Time-specificity of Performance

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Abstract

This article develops a notion of time-specificity of performance. It begins by taking a temporal approach to performance through the philosophy of Henri Bergson. It looks at three artists/collectives, Tehching Hsieh, Every house Has a Door, Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša. Their practices play with notions of the present, past and future, and by doing so set new terms for a temporal aesthetics of experience. Time-specificity opens up reconsiderations of pivotal notions within performance such as repetition, documentation and freedom.

Temporality and Choreographic Practices

What is at stake in considerations of performance and temporality is a placement of value on performance through its relationship to time. The events made possible by choreographic practices are not utopias, not perfect, but are sites inseparable from the radical difference and immanence inherent to lived time. In a historical moment when programmatic structures built on an algorithmic apparatus more or less visibly determine our social interactions, choreographic practices become crucial because they expose themselves. In time-specificity the performance invites its attendants to hack its structures in order to make the performance mean and do something. That something might be the activities involved in sharing duration, which collectivize groups around creative ideologies. Therefore I will argue that there is a link between performance duration and creativity that leads to an awareness of freedom.
The notion of choreographic practices, defined here as principled forms for structuring aesthetic experience, opens a space for a consideration of the essential acts of endurance that attendance at such events requires. Time is shared as it passes. As the performance becomes, as the choreography is attended, it changes through itself and in response to its conditions. It becomes necessary to elaborate what exactly is the nature of this endurance at the heart of attending, attending being the work that all involved in the performance are capable of, artist and audience alike. The temporality of performance implied through the notion of choreographic practices, a processual heterogeneity of activities, is crucial to the understanding what is at stake in contemporary performance in regard to aesthetic and social concerns.

The following discussion argues that choreographic practices are in themselves affirmative gestures of temporal activity, or strategies that reveal and revel in the importance of sharing time. Temporality returns to performance a conception of its politics as choreographic. In order to explain how this occurs, I will consider three performances in which a nature of time, present, past and future, is itself explored. How these works transform the passage of time will be framed through a discussion of the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Bergson’s relevance is his focus on the experiential nature of temporality, mirrored by time-specificity’s focus on the experience of performance. In order to vitalize the politics of choreographic practices this discussion aims to offer a reconsideration of both temporality and performance through their relation.

To consider the relationship between performance and temporality requires a careful use of terms. The difference between the word ‘in’ and the word ‘of’ distinguishes between the dominant chronological mode of temporality and the experience-based theory of duration found in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. The
difference consists of abstracted versus lived time. In more simple words, when something is in time, time is a dimension. When something is of time, time is a force of creativity. Clock time has achieved a ubiquity in culture to the point that time itself is rarely defined in any other way than with clocks. However, time-specificity conceives of duration as the core of temporality and considers clock time to as a system used to measure that force. Time and duration are related to speed, movement, distance, seasons, weather, reproduction, death and life, but these are factors of temporality rather than it itself. When temporality might have more than one definition, it becomes to important to be clear on what exactly it might be in relation to performance and choreographic practices.

That is why time-specificity becomes a useful term. Time-specificity is a mode of thinking performance from a practical standpoint in which the attention is toward temporality, as a complement to spatial forms of analysis. I will not claim therefore that all theatre or even some theatre is time-specific. Taxonomic gestures risk reducing the complexity of how choreographic practices alter and are altered by temporality. In a completely different vein then, time-specificity is a mode that attends to emergences in performance. It is performance in purely lived temporal terms. Time-specificity uncovers the vital forces of performance that continually change, endure through transformation and memory, and are constantly becoming different through creation.

To consider the issues of present, past and future time-specificity this article will attend to the work of one solo artist and two collectives. To explore the relation between performance and duration I will discuss the work of Taiwanese-American artist Tehching Hsieh. His One Year Performances reveal the need for a temporal approach to performance historiography that thinks documentation as memory. That gives way to a consideration of the Chicago-based collective Every House Has a
Door’s performance *Nine Beginnings*, which questioned the virtuality of the archive. With the present of performance as duration and documentation as memory considered through the lens of time-specificity, I turn toward the future in order to consider the open-ended social possibilities of performance through the name change project of three Slovenian artists Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša.

**Time-specificity of the present as duration in Tehching Hsieh**

In the performance art works of Tehching Hsieh there is a conscious experimentation with the passage of time. Potentially his work amounts to the creation of alternative clocks, if a clock might be defined as an arbitrary system of proof or measure for the reality of endurance as change. Consider Hsieh’s framing technique of beginning each yearlong performance with his head shaved, in order to allow it to grow uncut for the year. Duration is multiple; it includes a mass of changes at variable levels of perceptibility. The growth of Hsieh’s hair is but one mark among many that mark passages of time that sit outside typical frames of perception, in which time is capitalized. For Hsieh time is not money, time is passing, it is duration. It is the basis of being alive and the basis of art.

In ‘Time-clock Piece’, Hsieh’s performance from 1980-1981, Hsieh entered his studio every hour on the hour, inserted a time card into an industrial time clock, which punched the time of day onto the card. Hsieh then turned around, took a photo of himself with a specially modified 16mm camera set up to expose a single frame at a time, then exited the studio. This amounted to eight thousand seven hundred sixty punches of which Hsieh missed a mere one hundred thirty-three. Hsieh’s performance and documentation reveal a useful comparison that illuminates Henri Bergson’s conception of the difference in kind between clock time and duration or lived time,
leading to new definitions of concepts of performance aesthetics such as repetition, of which I will now discuss.

Each time card is a small yellow piece of paper that when completed shows a series of times, a matrix of numbers. They are countable. These times of the clock are instants, the flash in which Hsieh was ready at the clock with the card. It is clock time in its most material and immobile form. The time on the time card is not time itself, but is a mark attributable to a certain moment, given meaning as passage when in relation to the following and previous instants. For social life to function, moments are attached to certain numbers, markers that give order. This is what Bergson calls scientific or clock time. It is made up of number, a measurement, it is a quantitative multiplicity. It can be divided into parts without changing their nature, as with the conception of space that Zeno elaborates in the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. Through this sub divisibility, number is paradoxically both multiple and singular. The time on the card is one moment and yet is made up of a multiplicity, for example ten hours, a measurement of the interval between midnight and ten in the morning. Ten is a single number and the accumulation of the numbers between zero and itself. Each time on the time card, and each time card, has a regularity that is both many and one.

This regularity is the homogeneity of clock time. Each time card must be the same structure as the others, as each minute must be made of sixty seconds. For order the system's elements remove the variability of speed of experience. Each time card is one day. Put together, they make up another whole which is another number and yet many numbers, which are homogeneous and at the same time distinguishable. Each must have some difference that allows them to be counted together while maintaining enough similarity to be contained in a group. The homogeneity of clock time is the medium in which number clarifies moments of experience.
Clock time admits of the difference of kind of each minute of experience while requiring a quantitative difference between each of its composite elements. The time cards show how life continues differentiating even as clock time repeats its closed system indefinitely. Clock time requires duration but duration does not require clock time. It is a mistake to assume, as Zeno and some sciences do, that experience is dependent on measure. Bergson responds to Zeno’s paradox by differentiating between the measure of travel and the act of moving itself (Bergson 2001 pgs. 113-115). Time-specificity privileges the act of moving. Hsieh’s performance does not require documentation, rather the performance produces documents. Endurance as change makes measurement and abstract dimensions possible. Thus clock time for Bergson is number, a quantitative multiplicity, homogeneity and an abstraction of space that is a product of duration (Bergson 2001 pgs. 75-104).

For Hsieh’s *Time-clock piece*, clock time and measurement are found in not only the time cards but also the resulting film made up of the series of photographs taken throughout the year. The frames run in order and collapse the year into a video shorter than seven minutes. At least three measures of time can be found in the video. The hour hand of the clock can be seen rotating quickly through each hour of the year. The time cards themselves show the accumulation of durations. The inked-in punches rise up the time card and disappear, making way for another day and another fresh card to fill with another column of hourly punches. Each time punched on the card sits together, as if these successive moments were simultaneous.

These technicalities are the least striking elements of the video. What stands out is the face of the man. Hsieh’s simple focus remains throughout. The minor differences of position for each photograph amount to a moving body but that movement is caused by the succession of stills. The film and its measures of clock
time are meaningful because they are attached to the experience of Hsieh. The viewer recognizes the extremity of the performance. It takes virtuosity, but not of technique. Hsieh’s is a virtuosity of commitment, concept and dedication, a feat of discipline and devotion. The video proves that the act was done. The video and the documents the act produced are purposefully indexical to the actual experience of the performance. That Hsieh’s face continues to appear while his hair grows, the clock winds and the time cards fill up, displays the inability of the document to itself account fully for that which is lived, which is the experience of endurance.

Bergson calls this experience of passing time duration. Lived time is the activity, or the implement of choreographic practice that makes the film and punch cards possible. Duration is, for Bergson, nothing like number. It is pure continuity instead of juxtaposition. It is a heterogeneity of qualities. Thus duration and the performance are qualitative multiplicities. Still multiple, each part is a quality as opposed to a measurement. For One Year Performance, the lived durations are the crux of the artwork. The documents allow others to imagine that primary aspect of Hsieh’s practice. Some qualities of the performance are the patience, the lack of sleep, his resolve to continue. These qualities or aspects of the performance are a pure heterogeneity that interpenetrate through their continuity with each other. They differ as they repeat and they are immeasurable. The performance itself is a lived action. It is an actuality while the documentation materializes the virtual. Duration and the performance are mobilities, the constant becoming of change that is always manifesting difference. Duration is related to but nothing like abstract geometrical space, a dimension made up of quantitative multiplicities. Duration is pure qualitative multiplicity (Bergson 2001 pgs. 105-139 and 226).

**Temporal repetition through Hsieh**
One might argue that Hsieh is doing the same thing over and over again. He is repeating the action of going to the time clock, punching a card and taking a photo of himself. It is an act of extended repetition. Perhaps each punch of the clock and each photo in this understanding have only a difference of degree between each iteration of the entire group. Repetition then would be a process of homogeneous constructions of the same. It is nothing other than multiple copies of objects in space co-existing simultaneously. This is repetition ‘in’ time. But this is of course a process that requires a dimension, whereas because duration is a force it itself has no dimension. Repetition through process and change must be different in kind from repetition of objects in space. How then can repetition be conceived through time-specificity when we substitute of for in, or repetition of time? If in duration the past interpenetrates with the present through memory, there must be a difference in kind between an action of the present and a similar one of the past.

In Hsieh’s performance the difference in kind between the past and present action is secured by the memory of the past photo and card punch interpenetrating with the current actuality. Repetition cannot be considered as an operation of sameness. Duration operates through the becoming of difference. Temporal repetition is ontogenetic difference in kind, with an appearance of difference of degree attributed through the mind remembering the past.

In time-specificity repetition is a tensioning of the force of duration. It may increase or decrease tension, but it is only symbolically like the repetition that consists of two or more objects sitting side by side simultaneously. The tension that arises through repetition of and in performance reveals the difference that is inherent to duration. Repetition adjusts the pressure of performance when temporality is a force. Moments are unrepeateable because the past persists, which requires repetition to alter
momentum. This reveals the depth of Hsieh’s extended durations, which manifest through tensioning lived experience.

**Time-specificity of performance past**

If temporal repetition within a performance is a process of tensioning, might repetition of a given performance work in a similar way when viewed through the lens of time-specificity? In concrete terms, what exactly about a performance from the past can be repeated again in the present and how does this occur? Documents extend the reach of experiential arts, and thinking documentation temporally prompts reconsiderations of art historiography. The chosen document for drama is the script. It is used as the base to create the performance and usually records a specific iteration of the play. However choreographic practices that are not reliant on text alone require alternative modes of documentation in order to make the past accessible in the present. From the 1970’s onward it would appear that photography and video are the dominant forms of documentation for less literary forms of performance. In comparison to dramatic scripts, photographic documents perform different functions and they affect the way history is made and accessed.

For art that is less text-based than drama, the terms score and record are useful alternatives to script. Many forms of contemporary choreographic practices, such as the work of Jonathan Burrows and Matteo Fargion, employ the word score to processes that take both composed indeterminacy and the idea of writing as a practice to be important methodology. A score awaits manifestation. It does not claim to encapsulate the experience of the. It is instead a guide to the work of art, serving a diagrammatic function. The score gives to the artist in the studio a set of precepts and principles from which to work. The score is defined by its choreographic futurity.
As the score looks forward into the future, on the other hand, the record looks back. Records cast their viewers into the role of audience distanced from the performance, while the viewer of the score is an artist, an interpreter. Distinguishing between these two kinds of documents is important because it shows what they are made to do. However the mode of access by the present of the past also can alter the status of the relationship to history. It is similar to the way recollection can alter memory from the present, causing the appearance of the past to be different. This is in fact a repurposing of the past of the present. Time-specificity takes account of not only how documents are produced but also approaches to accessing them. Virtuality, as the non-actual field of memory and performance documents, offers insight into the potentials of documents to be transformed through modes of access. The differences between documents depends on use as much as it depends on how it was produced. Records might end up as scores.

A concrete example of the transferability of scores and records is evident in the recent Every House Has a Door production 9 Beginnings. The Chicago based company was commissioned to make a performance that responds to other artists’ archives in Bristol at Arnolfini. The company decided to re-perform the beginnings of nine different performances archived on video. Videos in the framework of time-specificity are records, but for 9 Beginnings they would be functioning as scores. That Every House Has a Door did not attempt to restage each work faithfully reinforces the argument that these records were used as scores, as the score is a document open to interpretation and manifestation. However there is an earlier score that begun to operate before the videos were selected. This is first the score of the commission, to respond to other artists’ archives. Later there is another score, to choose and restage the first three or so minutes of nine video documents of performances. What this
example shows is the immanent mixture of scores and records that operate in concrete examples. There are always complex mixtures of the actual and the virtual interpenetrating in the creation of performance. Different scales of perception will indicate different scores. Time-specificity takes account of the complexity of multiple tendencies that operate in performance processes. Any given lived art will have a specific configuration of documentation relation. Looking at a single work at various levels of magnitude will necessitate different versions of documents for the same piece, which can indicate historical reformulations of the score/performance/record relation.

**Documentation as memory**

*9 Beginnings* proves a useful case study in understanding how memory reveals operations within the relationship between performance and documentation. The performance is considered to be authored by Every House Has a Door, and yet the audience is given a program that details where each beginning comes from. Each of these beginnings required a different form of reenactment. *9 Beginnings* only had two performers for a piece that consisted previously of three dancers. Every House Has a Door choose to divide the dance into parts and loop it several times, in order to form a composite performance in which every relation of two dancers within the initial three were performed. In a way, the entirety of the choreography was danced, but only if synthesized simultaneously through memory. But as was shown earlier, experienced time is not a dimension that can be subdivided and reorganized. Memory is what allows virtuality to create the continuities necessary between these different performances. The version for *9 Beginnings* was related to but different in kind from the dance on video.
If memory is the way the present accesses the past, then performance documents, such as the video of the three dancers, can be considered memories. Thinking performance through this temporal relation offers a model in which a given work of art becomes in constantly changing forms of manifestation. These forms, like momentary rememberings, are a single iteration of a heterogeneous piece of art, which contains various performances, scores and records. Each becoming, each creation, is an act of accessing other temporalities, because while each iteration is different, it will also be continuous with the others, be they simultaneous, past or future.

**Diagrams of Time-specificity: mapping the relationship between performance, memory and documentation**

Diagramming may facilitate understanding the complex multiple tendencies that operate within the creation of a performance. Taking a genealogical approach to the development of creating a work of live art, scores beget performances which beget records. The table [Figure 1] accounts for this general concept and defines each category. However it represents a linear and divided process, which is in practice more continuous and interpenetrative. So the second diagram [Figure 2] groups scores and records into one broader category as documents and shows how memory is what connects these materials to the experience of performance.

Memory flows between performance and documentation, continuously, creating becomings of form that manifest as variable mixtures of scores, performances and records. This conclusion leads to [Figure 3] the performance memory documentation cone, inspired by Henri Bergson’s memory cone from *Matter and Memory* (Bergson 2004 pg. 197). The documentation cone shows a particular configuration of a mixture, in which performance, in the realm of the real and actual, pierces the lower left sphere at the level of perception. The surface of the sphere is
clock time, while its movement is duration. As performance memories travel upward away from the realm of the actual or real, they create another sphere, top right. This sphere is moved by memory, and its surface is documents. These documents either tend back toward the real performance as records in the direction of the virtual or push away as scores toward the possible. If enough force is exerted in the score/possible direction the cone is reproduced as another different but connected performance. The tendencies of generative constraints that act on the middle of the cone reconfigure the relationship between the two spheres. They might be aesthetic, environmental, political and ethical forces. This accounts for the variable mixtures of virtualities and actualities operating through performance.

**Names, authenticity and attention; performance appears**

Another repetition in *9 Beginnings* brought up a crucial aspect of how authenticity functions as a formula of fidelity and originality within performance and documentation. This work, previously by Lone Twin, consisted of the performers intimately addressing the audience and at one point using their own names. After much deliberation and attempts in several ways, Every House Has a Door decided that the most faithful way to restage the earlier performance would be to use the names of the performers in *9 Beginnings* instead of the names in the previous work. By doing so, Every House Has a Door attempted to create the effect of the performance, and in doing so had to change the original score.

This caused there to be fidelity in the present becoming to the past becoming, precisely through injecting differential originality. It may be that to repeat a past performance, whether that is through a new performance or through documentation, the present iteration is improved by taking the current material conditions into account. It will not do to merely recreate the recorded form the past work took, as might be the
case in repetitions aiming at an authentic reenactment. Such repetitions deny the importance of the situation for performance, and also misguidedly attach a singularity to the form of the past work when it was merely one of many manifestations. Singularity is contextual, it relates to the conditions of the performance event.

When the performers of 9 Beginnings used their own names, it became a case of creating a sense of the ‘unauthentic’, to use Michael Pearson and Michael Shanks’ term from their 2001 book Theatre/Archaeology (pg. 119). The intentionally unauthentic repeats the past through showing that for the present, it must become in a new way. The transparency of composition found in the unauthentic places import on the totality of performance experience, rather than on the spoken text or movements of performance. Singular authenticity is not achievable because of the multiplicitous nature of repetition in the time-specificity of performance. That kind of authenticity assumes that the presence of the previous work consists of a trustworthy original. The unauthentic denies the notion of presence as an immutable quality of performance. It may be that presence and authenticity become strategies to attach possession and ownership to works of art by containing and limiting their forms. Attention to the time-specificity of performance shows that the connection between performers and material is an enduring and transforming relation.

In time-specificity documents act as memories, and these memories make up one form of material available to performance. Other materials are the movements, words, atmosphere, audience configuration, and any other number of aesthetic decisions that may go into the formation of a work. When considered this way, the performers’ presence is yet another material, no more mysterious than the entrance to the space. So when the performers in 9 Beginnings said Selma and Sebastian instead of Gregg and Gary, they privileged the situation of the performance as material
instead of the Lone Twin text. Time-specificity uses the word attendants to describe both the artists and the audience, because all share in attending to the materials of performance.

When attention as opposed to presence becomes the mode through which performance is made and considered, it no longer becomes viable to contain the relation between attendants and materials in fixed ontologies. Thus, the debates within performance studies around ontology, for example between Peggy Phelan and Rebecca Schneider become cast in a new light. Time-specificity of performance, both present and past, show that performance can not only disappear or remain. Performance appears. It may later disappear or remain, but for either to be possible it must first appear. This appearance is not necessarily primarily visual but instead made up of a multiplicity of sense perception and affect merged with concept. The appearance is a becoming of form, an eruption from virtuality to actuality.

**Composition as subtraction and freedom**

As a performance is being composed, whether it is from nine video documents or a new play written by someone sitting at a typewriter, each becoming of form is an act of attending to certain elements, which requires leaving many other elements out of the composition. In this way the creation of performance is an act of subtraction rather than addition. Time-specificity indicates that composition consists of choosing to attend to a very small number of elements and removing the many other possibilities that are at hand. In the beginning there are an infinite number of possibilities. The decision to choose nine beginnings instead of more, for example, immediately removed the majority of the video documents available from the work. As the composition process develops these possibilities are narrowed further and further down until attention is given to specific elements. It might seem that a transition is
added, but in fact what is taken away is the appearance of disorder when attention is transferred from one material to another.

The act of composing performance requires time-specificity to consider the future as the temporality of the unknown. How much of a performance can be planned? This immediately brings up the issue of freedom and its opposite, which for time-specificity is control. Freedom is creativity with constraint, control is constraint itself. The time-specificity of performance future is a question of freedom. It is a negotiation with limits through creativity. To create something new within established limits is one possibility, but to reorganize limits is the absolute creative act. In this way time-specificity of performance future is also a question of ethics and politics. If the continuous nature of experience through time is taken seriously, then aesthetics, politics and ethics need to be considered as facets of experience with differences of degree.

**Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša**

The time-specificity of performance future is illuminated by the work of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša. In 2007 three Slovenian artists legally changed their names to the same name as the then right wing dictator of Slovenia. Each work in different disciplines but all were publicly known before the name change. However the artists gave personal reasons for assuming the same name as the politician, and for the most part continued doing what they had been doing before. While some would debate whether such an action could be called a performance, within the frame of time-specificity the Janez Janša project has a practical score and even generates legally authorized records in the form of identification cards, in addition to creating conditions for aesthetic experience of conceptual content. It is a performance that has an uncontrollable response in the public sphere. Journalists who up until that point had
been unable to criticize the politician Janez Janša for fear of lawsuits were now able to write whatever they wanted about the artist, knowing that the headlines would bear the name even when the name designated the artists. One journalist assumed the name of the then leader of Croatia, Ivo Sanader, and wrote an article titled ‘Is Janez Janša an Idiot?’ (Janša, Janša and Janša, ed. 2008 pg. 172).

The time-specificity of this artwork hinges on the fact that it has no ending through an aesthetic strategy that puts limits on the control of authorship. It is a performance that spreads between people, opening up possibilities of critique and response. Its future is uncertain. The artists gave up the control of their names, enabling new possibilities of creative critique. Although a name is attached to a self, the other is the one who most often utters the name. It is the people around Janez Janša who continue the piece. This is another example of the way both performers and audiences alike attend to materials of performance. It is also a useful model for a politics of performance, where the audience does the work of making meaning in the piece along with the artist.

Such a situation is possible in any spatial or temporal configuration of performance. This kind of engagement can happen in the proscenium. Openness depends on the conceptual structure. For a performance to be open in this way requires a relinquishing of control, which is to say a transparency regarding how the performance is reorganizing the limits of freedom. Meaning must be unbound and experience must be carefully composed. This creates the conditions under which the performance becomes able to multiply by appearing and reappearing in unknown ways in the future.

Immanent Encounter
When performance is composed in such a way as to allow all attendants a level playing field of access to material, an immanent encounter emerges. This is when a set of bodies collect a series of materials and attends to them, each in different ways, but without hierarchy. The immanent encounter assumes that the audience might know more about the art than the performers. This kind of relation operates through the inherent theoretical nomadism of performance, centered on movement and change, not fixities. The three Janez Janšas allow the name to be a material for political action, but do not program its results or lock down its interpretation. By stating that they have changed their names for personal reasons, they refuse to assume the role of artist as teacher, communicating a specific message toward its audience. The immanent encounter requires the choreographic practices to be centered, as they are in the work of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša, on a multiple mode of authorship. This is a pluralization of the artwork, a knock against any sovereignty of authorial control, formed through precise compositional strategies.

The politics of performance are not restricted to either the social contracts set by spatial and temporal configurations or by the formal models the performance operates within. Politics arise through these channels and through the agency of all involved to engage in whatever mode they find most suitable. Time-specificity as the acknowledgment of the futurity and creativity of choreographic practices enables the immanent encounter, which asks nothing by allowing meaning and value to be negotiated between forces. These negotiations are sites of ethical relations, where experiences are conceived of as multiplicities, where union is the fallacy of normativity, in which difference is positive.

In immanent encounters conflict and desire become positive forces useful for the manifestation of affirmative gestures by all attendants of the performance.
Affirmative gestures are what sustain the immanent encounter. Desire for the performance to go on, conflict in a discussion afterward, even leaving or intervening on a performance can make up affirmative gestures that sustain the immanent encounter. Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša allows the rest of us to find out what the artwork will be, through our energy to create new conditions of empathy and intimacy in social life. Immanent encounters are actualizations of the affirmative gestures that are virtuals of the artwork. In the best of immanent encounters, the composition allows all attendants the freedom to do more with the work than the work does itself. Attendants might think nothing of Janez Janša, or they might come to focus on their experience through time, aware of history, acting of the present, and interested in creating a future that will be better than what is now. Through creating conditions for action and thought, performance makes new futures possible. Thinking temporally opens up these options because the future is unknowable. The ability to act of the present and the use of the past as memory creates the necessary conditions for the modification of experience through performance.

Ending

What will happen when Janez Janša dies? In court the politician has used another first name, the one he was born with. Will his gravestone read that name or the one with which he performed politically and thus will connect him to history? Will the artists’ children have a say over the name on the artists’ gravestone? Their creative act proposes such questions, which interrogate the temporal continuity between art and life. Janez Janša reveals that performance is an act of life, and thus is an element of the slow development of evolution. That is the constraint within which freedom through creativity is possible, the durations that become as mixtures of the actual and the virtual, and wait to become again. Time-specificity of performance reveals these
processes through temporal thinking about lived experience. The present experience of performance operates through a heterogeneity of forces and tendencies. The past continues and the future is left open. It becomes more and more difficult to tell when one process begins and another ends.

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