many of which pose a threat to public order. It is unfortunate after the experience of more than a decade of violence and civil disturbance that such activities have not been abandoned in favour of less inflammatory forms of political expression” (Benington & Turbitt, 2007, p. 379).
Accordingly Hermon took decisive action by re-routing Orange parades away from the Catholic Obins Street in Portadown, among other places. (Benington & Turbitt, 2007, p. 379). These re-routings were important in themselves but had an additional significance particularly as Portadown holds a special place in Orangeism as its birthplace. This fact will not have been lost on Hermon in the decision making process nor the Orange Order. The reaction from the Orange Order and unionism was angry; from loyalists, violent (Bryan, 2001, p. 48) (Hermon, 1997, p. 201) (Doherty, 2004, p. 200). Hermon (1997) believed that through his decision “the independence of the police had been clearly manifested” and he writes in his autobiography,

“No mid May 1985 the Force was fully prepared to address the smouldering problem of loyalist parades. Over almost a century these had been given a special position in Northern Ireland and appeared to have acquired a sort of temporal sanctity. Participants believed they could parade almost wherever and whenever they chose. ……I was not alone in believing that the superior attitude of the loyalists in respect to their marches had to be changed” (p. 171).

Hermon’s willingness to tackle loyalism and orangeism had a number of impacts on the RUC and Orange relationship. It recast the traditional impression of the RUC as the protector of Orange Order rights. The levels of violence also led to new public order legislation. The Public Order (1987) Order removed the notion of customary parades. It is also suggested the legislation “moved decisively against the Orange Order” (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 158). Finally the period saw the start of attacks on RUC homes by loyalist mobs (Ryder & Kearney, 2002, p. 84). Leaving aside the physical impacts of these attacks, a process was started in which RUC officers no longer saw the unionist community as uniformly benign. To a degree loyalism
became part of the threatening environment in which RUC officers and their families existed. Ryder (2004) describes this process,

“The wider RUC family soon came to see itself as a third community in divided Northern Ireland. Virtual police ghettos developed in some parts of the Lagan Valley and North Down where officers and their families clustered together for mutual security” (p. 253).

As the policing landscape was beginning to change and the wider Protestant community was forced to reconsider its place in Northern Ireland due particularly to the Anglo Irish Agreement (Southern, 2007, p. 165) (O'Neill, 2000, p. 28) it is argued changes were taking place in orangeism. First the Orange Order began to expand the parading calendar (Cairns, 2001, p. 95), an indication of an increased willingness to assert the right to parade and to “flex muscles.” Indeed Cairns (2001) suggests, “at a superficial level, in times of contestation, orangeism expands to meet ‘the threat’ ” (p. 95). Second it is suggested Orangeism, particularly in urban areas, began to lose some “respectability” as a result of regular confrontations with the RUC. It is argued a battle for the soul of Orangeism was underway as it reacted to the unfolding political situation,

“‘Respectable’ Orangeism was caught between its support for the State and the rule of law and growing disenchantment with the State…‘Respectable Orangeism’ of the 1950s was in retreat. ‘Respectable Orangeism’ was no longer hegemonic” (Bryan, 2000, p. 169).

Third by the mid 1980s the Orange Order was in numerical decline and unable to attract young working class loyalists who were more attracted to the “blood and thunder” flute bands with their distinctive uniforms and limited musical repertoire (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 282) (Smithey, 2008, p. 14) (Bryan, 1997, p. 394) (Bell, 1987, p.
Bryan (2000) describes the bands as “without question, the most distinctive development in loyalist political culture since the 1960s” (p. 127). They were more aggressive in appearance than the Orange Order and more willing to confront the RUC (Bryan, 1997, p. 393) (Ryder & Kearney, 2002, p. 2). McKay (2007) describes the bands as representing the “rough side of unionism” (p.27). Although the Order made efforts to control the bands through conditions of engagement (Kennaway, 2007, p. 73), band and Orange interests did not always coincide,

“Loyalist bands remain separate from mainstream with their own social dynamics and cultural practices and at times they offer a counter and alternative culture to rather than being part of it” (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 74).

Despite this difference of tone, the Order became increasingly reliant on “Kick the Pope” bands (McKay, 2007, p. 30) for their numerous parades. This reinforced the increased militancy, or at least appearance of militancy, of certain sections of particularly urban Orangeism.

The relationship between the loyalist bands, their supporters and the Orange Order is interesting and one of the dynamics in existing parading relationships. Its proper consideration is beyond the scope of this thesis however and merits fuller consideration than is possible here. However it is important to emphasise that the Orange Order, despite popular public perception of this situation, does not control the loyalist bands. Loyalist bands are independent of the Orange Order and simply contracted by them to provide musical accompaniment to parades. As referred to previously when a band is contracted to play at an Orange event, terms of engagement are entered into (Kennaway, 2007, p. 73), these terms include, for example,
constraints on the type of music played (Montgomery & Whitten, 1995, p. 36). If a band chooses to breach the conditions of engagement this can lead to them being prohibited from playing at future Orange Order events. The conditions of engagement also cover the behaviour of band or parade followers (Montgomery & Whitten, 1995, p. 35). It is a feature of Orange parades and indeed band parades that young people who have an association with a particular band often follow them. Radford (2001) describes these as “coat trailing band followers” (p.39) and suggests many are young females (p. 42).

As well as having no actual relationship with the Orange Order other than being contracted to play music (Kennaway, 2007, p. 73), several commentators suggest that the tensions exist between the Orange Order and loyalist bands and that the bands have appropriated loyalist culture. Bell (1987), for example in his discussion of the role of bands in loyalism explains that contemporary loyalist culture has become the preserve of the bands and not the Orange Order (p.163). A point also made by Radford (2001, p. 41). Bell further points out that the process by which the bands supplanted the Orange Order’s influence especially among the loyalist working class is (174) is reflective, among other things of historic tensions between working class loyalism and what he describes as the “aristocratic and bourgeois elite” (p. 166) that traditionally controlled Orangeism.

There is a further tension between the bands and the Orange Order that is useful to highlight and which has consequences more directly for the relationship between policing and Orangeism. The Orange Order although it hires bands for its events accept no responsibility for the behaviour of either the bands or their followers at Orange Order events. They may condemn this behaviour should it be illegal or offend against the conditions of engagement. Later in the thesis senior police officers
will highlight this as a failure by the Orange Order leadership to accept the sometimes inevitable consequences of their events and hiring bands some of whom are claimed to have paramilitary associations (Radford, 2001, p. 42). Kennaway (2007) in referring to the relationship between the bands and Orange Order suggests it is “where the duplicity and the inertia of the Institution is most exposed” (p. 72).

1.7 Drumcree and the Parades Commission

The developing themes of increased Orange Order militancy and RUC robustness came to a head outside Drumcree Church of Ireland Church in Portadown during a series of July parade confrontations beginning in 1995. These confrontations were seminal in the evolution of the RUC and Orange Order relationship and continue to have implications for the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order. The significance of the dispute is summarised well by the then Chair of the Parades Commission who characterised Drumcree as, “The touchstone, the litmus test, the line in the sand” (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 78).

Drumcree was significant for a number of reasons. First Portadown is regarded as the “Vatican” of Orangeism where the right to march has been fought for since 1807 (Ruohomäki, 2010, p. 176) (Kennaway, 2007, p. 74). Second it is claimed as the oldest Orange parade and is not far from the place of Orangeism’s birth (Benington & Turbitt, 2007, p. 379). Third it is the first place where residents groups began to confront Orange Order parades (Dingley, 2000, p.55) (Kennaway, 2007, p. 76) and Portadown became a locus for Sinn Fein to fight their “proxy war” (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 149) via the parading issue. The wider unionist community of the time and Orange Order suspected these residents groups of being fronts for IRA/Sinn Fein (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 158) (Bryan, 2001, p. 45) and foot soldiers in he

At the heart of the confrontation was the Orange Order’s wish to return from Drumcree Church to Carleton Street Orange Hall by the Garvaghy Road, a main route into Portadown close to nationalist housing estates. Nationalist residents who protested in considerable numbers objected to the return route that had been used since 1986. In 1995, 1996 and 1997 the RUC permitted the parade (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 161 & 175 & 181) following protracted stand-offs between the RUC, the parade and counter protesters and high levels of violence across Northern Ireland. Turbitt
(2007), a former RUC commander describes Northern Ireland in July 1996 as “fast approaching anarchy” (p. 380). Since 1998 the Parades Commission (Dingley, 2002, p. 59) (Benington & Turbitt, 2007, p. 380), has not permitted the Orange Order to complete the return route. Although the violence waned over time the Garvaghy Road remains closed to the Orange Order despite weekly applications to the Parades Commission to complete the return leg (PC, 2014a, p. 4). To this day the Orange Order seeks to complete the parade every Sunday and is prevented from doing so by a Parades Commission determination and a very small PSNI presence.

As well as the Drumcree disputes placing the RUC and the Orange Order in direct and violent confrontation it had internal consequences for the Order. Most notable was the development of a hard-line element known as the “Spirit of Drumcree.” This Group, established in 1995 called for reform of the Order and harried Grand lodge, among other things, for a tough line on traditional routes, (Kennaway, 2007, p. 127 & 131) (Ryder & Kearney, 2002, p. 130). Kaufmann (2007, p. 200 & p. 201) suggests that despite soul searching in the Orange Order, particularly post 1998, the Spirit of Drumcree Group pushed the Orange Order to the right. Kennaway argues that Grand Lodge bowed to its “demands” (2007, p. 254). Despite the Group’s eventual demise it is argued by some any reformist sentiments expressed in reaction to the violence of three summers were silenced.

One of the most significant impacts of Drumcree was the formation of the Parades Commission in 1997 (O’Kelly & Bryan, 2007. P. 567). It became responsible for determining the route of sensitive parades and its decisions are possibly the most decisive factor in influencing the current PSNI and Orange Order relationship. The Commission was set up following the publication on 30th January 1997 of the Independent Review of Parades and Marches (North Report) (Kennaway,

While there exists a range of views regarding the Commission’s success (Hamilton & Bryan, 2006, p. 155) (Jarman & Scullion, 2013, p. 10) (B. P. White, 2000, p. 249) (O'Neill, 2000, p. 42) (O'Kelly & Bryan, 2007, p. 569 & p. 577) the Orange Order, despite making a submission to “North” (Kennaway, 2007, p. 152) opposed its formation from the outset and continues to have no official contact with it (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 239). In a web-based article, “The Case Against the Parades Commission” the Orange Order details their opposition to the Parades Commission, an “unelected quango” and the Public Processions Legislation,
“It [the legislation] is undoubtedly aimed at curtailing our Parades and is a direct attack on both our faith (in as much as parades to and from Church are an extension of our public witness) and our culture. Once again the Government have either failed to understand the core of the problem or have taken the easy option of dealing with the generally law abiding population, possibly as part of the on-going confidence building measures for republicans” (GOLI, n.d.-a).

The Commission is indeed unelected and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland following open competition appoints the Commissioners. The 1998 legislation allows the Secretary of State to appoint up to 7 individuals, including a chair ("Public Procession (Northern Ireland) Act," 1998, p. 14), to serve as commissioners. In the words of the 2006 Commission Chair, Commissioners “represent a broad range of interests and experience across Northern Ireland and beyond” (PC, 2007, p. 1). The parading year 2012 – 2013 provides an indication of their task. During this period 4499 parades were notified to the Commission. 58% of these parades were of the loyal order and broad unionist tradition. Of the total figure only 225 (5%) warranted consideration by the Commission and restrictions were placed on 73% of these sensitive events. The weekly Drumcree parade in included in the figures for sensitive events (PC, 2014a, p. 4).

Despite the 1998 legislation removing police from making decisions about parade routes it had a profound impact on the police and Orange relationship for two reasons. First the police became responsible for enforcing the decisions of a body the Orange Order viewed as a sop to republicanism, and for prosecuting those who breached legislation which in Orange Order terms is aimed at curtailing their cultural heritage and rights. Second the police were made not merely responsible for
upholding determinations but became part of the Commission’s decision-making apparatus. Police are required to present evidence to the Commission in closed session regarding parade routes. The Orange Order has often viewed the police role in this process with suspicion and some accuse police of partiality. The Commission decisions will be at the heart of the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order.

1.8 Patten – A New Beginning

In June 1998 the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (Patten) was charged with the reform of policing. Previous post ceasefire efforts by the RUC to respond to the more peaceful operational context had been structural and efficiency driven but did not confront the more radical challenges (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 107) of issues such as cross community legitimacy (Goldie & Murphy, 2010, p. 38) (Gordon, 2008, p. 143) (Beirne & O’Brien, 2010, p. 148) (O’Rawe, 2002, p. 1033).

As Patten set about his task the RUC was increasingly distant from unionism and those engaged in parading disputes. It is also argued the Orange Order had been on a rightward journey, increasingly marginalised from the state and hostile to efforts to curtail parading. The RUC however remained Protestant, visibly British through its symbols, and an organisation with which the Orange Order still had an emotional attachment. Patten stripped away those symbols to create a service representative of the wider community but a service which directly reflected none of the culture or symbols especially cherished by the Orange Order (Southern, 2007, p. 170). In describing the heart of the policing problem in Northern Ireland, Patten (1999) recognised the link between policing and political identity in Northern Ireland, “Policing has been contentious, victim and participant in past tragedies, precisely because the polity has been so contentious…the role of those
charged with keeping the peace has been contested...they have been identified by one section of the population, not primarily as upholders of the law but defenders of the State and the nature of the State itself has remained the central issue of political argument. In one political language they are the custodians of nationhood. In its rhetorical opposite they are the symbols of oppression. Policing therefore goes right to the heart of the sense of security and identity of both communities” (p.2).

Broadly the unionist community were opposed to Patten (Hillyard & Tomlinson, 2000, p. 408) and many viewed its recommendations as an outrage (McGarry, 2000, p. 180). David Trimble, leader of the majority Ulster Unionist Party described Patten as a “gratuitous insult” (McGarry, 2000, p. 180). Their previous experience of police reform in the Hunt Report was negative and previous suggestions that the RUC should take “brave decisions and move forward” had been rejected by them (Smyth, 2002a, p. 115). Ian Paisley summed up the objections to reform, “the RUC had stood between us and those who would destroy us” (Doyle, 2010, 187). The Orange Order echoed these objections. Over 330 of their members have died as a result of the Troubles (GOLI, 02/06/2015).

There is debate about how faithful the subsequent legislation was to Patten’s report (Ellison, 2007, p. 246 & 253) (Ryan, 2008, p. 97) (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 169) (Ryder, 2004, p. 307) (O’Rawe, 2002, p. 1041) and its effectiveness (Rolston, 2006, p. 143) (Ellison et al., 2012, p. 490), but equally there is a view that the reform process was transformational and broadly successful (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 184).

These far reaching reforms touched many aspects of policing, including accountability (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p.28-39), devolution of policing and justice and normalisation (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 4 & p. 49). It was however the more symbolic parts of Patten on which the Order focussed. This included elements which had maintained the British and Protestant character of the force, the renaming of the RUC (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 99) (Hays, 2012, p. 571), the imposition of the 50/50 recruiting scheme to boost Roman Catholic membership (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p.88), the creation of a neutral working environment (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 100), the removal of the royal oath (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 20) and the requirement that PSNI officers who were Orangemen should declare this. Paragraph 15.15 of the report (1999) reads, “We would prefer that public servants were not members of secret societies or organisations perceived to be sectarian such as the Orange Order.”

In common with much of the wider unionist community (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 159 & 162) (A. White, 2007, p. 127) (Southern, 2007, p. 170) (Goldie & Murphy, 2010, p. 38) (Lawther, 2010, p. 458) the Orange Order was opposed to Patten (GOLI, 2000b, p 1) (GOLI, 09/09/1999) (GOLI, 02/09/ 2007). One of their principal objections was the betrayal of the RUC memory. Two statements sum up the sentiment,
“It is almost as if the lives of those officers who paid the ultimate sacrifice, the sufferings of those maimed and the devastation and pain of their families have been for nothing” (GOLI, 2000e, p.1).

And

“The Patten Commission spat in the face of those who have sustained injury while serving with the force….the RUC has very little to be ashamed of. On the contrary the force has a record to be proud of.

…Doing away with the badge of the RUC is preposterous” (GOLI, 2000d, p. 1).

While it is difficult to reconcile these feelings with an organisation prepared to place police officers at risk by exercising their “right to march”, it is clear that the Orange Order had retained at some level their sentimental view of the RUC. This is all the more puzzling as the RUC since 1985 had shown willingness to curtail Orange parades. It may be the case that the Orange leadership were able to divorce the reality of their operational experience of the RUC and the willingness of the RUC’s senior leadership to deliver Patten’s reforms (O’Toole, 2010, p. 57) (Constantine, 2010, p. 80) (Orde, 2010, p. 99) from the imagined reality of a Protestant dominated force paying the ultimate sacrifice to defend the Protestant way of life. The loss of 332 of their so membership during the Troubles (GOLI, ND), often the softest of targets for terrorists, undoubtedly influenced this.

1.9 Police Service of Northern Ireland

Commentary on policing and unionism continues in the post Patten era but there is less from which to draw conclusions about the PSNI and Orange Order relationship. This is possibly a consequence of the revised position of policing. It is
seen less as a problem than a solution, and the PSNI enjoys broad cross community support (Ellison, 2010, p. 250). Less than 100 of its members belong to the Orange Order (PSNI, 2014). Much of the commentary considers PSNI reform (Ryan, 2008) and Patten type themes with issues of police legitimacy (Ellison, 2007) (Byrne & Jarman, 2010) (Hays, 2012) (Gordon, 2008), human rights (Engel & Burruss, 2004), accountability (Porter & Prenzler, 2012) and community policing to the fore (Topping, 2008a) (Topping, 2008b) (Service, 2012). The complex issue of the PSNI’s role in investigating Troubles related crime and “the past” is also a focus for study (Orde, 2006).

Parading remains a key feature of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship. Since the foundation of the service there have been some significant episodes of parade related violence where the PSNI and Orange Order have been in direct confrontation. Although the figure varies annually, in 2013/2014, 2766 loyal order and unionist parades took place. Of this figure 491 were declared to be sensitive and 88% had some restrictions placed upon them. The 2013/14 figures are skewed by the nightly Twaddel Avenue protests and the on-going Drumcree notifications (PC, 2014b, p. 8). They do give a sense of the scale of opportunity for PSNI and Orange Order to come into conflict both on the streets and through tensions caused by the Commission’s evidence gathering process. It would be very wrong however to give the impression that every sensitive parade ends in disorder. This is far from the case and disorder remains exceptional.

A useful example of tensions caused by parading issues is the Whiterock dispute of September 2005 when, following a Parades Commission determination, the parade degenerated into serious and sustained violence with PSNI and army coming under fire from blast bombs and gun attack. In the aftermath Chief Constable Hugh
Orde claimed the Orange Order was largely responsible for the violence (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 294) (Kennaway, 2007, p. 262), as it had called for its members to walk along a banned route. Kaufmann (2007) talks about the reaction of the Orange Order to the disorder, suggesting the Orange leaders displayed “unprecedented equivocation” (p. 295) and that there was a strong sense among much of the Orange leadership blame lay with the heavy handed policing style (p. 296) (GOLI, 10/09/2005). He remarks that although many condemned the violence, shared loyalist aspirations overrode differences between Orange and non-Orange and “helped bend the [Orange Order] unequivocal traditional commitment to law and Order” (p. 297).

The Belfast Telegraph remarked on 16th September 2005 “The attempt by Orange Order leaders to pin the blame on the PSNI is an insult to everyone’s intelligence. The Order’s credibility is at stake”.

Earlier in the literature review there was discussion of the closeness of the relationship between Orangeism and Ulster Unionism, particularly during the period of the Stormont Government. In contrast with this relatively straightforward arrangement the post Patten relationship between elected Unionism and Orangeism is more complex. There remains an undoubted link between elected unionism and Orangeism. Many unionist politicians are members of the Orange Order or other loyal orders. Nigel Dodds, for example, MP for Belfast North, where the Twaddell dispute is played out nightly, is an Orangeman and he has been trenchant in his criticism of the Parades Commission decisions (Belfast News Letter, 10/0713). While this practical link remains it is undoubted that the influence the Orange Order once wielded in elected Unionism has declined considerably. The Orange Order no longer has access to Government in the manner previously enjoyed. Equally they no longer have an official place in the Ulster Unionist Party (McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 39).
The Orange Order severed its constitutional links with the UUP in 2005. Although its members, in the main, also shifted their allegiance to the anti Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement Democratic Unionist Party (McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 40), the Orange Order was certainly given no official status in the DUP. The DUP’s relationship with Orangeism is also complex and reflective of the Revd. Ian Paisley’s early brush with the Orange Order as moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster (Smyth, 1987, p. 10).

The continuing presence of unionist politicians in Orangeism however has practical consequences. First the Orange Order can lever political pressure in parading disputes as parading remains an electoral issue in Unionism. There was a “pan Unionist” political reaction to the Parades Commission 2013 Twaddell decision (Belfast Telegraph, 03/0713). Also, and for example, the DUP 2015 Westminster manifesto stated they want “A new start on parades including the abolition of the Parades Commission. We will work alongside the Loyal Orders to achieve this.”

Second, and this is later spoken about by police interviewees, the existence of elected representatives who are members of the Orange Order extends the reach and influence of the Orange Order further into the wider unionist community. Senior police officers also referred in their interviews to being conscious that when speaking to unionist politicians they were also speaking to members of the Orange Order.

The Twaddell Avenue dispute of July 2013 followed a similar pattern of accusation and counter accusation, similar to Whiterock 2005. The Parades Commission prevented three North Belfast Lodges (the Ligoniel Combine), Earl of Erne LOL 647, Ligoniel True Blues LOL 1932 and Ballysillan LOL 1891, from completing their return route past the Ardoyne shop fronts in July 2013. This area had already been the scene of 12th July disorder in previous years following restrictions on
Orange Parades and counter protests by residents groups. In July 2013 the Parades Commission determination went further and for the first time the lodges were prevented from completing the return route. Following disorder on 12\textsuperscript{th} July, Sir Matt Baggott, the then Chief Constable of the PSNI remarked that,

“Some of their language [Orange Order] was emotive and having called thousands of people to protest they had no plan and no control and rather than being responsible I think the word for that is reckless” (BT, 13\textsuperscript{th} July 2013).

The Orange Order while, condemning the violence, accused PSNI command of intemperate language, unfair criticism, a clear operational intent to deal firmly with disorder and policing verging on the political (GOLI, 2013e, p. 15).

While recognising the limitations of the academic literature on the PSNI/Orange Order relationship the Orange Order’s monthly newspaper, “The Orange Standard” provides a deep vein of material. The content of the Standard serves to underline the Orange Order’s previously noted opposition to Patten, the PSNI’s creation and to official contact with the Parade’s Commission, (GOLI, 2002a, p. 1) (GOLI, 2000e, p. 1) (GOLI, 2000b, p. 9) (GOLI, 2004a, p. 7) (GOLI, 2009d, p. 10) (GOLI, 2000c, p. 2) (GOLI, 2000a, p. 1) (GOLI, 2005b, p. 1) (GOLI, 2006a, p. 1) (GOLI, 2011a, p. 1) (GOLI, 2011b, p. 5).

Against the background of these principled objections the Orange Order appears to assess the PSNI, or at least its front line, as performing reasonably well (GOLI, 2009d, p. 18), “The PSNI do an excellent job and deserve the full support and backing of all law abiding citizens” (GOLI, 2006b, p. 3). While recognising PSNI operational efficiency, a regular theme is PSNI’s under-resourcing, a legacy of Patten, (GOLI, 2004b, p. 2) (GOLI, 2009c, p. 16) (GOLI, 2009c, p. 16) (GOLI, 2010a, p.
18) (GOLI, 2002b, p. 11) (GOLI, 2004b, p. 2) (GOLI, 2006b, p. 3) (GOLI, 2009b, p. 16) (GOLI, 2009d, p. 18). Criticism of the front line is rare, although the Standard occasionally observes the lack of security afforded to isolated Orange Halls (GOLI, 2007c, p. 1) (GOLI, 2008, p. 18), and the inability of the PSNI to detect offenders (GOLI, 2013c, p. 1).

Although the Standard is positive about front line policing, it expresses an increasingly negative tone about PSNI command. The criticisms do not fall into neat categories but reflect a view that command is a pawn of the Parades Commission and complicit in their anti-Orange decision making (GOLI, 2005c, p. 5) (GOLI, 2009a, p. 4) (GOLI, 2013b, p. 1). The comments of Robert Saulters, former Grand Master usefully sum up the view,

“"It is sad that the PSNI are controlled by such a bunch of misfits.
[Parades Commission] We in the Orange Institution always did have respect for law and Order. However since the appointment of a new chief constable as an extension of the political process in Northern Ireland, it is plain to be seen that the position of the Chief Constable was an appointment made in Downing Street.... There you have it the police are puppets to seven members of an unelected quango” (GOLI, 2005a, p.2).

In addition an accusation is made that PSNI command has taken a decision to move against the Order and the wider loyalist community. In 2007 The Orange Standard again commented,

“"Then we have the PSNI who replaced the RUC. The Chief Constable keeps telling us they are undermanned except, of course, when they want to wash down or beat up a few Orangemen on parade. Then he has plenty of personnel to deal with the situation” (GOLI, 2007a, p. 2).
In August 2013, the Orange Standard commenting on the summer disorder argued, “The police have no political role and never should have, as Northern Ireland is a democracy. However some of the comments from senior officers are coming close to the line of political comment if not actually crossing it. What circumstances have brought about this situation whereby senior police feel it is appropriate to belligerently focus on the Orange Order?” (p. 15).

They suggest PSNI’s dealings with the Orange Order have led to a loss of confidence among unionist and loyalist people (GOLI, 2013a, p. 16) (GOLI, 2013b, p. 1) (GOLI, 2013d, p. 4) (GOLI, 2014, p. 1), “The reality is that the PSNI no longer commands the respect of a large section of the urban Protestant community in Belfast” (GOLI, 2014, p. 2). While the comments should be put in the context of two difficult summers and a toxic situation in North Belfast they reflect a sense of frustration with PSNI command. The frustration is not simply with regard to operational decisions, but reflect a view from some that the PSNI willingly serve the Parades Commission and are part of an anti Orange and anti parading axis (GOLI, 2013e, p. 15).

1.10 Conclusion

In conclusion specific consideration of the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order is largely absent in the written material. This extends also to detailed consideration of the RUC and RIC relationship. There are however a number of important themes to draw from which provide a context for the question “What is the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order since 2001”. In addition these themes provide material from which to shape the
questions put to the three interview samples during the research phase. The key themes are:

- Orangeism was borne out of sectarian adversity and had an uneasy relationship with State and policing until the late 19th century;
- Policing in its early-organised form in Ireland was established to be non-sectarian. It was demographically representative of its community;
- With the advent of Home Rule proposals the unionist establishment brought Orangeism into the mainstream of politics and increasingly viewed it as a resource to maintain the unionist hegemony;
- On partition the Orange Order gained considerable political influence and was able to rely on both Government and police to maintain their position and ability to parade. Policing became overwhelmingly the preserve of protestantism and unionism;
- Direct rule and military deployments progressively altered the relationship between Orangeism, the state and policing. The RUC and Orange Order entered into a complex relationship. On one side of this relationship was increasing confrontational driven by parading disputes and the rightward move of Orangeism. On the other side of the relationship was the emotional tie between Orangeism and the RUC. The Orange Order viewed the RUC as their bulwark against republicanism;
- Patten sought to create neutral and normal policing in Northern Ireland. Orangeism was opposed to Patten’s reforms and the creation of the PSNI. The ghost of the RUC would haunt the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order;
• Parading would remain at the heart of the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order against a background of increasing loyalist anger and their failure to benefit from the emerging political settlement.

These themes and some of the key dates are depicted in the table overleaf.
## Table 01 – The Relationship between policing and the Orange Order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Key Event</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1795</td>
<td>Formation of Orange Order</td>
<td>Order formed as a result of sectarian conflict. Builds on Williamite commemorative tradition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>Unlawful Societies Act</td>
<td>1st Government attempt to control Orangeism and indicator of tensions between State, Orangeism and law and order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>Formation of Irish Constabulary (later RIC)</td>
<td>Constabulary established as a non-sectarian force and representative of community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>Party Processions Act</td>
<td>Further Government attempt to control Orangeism and indicator of tensions between State, Orangeism and law and order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>1st Home Rule Bill</td>
<td>Orange Order began to be viewed as a political resource for Unionist establishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Formation of Ulster Special Constabulary</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly protestant auxiliary police force. Will a to the protestant and unionist character of later RUC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Partition of Ireland</td>
<td>Creation of Government in Northern Ireland heavily influenced by the Orange Order and its values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Formation of Royal Ulster Constabulary</td>
<td>Despite initial efforts becomes an overwhelmingly protestant force closely aligned with Stormont Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act</td>
<td>Far reaching legislation provided to RUC to assist maintain the political status quo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-62</td>
<td>IRA Border Campaign</td>
<td>Ill-fated terrorist campaign. Reinforces character of RUC as bulwark against the republicanism and the Irish republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Terence O’Neill becomes Prime Minister</td>
<td>O’Neill’s reforms and curtail of Orange parades begins to cause tension between Unionism and Orangeism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Formation of Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association</td>
<td>Beginning of sustained civil strife in Northern Ireland. Leads to further parading bans on N. Ireland impacting on Orange Order also and its relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Military deployed to N Ireland</td>
<td>RUC lose primacy for security and public order to military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Stormont prorogued. Direct rule imposed</td>
<td>Orange Order loses its influence in Government. Policing now subject to control of Secretary of State for NI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Ulster Workers Council (UWC) Strike</td>
<td>RUC response to loyalist strikers fails to win confidence of nationalist community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2nd UWC Strike</td>
<td>RUC response to loyalist disorder robust and indication of growing resolve to tackle disorder from PUL community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Anglo Irish Agreement</td>
<td>Violent reaction from loyalism. RUC in forefront of managing disorder. RUC members attacked in own homes by loyalists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Rioting in Obins St Portadown following RUC ban of Orange parade</td>
<td>Strong statement of intent from RUC that they will no longer facilitate Orange Order parades without reference to community impacts and sensitivities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>New public order legislation introduced</td>
<td>Legislation removes reference to customary parade routes and implied bias to Orange Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Drumcree 01</td>
<td>Contentious parade Portadown. Opposed by residents groups. Parade facilitated following violent and protracted stand off between Orange Order and police. Regarded by Orange Order as a line in the sand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Drumcree 02</td>
<td>Contentious parade Portadown. Opposed by residents groups. Parade facilitated following violent and protracted stand off between Orange Order and police. Regarded by Orange Order as a line in the sand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Drumcree 03</td>
<td>Contentious parade Portadown. Opposed by residents groups. Parade facilitated following violent and protracted stand off Orange Order and police. Regarded by Orange Order as a line in the sand. Last year parade permitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Good Friday Agreement</td>
<td>Begins process towards devolved Government in N Ireland. Loyalism increasingly at the margins of civil polity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Drumcree 04</td>
<td>Parade subject to determination by Parades Commission. Return route denied to Orange Order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Formation of Police Service of Northern Ireland</td>
<td>PSNI formed to provide neutral and normalised policing. The RUC, iconic to Orangeism, is absorbed into new police service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Whiterock Riots</td>
<td>Severe disorder following Orange parade. Caused significant difficulties in PSNI and Orange Order relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>PIRA decommissioning</td>
<td>PIRA put weapons and munitions beyond use. Step towards acceptance of policing and justice arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>St Andrew’s Agreement</td>
<td>Effort to re-start the devolution process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sinn Fein sign up to policing</td>
<td>PSNI makes strides to engage republicanism. On-going support of unionism loyalism is presumed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Devolution of policing to Northern Ireland Assembly</td>
<td>PSNI come under control of local Justice Ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Flags Dispute</td>
<td>Following Belfast City Council’s decision to flag Union flag on designated days outpouring of loyalist anger and protests Northern Ireland wide. Momentum maintained for approximately 6 months. Brings PSNI and loyalism into ongoing confrontation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Parades Commission restricts return route of 12th July parade past Ardoyne shop fronts</td>
<td>1st year return route denied to Orange Order. Significant disorder on 12th July 2013. Causes significant tension in PSNI and Orange Order relationship and becomes one of defining factors in relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Nightly Twaddell Avenue Protests</td>
<td>Orange Order protest Monday – Saturday regarding 2013 decision of Parades Commission. PSNI and Orange Order in nightly, if set piece confrontation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 2  Methodology

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter methodological issues are considered and a rationale is provided for the type of research undertaken. The chapter is divided into a number of sections. First, the aims and objectives of the research are considered and its contribution to knowledge. Second issues of ontology, epistemology and methodology are discussed and the choice of a qualitative paradigm defended. Third ethical issues are reviewed, including the challenges of insider research. Finally the specific research method employed in the research grounded theory is discussed. This discussion includes consideration of issues such as sampling, data gathering, analysis and the strengths and weaknesses of the grounded theory approach.

2.2 Research Question

Effective research begins with two things, a clearly formulated research problem, as Noakes and Wincup (2004) suggest “at its heart” (p. 14) and also a design. Robson (2011) suggests that “if you don’t give serious attention to the design of a research project you are likely to end up with a mess” (p. 4). Bachman and Schutt (2001, p. 73) recognise the difficulties in formulating research questions and describe three steps in this process, identifying, refining and finally evaluating the question. Bryman (2012. P. 86) also recognises the differences between questions in the qualitative and quantitative contexts. Helpfully Robson (2011, p. 62) in discussing what makes good research questions accepts that finding these is not a linear process but involves uncertainty and change during the research process. Following the identification of the research problem, the nature of the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order, some themes and later pilot questions were
developed. The questions were based on an existing perception of the relationship, experience of working with the Orange Order and themes from the literature. These questions were then “tested” by colleagues with experience of the Orange Order and policing parades. This process was useful and some missing elements in the research were identified. At the start of the data collection process, three sets of research questions existed (Appendix B) Chief Constables, senior PSNI officers and Orange Order. Each question schedule went through a number of iterations in response to the research experience and also the data provided. With the benefit of hindsight, the Chief Constables should have been interviewed at the end of the interview process and the data provided by senior officers and Orangemen would have usefully informed these specific questions. Both practicalities and research inexperience prevented this.

2.3 Aim and Objectives of Research

The aim of the research is to:

• Critically review the literature pertaining to the relationship between the police (RIC, RUC & PSNI) and the Orange Order in an effort to identify themes and issues to inform the data gathering and analysis processes;
• Examine the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order in Northern Ireland by conducting interviews with senior members of both organisations and critically analysing the data in the manner of grounded theory.

The objective of the research is to

• Make recommendations on the basis of the data gathered to both the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order. These
recommendations will be framed to allow the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order examine their existing relationship constructively.

2.4 Contribution to Knowledge

The literature reviews highlights the extensive academic consideration of policing issues and to a lesser extent unionist parading in the Irish context. It also highlights the absence of any academic reflection on the issue of the police relationship with the Orange Order, both RUC and PSNI. This research aims to fill the gap in knowledge and could prove to be the first study of this significant relationship in Northern Ireland. This is a relationship that is arguably critical to the maintenance of the peace process while also retaining the confidence of unionism in policing and justice arrangements. While it is not possible to be definitive, it is the researcher’s view that this research uniquely captures the views of the PSNI’s permanent chief constables from 2002 until today in a single place. Equally the researcher is not aware of another study that captures to such a degree the voices of both senior PSNI officers and senior members of the Orange Order.

2.5 Identifying a Research Paradigm

and qualitative paradigm was made on the basis of the author’s understanding of the ontological, epistemological, and methodological features of each paradigm and an assessment of which paradigm would most effectively meet the research aims. In choosing a qualitative paradigm it is recognised that the paradigm is not simply characterised due to its under-estimated complexity (DiCristina, 1997, p. 187) and breadth (Denzin, 2009, p. 140 & 142) (Bryman, 2012, p. 383) (Sandeleowski, 2003, p. 334) (Dey, 2003, p. 1).

It is understood that the qualitative paradigm broadly represents a relativist ontology where reality is viewed as a social construction (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 111) in contrast to the positivism (Noakes & Wincup, 2004, p. 26) or post positivism (Robson, 2011, p. 22) of the quantitative paradigm. Knowledge (epistemology) is transactional (Bennett, 2004, p. 100) and is influenced by the researcher (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 111). Qualitative research has a dialectic or dialogical methodology and employs a deductive logic (Bachman & Schutt, 2004, p. 51). It begins with specific data, which are used to develop a general explanation or theory to account for the data (Bachman & Schutt, 2004, p. 51). This methodological approach has generated an extensive menu of research options (Wincup & King, 2000, p.30) (Jupp, Francis & Davis, 2000, p. 57) (Pogrebin 2003, p. 4) (Robson, 2011, p. 135) (Bennett, 2004, p. 5) (Punch, 1994, p. 85).

Without wishing to crudely summarise the paradigms, the quantitative approach suggested a study based on a real reality that could be neutrally discovered on the basis of a theory to test. Conversely, the qualitative paradigm proposed an approach where reality was mediated by some form of historical, social or personal context; its discovery was influenced by the researcher and led to the development of a theory or ideas. In the context of a study of a relationship between two
organisations which is mediated and influenced by a large number of individuals and has a rich and complex history, the central planks of the quantitative paradigm did not resonate as an approach that would reach the heart of this very human issue. Tewksbury (2009, p. 56) summarises his qualitative preference by describing it as the “ballet line” where interpretation and emotion are valued above quantitative “line dancing” where a routine is followed to deliver a product. Although a comment for effect possibly, in the context of this research project it is a useful distinction. The choice of a qualitative methodology was not made on the basis of “methodological fundamentalism” (Denzin, Lincoln & Giardina, 2011, p. 770).

2.6 Ethical Issues

Similar to a variety of views existing regarding the meaning of both research paradigms, the world of ethics is also conflicted (Shaw, 2003, p. 13). Ethical principles in the social sciences emanated from those “formulated for biomedical research” (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, p. 262). As the particular ethical challenges of the social sciences have become apparent (Orb, Eisenhauer, & Wynaden, 2001, p. 93) a distinctive ethical voice has been sought for these disciplines. There are however some ethical considerations central to both the quantitative and qualitative approaches, chiefly an intention to avoid harm. Guillemin & Gillam (2004) describe this as an “absolutely basic consideration” (p. 272). Orb et al (2001), write, “ethics pertains to doing good and avoiding harm” (p. 93).

A range of ethical models exists and this research is governed by the University’s Code. It was guided by the overlapping principles (Robley, 1995 p. 46) of avoiding harm, securing informed consent, preventing invasion of privacy and transparency (Bryman, 2012, p. 135). These principles were adhered to by ensuring
both PSNI and Orange Order gave permission for the research on the basis of full disclosure of the author’s intentions and role as a serving PSNI officer. Permission was also sought and documented at the start of each interview and issues of anonymity were discussed. Some interviewees were content to go “on the record.” However strict anonymity was maintained and references to rank, role and geographic location removed. The inclusion of this information would have been interesting, particularly in localising some challenging aspects of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship, but it presented an unacceptable risk to the disclosure of identity. Interviewees were also alerted to the possibility of inadvertent disclosure due to the relatively small size of the senior ranks of both bodies.

Three Chief Constables were interviewed at the outset of the research. It was felt by the researcher it would be impossible to anonymise this data as the sample was small and very specific. Interviews were carried out therefore on the basis of full disclosure of identity. In two cases requests were made to view the chapter in advance of submission and this request was acceded to.

In terms of minimising harm to participants there was no particular concern regarding individual harm being caused. All of the participants were able to provide informed consent and capable of risk assessing participation in the project. Equally they are all to some extent public figures and used to managing the particular risks of public life in Northern Ireland. The greater harm issue, which became apparent as the research progressed, and reinforces the point that ethics is not a one-off process (Bryman, 2012, p. 199), was whether the research might undermine the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order, de-stabilise the parading environment and create conflict. Equally the researcher as a then District Commander needed to maintain a locally effective relationship with the Orange Order. The author has
engaged in senior level discussions with the PSNI as to how these wider risks might be managed and the research form the basis of constructive dialogue. There is an appetite in PSNI for constructive engagement with the Orange Order and it could be that this research will provide a stepping-stone towards this objective.

The above ethical considerations reminded the researcher of the particular dilemmas (Coghlan & Holihan, 2007, p. 6) faced as an “insider researcher” (Drake, 2010, p. 85) (Hellawell, 2006, p. 484) and some of the opposition to this practice (Brannick & Cohglan, 2007, p. 59). As an insider there was the huge benefit of ready access to senior colleagues that arguably may not have been extended to outsiders. This benefit had to be weighed against two particular risks. The first risk as a senior member of PSNI was subjectivity and an inability to be appropriately distant from the organisation (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009, p. 55) (Taylor, 2011, p. 14). The second was a temptation to be risk averse in research because of a need to maintain a constructive relationship with an employer at the end of the research, especially in a disciplined context and indeed also a relationship with the Orange Order. On balance and while alert to the temptations referred to above, what is assumed to be unparalleled access to senior ranks in the PSNI outweighed those risks and has allowed the research to make a greater contribution to knowledge than might otherwise have been the case. Equally while an outsider to the Orange Order, the researcher’s position as a PSNI insider undoubtedly facilitated access to that organisation.

2.7 Data Sample

At the outset of the research the author had in mind a discreet sample for PSNI interviewees based on rank, role, experience and geography. There was less initial clarity regarding what might constitute an equivalent sample for Orange Order
interviewees. This clarity was provided during a discussion with the Grand Secretary of the Orange who usefully proposed a particular group that broadly “matched” the PSNI sample on the basis of rank, role, experience and geography. A total of 9 Orange Order interviews took place and 13 PSNI interviews. A small number of Orange Order interviewees fell outside the initially proposed group.

The constraints imposed by ensuring the anonymity of the participants make detailed discussion of the sample groups impossible. However it is possible to make some general observations about both the PSNI and Orange Order interviewees. The police officer interviewees are overwhelmingly male and from the Protestant and unionist community. Other than in one case they have all served in both the RUC and the PSNI and have in excess of 20 years service. They have all attained senior rank. The author recognises “senior” is an imprecise term but anonymity prevents further clarification. All of the police interviewees have held territorial command at points in their careers. The Orange Order interviewees are all male and from the protestant and unionist community. They have been members of the Orange Order, including its junior branch, for a minimum of 35 years. All have attained senior rank within a variety of Orange Order structures and at time of interview retained these senior positions. All are members of at least one other loyal order. None have served in the PSNI, although 5 served in what were referred to during the Troubles as the “security forces.”

2.8 Data Analysis and Grounded Theory

Similar to other methodological issues a variety of data analysis approaches are possible (Dey, 2003, p. 1). Bryman and Burgess (2002) refer to Tesch’s (1991) distinctions in analysis (p. 6) and Srivastava and Hopwood (2009), refer to Miles and
Huberman’s (1984) assertion that “we have few agreed on canons for qualitative data analysis” (p. 77). A grounded theory approach has been chosen to analyse the data and answer the question “What is the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order since 2001.” The choice was not made on the basis of “methodological fundamentalism”

Grounded theory remains a popular method for the analysis of qualitative data, although some conflict and confusion exists regarding its use. Bryman (2012), among others (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1466), suggests “there is little doubt there is considerable confusion currently about the nature of grounded theory” (p. 575). In reaction to what was perceived as lack of rigour in qualitative research (Glaser & Strauss, 1995, p. 14), extreme positivism (Suddaby, 2006, p. 633), the sociological stance prevalent in the 1960s, (Robson, 2011, p. 147), and the “embarrassing gap between theory and empirical research” (Glaser & Strauss, 1995, p. vii) Glaser and Strauss devised grounded theory underpinned by pragmatism and social interactionism (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 419). Although they later apparently disagreed over its application (Suddaby, 2006, p. 638) (Robson, 2011, p. 147) (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1483) grounded theory is credited by some as rescuing social theory (Glaser, 2002, p. 34).

In essence a grounded theory is one that is induced from the data as opposed to preceding it. Cutliffe (2000) quotes Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) own definition of a grounded theory

“A theory that will fit the situation and being researched and work when put into use. By fit we mean that the categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to and indicated by the data under study: by work we mean that they must be meaningfully relevant and be able to explain the data under study. It is rooted in symbolic interactionism, wherein the
researcher attempts to determine what symbolic meanings, artefacts, clothing gestures and words have for groups of people as they interact with one another” (p. 1477).

Grounded theory has a number of key features. It starts for many grounded theory exponents (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1479) with a recognition of the importance of the researcher in the research process, the requirement for reflexivity as data is gathered, interpreted and analysed (Suddaby, 2006, p. 640), and an acknowledgment of the researcher’s prior understanding of the research area (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1479). There is less agreement about the place of the literature review in grounded theory, even among the architects of the method. Cutliffe (2000 p. 1480) outlines the various positions taken and contrasts the views, for example of Lincoln & Guba (1985), who advocate no literature review prior to data collection and Hutchinson (1993) who suggests that a literature review should precede data collection. Cutliffe (2000) also refers to a third approach where the literature review is a two stage process, an initial review for the researcher to become sensitive to the concepts and a further review of a different corpus of material at the concept development stage.

Sampling in grounded theory is described as either purposive (Robson, 2011, p. 148) or theoretical (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 420) (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1477). In neither description of the approach is there any notion of creating a random sample. Interviewees are chosen by the researcher to assist in the development of theory. The number of interviewees, the “how many” (Sherman & Strang, 2004, p. 215), is determined not by an arbitrary figure but a sample is considered to be complete when new interviewees “are saying nothing new about the concepts being explored” (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1477). Data gathering is typically, but not exclusively by means of interview (Robson, 2011, p. 149) (Bryman, 2012, p. 148). One of the few areas of
consensus in grounded theory is its iterative nature, data gathering and analysis is not a linear process, although the results may be presented sequentially (Suddaby, 2006, p. 637). Weuetherick (2010) in reviewing Anslem and Strauss (2008) quotes their description of grounded theory’s iterative nature “research is a continuous process of data collection, followed by analysis and memo writing, leading to questions, that lead to more data collection, and so on” (p. 1). Others describe the research process as one of “constant comparison” (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1488) (Robson, 2011, p. 489). Robson suggests this approach where the researcher makes several visits to the field to collect data, which is then analysed while further data is gathered until categories of analysis are saturated, is close to the dialogic process of the hermeneutic tradition (Robson, 2011, p. 148).

There is also a degree of consensus regarding the process of data analysis in grounded theory. Similar to other qualitative approaches (Basit, 2004, p. 144) data is analysed in grounded theory by coding (Bryman & Burgess, 2002, p. 4). A three stage coding process is advocated, open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 423). The purpose of coding is to discover first concepts in the data and then develop the concepts into categories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 420) (Allen, 2003, p. 3) (Glaser, 2002, p. 24) (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1482). Robson (2011) neatly describes the coding process. During open coding the researcher splits the data into discreet parts and asks the question “What is this piece of data an example of?” (p. 489). It is essentially an interpretive process as opposed to summarising (p. 490). In axial coding the data that had been “effectively split apart” (p. 490) is put back together into categories. In the final stage, selective coding, a core category is created, “the central phenomenon around which the categories from the axial coding are integrated” (p. 491). This coding process leads to the creation of theory,
“Whereas other forms of qualitative analysis may legitimately ‘stop’ at the levels of description or simple interpretation, the aim of grounded theory is theoretical development” (Lacey & Luff, 2007, p. 10).

As with any other research method grounded theory is discussed both in terms of its benefits and limitations. Those who advocate its use maintain it is a rigorous method (Glaser, 2002, p. 23) that has “rescued” (34) social theory by that rigour and it allows the researcher to transcend the merely descriptive (p. 24). Corbyn and Strauss (1990 p. 420) describe grounded theory, as a method of “great discovery” made effective by the early analysis of data. Robson (2011) refers to four particular strengths of the approach. First it provides explicit procedures for theory generation, second it is flexible while remaining systematic, third it is especially useful in applied areas of research and finally a wide range of exemplars exist of the method to assist the researcher (p. 147).

In terms of the limitations of grounded theory some, for example, point to the inherent difficulty of applying grounded theory well (Suddaby, 2006, p. 639) and its frequent misapplication (Glaser, 2002, p. 32). Bryman (2012) argues that “in spite of the frequency with which it is cited and the frequent lip service paid to it grounded theory is not without its limitations” (p. 574), which he then proceeds to articulate. First he argues that neutral observation, the requirement to suspend awareness of relevant theories (p. 574) until a late stage in the research process is unrealistic and ignores the benefits that an awareness of “existing conceptualisations” can provide to the researcher. Second that the method of constant comparison is made difficult due to the volume of data a researcher is required to analyse (p. 574). Third Bryman, among others (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1466) suggests that despite the corpus of material relating to grounded theory it remains in part ill defined (p. 574). He writes “there is
little doubt that there is considerable confusion currently about the nature of grounded theory” (p. 575). This lack of definition in the approach is compounded by the number of variants of grounded theory (p. 575). Bryman also argues that the coding approach can lead to the data losing its context (p. 575). Finally although Bryman accepts that many of the core processes of grounded theory have been “hugely influential” (p. 575) he also maintains “it is somewhat doubtful whether grounded theory in many instances really results in theory” (p.574). Robson (2011) refers to the various “challenges” to grounded theory coming from “the neighbouring fields of anthropology and cultural studies” (p. 492).

Conscious of the suggestion that many researchers pay lip service to the notion of grounded theory, it is important to set out its application in this study. First the place of the author (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1479 is acknowledged in the work not as a neutral bystander but as someone who brings to the research a previous knowledge of both the PSNI and the Orange Order, and a professional involvement with both organisations. Second a literature review was completed prior to the collection of data and data analysis. It is acknowledged that the place of the literature review in grounded theory is a contested issue. Dunne (2011, p. 113) says, “Within the field of grounded theory research, the use of existing literature represents a polemical and divisive issue, which continues to spark debate.” The argument against a literature review in advance of data gathering and analysis is that it might prevent the natural emergence of categories, uninhibited by “extant theoretical frameworks” (Dunne, 2011, p. 114) from the data. While not entirely dismissing this argument the author felt on balance that a full review of the literature provided a surer foundation upon which to base an exploration of the issues and formulation of the research questions. It is also case that as the research was novel, and as discussed in the literature review
there was no material to draw on which directly answered the question of the nature of the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order since 2001 there was less of a risk that the data analysis would be inhibited by the “extant theoretical frameworks” referred to above. Third sampling was more purposive (Robson, 2011, p. 148) than theoretical (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 420). Interviewees were purposely chosen on the basis of their positions in either the PSNI or the Orange Order. There is no notion of randomness in the sample.

Fourth, the method of data gathering was interview (Robson, 2011, p. 149) (Bryman, 2012, p. 148), specifically semi structured interview (Robson, 2011, p.285), as opposed to the focus group approach Bachman & Schutt, 2011, p. 253) (Sandelowski, 2000, p. 338), structured interview Robson, 2011, p. 283) or unstructured interview (Bryman, 1984, p.78). A semi-structured approach to interviewing was chosen on the basis that it would allow for an exploration of the issues with a degree of freedom but on the basis of a prompt of issues worthy of consideration. This approach is not without critics (Myers & Newman, 2007, p. 4) (Lillis, 1999, p. 84). Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed in full on the author’s behalf by two individuals who signed confidentiality agreements. The use of an analytic survey for the “why questions” (Oppenheim, 1992, p.12) was dismissed principally due to the challenges of response rates, and the inability to probe written responses (Barriball, 1994, p. 331).

Fifth the data analysis process was not a linear one. Transcripts were reviewed on production in an effort to identify early themes in the research and the process of “constant comparison” (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1488) was begun. The early analysis of the data also allowed for the suites of questions to be developed as the research
process progressed. Six iterations of the questions for police interviewees were produced and four for the Orange Order interviewees.

Finally data was coded manually, the author is aware that coding can also be managed by a number of software applications. Open coding, the splitting of data into discreet parts and the creation of initial concepts, was completed by using hand written tables that ground the data into gobbets. The axial coding was carried out by using type written tables that identified “detail” and “themes” leading to the creation of concepts in the research. The final stage of the coding process, selective coding, where core categories are created to integrate the results of the axial coding was completed in a review of the tables produced for the axial coding process and core categories created as set out in the final presentation of the data. The grounded theory developed was more in the manner of what Bryman (2012) describes as “substantive” (p. 574) in that it pertains to a specific social phenomena, the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order as opposed to a broader range of phenomena

2.9 Conclusion
One of the many contested areas of the methodological debate is that of the validity and reliability of research. Validity is about whether research is true and credible and not anecdotal (Silverman, 2013 p. 10). Reliability is about whether another researcher using the same methods would draw the same conclusions. Potentially because one of the criticisms of qualitative research is that lacks standard means of assessing either validity or reliability, in contrast to fixed design, (Robson, 2011, p. 154), some qualitative researchers have sought to differentiate the quality criteria for their work (Bryman, 2012, p. 394). The rights and wrongs of this particular debate aside, the methodological choices made in this research have been to deliver a credible and
transparent product. Research choices have not been made due to methodological fundamentalism” but a conviction this study is better explained by a qualitative paradigm and method that creates “rich description” (Bryman, 1984, p. 79) and allows theory to develop from the data.
Chapter 3  The Chief Constables

3.1 Introduction

During the 14 years of the PSNI’s existence (Switzier, C & Graham, B., 2009, p. 154) 6 people have held Chief Constable rank. Four held the rank substantively, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, Sir Hugh Orde, Sir Matt Baggott and the current incumbent, George Hamilton. Colin Cramphorn and Judith Gillespie held the rank temporarily. Of the four substantive Chiefs, Flanagan’s tenure was shortest. He oversaw the critical transition period between the RUC and the PSNI and the implementation, particularly, of the symbolic changes outlined in the Patten Report (Murphy, 2015, p. 20). Murphy (2015) describes Flanagan as a personally significant figure for the RUC/PSNI who gave the organisation in transition a path to follow which “while difficult was still perceivable” (p.122). It was Flanagan’s successors however who shaped the PSNI. These three Chief Constables have set the tone of the PSNI’s relationship with the Orange Order and held command at significant points in this relationship.

The researcher although uncertain as to whether his request for interviews would be granted was pleased to be given easy access to Chief Constables Orde, Baggott and Hamilton. The interview of Orde took place during the last days of his presidency of the Association of Chief Police Officers. Baggott’s interview was undertaken on his final day in PSNI. Anonymity was discussed at the commencement of each interview. It was suggested to each Chief Constable that their comments should be attributable. Aside from the attraction of capturing the Chief Constables’ views publicly the proposal recognised that anonymising the responses would have been impossible. The proposal was accepted.

Due to time constraints the Orde and Baggott interviews took place prior to other data collection. Although the data gathered from these interviews is valuable,
the interviews could have proved to be richer if undertaken at a later stage in the process and with the benefit of reflection on the material provided later by senior PSNI officer and Orange Order interviews. The researcher was also “finding his feet” as an interviewer and the style and manner of questioning was less incisive and consistent than it later became. The questions asked of Hamilton differ as they draw on his experience as a career RUC/PSNI officer. This interview also benefitted from coming at the end of the data collection.

The interviews ranged over a number of issues relating to the PSNI and Orange Order relationship. Particular issues discussed included:

1) What the English Chief Constables knew of the Orange Order on appointment;
2) What the Chief Constables perceived the Orange Order stood for;
3) Their level of contact with the Orange Order and the importance they attributed to that relationship;
4) Their general assessment of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship;
5) Their impressions of Orange Order leadership;
6) The rural and urban “divide” in orangeism;
7) The impact of the Parades Commission on the PSNI and Orange Order relationship;
8) The “Greening” of the PSNI (British-Irish, 2013).

3.2 Prior Understanding and Knowledge of Orange Order

Although the question was not asked the author was aware neither Orde nor Baggott were members of the Orange Order. That would have been a matter of public record on appointment. Equally while the issue of faith was not raised, it is known Baggott holds evangelical Christian convictions (BCN, 2010). Orde’s religious
background is not known but it is believed his views are either private or religion has not been a feature of his life. A comment made during the interview reinforced this suspicion (p. 4). It would not be unusual to be aware of the “church going” status of colleagues in PSNI.

The matter of Orange Order membership and community background was explicitly discussed with George Hamilton. Hamilton has never been a member of the Orange Order (p. 1). He describes himself as coming “from a Protestant community” (p. 1). At times during the interview Hamilton referred to his own faith as “personal” and reflected on what he perceived to be the relationship between faith and Orange membership (p. 1). In the case of Orde and Baggott, there was nothing to suggest in their backgrounds either a positive or negative disposition towards the Orange Order. Equally there was little in Hamilton’s “Protestant” background or “personal faith” that would point to a predisposition for or against the Orange Order despite being a Protestant male with distant familial connections to the Orange Order (p. 1) Hamilton’s background was broadly consistent with that of many of the police interviewees and the overwhelmingly protestant RUC he joined in 1985 (Brewer 1991, p. 246).

The issue of Orde and Baggott’s prior knowledge of the Orange Order on appointment was explored. In both cases this was proved to be very limited and reflected the reality of other priorities for both chief officers on appointment, managing the Patten reforms for Hugh Orde and the resurgent dissident threat for Baggott. It also reflected what will be referred to later as the cyclical nature of the relationship policing and the Orange Order where crisis plays such a large part in determining that relationship. Orde was appointed in 2002 as the Drumcree situation was beginning to stabilise and Baggott in 2009, four years after Whiterock, and before
parading issues in North Belfast would become so challenging. Orde refers to an “overall awareness” (p. 1) of orangeism gained partly through his two years as a member of the Stevens Enquiry team (ACPO, 2011) and a passing interest in parading (p. 2). Baggott reflected a similar lack of prior knowledge of orangeism, despite also having some previous professional exposure to Northern Ireland (p. 1). He suggested that he had to learn about the Orange Order “on the hoof” (p. 1).

In addition to both Orde and Baggott’s limited prior knowledge of orangeism the Orange Order did not form part of their pre or early briefing. Orde talks about being briefed on the “money” (p. 2) and full briefing on the “Patten reforms and all that stuff” but no briefing on orangeism,

“…the Orange in a way were just a law abiding, broadly law abiding, group of people who would not strategically cause me any particular issue” (p. 3).

Baggott’s experience was similar and, like Orde, the lack of pre-briefing did not surprise him, as the “big issues at the time” were “dissident republicanism and resources” (p. 4). He suggested that orangeism did not “feature at all really on my briefings or indeed my strategic priorities.” (p. 3) and “there was a degree of optimism that to some extent the parades were starting to look after themselves (p. 4). He added in an echo of Reiner 1992 (p. 228),

“My assessment was it was not on the radar of those that briefed me before I came here at all... Because the big threats for me were actually an upsurge in dissident republican terrorism and secondly the need to get the PSNI back to being sufficiently resilient to deal with that and prepare for the future” (p. 3).
3.3 What Does Orangeism Mean?

The researcher was keen to understand how the three Chief Constables viewed the Orange Order. Specifically if they understood orangeism in the same way the Orange Order does, as a religious fraternity (Manchester Orange, ND) or whether there was any fundamental rub between the Chief Constable’s understanding of Orangeism and the Order’s stated position. No such fundamental disconnect was present but interestingly both Baggott and Hamilton expressed difficulties of reconciling certain aspects of Orangeism with their personal religious views. A view that was also expressed by some of the senior PSNI interviewees and at least considered by some Orange Order respondents as they accounted for the differences between rural and urban orangeism.

Orde in his explanation returned to the theme of his limited knowledge and accepted that his interpretation was likely to be seen as “narrow” (p. 2). He described the Orange Order in historical terms, “a tradition going back to 1690” or “linking their tradition to 1690” (p. 2) and regarded it as “fiercely supportive of the Union” (p. 2). Orde also referred to the importance of the parading tradition (p. 2). Although the matter was not addressed specifically with Baggott he did in his interview register a difficulty with reconciling aspects of the behaviour of individual lodges and members with Orangeism’s christian claims,

“And not so much as the Chief Constable, but as a Christian I have sometimes difficulty reconciling what is the biblical message about being under authority in the gospels. So you're under authority, whether that's a Roman authority….. You may not like it but actually you are under authority here and the authority is the Parades Commission and the law. So any breaches of that is difficult to reconcile what that means and
secondly you know the way that people behave in terms of gentleness, sincerity, impartiality all those biblical statements from the Book of James, it's difficult for me to reconcile with some of the behaviour” (p. 10).

Unsurprisingly Hamilton gave a fuller description of orangeism. He first described its role as “upholding the unionist identity” and later described Orange parading as the “public manifestation of the attempt to uphold a Protestant unionist tradition and identity” (p. 2). What was interesting was his subsequent assessment, not unlike that of Baggott’s of some “disconnect” (p. 1) between the religious claims of the Orange Order and his experience of them. He described the Orange Order more in terms of “community and identity and politics, rather than religion” (p. 1), while recognising orangeism being “anchored in the reformed faith” (p. 3).

3.4 Nature and Type of Contact with the Orange Order

The discussion turned to an examination of the amount and type of contact the Chief Constables experienced with the Orange Order and whether this contact was event driven or part of a process of strategic engagement. In terms of amount of contact, variations become quickly apparent and reflected what was previously described as the operational priorities facing each Chief Officer. It also reflected, in Orde and Baggott’s tenure a lack of a strategy for engagement with the Orange Order until crisis points were reached. Orde had a hands-off approach to formal meetings with the Orange Order. He said “they certainly came to see me…I certainly remember meeting them fairly early on.” But equally that “they were not a group that sought many audiences” (p. 3). However he did recognise, as do the senior PSNI interviewees, that the Orange Order had a long reach and when he met PUL
stakeholders, it was inevitable that one of their number belonged to the Order, “One would meet people, members of the Orange Order all over the place” (p. 3). He also referred to informal meetings with the Orange Order describing these as “quiet conversations that I always said I would never compromise” (p. 5). The content of Orde’s formal meetings with the Orange Order were not discussed in detail but he alluded to their nature,

“. and I think a lot of people when I took over were quite angry, not that I’d taken over, they were in that mode where the Patten reforms, the peace process, the Belfast Agreement was seen as winners and losers. And I think the Orange would have seen themselves on the losing side of that, so I still sense quite a lot of angry, people were angry, not of the police necessarily, but of all the reforms” (p. 4).

Baggott’s early experience of the Orange hierarchy differed from Orde’s less in terms of meeting frequency than content. The Orange Order sought out Baggott “very quickly” (p. 2). Their message to him proved to be concerned with their religious and cultural standpoint. This particular message was likely given in the knowledge of Baggott’s religious convictions, he described them as being initially “supportive” (p. 3) in those initial meetings and seeking to educate him about “what they stood for and their Christian heritage” (p. 2). As with Orde, at least in the early part of his tenure, Baggott’s meetings with the Orange Order were infrequent and no commitment was given to the Orange Order (p. 3) in terms of access. However as issues concerning parading, flags and protest came to the fore from December 2012 onwards, a crisis point was reached, levels of contact with the Order increased. As attempts were made to manage relationships with the PUL community during periods of increasing strain he noted that contact with the Orange Order became “more
regularised because of the disagreements and disputes particularly last year during the flag protests” (p. 3).

Baggott was later to refer to “proactive” efforts to engage with the Orange Order and the adoption of a more strategic approach to engagement than had existed before,

“I met with the Order at a very senior level on a number of occasions last year and this year and that will carry on with my successor. So we have opened a door to meet with them to explain what we are doing and what we would ask them to help us with, and basically also to listen to some of their concerns” (p. 6).

While Hamilton has been in office for a relatively short period (p. 1) he outlined a more strategic approach to the Orange Order than either Orde or Baggott had adopted and an effort to involve himself personally in high-level discussions. He described that he initiated this process as one of Baggott’s assistant chief constables (p. 2) in the summer of 2013 and that in the first seven months of his appointment he had already met with “various senior officials from the Grand Orange Lodge” (p. 2) formally since becoming Chief, including the Grand Master. He described the rationale for formalising meetings with the Orange Order in the following terms,

“That summer (2013) became quite troublesome and before the end of July I got agreement from the then Chief Constable that we would attempt to have engagement at a very strategic level between the PSNI and the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland. And that was really the start of it” (p. 3)
3.5 The Orange Order as Priority

Having discussed issues of the frequency and nature of contact with the Orange Order, the interviews considered what on-going importance the Chief Constables attached to the Orange Order. It was clear that the importance the three Chief Constables ascribed to the Orange Order varied. It is also the case that the importance of the Orange Order has increased across the tenure of the three Chief Constables and that is linked less to the involving the Orange Order and the PUL community more widely.

Orde did not ascribe a specific importance to Orange Order and there is little sense that his initial impression of the Orange Order as “a law abiding, broadly law abiding group of people who would not strategically cause me any particular issues” changed (p. 3). Though he also said, “one of the issues around the Orange really was the fact it was vulnerable to being hijacked. If you think of the riots of 2005, for example, that wasn’t anything to do with the Orange” (p. 3). He summed up the priority issue as follows,

“I don’t think I had an order of priority, the learning here is it’s good to talk and it’s good to talk to anybody who wants to make a difference to policing, which is the mantra I adopted very early on” (p. 5).

Later Orde touched on what he perceived as the diminishing importance of the Orange Order. He described it as an “ageing organisation” (p. 11) and further as “not on its last legs but certainly getting smaller and older and one could argue therefore less relevant” (p. 23), a theme that will later be reflected by some senior PSNI officers. His perception of the Orange Order becoming “less relevant” to the people the PSNI were policing was based on a view that it did not speak for what he described as the “fractured and disenfranchised” (p. 20) loyalist working class.
Hamilton’s response was couched in terms of what he described as a “stakeholder analysis” (p. 5). He described the Orange Order as “high interest, low influence” while recognising their significance as a policing stakeholder (p. 6). His assessment of the “low influence” of the Orange Order was based on three factors, first its limited influence in political unionism (p. 6), second the challenges the Orange Order leadership faces in exerting “much influence over the membership” (p. 6) and finally a “generational shift” in Northern Ireland which is reflected in a reduced interest in politics and the loyal orders generally (p. 6). He attributes their “high interest” to the policing of parades, and protest activity and all of that” (p. 6).

3.6 The Organisational Relationship

Baggott and Hamilton were asked for their assessment of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship at the organisational level. Both pointed to a relationship that had a number of complexities and contrasted what they saw as the difference between the operational/tactical relationship. The tactical relationship was broadly positive with a clear focus on managing parades that were not contentious. The organisational relationship, in contrast had a number of challenges.

Baggott when accounting for the organisational relationship and how it has changed during his tenure identified “tension” (p. 5) as characterising the relationship particularly towards the latter years. He cited two reasons for the tension. The first was a reduction in the Orange Order’s influence politically. He said “I think the role of the Order in political life has become dissipated and reduced” (p. 6). The second reason he provided was a perception that Orange Order causes had become connected with the wider concerns of the PUL community and paramilitarism particularly in Belfast, “But in Belfast where it has become connected, for whatever reason, with
other bands, with paramilitaries and the cause is bigger than simply one of an Orange Order” (p. 6). While he expressed some confidence for the future of the relationship and denied it was a wholly reactive relationship (p. 15) he did acknowledge the importance of events in determining the organisational relationship including the 2014 Parades Commission determination on the Belfast 12th July parade, which he suggested,

“will no doubt set the tone for the following year in terms of relationships and conversations and those sorts of things. So we'll wait and see what events might do” (p. 14).

In contrast to this organisational tension Baggott accepted that in many places the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order had “never been better” (p. 7) and recognised that “a huge amount of effort has gone into trying locally to make sure that there is an opportunity for constructive dialogue” (p. 15). Hamilton similarly assessed that what he described as the “tactical relationship” relationship as “probably quite close” (p. 7) one that is characterised by pragmatism (p. 7) and a mutual desire to get “the job done” (p. 7).

Hamilton contrasted this mutually reliant tactical relationship with the strategic level engagement that he described in terms of challenge. He articulated this challenge in terms of a disconnect between where he perceives the strategic influence and agenda of the PSNI to be and that of the Orange Order’s. He characterises the Orange Order’s “influence and impact” at “a local level around bespoke events” (p. 7) as opposed to the

“the more strategic piece about shaping the environment and making Northern Ireland a more peaceful, safe, confident place, more progressive and moving on and the sort of post-conflict stuff” (p. 7)
Hamilton exemplified the point by suggesting that the Orange Order’s reaction to his change programme would be a tactical one based on aspiration for engagement with new District Commanders. While he recognised this as “important” and “pragmatic” (p. 7) he also suggested, “it’s not about how we can either resolve the parading issues, or make policing better, or make community relations with the police better” (p. 7) He dismissed, “I would refute it” (p. 11) the suggestion that PSNI command views the Orange Order as an “irritant” (p. 11) and instead characterised them as “pretty key stakeholders” representative of a “broad church”, albeit with internal organisational difficulties that has not moved significantly from their core functions into community capacity building, for example (p. 11).

Hamilton was asked whether he was frustrated by the on-going situation at Twaddell. While he acknowledged frustration in terms of what he described as “pure opportunity costs” both in terms of the cost of the policing operation generally to the public purse and also in terms of the police’s ability to deal with, for example issues of “anti-social behaviour” and all the other quality of life issues” which impact “in the communities the Orange come from” (p. 12), Hamilton also acknowledged it is “just part of the reality of Northern Ireland” (p. 12).

Although Hamilton identifies challenges in the relationship he was also clear of his personal commitment and PSNI’s commitment to managing that relationship positively. He said,

“I think we just keep the door of engagement open and try to be helpful and certainly not be dismissive, and understand the perceptions that exist and try almost, conversation by conversation, and relationship by relationship, to demolish some of the myths that have grown up over the last, probably 10, 15 years” (p. 11).
Of his personal commitment to that relationship he noted,

‘I can tell you what I will do that might help to build confidence within
the Orange Order, I’ll take them seriously. It’s simple things like I do
have an understanding of them, because of having grown up here frankly,
which has to be to their advantage” (p. 10).

3.7 Leadership

The Chief Constables’ perception of the general relationship between the
Orange Order and PSNI was followed up by consideration of specific aspects of this,
particularly the Chief Constables’ assessment of Orange Order leadership.
Interviewees were questioned about the ability of Orange Order leaders to influence
the membership and deliver coherent strategy. Throughout the interviews comments
were made which reflected on the Chief Constable’s perception of the overall
effectiveness of the Orange hierarchy. The general opinion of Orde, Baggott and
Hamilton appeared to be that the Orange Order leadership can at times display
weakness and inconsistency. It also had a limited influence over its membership.
They also accepted the Orange Order is a diverse organisation that militates against
strong leadership. In this regard they accepted that comparisons with a command and
control organisation, such as police, proved to be unhelpful.

Orde’s preliminary comments on Orange leadership were in the context of the
2005 Whiterock riots. He stated they “could have been stronger” (p. 3). He suggested
the Orange leadership in blaming the PSNI for the violence were “not honest”, (p. 16)
and that the behaviour of senior Orangemen “almost gave permission to anyone who
wants to fly the loyalist flag of convenience to riot, as they did for three days” (p. 16).
He described himself as “bloody critical” of the Orange Order and attributed their
lack of honesty to a deficit of “grip” (p. 10). A lack of grip that also extended to their ability to deliver strategy across a diverse organisation (p. 10).

Baggott’s comments proved to be very similar. He accepted orangeism was not structured to deliver strong leadership because it relied “upon common values and standards” (p. 6). He also believed that comparing levels of control between orangeism and PSNI was unrealistic (p. 8). Although Baggott couched his assessment of Orange Order leadership in terms of the difficulty a voluntary organisation faces he also stood by his comments of July 2013 that the Orange Order leadership had been irresponsible (p. 8) in their handling of the 12th July parade in Belfast and against the background of a politically febrile and tense atmosphere had failed to think through the implications of some of their actions (p. 9). He also reckoned that the Orange Order had lost control of the Twaddell situation (p. 9) that had become “wrapped up in other peoples causes” (p. 9)

Interestingly Hamilton’s comments on the Orange Order leadership, in part, reflected that of his predecessors. His starting point was a recognition of an “honestly held passion amongst them in terms of the Protestant identity.” However and in an echo of the previous discussion of the Orange Order and PSNI’s organisational relationship he noted strategic challenges for the Orange Order leadership. He said that,

“In one sense they know what they need to hold on to, which is British unionist identity, but I don’t think there’s a strategy around how that can be developed, how it can be made more progressive,…..I’m not talking about their values or their objectives (p. 4).

He concluded his assessment of the Orange Order leadership by arguing that some of the traits of Orange leadership created a difficulty for him as Chief Constable,
“Well it concerns me in that it depends who you speak to at the top end of the Orange Order about how much faith you can put in their ability to deliver, not because they’re disingenuous people, I think they’re probably pretty authentic. I mightn’t agree with them, but what they believe is genuinely what they believe. I wouldn’t doubt their authenticity, but their ability to deliver, or speak with one voice, is very limited” (p. 4).

3.8 The Rural / Urban Divide

One of the major issues considered with both PSNI and Orange Order interviewees was a perception of the Orange Order’s character. Was this significantly different between urban and rural contexts and could this be a factor in the PSNI and Orange Order relationship? The issue is considered more in subsequent chapters. The matter was discussed with the three Chief Constables also. Their responses were consistent in characterising urban and rural orangeism as differing. Rural orangeism’s community and family focus was contrasted with some of the tensions evident around urban Orangeism. Orde spoke of a “different approach between the urban and rural” and that rural orangeism was “far more community focused “ (p. 9). Baggott described the difference as “big” (p. 5) between Belfast and rural areas where parades retain a cross community dimension and where nationalists are “prepared to join in the festivities” (p. 5). He suggested that in Belfast the, “cause is bigger than simply one of an Orange Order it actually becomes wrapped up around flag protests and bigger issues of resentment or isolation or feeling that people have lost ground” (p. 5).

Similarly Hamilton said the “Urban Orangeman is a pretty different beast to the rural one. The mentality is different, its different dynamics apply there” (p. 4). He
suggested these different dynamics are a result, among other things, of a shifting
demographic in Belfast with a reducing “footprint” for the “Ulster Protestant”
community (p. 5.). Likewise Orde attributed to some of the difference between rural
and urban Orangeism as a reality of the community tensions evident in Belfast.

3.9 Concluding Questions

Two further issues that are germane to the relationship between the PSNI and
Orange Order relationship were explored with the Chief Constables, the police
relationship with the Parades Commission and the “greening of the PSNI.”

Orde and Baggott were asked about the police relationship with the Parades
Commission, the significance of that relationship and whether there was any
substance in the view among some elements of the Orange Order that the police and
Parades Commission colluded in limiting the Orange Order’s perceived right to
parade. Both Orde and Baggott maintained that the police relationship with the
Orange Order was professional. Orde, for example, argued that the PSNI’s
relationship with Commission was a matter of “law” (p. 22) and was conducted in
such a way as to be “pretty open and pretty transparent” (p. 22). He also suggested
any accusation he as Chief Constable had a “cosy” relationship with the Commission
was “predictable and simplistic” (p. 21). Interestingly and in contrast Baggott did not
accept there was an Orange Order perception that Police influenced the Commission
(P. 11). Pressure of time prevented the question being put to Hamilton.

The final issue explored was the Orange Order view the PSNI has “greened”
(British-Irish, 2013) and that in doing so has undermined its relationship not just with
orangeism but the wider PUL community. Orde, Baggott and Hamilton all rejected
the “greening” notion. Hamilton for example did not accept “for a minute that we
have ‘greened’ (p. 8). Orde suggested the accusation was as “inaccurate as some of their other statements” (p. 18) but also added that “if ‘greening’ ‘PSNI means we allow Catholics to join it in reasonable numbers….then yes I ‘greened’ and make no apology for it” (p. 18). In contrast to Orde’s robust rebuttal of the suggestion both Baggott and Hamilton accepted how such a perception might have been created. Baggott suggested that “inevitably there could be a perception that people who are outside the political life being brought in means you have given ground to them” (p. 17). Hamilton’s explanation was similar and he accepted that the PSNI’s efforts to build a relationship with the nationalist and republican community, among other things, “would come together to give the impression to a unionist, or to an Orangeman, that we had been ‘greened’. I can understand why the perception exists” (p. 8).

3.10 Conclusion

• On appointment, other than in the case of Hamilton, the Chief Constables had a limited knowledge of Orangeism and they did not regard it as an early strategic priority. The lack of strategic priority attributed to Orangeism by Orde and Baggott was reflected in the absence of the relationship being on a strategic and formal footing.

• As crisis, the flags dispute, began to overtake the relationship during Baggott’s tenure George Hamilton as an Assistant Chief Constable sought to formalise the PSNI’s dealings with the Orange Order and has continued this approach as Chief Constable with what he describes as his innate understanding of Orangeism due to being a locally raised Chief Constable.
• The three Chief Constables regard the tactical relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order in positive terms. In contrast the organisational relationship is regarded as presenting greater challenges, some of which the Chief Constables attribute to the nature of Orangeism and the strategic vision of its leadership. The role of events in determining the organisational relationship between the two bodies, a theme that will be developed later, is highlighted by Baggott in particular, although he rejects the notion the relationship is wholly event driven.

• Rural and urban Orangeism is differentiated by the three Chief Constables in an interesting reflection of changes in Orangeism apparent in the late nineteenth century (James W McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 36).

• The notion of the PSNI greening is rejected although it is accepted by Baggott and Hamilton the circumstances that gave rise to this perception. Hamilton and Orde contend that the PSNI's relationship with the Parades Commission is professional and legally based. They reject any suggestion of an inappropriate “cosiness” with the Parades Commission.
Chapter 4 Police Service of Northern Ireland

4.1 Introduction

A series of ten interviews were undertaken with senior PSNI officers. To protect their anonymity each PSNI interviewee is described as “Respondent 1 – 10”.

The questions asked reflect those put to the Chief Constables. Other than demographic questions the following issues were explored;

1. The understanding of orangeism;
2. Contact with the Orange Order;
3. Assessment of the Orange Order’s importance;
4. Local relationships with the Orange Order;
5. PSNI’s organisational relationship with orangeism;
6. Specific issues of the relationship, the rural/urban divide, Orange Order leadership, the Parades Commission and the “greening” of the PSNI;
7. Contrasts between the RUC and PSNI relationship with orangeism.

4.2 Demographics

Demographic details were explored. This included community backgrounds, membership of the Orange Order, and family connections to orangeism. This was undertaken to identify potential positive or negative dispositions towards orangeism.

The respondents were overwhelmingly from a male Northern Irish Protestant background. Inter-alia where the respondent was asked to describe their community background, the responses to this included: “very, very broadly [unionist”], “Protestant”, “middle class, Protestant, unionist” and “Protestant, unionist”.

Respondent 10 was to describe himself as attending a Protestant school but being
“wholly areligious and apolitical” (p. 1). None of the respondents proved to be members of the Orange Order or any other Loyal Order.

Six of the respondents have family connections with the Orange Order. Two respondents were found to have fathers in the Order. Other respondents referred to familial connections with the Orange Order through marriage. For the majority family connections were not either strong or current. One respondent referred to a “strong family membership of the Orange Order” when he was young and another to a “long tradition of membership” but no “direct family connection.” It would be ill advised to draw too many conclusions from this. It is reasonable to suggest that there is little in the respondents’ backgrounds to indicate a negative pre-disposition towards the Orange Order. The majority come from Protestant families where in many cases there a connection to the Orange Order and where there was likely to be an understanding of what orangeism stands for.

4.3 What Does Orangeism Mean?

Before finalising the questions they were circulated to colleagues for comment. One suggested a question about what the respondents understand the Orange Order is, to identify if any disconnection existed between how the Orange Order perceives itself and how senior PSNI officers view it. The question was put to the PSNI officers and on one level the answers were not surprising. In their descriptions of orangeism all were to use the term “Protestant” or “unionist.” Many alluded to the religious basis of orangeism. Respondent 6 describes it as, “…at its core a religious organisation…a fraternal organisation…and it looks to celebrate the reformed faith” (p. 3). Equally it is widely viewed as a historical and cultural
organisation that seeks to uphold certain values, including British identity and civil and religious liberty. Respondent 8’s answers was typical,

“They are an organisation that is primarily… in fact exclusively made up from the Protestant community, who have both a cultural, historical and religious aspect to their ethos, commemorating things that happened many hundreds of years ago …they will say that they are a Christian organisation and, I have never read their actual rules of organisation but I would see a large part of their raison d’etre now is around the promotion of protestantism, the promotion of a certain religious outlook and also about trying, whilst it’s a worldwide organisation obviously its genesis is in Ireland, so the promotion of the retention of the link of the United Kingdom with the six counties in Northern Ireland” (p. 2).

The Orange Order could place a greater emphasis on certain aspects of their existence. However the PSNI explanations were not in fact significantly at odds with the Orange Order position. They also reflected broadly the views of Orangeism put forward by the Chief Constables.

Also reflective of Hamilton and Baggott’s view was an opinion among some senior PSNI officers of what they perceived to be a gap at times between the stated religious principles of the Orange Order and its behaviour; or the behaviour of some members. Respondent 9 referred to this as a “say-do gap” (p. 3). Two of the responses (respondent 1 & 4) illustrated the point: Respondent 4, based on his assessment of the Order’s role in sensitive parading contexts, spoke of his “struggle” (p. 27) with the Orange Order putting itself forward as a Christian organisation. Respondent One stated:
“I know from the banners that they carry the different scriptures and different pictures which relate to bible stories, so I know the background to it but I think that having worked with them for many years whenever I would be talking about them they don’t spring to my mind as being a biblically based organisation” (p. 3).

Later in the Chapter the senior PSNI officers are asked about their personal views of the Orange Order, some of which are critical of Orangeism. It is interesting to reflect that the strength of these views are not reflected in the senior officer’s assessment of Orangeism and there is an evident degree of objectivity in their description of the principles of Orangeism.

4.4 Nature and Type of Contact with the Orange Order

There was wide ranging discussion regarding the extent and type of contact the respondents have with the Orange Order. The amount of contact varied by location and typically depended on whether parading was controversial in a particular area. For example, and in the main, those respondents who worked in areas where parades were not controversial had less contact with the Orange Order than colleagues who had to manage more sensitive events. Respondents 1, 3, 6 and 8 exemplified this point. Respondent 1 spoke of the relationship with the Orange Order being managed by his subordinates, particularly operational planning staff, (p. 3) due to the lack of what he called “interface issues” (p. 3). Respondents 3, 6 and 8 responses were similar. In each case they delegated day-to-day responsibility for the relationship to more junior staff as locally there were few parading sensitivities. Respondent 3 spoke of the relationship thus, “because 99% of this is resolved in a routine way” (p. 7) and also emphasised the critical role of operational planning staff in dealing with the
Orange Order, “99% of that is probably done through the Ops Planning Sergeant” (p. 3). Respondent 3 noted that he had little contact with the Orange Order, Respondent 6 is also responsible for a location with a relatively benign parading environment and consequently has “very few direct dealings with the Orange Order.” He did however and in reflection of the point made earlier that part of the reach of the Orange Order, historically and currently, is the presence of many unionist politicians among their ranks that by meeting with unionist politicians this represented informal contact with the Orange Order,

“I’ve had very few direct dealings with the Orange Order. I have indirect meetings with them because some of the politicians I meet also hold membership of those organisations so they are speaking with many voices, if you like, they are speaking with their political voice, they are speaking with their constituency voice but potentially they are also speaking from that as well” (p. 4).

Respondent 7's approach to contact with the Orange Order contrasted with colleagues. Respondent 7 spoke of a conscious decision to engage with the Orange Order in spite of a very benign parading context. He described the contact thus, “I’ve couldn’t tell exactly how many, but I’ve met with practically all the Districts’ sort of hierarchies” (p. 7).

This general lack of senior level contact in areas where parading is non-contentious contrasted with those where parading remains a policing challenge. Several respondents have experience of policing one particular area at points in their careers and referred to high levels of contact with the Orange Order. A number of factors characterised this contact. It is year long, although the pitch increases in the summer and it tended to be event focused. Respondent 4, who was very clear that
responsibility for managing relationships with the Orange Order and setting the tone
of that relationship sat with him (p. 8) described his approach,

“So building a relationship is a constant thing. When we get through the
main part of the summer marching season, I have sought to sit down with
representatives at that level that I described to have a bit of a review
around how the summer went and to look at where things are at the
minute and begin to sort of tease out where we’re going forward” (p. 5).

In addition to the contact being year long, tactical and granular there are clear
frustrations in the process. Respondent 10 discussed a lack of engagement prior to the
2013 parading season and said, “I was… saying you really need to come and have a
conversation with us and there was no engagement” (p. 9) and at other times he
experienced “complete disengagement” as they “just wont come in and speak to us”
(p. 8). Respondent 9, albeit discussing his perception of the situation 3 years ago,
echoed these concerns and stated, “I think the only time the Orange Order really
wanted to have a conversation was whenever things went badly” (p. 7). He did not
believe the relationship was “built on trust” and they “tend to come to dialogue and
engagement not in an open way” (p. 5). Respondent 2’s frustrations were related to
this. He suggested that parading disputes inevitably got escalated to senior command
levels as “certain people would only speak to certain other people” (p. 6). He also
contrasted unfavourably parading disputes with other aspects of his role and described
these as at times “all consuming” and that few other of his duties “drag you to that
kind of level” to the detriment of “virtually everything else” (p. 7).
4.5 The Status of the Orange Order

Once the level of contact between senior officers and the Orange Order had been discussed, the interviews went on to consider the importance senior PSNI officers attributed to orangeism and their view of its place within unionism and loyalism.

All of the respondents attributed some significance to the Orange Order. However a number recognised a change in PUL power dynamics and the declining size of the Order. Respondent 3, for example and not unlike an Orange Order interviewee, suggested the PSNI would get more “bang for their buck” with the loyalist bands than with the Orange Order (p. 41) and Respondent 8 suggested orangeism has “not got the prominent position it had in the 60s, 70s and 80s” (p.6). Others noted that importance fluctuated according to the time of year and events. Respondent 5 said, “I think the priority attached to them will fluctuate depending on the prevailing circumstances” (p. 7).

In discussing the status of Orangeism responses fell into two broad categories. Some stressed the Orange Order’s importance strategically in terms of its position in Northern Ireland and unionism and others in terms of its on-street presence. Respondents 1, 6, 7 and 8 attribute a strategic importance to the Orange Order. Respondent 1 stated:

“So I think as far as the unionist side of the community are concerned the Orange Order are very important because it means a lot to those people and therefore it has to mean a lot to us” (p. 8).

Respondent 6’s view was similar to this. He talked about the Orange Order’s “quite pervasive reach” within the PUL community and their emotional significance to that community. With Respondent 7 (p. 6) he also suggested that the Orange Order
derived an element of their importance from their place as one facet of an increasingly “disengaged, disenfranchised, angry, grassroots loyalist community” (p. 12).

Respondent 7 with Respondents 5 and 8 placed a positive emphasis on this “reach” of the Orange Order and suggested that the PSNI’ relationship with orangeism created opportunities for engagement across the PUL community. Respondent 8 believed that,

“I still think they are a big stakeholder and if they have 25 to 30,000 members, that’s a right sizeable reach they have in to that loyalist unionist community. So I could see a benefit of us having a relationship with them to exploit that reach, and, if they can be a vehicle by which we understand the resentments, the issues, the concerns that are existing within that community and a vehicle by which we can try and assuage or deal with some of those, why wouldn’t we?” (p. 13).

Other respondents saw the importance of the Orange Order more in terms of policing challenges and managing risk. Respondent 2 described contact with the Orange Order as “critical” and a “10” (p. 5) on a scale of importance. Respondents 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 echoed these views. Respondent 8 spoke of the policing demands in terms of their numbers and the “huge mobilisation of police” (p. 5) on the 12th of July. Respondent 4’s answer was especially revealing and effectively illustrated the critical importance that orangeism is viewed with when parading issues are controversial. He stated that,

“In X I think it’s right up there and I say that at a simple level because you know as well as I do - in actual fact the parading season and the marching season was never July and August as many people think. The parading calendar extended well beyond that for years, but particularly
in the context we’ve been operating in over the last couple of years, with
the added dimension of protests coming out of the PUL community, with
which certainly some aspects of the Orange Order are involved, the
reality is, on a week to week basis, without ceasing, the Orange Order are
involved in some way, shape or form of bringing people onto the streets,
in a lawful and notified way, don’t get me wrong, but they’re bringing a
lot of people onto the streets around parades and stuff. So it’s a critical
part of what we do, to the point, I’ll put it in a simple sense, I would want
to be getting a sense on a week by week basis, not necessarily directly with
me, but through the contact that I know other officers in the District
have, not least the likes of Operational Planning, I want to know what the
mood music is on a week to week basis” (p. 5).

Respondent 9 who policed the same situation spoke about the Orange Order’s
importance in terms of risk and the potential damage to community relationships of
mismanaging parading issues. He spoke of “huge” consequences (p. 9).

Of those respondents who gave a score of 1 – 10 for the importance of the
relationship with the Orange Order, only one described this as being low rising to
medium towards the beginning of the summer. Other scores ranged from a “6/7” to a
“10.”

When a question was raised about the on-going importance of the Orange
Order in unionism, the responses reflected the themes explored above. All of the
respondents attributed a continuing significance to orangeism although some noted
what they believed was a declining influence. The on-going importance is attributed
to three factors. First was the presence of so many politicians in the Orange Order.
Respondent 8 referred, for example to seeing “a lot of our prominent unionist
politicians” (p. 6) parading on the 12th July. The second factor that has been referred to previously was the reach of the Orange Order into the wider PUL community. Respondent 6 described this as based, on among things, familial connections. He said “Every Orangeman has a family, every Orangeman has friends and traditions come and traditions go but they are still a very large organisations and their outreach into that community is quite pervasive” (p. 12).

The final reason provided for the continuing importance of orangeism in unionism was its symbolic importance. Respondent 10, for example, described Orangeism as a “public manifestation” of a “large element of the loyalist and unionist tradition and identity” (p. 1).

4.6 Local Relationship with the Orange Order.

The interviews considered the PSNI and Orange Order relationship at a local level. Senior officers were asked to describe the “type” of relationship they had with the Orange Order. Comments regarding the nature of local relationships were also made later in responses to other questions. Other than in one context the PSNI and Orange Order relationship at the local level was described in positive terms and the impression given of business-like relations, serviced by operational planning staff and focussed on delivering a policing service. Respondent 1 spoke of a “good working rapport along with our operational planning people” (p. 3), Respondent 3 argued that, “Relationships historically have been very good in this District because probably there are very limited if any contentious issues with marching”, and Respondent 5 described a “static relationship” which is “positive” (p. 5).
In two cases the respondents qualified their general view of a positive relationship. Respondent 5 also suggested that although the relationship was positive accessing the Orange Order at the appropriate level could be difficult, “I found this one a little bit more difficult just to try and hook into the kind of key people that I would recognise as being on a par with my position” (p. 4). Respondent 3, although recognising a currently “solid” relationship had an interesting perspective on one of the challenges he saw in managing that local relationship. In contrasting the relationship with republicanism he suggested that Orangeism dealt more in emotion than logic and that in negotiations with the Orange Order it was, at times a matter of “we’ll have to see what the tail says first before the dog can decide” (p. 29).

In contrast to the positive relationships two senior officers described a very challenging relationship in one particular location. For purposes of anonymity the location cannot be identified, Respondent 9 described his experience of the relationship as “fragmented” “not healthy” (p. 7) and without any sense of “shared endeavour” or “outcomes” (p. 7), albeit his comments reflected the situation at least eighteen months before the date of the interview. Respondent 4 reflected on the same situation and recognised a similarly challenging situation that he intended to improve. He stated that,

“I think the last number of years…there has been a significant downturn in the relationship between policing and the Orange and it’s been impacted by factors outside the Orange institution but which more broadly affect the PUL community… you know the flags and all of that thing, but clearly the relationship suffered big time. …one of my key objectives was rebuilding the relationships with the PUL community, and in particular the Orange Order” (p. 7).
Another aspect of the local relationship with the Orange Order was examined. This related to the impacts of policing parades on delivering routine policing. All respondents, except one, noted frustration at the impacts of policing parades. Respondent 4 described the demands as “hugely resource intensive” which diverted local policing, “away from those core issues which ultimately...my sense is, vast swathes of the community want us to deal with” (p. 13). Respondent 5 echoed the theme that policing parades lessens the service the rest of the community receive and added that policing of parades took up an “an inordinate amount of time, money and effort with little positive outcome, either for policing, but actually for the community in general” (p. 24). Respondent 8 considered the cost issues in broader terms of the overall police budget but again reflected on the impacts of service delivery and referred to the “opportunity costs” (p. 10) of parades, similar to Hamilton. He framed his response in terms of a preference of spending money on “cyber crime” and other real priorities for local communities” (p. 10) as opposed to parades.

Frontline staff were not interviewed as part of the data gathering. The senior officers were asked to reflect on the attitude of their frontline colleagues to the Orange Order. It is accepted that front line staff are likely to hold various views of the Orange Order affected by such factors as community background, operational experience and also location. Indeed these points were made in a variety of responses. A view was also expressed, Respondent 2 for example, in response to the question that personal perceptions did not impact on the impartiality of PSNI officers and PSNI were adept at “neutralising” (p. 18) the community background of its staff.

The limitations of the question recognised its purpose was to identify common themes and assess the mood of the PSNI’s frontline, albeit interpreted by their senior colleagues. A general theme did emerge and 6 respondents pointed to a “weariness”
and “frustration” evident in their staff at the demands of managing Orange parades, particularly in Belfast. (Due to the requirements placed on the PSNI by the nightly Twaddell protests, officers from across Northern Ireland are deployed to deal with this on rotation). Respondent1, for example, described his staff as being “sick, sore and tired” (p. 17) of Twaddell deployments. Both Respondents 6 and 5 focused on the professional disruption that routine deployments to Twaddell caused officers in terms of managing their routine workload. Respondent 6 described his staff as “frustrated” (p. 23) and Respondent 5 summarised his feeling by suggesting that “I’m not sure that it [Orange Order] would have a particularly favourable perception among the vast majority of officers” (p. 21). One of the most telling comments was made by Respondent 4 who believed that the nightly management of Twaddell reinforced the Troubles notion of the police in Northern Ireland as the third religion, neither Protestant nor Catholic. He also maintained that it is not lost on those police officers doing duty at Twaddell that “12 months ago people with Orange sashes round their necks were swinging swords at them” (p. 26). In a lighter vein Respondent 7 referred to the detrimental impact on police of listening to “The Sash” for the “300th time being played badly” (p. 20).

4.7 The Non-Parading Relationship

The researcher was involved with a meeting set up between senior PSNI officers and Orange District Masters in 2014. The meeting was an opportunity to allow senior Orange figures to express any concerns about policing. It was also designed to provide a platform to discuss issues that were not solely parade focused. One of the architects of the event described it as being an effort to , “find a less
contentious space to try and have that engagement on or in” (p. 8). Engagement, he recognised, was typically defined by the contentious issue of parading. Although the value of this initiative was not discussed directly with the respondents, they were asked if a relationship existed with the Orange Order at local level outside that demanded by parades. The responses pointed to a relationship that was defined overwhelmingly by parading. A number of respondents pointed to single-issue engagement with the Orange Order over issues such as arson attacks on Orange Halls and low-level engagement with neighbourhood policing teams. One example arose where a senior officer, Respondent 7, had been “pushing” his staff to “go out and have a cup of tea with them [Orange lodges], go out and meet them” (p. 7). He also described efforts to link in with various youth programmes run by the Orange Order (p. 15).

Other respondents pointed to an absence in their current roles of specific engagement with the Orange Order that was not event related. However some did see evidence of non-event specific engagement with the Orange Order through the Orange Order’s links into the wider PUL community. Respondent 4 initially suggested that his responsibility as a senior officer did not extend beyond ensuring events passed off peacefully (p. 4). However when he was challenged on this limited view of engagement he did accept that alongside operational challenges an opportunity could be created for engagement that was not simply about events. He added,

“I fully accept the Orange institution is a significant body of people…and we have significant messages…which go beyond parading, whether it be crime prevention, whether it be simply about building strong relationships and building confidence in communities, so they’re a big
constituency and from that point of view, yes, I can understand and see that there are opportunities to get in front of people, that where you have that sort of gathering of people there’s good opportunities to get in front of them” (p. 6).

Other interviewees who described their relationship with the Orange Order solely in terms of events also recognised a gap in engagement with the Orange Order. Respondent 5 said, “I think we probably haven’t tapped into that to the extent potentially we could” (p. 9). One of the architects of the initiative referred to previously saw it as being of limited success. He believed, “I am not sure it got traction outside Belfast”. He also accepted that the Orange Order and PUL accusation that the PSNI’s interest in them was limited to the summer was a “fair challenge.”

4.8 The Organisational Relationship

Senior officers were asked to assess at the organisational level the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order. Their answers contrasted in the main, but not exclusively, with their assessment of a positive and business-like local relationship. Certainly three of the respondents were broadly positive about the organisational relationship but two, Respondents 1 & 4, caveated these comments by making a distinction between the organisational relationship in the rural and urban contexts noting tensions in urban areas. The other respondents were less positive in their assessment of the organisational relationship. Four of the respondents were comfortable with the description of the relationship as fragile. Respondent 6 described it as “fragile” and “brittle” (p. 15). Respondent 7 who pointed out some strengths in the relationship also referred to its fragility and argued that “it’s a very, very fragile
relationship” (p. 11). Respondent 8 agreed, “fragile is maybe not a bad term” (p. 13).
Respondent 9 was also comfortable with the term and said

“I think the fragile word is a fairly good analysis…. there’s a perception that policing from within unionism, I think from my experience, that policing really doesn’t have any time, or doesn’t really get what we’re about, doesn’t get the legitimacy of us as an institution and we’re only doing this because you have to do it, and actually you don’t do it very well. So that all lends itself to fragility, because there’s no confidence, there’s no trust” (p. 18).

Although Respondent 5 did not use the term “fragile” he described the relationship as “not particularly positive” (p. 10). He went on to stress the significance of Belfast and the Twaddell dispute in setting the tone for the organisational relationship as a whole. Respondent 10 picked up this same theme in a detailed analysis of the PSNI relationship with the PUL community. He stressed that the relationship is “defined by circumstances” (p. 6) and that attaching a label or description to the relationship has a “limited temporal value” (p. 6). He added that one of the defining features of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship is “crisis management” and that the “10%” of crisis still defines the “90%” of “normal activity and normal engagement” (p. 1). When the respondents were asked whether the relationship was improving or deteriorating, there was little consistency in the responses. On response stood out however and it contrasted the management of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship between Baggott’s and Hamilton’s tenure. Respondent 2 assessed the Hamilton as Chief Constable. He suggested that the relationship was in a “better place than it was” and described Hamilton as more
“open” to the Orange Order and prepared to give them a voice, as opposed to his predecessor.

4.9 The Rural/Urban Divide

The researcher has policed Orange parades in a variety of operational contexts. On the basis of that experience the perception of a difference between the PSNI relationship with orangeism in its rural and urban contexts was explored along with the reasons for this.

Without exception, a contrast was drawn between the rural and urban, particularly Belfast, manifestations of orangeism. Respondent 1 stated “I think you have the Orange Order in the country and the Orange Order in Belfast” (p. 2). Similarly Respondent 2 suggested “I would differentiate Belfast from the rest of Northern Ireland” (p. 3). Respondent 7 described rural orangeism as “more akin to the Women’s Institute” and “So I actually see that there’s a big split now between what I call the Belfast Orange Order and the rural Orange Order” (p. 2). Respondent 8 made similar comments and opined that “Belfast” may be “out of step” with rural Orangeism, a view held also by some of his rural Orange Order contacts. In the Literature Review reference was made to the influence of loyalist bands and the phenomenon of the blood and thunder bands. Both Respondents 6 and 10 in an echo of this described what he sees as the difference between rural and urban Orange events in the appearance, deportment and musicianship of the bands (p. 18). Respondent 10 spoke of a “discernible difference between “city and country bands” (p. 2)

Not surprisingly a number of explanations were given to explain this difference. The tendency was to attribute it to the difference between rural and urban
environments. In the urban environment people were characterised as living “cheek by jowl” in areas scarred by the Troubles and where sectarian tensions remained high. Here republican agitation around parades was also increasing and physical interfaces between communities remain in places delineated by peace walls. In contrast a sense of greater co-operation and mutual inter-dependence was seen in rural areas. Respondent 8 summed this up,

“….Then I think urban environment, high density of people, they live cheek by jowl, that sort of mistrust always existed around interfaces. You don’t really have interfaces in the rural community. I just think when you add all that together Belfast is just more difficult” (p. 8).

4.10 Orange Leadership

The PSNI view of Orange leadership was discussed in a number of questions. With echoes of the views of the Chief Constables, a leadership deficit was identified by a number of the respondents. Some, again similar to the Chief Constables, recognised that orangeism’s voluntary nature and democratic structure precluded strong leadership, certainly of a type recognisable to senior PSNI officers. The critique of Orange leadership was based principally on two observations. Some senior PSNI officers were critical of the perceived unwillingness of orange leaders to tackle militancy within its ranks and to take responsibility for those who associate themselves with parades, in bands or as spectators. Others pointed to a perceived lack of strategic capacity.

Respondent 1 believed there is unwillingness among Orange leaders to tackle particularly the behaviour of militants and bands. He described them as unwilling to “face down those what would be more militant” even though the bands are paid by the
Orange Order (p. 10). Respondent 10 reflected a similar view and pointed out PSNI had struggled to persuade the Orange Order of their responsibilities in accepting the consequences of parading. He maintained that the bands and onlookers are only on the street because of the lodges and consequently “So I don’t think its as straightforward as to walk away and a case of ‘mea culpa’ ” (p. 2). Respondent 9 spoke of the Order’s “protectionism” and “defensiveness” which “actually gets in the way of accepting any sort of responsibility, or getting any others to accept responsibility” (p. 5). He later referred while discussing whether the Orange Order thought through the consequences of their decisions to a conversation with local Orange Order leaders in the 1990s. He said that,

“I can remember a long time ago .. having a very difficult meeting with elements associated with the Orange Order in relation to taking the parade down X in the mid-90s when it was conveyed to me that if a police officer had to die as a consequence of getting the parade down to X, well that’s just the way it was. Now that’s very powerful, but it’s also a reflection of the absolute sense of fundamental righteousness, without reference to actual consequence, and that has always stayed with me” (p. 25).

A lack of strategic capacity was identified by a number of respondents that resulted in the Orange Order being exploited by others in the PUL community. Respondent 8, for example, referred to them as “strategically weak” and they have “placed themselves in corners through emotional decisions as opposed to well thought out decisions” (p. 22). He described the Orange Order leadership especially in Belfast as “ordinary” men who find themselves in “positions of power” without the benefit of having been “leaders” or “managers” (p.23).
Although the general tone of the senior PSNI officers is critical of some aspects of Orange leadership, two interviewees took a different view. Respondent 4 believed the Orange Order as part of a pan-unionist alliance displayed high levels of leadership to prevent disorder in July 2014. He also believed they had taken genuine strides to curtail the behaviour of the bands and parade supporters in contrast to 2013 (p. 15). Respondent 6 had an interesting view concerning Orange leadership. He acknowledged the change between 2013 and 2014, suggested there are some “good” leaders within orangeism and that PSNI should encourage strategic leadership in that organisation. However he also raised a searching question for the Orange leadership as to what type of organisation they wanted. The question was this, “I pose a question in my head what is more important to them, doing the right thing or preventing the split?” (p. 28).

4.11 The Parades Commission

The author discussed with senior officers the PSNI’s relationship with the Parades Commission, and their impression of the Orange Order’s perception of this relationship. There was an interesting level of consistency in terms of the responses. Senior PSNI officers believed the Orange Order regarded their relationship with the Parades Commission with suspicion. Respondent 1 stated they were “obviously very suspicious of that relationship” (p. 19). Respondent 5 said that “they feel that police are influential in that decision making process” (p. 5), and Respondent 6 noted that the Orange Order “probably” see PSNI and the Parades Commission as a “continuum” (p. 26). Respondent 9 added, “I still think they [the Orange Order] think it’s you come in, tell them what they want to know and then they make the determinations on that basis.” (p.21) and Respondent 10 “there is a perception at least
in some quarters that we have a cosy relationship” (p. 9). Respondent 7’s view
contrasted that of his colleagues. He said “I think that they now recognise that the
police and the Parades Commission is completely separate” (p. 23).

It is interesting that while the senior officers did not accept Orange Order
suspicion was justified, Respondent 9 for example suggested for some “that
perception of cosiness fits the counter narrative” (p. 22), some demonstrated an
understanding of why this perception may have arisen. Respondent 4 suggested, “I
think we became a wee bit arrogant and we didn’t live out the principles of openness
and transparency” (p. 30). Another, Respondent 3, recognised PSNI’s earlier dealings
with the Parades Commission may have been less neutral than as currently
demonstrated (p. 11). Respondent 10 maintained that the poor quality of some written
submissions to the Parades Commission had not created confidence in the Orange
Order (p. 10).

Two Respondents also believed the Parades Commission have contributed to
the levels of suspicion. Respondent 5 described the Parades Commission
determinations as “quite bland” and a “bit formulaic” (p. 12) and some more
“openness and transparency” in their decision-making would be helpful. In a telling
remark Respondent 2 suggested that the Commission had, at times, avoided taking
responsibility for its decision-making and sought to highlight the influence of the
police (p. 20).

In terms of improving the perception of the PSNI and Parades Commission
relationship there was no consensus. There was however an acceptance by some
officers that the evidential sessions at the Commission could become more open.
Other respondents questioned how much further the PSNI could go in seeking to
reassure the Orange Order. Respondent 10 was asked if the relationship could be
made more transparent. He stated “I am not sure how we could because we have
given them all the forms [PSNI submissions to the Commission]” (p. 10) and
Respondent 5 maintained PSNI had worked “incredibly hard” to explain the
relationship. Two respondents provided an interesting insight into efforts to actively
dispel suspicion. They previously decided to provide protagonists in a parade dispute
with an advance copy of the PSNI’s written submissions to the Commission. The
reaction to this illustrated well the challenges PSNI face in managing community
perceptions. As was noted,

“I emailed them all the stuff in advance. I had a number, small number
come back to me and said right we get it now it has helped us counter
some of this conspiracy theory in our community that you were in and
part of this whole pan-Parades Commission, PSNI, green-front to stop
Orange parades. The difficulty is you create another type of conspiracy
then because the next line you get back is that’s only the written and you
went out to do oral briefings and what did you say to them in person” (p.
10).

4.12 The “Greening” of the PSNI

In the previous chapter the view among some members of the Orange Order
that the PSNI had “greened” (British-Irish, 2013) was put to the Chief Constables. A
similar discussion was held with senior officers in the PSNI. None of the respondents
accepted the pejorative elements of the “greening” notion or there had been a
deliberate decision by the PSNI to turn its back on the PUL community. Respondent 5
“absolutely refutes” the idea and agreed it was “very unfair” (p. 19). Respondent 10
claimed, “So I don’t accept his [Mervyn Gibson] description of it as a “greening” in
that it has been a purposeful tangible objective for the PSNI. We know that’s nonsense” (p. 7).

Yet an understanding existed among some senior officers, similar to Baggott and Hamilton, as to why this perception had developed. They believed that the unintended consequence of PSNI engaging the CNR community post-Patten, created a gap in the relationship with the PUL community. There was also a view from some officers, Respondent 1 for example, that the PSNI had taken the PUL community for granted. Respondent 2 described the perspective as “understandable” (p. 16). Respondents 4, 6, 7 and 9 went further. They understood fully the imperative driving a focus on the CNR community, but Respondent 4, for example suggested consequently “we took our eye off the ball of loyalism” (p. 13) and Respondent 6, that as PSNI sought to build confidence in the CNR community that,

“little did we realise that behind us loyalists were looking at us putting their hands in their pockets and turning around shrugging their shoulders and saying “they’re not interested in us anymore” (p. 20).

One Respondent also discussed their “public” acknowledgment to “Mervyn and others” that the PSNI had presumed “a residual level of engagement and support from within the loyalist community” (p. 6). This respondent concluded by saying, “I accept the gap was definitely there and I accept at least in part we have to accept our responsibility for why the perception was created” (p. 7). Respondent 9 when asked about the PSNI’s greening replied, “I think there’s something in it” (p. 15) and that as PSNI built confidence in the CNR community it did not “give enough credence and credibility to a loyalist sort of underbelly which was becoming increasingly disengaged until it was too late” (p. 16).
4.13 The RUC

The respondents were asked about the RUC’s relationship with the Orange Order and if this was in any way different to that experienced by the PSNI. Some were also asked if the Orange Order’s view of the RUC was unrealistic and seen through “rose coloured spectacles.” The majority of respondents asked were content with the latter proposition. Respondent 4 exemplified the view and suggested that the Orange Order “golden” view of the RUC was symptomatic of a general feeling within the PUL community towards policing (p. 37). Others went further and as Respondent 6 argued the Orange Order viewed the RUC through a “haze of amnesia.” Respondent 10 identified “short memory syndrome” as driving the Orange Order view of the RUC (p. 14).

The consensus from senior officers was that the PSNI’s relationship with the Orange Order was very similar to that experienced by the RUC, although two referred to a closeness between the two bodies that had now ceased. Respondent 10 compared his experience of orangeism in 1998 and 2013 and suggested the relationship was “every bit as bad, every bit as visceral” (p. 11). Other respondents, Respondent 5 for example, assessing the RUC’s relationship with the Orange Order focussed on the RUC’s firm stand against Orangeism post 1985 and as set out in the Literature Review the impacts of Hermon’s decision, “a turning point” (p. 30) to tackle contentious parades. Respondent 5 and 9 also focused on the personal impacts of Orange Order decisions. Respondent 5, while not accusing the orange Order of orchestrating violence, noted that the Orange Order had “conveniently forget of the impact of their decisions and their actions on the police” and added

“because so many officers were directly, and their families, directly impacted, intimidated out of their houses, injured, cars destroyed. So I
think they have a selective memory when it comes to their relationship
with the organisation and I think it’s a kind of history they’ve written for
themselves that isn’t necessarily reflective of reality” (p. 31).

Respondent 9 also spoke of the RUC officers “burnt out of their homes” because the police service “stood its ground” (p.31).

4.14 Personal Reflections

Senior PSNI officers were asked to describe their personal feelings about the Orange Order and how they might feel if their children joined it. The questions prompted an interesting reaction from some Respondents who appeared uncomfortable in offering a response. One respondent declined to provide a personal view. Another said, “That’s the hardest question you have asked me, because I want to answer it honestly.”

The majority of respondents who provided an answer had reservations about orangeism. Respondent 7 stood out as the only officer to describe it positively. He believed orangeism had an “amazing potential for good” (p. 22) but also recognised the challenges of militancy in its ranks. Respondent 8 spoke of negative perceptions in society of orangeism and when asked if he shared those perceptions, said, “Well if I wasn’t in the police, I wouldn’t be in the Orange Order” (p. 19). Respondent 1 couched his view of the Orange Order in terms of seeing no “need” (p. 19) for them. Two of the respondents described the Orange Order in terms of an organisation, among others, that excluded people. Respondent 2, for example described the Orange Order, among other groups as “exclusive and in some ways harmful” and they “divide the community for their own purposes” (p.19).
Respondent 3 echoed this view of a body that excludes “the vast majority of Northern Ireland” (p. 34) Respondent 5 framed his response in terms of the negative impacts of the Orange Order’s “insistence” on parading (p. 23) on communities. Respondent 6’s answer was more difficult to interpret. He maintained that he held no antipathy (p.25) towards the Orange Order and it is no different to other faith-based organisations. However he did suggest that orangeism, among other groups, contributes to a society (p. 25) where a “perpetual cycle of tension, strife and trouble” exists.

It is unsurprising there was no particular enthusiasm among the respondents for their children to join the Orange Order. Some in answering the question accepted this would be a personal matter for their children and they would be unwilling to interfere in this. Respondent 5 and 1 exemplify the point. Respondent 5 says, “Mightn’t like it, but people are free to make a choice around it” (p. 22). Interestingly though both respondents while recognising the freedom of choice for their children were clear none of them would take this step. Respondent 5, for example, noted his children’s view of orangeism was based on their perception of the impact the Orange Order had on their parent (p. 22). Respondent 2 advised he would be “deeply concerned because I can’t regard it as a valuable contribution to society” (p. 18). He argued the Orange Order was a “divisive” organisation. Respondent 4 answered the question from the perspective of his Christian faith and said he “wouldn’t be that comfortable” with his children joining the Orange Order because he sees a disconnection between some of the Order’s activity and what “the Bible says” (p. 27). Respondent 6 described himself as “nervous, very nervous” at the prospect, and says, “let’s just be normal, normal’s good” (p. 25). Equally Respondent 8 baulked at the prospect of his children joining the Orange Order and said, “I would actively seek to discourage it” (p. 19). Respondent 9 took a similar view. He describes the Orange
Order as “in many ways schizophrenic” (p. 25) and until the organisation changes he would “probably not” want his children involved with it. Respondent 7 stood out among his colleagues again. While he would not wish his children to be part of the Orange Order in Belfast, outside of Belfast he would “not mind too much” (p. 21).

4.15 Conclusion

• The senior officers interviewed were overwhelmingly former RUC officers and members of the PUL community, many with family links to the Orange Order. They were able to characterise the Orange Order in terms not dissimilar to those the Orange Order may use. Their community backgrounds reflect those of previous RUC contemporaries.

• The level of parading controversy determines levels of contact between senior officers and the Orange Order in the main. Where parades are controversial, levels of contact are intense. These low levels of contact do not, in the main, extend to conversations outside parading and are managed by more junior officers. There is an absence of local strategies for engagement, either in terms of parading or issues outside of parading.

• Consistent with the low level of contact if parading is not controversial, the local relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order, other than in some urban contexts is positive and business-like. Its primary focus is on managing large numbers of trouble free events. Operational planning staff and not senior police officers manage the local relationship typically. The urban relationship, as will be echoed by the Orange Order interviewees, demonstrates a deficit of trust as it seeks to manage some exceedingly tense on-going parading disputes. Although there is clear
evidence of efforts to build trust and confidence. The one negative aspect of this generally positive picture is the professional frustration senior officers feel at the opportunity costs of policing Orange parades.

- Although the local relationship is benign, the organisational relationship is more challenging and it is characterised by the controversial events as opposed to the routine. The senior PSNI officers point to the fragility of the relationship and the ability of individual events, particularly those in Belfast, to dictate the overall relationship between the two organisations. No mechanism appears to be in place between the PSNI and the Orange Order to prevent the extraordinary overwhelming the ordinary and positive. Feeding into the fragility of the organisational relationship is the perception of senior officers of a deficit in certain aspects of Orange leadership and a perceived unwillingness to take responsibility for the consequences of events and those associated generally with parades, bands and onlookers. A further factor in this organisational relationship is the Parades Commission whose decisions create the single and highly charged events that become emblematic of the overall relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order.

- Senior PSNI Officers, similar to the Chief Constables understand rural and urban orangeism to be different entities which has a bearing on both the organisational and local relationships. This sense of difference reflects late nineteenth century changes in Orangeism and the reality that there are few actively controversial parades outside of the urban context. Orange Order interviewees will propose a similar view of the differences between rural and urban orangeism.
Senior PSNI Officers do not accept that the RUC and Orange Order relationship was much different to that experienced by the PSNI. They have no nostalgic affection for the relationship and some understand the Orange Order view of the RUC to be a “rose coloured.” A view that does not take account of the reality of history and various parading disputes. Equally a view that does not take into account the reality of their personal experience of the outworkings of some Orange Order decisions. The senior PSNI officers expressed the acuteness of some of these personal experiences powerfully in a number of reflections.
Chapter 5 Orange Orders

5.1 Introduction

Nine senior members of the Orange Order were interviewed. Together they have held a variety of offices in orangeism but also remain part of the Orange Order’s grass roots structure, the private lodge. The Order’s Grand Secretary facilitated the interviews. A number, 1 to 9, identifies each interviewee. To protect the anonymity of the interviewees no detail is given of either their office or their location. A series of questions were put to the interviewees. The questions reflect those put to the chief constables and senior PSNI officers.

The Chapter is divided into a number of sections. Following some demographic details, the themes below are explored by way of interview;

1. Contact with PSNI command;
2. Local relationship with PSNI;
3. The Orange Order’s organisational relationship with PSNI;
4. Some specifics of the relationship, including the rural/urban divide, the Parades Commission and the PSNI’s “greening”;
5. The contrast between the RUC and PSNI relationship with Orangeism;
6. Personal reflections.

5.2 Demographics

Some demographic details were gathered. Respondents hold senior positions in orangeism and all previously held a range of offices at a number of organisational levels in the Orange Order. All have been members of the Orange Order for a considerable period. Respondent 5’s membership is the shortest, approximately 35 years (p. 31). Respondent 3 joined the Orange Order in 1961 (p. 1). A number of
respondents joined the Order’s junior arm, including Respondent 8 who joined at aged 7 (p.1). In terms of the senior offices held at time of interview, the duration of tenure was typically less than 5 years. However two interviewees had been in post for 10 years.

None of the interviewees are serving or former members of the PSNI. Five of the 9 had connections with what were described during the Troubles as the “security forces.” One is a former member of the RUC and another a former member of the Ulster Special Constabulary. A further two were part-time members of the Ulster Defence Regiment, later Royal Irish Regiment.

The interviewees were asked if they belonged to any other Loyal Order. Five are members of the Orange Order, Royal Arch Purple (RAP) Order and Royal Black Preceptory (RBP). Three are members of both the Orange Order and RBP. One is a member of both the Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys of Derry. Additionally five of the respondents have held office in both the Orange Order and RBP. One has held office in the RAP, RBP and Orange Order.

While the demographic data formed a small part of the overall interviews it proved to be instructive from a number of perspectives. First due to their length of service all of the interviewees were able to draw personal comparisons of both the RUC and the PSNI. Second, all joined the Orange Order either during its “golden era” or when the organisation was numerically stronger, politically aligned to the majority Unionist Party and able to parade with fewer restrictions. Third, several served in security capacities where contact with the police would have been routine. Fourth, all belonged to other “branches” of Protestant fraternal orders and many have also held office in these. Consequently it is not unreasonable to suggest that the views
articulated by the Orange Order members may be representative of the parading orders generally.

5.3  Contact with PSNI

Before discussing the detail of contact senior Orange figures have with PSNI, they were asked to name the PSNI District they lived in and its Commander. Only three were able to correctly name the District Commander. Of the others, two proffered no name and the other 4 the name of their local area commander. Respondent 3 referred to frequent changes in command (p. 3). At the time of interview each PSNI District was designated by a letter (A – H). Four of the respondents were able to correctly identify the PSNI District they lived in. The other five described the PSNI Area. In PSNI terms, the then Areas were a sub division of Districts.

All but one of the interviewees had some contact with the PSNI but the level, amount and type of contact varied greatly. The data from the Orange Order respondents reflected that of the senior PSNI officers that contact with PSNI was in the main dictated by events other than in those few contexts where a conscious decision had been made to actively manage the relationship between the two organisations. Respondent 1 spoke of an absence of formal contact with the PSNI as contact is managed at “Private Lodge and District level” (p. 2). However he is satisfied that should contact be required that would be facilitated. Respondent 7’s only contact with police was through the submission of Parades Commission forms and in a local capacity (p. 4) He viewed meetings with senior PSNI officers as a Grand Lodge responsibility. He was also confident that should contact with PSNI officers be required this would be facilitated (p. 4).
The other respondents had more extensive and purposeful contact with PSNI.

Two of the respondents, who are involved in the same particularly sensitive parading context, described senior level contact with PSNI. Respondent 3, although he does not specify the amount of contact, referred to meeting ACC “Bill” Kerr and the current chief constable (p. 3). Respondent 8 described his satisfaction with levels of contact. “right to the very top (Chief Constable)” but recognised this might be anomalous (p. 2). Respondent 9 also spoke of senior level PSNI contact. He described, “sort of getting to know local command” and also ready access to the District Commander (p. 4). Respondent 2 also described meetings with District Command in the “run up to the parading season” (p. 4). He was also content with the amount and ease of access to the PSNI. He noted that he was “happy enough with the ease with which I am able to contact the police” (p. 6).

For the other respondents contact with the PSNI existed at Area Command level. Respondent 6 talked about meetings with Area Command twice a year to discuss parades. Similarly Respondent 4 talked about an annual meeting with Area Command and a satisfaction with the arrangement and also with levels of contact (p. 3). Respondent 5 spoke of his engagement strategy with the PSNI that was managed at Area Command level and included pre event meetings and post event debriefs (p. 9). In a similar way to other Orange Order interviewees, the importance of telephone contact with the PSNI was emphasised. Respondent 5 described it as getting on “the blower” (p. 8).

5.4 Local Relationship with the PSNI

The Orange Order respondents were then asked to describe their relationship with local PSNI command. Again their answers reflected those provided by the PSNI
officers. The typical answer was that local relationships were good, focused on managing large numbers of mostly uncontested parades. Where these parades became controversial this positive local relationship became strained and difficult.

Respondent 1 who based his answer on talking with “large numbers of people right across the county” stated that “relationships with the PSNI, good” (p. 8). Respondent 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 share this perspective of a good local relationship being in evidence. Respondent 7, while noting later diminishing PSNI attendance at small parades commented that “we have always had a good connection with the RUC/PSNI” (p. 6). Respondent 9, talked about “a very strong relationship” and “we work very well with them” (p. 3). Respondent 4 was asked to summarise the relationship with local PSNI and described it simply as “good” (p. 4).

Respondent 5 provided an interesting narrative on his relationship with local PSNI. He discussed a decision approximately 10 years ago in his area to move the parading situation beyond tense relationships with local PSNI and communities. Meetings took place with PSNI that were described at times as being “frosty” (p. 6). While the meetings with PSNI covered a range of issues, key to the local strategy he outlined was the development of a more proactive approach to marshalling events by the Orange Order (p. 5). He noted that the consequence of the decision by Respondent 5 and colleagues to re-calibrate the local parading environment has considerably improved the relationship with the PSNI. Respondent 5 went on to comment, “The relationship is very good at the moment” (p. 8) and “Now I can hold my hand up to say they [PSNI] definitely work with us” (p. 9).

Interestingly in the course of the interviews three senior Orange figures from rural areas mentioned locations to which they would not take main parades to. Respondent 4 mentioned moving a parade “rather than fire the situation” (p. 3).
Respondent 9 mentioned locations he would avoid. [The annual 12th July parades are usually rotated around the various Orange Districts in a county]. He was also clear that his variety of orangeism was not “an organisation that parades to confrontation” (p. 14). The rationale for these decisions was not based wholly on the community composition of an area. It was also about the capacity of the local infrastructure to host a large event. That accepted, it is possible to detect willingness in some parts of the Orange Order to avoid local confrontation both with opponents of parades and also the PSNI who have to manage the potential confrontations.

Three of the respondents made a more negative assessment of the local relationship with the PSNI. Respondent 2 noted “on the face of it I think it is a good relationship” (p. 7). He, however, then described a lack of trust in the local relationship with senior command particularly around the transparency of their dealings with the Parades Commission and accused PSNI command of a lack of transparency. He commented that, “you tell the Parades Commission that the parade basically shouldn’t go ahead” (p. 7).

In their assessment of the local relationship Respondents 3 & 8 referred to the same location. Respondent 3 was complimentary of one sergeant “he’s like the old RUC” but this positive impression did not extend to the rest of his dealings with PSNI (p. 1). He stated that the relationship with local PSNI had gone down to “zero” (p. 12), was worse than the relationship during the 2005 Whiterock disturbances and this was a consequence of the “lies” that PSNI among others had told the Orange Order (p. 12). Much of his assessment was based upon a reaction to July 2013 and the ongoing Twaddell impasse. Respondent 3 also believed that PSNI had failed to protect the Belfast Orange Order parade in July 2013 (p. 16). Earlier he also complained about what he regarded as excessive use of evidence gathering by the PSNI and the
risk that the material gathered could fall into the hands of paedophiles (p. 9). He said “It used to be pack your shield and your helmet. Two years ago it was pack your camcorder “ (p. 9).

Respondent 8 commenting on the same relationship proved to be more positive. He said of the relationship with local senior PSNI officers it was “reasonable, has been good. It has been difficult at times” (p. 3). He also referred to the attack on the parade in 2013 and described this as a “blip” in the relationship. Later in the interview Respondent 8 made some interesting comments on how he saw local relationships between the PUL community and the PSNI having changed more generally. He referred to both a lack of local policing and an absence of continuity in neighbourhood policing. He contrasted his previous experience of community policing with today’s model and noted the absence of neighbourhood police officers prepared to commit to communities for long periods and making “that connection” with communities (p. 47).

5.5 Impacts of Parades on Local Policing

The impact of parading costs was discussed with the interviewees. Senior PSNI officers had noted the opportunity costs of policing Orange Order events at the expense of other policing priorities of importance to the wider community. Not surprisingly, although not uniformly, the Orange Order interviewees argued these costs and impacts were the reasonable price of securing their heritage. Respondent 1 believed the cost of parades was directly attributable to republicanism, the “bottom line is the republican movement is trying to bankrupt Northern Ireland” (p. 36). Respondent 3 described the costs “as the price of democracy” (p.5), Respondent 2 said, “we have a parading tradition, so society just has to pay for that” (p. 41).
Respondent 8 argued that “because its part of our culture and what we do” (p. 50). Respondent 8 also maintained that a focus on the cost of policing parades was a “red herring” (p. 51) and measuring the cost of parades against health care, for example, belied the complexity of relationships in Northern Ireland and focused unduly on one community. Respondent 7’s while registering a concern about the impacts of parades policing suggested that, for example, the Twaddell situation might be purposely over-policed and overtime generation was an element in the policing arrangements (p. 32).

Respondents 4, 6 and 9 provided a contrasting note. They identified concerns about the ability of local PSNI to deliver a service against the backdrop of parading demands. Respondent 6 referred to Twaddell arguing, “in the current situation that money could be used for a lot of other purposes” (p. 16). Respondent 9 echoed this and commented that cost was a “big issue” and questioned whether the cost of policing parades, especially Twaddell, may have led to a reduction in police coverage and estate (p. 31). Respondent 4 also spoke of the impacts of parading (Twaddell) on police numbers, and the general “cost to communities and the province” (p. 9).

It is interesting that both Respondents 5 and 9 proposed changes to marshalling arrangements to permit the Orange Order greater responsibility over their own events to minimise costs for the PSNI.

5.6 The Non-Parading Relationship

The final element of the local relationship discussed was that which went beyond parading. As with the PSNI interviewees there was little evidence of a meaningful relationship other than through the management of events and no coherent strategy to develop such a relationship. Respondent 9 was the sole interviewee to allude to a non-parading relationship. He noted that this had developed to “some
extent” (p. 16) with local “workshops on road safety” but admitted, “maybe we have not done as much as we could do” (p. 16). The only other non-parading contact was on a single issue. Two interviewees referred to meetings about Orange Hall security. None of the interviewees were opposed to the notion of a relationship outside of parading. Some, for example Respondent 4, positively welcomed the proposition.

The only respondents that sounded any caution were 3 and 8. While Respondent 3 welcomed contact with PSNI, he added, “we don’t trust them” (p. 19). Respondent 8 had a different position. First he argued that the parading relationship is the defining one and any activities not linked to parading still must take cognisance of that. Second he suggested that particularly in rural areas, some of the wider services PSNI offer to the community such as crime reduction, internet safety and the like, should not be offered to the Orange Order per se but the wider unionist community (p. 22). Linking his narrative to the unwelcome changes in policing and the PSNI withdrawal from their communities, he finally concluded that,

“‘Yes I want the police to be part of that and involved in all that, but not in the sense we’re in the barracks and they’ll come and deliver that for you, but as part of that community. I know it’s hard if you’re not living in that community and police have traditionally withdrawn, still have to, to Bangor and areas like that, but as a matter of partnership, but not as a matter of we will deliver, we will come in, drop in and do that”’ (p. 22).

5.7 The Organisational Relationship

The organisational relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order was discussed specifically in the interviews and comments were made throughout the interviews that referred to this issue also. Similar to some of the PSNI interviewees,
the Orange Order interviewees painted a picture of a fragile relationship, with lower levels of trust, particularly in the urban context. And again the picture of a generally positive and uncomplicated relationship at local level was not reflected in their assessment of the organisational relationship. In assessing the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order, the Orange Order interviewees referred to a number of factors that presented challenges for the relationship, perceived political interference in policing, “persecution of the unionist community” and a change in policing style.

In contrast to those who spoke of challenges in the relationship, Respondents 4, 6 and 9 had a more benign view. Respondent 6 believed the relationship has deteriorated “slightly” over the years (p. 7) but also suggested the situation in Belfast and the rural areas was “absolutely different altogether” (p. 8). Respondent 4 shared this view (p 7). Respondent 9 had a similar perception. While he acknowledged that the question was difficult he argued that outside of the very few “flashpoints” the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order was “pretty good” (p. 7).

The remaining respondents pointed to some difficulties in the relationship. Three respondents highlighted tensions during Baggott’s tenure. Respondent 3, who also alluded to political interference in policing, suggested Baggott did not understand in 2013 “what was on” (p.13). Respondent 1 described Baggott as “a typical Englishman who was manipulated by others” (p. 13). Respondent 2 added that Baggott’s appointment was political and that no “Englishman should hold the PSNI Chief Constable’s office (p. 21). Other respondents referred to the theme of political influence on policing. Respondent 1 said that “The Police Service is not allowed to do one thing unless they ask permission to do it” (p. 13). He suggested later that Catholic officers “feel that if they get a shield and a baton they can do the dirty work for the
republican movement” (p. 28). Respondent 7 described the PSNI as “the puppet on the string” and their propensity to take action against the loyalist community was based on “I think possibly a fear of government” (p. 13).

The remaining issues that impacted on the PSNI and Orange Order centred broadly around policing style. A number of interviewees were critical of the PSNI uniform and the inappropriate wearing of public order equipment, in their view. Respondent 7 for example contrasted the six-foot RUC officers with their clean boots to unkempt PSNI officers with dirty boots and wearing baseball hats (p. 20).

Respondent 2 and 8’s criticisms were more fundamental. For Respondent 2 the PSNI was no longer a force but took the line of least resistance that included a disproportionate focus on policing the PUL community (p. 12). Respondent 8 referred throughout his interview to the state of the relationship between the PSNI and unionism. He came from the perspective the PSNI’s relationship with the Orange Order could not be separated from the relationship with the wider unionist community, a community that he believed has neither understood nor accepted changes to policing in Patten,

“The broad unionist community haven’t understood the changes and what they seen as a police force, was our police force, not in the sense they seen it as all Protestant, but ours as being we’re on the side of law and order and terrorism, isn’t. All of a sudden they found it changed, they found people in it who could come from a nationalist background and aspired to a United Ireland” (p. 8).

He also suggested that the standard of service has dropped and PSNI have become more like An Garda Siochana (p. 9). Much of Respondent 8’s analysis was based on an assessment PSNI had become more distant from the PUL community and was no
longer “a police force of the people in many ways” (p. 20) as the RUC had been. This distancing from the community was the result of a number of factors. Chief among these was the view that PSNI is no longer a working class organisation but is now “seen as an academic force” (p. 20) whose officers’ attitude and manner of dealing with people needed to be changed (p. 44).

5.8 PSNI Leadership

The Orange Order interviewees were asked their views of PSNI’s leadership. They were asked what they believed PSNI senior command thought of the Orange Order. A range of views arose, but the more typical view was negative. One respondent’s view was not entirely clear and two were waiting to see what tone the new Chief Constable will set. At least one interviewee, Respondent 1, was confident that a local Chief Constable was preferable to an “Englishman” (p. 24).

Respondent 6 did not believe PSNI senior command give the Orange Order “a bad press overall” (p. 16) while Respondent 7 believed that police command “maybe respects what the Institution stands for” (p. 23).

The others had a different view. Respondent 1 said “I’ve a funny feeling that if we could go away tomorrow they would lap it up” (p. 25) and Respondent 2 added “Their view would be would the Orange Institution not just go away and become an organisation that doesn’t really parade or only in certain areas” (p. 27). He described the Brownlow House initiative as possibly a “charm offensive by command” “because we’ve [police] made a bit of a cock up over the flags protest” (p. 27). Respondents 5 (p. 28) and 9 (p. 26) echoed the view that PSNI command would prefer to see the Orange Order disappear. Respondent 8 returned to his class based analysis of the PSNI and argued that PSNI command reflected the wider views of middle class
protestants that the Orange Order was a “pain in the backside” (p. 38). He did not argue that PSNI command was hostile to the Orange Order.

5.9 View of Front Line

Orange Order interviewees had a more benign perception of the attitude of front line PSNI officers to them than that put forward by senior police officers. Again the answers reflect the central importance of events and context in determining attitudes and respondents. Respondents 1, 8, 9 recognised the front line view of the Orange Order depended on the local parading context and also the community backgrounds of officers. Respondents 7 and 5 believed front line PSNI officers see parades as simply part of their lot and partly an opportunity to earn overtime. Respondent 6 described feeling “respect” (p. 6) from the police towards the Orange Order.

Respondent 3 had a different opinion. Discussing the matter he pointed to a breakdown in relationship between PSNI and the Orange Order at a particular location. He said that his “people” would simply no longer speak to police (p. 26).

5.10 View of Law

In the course of the PSNI interviews some references were made to a perception that Orange Order leaders failed at times to take responsibility for the breadth of parade related problems. Orange Order interviewees were asked about the Order’s use of internal discipline, both its transparency and speed. Some interviewees were asked also if they distinguished between breaking parades determinations and other criminal offences. Most of the respondents questioned did make this distinction. For some it was an issue of degree and the comparative severity of the offences.
Respondent 5, for example, contrasted what he described as a “minor misdemeanour” with criminal damage or assault (p. 20).

Interestingly three respondents with connections to challenging parading contexts made this distinction from a different perspective. Respondent 3 who described the Public Processions Act as “bad law” (p. 6), stated he is willing to “go to jail” to prove a point around the legislation. Respondent 2 articulated the view that he would only abide by determinations as he saw fit. He referred particularly to those determinations imposed in the environs of churches. He argued, in contrast to the Parades Commission position, that a place of worship was only significant if a religious service was underway (p. 26). Respondent 8’s position was even more definitive. He argued that,

“I wouldn’t discipline anyone who breaks a Parades Commission determination. I have to say, I’ve been questioned myself under caution, never prosecuted, but I’ve had two friends prosecuted for delaying a parade for so many minutes and I have to say I would be totally against discipline, because I think the law’s unjust” (p. 30).

5.11 The Urban / Rural Divide

The issue of a divide between urban and rural orangeism was discussed. Senior Orange figures were asked if they perceived a difference between rural and urban orangeism and if that played out in the relationship with the PSNI. Senior PSNI officers, and the Chief Constables, as noted earlier were clear this difference existed. It is informative that the views of the Orange Order interviewees had similarities with PSNI interviewees and again reflected both what was described earlier as the late 19th century move in Orangeism’s power base from the rural to the urban environments.
and the current lack of sensitivity in rural parading issues. Respondent 1, while arguing that rural and urban Orangeism shared the same traits, also said “the country man and the city man … they don’t live on the same planet and I’m not just talking about within the Institution, that is right across the board” (p. 8). Respondent 2 talked about rural Orangeism being “more tolerant” (p. 31) and felt that rural Orangeism is more faithful to the true faith-based nature of the organisation (p. 32), as did Respondent 6 (p. 8). The explicitly faith-based nature of rural Orangeism was also noted by a further respondent. This respondent suggested that managing the Twaddell situation, with its various influences, presented a risk for urban Orangeism’s religious credibility. Respondent 7 also noted a difference in attitude between the city and the country while acknowledging the common bonds between all Orangemen (p. 9).

Respondent 5 suggested these differences were evident in the contrasting styles of the Belfast and rural leadership of the Orange Order (p. 13). None of the Respondents who referred to the urban and rural differences went as far as to suggest the bonds of brotherhood were entirely broken with urban Orangeism. However, some did allude to challenges in the relationship. Respondent 5 noted, for example, his distress at some of the behaviour of Orangemen in the “City” (p. 18).

Respondents 3 and 8 had a different view. Respondent 3 suggested that there are short-sighted elements in rural Orangeism that did not see the creeping constraints on their cultural expression. He also recognised the contribution of country Orangeism to defending particular Orange interests (p. 17). Respondent 8’s analysis proved to be more in-depth once again. He accepted that rural and urban Orangeism looked different, “Very different” (p. 14). He also accepted one element of this difference might present itself as increased familiarity with PSNI and the appearance of a better relationship with them. He was however clear that while the impression of “better”
relationships existed and there was a “sort of better attitude” (p. 17) in rural orangeism this should not be misunderstood as “a better love for the police” (p. 17). He recounted his experiences of visits to rural Orange Halls and his surprise at the views expressed of police in rural Orange halls (p. 18) and this was not a particularly new phenomenon (p. 14).

During the course of the interviews the Twaddell Avenue impasse was discussed which at the time of writing has been running for nearly two years. A nightly parade occurs at Twaddell Avenue. The parade is in protest at the decision by the Parades Commission in July 2013 to re-route the return leg of the 12th July parade for three North Belfast lodges, the Ligoniel Combine. Twaddell is undoubtedly one of the key factors in determining the PSNI and Orange Order relationship currently. The researcher was trying to understand whether country orangeism saw this as “their cause” or whether a lack of interest reflected a rural/urban divide, which played out in PSNI and Orange Order dynamics also. For a number of respondents Twaddell was a line in the sand. They were actively engaged in supporting the Ligoniel Lodges to complete the return parade. These respondents also testified to what they saw as the breadth of support for Twaddell from across orangeism.

Of the other six respondents none had been to Twaddell. Some while they have not physically supported the protest, are wholly comfortable with it. Respondent 7, for example, stated, “I would have no issues about going. I was down in Portadown” (p. 11). The other interviewees saw the situation differently. These suggested both a lack of physical support for Belfast and a need to resolve the situation, although they still maintained support in principle for the right to parade. Respondent 6 referred to only very small numbers attending from his area (p. 8), Respondent 4 referred to “elements” (p. 5) attending and Respondent 9 stated, “To be
quite honest if I was to organise a bus tomorrow to go to Twaddell I would not be sure if there would be any one on it except me” (p. 11). These same Respondents also suggested the need for a rethink of the current impasse. Respondent 6, for example proposed that, “Drumcree may have to be forgotten about, Twaddell Avenue may have to be forgotten about” (p. 9).

5.12 The Parades Commission

The matter of the PSNI relationship with the Parades Commission was considered. The Orange Order interviewees were asked what they understood this relationship to be and the extent to which they trusted it. Senior PSNI officers as noted made strong claims to the effect that despite some Orange perceptions, the relationship was professional and an appropriately distant one.

A number of the interviewees, surprisingly, gave the PSNI and Parades Commission relationship a “clean bill of health.” Respondent 4 believed the PSNI have no option other than to be honest particularly about contentious situation (p. 12). Respondent 6 was similarly positive and talked about having “a lot of trust in local police” to give neutral information to the Commission. Respondent 5 mentioned a “fair bit of trust” in his experience of the PSNI and Parades Commission relationship although less at the grass roots level. He also described his experience of the PSNI assisting the local Orange Order to understand and have an insight into the workings of the Parades Commission (p. 16). Respondent 9 was broadly trusting of the PSNI and Parades Commission relationship on account of his local experience yet he understands that this level of trust might not be consistent across the Orange Order (p. 18).
The remaining respondents proved to be less trusting of the relationship. Respondent 8 interestingly believed that the Parades Commission has done the PSNI a disservice and has contributed to a lack of trust in them. He was an ardent critic of the Commission and suggested for the loyalist community its removal was as important as the disbanding of the RUC was for republicans. He noted an improvement by the PSNI in dealings with the Commission but there was a clear sense that PSNI had been “caught out” in their dealings with the Commission and PSNI still need to be watched to prevent them “playing everyone against the middle” (p. 24).

Respondent 3 suggested the PSNI “hide behind the Parades Commission” (p. 8), as did the “Secretary of State.” He suggested the Commission is “answerable to nobody and they write their own law” (p. 8). Respondent 1 complained about the lack of transparency in both the written and oral processes of the Parades Commission. Respondent 8 described the “greening” as being,
“the Feis up at Londonderry gets 2 Irish speaking policemen; we get 102 cameras in our faces when we go out to a service on a Sunday with our bowler hats on when there’s no threat. If you said you’re starting a GAA in the police, you’re wonderful, you’re laudable, and this is fantastic. If you said were you starting an Orange Lodge, it’s not promoted, it’s not talked about” (p 12).

He recognised why the PSNI has made a serious effort to build a relationship with the nationalist community yet he believed this has gone too far and “you forgot about the community who has supported you traditionally and you were too eager to embrace the new community” (p. 12). Respondent 8 also believed that there is recognition at senior policing levels this pendulum had swung too far. Respondent 3 described the “greening “with a biblical reference, and that PSNI had treated the republican community like the “prodigal son” (p. 20).

Other respondents described the PSNI’s “greening” principally in terms of its willingness to take action against the PUL community, in contrast to the CNR community. Respondent 2 described this in terms of the Protestant community being an “easy touch” (p. 35) for police. Similarly although Respondent 7 believed the PSNI give a “reasonably fair service” he maintained in terms of dealing with both communities that “the easy way out [for the PSNI] would be to go against the Orange for you are not going to get the same backlash” (p. 28). Respondent 5, who was less inclined to be critical of PSNI generally, identified the same theme that unionism was easier to police than nationalism because of what he regarded as the lack of respect for law and order in the Catholic community (p. 35). Respondent 9 was more ambivalent about the issue yet he recognised a “perception” of the PSNI’s “greening”
especially in “difficult” areas (p. 29), a perception that he believed had not been assisted by PSNI recruiting officers from the Irish Republic (p. 29).

Though the “greening” view was more typical two respondents reflected a different viewpoint. Respondent 6 accepted the perception existed among “hard line people” (p. 17) but paid tribute to PSNI efforts to build confidence in the nationalist community that has “90% accepted the PSNI” (p. 17). Respondent 4 disagreed with the assessment PSNI had greened and maintained from his “own experience on the ground” (p. 18) that it was without substance.

5.14 The Relationship with the RUC

The interviewees were asked about the Orange Order’s relationship with the RUC and how this contrasted with the PSNI relationship. Providing context to the discussion the Patten reforms were touched upon. The interviewees collectively found Patten reform’s objectionable on a number of levels predominantly the 50/50 recruitment scheme and the symbolic changes to the RUC. Respondent 3 felt Patten was “to placate the republicans” (p. 27) and his greatest objection was the to “lawful discrimination.” Respondent 2 asked, “whatever happened to the best person for the job?” (p. 36). Respondent 6 referred to the 50/50 recruitment scheme as hurting the “most” (p. 19) and Respondent 4 spoke about the “laying off of the good” (p. 19). Respondent 8 pointed to the “hurt” caused by the symbolic changes to the RUC, “because people had died for the harp and crown and 336 of our members died” (p. 46). Respondent 7 described the reforms as simply “ridiculous” and as part of a process of appeasement towards republicanism (p. 29).

The negativity about Patten fed into a nostalgic narrative about the RUC and the Orange Order’s assessment of a positive relationship with the RUC. While
interviewees were, at times, critical of the RUC, for example Respondent 2 described seeing RUC officers beating “an oul’ boy” at Drumcree and goading Orange protesters (p. 40), there was a clear affection for the RUC. This affection was for, among other things, a policing style that does not, according to the interviewees, exist in the PSNI. Respondent 3 stated the RUC, in contrast to the PSNI, “listened to you” (p. 28) and that he trusted them. This trust extended even to the RUC’s action at Drumcree as he believed the RUC was operating under military control in that situation (p. 31). For Respondent 1 the difference between the RUC and the PSNI was the extent of personal contact facilitated through a network of small local police stations that no longer existed (p. 34). He also wanted to return to the time when parades’ policing was different and managed by senior officers at the head of alcohol free parades equipped with their blackthorn sticks (p37).

Respondent 8 suggested that the change in the police’s relationship with the Orange Order and the wider loyalist community began at Drumcree and was cemented with Patten (p. 45). He believed the Orange Order relationship with the PSNI has become more bureaucratic (p. 10) and less practical (p. 21). Throughout his interview he referred to changes in policing and particularly his perception of the PSNI’s move away from policing from within the community to a more distant model resourced no longer by “famers sons” but what he describes as “academics” (p. 10).

Others echoed these themes of a different type of service provided by the RUC. Alongside complaints about the height of female officers and general appearance (p. 20), Respondent 7 spoke of the understanding and respect the RUC had for the Orange Order. Respondent 6, in an echo of Respondent 8, believed that there was a greater continuity of service with the RUC and officers particularly in critical roles were left in post long enough to build a relationship with the community.
Respondent 5 who discussed a closer relationship with the RUC also pointed to an ease of doing business with the RUC (p. 38), in contrast to PSNI. This was a situation brought about partly by the closure of police stations. (p. 39).

Interestingly although Respondent 4 speculated whether the Orange Order would ever going to stop talking about the RUC (p. 20), he also pointed to a greater familiarity with the RUC and the easy relationship with it that many of the other Respondents had testified to also (p. 20). Respondent 9 raised similar issues about “local police stations gone, you no longer had the local sergeant and you lost a lot of that personally” (p. 21). When asked about the emotional connection between the RUC and the Orange Order he pointed to a relationship based on a shared aim to protect Northern Ireland. He described the RUC as “These are our boys and they would keep our country right” (p. 24).

5.15 Personal Reflections

Personal reflections were discussed less with the Orange Order interviewees. Six were asked how they would feel about their children joining the PSNI. Of that number only one expressed concern at the prospect. Respondent 7 suggested he would be “delighted” and Respondent 4 talked of a police career as “grand” (p. 19). Respondent 8 who expressed “no issue” with the prospect hoped his children however would however have a “different attitude” to people and not be subject to the “class issue” (p. 44) which he saw as besetting PSNI dealings with the loyalist community. Only Respondent 2 was opposed to the idea of his children joining the PSNI. He stated, “If they had been joining the RUC I would have encouraged them, no, definitely not” (p. 36).
5.16 Conclusion

• The Orange Order interviewees were long serving members of that organisation whose length of service allowed them to draw direct comparisons between the RUC and PSNI. None had direct professional experience of the PSNI but experience of the RUC and other “security forces.” All belonged to other loyal orders also. It might therefore not be unreasonable to claim that the conclusions of this thesis extend beyond the Orange Order.

• There is inconsistency in the amount of contact individual Orange interviews had with the PSNI despite the similarity of their roles. This was attributed in the main to the absence of parading controversies. Contact, and seniority of contact appeared dictated by parading tensions. There are a few examples where contact is regarded as an element of proactive management of the relationship with the PSNI. There is a general confidence in the PSNI’s willingness to communicate should that be required by circumstances.

• The positive local relationship referred to by senior police officers is similarly perceived by Orange Order interviewees other than in those locations where parading is actively controversial. In these controversial areas significant and on-going challenge is evident in the relationship although there may be some signs of an improvement but only against the backdrop of two years of reduced levels of disorder associated with parading.

• Again and similar to the senior PSNI officers the positive nature of the Orange Order’s local relationship with the PSNI is not wholly reflected in
their assessment of the relationship between both bodies, which is largely determined by reaction to events. Although these events are extraordinary and limited to a particular geographic location their significance to both organisations is such that it dictates for many their perception of the overall relationship. It is also clear from the data provided by the Orange Order interviewees that they also judge the organisational relationship with the PSNI both in terms of the PSNI’s policing style which some regarded as partisan and a command team several referred to viewing orangeism as an irritant.

• Although the Parades Commission remains objectionable to the interviewees, not all view the PSNI’s relationship with suspicion. Significantly in the context of relationships determined so much by events those interviewees operating in difficult parading contexts demonstrate greater suspicion of the PSNI’s dealings with the Commission and also a willingness to breach Parades Commission determinations which will inevitably bring them into conflict with PSNI.

• With a small number of exceptions a difference is perceived between rural and urban orangeism a difference that is played out in relationships between the PSNI and Orange Order. Some internal tension is noted between urban and rural orangeism.

• Again with a small number of exceptions the PSNI is believed to have “greened’ as an organisation and deliberately distanced itself from the PUL community. These perceptions of the PSNI’s greening feed the Orange Order’s narrative of an RUC that delivered a service that met the needs of the unionist community with whom they were joined in a
struggle to maintain Northern Ireland’s distinctive character at a high and personal cost.
Chapter 6 Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

In this final chapter the question is answered, “What is the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order since 2001?” This question is answered in a number of ways. Firstly how and to what extent the demographic make up of the senior levels of both organisations determines the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order. Second the place of events in dictating the relationship will be examined both at the local level and also at the organisational level. Included in this particular consideration will be discussion of the consequences of the rural and urban divide in Orangeism for the relationship between the Orange Order and the PSNI. Suspicions of the PSNI’s relationship with the Parades Commission is a further element of this consideration, as the Commission’s decisions and determinations are germane to events and on street confrontations between the PSNI and the Orange Order. The question is finally answered by asking what the spectre of Patten’s reforms and the ghost of the RUC mean for the PSNI and Orange Order relationship as they seek to manage the present.

Alongside answering the research question a number of recommendations are made for both the PSNI and the Orange Order. These recommendations are proposed with the intention of placing the relationship between the PSNI on a firmer and more positive footing, to the point where the relationship has the capacity to weather crisis and the annual cycle of tension. The recommendations bring the researcher back to the place of his raison d’etre for embarking on the thesis.
6.2 Demographics and the Relationship Between the PSNI and Orange Order

A limited amount of demographic data was gathered during the course of the interviews. The data was gathered for a number of purposes. Principally it was gathered to identify if there was anything about the backgrounds of the interviewees which might determine more generally the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order: as groups of interviewees were they by background especially pre-disposed for or against the PSNI or Orange Order?

The data gathered from the senior police officers was unsurprising. They were overwhelmingly former RUC officers, male, and from the Protestant and unionist community. Many had familial connections with the Orange Order although none had joined the Orange Order or any other Loyal Order as members of the RUC or the PSNI. The senior officers were able to competently describe what Orangeism stood for. Their backgrounds will have reflected in broad terms many former RUC officers. In terms of what this might tell us about the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order, it would be ill advised to draw too many conclusions. Certainly it is reasonable to argue that there is nothing in their backgrounds to suggests a strong negative predisposition towards the Orange Order. If anything the senior police officers are from backgrounds where at the very least there is an understanding of what orangeism stands for and potentially a residual affection for an organisation that has a continuing long reach into the unionist community and a long historical legacy. The significance of the place that orangeism continues to hold in the unionist community was well made by one of the senior police officers (Respondent 6). Although the Orange Order may be ageing and declining in numerical strength it has a continuing influence and place in the unionist community, as part of their cultural history. He said
“It is interesting if you listen to middle class members of the unionist community and at times they can be quite scathing of the Orange Order and then something happens to the Orange Order and their attitude flips in a second, why are you doing that? that’s not right, hold on a minute my Grandfather was in the Orange “ (p. 12).

It would be interesting to conduct this research in another 10 years when the senior command of the PSNI will be predominantly made up of PSNI officers as opposed to former RUC officers and assess their demographic make up and links to the Orange Order and whether this has any implications for the relationship with orangeism.

The author was surprised by the lack of understanding of the Orange Order that Orde and Baggott brought to their roles as Chief Constables. In making these comments it is understood that both were appointed in a relatively short period of time and consequently had little opportunity to be briefed fully on the complex range of challenges they were about to face. Equally it is recognised as both took office they had some immediate priorities. Orde had to deliver the numerous Patten recommendations against the background of an incomplete political settlement and Baggott had to confront a resurgent violent dissident republican threat and financial constraints unknown to his predecessor. These two caveats accepted it may be the case, particularly during Baggott’s tenure when the flags dispute erupted and pressures in north Belfast parading became acute, if early ground work with the Orange Order had taken place and they had been perceived as a strategic partner, relationships between the two organisations might not have declined particularly in the context of the urban areas, the impacts of which leached into the organisational relationship.
A number of conclusion can be drawn from the demographic background of the Orange Order interviewees to assist answer the question what is the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order. Firstly similar to the senior police interviewees understanding of and connection to the Orange Order, some of the Orange Order respondents had a broad familiarity with policing. Although this familiarity was not especially current. The familiarity overwhelmingly was with the RUC and came through service typically in part time capacities in what were referred to during the Troubles as the “security forces”, the RUC reserve or Ulster Defence Regiment. This familiarity should at least give some of the respondents an insight into the workings and complexities of policing, albeit in a very different and much more counter terrorist focused context.

Second and more critically the senior Orange Order members interviewed had belonged to the Orange Order for a minimum of 37 years at the time of interviews. In some cases membership of the Orange Order had commenced in childhood with the junior Orange Order, (the Junior Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland) whose membership currently appears to stretch from 7 – 16 years old. They had indeed been Orangemen “Man and Boy.” This length of service in the Orange Order creates two potential dynamics in how the senior Orangemen interviewed view the Police Service of Northern Ireland. In the first place as individuals and also senior representatives of the Orange Order they have a much greater chronological acquaintance with the RUC than they do of the PSNI. Second they have all lived with the “Troubles” and witnessed the levels of violence that existed especially during the 1970s and 1980s. As discussed previously the levels of security forces and Orange Order deaths during the Troubles created a strong emotional bond between the Orange Order and RUC, and the RUC became viewed as a bulwark against a United Ireland for the Orange
Order. The Orangemen interviewed undoubtedly reflected the depth of this emotional connection with the RUC. Circumstances have dictated nothing similar in their relationship with the PSNI; the political and security dispensations have both altered considerably.

The other important factor relating to the length of service of the Orange Order interviewees is that for all of them when they first either became acquainted with Orangeism or joined the Orange Order the organisation was undoubtedly numerically stronger. Equally the then Orange Order held levels of political and cultural influence that are unknown today. The trajectory of the Orange Order was in direct contrast to the Orange Order of today. In addition some of these long serving members have either direct experience or at least close proximity to what was referred to in the Literature Review as the “glory days” of the Orange Order when their political influence was at its height and the aims and aspirations of Orangeism were closely reflected by Government and largely protected by the RUC (Haddick Flynn, 1999, p. 331) (McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 39) (Boyd, 1972, p. 74) (Jarman & Scullion, 2013, p. 8) (Wilson & Stapleton, 2005, p. 636) (Bryan, 1997, p. 381), Parading disputes were rare and the legal context of Northern Ireland gave Orangeism a favoured place. (White, 2000, p. 227) (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 39) (Bryan, 2000, p. 67) (Weitzer, 1995, p. 49). (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 31) (Callaghan, 1973, p. 90).

It is also worth noting that all of the Orange Order interviewees were members of other loyal orders, Apprentice Boys, Royal Arch Purple, Royal Black Preceptory and some have held office in these orders. The cross over between the loyal orders in Northern Ireland requires much greater examination, particularly the extent to which the attitudes, for example to policing coalesce. That accepted, the extent of the cross
over between the loyal orders identified in this research might suggest it is not wholly unreasonable to suggest the views expressed by senior orange figures were likely to be at least representative of the other parading orders. In making these comments the author is aware that the on street presence of the various loyal orders is different, in both the extent of their annual parading and the style of that parading and both those realities remain a key factor in determining the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order. The Royal Black Preceptory, for example, is typically regarded as representing the most “respectable” of the loyal orders (Evangelical Truth, ND).

6.3 “Events dear boy, events.”

In the Literature Review reference was made to the abiding nature of the Orange Order’s relationship with the RUC, sometimes in spite of the reality and the gravity of particular events. While the ability of the Orange Order to maintain an emotional attachment to the RUC in spite of crisis remains key to understanding their relationship with the RUC, it would be inaccurate to suggest events have no significance in this relationship. Indeed the Orange Order and RUC relationship is littered with hugely symbolic events, not least Obins Street in Portadown and Drumcree from 1995 onwards. Both Orange Order and PSNI interviewees recognise this. Some of the police officers referred to the symbolic significance of Obins Street in 1985. For a senior Orangeman (respondent 8) the rot in the relationship between policing and Orangeism set in at Drumcree.

While the place of events in determining the relationship between the RUC and the Orange Order cannot be ignored, with the advent of the PSNI events take on a wholly different importance and become germane to understanding how the two organisations relate to each other. The RUC has gone, the provisional IRA has gone,
Orangemen no longer walk behind the coffins of murdered brethren or security force neighbours shot on their farms or driving children to school. In the place of the RUC was a police service created as a result of political dispensation that the Orange Order was at the very least suspicious of. This new police service was, in Orange Order terms, created to appease the increasingly influential republican political agenda. The cherished symbols that linked policing to the crown were removed. In the place of those cherished symbols were others that spoke of conscious neutrality. The job opportunities that many young protestant men and women had availed of, like their fathers before, were no longer available to them in the numbers or with the same possible predictability. Orange Order members who were also members of this new policing service had to declare their membership to the Chief Constable. Patten (Ireland & Patten, 1999) had indeed made it explicit in paragraph 15.15 of his report that

“We would prefer that public servants were not members of secret societies or organisations perceived to be sectarian such as the Orange Order or the Ancient Order of the Hibernians; and we note that the Chief Constable has himself said that he would strongly prefer that members of the police service did not belong to Orange lodges” (p. 89).

Thus as the PSNI came into being those elements which had maintained the relationship between the RUC and Orangeism were removed. Indeed the Chief Constable who was charged with delivering the changes was an Englishman who at his own admittance had little knowledge of the Orange Order and did not regard them as a strategic priority. What was left were personal relationships, the Orange Order’s conservative disposition inclined to be supportive of law and order, and events. And it was events that were to determine this relationship. The place of events is central to
the the chief constables, senior police officers and senior Orangemen’s explanation of both the local and organisational relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order.

The local relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order is predominantly benign. The local relationship is characterised by both the PSNI and the Orange Order respondents as based on a collective wish to manage a large number of annual parades which are entirely free of trouble or tension (PC, 2008, p. 3) (PC, 2014a, p. 4) and many which require little or no policing other than to close a road or manage the dangers of traffic to participants. Such is the benign nature of this local, and often haphazard, relationship is that in most cases it does not require senior level interference or management from either senior Orange Order members or senior police officers. In the majority of cases senior police officers or their Orange Order equivalents leave the management of the relationship to local officials. In policing terms the relationship is driven by operational planning sergeants and constables who have the year long contact with Orange lodges and discuss the policing of their individual parades and assess whether tried and tested arrangements for particular local parades need amendment. This annual contact may be as simple as a short telephone call to discuss with the parade organiser any changes to previous arrangements. In Orange Order terms the bulk of the local relationship with police is managed by private Lodge secretaries and parade organisers not the senior Orangemen interviewed as part of this process.

This is not to say that senior police officers and senior Orangemen in non-sensitive parading contexts make no efforts to manage this local relationship. There was some evidence of senior level meetings. These senior level meetings also have an appearance of being haphazard in terms of frequency, the rank levels at which they
take place, and the purpose of the meetings. These efforts to actively manage the local relationship are also not apparently underpinned by any particular strategy for engagement other than in a handful of cases where the benefits of considered engagement have been seen and seized. This is simply because senior members of both organisations see a business like local relationship that functions effectively from year to year and requires no interference. Senior police officers often speak of managing threat, harm and risk; a benign parading environment presents neither threat, harm nor risk. It is also likely the case, and as discussed with the author in a recent discussion with an Orange Order official that Orangemen due to their conservative disposition when parading is routine are reluctant to “bother” the police and “waste their time.”

The importance of the place of events in the local relationship is further evidenced by the reality that where parading is contentious the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order is wholly different to the relationship discussed above. In these few cases, overwhelmingly in urban areas, the relationship is characterised by two factors, intensity and tension. The intensity is present in the frequency of meetings between senior staff in both organisations, meetings which are not limited to the parading seasons but are often year round in recognition of the challenges faced and the risks involved in the relationship failing. It is worthwhile being reminded of the comments of one of the PSNI interviewees (Respondent 2) who described his described managing parading controversies as at times “all consuming” and that few other of his duties “drag you to that kind of level” to the detriment of “virtually everything else” (p. 7). There are also clear tensions in this relationship. Both PSNI and Orange Order interviewees attest to this. They spoke of declining relationships in urban areas particularly in the last three years and losses of trust between both
organisations. The researcher was struck by the assessment of an Orange Order interviewee that the local relationship with PSNI in one urban location was worse than in 2005 following the Whiterock parade and subsequent serious rioting (Jarman, 2006, p. 2). These declining relationships are on the basis of events, specific parades, the policing response and the response of orangeism.

Another factor that points to the place of events in determining the local relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order is the absence of a relationship outside of parading. The author in the research process identified one location where the PSNI and the Orange Order appear, albeit in very limited terms, to have transcended parading issues and have identified mutual issues of concern upon which to relate. There are of course occasions where local PSNI and local Orangemen discuss non-parading issues but these are single issues, such as attacks on particular Orange halls and the engagement starts and finishes with the single issue. None of the respondents questioned are opposed to the concept of a relationship outside of events but there appears to be little energy given to making this a reality. This may of course, reflect the shared perception that a local relationship characterised by routine parading simply does not need anything else. The author remains surprised that both organisations, nor their senior figures, do not view the need for a strategy for local level engagement particularly as one of the themes that has emerged from the data is that despite the reduction in the size of the Orange Order (Clarke, 2014), senior PSNI officers continue to regard the Orange Order as an important organisation whose reach remains long into the PUL community and larger than any other political or cultural group. One senior officer acknowledged the claim that PSNI interest in orangeism did not extend beyond the summer months was a “fair” challenge to PSNI.
The above observations lead the author to make the first recommendations

**Recommendation 01 - The PSNI and the Orange Order should develop a strategy for engagement at local level. The strategy should include managing parading issues and also finding areas of mutual concern upon which both the Orange Order and the PSNI can build a relationship. The strategy should set out the level and type of contact required to make local engagement effective. This need is particularly acute in those areas where tension is apparent. Although in these areas parading will inevitably drive the relationship, a relationship wider than parading might provide a mechanism that prevents crisis overwhelming the local relationship. PSNI officers should feel welcome to walk into lodge rooms.**

While the local relationship is posited in the main as benign it would be remiss to ignore the levels of frustration articulated by senior officers regarding the demands parades placed upon diminishing resources (Kearney, 2014) and also their perception of a “weariness” among frontline staff due to the requirements of managing, in particular, the current nightly Belfast protests. Further it would be wrong not to mention the view articulated by a number of Orange Order interviewees that parading costs and consequences simply had to be borne by PSNI and wider society as the price of democracy. In practical terms this sense of frustration has few consequences for the current local relationships. The issue might occasionally raise its head if PSNI decide on the basis of a risk matrix to remove police entirely from a small and local parade and leave it to Orange Order marshalling and the Orange Order might register a small “protest”. It will be interesting however to note how as PSNI budgets become increasingly constrained if this might impact on their ability to police routine Orange Order parades as widely as the current practise and whether such a withdrawal of
service might impact on levels of contact and good will locally evident. In assessing local relationships as generally good the researcher is also mindful of comments made by Orange Order Respondents 2 and 8 that this particular study may be skewed by the choice of sample and the grass roots of orangeism may take a less benign view of the relationship with PSNI. Respondent 2 says “I think the vast majority of the ordinary membership, if they were coming to meet you, it wouldn’t be as pleasant a meeting” (p. 12).

6.4 Events and the Organisational Relationship

There are obvious difficulties in trying to capture the organisational relationship as it is multi faceted and exists on a number of levels. However analysis of the data again points to the significance of events in determining how both the PSNI and the Orange Order characterise their relationship with each other.

Between both groups of interviewees there are those who characterise the organisational relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order as good, or good in the main. These interviewees are in the minority and it is interesting to note that both the police and Orange Order interviewees caveat their description of a good relationship by distinguishing between the rural and urban contexts. Specifically that outside of the urban parading context the organisational relationship is good. The rural and urban issue will be discussed in greater detail below.

The other interviewees, both Police and Orange Order have less confidence in the organisational relationship, which provides an interesting contrast to the collective assessment of a positive and business-like local relationship, The word “fragile” typified the response provided by the senior PSNI officers. That fragility for some of the PSNI officers was caused because the relationship between the PSNI and the
Orange Order was driven at the moment by the Twaddell or Belfast agenda, and had been since 2013. One of the senior PSNI officers described the situation in Belfast as “toxic” for the overall relationship between the PSNI and Orangeism. Another PSNI interviewee provided some very insightful analysis into the state of the current relationship which between both organisations. This analysis highlighted the temporary nature of any description of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship because it is so prone to being affected by crisis and events. He argued that this trend was unlikely to change particularly against the backdrop of 2016, the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the symbolism of that year. It is worth rehearsing this analysis in full. He said,

“Don’t forget the relationship is defined by circumstances. We had a peaceful 2014 so people will define the relationship as okay because it’s against that backdrop. If you asked them in 2013, terrible, fragile, never been worse. And it depends what the summer is like this year and people will define it accordingly. This is a generational issue. This is not a year-to-year issue, as year to year it will just be defined by events beyond our control. Marching season this year takes place after the Parliamentary election cycle and then we are preparing for the Stormont election cycle. All these things will have an influence on it so I think it is too simplistic or too inaccurate to say it has got better worse or indifferent. I think it is what it is, against a very difficult couple of years and a predictably difficult couple of years to follow. And any label that is put on it at the moment has a limited temporal value.”

And later,
“It’s [the relationship] still defined by crisis management as opposed to a relationship where you can manage 90% of normal activity and normal engagement and normal things that are less politicised and less contentious and just get on with it. So that 10% still defines the relationship.”

As discussed above the consensus among the Orange Order interviewees was that the organisational relationship with the PSNI was challenging and although they did not specifically articulate it is in contrast to what they experience as local Orangemen involved in local events. In capturing the Orange Order views of the organisational relationship there was less of a strategic narrative than that provided by the senior PSNI officers. It is also the case that in some respects there was less of a focus on the strategic impact of events than that provided by the PSNI officers; some did refer to the difficulties during Baggott’s tenure as Chief Constable and these were surely a reflection of specific parading tensions that became an increasing feature of the policing landscape from December 2012 and the flags dispute. In place of an understanding of the impact of events on the relationship between the two organisations much of the Orange Order narrative or assessment of the relationship focused on their perception of the standard of service provided by the PSNI. While the concerns were not consistent they broadly reflected a view of a PSNI service of declining standards, including appearance, which is less connected with their community and subject to greater political interference; for some Orange Order interviewees the PSNI regarded the PUL community as an “easy touch” in policing terms. One influential interviewee was very clear that the PSNI relationship with orangeism reflected that of the relationship with the wider PUL community. This is a community that had not understood the changes to policing undertaken since the
Patten report. This same interviewee also noted a worsening attitude among PSNI staff towards the community due to PSNI’s recruitment of better-educated and increasingly middle class staff.

While the place of events appears less important in the narrative of the senior Orangemen in assessing the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order, there were other factors discussed which continue to point to this importance. Key to these factors is the rural and urban issue in Orangeism. There was a very clear view expressed by the Chief Constables, senior PSNI Officers and the majority of senior Orangemen interviewed that the Orange Order was somehow different in its urban and rural manifestations and this difference plays out in the Orange Order’s relationship with PSNI. For the senior PSNI Officers this perception of difference is a consequence of their experience of policing Orange Order events across urban and rural contexts. The senior Orangemen, although not uniformly, contrasted rural and urban orangeism in terms of its tensions, authenticity, attitudes and religious adherence. None suggested the bonds of brotherhood have been broken between city and country but there was a suggestion of strain or at the very least a difference of emphasis between orangeism’s contrasting elements. Even an Orangeman who suggested it should not be interpreted as a greater affection for PSNI accepted that county and urban Orangeism looked different.

It is also the author’s view that the difference between rural and urban Orangeism was evident in the support for and approach to the Twaddell impasse. A nightly protest parade [except Sundays] has been maintained at Twaddell since the decision of the Parades Commission in July 2013 to re-route the 12th return route for three North Belfast lodges (GOLI, 2014) and this impasse is the single greatest influence currently in the PSNI and Orange Order relationship. The PSNI and Orange
Order confront each other nightly at Twaddell as the PSNI enforce the Parades Commission determination and stop the return route from being completed. The researcher was struck by the fact that other than those directly involved with the protests; only one interviewee had in fact travelled to Twaddell. Those who had not visited Twaddell did not entirely distance themselves from the protest but some certainly questioned the wisdom of the on-going protests and pointed to low levels of physical support among their own local structures for the protest. There are undoubtedly numerous reasons why the interviewees had not been to Twaddell. For the purposes of this study it was interesting to note that the leadership of a significant section of orangeism did not participate in demonstrations that currently defined some of the tensions between PSNI and orangeism (GOLI, 05/11/2013).

There are likely many reasons for this rural and urban distinction in Orangeism. Some of this will be historic. In the Literature Review the influence of industrialisation and urban competition between Protestant and Roman Catholic was mentioned as being significant for the development of the character of urban orangeism. One of the reasons proffered by senior PSNI officers for the distinction between rural and urban orangeism was the inherent distinction between rural and urban living, especially in Belfast, where working class communities live cheek by jowl separated by what have become known as interfaces. These interfaces, particularly during the summer months can be the focus of tension and disorder as communities seek to “protect” their territory. Interfaces and this acute community tension exacerbated by proximity is not a feature of rural life. While the historic developments in orangeism should not be ignored, nor the difference between urban and rural experience, it is the author’s view that one of the key reason for this difference is that rural parading is largely without incident and without tension.
Certainly some rural parades remain sensitive but this sensitivity has rarely in the past 20 years resulted in disorder or protest or significant police deployments. Drumcree was likely the last cause celebre for the rural Orangeman. This brings us back to the importance of events. Rural orangeism has this different appearance, different tenor, and apparently better ability to relate to the PSNI due, among other reasons, to an absence of events that create tensions between the two organisations. The author as he interviewed senior Orangemen occasionally attended rural Orange halls in isolated country areas; these were a world away from the febrile atmosphere of Twaddell, confrontation and impasse. It is worth being reminded of PSNI Respondent 10’s view and summary “This is a Belfast centric problem reflecting very fractious Belfast centric interface and community tensions” (p. 10).

This assessment of the importance of events in determining the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order leads the author to make a further recommendation.

**Recommendation 02** – *PSNI and the Orange Order should develop a strategy for organisational or strategic engagement. While the primary purpose of the strategy is to manage the outworkings of parading issues it should seek to build a relationship that is grounded in others areas of mutual concern and shared endeavour. The strategic relationship should also contain a mechanism to prevent crisis overwhelming routine business. The strategic engagement should also confront the issue of the Orange Order’s “responsibility” for events, and for those connected with the events. This issue is discussed in further detail below.*

It is also the case that in some respects the issues of leadership identified and the role of the Parades Commission in being a key dynamic in the relationship
between the PSNI and the Orange Order supports the argument that events are central to understanding the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order.

A range of leadership issues was discussed. There was the issue, for the PSNI Chief Constables and their senior staff, of the strategic direction of the Orange Order and the capacity of the leadership of a voluntary religious and cultural organisation to provide clear direction to its diverse membership. There was also an aspiration expressed by the PSNI that the Orange Order would enter some of the strategic space occupied by PSNI and others and discuss some of the “bigger picture” issues confronting their community and Northern Ireland more generally. For the Orange Order interviewees although a range of views were expressed about PSNI leadership there was a perception among some that PSNI command viewed the Orange Order as a costly irritant that both PSNI and the wider Northern Irish society could ill afford. Orange Order Respondent 8 suggested PSNI saw the Orange Order as a “pain” (p. 42).

Alongside these comments about leadership there was a clear view expressed by a number of senior PSNI officers that the Orange Order’s leadership did not take, at times, sufficient responsibility for the outworkings of Orange Order events. In essence the judgment of senior PSNI officers regarding Orange Order leadership was based on that leadership’s reaction to events, handling of critically sensitive parades and management of the consequences of their own decision-making. None of the senior PSNI officers suggested that the Orange leadership condoned violence or sought to create disorder. But they did suggest that the Orange leadership failed on occasions to make a connection between an Orange Order event and later disorder, even if Orangemen were not involved. One of the PSNI senior officers had talked about a tendency of the Orange Order to walk away from the sometimes-inevitable
consequences of certain events. In discussing Orange Order disciplinary proceedings again there was a sense from some of the PSNI senior officers that it was slow, lacked transparency and failed to send sufficiently strong messages to Orange Order members involved in unlawful protest. The expectation appeared to be from some senior PSNI officers that Orange Order leaders should take responsibility for their own membership, for the bands paid to play by Orange lodges and for the supporters who were only on the streets because an Orange Order event was being held. Orde, for example, during his interview spoke of his anger in 2005 at the Orange Order’s reaction to the 2005 Whiterock Riots. Riots which some commentators suggest he held the Orange Order responsible for (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 294) (Kennaway, 2007, p. 262), as it had called for its members to walk along a banned route.

It is unlikely that there will ever be a meeting of minds between the PSNI and the Orange Order on the issue of responsibility for events and their outworkings. However this issue should form an element of their strategic conversations as per Recommendation 02.

The matter of the Parades Commission also supports the idea that events are a key influencer in the Orange Order and PSNI relationship. As was discussed in the Literature Review the Orange Order has been opposed to the Parades Commission (B.P. White, 2000, p. 242 & 243) (O’Kelly & Bryan, 2007, p. 567) (PC, 2007, p. 1) since its formation was first mooted. It is opposed to the 1998 Public Processions Act (GOLI, n.d.-a) (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 239) and maintains an official position of having no contact with the Parades Commission and taking no part in the Commission’s evidence gathering and decision-making process. An evidence gathering and decision making process in which the PSNI play a key part. So it could be argued that the very fact of the existence of the Parades Commission, the Orange Order’s opposition to its
decision making process, and the PSNI’s statutory responsibility to be part of that process creates a tension between the PSNI and the Orange Order.

Added to that inherent tension caused by the existence of the Parades Commission is the decision making of the Parades Commission. The Parades Commission makes decisions that at times place significant constraints on Orange Order events. It is the PSNI that enforces these decisions of the Parades Commission, at times leading to direct confrontation between themselves and the Orange Order. In enforcing these decisions of the Parades Commission the PSNI become viewed in some Orange Order quarters as part of a process that denied them the right (GOLI, 2005a, p. 2) (GOLI, 2005c, p. 5) (GOLI, 2009a, p. 4) (GOLI, 2013b, p. 1) to express Orange culture of which parading remains such an intrinsic part (Pehrson et al., 2012, p. 112) (Southern, 2007, p. 166) (Bryan, 2001, p. 43) (Montgomery & Whitten, 1995, p. 9). The final element of the Parades Commission dynamic for the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order is that although not uniformly there was a suspicion expressed by some Orange Order interviewees and more widely (GOLI, 2013e, p. 15) that PSNI was not transparent or honest in its dealings with the Commission and it pursued an agenda that was detrimental to the Orange Order and fettered their perceived right to enjoy events without restrictions. The PSNI maintained, perhaps not surprisingly, their dealings with the Commission were transparent and some suggested that Orange Order accusations of bias less reflected reality than the Orange Order’s anti Parades Commission narrative (BBC News, 2013) (GOLI, 2005a, p. 2) (GOLI, 2005c, p. 5) (GOLI, 2009a, p. 4) (GOLI, 2013b, p. 1). There was also evidence of some senior officers taking positive steps to reassure the Orange Order of the transparency of the PSNI position.
The importance of the Parades Commission dynamic in the event driven relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order leads the author to make a third recommendation.

**Recommendation 03** – *PSNI should continue to reassure the Orange Order that its dealings with the Parades Commission are transparent and based on a position of strict neutrality. PSNI should also take opportunities to demonstrate evidence of this strict neutrality as outlined by a number of PSNI interviewees.*

6.5 The Ghost of the RUC

The final significant theme in understanding what is the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order is that of the ghost of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The ghost of the RUC haunts the current relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order in a number of ways. In the first place the Orange Order has a continuing affection for the RUC, affection clearly evident in the interviews with senior Orangemen who talked about the “old RUC.” Equally there is an emotional attachment to the RUC that is absent in the Orange Order’s relationship with the PSNI. This emotional attachment is profound although at times it appears to run contrary to the realities of the history of both organisations.

Chapter one discussed in detail the relationship between the Orange Order and RUC. It noted from the RUC’s formation and until the end of the Stormont government a close relationship existed between both bodies, cemented by the Unionist Party (White, 2000, p. 227) (Bryan, 2000, p. 61) (Lawther, 2010, p. 457) (Murphy, 2013, p. 10) (Ryder, 2004, p. 33) (Nagle, 2009, p. 138). It is also noted how this relationship changed due to, among other things the imposition of direct rule (Bryan, 1997, p. 382) (Bryan, 1997, p. 382) (Warner, 2005, p. 17), the conscious

Although the operational relationship between the two bodies undoubtedly changed and became increasingly confrontational, the RUC remained the Orange Order’s police force for a number of reasons. First they were viewed as a bulwark against the Provisional IRA and inclusion in an Irish Republic. Second the RUC had borne a high price for protecting the British way of life and this was a price shared by 332 Orange Order members (BBC News, 2010) (G.O.L.I. 02/06/2015). It is interesting to note that in a recent press discussion of whether Martin McGuinness would attend an Orange Order parade, the Orange Order said that, while their annual demonstrations are open to the public, they had "over 300 reasons" why they would not invite the deputy first minister to attend (BBC News, 2016). This was a direct reference to the number of their members who had died during the Troubles.

Not surprisingly the Orange Order strongly opposed and indeed resented Patten and his 175 recommendations (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 153) (GOLI, 09/09/1999) which removed in their terms British symbols (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 99) from the force, denied protestant young people jobs due to the enforced 50/50 recruitment arrangements (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 88) and proposed the compulsory registration of PSNI members of the Orange Order (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 90) (GOLI, 02/09/2007). One of the interviewees effectively summed up the Orange Order’s feelings about the creation of the new police service. He spoke in terms of “hurt.”

Alongside this affection for the institution of the RUC that in Orange Order terms had stood shoulder to shoulder with them in the struggle to protect Northern
Ireland there was also a clear affection for the type of service that the Orange Order respondents believed the RUC had provided in contrast to that provided by the PSNI. The Orange Order respondents spoke of the smartness of RUC officers, their ability to transact business informally, their responsiveness and accessibility in small police stations dotted across rural areas and their measured approach to dealing with disorder. In contrast there was a perception among some Orange Order interviewees of scruffy PSNI officers, a bureaucratic and diminishing service to the public, a service no longer wedded to sustained community engagement and politically influenced policing.

The Orange Order’s affection for the RUC was also clear in their perception of the PSNI’s “greening” (Mcauley, 2004, p. 206), the sense that the PSNI, unlike the RUC, had turned its back on the Orange Order and the wider Protestant, unionist and loyalist community in favour of nationalism and republicanism. One element of this “greening”, a notion subscribed to by the majority of the Orange Order interviewees was an over-policing of the PUL community by the PSNI as they were regarded by PSNI as an easier policing option. Respondent 8’s comment that at the Feis [Fleadh] in Derry, PSNI supply 2 Irish speakers (Deeney, 2013), while Orangemen parading to church get “102 cameras in their faces” summed up the feeling well (p. 11) and the sense that the Orange Order has lost that relationship it once enjoyed with the RUC united in the common struggle.

Despite the strength of feeling expressed by the Orange Order respondents and the depth of the emotional bond they maintain with the RUC, and also evidence from the wider literature, it was very apparent the senior PSNI officers did not share the Orange Order analysis. These former RUC officer’s had no nostalgia for that organisation’s relationship with the Orange Order. Some characterised the Orange
view as one seen through rose-tinted spectacles; PSNI Respondent 6 described the Orange Order view of the RUC as seen through a “haze of amnesia” (p. 15). Some reflected on the perceived consequences of Orange Order decisions on their personal lives. It is also clear that some of the strength of personal reflection expressed by the PSNI officers and reluctance to see their children join the Orange Order was informed by their experience as RUC officers and becoming part of what Hermon termed the “third religion” in Northern Ireland (Ellison, G. & Mulcahy, A., 2001, p. 250).

While the senior PSNI officers did not share the Orange Order analysis of its relationship with the RUC there was an interesting, albeit partial, meeting of minds on the perception of the PSNI’s greening. None of the PSNI senior officers accepted that the PSNI had greened in the sense that a conscious decisions had been made by the PSNI to turn its back on the PUL community. Some did however accept that as the PSNI sought to secure the peace and build very necessary and novel relationships with the nationalist and republican community, this may have been perceived by the PUL community as the PSNI turning away from its traditional support base. Some went as far as to suggest that the PSNI had taken the PUL for granted in the necessary pursuit of peace and community cohesion.

The ghost of the RUC and its implications for the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order lead the author to make a final recommendation

**Recommendation 04 - While it is unlikely both organisations will come to a common understanding of policing’s history, both should be prepared to discuss that history respectfully, honestly and in an acknowledgment of mutual hurt. PSNI and the Orange Order should also seek opportunities to make their mutual respect for each other clear.**
6.6 What is the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order since 2001?

This thesis was written with the clear aim of improving the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order. This is because the relationship between policing and Orangeism in Northern Ireland is a relationship that matters. It matters because it remains an element in the on-going peace process and has consequences for the credibility and sustainability of Northern Ireland as a post-conflict society. It also matters as it does not just speak of policing and orangeism but on some levels speaks of the wider relationship between policing and Northern Ireland’s two primary religious identities. Finally the relationship matters because it has implications for the public purse, for reducing police resources and indeed for those communities and individuals caught up in the eye of the various storms.

In drawing the thesis to a conclusion the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order is one where an understanding of events and historical context is key. Events determine the local relationships. Events determine the levels of contact between both organisations at local level and in most cases is the only basis for that relationship. In the main no other issues of mutual local concern have been identified between the PSNI and the Orange Order and no areas of common ground. All but a few of these local events are lawful, peaceful and require a very limited police presence. As the events are peaceful, lawful and benign, both senior PSNI officers and senior Orangemen characterise the local relationship positively. Equally where the reverse is true and parading is controversial, its outworkings troublesome and significant police resources are required to manage parades, the relationship is characterised as challenging and stretching the bounds of trust.

Events equally have a significant bearing on the organisational relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order and are key to understanding this element of
the overall picture. In the case of the organisational relationship a very small number of events appear to overwhelm normal relations and the positive nature of the local and routine. Events also help understand the rural and urban distinction in Orangeism, perceptions of Orange and PSNI leadership and the dynamic created by the Parades Commission. It is difficult to explain why this is the case and why one or two events have the ability to symbolise the relationship. It is more than likely because the relationship between both organisations is based on the here and now and the current as opposed to drawing on a more solid foundation that takes account of more than parading, and which has the strength to weather the storms of controversy. It is as though the organisational relationship has no resource to draw on beyond reaction to controversy, anxiety and confrontation. As long as this continues to be the case fragility will be the defining feature of the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order.

Historical context is also key to answering the question what is the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order. The ghost of the RUC haunts the relationship. The Orange Order retains a deep emotional bond with the RUC. It retains a profound affection for what they regarded as their police force that engaged in a deadly struggle to preserve a particular way of life. A struggle that so many of their Orange brethren paid the ultimate price for also. In the place of the RUC, is the PSNI, a police service foisted upon them in a political deal they did not support; a police service that apparently retains few, if any of the hallmarks of policing that the Orange Order cherished in the RUC.

The relationship is far from hopeless. In the main it works and works well. It delivers safe, lawful and peaceful parades across vast swathes of Northern Ireland with an absence of community tension. But this relationship will only be transformed
when it develops the ability to rise above the occasional, the controversial and the extreme.
Appendix A  Search Terms

1. Royal Irish Constabulary
2. Royal Ulster Constabulary
3. Ulster Special Constabulary (“B” Specials)
4. Police Service of Northern Ireland
5. Orange Order
6. Royal Black Preceptory
7. Apprentice Boys of Derry
8. Independent Orange Order
9. Parades and Parading in Northern Ireland
10. Parades and disorder in Northern Ireland
11. Parades Commission Northern Ireland
12. Parades Commission and Orange Order
13. Parades Commission and Royal Black Preceptory
14. Parades Commission and Apprentice Boys of Derry
15. Parades Commission and Independent Orange Order
16. Parades Commission and Police Service of Northern Ireland
17. Orange Order and Residents Groups
18. Royal Black Preceptory and Residents Groups
19. Apprentice Boys of Derry and Residents Groups
20. Independent Orange Order and Residents Groups
21. Royal Irish Constabulary and Orange Order
22. Royal Ulster Constabulary and Orange Order
23. Ulster Special Constabulary (“B” Specials) and Orange Order
24. Police Service of Northern Ireland and Orange Order
25. Royal Black Preceptory and Royal Irish Constabulary
26. Royal Black Preceptory and Royal Ulster Constabulary
27. Royal Black Preceptory and Police Service of Northern Ireland
28. Apprentice Boys of Derry and Royal Irish Constabulary
29. Apprentice Boys of Derry and Royal Ulster Constabulary
30. Apprentice Boys of Derry and Police Service of Northern Ireland
31. Independent Orange Order and Royal Irish Constabulary
32. Independent Orange Order and Royal Ulster Constabulary
33. Independent Orange Order and Police Service of Northern Ireland
34. Nationalist objection to parades Northern Ireland
Appendix B  Question Schedules

B.1  George Hamilton

1. Please can you state your name and position

2. Are you content to be quoted in the thesis?

3. Prior to your appointment as Chief Constable how aware were you of the Orange Order and how did you view them, as a political, religious or marching organisation or something else

4. What was your first formal contact with the Orange Order – I am particularly keen to know if they sought you out and you felt the need to engage with them. Or indeed if you took a more proactive approach to them

5. If you consented to meet them or proactively sought them out what was this an acknowledgment of and what were you seeking to do?

6. In your initial meeting with the Orange Order can you recall the messages they gave you and equally what messages were you seeking to give them?

7. At this initial meeting how did you assess the PSNI and Orange Order relationship – what was driving that relationship? And was there any sense that Orange order simply did not accept the PSNI as a police service they were comfortable with as opposed to their view of the RUC

8. Is there a sense in which the Orange Order now views the RUC through rose coloured spectacles?

9. How do you characterise the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order during your tenure as Chief Constable. I am particularly interested to know whether you think this has improved or deteriorated and why
10. There are presumably some low points in that relationship, can you point to any periods when you felt a more positive relationship with the Orange Order existed and why?

11. It strikes me that one of the difficulties in dealing with Orangeism is that it is a very democratic organisation with little central control, when you spoke to senior orange leaders how confidence were you they could actually influence what was happening on the ground?

12. Outside of parading what is the Orange Order’s interest in policing?

13. With the existence of the parades commission how much is the PSNI able to determine its relationship with the Orange Order?

14. How do you assess the future of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship?

15. What needs to change to make that relationship more productive or will it always be determined by events?
B.2 Sir Hugh Orde

1. Please can you state your name and position
2. Are you content to be quoted in the thesis?
3. You were Chief Constable of the PSNI May 2002 – May 2009?
4. Prior to becoming Chief Constable how aware were you of the Orange Order and what did you understand the Organisation as?
5. As you were becoming Chief were you pre-briefed and was Orangeism a feature of this pre-briefing. If “yes” do you recall how it was framed?
6. What was your first formal contact with the Orange Order and who initiated this contact?
7. What was the level of your ongoing contact with the OO?
8. In the early part of your tenure how important did you see contact between the Chief Constable and the Orange Order? Where did they sit in the scale of priorities and why?
9. In your initial meetings with the Orange Order can you recall the messages they gave you and equally what messages were you seeking to give them?
10. At this initial meeting how did you assess the PSNI and Orange Order relationship – what was driving that relationship? How big a factor were the Patten reforms and the Parades Commission?
11. Was there much in the Orange Order narrative about a comparison between the PSNI and the RUC?
12. Was there a sense in which the Orange Order viewed the RUC through rose cultured spectacles?
13. What sense did you have of how the PSNI felt about the Orange Order? Clearly only maybe couple of hundred members sense any general predisposition towards Orangeism.

14. You pushed through the Patten reforms concern about the loyalty of OO police officers or sense OO attempt to undermine this through their membership?

15. In general terms how do you characterise the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order during your tenure as Chief Constable and what factors influenced that relationship?

16. Following the riots in Whiterock in 2005 you made very public criticism of the Orange Order what impact did those riots have on your attitude to the Order and your ongoing relationship with them?

17. One of the accusations the OO might make is that during your tenure the PSNI greened and you did not pay sufficient attention to loyalism and their consistency, how do you respond to that?

18. A further criticism the OO makes of you is your relationship with the Parades Commission – characterise the PSNI as part of the same process to limit their culture. What was your understanding of the PSNI’s strategic relationship with the Parades Commission?

19. Could PSNI have tried to build a relationship with the Parades Commission that might have given the Orange Order more confidence?

20. It strikes me that one of the difficulties in dealing with Orangeism is that it is a very democratic organisation with little central control, when you spoke to senior orange leaders how confident were you they could actually influence what was happening on the ground? Perceive a rural/urban split?
21. In dealing with Orange leaders what strains did you perceive among them?

22. How do you think the Orange Order would describe you as chief constable?

23. Outside of parading what was the Orange Order’s interest in policing?

24. Would you assess that while you were Chief Constable the relationship improved or deteriorate and why?

25. In the round were the Orange Order a support or a barrier to the building of a peaceful and stable society in NI?
B.3 Sir Matt Baggott

1. Please can you state your name and position

2. Are you content to be quoted in the thesis?

3. Prior to your appointment as Chief Constable how aware were you of the Orange Order and how did you view them, as a political, religious or marching organisation or something else

4. What was your first formal contact with the Orange Order – I am particularly keen to know if they sought you out and you felt the need to engage with them. Or indeed if you took a more proactive approach to them

5. If you consented to meet them or proactively sought them out what was this an acknowledgment of and what were you seeking to do?

6. In your initial meeting with the Orange Order can you recall the messages they gave you and equally what messages were you seeking to give them?

7. At this initial meeting how did you assess the PSNI and Orange Order relationship – what was driving that relationship? And was there any sense that Orange order simply did not accept the PSNI as a police service they were comfortable with as opposed to their view of the RUC

8. Is there a sense in which the Orange Order now views the RUC through rose coloured spectacles?

9. How do you characterise the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order during your tenure as Chief Constable. I am particularly interested to know whether you think this has improved or deteriorated and why
10. There are presumably some low points in that relationship, can you point to any periods when you felt a more positive relationship with the Orange Order existed and why?

11. It strikes me that one of the difficulties in dealing with Orangeism is that it is a very democratic organisation with little central control, when you spoke to senior orange leaders how confidence were you they could actually influence what was happening on the ground?

12. Outside of parading what is the Orange Order’s interest in policing?

13. With the existence of the parades commission how much is the PSNI able to determine its relationship with the Orange Order

14. How do you assess the future of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship?

15. What needs to change to make that relationship more productive or will it always be determined by events?
1. Please state your name and role in the PSNI

2. Are you prepared to be quoted in the interview or would you prefer to remain anonymous?

3. Are you a member or have you previously been a member of the Orange Order or any other loyal order?

4. What, if any, family connections do you have to the Orange Order?

5. What do you understand the Orange Order to be?

6. As a senior police officer what is the extent and type of your relationship with the Orange Order? Does this go beyond the summer months?

7. If the extent of the relationship is limited, is it your expectation this relationship is managed by those working for you? And if “yes” have you given them any strategy for engagement?

8. As a senior police officer how important do you view your relationship with the Orange Order and please explain your answer?

9. If you view this relationship as important, how would you assess its importance in comparison to other key community relationships?

10. If you do not view the relationship as important please would you explain why not? Has that importance of this relationship altered recently?

11. How important is the Orange Order in the unionist community?

12. What if any levels of frustration do you feel about having to police orange parades against the background of other demands?
13. How would you describe the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order in general terms?

14. What factors impact on this relationship?

15. Of the various factors that impact your relationship with the Orange Order how important is parading?

16. Other than managing parading relationships, what is the nature of the relationship? If the Orange Order did not parade would the PSNI need to have a relationship with them?

17. Has the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland the Orange Order improved or deteriorated since the creation of the PSNI?

18. If you have noted a change in the relationship what is your explanation for this can you account for this?

19. If you have also served in rural/urban region how would you differentiate between the police/orange order relationships in both, if at all.

20. The PSNI is accused by some as “greening” as an organisation and failing to take the needs of the loyalist community seriously. If you assess this to be a fair assessment please explain why?

21. Do you think PSNI needs to make greater efforts to explain Orangeism and loyalism to its staff?

22. How would you describe the front line view of the Orange Order?

23. How would you feel if your son or daughter became members of the Orange Order? Please explain your answer.

24. On a personal level, how do you feel about the Orange Order

25. What would you do to improve the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order?
26. What do you think Orange order thinks of PSNI and Parades Commission relationship and how important is this in determining the relationship and is this an area for improvement

27. What do you believe the Orange Order needs to do to improve its relationship with the police and how effectively do you think they manage this?

28. What is your sense of the Orange order’s ability to control its membership?

29. The former Chief Constable referred to the Orange Order as reckless following the events of 12th July 2013. How well do you believe the Order thinks through its actions in parading disputes?

30. How willing do you assess the Orange Order is to discipline its members who become involved in parade related disorder?

31. How willing do you believe the Orange leadership is to accepting responsibility for the actions of its members and others?

32. Should the police charge for managing Orange parades? Please explain your response

33. How do you assess the future of the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order and what might determine this?

34. There is a tendency in the Orange Order to view the RUC as their police force. What was your experience of the RUC/Orange Order relationship and how does it differ between the current police/orange order relationship?

35. Is there anything else you would wish to add about the police and orange order re
1. Please state your name and your position in the Orange Order?
2. How long have you been a member of the Orange Order for? Are you a member of any other loyal Order?
3. Are you a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland?
4. Were you a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary? If yes for how long and in what capacity?
5. Are you aware of what police District you live in and the name of the District Commander? If “yes” please can you tell me?
6. What is the nature and extent of your ongoing contact with members of the Police Service of Northern Ireland? (Summer only?)
7. How content are you at the level at which you access the PSNI and the ease with which you access the PSNI?
8. How would you describe your relationship with local senior police?
9. How would you describe the relationship between the Orange Order and the Police Service of Northern Ireland generally?
10. What factors influence this relationship?
11. How important do you believe the parading issue is in influencing the relationship between the Orange Order and the Police Service of Northern Ireland?
12. Other than parading what do you believe the key factors to be in the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Institution?
13. What do you want from the PSNI?
14. What do you believe to be the relationship between the Parades Commission and the Police Service of Northern Ireland?
15. How much do you trust this relationship?
16. What more could either the PC or the PSNI do to reassure you about the nature of the relationship?
17. How effective do you feel the Institution is in disciplining brethren who may be prosecuted for parade related disorder and how clear do you feel the leadership is in condemning breaking of the law?
18. In July 2013 Matt Baggott accused the Orange Order of being reckless in bringing people onto the streets at Twaddell? How do you feel about this comment?
19. If you had to assess the relationship of the Orange Order and the Police Service of Northern Ireland during the past ten years, would you assess this as an improving or deteriorating relationship?
20. What is your sense of the attitude in the Police Service of Northern Ireland to the Orange Order and why?
21. How do you think the PSNI leadership views the Orange Order and how do you regard the levels of access afforded to the Institution by the PSNI generally?
22. How do you think front line officers who police parades feel about the Orange Order?
23. How could the Orange Order improve its relationship with police?
24. How could the police improve its relationship with the Orange Order?
25. Do you hold a different opinion of PSNI front line officers than your opinion of its senior leaders? If “yes”, please would you explain why?
26. The accusation is sometimes made that the PSNI has “greened” and has lost interest in the Protestant Unionist and Loyalist (PUL) community? What is your view?

27. How would you feel if your son or daughter joined the PSNI?

28. What did you feel about the Patten reforms on policing? And how do you think these impacted on the Orange Order’s relationship with police?

29. If you objected to the Patten reforms which reform did you most object to?

30. What is the difference between rural and urban Orangeism and if there is a difference does this extend to the attitude to police?

31. How much does what is happening in Belfast impact on wider Orangeism?

32. What do you think the impact of policing parades is on the ability of the PSNI to do its routine tasks such as preventing crime?

33. Should the police charge for managing Orange parades? Please explain your response.

34. How would you describe the Orange Order’s relationship with the Royal Ulster Constabulary and how does this contrast with the relationship with the Police Service of Northern Ireland?

35. Is there anything else you would like to add about the police/orange order relationship?
FORM UPR16
Research Ethics Review Checklist

Please include this completed form as an appendix to your thesis (see the Postgraduate Research Student Handbook for more information)

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If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee for advice. Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University’s Ethics Policy and any relevant University, academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study.

Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s).

UKRIO Finished Research Checklist:
(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics Committee see the online version of the full checklist at: [http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-practice-for-research/](http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-practice-for-research/))

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<td>c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, publication and authorship?</td>
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<td><strong>e)</strong>  Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements?</td>
<td>YES</td>
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**Candidate Statement:**

I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully obtained necessary ethical approval(s)

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Signed: Simon Walls  
(Student)  
Date: 26th July 2015

If you have not submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered ‘No’ to one or more of questions a) to e), please explain why this is so:


Signed:  
(Student)  
Date:
Mr. Simon Walls  
Professional Doctorate Student  
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies  
University of Portsmouth

REC reference number: 14/15:04  
Please quote this number on all correspondence.

9th October 2014

Dear Simon,

Full Title of Study: An examination of the relationship between the Police  
Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order

Documents reviewed:  
Consent Form  
Ethical narrative and self-assessment  
Letters  
Participant Information Sheet  
Protocol  
Questionnaires

Further to our recent correspondence, this proposal was reviewed by The Research  
Ethics Committee of The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.

I am pleased to tell you that the proposal was awarded a favourable ethical opinion by  
the committee on the understanding that you undertake to do the following:

1. Provide the supervisor and the participants with a clear understanding of what is  
meant by a 'trusted' person to undertake transcription and why that person can be  
considered 'trusted' and to consider whether some form of documentation should be  
signed to agree non-disclosure and confidentiality.
2. Give consideration to interviewees being permitted to see the transcript and possibly even after the researcher analysis, in order to verify the data and findings.

3. Ensure that the specific ethical risks and risk mitigation discussed in other parts of the bundle are entered onto the Self-Assessment document.

4. Documentation arising out of the research data and analysis process should be kept (as per the DPA) for 5 years. This aspect will need amending. Signed consent forms should be kept (as per the DPA) for 30 years. Please make sure that you specify this to all concerned and clearly identify how you will store the documents.

Kind regards,
FHSS FREC Chair
Dr Jane Winstone

Members participating in the review:

- Richard Hitchcock
- Wendy Sims-Schouten
- Geoff Wade
- Jane Winstone
Reference List


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