‘Yes Prime Minister’
Early Indications of the Impact of a Change in Policing Governance and the Introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners Across England & Wales

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Criminal Justice of the University of Portsmouth.

February 2019
Declaration

Whist registered as a candidate for the award of the degree of Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice, the author has not registered for any other research award. The narrative, findings and conclusions contained within this thesis are the work of the named candidate and they have not been submitted for any other academic award.

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Signed

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<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<td>APA</td>
<td>Association of Police Authorities</td>
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<td>APCC</td>
<td>Association of Police and Crime Commissioners</td>
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<td>ASB</td>
<td>Anti Social Behaviour</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Chief Constable</td>
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<td>CDRP</td>
<td>Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership</td>
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<td>CoPaCC</td>
<td>Comparing Police And Crime Commissioners (Independent PCC monitoring organisation)</td>
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<td>HAC</td>
<td>Home Affairs Committee</td>
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<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
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<td>HMICFRS</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire &amp; Rescue Services</td>
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<td>IOPC</td>
<td>Independent Office for Police Conduct</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Independent Police Complaints Commission</td>
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<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Police Chief's Council</td>
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<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Police Complaints Authority</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
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<td>PCP</td>
<td>Police and Crime Panel</td>
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Abstract

In November 2012, voters across England and Wales went to the polls for the first time to elect Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), individual political office holders responsible for the governance of policing in local police forces. The PCCs replaced seventeen member Police Authorities that had been in place since 1964. The Conservative party had made the concept a key policy in its manifesto for the 2010 general election and the ensuing coalition government rapidly implemented it. The governance problem to which PCCs were seen as the answer was a perceived lack of police accountability and a democratic deficit in public participation in police governance. This thesis undertakes a review of organisational governance literature, particularly with regards to the public sector and the police service, before moving on to discussing the political journey to the PCC model of policing governance. The literature and a pilot study indicated that the interpersonal relationship between the Chief Constable and the PCC was crucial in terms of understanding the governance dynamic. The research therefore focussed upon qualitative accounts of sixteen serving Chief Constables and fifteen Police and Crime Commissioners, semi-structured interviews were undertaken and subjected to content analysis. The findings indicated that there have been benefits as a result of the introduction of PCCs, in terms of a greater speed and efficiency in decision making, reduced bureaucracy, more effective partnership working and a more focussed approach that comes with a full time role. There were, however significant issues disclosed regarding the PCC governance model; a lack of accountability, issues of personal resilience and the risks of the interpersonal relationship between PCCs and the Chief Constable and its impact upon operational delivery. These issues need to be addressed if the project driven by the Conservative Party of the early 2000’s is to become an effective governance structure that both enables the police to serve and protect communities, while also being effectively held to account.
Chapter One

Background and Purpose

Introduction

The 1950s saw a number of scandals involving English police forces. At that time local 'watch committees' responsible for police governance had been set up in municipal areas by the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 (Home Office, 1835) and in rural areas by the County and Rural Constabulary Act 1839 (Home Office, 1839). The committees were ostensibly responsible for holding local police forces to account. Some committees were alleged to be failing to control deviant police behaviour and to be exerting an inappropriate and corrupt influence on local policing, (Marshall, 1965 p.12). These cases prompted in 1962, the formation of a Royal Commission with a remit to review the constitutional position of the police (Home Office, 1962). The findings led to the Police Act 1964 that introduced 'police authorities', governance bodies comprising local councillors, magistrates and later in 1994 independent members (Police and Magistrates Courts Act, 1994). The police authority was responsible for scrutinising and holding police forces to account (Home Office, 1964). Police authorities formed part of a 'tripartite system' of police governance (Lustgarten, 1986 p.113, Mawby & Wright, 2003, pp.169-195) in which responsibility was shared between police authorities, the Home Secretary, and chief police officers.

This system of police governance remained in place for the next 48 years until the arrival of the Police and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011). This established in November 2012 Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). Who were to be directly elected individuals responsible for police governance. PCCs, as will be discussed in detail later in this thesis were given significantly wider powers and responsibilities.
including the setting of the policing strategy for their area (Home Office 2011, Home Office 2011a).

The journey that led to the change in police governance was driven by increasing concerns regarding the accountability of chief constables and a perceived democratic deficit in the way that policing was governed (Reiner 1991, Reiner 2013, Lister and Rowe 2015, Millen and Stephens 2011, Loveday and Reid 2003 and Muir and Lodge 2008). The Conservative party in opposition identified the issue of police governance, which was fuelled by the notion of a democratic deficit in the early 2000s (Caless and Owens 2016).

In its manifesto for the 2010 UK elections, the Conservative Party made a commitment to introduce across England and Wales;

‘...a directly elected individual who will set policing priorities for local communities’ (Conservative Party, 2010 p.57).

This model of police accountability appears to have had its origin in the experience of Prime Minister Cameron’s exposure to policing models in the United States of America (Cameron, 2005). Cameron was further influenced by the recommendations of the Policy Exchange report; ‘Going Local: Who should run Britain’s Police?’ (Loveday and Reid, 2003), it reported that there was a growing perception that police forces were withdrawing from communities as part of a growing centralist governance agenda. The report recommended that police forces should be more accountable to directly elected local council leaders or mayors. The subsequent coalition government consultation document (Home Office, 2010) asserted that local people had become disempowered regarding policing with increased influence from central government and largely ineffective and invisible police authorities.
Despite Cameron’s positive view of the US policing governance landscape, Mawby & Smith (2013), were to find no evidence of a consistent US policing governance model, or that those governance structures in place across the USA were particularly effective in delivering local police accountability. They noted that some commentators suggested that the structure of police authorities in England & Wales would be a more appropriate model for US policing governance (ibid p.148).

Police authorities were dissolved, in their place locally elected PCCs were established by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011) across 41 Police Forces in England and Wales. Secondary legislation, the Policing Protocol Order 2011 (Home Office 2011a), set out the way that PCCs and chief officers of police should exercise their functions in relation to one another. Particular reference was made to police operational independence (s22, Policing Protocol Order, 2011), which was well established within the ‘tripartite’ structure (Jones et al, 2012). The principle established in the cases of Fisher –V- Oldham Corporation (1930) and R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn (1968) was overturned in a judicial review of the Policing Protocol Order, (2011) in so far that it related to the responsibility of the PCC to intervene in operational policing matters (R (Crompton) –v- PCC South Yorkshire & others [QBD Para 78:2017]) emphasised that the Policing Protocol provided a more ‘nuanced approach’ to police operational independence:

‘It is in our judgement impossible to see operational independence as being beyond the supervision of the PCC’

(R (Crompton) –v- PCC South Yorkshire [QBD Para 79:2017]).

The potential impact of this judgement will be the subject of more detailed discussion in this thesis.
The Policing Protocol 2011 (Home Office 2011a) also established Police and Crime Panels (PCPs), charged with supporting, scrutinising and holding to account the PCC, (s28 (2), Home Office 2011).

These reforms were presented by the government as bringing greater public influence upon policing priorities by way of a democratic mandate (Green, 2012). There was, however the potential to further fundamentally alter the balance of the tripartite arrangement (Sampson, 2012, Jones et al, 2012). This was more likely, given the additional dimension of a gradual withdrawal of central government from police governance exemplified by Home Secretary Theresa May’s speech to the Conservative party conference in October 2011 in which she highlighted the removal of central performance targets for the police, replaced by one measure, that to ‘cut crime’ and emphasised the role of PCCs in directing police strategy (May, 2011).

In the advent of the changes, there was great debate regarding the potential impact upon policing delivery. Sir Hugh Orde, President of the Association of Chief Police Officers, drew attention to the significance of the changes:

‘... I remain concerned with the general lack of appreciation of just how significant the introduction of PCCs is likely to be.’ (Orde 2012 p.1)

Sir Hugh remained of the same view at the time of the submission of this thesis:

‘...I still view the Police and Crime Commissioner Governance structure to be fatally flawed. Any structure that relies on just two individuals getting on, when one holds the power to dismiss the other is doomed to fail. Failure in policing is too important to risk’ (Orde 2018).
Chair of the civil rights organisation Liberty also raised concerns regarding perceived changes in the constitutional position of the police;

‘Today in the 21st Century, policing should continue to serve the rule of law rather than the interests of the executive.’

(Chakrabarti 2011 p.26)

Police authorities were understandably concerned (Sampson 2012). Academics saw the direct election model of governance as questionable:

‘...PCCs are a new and entirely untested venture into popular election and represent a significant shift in the form of governance that has traditionally characterised public administration’ (Loveday, 2013 p.22).

‘To be truly effective PCCs will need to resist the temptation to play to the gallery, and will need to defend those aspects of policing which are least easy to measure, or may be relatively invisible to the voting public.’

(Newburn, 2012 p.2).

Confidence in the new governance structure was not improved by a problematic election process as a result of the government failing to communicate to the public the significance of the role of the PCC role, and to stand-alone elections held in November. The low elector turnout was described by Loveday as an ‘Election Omnishambles’ (Loveday, 2012, p. 183, Loveday, 2017 p. 29).
Aim of this Thesis

This thesis will explore the history of policing governance in England and Wales, placing it in the context of established models of governance, before considering the development of the new governance paradigm. A detailed analysis of the legislative and policy distinctions between the legislation which established police authorities and later PCCs, respectively the Police Act 1964 (Home Office, 1964) and the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011) will be undertaken to identify differences in functions, responsibilities and accountabilities across the two structures.

There is a growing literature that considers the way in which the introduction of PCCs has impacted on both governance and on the delivery of policing since their implementation. The reviews conducted immediately following the introduction of PCCs focussed upon public awareness of the role (Gilmore, 2013) or took the form of governmental reviews of effectiveness in setting budgets or holding chief police officers to account (Home Office, 2014). There is some insight into the views of Commissioners in a collection of essays drawn together by Policy Exchange (Chambers, 2013). The relationship between PCCs and PCPs, the body established to support the commissioners and to scrutinise their activities were examined in a report by the Centre for Public Scrutiny (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2014). There is later academic work that examines the way in which the new governance structure has been working in practice and how police professionals perceived the way in which the new paradigm has affected the delivery of policing and community safety in a professional context. Wells (2015) interviewed matched pairs of 11 Chief Constables and PCCs, and Caless and Owen (2016) interviewed 20 Chief Police Officers and 23 PCCs. The research in this thesis was to some extent contemporaneous to those studies, it seeks to build upon that body of work and in doing so provide new insights.
The thesis makes use of a qualitative methodology to access the views and perceptions of key actors in the new policing governance structure. The overarching objective of the research has been to gain an understanding of the way in which the new governance structure in policing across England and Wales has altered, and what that means for service delivery in policing. It considers key issues that have arisen since the introduction of the role of PCC from the perspective of significant actors consisting of chief constables and PCCs in police forces across England and Wales. In particular it considers how governance and operational delivery are affected by the interpersonal dynamic between the Chief Constable and the PCC.

**Informal Impressions and a Pilot Study**

The author is a former chief police officer in one of the larger police forces in England and Wales. Conversations with members of his network including both serving police staff, academics in the criminal justice field and contacts within his social network that took place prior to the commencement of this research acted as a catalyst for his thinking in this area. As the author began to refine his decision to conduct his doctoral research upon the changed paradigm in policing governance, such interactions became more salient to him and he paid close attention to the views that his contacts articulated. During these interactions with ex colleagues and others he developed a sense of the emerging themes that might prove to be salient in research in this area. Although unrecorded and informal, these contributed to his growing conceptualisation of the research domain alongside more formal models that are discussed later in this thesis.

In preparation for this research project, a pilot study was conducted with the intention of exploring emerging issues following the change in the policing governance paradigm. This took the form of a small scale, qualitative study (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) conducted in April 2013, a relatively short time after the PCCs had taken up their posts in November.
2012. The research focussed upon five Chief Constables, the most senior operational police officers, responsible for the professional leadership of the police (Home Office 1964). The cohort had been directly affected by the change in as much that they were working with a PCC, an office holder who has a democratic mandate to deliver policing and crime reduction (Home Office 2011a), which was not the case with police authorities, whose remit was confined to scrutiny of the chief officer in respect of his/ her delivery of efficient and effective policing (Home Office, 1994).

The Research Questions

Building upon a review of the available literature, the learning provided by the pilot study and his informal interactions, the following research questions for this study were identified:

What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across England and Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a strategic and operational level?

What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in terms of improving the effective delivery of policing and community safety?

What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the delivery of effective policing and community safety?

What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that may have the potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and community safety?

These research questions guided the development of the research methodology, the research approach itself and the later data analysis phase.
Reflection and Reflexivity

The author was, for over 30 years a serving police officer. An important aspect his preparation for this research was his exposure to the theory of reflective practice and learning. From Marcus Aurelius who in 167 ACE produced his reflective account of life and meta physical questions in which he demonstrated the importance of individuals developing and improving by reflecting carefully upon one’s environment (Long, 2010), through to Schon (1983), who, building upon the work of others is generally credited as having introduced the concept of reflective practice,

An important aspect of the author’s reflection was his identification of himself as a researcher within the research paradigm itself. A practitioner researcher (Scott et al 2004) must position his/ herself within the research construct, and adopt a reflexive stance, as described by Woolgar (1988) and Etherington (2004). This is particularly important in interview-based research (Atkinson and Coffey, 2003, p.119), the basis of the research methodology described here.

As a serving chief police officer in England and Wales, the author had been closely engaged in the tripartite structure that was in place prior to the introduction of PCCs. The pre-existing structure underpinned policing governance for all of his 32 years of service, and was strongly embedded in his cognitive schema in terms of his perception of appropriate policing governance models.

During the conduct of this research project, he had to take care to ensure that his earlier perceptions did not influence either the construction of the project itself or the analysis and interpretation of the data. He asked the question:
'Am I writing about me, or reflecting a truly independent reality?' (Dunne et al, 2005, p. 130).

The author had to take care that his previous position and his frames of reference did not impact upon the research or the participants in terms of affecting the ‘internal validity’ of any data and findings (Campbell and Stanley, 1963, pp. 2-5). He did this by constructing research conditions that reduced as much as possible the influence of his embedded experiences. An important step in reducing the potential inappropriate impact of personal experiences was the recognition that they were a factor and to be as disciplined as possible in keeping the issues to the fore, whilst also recognising that complete independence was not possible:

‘... even the best laid plans and designs have to be actualized in social, institutional and political context which can have a profound effect on the outcome of research.’ (Jupp et al, 2000, p. 169).

The author chose this research subject because it was an area of great interest to him. His challenge was to maintain objectivity in progressing the project to meaningful and valid conclusions, (Robson, 2003, p. 21). His initial view was that the implementation of PCCs was ill thought out on the part of government and had the potential to drive policing delivery away from the needs of the community to those of the individual PCC or more reflective of their political affiliation. Which in effect would constitute the politicisation of policing. The author sought to adopt a reflective and reflexive approach throughout the formulation of the research questions and the methodological approach adopted. This included the development of a philosophical stance, through the execution and analysis phases of this research along with the final completion of the thesis.
A Significant Study?

There is now an elected individual office holder with the responsibility for delivering policing and crime reduction across 41 police force areas. However, just what the implications were for the delivery of policing and the integrity of the governance framework were not at all clear prior to this research. The pilot study and the review of the current literature identified that a critical area in the governance dynamic could prove to be the relationship between the chief constable and the PCC. This research therefore focused upon that dynamic. The research considered the way in which changes in the governance structure has impacted upon strategic leadership, and the direction and delivery of policing to communities. The knowledge obtained provided an assessment of the level of success of the change in governance in terms of providing effective policing and identified potential areas for improvement. This study has, therefore potentially considerable professional significance across the domain of policing governance.

Sign Posts- The Structure of this Thesis

In Chapter one, the author has sought to summarise the rationale for conducting research in this area and its potential significance as well as beginning to lay out the key issues and debates.

A comprehensive literature review will be provided within Chapter two. This explores the history of governance models, particularly within public sector bodies by reference to accountability and effectiveness of the organisation. Chapter three provides a comparative analysis of governance models within policing organisations up to the point of the earlier ‘Tripartite model’ (Lustgarten, 1986 p.113, Mawby & Wright, 2003, pp.169-195). It then examines the academic and political thinking around policing governance in the advent of the introduction of PCCs in November 2012. In addition it identifies the legislative and policy evidence that clearly contrasts the different roles, powers and
expectations placed on PCCs when compared with police authorities. This extends to a discussion of the role of the PCP and its ability to support and bring the PCC to account.

Chapter four considers research methodology and provides a critical review of a range of methodologies and their applicability to this research. It highlights the adopted research strategy, sampling issues and ethical considerations. Chapter five outlines the conduct of the research and also explores the analytical approach adopted by the researcher.

Chapter six provides the findings arising from the research phase. It highlights links to the current literature concerned with both general governance and policing governance paradigms. Chapter seven draws together the key findings and how they might inform a judgement as to the way in which the new governance paradigm has impacted police effectiveness. In concluding, further research and improvements are suggested based upon the research for the development of policing governance.
The Rationale and Structure of the Literature Review.

It is essential to frame any research study within the context of the body of research literature and knowledge on the areas relevant to the enquiry;

‘…a review of the literature is important because without it you will not acquire an understanding of your topic, of what has already been done on it, how it has been researched, and what the key issues are.’ (Hart, 1998, p.1).

Hart’s argument is reinforced by that of Creswell who also emphasised the importance of the literature review in;

‘…determining whether the topic is worth studying and it provides insights into ways in which the researcher can limit the scope to a needed area of inquiry’ (Cresswell, 2014 p. 25).

Easterby-Smith et al, (2002) see the literature review as integral to any research exercise they build upon McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) who emphasise the importance of a literature review in identifying the conceptual content of the area under research and in supporting the development of theories in the field. Dellinger and Leech (2007, p.319) point to the importance of the literature review in determining validity in qualitative studies Fink (2014, p.3-5) draws attention to the importance of the literature review being systematic, explicit and reproducible she describes a
systematic process for the literature review, which the author found helpful in structuring his review of the literature in this study.

The literature review was undertaken in order to enable the author to fully appreciate and understand the domain of governance from an academic perspective and how it has been applied in both the public sector generally and to police organisations in particular. This would put the research into the context of our current knowledge base and also help to identify key issues that would drive the development of the research question while providing a clear focus for the research project.

The chapter considers therefore organisational governance theory, governance in public sector bodies and governance in police organisations. It examines and how this has developed in England and Wales and it concludes with a review of police accountability frameworks.

**Organisational Governance Theory**

In etymological terms, ‘governance’ arises from the Greek verb *kubernan* meaning to pilot or steer a vessel. Plato used the term to describe the design of a system of rules in society (Kjaer, 2004). The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘governance’ rather unhappily as; ‘the action or manner of governing’ (1971, p.319). However, in the same volume ‘to govern’ is defined as ‘...to direct and control the actions and affairs (of a people, a state or its members) whether despotically or constitutionally; to rule or regulate (a body of men, corporation)...’ (1971, p317). Rhodes (1997) sums up the development of the concept of governance in stating that:
‘Governance refers to self-organising, interorganisational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state’. (Ibid p.15)

There is a significant ambiguity in the way that governance typologies are conceptualised (Rotberg, 2014, p.511). There is considerable diversity in the way that the terms are used to describe political and organisational networks and activities. (Kjaer, 2004, p.4). Governance has a wide range of definitions and these are dependent on the organisational context that is being examined. At its core, however is the concept that governance is more than ‘government’ (Kjaer, 2004 p189).

The most extensive research in the field of governance have been in the domain of management and corporate governance. This has typically focused upon the dyad of the board of directors and the executive in the context of the generation of revenue by the effective and efficient allocation of resources, (Tihanyi et al. 2015, p.2). There appear to be synergies with the PCC police governance model to the extent that the PCC directors set or approve strategy, which chief constables as executives deliver against a performance framework (Home Office 2011a).

Given the apparent difficulty in defining governance, it is perhaps helpful to identify what constitutes good governance. The United Nations brought together five principles of good governance, which generally arise within the literature. These are ‘Legitimacy and Voice’, ‘Direction’, ‘Performance’, ‘Accountability’ and ‘Fairness’ (Graham et.al, 2003 p.3);
Governance of organisations therefore is concerned providing leadership and direction to people within organisations, and the control of systems and processes within a clearly defined framework (Audit Commission, 2003). This conceptualisation was reinforced by Foss and Klein (2008) who discussed organisational governance with reference to the ‘instruments of governance’ that organisations use to influence members of that organisation and stakeholders to contribute to the organisation’s goals.

This research is focused on examining relationships and delivery within the governance of policing in England and Wales. However, this narrative will begin with an exploration of public sector governance.

**Governance in Public Sector Bodies**

The literature on corporate governance in organisations is divided into that which considers corporate governance in the private sector and that which deals with the public sector. The later are defined simply as; organisations that deliver services on behalf of the public (Australian National Audit Office, 2014).

Public sector governance theory has centered in England and Wales upon the emergence of a decentralised model of governmental control over public sector organisations since the 1980’s. This phenomenon was described as ‘agentfication’ by Kjaer, (2004, p27). He pointed to the establishment of semi-autonomous public agencies that are distanced from central government in order to allow them to manage in the absence of political pressure. The formation of PCC structure can be seen as part of this continuum of devolvement. The ‘hollowing-out’ of the governmental executive has been driven by a number of factors. External factors include the growth
of European structures, while internal factors can be characterised as the growth in the complexity of devolved governmental functionality (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p.58).

The transition from central to devolved governance was potentially significant in terms of the perceived changes in the pre-existing ‘tripartite’ governance arrangement in policing (Lustgarten, 1986, p133, Mawby and Wright, 2003, pp169-195), and formed a key area for examination in this research.

The PCC structure is distinguished from other public agencies by being the only governance structure with a single politically elected official having sole responsibility and accountability for the delivery of the service that the agency provides (Longstaff, 2013). Indeed, the closest public governance role in England and Wales appears to be the directly elected city mayors responsible for setting policy across several agencies including policing. In the case of London, the mayor takes the role of PCC for the Metropolitan Police, Home Office (2011) and iteratively other city mayors are taking that dual role as they are appointed (Home Office 2016 s107F (1)). In practice the day-to-day responsibility for crime and policing is devolved to their deputies.

Ferlie, Ashburner and Fitzgerald, (1995) in their study of governance within the National Health Service (NHS) saw, the demise of a public sector tripartite governance structure similar to that in policing post 1964 in the 1990’s. This framework comprised professionals, generalists and local authority nominees on NHS boards. Criticisms of the NHS tripartite framework have some resonance with the issues raised during the debates that led to the introduction of the PCC model. The perceptions of a ‘democratic deficit’, for example and issues of apparent loss of probity in public services were to the fore (ibid, p389). One of the disadvantages of the reformed NHS structure identified at an early stage was the dominance of the chair/CEO duopoly, again potentially resonating with this research. (ibid p389).
Accompanying the decentralisation of agencies delivering public services across western societies was the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) movement. Hood (1995) reminds us that NPM was neither new nor a coherent concept (ibid, p94), but was a repackaging of disparate ideas in management over the preceding decades. He identified a range of NPM characteristics, these included the disaggregation of public organisations into ‘corporate’ units bringing with it devolved budgets and managerial autonomy. Together with a shift, even within ‘captive markets’ towards competition between public sector and public-private sector organisations. A move to the use in the public sector of private sector managerial practices along with greater discipline and ‘parsimony’ in the use of resources. There was a focus on finding less costly ways of delivering public services and increasing measurement of performance by developing performance cultures within public sector organisations. (Hood, 1995, pp.96-97).

These developments were driven across all public sector organisations including the police service, Gilling (2014) identified the impact of managerialism on policing driven by both Conservative and New Labour governments over two decades from the 1980s. The author whose police service was contemporary with the development of NPM recognises the above dimensions of management within the policing paradigm throughout the 1980’s, 90’s and into the first few years of the 21st century.

**Governance in Police Organisations**

Loader (2000), drawing together the work of Webber (1972), Walker (1999) and Berki (1986) provides a useful summary of the way in which western liberal societies have over the past two centuries been part of a construct of state-centred government with particular reference to policing. As he argues:
“…the defining feature of the modern sovereign state is its monopoly of legitimate force within given spatial boundaries, a monopoly that is principally vested, with regard to internal security at least, in the dedicated uniformed body we have come to know as the police…This institution has, moreover, come to be closely if paradoxically tied to the production of security within liberal democratic societies, the police representing both a guarantor of the security upon which the exercise of liberty depends, and a potent ever-present threat to those same liberties.’ (Ibid; p325).

Given the double-edged sword of policing’s effect on society identified by Loader, there is a clear need in liberal democracies for effective governance frameworks that ensure, by way of oversight and accountability that the security of communities is maximised at the same time that any threat of unaccountable policing is minimised. This concept is fundamental to any policing governance arrangement and underpins the importance of research that examines the efficacy of policing governance arrangements. Outside the scope of this research is the challenge of plural policing where non-government organisations perform quasi-policing roles, the dangers of which have been identified by a number of commentators (Hirst (1997), Button, (1999), Rhodes, (1997)).

Jones (2008) in his review of a range of publications on the subject of policing governance draws attention to the need for policing governance to go beyond accountability to latent threats to liberty posed by police and the need to address societal issues. He states that there is a need to:

‘…bring into focus the importance and continued need for scholarship dedicated to the development of democratic police forces, both domestically and abroad. Rather than focusing on narrowly constrained issues of law
enforcement, the trend appears to be an investigation of the strategy needed to transform police forces around the world into successful institutions for social problem solving’. (Ibid; 584)

Aguja and Born (2017, p.6) provide a comparison of the governance in Asian and European policing organisations. They see three distinct functions of oversight, in the context of parliamentary responsibility and these are; 'Legislative, 'Oversight' and 'Budgetary control'.

There are a range of solutions to the challenges to provide an effective and meaningful governance model for policing. They present different constructs, from militaristic policing organisations with direct national government control to more civil centric policing models. This dilemma has been described by Bayley and Stenning (2017), as one facing all democracies. In effect, the challenge is, how to manage the police so that they act in the public interest whilst avoiding the temptation to use them for partisan interests. In their review of six jurisdictions Bayley and Stenning provide an insight into the diversity of policing constructs across the world. They identify a number of separate policing organisations in various countries which does not seem necessarily to correlate with population or geography.

These are listed below:

New Zealand – 1 Police organisation

Australia - 8 Police organisations

India - 36 Police organisations

Britain - 43 Police organisations
Canada - 340 Police organisations

USA - 17,000 Police organisations (estimated)

(Ibid)

Table 1, below provides examples of global policing governance models drawn from data available through police web sites, and other sources. Within the United Kingdom, only England and Wales have introduced the PCC model and there does not seem to be any homogeneity between countries in the same region. The closest model to that of the PCC globally appears to be the US County/Sherriff construct;

Table 1. Police and Policing Governance Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Police Structure</th>
<th>Governance Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>1. 43 Local forces</td>
<td>1. Directly Elected Police &amp; Crime Commissioner (or City Mayor fulfilling the PCC role)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian, Community policing focus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Centrally controlled forces (BTP, MoD)</td>
<td>2. Centrally Controlled – Departmental panels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>1. One national force</td>
<td>1. Police Authority comprising 10-14 centrally appointed members as public officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian, Community policing focus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Centrally controlled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Police Force Description</td>
<td>Governance Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Province wide Police Service (PSNI)</td>
<td>Policing Board political members and independent members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>forces (BTP, MoD)</td>
<td>2. Centrally Controlled – Departmental panels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1. National (RCMP)</td>
<td>1. National Government, oversees by Central Association of Police Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1. Federal Police (IPS)</td>
<td>1. Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>-----</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi Level;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Abu Dhabi Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. County Police</td>
<td>3. County Government/ directly elected County Sheriff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Municipal/ Metropolitan</td>
<td>5. Local Mayor/ City Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Specialist (i.e. Port Authority, University Campus etc.)</td>
<td>6. CEO/ Manager of relevant organisation.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. State Police</td>
<td>2. State Government (all chief police officers are appointments of the IPS)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Arab Emirates</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Abu Dhabi Police</td>
<td>1. Minister of the Interior for Abu Dhabi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Northern Emirates Police</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>National Policing Body</td>
<td>Governance Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Single national policing body</td>
<td>Central government – Interior Ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Central only Royal Thai Police</td>
<td>National Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| France    | 1. Two national forces  
   a) Police Nationale,  
   b) Gendarmerie Nationale  
   b) Ministry of Defence  
   2. Local Mayor |
| Germany   | 1. Federal –  
   Bundespolizei  
   2. State -  
   Landespolizei | 1. Federal Government  
   2. State Government |

The findings as to the diversity of police governance constructs are echoed by Aguja and Born (2017):

‘...the governance and structure of the police is a complex matter, with a great variety of governance models between states…’ (ibid; p. 231).

The explanation for the variety of governance models reflects differing political and constitutional frameworks and culture (Aguja and Born, 2017). An additional driver in the development of policing governance may have been negative perceptions of police
behaviour such as those in Northern Ireland; (Wilks-Heeg, Blick and Crone (2012)), Australia; (Dupont 2003) and Ireland; (Conway and Walsh (2011)).

Against the background of a diverse global patchwork of policing governance frameworks, the Cameron led Conservative party began a search for a new governance paradigm for policing across England and Wales, in which they would:

‘...swap the bureaucratic control of the police for democratic accountability’.

(Herbert 2011).

The Development of Police Governance Frameworks in England & Wales.

This section will provide a chronology the development of policing structures and governance across England and Wales and a backdrop to the implementation of the PCC construct.

In etymological terms Emsley (2016) identifies the word police as having origins in ancient Greek Poletia, which referred matters relating to the security and welfare of the state (Polis). Over millennia, the meaning developed such that it referred to individuals and public bodies that enforced state and local regulation, and latterly community safety and security (ibid p.3)

Policing in England and Wales has its origins in the Anglo Saxon period (400-1066) in which the responsibility for preventing wrongdoing and taking action against offenders was vested in local communities. Following the Norman conquest of 1066, a system of ‘Frankpledge’ was introduced that required all adult males within a community to
swear a pledge to conduct themselves in a lawful manner and to work together to prevent wrongdoing and detect wrongdoers in the community. Offenders were tried by their peers in ‘Frankpledge’ hearings (Joyce and Wain, 2011). The first recorded formal policing structure can be traced back to the Statute of Winchester, enacted in 1285, in which the court of King Edward I attempted to address what was seen as unacceptable lawlessness in England. It put in place the statute that required each local area (hundred) take responsibility for controlling crime and raising ‘hue and cry’ (pursuit of criminals) when necessary. The local landowner was charged with making the arrangements to ensure the statute was complied with (Cannon 2015). Effectively, this was the first recognisable policing structure with an identifiable ‘police chief’ at its head.

Over the next five and a half centuries, local policing arrangements remained disparate with the ad hoc development of watch committees and the establishment of the office of ‘constable’. This was a term brought to England at the time of the Norman conquest, originally a military officer with responsibility for the security of garrison stables ‘comesstabuli’, it came to refer to people appointed to serve local parishes, providing security and bringing offenders before local courts, (Cannon 2015).

The first organised police force in England and Wales was the Metropolitan Police, serving London and other places (such as the Portsmouth Dockyard) established by the then Home Secretary Robert Peel in 1829, (Home Office, 1829). However, Scotland can (and does) lay claim to having the first police force in Great Britain. Glasgow police was formed in 1800 and Edinburgh police followed in 1805 (Cannon 2015). Given that it is the only jurisdiction to have introduced PCCs. This research has restricted its focus to policing across England and Wales. Scotland, following the
setting up of a national police force retains an un elected wholly appointed policing board structure (Malik, 2017).

Outside London, the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 (Home Office, 1835) required local authorities to establish police forces in 178 towns and cities. Following a royal commission in 1836, the County and Rural Constabularies Act, 1839 (Home Office, 1839) enabled justices of the peace to establish police forces within their jurisdictions in rural areas. By 1851, approximately 13,000 police forces had been established across England and Wales, (Taylor, 1997, UK Parliament (2017)). This number was reduced by the County and Borough Police Act (1856), which required every town and county to have a police force in place. It also required amalgamations forming fewer, larger forces (Hart, 1956).

By the late nineteenth century the model and structure of policing recognisable today had been set. Governance fell to either the Home secretary in the case of the Metropolitan Police, or outside London to watch committees in municipal areas or in rural areas standing joint committees both made up of Justices of the Peace and local councillors, (Taylor 1997).

The next significant development did not arrive until the first (and only) police strikes in 1918 and 1919, linked to officers’ poor pay and conditions. This led to the Police Act (1919) that prohibited the police taking strike action. The Police Union was outlawed and the Police Federation, a staff association without the power to organise industrial action was established (Reiner, 2011).
Perhaps the most significant legislation in policing governance in the 20th century was the Police Act 1964 (Home Office 1964). The act followed a number of scandals during the 1950s involving English police forces governed then by local ‘Watch Committees’ who were alleged to be exerting undue and corrupt influence on local policing, (Marshall, 1965 p.12). This prompted a Royal Commission into policing with a remit to review the constitutional position of the police (Home Office, 1962). The findings of the Royal Commission led to the Police Act 1964 (Home office, 1964). The Act introduced police authorities that were mandated to comprise local councillors and magistrates. They were to be governance bodies whose responsibility was:

‘…to secure the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for the area.’ (Home Office, 1964 S4 (1)).

For the next 48 years, the police authority model of governance remained in place, subject to adaptations required by statute in the Local Government Act (1985), the Police and Magistrates Courts Act, 1994 and the Police Act, 1996 (Home Office (1994), Home Office (1996)).

**The Development of Police Accountability**

A crucial element in the story of policing governance across England and Wales has been that of accountability. The concept of accountability was described by Jones (1992) as being associated with a ‘higher authority’ calling an individual or organisation ‘to account’ for their actions and that higher authority having the power to levy sanctions for misdemeanours or malpractice (Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry, 2016 p.2). In the context of the criminal justice domain Joyce and Wain (2011) define accountability as being:
‘...a political concept whereby individuals or agencies to whom responsibilities have been delegated are required to submit to the scrutiny of another body (or bodies) and justify their actions’. (ibid p.4).

Accountability in policing has focussed upon two key areas. The first is a monitoring function, which provides a level of democratic supervision of performance against expectations of policing delivery (Talbot, 2004). The second is around the prevention and detection of wrongdoing (Jones, 1992, Brain, 2010). Alongside these supervisory imperatives sits the additional convention of the ‘operational independence’ of the police (Wood and MacAlister, (2005 p.198)). From the beginnings of policing in England and Wales, issues of accountability and operational independence have been the imperatives at the core of the development of governance models. They have been driven by attempts to achieve a degree of balance between these elements (ibid, p. 197, Caless and Owen, 2016 p.13).

Stenning (1999) saw accountability and operational independence as a dichotomy with separate, mutually exclusive aims. Wood and McAlister (2005) however took a more nuanced view that;

‘They should be seen instead as competitive, but integral, dimensions of practical police governance endeavours.’ (ibid p.202).

It is important therefore, when examining the development of policing governance to see that evolution in the context of the competing imperatives of accountability and independence.
Lustgarten (1986) in his description of the development of policing governance, looked back to the 1926 case of the chief constable and watch committee of St Helens which turned upon allegations excessive force used by the police in respect of the policing of a miners 'lock out' industrial dispute as the beginning of the debate around the need for effective police accountability. The debate paused during the 1939-1945 war but was taken up in the public and political response to three incidents where public attention was focussed upon the inadequacy of the law surrounding the accountability relationship between authorities responsible for the oversight of police forces and the police.

In 1956, the chief constable of Cardiganshire was subjected to disciplinary proceedings for inefficiency while the chief constable of Brighton was dismissed for corruption. In 1957, a young man was assaulted by police officers in Thurso. These incidents led to two parliamentary debates and a public enquiry (Oliver, 1987). The final catalyst for change occured when in 1959, the public debate became more heated following a dispute between the chief constable of Nottingham Captain Athelstan Popkess and his watch committee. The watch committee following to his refusal to disclose to them a report on alleged financial irregularities by members of the committee suspended Captain Popkess. He later was reinstated by the then Home Secretary (Brain 2010).

These cases led to the Conservative government of the time establishing the 1960-1962 Royal Commission on Policing (Marshall, 1965, Oliver, 1987, Brain, 2010). The commission examined the constitutional position of the police (UK National Archives 1962).
Two reports delivered by the commission were used to formulate the Police Act 1964 (Home Office 1964). The Act established for the first time the lines of accountability between the Home Secretary, police authorities created by the Act and chief constables. These formed the ‘tripartite arrangement’ (Newburn and Reiner 2014). That structure remained in place until the introduction of PCCs in 2012. The 1964 Act and its later iterations; the Police and Magistrates Courts Act, 1994, and the Police Act 1996 provided the basis of police accountability in terms of the efficient and effective delivery of policing services as well as establishing a complaints and disciplinary framework. Although these measures followed the ‘noisy politics’ of the 1980s with calls for greater police accountability in the wake of urban riots and industrial disputes (Gilling, 2014), they did little to improve police accountability.

As regards police complaints and discipline, increasingly empowered independent bodies were put in place to manage complaints against the police to improve public confidence in the complaints process. These were; the Police Complaints Board between 1977 and 1985, then the Police Complaints Authority from 1985 (Waters and Brown, 2000). In 2004 the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) was established. It was replaced in January 2018 by the current Independent Office for Police Conduct (Home Office, 2018).

The legislation that mandated the accountability framework was silent upon the second issue that caused tension in police governance, which was police operational independence (Wood and MacAlister 2005). The issue of operational independence had been considered in the debates around the causes celebres during the 1950s discussed above. The principle had been established in the case of Fisher –V- Oldham Corporation, ([1930] 2 KBD 364). The claimant, Fisher sued the Oldham
Corporation and its watch committee for wrongful imprisonment by the police. The judgement, *inter alia, held* that there could be no master/servant relationship between the corporation and the police albeit they employed them. In addition, the judges found that constables had authority conferred upon them by the state, not the local authority that paid them, and were therefore not in the control of those that paid their salary. The Fisher judgement built on an earlier case Stanbury v Exeter Corporation ([1905] 2 KBD 838). In this case, the judges made a comparison with the police in the case before them that concerned the actions of a ‘sheep disease inspector’. The argument was that if an official was mandated to perform public and national functions, then local government could not be made liable for their actions. The principle of police independence was further reinforced in the judgement of *R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn* ([1968] 2 Q.B. 118). This case related to an action brought by an individual who complained that the police had adopted a policy of not prosecuting London gaming clubs for illegal gambling. The court held that the police decision as to what or how to investigate was not open to question. In summing up Judge Denning stated;

> ‘No minister of the crown can tell [the Commissioner] that he must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that; or that me must or must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and the law alone.


The police officer’s status was identified by Alder, 2011 p.94 as an official locally appointed but deriving an original authority from the Crown, supporting an earlier description of the origin of that status and its implication:

> ‘…law and order was the responsibility of borough watchmen and parish constables. The latter is an ancient common law office. Policemen today are
also constables and thus inherit the status of that office. This means that a policeman’s responsibilities to enforce the law and maintain the peace are original, not delegated. Consequently he cannot be subjected to the orders of and political superior in the exercise of these duties. Decisions about operational policing can only be taken by policemen.’

(Regan 1983 p.4 (in Hampton, 1987 p.70))

Chief constables over the ensuing years used the doctrine of police independence as both a sword and a shield in their interactions with police authorities and central government (Brogden, 1982, Loveday, 1983, Loveday, 1984, Loveday, 2017). There was disagreement between academics as to the implications for the lack of police authority influence on operational policing, exemplified by the debate between Loveday (1984) and Waddington (1984) in which the former saw dangers inherent in the lack of influence, whilst the latter was more comfortable with the extant relationship. Often the line between operational independence and policy issues was blurred, to the extent that over time police accountability arrangements became increasingly opaque (Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry, 2016 p. 2).

Hampton (1987) in his examination of local government and politics identified the problem that the convention of police operational independence gave police authorities in holding chief constables to account:

‘Police committees, therefore are precluded from either directing or even questioning the chief constable on operational matters (Loveday 1983). They are confined to discussions of a very general nature and to the providing of resources necessary for an efficient service.’ (ibid p. 70).
He went on to identify that there were suggestions that police authorities were so ineffective that police forces should be directly accountable to the Home Secretary (ibid p.70).

In respect of the PCC experience, in her interviews of chief constables and PCCs, Wells (2015) found that there was some evidence to support the assertion that PCCs were beginning to test the boundary of operational and strategic independence of chief constables.

In the context of policing in Northern Ireland, the issue of police operational independence was addressed by the recommendations of the Patten Report that sought to replace the concept of ‘operational independence’ with that of ‘operational responsibility’ (Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, 1999, para 6.20). Lister (2013) reports that a similar recommendation was made in respect of PCCs by the Home Affairs Select Committee (House of Commons, 2010). This was rejected by the legislators on the basis that the roles and responsibilities of chief constables and PCCs were already defined by existing and draft legislation (Lister, 2013, p. 240).

This research project was, therefore set against the background of a rather confused accountability framework that the Conservative government of 2010 sought to reform by the introduction of PCCs. Chapter three discusses the political drive towards a new governance structure.
Chapter Three

A New Policing Governance Paradigm;

The Advent of Police and Crime Commissioners

In England & Wales.

The Wind of Change – Political and Academic Thought leading to the Police & Crime Commissioner Model.

The effectiveness of Police Authorities as a governance framework for policing was being questioned in the early 1980’s (Hampton, 1987, pp. 68-71, Regan, 1983 p.13). Loveday (1983, p.39) commented that despite financing police forces, the authority had little influence on how those funds were spent. Elcock, (1982 p.170) suggested that police forces should be directly accountable to the Home Secretary and through that office to parliament. There was growing dissatisfaction with the police governance model across several domains.

Commentators identified a widening schism in the tripartite governance arrangement, with increasing central government control (Loveday (2006), Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry (2016)). This was in part exemplified in the effect of legislation such as The Police and Magistrates Courts Act, 1994 that changed the composition of police authorities, by introducing independent members appointed by the Home Secretary (Home Office 1994). Summing up the issue, Loveday and Reid (2003) argued that:
The recent history of policing in Britain has been one of increasing central control and weakening links between police and local communities…'(Ibid p.7).

Loveday (2006) also identified as part of a growing centralist agenda the increasing influence of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) working closely with the Home Office to drive compliance by police forces and police authorities. This trend continued, even with the Conservative government’s avowed commitment localism in policing. Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry (2016) supported this view when they reported that between 1998 and 2010 every Public Service Agreement linked central government funding to the delivery of ministerial priorities included targets relating to police performance.

A further significant development in the move to centralism, contemporaneous with the implementation of PCCs was the appointment of Tom Winsor as Chief Inspector of Constabulary. Winsor, who had no police background, was appointed to a role traditionally seen as the remit of senior police officers. His appointment created widespread concern across the police service (BBC 2012). This may have been intentional, given that Winsor had, shortly before his appointment to HMIC conducted a review of police pay, conditions and structures which had been critical of existing police structures and practices and recommended significant changes (Winsor 2012). Whilst some, particularly the Police Federation argued that the role could not be effectively discharged by someone with a non-police background who was unlikely to understand policing, the government policing minister Nick Herbert argued that Winsor’s appointment was not as a senior police officer, but that the role was one of inspection and that he would provide ‘fearless independence’ (BBC 2012b).

At the same time, chief police officers through the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) were perceived as having a growing in influence over both national and local
policing, and becoming to some extent an open rival to the Home Office. (Loveday, 2000, Savage, Charman and Cope, 2000). This was particularly noticeable in the run up to the introduction of PCCs in an open antipathy between the Chair of ACPO, Sir Hugh Orde and the Home Secretary Theresa May (Blackburn, 2011).

In addition, the tripartite structure had grown into a complex construct. The diagram below, taken from Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry (2016) demonstrates the tripartite model prior to the implementation of PCCs. The reality was far more complex and top down than the tripartite shorthand suggested.

The tripartite arrangement that had been at the core of policing governance across England and Wales since 1964 was seen by both the academic community and some

Crucially there was evidence that police authorities failed to properly engage with the public and represent their needs and expectations in terms of policing, Millen and Stephens, (2011).

The challenge lay in identifying what model should replace the police authority, given that it was widely seen to be unable to fulfil its statutory remit.

The first proposal for a police governance framework with directly elected PCCs was provided in a 2002 pamphlet by Douglas Carswell, founder of the radical ‘Direct Democracy’ group within the Conservative party. He proposed directly elected police commissioners based upon the US Sheriff model, a proposal described in more detail in a follow up paper entitled ‘Send for the Sheriff’ (Carswell, 2010).

November 2003 saw the New Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett adopt a similar approach in a speech to police authority chairs. He raised the prospect of directly elected police authorities or panels (Blunkett, 2003). He cited the need for communities to feel more connected with policing and for clearer accountability. The chair of the Association of Police Authorities (the APA) Ruth Henig and on behalf of chief constables, ACPO chair Chris Fox were quick to oppose the plan. They did so on the basis of a risk to diversity of membership on police authorities and of increased parochialism (Johnson, 2004). Influenced by these objections, in December 2008 the proposal was dropped by the New Labour government. Ironically the Home Secretary Jacqui Smith expressed concern that such a development would politicise policing. At
the same time she took the opportunity to criticise the opposition Conservative party’s proposals for directly elected commissioners, seeing it wrongly as an attempt to maintain centralised control of policing (BBC, 2008).

The Cameron led Conservative party used for evidence of the need for directly elected police governance the work of both Loveday and Reid (2003) and of Muir and Lodge (2008) who built a similar thesis for change. However, neither Loveday and Reid (2003), nor Muir and Lodge (2008) recommended the introduction of a directly elected PCC. The former recommended that local police should be accountable to Mayors or Council Leaders, and the latter identified a range of options, only one of which was the directly elected PCC. The political catalyst for the drive to introduce a directly elected police commissioner may have had its foundation in a visit by David Cameron when leader of the government opposition to the USA in 2005 (Davies, 2014). This experience built upon the earlier ideas of Carswell (Carswell, 2010) and contributed to Cameron’s comments on police governance in his wide-ranging speech on public sector reform made in Portsmouth in September 2005 (Cameron 2005).

The author was at that time a chief police officer and had an opportunity prior to Cameron’s 2005 speech to meet and discuss with David Cameron his positive impressions of the US elected sheriff model. Cameron was convinced of the effectiveness of the US system and its ability to connect local communities with policing. In his conversation with the author, Cameron was not prepared to brook any discussion of the disadvantages, which the author articulated and were identified by Loveday and Reid (2003) in their report relied upon by the Conservative party as evidence for police governance change and which noted of the US sheriff system that;

‘Where they are weak, corruption and incompetence can flourish’. (ibid, p.47).
Some commentators suggested (in the context of city mayors), that directly elected officials ‘at the apex of a public body’ can increase the ability of the organisation to achieve its objectives (Eckersley and Timm-Arnold (2014). During this research, the author searched for other public bodies across the UK where the strategic head of a public body had been directly elected. With the exception of city mayors and PCCs, he was unable to find any examples of this. Cousins (2012, p 16) drew attention to the fact that in the UK, politicians have hitherto been elected to generalist roles. This includes city mayors who have a local generalist responsibility. ‘Specialisms’ such as policing were, prior to the introduction of PCCs governed by appointed individuals or bodies. Longstaff (2013, p. 8) of the Police Foundation confirmed that there were no equivalent posts to that of PCCs in public service in the UK.

An additional assertion made by the Conservative party was that part of the rationale for the creation of PCCs was the need to reduce central control of policing and improve accountability (Conservative Party 2010). This appears to be at odds with the drive by the same coalition government to abolish the large number of quasi-autonomous national government organisations (QUANGOs), which had been established by both Labour and Conservative governments since the 1980s (O’Leary, 2015). O’Leary identifies inconsistency in the express rationales for the abolition of QUANGOs as between Prime Minister Cameron, the Cabinet Secretary and the House of Commons Public Administration Committee, as between accountability and cost savings. Questions therefore arise as to the validity of the government argument at a strategic policy level.

There therefore appears little evidence to support the hypothesis that the PCC structure was the right answer to the question ‘what is the best governance structure for policing in England and Wales?’ In particular, there appears to have been no consideration of formal theories of governance in organisations underpinning the
decision to move to the new structure, and the devolved structure was at odds with the policy of QUANGO reform by the same government.

In opposition, a decision was made by the Cameron government in waiting that a directly elected individual responsible for policing would be created to replace the existing 17 member police authorities. Also that they would be provided with wider powers to set policing policy than the police authority whose remit extended only to a scrutiny role (s28 (2) Home Office 2011). The scene was set for one of the first acts of the 2010 Coalition government to move forward legislation to deliver directly elected PCCs who took office across 41 Police Forces in England and Wales in November 2012.

This key priority had been described in the manifesto in the lead up to the 2010 elections (Conservative Party, 2010 p 57). The document cited the review conducted by Muir and Lodge (2008) which argued that there was an ‘accountability deficit’ in British policing, Policing Minister Nick Herbert MP converted this into the term ‘democratic deficit’ for the purposes of his speech. In describing the ‘problem’ in policing accountability at that time, Muir and Lodge were clear that:

‘The police service in England and Wales suffers from an accountability deficit. At the national level fragmented governance means that no actor in the system has the power to effectively incentivise performance improvement or drive through change and reform. Recent attempts by the Government to increase control from the centre through target setting and top-down initiatives have had limited success and have made policing even less responsive to local needs and circumstances. At the local level there is no real democratic accountability:...
police authorities are weak, unaccountable and remote, while elected local government has no effective say over local policing priorities.’ (ibid; p. 8).

This position was supported by the HMIC thematic review of police authorities in 2010 (HMIC, 2010).

The Conservative led coalition government made it a priority to address these ‘problems’ in policing governance immediately they came to office, articulated within their coalition programme (Cabinet Office 2010 p.13). A consultation paper was published just two years prior to the abolition of the police authorities which put PCCs in place; ‘Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting police and the people’ (Home Office 2010), made it clear that:

'We will abolish Police Authorities and put power directly in the hands of the public. For the first time ever the public will be able to directly vote for an individual to represent their community’s policing needs…These reforms are too pressing for a lengthy Royal Commission on increasing policing accountability. The coalition agreement set out our intention to introduce Police and Crime Commissioners. We are keen to hear your views about how we can make this work most effectively. We will introduce legislation in the autumn and the public will be able to vote for their Commissioners for the first time in May 2012’. (ibid paras. 2.4/ 2.7)

The paper outlined how the government saw the role of PCC as an agent to reconnect the public with policing and reducing top down influence. It stated that;

‘Police and Crime Commissioners will be powerful representatives of the public leading the fight against crime and ASB. They will ensure that:
• The public can better hold police forces and senior officers to account;
• There is greater public engagement in policing both in terms of priority setting and active citizenship;
• There is greater public – rather than Whitehall – ownership of force performance; and,
• The public have someone ‘on their side’ in the fight against crime and ASB.

Police and Crime Commissioners will ensure that the police are held to account democratically, not bureaucratically by Whitehall. This is part of the deal for the police: removing micro-management by central government in local policing, in return for much greater responsiveness to and engagement with the public.’

(ibid paras. 2.5-2.6).

The coalition government clearly placed great store in direct elections providing the solution to the problem of a ‘democratic deficit’ in policing governance. Reiner (2013) however cautioned that this was but one element, and that the assumption that the problem was solved was dangerous. He noted that the introduction of PCCs:

‘identifies democracy solely and wholly with voting; a contemporary trope that is (mis)used much more widely... Free and fair elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition of democracy’ (ibid p. 173).

The apparent haste on the part of the Conservative party to introduce this key policy was, perhaps demonstrated by the ‘...late and unwelcome’ introduction of Police and Crime Panels (PCPs), a body whose purpose was to hold to account and to support the PCC. The PCP construct was only included in the legislation following pressure
from the Liberal Democrat element of the coalition government (Caless and Owen, 2016, Bailey, 2017).

On 28 March, 2011, a speech by Nick Herbert MP, (Herbert, 2011), became a statement of intent by the Cameron led coalition to introduce PCCs. The policing governance ‘problem’ that Nick Herbert described:

‘...is that police authorities are not strong enough to exercise this alternative governance, and they are not sufficiently connected to the public’

(Herbert, 2011).

Clearly the consultation was not about whether or when, but how PCCs would be introduced. This provided the background for the most significant change to policing governance in nearly 50 years.

**Police Authorities-v-Police & Crime Commissioners comparative Models, Roles, Responsibilities and Powers.**

Having dealt with the drivers for change, this chapter will now analyse the legislation that defines the roles, relationships and responsibilities of PCCs in comparison to that which applied to police authorities from 1964. In order to understand the scale of the paradigm shift in policing governance across England and Wales that occurred following the elections for PCCs, it might be helpful to compare and contrast the two models of governance.
An express objective of the coalition government in driving the implementation of PCCs was to ‘reconnect the police and the people’ (Home Office 2010). This would suggest a simplified construct, which facilitated accessibility by the community to the governance framework enabling the community to both express its needs, expectations and complaints whilst at the same time understanding with more clarity the rationales for strategic and tactical policing activity. A comparison of the reality of the two governance frameworks suggests that the new model is more, not less complex and for the layperson potentially even more opaque. It is helpful to compare Figure 1 (ante) that describes the pre 2012 model (Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry (2016)), with that post the implementation of PCCs, (Figure 2) which the authors use to demonstrate that in spite of government rhetoric, the new model is considerably more complicated (ibid):

NB. The Association of Chief Police Officers included above is now no longer in existence, its role in this context is taken by the National Police Chief’s Council.
The new governance model was described by Lister (2013, p. 241) as a ‘quadripartite’ governance framework, with the added Police and Crime Panel component.

**Policing Governance in England and Wales 1964-2012**

The Police Act 1964 (Home Office 1964), a significant piece of legislation in police governance established not only police authorities, but also put in place the tripartite arrangement of governance. In addition it delineated police areas and dealt with many day-to-day organisational issues such as pensions, codes of police conduct.

Within this legislation, the ‘Police Authority’. Two thirds of the authority were required to be councillors appointed by the relevant council and one-third local magistrates (S2.1 (Home Office 1964)).

In the case of metropolitan police areas (i.e. Manchester, Liverpool, West Midlands etc.) and combined areas (i.e. Thames Valley Police with policing responsibility for more than one county), similar arrangements were prescribed, except for the case of The (London) Metropolitan Police on which the Act was silent and for whom the police authority remained the Home Secretary until the enactment of The Police and Magistrates Courts Act, 1994 (Home Office (1994)), when, *inter alia*, the (London) Metropolitan Police Authority was established with similar responsibilities to the then reformed county Police Authorities. Other ‘non Home Office’ Police forces (i.e. City of London, British Transport Police & Ministry of Defence Police) had separate governance arrangements outside the Police Act 1964, though they generally mirrored those prescribed by the Act.
Having established police authorities, the 1964 Act identified their responsibilities. It stated that the police authority should secure an ‘adequate’ and ‘efficient’ police force for their area. In doing so they were required to appoint the chief constable and determine the number of police officers of each rank in the force. More prosaically they were also charged with maintaining adequate police buildings, vehicles and equipment (ibid S4, (1)-(4)).

It is interesting to note that significantly more attention within the 1964 Act is devoted to the procurement responsibilities of the police authority than to any discussion of how it might go about securing the ‘maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force’. Still less space is given to what an adequate or efficient police force might look like or how it might be judged, except that annually the chief constable was required to produce a report to the police authority ‘…on the policing for that year. .’. (ibid S12 (1)) or when required by the police authority (ibid S12 (2)). This being the extent to which the chief constable and the force were to be held to account.

The seeds of the later demise of police authorities may, in fact lie in the complete lack of reference in the Police Act 1964 to any form of public or community engagement, representation or communication. This was the core of later of complaints that the police authority governance construct created an accountability and democratic deficit. Reiner, (1991), Reiner (2013), Loveday and Reid (2003) Lister and Rowe (2015), Millen and Stephens, (2011) and Muir and Lodge (2008). It appears that the original model, like the policing culture of its time did not see community understanding or engagement as being relevant.
Successive governments moved towards more centralised control and managerialism in policing (Drake and Simper, 2004), and this led to the Police and Magistrates Courts Act, 1994 (Home Office (1994)). Amending the 1964 significantly, it stated that; the size of a Police Authority would be 17 members (ibid S3A(1). Its purpose was to ‘secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force for its area’. (A semantic change in the purpose from ‘appropriate’ to ‘effective’). (ibid S4(1)). It was made clear that ‘In discharging its functions, every police authority established under section 3 of this Act shall have regard to—(a) any objectives determined by the Secretary of State under section 28A of this Act, (ibid S4(2)(a)). Establishing more direct downwards influence from central government.

For the first time the Act required police authorities to develop a policing plan ‘Every police authority established under section 3 of this Act shall, before the beginning of each financial year, determine objectives for the policing of the authority’s area during that year’. (ibid S4A (1))

In the 1994 Act, there was, however still no requirement, or recommendation to consult communities when assessing policing needs or the allocation of policing resources.

There was some movement in the direction of public engagement with the implementation of the Police Act 1996, (Home Office 1996). This consolidated much of the 1994 Act, and placed a responsibility on the authority to produce a three year strategic plan, (ibid S 6A(1)). This however, had to be compliant with directions of the Home Office and in consultation with the chief constable. The Act for the first time instructed the police authority to obtain the views of local people about matters concerning the policing of the area, and their co-operation with the police in preventing crime in that area’(ibid S96 (1)).
Attempts made by the police authority to engage with communities in accordance with S 96 of The Police Act 1996 were often lacklustre, (Author’s personal observation). In the early 2000’s however, it became increasingly apparent from government that the importance of community engagement in policing was growing, and becoming an existential threat to the police authorities. This was particularly the case when reports began to use phrases such as ‘democratic deficit’. These attempts at public engagement by the authorities were, however ineffective. It appeared that the police, as they became more sophisticated in their public engagement strategies, rapidly left police authorities behind in this regard. The police authority relied increasingly upon the police to carry out the engagement required to comply with S96, Police Act 1996 on their behalf (Author’s personal observation).

Loveday (2018 p.3) noted that the Police Acts 1994 and 1996 (Home Office 1994, Home Office, 1996) significantly reduced the power and influence of police authorities within the tripartite arrangement. Chief constables and ACPO were more directly linked to the Home Office through national priority setting, the number of members on the authority was significantly reduced, chief constables had more budgetary control and the HMIC were given wider responsibilities. Legislation that tended to further marginalise police authorities proved to be the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Home Office, 1998a). Gilling (2008) congratulated the New Labour government for bringing in the act as a radical reform in crime control, but at the same time he criticised its effective government control of the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) set up by the Act.

Police authorities had, therefore a relatively narrow and declining remit that amounted to scrutinising and holding the chief constable and the police force to account for the efficient and effective delivery of policing across their area of responsibility, producing a strategic plan and appointing or dismissing the chief constable and other chief
officers (Loveday, 2018). Until 1996, there was no requirement to engage with the communities who were subject to the service being delivered. When that became a requirement the authorities were ineffective in doing so Loveday and Reid (2003), Muir and Lodge (2008), Herbert (2011). The end of the era of police authorities was drawing inexorably to its close.

**The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011).**

The 2011 Act abolished police authorities (ibid S1(9)) and established PCCs across 41 police forces in England and Wales outside of London (ibid S1 (1)). It also established the analogous ‘Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime’ (ibid S3 (1)) that empowered the Mayor of London to perform a similar governance role for policing across the metropolis. The Act included descriptions of the responsibilities of the PCC and of the Mayor for London, their relationships with police forces, government and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. It also included the arrangements for the election of PCCs. The Act also dealt with a number of loosely connected issues, including ‘selling of alcohol to children’ (ibid S118), ‘demonstrations in the vicinity of parliament’ (ibid S141 (1)) and ‘restrictions on arrest warrants in private prosecutions’ (ibid S153 (1)). This made the Act a historical piece of legislation that revolutionised police governance.

**Responsibilities of The Police and Crime Commissioner**

The 2011 Act, at the outset established the PCC as a ‘corporation sole’ (ibid S1 (2), the office to perpetuating while individual post holders may change. This is a status that has its roots in ecclesiastical law and includes the monarchy and other high offices of state McLean (2012).
The functions of the PCC set by the Act were very broad, and certainly wider than the narrow scrutiny remit of the police authorities. Section 1 of the Act dealt with the ‘Police’ dimension of the role, in terms of maintaining an ‘efficient and effective’ police service and to holding the chief constable to account for the delivery of his/ her statutory functions (ibid S1 ss. 6-8)).

The thrust of Chapter 3 of the Act is the requirement of the production by the PCC of a Police and Crime Plan, immediately within the financial year that he/ she takes up office and to review and re-issue on a regular basis (ibid S5 (1-13)). In this section, the only reference to the PCC having regard to external considerations is one that ties the PCC back to central government by the need to maintain certain strategic policing resources for national deployment in times of crisis. This had regard to the ‘strategic policing requirement’ issued by the Secretary of State under section 37A of the Police Act 1996’. (ibid S 5. (5))

In addition to responsibilities within policing, S 9(1) of the Act empowers the PCC to make ‘Crime and Disorder Reduction Grants’ to individuals or bodies whose activities may tend to reduce crime and disorder in the relevant area, extending similar powers and practices exercised by the police authorities.

Public and community consultation requirements were, as one would expect from the above drivers for change, significantly increased for PCCs beyond those placed upon the police authorities by The Police Act 1996 (Home Office, 1996). In particular, S 14 (1-6) of the 2011 Act extends the provisions of S.96 of the 1996 act to include the views of victims of crime as to policing issues in addition to communities more generally. Given the concerns regarding the ‘democratic deficit’, and the inability of
police authorities to engage with the public (Milleen and Stephens, 2011), it might have provided more detail in the legislation as to how a single individual could be expected achieve this more effectively than an authority of 17 members.

S 21 of the 2011 Act, et. seq provides the PCC with financial powers to receive the various policing grants and to allocate them according to policing needs. In addition, S26 enables the Commissioner to set a precept on local rates to contribute to the policing fund.

**Accountability of the Police and Crime Commissioner**

The creation of a body to hold the PCC to account became something of an after thought brought about at the insistence of the Liberal party element of the coalition government, (Caless and Owen, 2016, Bailey, 2017)). As argued by Policing Minister Nick Herbert MP seeking to justify the inclusion of this body;

‘To prevent too much power from being invested in a single individual, we are putting in place strict checks and balances. These will include local Police and Crime Panels, with representatives from each local authority and independent members, with the power to scrutinise the commissioner’s actions’.

(Herbert 2011).

Section 28 of the 2011 Act established the Police and Crime Panel (PCP);

‘The functions of the police and crime panel for a police area must be exercised with a view to supporting the effective exercise of the functions of the police and crime commissioner for that police area’. (ibid S 28 (2)).
At the same time the PCP is required to review and scrutinise the activities of the PCC. This includes decisions made, or other action taken, by the PCC in connection with the discharge of the commissioner’s functions; and to make reports or recommendations to the relevant police and crime commissioner with respect to the discharge of the commissioner’s functions’. (ibid S. 28 (6)).

This late addition of PCPs to the governance structure has changed the tripartite arrangement into a ‘quadripartite’ arrangement (Lister, 2013, Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry, 2016). The findings of Bailey (2017) in his more focused work on this aspect of the governance framework raised significant questions as to the efficacy and impact of PCPs and questioned Herbert’s reassurance about this model. Lister and Rowe (2013) questioned whether it was realistic to expect PCPs to be able to fulfill their disparate roles of both scrutinising and supporting the PCC. Lister (2014) later concluded that the PCP’s performance so far as scrutiny of the PCC was concerned was Ineffective and unchallenging. Loveday (2013) drew attention to the fact that there was no requirement for the PCC to act upon any recommendation or requirement of the PCP. Indeed, in the view of Loveday (2018) the issue of the accountability of PCCs appeared to have replaced the earlier concerns expressed regarding the accountability of chief constables (Loveday 2018 p.5)

**Appointment and Dismissal of Chief Constables**

A section of the 2011 Act that was to generate much debate and which forms a key part of the findings of this thesis (Chapter six), this concerns the ability of the PCC to ‘hire and fire’ chief constables’ (Orde, 2011).
The chief constable is the most senior operational police officer within a police force. The 2011 Act sets out their responsibilities;

‘A police force, and the civilian staff of a police force, are under the direction and control of the chief constable of the force’. (ibid S 2 (3)).

It had previously been the role of the police authority to appoint and potentially dismiss the whole of the chief officer team (including Deputy Chief Constable and Assistant Chief Constables) Police Act 1964 (S6 (4)). The candidates for chief officer posts needed the approval of the Secretary of State (ibid S 6 (4)). This was in practice based on the advice of HMIC. Under the 2011 Act, there is no requirement for candidates to be so approved. However, the PCC must, according Schedule 8 of the Act seek the approval of the relevant PCP for the appointment of the chief constable. The PCP must in turn hold a public ‘confirmation hearing’ at which the preferred candidate for the post will be questioned (ibid Sched. 8 (6; 1-4)). The PCP has the power to veto the appointment of the candidate (ibid Sched 8, (8; (1-3)). If they do so, the provisions are somewhat vague as to what the further steps are, other than stating that the Secretary of State may make regulations to deal with such circumstances (ibid Sched. 8 (9,10)).

There was also increasing controversy surrounding the powers of PCCs to dismiss chief constables. Schedule 8 of the 2011 Act sets out the procedure for the PCC to remove a chief constable. This is achieved by requiring the chief constable to resign or retire and where the chief constable has no alternative but to do so (S 38 ibid). The only procedural requirements placed upon the PCC in this regard are for him/ her to provide the chief constable with a written explanation of the decision, and then to consider any written response from the chief constable. At the same time the PCC should seek advice from HMIC and inform the PCP who will consider the proposal and may hold a scrutiny hearing. The PCP is required to inform the PCC of their views
within six weeks of the initiation of this process. Following that process it is then solely the decision of the PCC whether or not to dismiss the chief constable;

‘...the role of the panel is purely advisory. The final decision to dismiss a Chief Constable rests with the commissioner alone.’ (House of Commons, 2013 p.3).

There is no role in this process for the Home Secretary, and the view of the Home Affairs Committee on the matter was somewhat equivocal;

‘Some will argue that it represents an undermining of the independence of the office of chief constable if it becomes too easy for their political masters to dismiss them over any minor disagreement or personality clash. On the other hand, it is essential to commissioners’ role as directly elected office-holders that they have the power to dismiss chief constables, and commissioners can and should provide robust, critical challenge to chief constables. It is right that commissioners should have the initiative in removing a chief constable…’

(ibid p.5).

The response from government to the report by the Home Affairs Committee was to state that they felt that there were sufficient safeguards in place within the process to remove chief constable and that they would remind PCPs that they should fully exercise their powers of scrutiny in this regard (Home Office, 2013). Tom Winsor the Chief HMIC attempted to reinforce this when he cautioned PCCs to exercise care when using their powers to dismiss chief constables ‘without reason (or at will)’, and reminded them that they should do so in the context of the 2011 Act as a whole and only in respect of matters where the performance of the chief constable affected the delivery of policing objectives (Winsor, 2013 p. 9). Despite in his speech Winsor’s
attempts to clarify this issue, by the end of it the situation remained as opaque as at the start.

In the case of R v PCC South Yorkshire (2017) the PCC for South Yorkshire, required his chief constable to resign following a public comment by the chief constable in respect of the findings of the independent panel examining the ‘Hillsborough’ tragedy in which 96 people lost their lives at a soccer match in 1989. The comments of the chief constable were subject to public criticism and to censure in parliament. The chief constable applied for judicial review of the decision of the PCC. The court found that the decision of the PCC in this case was irrational in view of the representations made by the chief constable and HMIC to him regarding his decision, and that he should have taken due regard of them. Yet, still the process remains unchanged, and in the event the chief constable did not return to office. Another example which raised questions as to the competence of PCCs to manage disciplinary issues in respect of chief constables alone proved to be that of the chief constable of Cheshire police. He was charged with allegations of gross misconduct by his PCC in spite of never having been informed of the allegations or interviewed about them. The disciplinary panel chair held that the actions of the PCC were ‘…an affront to natural justice’ and that it had ‘the potential to discredit public confidence in the police misconduct regulations’ (BBC, 2018).

Police Operational Independence

A key issue within the policing governance model in England and Wales is that of the operational independence of the chief constable and thereby the police force (Orde, 2011, Caless, 2011, Wells, 2015, Winsor, 2013). This debate has continued into the
current PCC construct. It was also addressed by Herbert (2011) in a speech to the Institute for Public Policy Research:

‘It’s fundamental to the British system that the police remain operationally independent. No politician can tell a constable – a sworn officer of the crown – who to arrest. Forces will continue to be under the legal ‘direction and control’ of their chief constable.’ (Ibid 2011).

The government consultation paper *Policing the 21st Century* (Home office 2010) identified this concern and was explicit in addressing it:

‘Giving chief constables a clear line of accountability to directly elected Police and Crime commissioners will not cut across their operational independence and duty to act without fear or favour.’ (ibid, para. 2.13).

HMIC, in its thematic review of police governance attempted to define police operational independence as:

‘The principal consideration of whether a matter falls within the chief constables operational remit is, accordingly, whether it is, or significantly impacts on, an issue in relation to which he or she has specific expertise (i.e. how to uphold the law in their force area)’. (HMIC, 2010 p.18)

The independence of chief constables in terms of the new governance model was meant to be clarified by Nick Herbert MP, when he described the proposed legislative arrangements for doing so:
‘The government has therefore committed to developing a new protocol – which has also been described as a Memorandum of Understanding – to delineate the key responsibilities of Chief Constables, Police and Crime Commissioners, the new local Police and Crime Panels’ (Herbert 2011).

The Policing Protocol Order 2011, Home Office (2011a) is a statutory instrument issued under S. 79 of the 2011 Act. It sets out the powers and duties of the PCC insofar as the relationship between the chief constable and the PCC is concerned. In terms of the operational independence of the chief constable it states that;

‘…the PCC must not fetter the operational independence of the police force and the Chief Constable who leads it... The Chief Constable is accountable to the law for the exercise of police powers, and to the PCC for the delivery of efficient and effective policing, management of resources and expenditure by the police force. At all times the Chief Constable, their constables and staff, remain operationally independent…’ (Ibid paras. 18 & 22).

The protocol, having made it clear that the PCC should not impinge upon the operational independence of the chief constable, goes on to recognise that there is some room for debate as to what operational independence means in practice. It exhorts the chief constable and PCC to work it out between themselves;

‘The PCC and Chief Constable must work together to safeguard the principle of operational independence, while ensuring that the PCC is not fettered in fulfilling their statutory role. The concept of operational independence is not defined in statute, and as HMIC has stated, by its nature, is fluid and context-driven’. (Ibid para. 35).
The concept of operational independence by chief officers, was, therefore in the view of the government enshrined in the Policing Protocol Order 2011, which purportedly reinforced the principles established by the stated cases of Fisher –V- Oldham Corporation, (1930) and the Blackburn dicta (R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn1968 [2QB 118]). The assumption that strong police operational independence was universally beneficial was not unchallenged. Loveday (2017, p. 29) argued that the drive by successive governments to preserve this model actually mitigated against democratic accountability, and cited the fact that this gave chief constables the ability to rebuff challenges without proper scrutiny (Brogden, 1982, Reiner, 2000).

Winsor (2013) in his John Harris Memorial Lecture, in a response to concerns around police operational independence that had arisen since the implementation of PCCs provided a comprehensive review of the development and importance of the operational independence of chief constables, concluding that;

‘In making the chief constable accountable to a directly elected police and crime commissioner, Parliament did not intend to affect or diminish the operational independence of the police, which remains a fundamental principle of British policing. The concept of a chief constable being accountable to the police and crime commissioner does not mean that he or she is not independent of the police and crime commissioner’. (ibid, p. 12).

Lister (2013) examined the way in which the Policing Protocol Order (Home Office 2011a) affected operational police independence. He found that although the protocol spoke of the importance of such independence, it goes on to undermine that ambition;
‘...by the nature, scope and reach of the powers that it confers on PCCs’

(ibid, p. 10).

Supporting Lister, Loveday (2014) identified that the ‘unfettered powers’ of the PCC were significantly more wide-ranging than those of the police authority. Lister (2013) drew attention to the potential impact of strategic, policy decisions upon chief constable’s ability to deliver operational outcomes. He correctly predicted that the matter would be subject to clarification by the courts (ibid, p.13).

The 2017 case of R-v- PCC South Yorkshire ([2017] EWHC 1349) examined the decision of the PCC for South Yorkshire to suspend and then require the resignation of the Chief Constable in respect of matters relating to the inquest of those that died in the Hillsborough tragedy (BBC, 2016a BBC 2017). The judgement found that the PCC was;

‘...obliged to hold the relevant chief constable to account in respect of all the functions of the chief constable and for all the functions of those acting under his direction and control... In our judgement matters relevant to operational independence are not excluded from the scope of the PCCs power of scrutiny. The operational independence at common law [See notably Commissioner of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn [1968 2QB 118 at 135] must give way if so required by the terms of the 2011 Act and in our judgement the Act qualifies that common law rule’

(R-v- PCC South Yorkshire ([2017] EWHC 1349 paras 76-78)
The implications of this judgement are considerable and have yet to be fully realised by both PCCs and Chief Constables. At the 2018 CoPaCC policing governance conference during the debates, it was clear that very few participants were aware of the significance of the case in terms of identifying the responsibility of PCCs for all operational policing delivery (CoPaCC, 2018).

The very live issues of police accountability and operational independence have become key issues within the research. The research questions identified in Chapter four were framed in order to capture not only the clear areas of operational police activity such as policing operations in terms of arrests etc., but also grey areas such as those where the decisions of the PCC may affect the ability of the chief constable to deliver an effective operational response. This might include the closure (or otherwise) of police stations, or the categories of police staff taken under direct control of the Commissioner under the so-called ‘Stage 2’ arrangements (Home Office, (2011) Sched. 15 Para 23).

The Role of The Chief Constable

The Policing Protocol Order 2011 (Home Office 2011a) states that:

‘The Chief Constable is responsible for maintaining the Queen’s Peace, and has direction and control over the force’s officers and staff. The Chief Constable holds office under the Crown, but is appointed by the PCC…The Chief Constable is accountable to the law for the exercise of police powers, and to the PCC for the delivery of efficient and effective policing, management of resources and expenditure by the police force. At all times the Chief Constable, their constables and staff, remain operationally independent in the service of the communities that they serve.’ (ibid)
In particular, the legislation specifically requires the chief constable to; lead the force, ensuring that it acts with impartiality and to appoint the force’s officers and staff (in consultation with the PCC, in the case of officers above the rank of Chief Superintendent and police staff equivalents). They should manage all complaints against the force, its officers and staff, except in relation to the Chief Constable, and ensure that the PCC is kept informed in such a way as to enable the PCC to discharge their statutory obligations.

The chief constable is also required to support the PCC in the delivery of the strategy and objectives set out in his/ her plan, to assist the PCC in planning the force’s budget. Provide the PCC with access to information, officers and staff. In particular exercising the power of direction and control in such a way as is reasonable to enable their PCC to have access to all necessary information and staff within the force.

In doing so they must have regard to the national Strategic Policing Requirement when exercising and planning their policing functions in respect of their force’s national and international policing responsibilities. They have day-to-day responsibility for financial management of the force within the framework of the agreed budget allocation and levels of authorisation issued by the PCC.

They must notify and brief the PCC of any matter or investigation on which the PCC may need to provide public assurance either alone or in company with the Chief Constable (the Act also states that all PCCs will be designated as Crown Servants
under the Official Secrets Act 1989(a), making them subject to the same duties in relation to sensitive material as Government Ministers).

The chief constable is the operational voice of policing in the force area regularly explaining to the public the operational activity. Where appropriate they enter into collaboration agreements with other Chief Constables, other policing bodies and partners that improve the efficiency or effectiveness of policing.

The chief constable must at all times remain politically independent of their PCC.

Home Office 2011a ( paras. 21-23).

The government’s desired relationship between the chief constable and the PCC, was summarised within the protocol as being:

‘The relationship between the PCC and Chief Constable is defined by the PCC’s democratic mandate to hold the Chief Constable to account, and by the law itself: primary legislation and common law already provide clarity on the legal principles that underpin operational independence and the Office of Constable.’ (ibid, para. 36).

This assertion as to clarity around police operational independence has, as discussed been apparently overturned by judgement of the court in the case of R-v- PCC South Yorkshire QBD (2017).
Brain, a former Chief Constable of Gloucestershire raised a worrying spectre within the new governance paradigm with particular reference to the relationship between the PCC and the Chief Constable:

‘Chief constables have always faced political pressure from politicians, but the ultimate power in policing authorities was dispersed. Now, there will be a risk of more subtle influence: behind closed doors, a PCC may ask a chief constable to focus on a particular local area where the commissioner has a lot of support. And the new PCCs have sole authority to appoint or remove the chief constable. Removing a chief constable is messy, but they will also be on fixed-term contracts, so if you were a young, ambitious chief constable, not quite ready for your pension and your contract was near renewal, what would you do?’ (Brain, 2012).

Lister (2013) also saw potential problems in the interpersonal relationship between PCCs and chief constables and it’s potential detrimental impact upon policing services (ibid p.245). Davies and Johnson (2016) pointed to examples of such relationships ranging from ‘strong partnerships to total breakdown’, the latter being a reference to the dismissal of chief constables by PCCs in Avon and Somerset Police, Lincolnshire Police and Gwent Police (ibid p.285).

The findings in later chapters will consider whether this critical interpersonal relationship allows for the delivery of effective policing and community safety.
The Role of Central Government

The historical ‘tripartite arrangement’ was described above as a balanced construct in which chief police officers, the Home Office and police authorities each contributed to the governance of policing across England and Wales. The Home Office provided central funding and national policy, the authorities, local funding and accountability and Chief Officers, operational delivery professional management of policing Lustgarten, (1986), Mawby & Wright, (2003). The 2011 Act (Home Office, 2011) and the Policing Protocol (2011) (Home Office, 2011a) demonstrated the intention of the Home Office to end the hitherto growing centralist approach:

‘The establishment of PCCs has allowed for the Home Office to withdraw from day-to-day policing matters, giving the police greater freedom to fight crime as they see fit, and allowing local communities to hold the police to account’.

(Home Office 2011a para. 27.).

The Home Office, however retained within the Policing Protocol significant influence. Thus the Home Secretary has reserve powers and legislative tools that enable intervention and direction to all parties, in order to prevent or mitigate risk to the public or national security. These, as emphasised in the protocol will be used only as a last resort, and will not be used to interfere with the ‘democratic will of the electorate’. In addition, the Home Secretary has retained accountability for national security and the role that the police service plays within the delivery of any national response. The Home Secretary is required to issue a ‘Strategic Policing Requirement’ that sets out what are the national threats at the time and the national policing capabilities that are required to counter them. (Ibid paras. 28 & 29). The express intent of the Home Office to move away from immediate engagement in police governance and its impact would be tested during this research.
As the government policy of decentralisation of local government to metropolitan mayors, (Casebourne, 2017) has moved forward, the new city mayors are, like the Mayor of London to be given the responsibility for policing governance and have been empowered to act as PCCs by the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 (S107F (1)).

Summary

The legislation that created and guided the police authorities within the 'tripartite arrangement', the Police Act 1964, the Police and Magistrates Court Act, 1994 and the Police Act 1996 required that the authorities hold the police to account and provide scrutiny as to efficiency and effectiveness, the later two Acts required that the authorities do this in the context of the views of communities.

The potential impact of a single elected individual, the PCC with ‘unfettered powers’ (Loveday 2014) who has responsibility for setting policing strategy and relying upon the Chief Constable, (whom they have ‘hired’ and may ‘fire’) to deliver that strategy while at the same time delivering day to day policing is at the core of this research.

The relationship between the PCC and the chief constable, is therefore crucial in delivering effective policing. Gilling, 2014 identified that prior to the introduction of PCCs, within the managerialist governance construct that chief constables and the Home Office were in a principal/ agent relationship statutorily imposed by the Police Reform Act 2002 (Home Office, 2002) that gave the Home Office powers to monitor

’Whenever one individual depends on the action of another, an agency relationship arises. The individual taking the action is called the agent. The affected party is the principal’ (ibid, p.2)

Davies and Johnson (2016), drew upon the analysis of research based on interviews of PCCs and chief constables. Davies and Johnson’s findings suggested that the formation of a principal/agent relationship may, in the context of policing governance be positive so long as ‘goal divergence’ is avoided. Their paper goes on to recommend tactics for maintaining an effective relationship between the PCC and chief constable. The extent of the principal/agent relationship and its importance would be explored within this research.


The election process for PCCs across England and Wales, held on 15th November 2012 was badly organised. There was little public information as to what the PCC was, or how voters would have a voice in policing their communities. The chair of the Electoral Commission Jenny Watson stated that the government had not delivered an effective process, and that this had caused a record low turnout of voters. The elections she argued had taken place:
'...at an unfamiliar time of year, which is why we have made clear at every stage that it would be important to engage effectively with voters…The government took a number of decisions about how to run these elections that we did not agree with…' (BBC 2012 (a)).

The average voter turnout across the country was 15.1%, the lowest being Staffordshire at 12% and West Midlands at 12.3%. The highest turnout was in Northamptonshire at 19.8%, (Electoral Commission 2013). The highest figure was still well short of the average of turnouts for local elections, which vary, but as a reasonable comparator the turnout for the most recent local elections held in 5 May 2011 across England was 42% (Rallings and Thrasher, 2011). The new PCC elections were the lowest ever turnout for a national election, the previous low being the 1999 elections to the European elections which stood at 23.1%, Berman, Coleman and Taylor (2012).

The Electoral Commission review of the 2012 PCC elections, Electoral Commission (2013) identified the factors that accounted for the very poor turnout;

‘There were a number of factors at play here: the arguments about these being new elections taking place at an unfamiliar time of year are well rehearsed. But the decision to limit public support to candidates in getting information about themselves to voters, so that candidate information was provided primarily via a website, was a mistake…the Home Office does not have the necessary expertise to set the detailed legal framework for holding elections. As a result some of the rules were confirmed too late, which caused confusion or a lack of certainty for candidates and electoral administrators. This is unacceptable. This
This review provides support for Loveday’s description of the process as an ‘Election Omnishambles’ (Loveday, 2012, p. 183). The process did little to add to the credibility of the role of PCC, or indeed the democratic mandate of the post holders as they assumed their new roles. The claim in Loveday (2012) and the Electoral Commission (2013) that one of the most significant factors in the lack of public engagement in the election process was the lack of information was supported by a poll reported in Berman, Coleman and Taylor (2012). This also identified a significant level of antipathy and disinterest:

- I didn’t have enough information about the candidates to make a decision 45%
- I don’t agree with electing police officials in this way 19%
- I wasn’t interested 18%
- I didn’t think that my vote would make difference 5%
- I wasn’t aware of the election 3%
- I didn’t know where to go to cast my vote 2%
- Other 9%

(ibid p.10)

The majority of those elected to positions of PCCs in 2012 were former elected politicians (52%) Berman, Coleman and Taylor (2012). Interestingly a significant
number of independent candidates were successful (29%) (ibid). The division of the political representation was, 16 Conservative, 13 Labour and 12 Independents.

In part, the concept of PCCs was based upon the US Sherriff model (Cameron 2005), it is therefore interesting to compare the voter turnout at elections for Sherriffs in the USA. Tomberlin (2018) questions how meaningful accountability through election is, given the low awareness of voters coupled with a low and reducing turnout (ibid. p 143). In doing so he cited Macaig (2014) who researched voter turnout in local elections (which included sheriffs) across 144 large US cities, and found an average of 26.6% in 2001 and 21% in 2011. Both Tomberlin and Macaig raised concerns of legitimacy with those turnout figures although they were clearly much higher than in the PCC elections of 2012 and 2016.

Given the high level of politically motivated successful candidates in the PCC elections, Newburn (2012) in one of the first articles following the election of PCCs in November 2012, exhorted them to act in an apolitical manner;

‘To be truly effective PCCs will need to resist the temptation to play to the gallery, and will need to defend those aspects of policing which are least easy to measure, or may be relatively invisible to the voting public.’

(ibid p.2)

Perhaps due to the questionable democratic mandate of PCCs, or the antipathy to the new governance framework Orde (2012), Chakrabarti (2011), Sampson (2012), Jones et al, (2012), Loveday (2013 a) and Newburn (2012), there was considerable scrutiny of the new policing governance model and how it operated.
A relatively positive tone was set by the Home Affairs Committee (HAC) that reviewed the development of the governance construct (House of Commons, 2014). The HAC found that even at an early stage, PCCs were demonstrating greater clarity of leadership and were becoming more recognisable by the public as having responsibility for the strategic direction of policing. There were also positive comments in respect of the way in which PCCs had addressed collaborative working and support for victims. However there were concerns around the transparency of some commissioners and the way in which deputies and assistants had been appointed, echoing the claims of cronyism made to the committee (ibid pp.46-47).

Concerns were raised around a number of examples where PCCs had within a relatively short time following election, sought to dismiss their chief constables (Brain 2012). Examples that interested the HAC (House of Commons 2013 & 2014) were, the chief constable of Avon and Somerset Police being required to re-apply for his job by the incoming PCC, ostensibly in order that the tenure of the chief constable would become coterminous with the PCC’s period of office. The chief constable of Gwent police, who was invited to retire by the PCC as an alternative to dismissal, and the chief constable of Lincolnshire who was suspended by the PCC, only to be reinstated by order of the High Court. Carmel Napier, the chief constable of Gwent police summed up the issue for the committee:

‘...the Government had drafted the legislation, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, which apparently gave the PCCs unfettered powers to appoint, suspend, and remove Chief Constables. Therefore no matter what process I went through with the Police and Crime Panel, the outcome could be the same because the PCC is the ultimate decision-maker about what has happened.’ (ibid p.4)
The government rejected these concerns (BBC 2013). However, in 2014, the Committee on Standards in Public Life (2015) revisited the same issues in its review of accountability and ethics in police leadership. Evidence was provided to the committee by a range of individuals and organisations including the author, his first supervisor and colleagues (Loveday et al 2014). Their paper identified that there were potential risks around the relationships between individual PCCs and chief constables, which were opaque to the scrutiny of the PCP (ibid p.15). In addition, their evidence highlighted the risks associated with the potential for PCCs to behave unethically in the absence of an effective accountability framework (ibid p.16). The Committee on Standards in Public Life subsequently found that there was insufficient challenge and scrutiny of the PCC in addition to insufficient redress where a PCC’s behaviour fell below that expected in public office (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2015 p.5). To date, no changes have been made to the legislation regarding the accountability of PCCs.

Further questions have arisen regarding the decisions of PCCs concerning the behaviour of PCCs towards chief constables. An example being the suspension of the chief constable of South Yorkshire Police and the call for him to resign by the PCC. This was later described as unlawful by the High Court (BBC 2017). In another example:

‘...Surrey PC Kevin Hurley’s former chief constable, Lynne Owens showed how ugly things could get when politics, policing and personalities collided’.

(BBC 2016).

At the same time, pressure bore upon the new governance construct from the ‘Independent Police Commission’ set up by the Labour Party which saw the PCC
governance construct as ‘riddled with failings’ and ‘systematically flawed’. The report called for it to be abandoned Stevens (2013 p.13). The report suggested that it be replaced by a system where local authorities appointed police commanders and set local policing priorities in a construct similar to that recommended by Loveday and Reid (2003). However, the report was silent upon the issue of police accountability. The report was not taken forward, particularly given that many Labour party PCCs once in the role saw it as effective and had put in place many beneficial initiatives (Gaskarth, 2014).

The conduct of a number of PCCs raised further questions regarding the appropriateness of one individual having the responsibility for police governance. This included the PCC for Kent who appeared in a television documentary where her behaviour was criticised, and other concerns were raised regarding her appointment of an assistant commissioner (Guardian, 2014). Shaun Wright PCC for South Yorkshire was found to be culpable as head of children’s services in the response to widespread child sexual abuse allegations. In spite of pressure from the media and government to do so, he did not stand down for a significant period of time. This raised further questions as to the accountability of commissioners (BBC 2014). These concerns were recognised by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (2015) that considered inter alia evidence submitted by the author and his academic supervisor. The Lord Bew identified the risks resulting from a significant shift in the power balance within the police governance structure such that the PCC holds a ‘monocratic’ position that could lead to too much power in the hands of the PCC without sufficient public accountability (ibid pp. 36-37). The report also highlighted concerns regarding the relationship between the PCC and the chief constable, in particular the potential for the ability of PCCs alone to dismiss chief constables or to decline to renew their contracts to impact upon the confidence of chief constables to exercise independent professional judgement for fear of upsetting the PCC (ibid. p.100).
Anecdotal evidence within political parties suggests that some regret the selection of their candidate to a PCC post. The author was informed by a senior party-political member that the incumbent PCC affiliated with their party was so incompetent that central office was attempting to induce the PCC to step down, but were worried about forcing the issue in case the PCC dropped his party allegiance and remained in office as a potentially hostile independent (Personal Conversation 2018).

Against this background, four years later the second round of PCC elections were held on 5 May 2016. Significantly, these elections were held at the same time as local council elections in most areas across England and Wales. This may explain the significantly increased voter turnout that was up by 11.5% to a national average of 26.6%. The voter turnout was significantly higher in areas where local council elections were being held in addition to the PCC elections (Electoral Commission, 2016). This may have contributed to the fact that in the 2016 elections, the number of Independents fell from 12 to 3, as the political parties increased their share, with 20 Conservative commissioners, 15 Labour and 3 Plaid Cymru in Wales. (Dempsey (2016 p.16)).

Whilst welcoming the increased voter turnout, the Electoral Commission was still critical of the government for failing to improve voter awareness of PCCs in the lead up to the elections:

'We were disappointed when the Government did not follow this recommendation and candidate information was not delivered directly to voters ahead of the elections in May 2016. The findings of this report support the Commission’s previous concerns about the lack of candidate information available to voters to enable them to make an informed decision of how to vote
in the PCC elections. They also highlight that this had a significant impact on voter understanding of what are still relatively new elections’. (Electoral Commission (2016 p.1)).

It is appropriate at this juncture to state that the author was, himself a candidate in the 2016 PCC elections. He stood as independent of the main political parties and in the event he was not successful. However, the experience gave him a very significant insight into the process of the election. It appeared to him that the process militated against individuals with no support infrastructure. This was highlighted by Gilmore (2013) in her review of the first year of PCCs and Joyce (2016) who found that, public apathy to the role meant that the main route for successful PCCs was through party political affiliation (ibid. p.50). This was a view supported by Mawby and Smith (2016) who saw the increase in successful party-political candidates as undermining the express desire on the part of government to insulate the police from the influence of party politics (ibid, p. 29).

In a recent development in terms of PCCs span of responsibility, the Policing and Crime Act 2017, which came into force in April 2017, *inter alia* empowers PCCs to take responsibility for fire and rescue services should there be a case to do so (Home Office 2017). Time will tell whether this amendment along with the potential for convergence of policing, fire and rescue services will improve community safety, or merely support the continuing drive for economies in public services. The 2017 Act does not, however change the policing governance construct put in place in 2012. Interestingly, and perhaps signalling a direction of travel, at the same time the police inspectorate HMIC in July 2017 had its remit extended to fire and rescue services and was re named Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services
(HMICFRS) (Home Office 2017a), and the government Police Minister is now termed the Minister of State for Fire and Policing (Home Office, 2018a).

**Summary**

This chapter has catalogued the drivers for change in police governance across England and Wales, since the Conservative 2010 manifesto (Conservative Party 2010) which was implemented immediately on their election in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011). This replaced police authorities and put in their place PCCs. The chapter has also compared the roles and responsibilities of PCCs against the police authorities they replaced, with particular reference to police accountability and operational independence. It has also reviewed academic and media perceptions of the way that the new governance construct has operated to date.
Chapter Four.

Methodological Choices

Philosophical Positioning and Methodology

Approaches to social research carry with them important epistemological and ontological considerations. (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.29). The philosophical position of the researcher must be made explicit in order that readers of the account of the research can understand the paradigm within which the research was conducted (Scotland, 2012). If researchers do not understand the principles and assumptions that underpin their research then this may limit or distort the integrity and validity of the research design and the research findings (Crotty, 1998; Robson, 2003).

The philosophical concepts of ontology and epistemology have a long history within philosophy dating back to pre-Socratic traditions (McCabe, 1995). Ontology is the philosophical domain that considers the nature of, and how individuals understand reality (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Jupp, 2006) and how judgments are made about the world (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Epistemology, deals with the way in which individuals come to have legitimate knowledge (Bunge, 1983), what it means to have knowledge (Cohen et al, 2007) and the relationship between the researcher and reality (Carson et al., 2001).

Positivist ontology, ‘realism’ views the world as external and having a reality independent of the observer (Carson et al, 2001; Cohen et al, 2007). Positivists see a clear distinction between science and individual personal experience. The positivist
researcher seeks objectivity using rational and logical, structured approaches reliant upon statistical and mathematical methods (Carson et al, 2001). The positivist epistemological standpoint has been described as ‘objectivism', in which knowledge is an independent reality that can be discovered by the research including the identification of causes that influence outcomes (Cresswell, 2009). The research methods favored by proponents of this approach are quantitative in nature, involving measurement and experiment.

Interpretivist ontology, ‘relativism' takes the view that all reality is subjective and differs from individual to individual within a population (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). In relativist terms reality is constructed in the interaction between individuals and the real world mediated through social contexts (Berger and Luckman, 1967: Crotty, 1998). Epistemologically, interpretivism is characterized as ‘subjectivism' which recognizes that the world does not exist independently of the individual’s knowledge of it and that knowledge is influenced by interactions between the individual and his/ her world (Heron and Reason, 1997: Grix, 2004). The principal methods used as part of an interpretivist approach to research are those referred to as ‘qualitative’, describing research that is naturalistic, concerned with understanding the meanings that individuals place on actions, decisions and beliefs within a social context (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).

Hagan (2010) described quantitative and qualitative research as evolving from separate philosophical traditions. The former being associated with the positivist natural science position, emphasising empirical measurement and data analysis, whilst the latter seeks to understand the issue or reality under examination in a manner that sociologist Weber described as ‘Verstehen', meaning ‘understanding or empathy’ (Weber, 1949).
Significant cohorts of methodological commentators see interpretivist/ qualitative approaches as being incompatible with positivist/ quantitative methodologies (Sale, Lohfeld, and Brazil, 2002). Dichter (1955, p.27) described quantitative methods as being limiting in that they only contribute a component of the information required to ‘make an intelligent and scientifically based decision’. Denzin & Lincoln, (2005 p.12) report that quantitative researchers see qualitative, interpretivist research as ‘unreliable, impressionistic and not objective’. Others see these philosophical standpoints as being on a continuum between an extreme pole of the qualitative ‘historicism’ which rejects positivism completely (Fullerton, 1987) where all events are a chronicle of unique happenings with no potential to draw generalisable scientific data, to the quantitative extreme of ‘scientism’, where the view taken is that if a phenomenon cannot be measured, then it is not worthy of study (Anastas, 2012).

Weber (2004) suggests that the positivist versus interpretivist rhetoric has reduced over recent years and that all methodologies can contribute to an understanding of reality. O’Leary (2007, pp.206-207) points out, the dichotomous distinctions drawn by some commentators in terms ontological and epistemological philosophical stances are both unrealistic and unhelpful.

‘Pragmatism’ is seen as an alternative to the quantitative, qualitative ‘dogma’ (Howe, (1988), James, (2010)) whereby the researcher chooses from the array of tools available, those that address the research question most effectively, using a diversity of methods to address a given research question. In doing so the researcher recognises that no one method or combination of methods is perfect (Creswell, 2009, Denscombe, 2010, Fielzer, 2010 Muijs, 2011). This position is supported by Mhlanga (2000) in his discussion of a research model constructed to examine ethnicity issues in criminal justice;

‘While quantitative data are thought of as ‘hard’ and qualitative data as ‘soft’, it is also now widely accepted in criminological research that quantitative and
qualitative data can complement one another, each shedding light on the
other.’ (Mhlanga, 2000, p.415).

The author of this thesis was attracted to an interpretivist rather than a positivist
approach. He was therefore philosophically inclined towards using qualitative
methods. This study was not to be about testing out the validity of a hypothesis within
a positivist approach, but was focussed upon developing an understanding of what the
issues were within a governance construct. Much of the data required was likely to
involve individual perceptions and interpersonal interactions between chief officers and
the PCCs. In this regard, the author was particularly attracted to the adapted
‘Grounded Theory’ (Glaser and Straus 1967, Corbin and Straus 2008) where research
is structured in such a way that the researcher gathers data without pre-conceptions or
hypothetical constraints, allowing understanding to arise from the data itself. This
methodology is particularly appropriate in areas where there is little extant literature
upon which theories can be based (Creswell, 2005, p. 30) which at the time of the
research phase was arguably true in this area.

In addition, in the context of the research questions in this study, which were focused
upon understanding the way in which a changed governance paradigm in policing
affected the delivery of policing within a local area. Such data were, is seemed to the
author more susceptible to a methodology that accessed subjective perceptions of
reality by key actors than a more positivist approach that would look at statistical data.
This position was supported by Bevir and Rhodes (2003 p 17) who advocate an
interpretivist approach to the study of governance.
The author was at the same time mindful of the importance of selecting the right methods rather than one that he was most comfortable with, heeding the warning from Silverman, (2005);

‘...qualitative research is not always appropriate to every research problem. You need to think through exactly what you are trying to achieve rather than be guided by some fashion or trivial preference- perhaps you are not comfortable doing statistical calculations.’ (Silverman, 2005, p. 7).

A positivist approach, focusing on statistical data could, in the author’s view only give a report of response, demand or public satisfaction indicators that would not enable an understanding the interpersonal dynamic between the police and the PCCs in a manner that could provide an insight into the impact and efficacy of the governance arrangement at a human participant level. Indeed there is an argument that traditional performance data used in policing is not necessarily a measure of impact or effect in policing delivery (Eterno and Silverman, 2012), and that the determination of any statistical correlation between police performance and the introduction of PCCs would be questionable (Ludwig, Norton & McLean 2017). The author was not looking for statistical evidence of changes in policing outputs such as crime rates, or public fear of crime following the election of PCCs. Hinton (2014) identifies that statistical analyses are more appropriate in quantitative research rather than qualitative data such as those arising from research that involves interviews as in this study. He goes on to point out however, that a combination of the analytical approaches may provide a more comprehensive answer to the research question. In this research, the search was for a subjective account of perceived changes within the police governance dynamic, which suggested a qualitative strategy. Although the author accepts that it would be possible to reduce interview data into numerical categories such as the frequency of participant comments within a categorical theme from which meaningful interpretations may be made that could contribute to answering the research
questions. However, since this was a new area of research in an area about which little was known, it was, therefore in the view of the author necessary to apply a grounded approach (Corbyn and Strauss, 2008). He therefore took a decision to choose an interpretivist approach for the study, employing a qualitative methodology in which concepts and ideas enhance the understanding and explanation of reality (Weber, 1949; Vlidich & Lyman, 1994).

The author recognised the potential disadvantages in taking an interpretivist approach in this study, particularly in terms of the perception of potential readers who may be looking for definitive, measurable evidence of the impact of the governance change. He took the view however that his approach had the potential to access the developing interpersonal relationships and how they affect the governance process, rather than reporting descriptive statistics from which it may prove impossible to draw causal relationships thereby being unlikely to take forward the body of knowledge in this area. Future research may use the data produced within this study to add to an understanding of the domain.

**Critical Review of Available Methods and Selection of the Appropriate Method**

Having determined his philosophical stance, the author looked towards the appropriate methodology to address the research questions. Crotty describes research methodology as the strategy or plan that guides the choice and use of particular research methods that are the specific techniques and procedures to collect and analyse data (Crotty 1998, p3). It is crucial that the chosen research methodology is constructed in a rigorous manner using appropriate methods. King and Wincup identify the strategic imperative:
‘Problems of law and order, crime, and the criminal justice process ...must be effectively researched in ways that are theoretically grounded, methodologically secure and practically based’. (King and Wincup, 2000, p.1)

Mays and Pope (1995, p.109) added that it is crucial, in order to avoid assertions that the research is unscientific, that the qualitative researcher ensures that the design provides for replicability and generalisability. These were key aims for the author in his review of the available techniques and the construction of his research plan.

The principal qualitative methods are summarised by Noakes and Wincup (2004). The author felt that all of the methods would, potentially have applicability in studying the impact of the changes in policing governance, each with advantages and potential disadvantages.

Ethnographic techniques are defined as, including participant observation originating in the work of the so called ‘Chicago School’ studies of ‘deviant groups in their natural setting’ Noakes and Wincup (2004, p.94). An ethnographic approach may allow the observation of the developing relationship between chief constables and the PCCs. However, it was anticipated that such access would be very difficult to achieve, given the potential sensitivities around the developing relationships. In addition the crucial nature of the business interaction may give rise to skewed behaviour due to observer effect (Jones and Nisbett, 1972). This method was rejected at an early stage.

Documentary Evidence, in this context documents are not used to extract statistical data as a quantitative researcher might, but are used as a means of; ‘exploring those who produce such materials ‘ (Brookman ,1999, p.52). The processes of policing and
its governance, particularly at a strategic level, generates of a plethora of documentary material. These documents in a hermeneutic sense (Patterson and Williams, 2002) are potentially a rich source of data. However, it was felt that given the change in governance structure had occurred recently that relatively little material would have been produced. Therefore it would not be possible at that stage to discern changes that could be reliably represented as correlating to systematic effects. In addition, it was questionable whether access would be forthcoming in respect of the material from both PCCs and the chief constables.

Interviews, research interviews of individuals or groups, using structured, semi-structured or unstructured techniques are described by Robson (2003, p228) as ‘conversations with a purpose’. They provide the researcher with the ability to gain an understanding of the participant’s real world experience (Kvale, 1996, p.2, Hammersley 1992, p. 165). Interviews were, therefore seen by the author as potentially the most productive method in terms of identifying the perceptions of actors (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p. 2). Thereby enabling an understanding of the critical governance relationship and its effect, if any upon policing delivery. Noakes and Wincup (2004, pp. 77-78) highlight that the term ‘interview’ is generic, ranging from delivery of a quantitative research questionnaire to the semi structured interview or in-depth study. The decision as to the model employed depended upon many factors, including the characteristics of the research population, the sensitivity of the topic, the location of the interview and the timescales. Three types of interview are identified (Noakes and Wincup 2004, pp. 79-80);

Firstly the ‘structured interview’ which is common in large scale projects where consistency is required due to the large number of subjects and potentially large numbers of researchers. It does not allow for prompting or probing by the interviewer to obtain a deeper understanding. In the view of Robson (2003, p. 229) this method offers nothing above the administration of a questionnaire, and according to Bryman
(2012, p. 193) is more applicable to areas that have already been extensively researched. Secondly, ‘semi-structured interviews’ are used where there is a need for the researcher to understand the topic, they allow for appropriate probing within an interview schedule. The semi-structured interview offers more opportunity to probe with follow up questions. The interviewer has a choice of the order in which to ask questions from the schedule. The semi-structured interview relies on a schedule of prompts and sub questions to keep the interview on track, and the interviewee led nature of the process may mean that the participant is more relaxed and therefore more likely to provide in-depth responses (DiCiccio-Bloom and Crabtree 2006, p. 315).

Finally, the ‘unstructured interview’ which are often used in life history, biographical studies, the interviewer has a broad aim, but allows the interviewee the freedom to talk and ascribe meaning. This method can elicit very in-depth data (Patton 2002), however due to the lack of standardisation of the research instrument; there can be a lack of focus and the potential for interviewer bias (Robson 2003, Bryman 2012).

Cockcroft (1999) in his study of Police culture using unstructured interviews of retired Police Officers found that issues associated with unreliable memories and the influence of hindsight could intervene. In order to focus down on issues, Cockcroft went on to use semi-structured interviews on later subjects.

The author, having considered the available models, chose the semi-structured model as the most appropriate, given that he alone would be interviewing in this case a small population about a subject in respect of which he had a good understanding (Bryman and Bell, 2003), in an area of research that had little precedence (Bryman 2012, p. 193). He took the view, therefore that semi-structured interviews would be most effective in answering the research questions in this study.
Selection of Participants

In terms of social science participant sampling strategies, four broad typographies are generally accepted (Teddlie and Yeu, 2007);

- **Probability** – Participants are selected from the population under examination in relatively large numbers in a random manner. Probability sampling attempts to achieve representativeness of the entire population. This method is often used for quantitative studies within a positivist research paradigm.

- **Purposive** – Participants are selected for the purpose of answering the research question. In the words of Maxwell, ‘…particular settings, persons or events are deliberately selected for the important information that they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices’ (Maxwell 1997, p.87).

- **Convenience** – participants who are easily accessible and willing to participate in the study.

- **Mixed Method** – Techniques used to combine probability and purposive sampling strategies.

The literature had indicated that the relationship between the chief constables and PCCs was likely to be crucial in terms of the governance structure of policing (Jones et al, 2012, Loveday 2013, Loveday 2017, Davis & Johnson, 2016). It seemed that those best able to provide ‘…important information… that cannot be gotten from other choices’ (Maxwell, 1997, p. 87) were individual chief constables and PCCs. The author therefore decided upon a purposive sampling strategy focussing upon chief constables and PCCs as interview participants. This decision was to some extent validated by the later similar research carried out by Wells (2015) and by Caless and Owen (2016) who also conducted interviews of chief constables and PCCs and whose findings echoed some of those within this thesis.
Ethical Considerations

In its guidelines, the British Sociological Association state clearly that researchers have;

“...a responsibility both to safeguard the proper interests of those involved in, or affected by their work, and to report their findings accurately and truthfully. They need to consider the effects of their involvement and the consequences of their work or its misuse for those they study and other interested parties...” (ibid 2002 p.2).

This requirement, along with a large body of literature on the subject of ethics in research places a responsibility upon the researcher to consider at all stages of the research journey issues that may affect the subjects of that research, stakeholders and the wider community, as well as ensuring the integrity of the methodology and any results reported. (Kimmel,1988).

There are also, within the jurisdiction of England and Wales, legal considerations including the Human Rights Act 1998 (Home Office 1998) and the Data Protection Act 2004 (Home Office, 2004) which must be taken into account when obtaining and handling personal data obtained from individuals.

Ethical issues must be resolved prior to the commencement of the research study (Silverman, 2005, pp. 257-258). In this study, the author complied with the University of Portsmouth ethical guidelines by formally seeking a positive ethical view from the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, Faculty Research Ethics Committee prior to embarking upon the data collection phase. An ‘ethics self-assessment form’, together with a research protocol describing the methodology to be undertaken and an ethical narrative describing in detail the ethical issues and mitigation measures in place was submitted for ethical review (Appendix A).
The thinking required in order to address the ethical issues in this study and the process of completing the required research ethics assessment and protocol was, for the author an important experience in that it focused his thinking not only on the research but also upon the wider implications for the potential participants and his responsibility towards them.

At first glance, the chief constable cohort of potential interview participants in this study, represented a relatively small and resilient group (Reiner, 1991), the same might, prima facie, be reasonably inferred of those who had gained the office of PCC. However, the author was aware that there were significant ethical considerations in this research project potentially centred upon the dynamic between the chief constable and the PCC. In particular, the need to consider sensitivities in a research project is relative to the potential impact upon the potential participants. This will always be a subjective judgement;

‘...a sensitive topic is one that potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, the emergence of which renders problematic for the researcher and/or the researched the collection, holding and/or dissemination of research data.’
(Renzetti and Lee, 1993, p.5).

The author took the view that the context and circumstances of this study did present issues of sensitivity within the above definition for both the chief constable cohort and the PCC participants.
Considerations Regarding Chief Constables

The Policing Protocol Order (Home Office 2011a) imposes a requirement for a close working relationship between the PCC charged with driving a policing strategy that meets the needs of local communities, and the chief constable. In pragmatic terms, in order for the chief constable to deliver, he/ she needs a positive working relationship with the PCC, particularly given the assertion in Loveday (2017) that the PCC can ‘do anything that is lawful’.

In addition, at an individual level, chief constables are subject to time-limited contracts of employment (Home Office, 2003) and rely in employment terms upon the PCC who has the sole power to decide whether or not to renew the chief constable’s contract, or to dismiss him/ her (Home Office 2011). It is reasonable, therefore to anticipate that chief constables who participated this research may be concerned as to the potential impact upon their relationship with their PCC if their participation and their views found their way into the public domain. This potential also gave rise a concern as to the validity of the research itself in terms of the potential for chief constable participants to be reluctant or inhibited in their responses if they feared that the PCC could become aware of their participation and/ or comments. These considerations provided an imperative to minimise the potential for the subject’s participation to impact upon the crucial professional relationship at the heart of the governance paradigm.

It was decided therefore not to approach the PCCs in order to seek permission to interview chief constable participants. Indeed, the legal relationship is such that although the PCC appoints the chief constable, he/ she is not in a legal sense the employer of the chief constable who is an independent officer of the crown (Home Office 2011). The author therefore felt no requirement to approach PCCs to seek such
permission. Further, to inform the PCC would in the view of the author have compromised the strategy to ensure the anonymity of the chief constable participants.

**Considerations Regarding Police and Crime Commissioners**

PCCs are statutorily separated from the police hierarchy, (Home Office 2011). They appoint chief constables as well as renewing their contracts. It was considered, therefore that they would not feel themselves to be vulnerable in the same way that chief constables might when participating in the study. However the literature indicated that the interpersonal relationship between the chief constable and the PCC was critical. This was reinforced by the author’s pilot study to this research project, which is described below.

It was therefore important to maintain the confidentiality of the PCC participants so as not to compromise that working relationship. In addition, PCCs are subject to public election to their positions and the author recognised the importance that their comments were not inappropriately put into the public domain without their informed consent, given the potential impact upon public perception upon the individual or the office of PCC. Maintenance of confidentiality was, in the view of the author, as critical for the PCC participants as for the chief constables.

**Participant Confidentiality Arrangements**

The author addressed the issue of confidentiality in some detail in the letter of invitation to potential participants (Appendices B & C) and the accompanying Participant Information Sheet (Appendix D) which detailed the measures that would be taken to ensure individual anonymity.
The research project and the proposed methodology received a favorable ethical opinion in January 2015 (Appendix E). It was then appropriate to move forward with the research project as described within the ethical review documents, being careful at all times to adhere to the research protocol and ethical narrative that had been reviewed. Any deviation from those parameters would require the author to seek a further review of the changed circumstances or proposal.

**A Pilot Study**

This research study was advised by an earlier pilot study involving semi-structured interviews of five Chief Constables carried out by the author in April 2013. The author decided that in the pilot study, only serving chief constables would be approached as research participants in this study, and not at that time Police and Crime Commissioners, since chief constables alone would be able to answer the research question as to whether there had been discernible change in policing delivery since the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners. They had been a constant across the changed governance paradigm.

Seven chief constables were approached, five indicated that they were prepared to assist in the research and two declined. One of those declining gave no reason for doing so, but the other indicated that they felt that there was too great a risk that the Police and Crime Commissioner would learn of the encounter and that may detrimentally affect their relationship which was of crucial importance in the delivery of policing across the Force area. This rationale for declining to participate is potentially significant in that it immediately disclosed a concern on the part of a Chief Constable of the potential impact on their ability to deliver policing dependent upon their personal relationship with the PCC.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the chief constable participants. Participants were confident in their responses and the interviews were free flowing.

The pilot study enabled the author to test whether the area was likely to be fruitful in terms of adding to the body of knowledge in the domain of policing governance, as well as testing the methodological approach.

**Pilot Study Findings;**

The product of the interviews were analysed using a thematic content analysis of responses (Newell and Burnard, 2011, pp. 118-129) based upon themed question domains. The findings were grouped within thematic areas as follows;

1. **The expectations of the Chief Constables prior to the implementation of Police and Crime Commissioners.**

Four chief constables indicated skepticism, uncertainty, trepidation and opposition on their part in the advent of Police and Crime Commissioners. The remaining participant welcomed the prospect on the basis that it may remove a large degree of bureaucracy that was a feature of the Police Authority framework.

The group felt that there might be too much power vested in one individual, one commenting that there was no other public or private model of governance provided by one person.

Three respondents questioned what, in fact was the problem that needed to be solved. They felt that The Police Authority governance model of 17 members including elected representatives had effectively held them to account.

One respondent was concerned about the introduction of national and local politics into policing, which was seen as a deliberate intent of the government. However, they were not about confusion over operational independence because they were ‘up for the fight’ with the Commissioner if necessary.
2. What change has occurred since the implementation of Police and Crime Commissioners and what has been the impact on Policing delivery and on Chief Constables?

Three of the respondents confirmed that there had, as expected been a significant reduction in bureaucracy since the implementation of Police and Crime Commissioners, they also said that the Police and Crime Commissioner who had been elected in their Force area were ‘good’, ‘sensible’ and ‘a breath of fresh air’. The participant who had earlier expressed concern regarding the perception of a political agenda, and was ready for confrontation over the issue of operational independence, in the event found that the elected Police and Crime Commissioner was ‘a good person’ whose vision of policing to a great extent accorded with theirs. The remaining respondent was less positive, reporting that the Police and Crime Commissioner for that area was beginning to declare themselves on single issues, apparently seeking to turn them into causes célèbre. This respondent was beginning to sense that the motivation of the Police and Crime Commissioner was more about seeking publicity with a view to politics and re-election than public service.

In terms of the individual impact upon the chief constables, three of the respondents had positive experiences in that they did not perceive any change as far as their personal position was concerned. References were made to the importance of a good interpersonal relationship with the Police and Crime Commissioner. A respondent commented that the Police and Crime Commissioners making new chief officer appointments were probably appointing candidates who would deliver their vision.

There were significant concerns about the power of the Police and Crime Commissioner to ‘hire & fire’ chief constables with concerns that this would put pressure upon chief officers to comply with the agenda of the Police and Crime Commissioner even if that was at odds with their professional judgment. A respondent developed a further thread expressing concerns that the checks and balances present in the 17 member Police Authority had been removed. There was the potential for a
clash of personalities to detrimentally affect delivery. This was made worse by a lack of clarity as to what the checks and balances are around appointments, or disputes. Another participant echoed this theme, concluding that there was no accountability framework for the PCC and that a chief constable has no ability to challenge the PCC. The PCP were seen as having no power and the role of the Inspectorate (HMIC) was unclear.

Two participants saw the changes to the previous ‘tripartite structure’ as having reduced the influence of the chief constable, one commenting that the position of chief constable had moved from that of Chief Executive Officer of the Force to that of Chief Operating Officer.

A positive effect that one chief constable saw was that the PCC, due to their constitutional position could say things in the public domain that the Chief Constable may feel constrained in saying. The Chief may use this as a way of getting ‘greater traction’ on some issues.

3. The effect of the implementation of Police and Crime Commissioners upon the key relationships between the Chief Constable, partners, the public and the government.

In terms of partner organisations, none of the respondents saw any change, although two respondents reported some confusion on the part of partners as to what the role of the PCC was in this context. This appeared to be in spite of the fact that as two respondents highlighted, the PCC now holds very significant budgets for crime and anti social behaviour reduction activity.

In terms of the relationship with Government, four interviewees saw a retreat by central government from the new tripartite arrangement, as a deliberate intent of the Home Office, which is to be expected given the intention of the legislation (Home Office 2011). Only one saw a danger in this around chief constables being ‘out of the loop’ in terms of national developments and debate. In this regard, one participant
interestingly saw the retreat of the Home Office as part of an agenda to distance themselves from risk. In a time of austerity, they saw the Home Office pushing risk and responsibility down to the local level onto PCCs and chief constables. This respondent saw this as paradoxical in the light of government apparently taking a more centralist approach in respect of counter-terrorism and serious and organised crime.

4. **The importance of the relationship between the Chief Constable and the Police and Crime Commissioner in delivering policing.**

It was the unanimous view of all participants that the interpersonal relationship between the chief constable and the Police and Crime Commissioner was extremely important and critical in allowing effective policing delivery. Phrases such as ‘massively important’, ‘critical’ and ‘vital’ were used. One chief constable said that the relationship with their Police and Crime Commissioner was ‘good’, but that they recognised how difficult it would be if the relationship were not good.

5. **The positive and negative effects of the implementation of Police and Crime Commissioners.**

The overwhelmingly positive aspect of the introduction of PCCs was seen by chief constables in this cohort as a reduction in personal and organisational bureaucracy, previously a great deal of time and resources were expended responding to the demands of the Police Authority structure. They are now working to a single individual providing a more direct and rapid conduit for reporting and decision-making.

PCCs being able to address issues publicly and with government that the Chief could not, was also seen as a positive by one.

One participant saw the ability to develop a close relationship with the Police and Crime Commissioner as potentially an opportunity to offset risk. The participant indicated that they would seek to develop a close relationship with the Police and
Crime Commissioner putting them 'right in alongside me to understand every risk and threat… I want [the Police and Crime Commissioner] to understand the difficulties we face then [the Police and Crime Commissioner] will understand the difficulties we face because then [the Police and Crime Commissioner] understands tough professional decisions'.

Three participants did not see any negative aspects at the time of the interview, but the negatives raised by two interviewees were, the influence of politics, potential blurring of lines around operational independence and one had concerns about the extent to which the Police and Crime Commissioner held the Force to account.

6. The future of policing delivery and key issues going forward.

One chief constable made reference to the significance of the relationship between the Chief Constable and Police and Crime Commissioner, and how that might play out when there was a significant divergence of view. This theme was also raised by another who said that the first ‘critical incident’ (a significant operational policing incident with the ability to affect confidence in the policing response) would be likely to test that relationship.

The perception of the key issues for chief constables into the future of the governance arrangements centered around structural issues such as staffing models and budgets, and again interpersonal relationships between Police and Crime Commissioners and chief constables, in this context at times of conflict or crisis.

The Methodological Choice

The reviews of the literature in Chapters three and four, together with the personal interactions of the author articulated in Chapter one, and the findings of the pilot study described above enabled the construction of the research questions in this study that are;
Research Questions

What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across England and Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a strategic and operational level?

What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in terms of improving the effective delivery of policing and community safety?

What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the delivery of effective policing and community safety?

What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that may have the potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and community safety?

The review of the available research paradigms, methodology and research methods in the context of the philosophical stance of the author, described in this chapter enabled the author to identify the methodology appropriate to answering the research questions. This was to conduct semi-structured interviews with police chief constables and PCCs in a manner that maintained confidentiality of the individual participants so that they would be more likely to speak openly and any potential detrimental impact upon the individuals was eliminated.

The following chapters describe the conduct of the research, analysis of the data and the findings that arose.
How it Went - The conduct of the Research

The Arrangements

The author was a former chief police officer in England and Wales which meant that he personally knew a large proportion of chief constables, and a smaller number of the PCCs, particularly those who were former police officers. He was mindful of the possibility that a different approach to those participants that he knew as against those that he did not could introduce a skewed effect in terms of those who chose to take part in the study. The author had to accept, however that those who knew him (and were well disposed towards him) might be more likely to agree to participate than those who did not. In any event, he was keen to minimize that potential danger. In communications with potential participants, therefore no indication was given as to any familiarity with the prospective participant. Where the author was known to the chief constable, or to the PCC the letter and other communications remained in the formal format agreed within the ethical review. This maintained consistency, and so far as was possible avoided potentially skewed responses that a more informal approach could have produced, i.e. a cohort of the author’s ‘old chums’.

In addition, prior to making an approach to participants the author considered it important to inform the national bodies representing the two cohorts of the research. This was in order to make them aware of his intention to approach chief constables and PCCs as potential participants. The researcher made it clear that he was not seeking any permission, approval or validation by those organisations, but that it was
likely that some of the individuals who had been approached by him would contact their respective professional body querying the bona fide of the research. He therefore contacted by telephone and by email both the Association of Chief Police Officers for England and Wales (ACPO) (now defunct and succeeded in April 2015 by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC)) and the Association of PCCs (APCC). The former organisation responded positively, and without being asked the CEO of ACPO sent an email to all Chief Constables explaining the research project to them and indicating that as a body they supported the project. Indeed, as a result of that communication by ACPO, the author was encouraged by the fact that five chief constables contacted him offering to take part in the study. Unfortunately, in spite of follows up messages, the APCC did not respond to his message, which had been directed to a named individual within the APCC.

Personal contact was, made with the personal assistants, or equivalent of the potential participants. Given the author’s understanding of police and organisational culture, this was seen as a strategy that would maximise the potential for the letters to be put before the chief constable or PCC rather than being filtered out at an early stage by junior staff members. Second, in order to maintain confidentiality, given that personal assistants are familiar with managing confidential matters on behalf of their principals, they would be unlikely to disclose to others participation in this project by their principals. In this way, each of the 41 Chief Constables and the 41 PCCs across the Police Forces of England and Wales were sent by email copies of the Letter of Introduction, the Information Sheet and the Participant Consent Form (Appendix D & F) in the formats approved by the university research ethics committee.

As part of the arrangements to maintain the anonymity of the potential participants that were approached, and those who agreed to participate, their identities are not included
within this research. A schedule was prepared within an MS Excel format to manage the contact and arrangements with potential participants. That schedule is not reproduced here, but is available for review by academic supervisors and examiners as are copies of the correspondence sent and received. Within the schedule, in order to provide ease of reference within a confidential framework, individual participants were ascribed a random number, i.e. CC 5 (Chief Constable 5) or PCC 23 (Police and Crime Commissioner 23). It was important to ensure that the numbering was not sequential such that the knowledge of the number of one police force would not give an inference as to those before or after in the sequence. In addition the author had to ensure that the random number ascribed to a particular police force did not match their national police identifier number, (for the purposes of certain documents and computer input, Forces are assigned a numerical code number, for example the Hampshire Constabulary numerical identifier is ‘44’). It was important, therefore that the numbering could not be related to the force identifier. No force represented on the schedule and thereby no participant has their respective force identifier as their reference number for the purposes of this study.

Over time, responses were received to the direct requests sent via personal assistants or equivalents to all 82 potential participants. By June 2015, 27 chief constables had replied (66%) and 20 (48%) of PCCs had replied. Of those who responded, 17 chief constables (41% of the total available population) indicated that they were content to take part in the study. One chief constable later withdrew however, having decided to retire, and this reduced the research cohort of chief constables to 16 (39% of the total available population). 15 PCCs (36% of the total available population) indicated that they would be content to participate in the research.
Some of those that replied to the approach indicated that they did not wish to take part in the research, five PCCs (12% of the total available population) and 9 chief constables (21% of the total available population) declined to participate. The reasons given for not wishing to take part by PCCs were ‘too busy/ too many commitments’ in the case of four, whilst one provided no explanation at all.

In the case of the chief constables who declined to participate, three claimed that they were ‘too busy’. Four chief constables gave no reason at all. Of the remaining two, one indicated that they were not content to participate ‘for the reasons stated in your letter’. The author took this as a reference to the clauses in the letter of invitation to participate that referred to the rationale for confidentiality being the potential impact upon chief constables;

‘I recognise that some Chief Constables may be concerned about being involved in such a project, given the importance of the Chief Constable maintaining a positive working relationship with their PCC. There may be understandable concerns that comments made by them as part of the research may potentially impact upon that relationship.’ (Appendix B)

The PCC in the same Force as the above chief constable was one of those that did not respond to the request to participate.

The remaining chief constable, who declined to participate, was known personally to the author. That officer took the time to telephone the author to explain their rationale for declining to take part. The chief constable concerned, who consented to reporting their comments in this research, said that they were;
‘...just too worried about the consequences of (the PCC) finding out that I have spoken to you...I feel too vulnerable...’

(Personal conversation with the author. March 2015).

Significantly perhaps, the PCC for this Force did take part in the research.

The total number of police forces represented by either a chief constable or PCC participant was 25 (60% of the total number of Forces). In only four cases did both the chief constable and the PCC from the same police force participate in this study.

The researcher was satisfied with the response levels to his first contact. He began to set about making arrangements to conduct semi-structured interviews with the participants. Those interviews were completed by the end of July 2015. The researcher decided that following the end of the tranche of interviews he would contact again those chief constables and PCCs who had either not responded or who had declined the first invitations to participate. The reason for this was that given the passage of time and the fact that 31 interviews had been conducted and confidentiality had been maintained, those who had initially declined to participate might have taken a different view. Also, given the career churn of chief constables newly appointed chief constables might have felt able to participate in circumstances where their predecessors refused to do so. A second tranche of requests was therefore sent to potential participants, in the manner described above including 13 Chief Constables and 19 PCCs who had either failed to respond or declined to be interviewed in the first tranche. Unfortunately, none of those approached for a second time agreed to join the participant cohort.
Arrangements for the semi-structured interviews were made with the participants or their representatives to meet at locations of their choice. The author, based upon his experience of interviewing individuals acquired during his police investigative career had decided that it was important to ensure that the interviews were face to face. This decision was supported in the literature on research interviewing, in particular by Szolnoki and Hoffmann (2013). In their review of survey methodologies, they found that face to face surveys delivered the most representative results when compared with telephone, paper or online surveys.

In each case a private room was secured for the interview so as to maintain confidentiality, and, the author hoped give the participant confidence to speak openly. In the majority of cases the location of the interview was in the offices of the participant. The author took care not to disclose the purpose of his visit to anyone apart from the personal assistant or equivalent with whom he had made the arrangements to meet the participant.

The location of the interviews were, given the geographical range of the force locations of the participants spread across England and Wales, it was often necessary for the author to travel very significant distances over several days, involving considerable financial cost in terms of travelling and accommodation expenses. In addition, the exercise was physically demanding, with often very early starting times in order to meet a participant at the time of his/ her choosing.

The author after some time was tempted to revert to conducting the remaining interviews by telephone or Skype/ Facetime. He was, however reinforced in his commitment to face-to-face interviews by the experience of interviews with two
participants, one chief constable and one PCC who had both indicated that they would only consent to a telephone interview. These interviews were far less flowing or rich in detail. In face-to-face interviews, it was possible for the author to use pauses to allow participants to expand on comments and concepts and explore a more conversational approach. This was not the case in the telephone interviews that were more stilted, requiring more reference to the semi-structured interview schedule. Rubin and Rubin (2005 p.2) speak of the interviewer talking and listening intently to the participant thus obtaining rich information. The telephone interview did not allow the author to have a conversation with the participant in the same way that he could in a face-to-face situation.

The telephone interviews were also significantly shorter (an average of 40 minutes compared to an average of 65 minutes in face-to-face interviews), which might suggest that less information was forthcoming. In spite, of the logistical issues connected with face-to-face interviews, the author determined to continue to pursue that strategy wherever possible in order to maximize the richness of the resultant data in accordance with the advice of Szolnoki and Hoffmann (2103).

A semi-structured interview schedule was developed by the author a process requiring a number of iterations. The questions were based upon the issues that arose from the literature, the pilot study and informal conversations that the author had engaged in with chief police officers, PCCs and academic contacts prior to embarking on this study. In this way initial themes were identified which required further probing in a more controlled environment. Importantly the schedule needed to focus the interview upon the research questions, while allowing the participant to answer freely within the topic being covered. In particular, the author was careful to avoid closed questions, which invite binary yes/no response. An example of potential bias in such
circumstances is described by Noakes and Wincup (2004). They found that where they asked open questions of residents in an area what crime categories were a problem in their area, the responses differed when asked if a particular crime was a problem or not. (ibid, p.77). Care was, therefore necessary in the construction the question schedule, in doing so the author referred to a number of texts on the subject. (Kvale, 1998, Briggs, 1995, Silverman, 1995, Robson, 2003, Noakes and Wincup 2004). The semi-structured interview schedules used in this study are attached at (Appendix G). The interview schedules differ slightly between chief constable and PCC participants, given their differing roles and responsibilities.

The Interviews

In total 31 semi-structured interviews were carried out, 29 face-to-face and 2 by telephone. Suchman and Jordan, (1992) in a study of semi-structured interviews, saw the interview as an interactive event between the researcher and participant, the difference between a conversation and an interview being the interpersonal dynamic in terms of who decides the topics discussed. This built upon the work of Cohen and Manion (1989) who defined the interview as an event;

‘…initiated by the interviewer for the specific purpose of obtaining research relevant information and focused by him on content specified by research objectives of systematic description, prediction or explanation…’(ibid p.307)

and upon that of Robson (2003) who saw the interview as;

‘…a conversation with a purpose.’ (ibid p.228)

In particular, Fielding and Thomas (2008) highlight that crucially, the semi-structured interview in particular involves having clear questions, asked within construct that allows the researcher to probe and adapt to the dynamic of the interview.
In terms of approaching the interviews as an event, the author primarily considered the generic issues associated with effective interviewing within the literature as well as the author’s reflection on his position as a researcher who had a strong connection to the subject under review and in some cases an association and acquaintance with the subjects. The author felt relatively confident in the techniques of conducting a semi-structured interview. Having spent a career in investigation and the leadership of investigations, and having had a lead role in ethical investigative interviewing development for the police service nationally, he felt comfortable in structuring the interview event and the phased approach to developing the interview conversation within the model adopted by the police in England and Wales (College of Policing, 2015).

It was important, however for him to review the requirements and guidance that was available for interviews within a research context. He therefore examined the literature in respect of the use of semi structured interviewing in a social research context (Hagan, 2010, Robson, 2003, Miller and Crabtree, 1999, DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006, Ruben and Ruben, 2005, Melia, 2000 Atkinson and Coffey, 2003). The advice given in those publications was strikingly similar to that adopted in the established police investigative interviewing process, including the establishment of rapport, putting the participant at ease, use of open questions, probing areas of interest and considerations as to closing the interview.

In terms of the potential impact of the author as the interviewer upon the participant and the interview process itself, Holstein and Gubrium (2003) highlighted the dangers of the ‘active interviewer‘ failing to be aware of his/ her contribution to the data produced by the interview. Kvale, (1996), emphasized the importance for the researcher to approach the interview as a professional conversation that needed to be
managed effectively so as to elicit the maximum data recognising the context and the potential influences of the researcher, whether inadvertent or not. In addition, the author considered the impact of his own experiences and views having been a police officer for almost 32 years and latterly a chief officer, he realised the potential impact of his approach, if unconsidered to detrimentally affect the interview and thereby the quality of the data.

In Chapter one of this study, issues of reflection and reflexivity were discussed, in the context of the overall research study, in particular the importance for the author to recognise the potential for his pre-formed schema and biases to impact upon the construction of the research project, its conduct and the analysis of the data. It was particularly important for the author to carefully reflect on his position within the interactive arena of the interview, and to ensure that so far as was possible he did not knowingly, or inadvertently influence the interview with his own views. In this regard, the author, given his psychological training (a Masters degree in psychology) was mindful of the potential impact of heuristics and cognitive biases in the conduct of the interviews and the later analysis summarised in the work of Gilovich et al. (2003). The interview schedule was, therefore critical in ensuring that the author focused upon questioning that linked directly with the research questions and was not skewed by pre-formed cognitive schema.

The author took care to use the interview schedule as a guide to enable him to ensure that, so far as was possible all the areas relevant to the research questions were covered during the interview conversation rather than as a restrictive template. In this way, he was able to probe and pursue issues raised by the participants in their answers to the open-ended questions whilst remaining aware of the potential impact of his presence and style of questioning.
In addition, prior to the interviews taking place, the author researched the background and views of the participant using open sources. This he anticipated would facilitate the interviews, ensuring that he was able to understand the local or individual context of the responses given.

**The Interview Events**

Prior to commencing each interview, the author carefully went through the information sheet and the consent form with the participant. The documents had already been provided with the initial request to the participant by email as part of the initial request for participation. (Appendices B, C & D). The majority of the consent forms were signed in the presence of the author at the commencement of the interview; the remainder had been pre-signed by the participant (this was particularly the case for those who had elected to conduct a telephone interview). In the latter cases, the author ensured that he discussed the content of the consent form with the participant who had pre-signed the consent form. His objective was to ensure that informed consent was obtained for the interview to take place in the circumstances described within the form. Emphasis was placed upon consent to digitally record the interview, and that verbatim quotes would not be used in any report without the consent of the participant. In all cases full consent was forthcoming. The signed consent forms are available for inspection by academic supervisors and examiners.

All participants were content to be recorded using an application to the author’s iPad tablet computer. This method of recording allowed the author to secure the responses in a reliable, secure format within a password-protected device. Upon return to base, the author made backup copies of the recordings on a password protected desktop.
computer. It is possible to identify the participant by reference to his/ her reference number assigned in this project which can be compared with the securely stored participant schedule. The audio files are available for review by academic supervisors and examiners.

The participants were confident in their responses and the interviews were free flowing. The interviews were scheduled for one hour, in the event they lasted between 38 and 97 minutes, with an average for face-to-face interviews of 65 minutes. The duration of the shorter interviews seemed more a function of the character and brevity of expression of the participant generally rather than any reluctance or hesitation on the parts of those providing the shorter interviews.

The author tried hard to make the interview with participants a conversational event, mindful that this was most likely to produce the desired rich data (Hagan, 2010, Robson, 2003, Miller and Crabtree, 1999, DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006, Ruben and Ruben, 2005, Melia, 2000, Atkinson and Coffey, 2003).

In the case of the chief constables, all the discussions were conversational in tone with the participant often speaking widely on the subject, questions from the author acting as prompts. Many of the PCCs also took this approach, however some took a more didactic stance, requiring the author to use more questioning than with the more expressive participants. On reflection, it may be that the chief constable participants felt more comfortable having a conversation with the author who was known personally to them, or was known to be a former chief officer.
In the early interviews, the author noticed that on the occasions that he began to make a note during the interview, the participant often slowed down or stopped speaking, and looked at the note pad, presumably to see what was being noted and/or to give him time to finish the note. This broke the flow of the conversation. In the remainder of interviews the author elected not to make notes during the interview, but to make notes from memory immediately following the interview. Similarly, in the early interviews, the author needed to refer to the question schedule to remain on track, however after a few occasions he was able to remember the areas to be covered, and this enabled the interview to be more conversational, thereby more comfortable for the participant which it was hoped would elicit richer data.

A key issue that arose during the series of interviews was an order effect, in that there were issues raised by the first participants that had not been included specifically in the interview schedule, following each interview, the author reflected upon the experience and how the conversation had developed as well as the data elicited. Utilising the principles of the ‘responsive interviewing model’ (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.36) and with reference to the Grounded Theory model (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Bryman and Bell, 2003, Corbin and Straus, 2008), the author adapted the later interviews to include the additional issues, pursuing their significance with subsequent participants.

In summary, the participant cohort represented a significant proportion of the chief constables (39%) and PCCs (36%) across England and Wales. All participants were supportive and gave full responses to the questions asked, with many discussing further issues that contributed to a greater understanding of the issues related to the research questions.
**Analysis Commentary**

Miles (1979) argued that the analysis of qualitative data was the most demanding aspect of the research process within that methodological paradigm, and for the author, Basit (2003) effectively sums up the challenges and opportunities in the analysis phase of qualitative research, such as that conducted in this study;

> ‘Data analysis is the most difficult and crucial aspect of qualitative research. Coding is one of the significant steps taken during analysis to organise and make sense of the contextual data. This is usually seen as arduous. It is not fundamentally a mechanical or technical exercise. It is a dynamic, intuitive and creative process of inductive reasoning, thinking and theorising’ (ibid p.143).

This approach is at the core of the interpretive approach taken by the author in this study where the object of analysing qualitative data is to determine the categories, relationships and assumptions that inform the interviewee’s view of the subject of the research. McCracken (1988). Significantly, Basit (2003) identifies that;

> ‘Qualitative data analysis is not a discrete procedure carried out at the final stages of research. It is, indeed, an all-encompassing activity that continues throughout the life of the project’. (ibid p.145).

This phenomenon described by Basit describes exactly how the findings evolved for the author, after each interview during his reflection upon the conversation, themes began to arise based upon the frequency of the apparent saliency of the comments made by the subject in the context of both the literature he had reviewed and other interviews carried out previously. He recognised that these early impressions may be
the subject of bias due to pre existing cognitive schema discussed previously in this thesis. However, this informal categorisation was the beginning of the analytical process that was to follow within more formal parameters.

The material was subjected to content analysis, which is a structured analytical method used to interpret meaning from the content of textual data (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). A phrase widely used in the field of qualitative content analysis is that of ‘coding’. Saldana (2016) in his coding manual he describes a ‘code’ as a researcher generated construct that symbolises or describes the data (Ibid p.4). In order to draw out the themes within the interview data that may serve to address the research questions, it was necessary for the author to apply a structured categorisation of the material, coding provided an effective means of doing so in a manner that attributed meaning to the data (ibid p.292).

A great deal of consideration was given to the mechanics of the process by which the coding was carried out, and the author in particular looked closely at the NViVO computer aided content analysis and coding system (Robson, 2003). This automated solution seemed at the outset to offer a more effective and potentially more time efficient process. In order to assess the efficacy of NViVO, the author engaged in two University of Portsmouth graduate development courses, examining in detail the applicability of the technology to his research analysis requirements. In the event, the technology did not appear to the author to offer any significant advantages, and indeed, in his view it threatened to potentially become a distraction in terms of the author working for the technology rather than it enabling him to draw greater understanding from it. Therefore, following discussions with his first supervisor, the author decided to conduct the content analysis and coding manually. In the event, the
author found that this approach kept him more connected to the data and in retrospect, he is of the view that it was the right decision.

The author therefore began the laborious, but rewarding task of immersing himself in the interview recordings, systematically identifying the material that appeared to answer the research questions, or indeed given that this was a relatively new area of research, and the strategy was to some extent a ‘grounded approach’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967) in that there was the potential for the identification of new issues within the policing governance construct.

The author was mindful during the coding process of the risks to critical thinking in drawing out themes from the data that may emanate from cognitive biases and heuristics described by Gilovich et al. (2003). He worked hard to ensure that the coding judgement were based upon the interview product, linked to the extant literature.

The author reviewed the material in detail over several iterations, coding the data, as either single category descriptors or as longer explanatory passages. Given that the author had, for the reasons described in the ethical review process assured the participants of complete confidentiality, it was not appropriate to reproduce in this thesis verbatim quotes from participants and therefore the coding narratives in the resultant spread sheet are paraphrased records as close to a quote as possible rather than verbatim references.
Summary

In this chapter, the author has described the approach to the research and how the planned method operated in practice. The process was extremely challenging in terms of logistics and the sheer geography involved, requiring considerable journeys across England and Wales in order to meet and interview the participants, this was necessary, given that their status and position meant that there was no chance of them travelling to meet the researcher. Some thought was given to meeting a number of chief constables at ACPO/ NPCC gatherings or APCC meetings when a large number of potential participants would be together in one place. The author discounted this since it had the potential to compromise the confidentiality of the research that had been assured. In the event, the approach appeared to be correct, given the difference found by the researcher when he was required to conduct telephone interviews that yielded significantly less data.

Chapter six will discuss the findings of this research.
Chapter Six.

Findings

Pilot Study Findings

A pilot study was conducted to explore early emerging issues as a result of the change in policing governance, and to test the methodological approach. The pilot study was conducted in April 2013, a relatively short time after the PCCs had taken up their posts in November 2012. The study took a qualitative approach and consisted of semi-structured interviews (Noakes and Wincup 2004, Pogrebin, 2003) with chief constables. It sought to answer the relatively simple research question posed at that time;

‘Has there been any effect on policing delivery since the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners on 22 November 2012?’

The product of the interviews was analysed using a thematic content analysis of responses (Newell and Burnard, 2011, pp. 118-129). The findings were identified within the thematic areas and were explored within those contexts, and are discussed in Chapter 4 ante. In summary, they were, the expectations of the chief constables prior to the implementation of PCCs, changes that have occurred since the implementation of PCCs, the impact on Policing delivery and on chief constables. In addition to the effect of the implementation of PCCs upon the key relationships between the chief constable, partners, the public and the government together with the importance of the relationship between the chief constable and the PCC in delivering policing and the positive or negative effects of the implementation of PCCs. Finally, the future of policing delivery and key issues going forward.
Main Research Findings

The Research Questions

Building upon a review of the available literature, and the learning provided by the pilot study, the following research questions for this study were developed;

What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across England and Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a strategic and operational level?

What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in terms of improving the effective delivery of policing and community safety?

What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the delivery of effective policing and community safety?

What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that may have the potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and community safety?

The research questions guided the analysis of the data. The findings are reported below.

The Findings – Commentary

Thirteen key governance themes were evident in the interviews of both chief constables and PCCs. This section will explore those key governance themes in a manner that examines in detail the issues that individuals and cohorts found were salient and made comment upon during the interviews. Within each theme there is a discussion of the issues with examples of responses by participants that support the finding. The full collection of participants responses under each theme is attached in
Appendices J & K. The key findings are drawn together at the conclusion of the
narrative in respect of each theme.

**Positive Views of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure**

Chief constables and PCCs saw positive aspects in the new governance paradigm.
The principal positive impact seen by chief constables was the improved speed of
decision-making facilitated by the fact that they now only had to interact with a single,
full time office holder rather than a part time 17-member committee. This reflected
similar findings reported by Caless and Owens (2016), and the predictions of HMIC as
to an expected improved speed of strategic decision-making (HMIC 2010 p. 13);

CC

‘Flash to bang time is quicker... There’s definitely innovation around the country... that
probably wouldn’t be set up under a Police Authority’.

CC

‘With a Police Authority with 17 people you were constantly being lobbied, engaged in
corveration, about local issues...I would go to (PA) meetings trying to focus on the
corporate ... Inevitably there were conversations raised around local issues. The things
that local people are speaking to the PCC about are the same that they were at the
Police Authority. In some ways that’s a good thing because you only have to have that
corveration once. The plethora of meetings and committees we had under the Police
Authority have been swept away’.

CC

Bureaucracy has been massively reduced, typically with the Police Authority we would
complete over 200 reports a year on anything they took a fancy to or were enquiring
about. If we wanted to bring about change in the force particularly if it cost money,
and it was something we felt needed Police Authority approval, then typically we would submit a report, it would get in front of a committee within 3 months we’d be asked for another one and another one, and it would go on until eventually the answer would be no. With the PCC all of that bureaucracy has been removed I can either address issues in my one to one with [the PCC], in informal meetings in special meetings or have a conversation and [the PCC] will make a decision quickly.’

One chief constable saw consistency as a significant improvement;

CC

‘I’ve got one person to deal with, I get consistency of view from that person.’

Another chief constable saw improved community representation as an important positive aspect of the new structure.

CC.

‘I felt that the link between police and the community was essential. Separate to the police a route that communities and partners can engage with policing. I’m not sure there’s an ideal way of that being delivered. I think the system was appropriate for change.’

However, amongst the positive views, chief constables expressed concerns that along with more rapid decision-making, there may have been brought with it a reduction in the moderation effect of the police authority committee structure;

CC

‘There is a challenge because with one person you have one view, but it is better than the Police Authority’.
CC

‘The Police Authority was very formulaic, very committee focused ...it was slow and laborious lots of scrutiny but it was a kind of chess match. This can be far more dynamic because there are two individuals, if those individuals agree it tends to happen. But then there’s the question who is constraining those individuals to make sure they make the right decision?’

Among PCCs, surprisingly perhaps there were some who questioned the perceived defects in the police authority structure that in part led to the introduction of the changed governance framework, though now that they were PCCs they saw benefits;

PCC

‘I did not see the Police Authority system needed fixing saw it as a move by government to blame PCCs for the failures that were inevitably going to result from cutbacks. Although I was an opponent, it is a better system’.

Other PCCs echoed the assertions made by the 2010 coalition government in the lead up to the changes in governance and the findings of Loveday & Reid (2003) in respect of the failings of police authorities;

PCC

‘They [Police Authorities] did a competent job but I saw nothing at all that convinced me that they were properly holding the chief constables to account on behalf of the public. Police Authorities were cowed by the sight of someone in braid. However on the technical side they were quite effective I don’t think they were a waste of time but they were invisible.’
PCC

‘Police Authorities did not do the job they were paid to do. The relationship between Police Authority and Chief Constables was one with too much familiarity. Police forces had more money than they needed and were not used to being held to account’.

In terms of the positive aspects of the introduction of PCCs, again the PCC participants echoed the views of chief constables in terms of the reduction of bureaucracy and improvements in decision-making;

PCC

‘If we decide to move in a certain direction we can do it much quicker than the old system’.

PCC

‘On the whole its fairly satisfactory, a huge improvement on Police Authorities, for example in speed of decision making. We get things done its a proactive system rather than a reactive system as Police Authorities’.

PCC

‘...decisions can be made very quickly, not hastily, but the decision making process which helps the force, helps the Chief Constable they need to know where they stand on funding and a million and one other things. I can say yes to the Chief Constable, and nobody can gain say me, I can say you will have this, this is the amount of money you will have...its not just a steer, making a decision is another, I can give the Chief Constable certainty I don’t have to ask anybody else’.
PCCs mentioned the positive aspects of improved accountability more than was the case with chief constables;

_PCC_

‘...they [the public] get a direct line of accountability that they’ve never had before. With Police Authorities they were never elected to represent the authority’.

_PCC_

‘The core principle of democratically accountable policing I supported. Having taken it on I really think it’s a good idea. The public identify Chief Constables who have failed but for each of those there was a Police Authority that allowed them to fail. There has been inadequate policing governance in the past and the principle of making that governance sharper, open, transparent, locally democratically accountable is a really good principle’.

One PCC also saw some improvement in accountability more widely across the governance framework;

_PCC_

‘It would be very hard for me in this role to operate in a secret perverted way or be corrupt, I think there’s more likelihood of that in a Police Authority type setting where you’ve got part time members who are occasional visitors ...I think when you’ve got a full time person in that role they [others] are far better informed far more aware of what’s going on’.

Both chief constables and PCCs in this sample saw the principal positive aspects of the introduction of the new governance structure to be a reduction in bureaucracy leading to improved, quicker decision making at the strategic governance level. In addition to improved police accountability and enhanced community representation.
These findings confirm those identified in the pilot study. They provide an overall positive backdrop to the new governance framework, apparently achieving, in the view of these participants the express aims of the coalition government of 2010 (Cameron, 2009).

It is, however important to note that, in particular the chief constable participant cohort did not include participants who had not responded to a request to participate or who had declined to take part. Given the tone of the responses from chief constables who declined to participate, strong negative feelings existed that may not be represented in this sample. This was exemplified in the chief constables who in Chapter five reported feeling too vulnerable in terms of their relationship with their PCC to participate.

Negative Views of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure

Given that PCCs had put themselves forward to be elected to the new governance role, it is perhaps not surprising that as a cohort they had fewer negative views of the governance structure. The concerns were around the accountability framework for PCCs themselves and suggest a lack of confidence in the efficacy of PCPs to perform that moderation role;

\[
\text{PCC}
\]

‘...not strong enough checks and balances on the PCC not to do things that are disruptive.’

Chief constables saw more potential dangers, notably in respect of the same accountability of a single elected individual issue that was identified by PCCs;
CC

‘Too much power vested in one person I’ve seen the good and bad of that. The trouble is you are just too dependent upon the intellect, the politics the personal characteristics of the individual that gets the job.’

CC

‘Fundamentally I disagreed with it. On the basis that it all becomes an individual … It’s a big role in the hands of one person. The bits that are positive; it gives a human face where people know they can contact somebody where Police Authorities were anonymous…I don’t think its right for one to have such an influence over something as important as policing.’

A number of chief constables saw potential danger in what they saw as too much power vested in one person in the new structure. In the event, however they found that this did not manifest in their experience with their PCC, again perhaps an indicator that this cohort had a degree of self selection based upon chief constables who had a relatively benign relationship with their PCC.

CC

‘I don’t agree with it, its too much power in one person and its too personality driven [however] My own PCC has been breath of fresh air…Its too much power in one pair of hands if they choose not to use it properly or proportionately or fairly or listen… The power in the hands of one person if they use it appropriately can be enormously helpful, as it is here but it is too dependent on one personality…[The Police Authority was] Bureaucratic, self serving, corrupt and ineffective’.

Others expressed concerns about the level of political influence inherent in the structure both party political and as an element of the structure itself;
‘I think the model of governance is fundamentally flawed on a whole series of levels. One thing that was talked about was the introduction of politics into policing and I think that has manifested itself, not so much as party politics, but the mechanics and the day to day focus of somebody who is elected and therefore is a politician, in an organisation to influence views and deliverables which I as a police professional don’t always agree with. Whilst there is a Policing Protocol that talks about 43 Chief Constables independent operational Chief Constables and the PCC not fettering the ability of the Chief Constable to deliver their business. The reality is that it’s not anything like as black and white as that gets presented. Because at the end of anything you might want to do there is money and/or reputation.’

One chief constable saw potential dangers in the new governance structure allowing a return to the issues that had led to the formation of the 1962 Royal Commission and the enactment of the Police Act 1964 (Home office 1964) that set up police authorities as an improved governance system;

‘... so my sense is that we should have strong democratic governance. albeit, I thought the Police Authorities were entirely serviceable certainly better than the watch committees which thru various iterations they replaced. When you look back at what was happening in Notts. & South Wales in the 50’s and early 60’s ... I wouldn’t want to go back to those bad old days. There is a sense in some of my colleagues that that is what is the case.’

It appears therefore, that the concerns raised in the advent of the legislation to introduce PCCs as regards the potential for erratic behaviour and for political bias (Orde, 2012, Chakrabarti, 2011) and more recently (Davies 2014, Joyce, 2016), is
supported by chief constables in this cohort, in both respects and by PCCs to some extent in the case of erratic behaviour.

The key findings in terms of the negative views of the PCC governance structure were, therefore according to this cohort are; a lack of accountability of individual PCCs and the potential for inappropriate political and party political influence upon policing.

**Perceived Dangers of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure.**

Chief constables and PCCs expressed significantly more positive views of the new governance structure than they did negative views. When the interview turned to issues that they saw as potential dangers in the structure, chief constables focussed upon personal and interpersonal issues;

*CC*

‘Delivering policing services and delivering a business based upon the relationship between two people which is absolutely critical is flawed. It doesn’t work to the benefit of the public, and as we go into austerity, having to think about what do the public really need from a professional police service as opposed to what does the PCC want to do because its popular with the public then we are likely to get into some difficult territory.’

*CC*

‘The trouble with the system is that it is a very personal system its designed to be very personal...so you make an assumption that you set up arrangements for how the working relationship should work.... there’s a great deal of instability in it all...its possible you may have to undo all the arrangements {when a new PCC arrives}....the
arrangements between the two corporations sole are only as good as the agreement of the current PCC… it seems to me that because its based upon the individual its inherently unstable.’

CC

‘…what you’ve got with a PCC is a personality who has been put into a role with no prior qualifications no prior experience…and then in effect (though CHMI) would disagree with this, but has in effect unfettered power within an organisation. It really is dependent upon the Chief Constable setting the ground rules, developing the relationship, working out where the line is.’

Some chief constables also raised issues of competence in PCCs;

CC

‘I think the PCC finds policing quite complex, the reality is that if you applied a pure resources to risk basis, I’d be pulling a lot of resources out of the rural areas and putting them into XX & XX (urban areas) but that is politically difficult, not only from the PCCs perspective but also from the community engagement aspect for me.

CC

‘[PCC] misses the point its more powerful for me to have someone to say I’ve challenged the CC and I’m satisfied rather than were doing this and that. The public do not get the scrutiny they deserve.’
A further danger was seen in the behaviour of some PCCs that alluded to the potential danger for PCCs to behave in an extreme manner in a way that may give the chief constable cause for concern regarding their personal professional position;

CC

‘If you are one of those CCs with a PCC at either end of that curve of normality, particularly if you’ve got the more aggressive bombastic, throwing their weight around type of PCC, its incredibly stressful because its a one on one relationship...it does make a difference as to how stressful your life is massively .... You’ve got *** (referring to a Chief Constable who went sick allegedly due to stress) who’s gone off how open people will be I don’t know but that’s all PCC driven. I never got there because I got my head around it... But that’s ok for me to say who's kids have left school ... But if you’re (referred to another Chief Constable with younger family who had gone sick allegedly due to stress) ... In a more vulnerable position with younger kids and you saw what happened to ** (referring to the CC in question). Its all very easy for me to say get your head around it, perhaps my particular situation meant it was easier for me to get my head round it, if I'd been just over 25yrs, kids 10 & 11 ...different ball game.’

CC

‘I feel sometimes they have recreated the silverbacks of policing but called them something different. So some of the worst excesses of some of the CCs who thought they were running their own fiefdoms it does create the environment for that to happen because who’s going to stop them’.
There was some evidence that the personal interests of PCCs affected their span of interest either personally or politically;

CC

‘PCC must be briefed re things happening in the area he lives’.

CC

‘...in practice as its worked out for me its been a pretty positive experience. But I think that’s a bit of a lottery. I’m not sure there’s enough regulation around a PCC who might want to be making operational decisions, when they are paying my salary and responsible for sacking me or not...I’ve seen it with neighboring forces where their relationship is just not the same as ours. But I really think if you’ve got those three criteria right (boundaries, equity & trust) it works...clearly, there are some [PCCs] that are politically motivated - party political. ...There are Chief Constables around the country who have no relationship with their PCCs ...you have also got some PCCs around the country who have come into office and think they have to have all the ideas about changing the service and forget we’ve done this for 150 yrs., and are not dull people.

Another issue for chief constables was a perceived lack of resilience in the governance structure due to authority being vested in one individual, echoing similar concerns raised by participants in the Caless and Owen (2016) study which identified PCCs working under significant workload pressure;

CC

[Re PCC being unavailable] ‘It showed the fragility of the system, the resilience was non existent there is no statutory position for the deputy, so that at the point [PCC
became unavailable] we had no governance for a period. The panel, which is one of the elements in the new governance arrangements that has just not functioned. The panel had responsibilities but didn’t appreciate their significance, couldn’t act quickly. We had all sorts of fun and games with the Home Office, trying to work out what the rules were.’

CC

[Chief Constable described the situation when PCC was unavailable long term]. ‘...This meant that policing would be affected - the CFO was identified as the person who would sign matters off in the absence of any guidance. He avoided taking decisions that an elected PCC would, so was seen as there to only enable the police to conduct business, and not to determine long term strategy.’

Some PCCs agreed with chief constables regarding the dangers presented by the personal and interpersonal skills and traits of some PCCs and the need for moderation;

PCC

‘There must be a system that prevents mad people being PCCs.’

PCC

‘If you have a maverick what do you do? PCCs should have same power of recall as MPs.’

Other PCCs however recognised the danger but felt that it was mitigated;

PCC

‘The PCC has a lot of responsibility but not much exercisable power There is a risk from maverick PCCs, but they would be recognised and weeded out the big risk is from mediocre PCCs who might coast along not take decisions etc’.
PCC

‘It’s a hugely powerful role (PCC)...I don’t think it places too much power in the hands of one person I’m an Individual, I’m a PCC, I’m a Corporation Sole, and I’m a Local Authority all rolled into one nobody has ever had that before - never. I don’t think its too much power and the government are going to give us even more power.’

PCCs also saw the personal resilience of PCCs as a potential risk in the governance structure;

PCC

‘It’s unproven whether the model is sustainable by investing it in one person particularly when we are doing it with meager resources Its about resourcing and personal resilience.’

PCC

‘[Personal resilience is an issue] The age profile of PCCs is quite high. The statistical chance of someone dropping dead in the next 4 years is very high. At the moment two are seriously ill and one has died.’

The key findings in terms of the perceived dangers presented by the governance structure are therefore; the potential for the PCC to have too much power vested in an individual. There was a risk of inappropriate behaviour by PCCs. In addition there was a perceived lack of scrutiny and/or moderation of PCCs, both of which echoed the earlier findings of the Committee for Standards in Public Life (2015). A lack of personal resilience in PCCs was seen as potentially leading to strategic vulnerability. Inappropriate political influence in policing as a consequence of the structure was also seen as a risk. Finally, there were concerns regarding the operational independence of Chief Constables.
The preceding thematic categories described above are somewhat general in terms of perceptions of chief constables in respect of positive and negative impressions of the impact of the implementation of the new governance structure. The thematic categories that follow are more focussed upon particular aspects of governance and its impact upon the police and the delivery of policing.

**Police & Crime Commissioner Election/ Legitimacy Issues**

Immediately following the elections of the first PCCs in November 2012 there was significant public and academic debate regarding the level of voter turnout and the consequent issues for the democratic legitimacy of PCCs (Electoral Commission, 2013). These issues were discussed in Chapter three of this thesis. Much of the argument against the police authority model was predicated upon the perceived democratic deficit in the governance structure put in place by the Police Act 1964 (Home Office 1964) (Herbert, 2011). This theme reports upon the views of the participant cohorts in this regard.

PCCs recognised the issue of poor voter turnout as a fact, but did not see it as affecting their democratic mandate;

*PCC*

‘There is a single elected person and it doesn’t matter if it was 16.38% or 60%.’

*PCC*

‘...they [the public] get a direct line of accountability that they’ve never had before.

*With Police Authorities they were never elected to represent the authority*.‘
Chief constables did question the process in terms of legitimacy, one commenting that;

CC

‘You’ve really got to question the democratic process where a person has been elected by 14% of the electorate is now responsible for such a big budget with big responsibilities...’

It was apparent that in spite of the media and academics seeing the poor electoral turnout as significant, for chief constables and PCCs in these cohorts it was not an issue of concern. Their view seemed to be that the democratic process had been followed and those that had been elected represented the whole community within the relevant policing area. Both cohorts did, however feel that improved electoral turnouts would improve the perception of the legitimacy of PCCs. The issue of political legitimacy feeds directly into that of public engagement that is discussed below.

Public Engagement

Public engagement is fundamental to delivering effective policing to communities (Millen and Stephens, 2011) and was a key thrust of the 2010 Coalition government in driving the PCC agenda (Home Office, 2010) that led to the Policing, Crime and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office, 2011).

The responses from both cohorts in this research indicated that overall the implementation of PCCs has been seen as positive in terms of engagement with communities;

PCC

‘94% didn’t know a Police Authority existed... at least 70-% of people know they have a PCC.’
PCC

‘...the frustration from the public early on was a) there was no point complaining because nobody listened and b) if you did complain it put you at a disadvantage ... A sense of there’s no way into this organisation, no way to challenge it. The very fact of there being someone who is not the police but has some authority over them, that in itself is a reassurance’.

Some PCCs mentioned the importance of the media in terms of positive and negative community perceptions of their role;

PCC

‘It is difficult to engage with the public across a large force. The size of my area is such that I needed a part time one driver/staff officer. I was accused of having a chauffer, I was hammered by the BBC. MPs and Local Councilors can claim expenses to go to their place of work PCCs cant. It could put people off doing the job, particularly rural ones’.

PCC

‘Various editorials were very aggressive, for example the Times reported that 24 PCCs were under investigation, when many of those matters related to things years before PCCs were created. I think the press have now woken up to PCCs being quite a good thing’.

Chief constables supported the PCC cohort in this regard;

CC

‘I am a fan of his Police & Crime Plan...he crafted a plan that was framed around some priorities that would be meaningful to the public. The public are better engaged into policing due to [the PCC].’
‘They [PCCs] are more out there in the media and sometimes they can add to the public debate in a way that it would be inappropriate for me to do...He will get engaged in political conversations and can say what he wants’.

‘They are incredibly hard working they try to meet as many people as they can my only criticism is that sometimes its not coordinated. ... I cannot fault their commitment and public spiritedness.’

The chief constable cohort did, however point to persistent public confusion and to an extent disinterest in the new policing governance structure;

‘...the public still recognise the head of the police service as being the Chief Constable rather than the PCC. There are some PCCs who would say they are the boss. and that has undoubtedly caused some real problems’.

‘The public are confused, they don’t understand that the PCC is separate to the police and the PCC is there to hold me to account The public and the media sometimes believe that the PCC runs the operational side of the organisation, and it is not uncommon to see headlines where they talk about the police chief when they talk about the PCC. So I do think there is utter confusion. There is a need for marketing to explain the role of PCC’.

In this sample, both chief constables and PCCs held views that were consistent with Loveday (2017) in that they both saw the potential for and the practical positive impact
of the introduction of PCCs on public engagement and public understanding of policing. There is, however much more work to be done, in particular a need for the role of the PCC in representing the public to be more widely understood across communities. This view is supported by the work of Wells (2015) who expressed concern regarding the ineffective ways in which PCCs accessed public views (ibid, p.96). The key finding arising from this theme was, therefore; that the introduction of PCCs has improved public engagement in policing, however there is a lack of understanding across communities of the policing governance structure.

Partnerships

In order to deliver effective policing, strong partnership working by the police and other local authorities and organisations is essential (Sampson et al (1988), McCarthy and O’Neil, (2014)), There was criticism of police authorities in terms of their involvement in local partnerships and much of the development and management of partnerships was left to the police (McCarthy and O’Neil, 2014). The Policing Protocol 2011 (Home Office, 2011a) requires that the PCC drive effective local partnerships to facilitate effective policing.

The chief constable participants had mixed views regarding how PCCs had impacted upon effective partnership working, from a negative perspective;

CC

‘We are one of the places where it [partnerships] has been disastrous.... the PCC is perceived in a very hostile way by local leaders, seen as mayoral rival and a point of influence that they don’t control. Its made it harder for us to get engaged in partnerships. ..It shows how if you drop a political figure into the pool of local government and local control and you cant judge where the ripples will go to. In our
case its created more tension. We, me and the Chief Exec get on well ...but as soon as the PCC is introduced into that mix its difficult so we try not to do it. The PCC is not at the partnership meetings. PCC has high media profile and often says the wrong things because he is not part of the debate.’

CC

‘Lack of structure and planning means that partnerships have been a bit of a dogs breakfast. [commissioning] they cant work out how to effectively fund and measure so what happens is .... Somebody will come and see him with a project and wow him then they’ll fund him. .. But they never ask the so what factor’.

Other chief constables, however see the involvement of PCCs as being more positive;

CC

‘The PCC is very engaged in partnerships some times I have to pick up the pieces. But he can say things I can’t that is a really blunt instrument. So on the one hand I think oh goodness I have to pick up the pieces but on the other hand he really does say the things you want to say yourself...He [the PCC] is good enough to ask me before he says it.’

CC

‘PCC is able to get traction where we struggled.’
PCCs saw their partnership role as important and adding significant value;

\[\textit{PCC}\]

‘\textit{A big part of my job is to bring organisations together...to have sensible conversations, often quite difficult ones. E.g. Community safety partnerships I aligned all their priorities to the police & crime plan priorities}’.

\[\textit{PCC}\]

‘\textit{I’ve been able to make alliances that perhaps the authority because of the way they work and they were very geographically confined. I can move out nationally as well for example a CSE project with the Children’s Commissioner}.’

At the same time, PCCs recognised the effectiveness of the police in this area;

\[\textit{PCC}\]

‘\textit{The Chief Constable and staff are good at building partnerships}.’

\[\textit{PCC}\]

‘\textit{The Chief Constable has very good relations with partners}’.

Partnership working for the benefit of effective policing is therefore according to these participants a positive aspect of the introduction of the new governance structure. The introduction of PCCs has improved partnership working in some areas, but in others more improvement is needed.

\textbf{Politics (HMG, HMIC, ACPO)}

The tripartite structure of policing governance (Lusgarten, 1986, Mawby and Wright, 2003) was fundamental to the post Police Act 1964 (Home Office, 1964) structure.
This positioned chief constables including both individual chief officers and the combined Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Government (Home Office) and the police authorities (including the Association of Police Authorities (APA)) in terms of their relative influence. This structure for 48 years underpinned the way in which policing was governed including the setting of policy, practice and accountability. The introduction of PCCs and the subsequent collapse of the Association of Chief Police Officers, it is argued by Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry (2016) and Lister, (2013) has fundamentally altered the distribution of influence within the governance framework.

Caless and Owens, (2016) in their interviews of chief constables and PCCs found that there was little overt party political influence on policing governance, this research found a more mixed picture;

PCC

‘The relationship has become more political since Police Authorities. As an example, last year when the announcement was made about further cuts, the APCC said this cannot continue. ...we decided to write to the Home Secretary saying we are happy to take our share, but this is now getting dangerous... the conservative PCCs to a man and woman refused to sign it. On a more local level, an MP summoned me to a meeting, I declined the PCC from ** went they are from the same political party. You get it from both Tory and Labour saying they cant go or express a view because their party allegiance is stronger.’

PCC

‘Its the opposite of being politicised...most of the PCCs don’t have political differences about policing in the APCC unless you looked them up you’d be hard pressed to tell if
they were representing Conservatives Independents or Labour Its a red herring The
government has less direction [of policing] at a local level it has been devolved.’

PCC

‘Policing damn well ought to be under political control! In any democracy the police
answer to the civilian authority that is a fairly fundamental principle. All civilian
authorities in a democracy are political because they are elected The police answer to
someone not run around doing what the hell they think they should be doing.’

PCC

‘Even with the ones who belong to political parties —…I have never ever seen or heard
of a decision that is politically motivated…’

Unsurprisingly within the PCC cohort, there were dissenting views as to the positive
views regarding the political dimension expressed above;

PCC

‘The Home Office in some ways wish they had not let the Genie out of the bottle, I
think they would like to have a bit more control than they do. Look at the Rotherham
case where they realised they couldn’t sack a PCC that was a wake up call to them’.

PCC

‘I Feel abandoned by central government.’

Some chief constables expressed negative views regarding the political dimension
centered on increased politicisation of policing and a somewhat cynical perception of
the motives of government in driving the governance change;
CC

‘Although our relationship is good I didn’t like operating in it. I never felt relaxed I always had to watch every decision and every policy and everything had to be carefully managed. It puts political control into CCs too directly I agree CCs needed more accountability...they had a degree of autonomy unlike other public services I accept those days are gone, but the way in which this operates its too much on the other side of the pendulum. There is too much political control’.

CC

‘...central govt have become less likely to do anything, bluntly. I don’t know if in some respects they created the PCC system because that’s what they wanted, or whether the PCC system made that happen’.

CC

‘The relationship with government has never been much poorer to be honest. The whole movement to PCCs was to push power down and for the Home Office not to be responsible for the things they were responsible for in the past. Very little point in talking to the home office because they don’t hold the power anymore, its a waste of time to be quite honest. I think this govt went too far in pushing power down and not taking responsibility for anything or providing any national leadership.... There’s a whole host of reasons why with this government relationship with the Home Office has not been good, but that’s not to say because we’ve got PCCs its a wider movement’.
There were, however, some positive views, albeit these were generally seen as unintended consequences by government;

CC

‘I would argue yes [it is] its been extremely helpful with austerity I don’t think you can put aside the austerity, what the Police is calling austerity I don’t think is austerity I think it is some kind of fundamental challenge to the way that we’ve delivered policing and the police’s ability to deal with some of the really wicked problems in society. The relationship with government has never been much poorer to be honest. The whole movement to PCCs was to push power down and for the Home Office not to be responsible for the things they were responsible for in the past. Very little point in talking to the home office because they don’t hold the power anymore, it’s a waste of time to be quite honest. I think this govt went too far in pushing power down and not taking responsibility for anything or providing any national leadership’.

CC

‘When you’ve got one local figure who’s been elected very clearly... They are actually in a far stronger position (than Police Authority), to say no government, I’m not going to because I’ve got a lot more political legitimacy because I’m the only person elected by all the people of ** (force area)’.

Both chief constables and PCCs saw political issues becoming more significant in the run up to elections;

CC

‘He (PCC) has courted controversy on occasions I have not welcomed that but I recognise that he has a public profile that he works to maintain, and candidly that’s going to get worse before May next year (elections) because he will want to get re-elected.’
PCC

‘I’m already seeing evidence of PCC colleagues acting in a way that they have one eye on May 2016. It’s already started. That is counter productive. It’s a demanding job, they should be concentrating on the job and delivering for the public. There is one PCC who has said to me that they are taking 3 months off from February to May to prepare.’

Chief constables, as a cohort were ambivalent regarding the demise of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and its replacement by the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC);

CC

‘Has it changed? I’m still the national lead for X & Y, my meetings haven’t changed. I think this is Sir Hugh’s (sir Hugh Orde, President of ACPO) relationship with the Home Secretary etc that caused a lot of the issues, its between the two and the change in name, I don’t think will alter one jot the work that’s been undertaken. Different re the things that should never have been part of ACPO the Limited company status that will go but I don’t think it will change’.

Some chief constables, however saw the demise of ACPO as more sinister and part of a move by government and to some extent PCCs to reduce the influence of chief constables within the tripartite arrangement;

CC

‘This administration wanted to remove the perceived power, some PCCs felt threatened. The incentive for chief officers to take national role has reduced given that PCCs are locally focused etc. The relationship with government was damaged during the time with Hugh (Orde), it is better with Sara, she spends more time in the Home
Office. We have to change, you can no longer operate the way some Chief Constables
did (big Silver back Gorillas) those days are gone’.

CC

‘It has been decapitated by the Home Office when you put that all together; the Chief
Constable role has been downgraded. I’m not sure that the NPCC as a coordinating
body can maintain the independence of policing’.

Some PCCs agreed with the chief constables as far as ACPO was concerned;

PCC

‘It [ACPO] was not too strong, it was a way of organising themselves Some of the
political PCCs see it as a challenge, the Chief Constables conspiring. I see it as them
talking about the challenges and what they can do together to address them’.

PCC

‘The way the Home Secretary dealt with ACPO was quite damaging. It didn’t do the
PCC/ Chief Constable relationship much good. Some PCCs who like to flex their muscles
used that time to reinforce the fact that they are in charge. The loss of ACPO itself is
not that important NPCC will take it forward’.

However, unsurprisingly perhaps the majority of PCCs in this cohort saw ACPO, as an
obstacle to change and to some extent anti-democratic;

PCC

‘I saw the silver backs in action, they had to go [ACPO].’
‘There were significant problems with ACPO making up the rules as they went along. A lot of their guidelines became almost law without outside scrutiny or thought. The companies they set up were wrong’.

Within this theme there was also some discussion of the role of HMIC whose position within the governance framework was discussed earlier in this thesis at Chapter three. Those PCCs who referred to the HMIC were relatively negative in their views;

‘The Police have been thoroughly reformed, HMIC still reflects policing of yester year’.

Chief constables however, expressed concerns regarding HMIC only in the context of the removal of the Inspectorate from involvement in the selection process for chief officers;

‘...we have lost a lot, an awful lot with the HMI and their role and the fact that the HMI now has zero impact on the appointment of Chief Constables is a huge loss’.

‘That selection process [of Chief Constables] just seems whimsical you’ve got someone as important as the Chief Constable in the constitution of the fabric of society, I don’t think you should be whimsical. Its not really a PCC issue, its because they got rid of SAP [the Senior Appointments Panel, administered by HMIC] so all those checks and balances that would have supported the PCC e.g. HMIC are no longer allowed to be part of the selection process. I rang the HMIC when I was looking to appoint a Deputy and he said I can’t get involved, I would have loved him to get involved’.
It may be the case that, given that all chief constables in the cohort will have operated with HMIC throughout their policing career that they did not have concerns regarding their role more generally as did the PCCs.

The two cohorts then saw political issues in the introduction of PCCs as; introducing a political dimension to policing governance in the current model. The majority saw this as appropriate. It was not seen as a problem in terms of policing delivery. However, some saw the potential for inappropriate party political influence, particularly in the run up to elections.

There has been a significant change in the tripartite structure of policing governance with chief constables having less influence and a retreat of central government, the latter seen by some as an attempt by government to distance itself from responsibility in a time of austerity.

The attitude of chief constables to the demise of ACPO was somewhat sanguine and seen almost as an inevitability, whilst PCCs saw the removal of ACPO as a more significant event in reforming the governance structure and the reduction of the traditional power of chief constables. There were differing views of HMIC, seen by PCCs as a reactionary influence, whilst chief constables merely lamented their role in the selection of chief officers.

**Police & Crime Commissioner Scrutiny & Accountability role in Policing**

A significant driver for the change in policing governance that gave rise to PCCs was the issue of police accountability that is discussed at length in Chapter two of this thesis. There was a clear perception that police authorities were not effectively holding
chief constables to account for the delivery of policing to communities (Loveday and Reid, 2003). A key element of the role of PCCs was that of holding the police to account (S1. Police Crime and Social Responsibility Act, 2011 (Home Office, 2011)). Many chief constables reported that they felt they were more effectively held to account by the PCC than they had been by the police authority;

CC

‘He holds me to account more effectively than the Police Authority did. Its not a theatre where you could walk into a Police Authority and perform in uniform and that was the end of it, this is much more intimate, more regular and it reacts more quickly to local concerns’.

CC

‘The principle of the PCCs making policing more accountable...I think its definitely done that. ... A significant change in policing on a daily basis. ... the PCC is in the next building, full time staff who are here permanently to support the PCC an individual who is not only passionate about [Force area], but is absolutely clear on benefits to communities that he can bring without interfering with operational policing, and can hold us to account on behalf of communities, and is absolutely striving for a more transparent service. There’s things he’s challenged policing in [Force area] on that we would previously have said either we cant be open about that, transparent no we wouldn’t release that report to the public, to be honest wouldn’t even have thought to release it to the public (e.g. Significant football disorder - debrief & learning PCC suggested publishing redacted version – Chief Constable thought this a good idea).’
Some chief constables were less convinced;

CC

‘...its not the most robust accountability framework that I have ever worked within or had to report to. I’d say it was the same (as the Police Authority). Across the country you may see PCCs saying next week I’m holding the Chief Constable to account because, but that’s only showboating. ...There’s no huge interest in these public meetings... They’re held in the middle of the morning on a working day - who’s going to want to come and listen to that?’

CC

‘Its all informal, he doesn’t like formal governance which I find at times makes me feel a bit vulnerable having been brought up through Police Authorities where you would have a very formalised process ... PCC doesn’t particularly like papers doesn’t particularly like structure.’.

PCCs tasked with delivering a robust accountability regime and, generally (with the exception of former members of police authorities and former police officers) had no previous experience of policing accountability regimes, generally thought that their accountability processes were an improvement and did effectively hold the police to account on behalf of communities;

PCC

‘I see the role as making sure that the public know what the Police are doing. Police had lost sight of the fact that they were to serve the public, the fixation was on recorded crime’. 
‘The role of the PCC [is to hold the police to account] from my point of view, I would say there are several aspects to that, there is the traditional role of holding the Force to account holding the Chief Constable to account and introduce an accountability structure that works.’

A principal aim of the government’s drive for policing governance reform was focused upon policing accountability. The interviews with these cohorts suggest that whilst policing accountability frameworks put in place by PCCs differ across the country, in general there has been an improvement; Police accountability frameworks are improving in terms of effectiveness and openness.

Police & Crime Commissioner Relationship with Police Officers & Staff

In addition to their relationships with communities, partners and chief officers, the relationship with police officers and staff across forces was discussed. Again there was significant variety;

‘The cops just get on with it. we are looking at our estate like everyone else, we may end up reducing opening hours or the number of stations. The staff are saying this is the PCC getting rid of staff they are not saying its the Chief Constable, its the PCC. ...the PCC said people will always remain loyal to the Chief Constable because you are seen as the institution of policing and I’m a politician. And you cant get away from the fact that the public have a particular view of politics and politicians in particular so they will always query the motivations for any particular decision and in reality the review was instigated through the operational policing review’.
‘At a senior level [they understand the role of the PCC], less so lower down. At a strategic level, they are really comfortable around him. At a lower level, there is a bit of deference, they see him as the boss, there is a little bit of that’.

PCCs held similar views;

‘At commander level, they [the police] definitely understand, below that I think no’.

‘There is no misunderstanding in force as to what PCC can & cannot do PCC must stand up and say I am not the Chief Constable, the PCC job is to be the bridge with the public.’

The research participants were relatively ambivalent regarding this issue. There is, however some evidence that more recently that rank and file police officers are expressing significant concerns regarding the performance of their PCC, including in Hampshire Constabulary, the Police Federation held a vote of no confidence in their PCC (Police Oracle, 2018). Whilst having no constitutional standing the result of that poll which demonstrated a significant lack of confidence in the PCC by the rank and file which did potentially impact upon the credibility of the office of PCC (BBC, 2018a).

The key finding from this cohort within this theme therefore was that whilst there is variability across the country in the manner and extent to which PCCs interact with police officers and staff, this does not yet appear to be a significant issue.
Police & Crime Commissioner/ Chief Constable Relationship

The pilot study in this research project and the later work of Wells, (2015), Caless and Owens, (2016) and the findings of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (2015) pointed to the potential critical importance of the interpersonal relationship between chief constables and PCCs in maximising the effective delivery of policing to communities. In the view of Reiss (2018), having observed the relationships between PCCs and chief constables in his role as chief executive for the Durham PCC there was;

‘...a spectrum of PCC, chief constable relationships, from cosy to adversarial. At every stage there is an effect on policing delivery’ (ibid).

It was not surprising therefore that both chief constables and PCCs saw this theme as very significant. PCCs generally recognised that a good interpersonal relationship was important, but saw themselves as the senior partner in that relationship;

PCC

‘You can make any governance system work provided you’ve got the right individuals involved. If you have got people who are reasonably mature, proportionate balanced then you would have a reasonably constructive working relationship. If you’ve got individuals who are flawed in whatever, there have been one or two examples...I think there should probably be some reforms to the role’.

PCC

‘I want him to be the best Chief Constable in the country because that delivers better policing...its not about publically humiliating him because the only person that shows up is you. I have seen that done unfortunately and its been quite unedifying’.
PCC

‘We are not best mates, that’s not how it works, we have a mutual respect...he’s got a job I’ve got a mandate. In the balance a mandate is far more powerful than a job...we get on very well’.

PCC

‘We don’t live a life of compromise I produce a police and crime plan that plan is followed by the Chief Constable...on behalf of the people of*** whose views I have sought before drawing up the plan, I make sure they get the sort of policing they tell me they want’.

Chief constables appeared to place even more importance on positive interpersonal relationships. Many found it to be potentially a significant risk to the delivery of effective policing;

CC

‘Its far too important, what I mean by that is that I’m incredibly lucky here I will finish my time and feel - not a friendship [with PCC] we deliberately don’t even have a drink together, we don’t have meals together. We’ve kept it very professional...However, it could be the other way, and because there’s no checks and balances... It could be if we didn’t get on there’s very little to make it work, the PCP certainly couldn’t, it doesn’t have the time influence, power to bash heads together, and our relationship could be very fractured and fraught and counter productive...that does worry me that too much is predicated on that one to one marking... I sense most Chief Constables are saying its working ok but its a risky model. The one thing a Police Authority had, it did have moderating impacts... I don’t think there are any ways that it can be mitigated now [conflict between PCC & CC] I think its a really tricky scenario’.
‘Delivering policing services and delivering a business based upon the relationship between two people which is absolutely critical is flawed. It doesn’t work to the benefit of the public, and as we go into austerity, having to think about what do the public really need from a professional police service as opposed to what does the PCC want to do because its popular with the public then we are likely to get into some difficult territory’.

‘I’ve known [PCC] for many years, there are three criteria that have to exist or else our relationship is built on sand. First a shared vision. ...second, there’s equity in the relationship ...that equity works well so we don’t fall out we have difference of opinion but we don’t fall out ...the third one is that we trust each other’.

‘The trouble with the system is that it is a very personal system its designed to be very personal...so you make an assumption that you set up arrangements for how the working relationship should work.... there’s a great deal of instability in it all...its possible you may have to undo all the arrangements [when a new PCC arrives]....the arrangements between the two corporations sole are only as good as the agreement of the current PCC....it seems to me that because its based upon the individual its inherently unstable’.

‘Its too much personality based. I think that’s a risk I think if people aren’t able to maintain effective professional relationships then it is easy for it to be undermined.'
We’ve had some examples, Lincolnshire was the classic. There need to be a few more safety nets. ..and the PCP, doesn’t really have much teeth’.

Sub Theme – Contractual Relationships

The legislation establishing PCCs, the Police, Crime and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011) and the Policing Protocol 2011 (Home office 2011a) make it clear that the PCC is responsible for appointing and for dismissing the chief constable (Home Office, 2011 S38 (1-4)). In addition, chief constables are subject to time-limited contracts of employment defined by Regulation 11 of the Police Regulations 2003 (Home Office 2003). This fact coupled with the importance of the interpersonal professional relationship exercised many of the chief constables in terms of the potential for the possibility of dismissal to affect the ability of a chief constable who feared for their position to exercise proper professional judgement a risk also identified by Brain (2012);

CC

‘I absolutely believe that it [PCC ability to ‘hire & fire Chief Constables] affects the nature of the relationships with CCs and PCCs. Its got to hasn’t it? In Chiefs council, people have said to what sounds like a really good professional idea, I won’t be able to do because I’ve got a PDR [Personal Development Review] priority, I’ve got to work very closely with the PCC! The example is the Police Innovation fund we said, why not pick three things from policing that will help advance professional policing. Rather than competing with each other... I was a big supporter of it, but there were people saying that ‘I’ve got that as a PDR priority, and I wont be able to go back to the PCC other than, I will be pursuing money on behalf of the organisation. People wont necessarily say I’m concerned about my position but we’ve got people (Chief
Constables) in the country that are in quite a difficult position because of their relationship with the PCC’.

CC

‘A lot of Chief Constables depend on their contracts with PCCs and that means that they don’t have the strength to stand their ground. To stand up and resist it as they did before. Saying [PCC] I’m not worried about my pension. Or getting my contract extended, a lot of people are not in that position. The Chief Constables wanted to write a collective letter, to the Home Secretary from all 43 Chief Constables saying that we believed that the cuts could no longer be maintained without a serious impact on public safety. ..at the last minute in Chiefs council, 7 or 8 Chief Constables said our PCCs have told us that if we sign that letter it will have consequences for us. (they were all CCs with less than 30 yrs service). That demonstrated to me...they are beholden to PCCs’.

CC

‘It helps that I’ve got over 30 years in - that was a very liberating milestone. Because I’ve got that in my back pocket he can make me a retired person I’d be disappointed because I’ve still a lot to do.... I’m not going to deny my selflessness is influenced by that 30 years’.

CC

‘I look round the room at Chief Constables council and there are too many people in that room who are not capable I don’t believe of standing up to their PCCs and saying this is operational policing this is none of your business and being prepared to fight their corner. Easy for me to say that from my position of strength, they are vulnerable nothing to loose I just want to come into work and do a good job in an in terms of their appointment and their longevity as Chief Constables It doesn’t seem to me terribly
healthy that you’ve got that situation and something needs to be done about it. One thing you could do is change the selection process for Chief Constables take it out of the hands of the PCC and say that’s a decision for the panel or for whoever takes the place of the panel’.

Some PCCs recognised the problem articulated by chief constables;

PCC

‘I can see that the fear that PCCs may use the power [to decline to renew a CC contract] arbitrarily is true’.

PCC

‘I come across Chiefs who appear to be a bit frightened of the PCC. There was an occasion when a group of Chiefs wanted to write a letter to the Home Secretary...’ [repeated story of some Chief Constables declining to sign fearing repercussions from their PCC].

Further issues of concern regarding the potential impact on professional judgement and independence for chief constables who were appointed by their PCC, and the effect upon the available pool of candidates for Chief Constable posts was expressed by both chief constables and PCCs;

CC

‘Another effect was the loss of something like SAP [Senior Appointments Panel] there is nothing there the college has done some good work to put some best practice, some guidelines around it [selection of Chief Constables], but not to put too finer point on it, it really is down to PCCs to pick their person. There is no coordination of Chief Officer careers the quantitative stats would suggest they are safer than ever, there’s less
movement of Chief officers, more Deps get put in Chief Constable slots than ever before.... So, any sense that bringing PCCs in would create a healthier refreshing, that’s not happening’.

CC

A weakness of the system is that there is no proper national oversight over [Chief Constable] appointments I think that is the area of weakness, things like decisions to extend contracts appointment processes I think that is the bit where there is too much power in one hand. Where there is potential for soft corruption on both sides so I’ve been arguing that there should be a national system because there are too many internal appointments too many DCCs almost automatically getting the job. And what that is, is a sign that government in its wish to push more and more stuff down has gone too far. And there needs to be a bit of adjustment back up to say that within this process there are some really crucial decisions like the appointment of the Chief Constable... Going to some form of SAP process some form of external accreditation, some form of national talent management’.

CC

‘I think that one of the truly constitutionally worrying issues is the number of Chief Constables now being appointed from deputies in their existing force ...there’s a number who have never served in forces other than the one they are about to be Chief Constable of. I don’t think its good. Also I think it creates a sort of mutual dependence that’s not great. Almost it could take us back into the Cleveland scenario of mutual support. .... there is something not very healthy where two people work together and one gets picked as the next Chief Constable. It’s very hard then to get clarity, separation and to dig in on the points that perhaps you would want to dig in professionally around’.
Both chief constables and PCCs in these research cohorts saw the interpersonal professional relationship between them as crucial in the delivery of effective policing. However, there are associated risks when those relationships are not positive or breakdown. In addition both cohorts saw the inherent dangers in the fact that the PCC can alone appoint or dismiss the chief constable. This situation was not changed by the intervention of the Home Affairs Committee (2014) or of the judgement in R (Crompton) v Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire (2017) that was founded upon the requirement of a chief constable to resign by his PCC. Muir (2017) in his review of the case found that the tension between operational independence and oversight still existed. This appears more significant given the concerns raised by the
participants in this research, that was supported recently by Rowe et al. (2018) as part of conference panel that included the PCC for Derbyshire and Sir Hugh Orde who were in agreement when he commented that Chief Constables now saw themselves as 'subservient' to the PCC, a situation that did not bode well for an open professional relationship. In summary, the research cohort took the view that a positive professional interpersonal relationship between the chief constable and the PCC in a force is essential in delivering effective policing to communities. If a positive relationship does not exist there are risks to effective policing.

The fact that solely a PCC can appoint or dismiss a chief constable has risks in terms of the potential impact upon the professional judgement decision making of chief constables. In particular problems were inherent in the selection process that has led to a reduced pool of candidates for chief constable posts, the perception that a disproportionate number of deputy chief constables are being promoted to chief constable in the same force, and that the contractual arrangement for chief constables gives rise to the potential for their independence of decision making to be impacted upon.

**Police Operational Independence**

Chapter two of this thesis dealt with issues of police operational independence, identifying the origins of the concept in the work of Marshall (1965) and was committed to by Nick Herbert MP the then Policing Minister within the new governance framework (Herbert, 2011). This concept must be considered in the context of the implications of the agent/principal relationship within the governance structure as regards PCCs and chief constables (Davies and Johnson, 2016) discussed in Chapter three.
This theme was important to chief constables, although some did not identify any negative issues. Others saw actual and potential inherent dangers, in particular around decisions of PCCs that have the potential to impact upon operational policing delivery. This they saw as being exacerbated by the lack of clarity provided in the Policing Protocol Order 2011 (Home Office 2011a) as to the definition of ‘operational independence’ and the lack of a clear delineation of roles within the governance structure;

CC

‘Because of the Policing Protocol, the PCC does not know what their role is they think they know what the role is the Chief Exec thinks they know, but that will be completely different to - if you go round the country to what every other PCC there is. To me the issue in *** has been does [the PCC] run the Police service or do I run the police service. There are two areas where he has got more control. One is around collaboration, if [the PCC] doesn’t sign the sec 22 framework agreement it doesn’t happen. He can therefore decide whether or not an operational proposal goes forward or not.

CC

‘I tried to make sure there was a distance between us that our roles were clearly understood. And that the distinction between the strategic over view of policing and the operational That of course is very difficult to do when the person that sets the strategy also has the money and has control of the money. That is a difficult environment to work in. I believe that some CCs have taken the line of least resistance and allowed the border between direction of operational policing and the setting of strategy to become very blurred’.
'we have never had any tussle with PCCs around operational decisions ... So the worst fear that you’d have a PCC directing that someone is arrested or directing the use of resources, that’s never been, we’ve never been anywhere close to that’.

‘There are significant areas of greyness in the way it is set up one test of it is to ask the question, ‘who owns the IT strategy?’ ...I’m not sure I can answer you, if it was the PCC on their own then presumably they are taking responsibility for all sorts of issues, around information and if theoretically we had some kind of breakdown Soham style [a murder investigation which identified information sharing failures] in terms of information handling. Then its very difficult to see how the PCC holds me to account if its their thinking and systems - if its my strategy then its one that I cant always execute without contractual oversight...I don’t allow them {OPCC} into gold groups [strategic coordination meetings regarding critical incidents]. If you do you are judging the accountability you are inadvertently signing them up to a collective approach to something that at some point they may want to hold you to account for - so its quite dishonest to do that really’.

‘There is a classic one at the moment where a PCC ... Who has posed the question about armed policing to the electorate and whether his Chief Constable should allow police officers to have side arms or not. ...to me that’s clearly an incredibly sensitive operational decision based upon intelligence that the PCC wouldn’t get to see’.
PCCs also recognised the importance of this issue and the difficulty of apparent ambiguity as to what constituted ‘operational independence’;

\[\text{PCC}\]

‘I don’t know of any major fall outs, but operational policing is the responsibility of the Chief Constable. It would have to be a huge clash of personalities’.

\[\text{PCC}\]

‘There are some PCCs who are getting involved in operational things that are nothing to do with them. I don’t want anything to do with it. The day I go there it all unravels’.

\[\text{PCC}\]

‘If we got to the situation if something was...something had happened, an event or a particular issue, where I felt the force was wrong, and I’d had those conversations and made those points and we still had a difference of opinion then I would say so because I think that’s my role. So I might be critical publically. I don’t think I would use my authority as PCC to try and instruct the Chief Constable. I think that might be – because if you’re heading down that road then you are basically saying, my instruction is do this, and if they don’t then you are on a collision course that is then ultimately going to lead to a parting of the ways...because in a dispute situation there is only ever going to be one winner and that is the PCC, but that not where I would want to be.’

\[\text{PCC}\]

‘Every decision that I make has an operational effect’.

\[\text{PCC}\]

‘There can be areas like closure of Police Stations you might say it is operational. I think its budgetary, reputational, efficiency and effectiveness, and it affects public confidence ... So that is when it comes together if its about directing operations and
operational policing, that’s an easy one, that’s the Chief Constables job. With some PCCs who have little knowledge of policing they are dipping into areas I wouldn’t get involved in’.

PCC

‘I’m very clear about what’s operational and what’s not. I am always kept in the loop about operational matters, there is hardly anything that happens that I’m not briefed about. I keep a finger in that pie. I’m kept updated ... That goes into my mental record. Never commented on operations I know other PCCs have expressed concerns about operations.’

The participant cohorts therefore shared concerns regarding the lack of definitional clarity around ‘operational independence’, but where there was clarity that tended to be in the tactical operational sphere where there was an expectation on the chief constables that they were to operate as independent professionals. This was recognised on the part of the PCCs. In terms of tactical operational policing delivery there is recognition of the independence of the police in operational response. However, there are a number of areas of concern where decisions of the PCC can affect the ability of the Chief Constable to deliver effective policing.

Police & Crime Panels

In their responses to some of the preceding themes, both chief constables and PCCs identified a lack accountability and moderation upon PCCs. Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) were established as something of an after thought (Bailey, 2017) within the new policing governance framework, their remit being to ‘scrutinise and support the PCC in his/her work (Home Office, 2011 S28). In Chapter three of this thesis, the author discussed PCPs and their perceived effectiveness or otherwise in achieving their remit. The issue of the accountability of PCCs appears to have now replaced
earlier concerns expressed regarding the accountability of chief constables (Loveday 2018). The comments of the participants in this study generally supported that view. They also supported the wider view that whilst some panels try hard, they are on the whole relatively ineffective (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2015, Lister, 2014, Bailey, 2017);

CC

‘PCC [local] is very arrogant, won’t take any shit from anyone he takes the view this is just something I have to do [attend the PCP] and I really don’t care what you say. The PCC has a political mandate they have been elected on a broader mandate than my MPs, … you’ve then got a bunch of councilors elected on a far smaller level now holding him to account. Do they understand Policing - no Have they been involved in policing - very few…so you’ve got to question what’s their knowledge, what are their attributes and skills to really be incisive and understand what’s going on. I don’t think its there personally’.

CC

‘They are rubbish - the chair of the PCP hated [the PCC] he was a mason and a conservative. Again, just awful…You have a range of people with a range of knowledge, so I think their ability to hold the PCC to account is limited, very limited’.

CC

‘What the hell is the PCP ? What’s it there for? was it put in there to placate or for a purpose and I don’t see the latter. I think one of the biggest issues is the lack of any true role that the PCP has there is no real power that the PCP has and as a consequence its an untamed individual [the PCC] that can do what they want. With very little recourse than to wait a number of years before the next election when the electorate will decide whether they get through or not. I think it [the PCP] is the same
as every other one in the country its benign. They will receive reports and discuss issues but it is fairly benign.’

PCCs had more mixed views, some seeing the panel as effective, some thought that it required improvement, others were quite disparaging;

PCC

‘They do scrutinise me pretty effectively. Some PCPs think they are there to tell the PCC what to do. They are not there to hold me to account they are there to scrutinise, once that was sorted here, that was fine’.

PCC

‘They are not part of my decision process, but certainly are influential. Support was not much in evidence in the early months, but it is now and that’s because the PCP, myself and the Chief Constable with the way that our relationship has matured, over the last couple of years we are very much on the same side. I find them now very supportive, for example over fairer funding for police.’

PCC

‘They are a joke, they don’t hold me to account. The legislation is flawed. Councilors with no experience in policing or budgeting I go in with 1.99% [proposed policing precept increase] they say no, I go back with 1.98, thanks very much! My biggest regret is that I’m not held to account’.

The views expressed by both chief constables and PCCs in this research tended to support the findings of Lister, (2014), Chambers (2014), Bailey (2017) and of Loveday (2017). The reality of the PCP in terms of its ability to scrutinise and mediate PCCs
has not realised the intent of the coalition government when Nick Herbert, Policing Minister said;

‘These panels are important. They will have teeth…and the weapon of transparency…they will have the power to compel commissioners to release documents and summon them for questioning’. (Herbert 2011a).

These participants did not see that ambition as having been realised, and the key finding that arose was that the effectiveness of Police and Crime Panels in performing their role is variable across the country, but is generally seen as ineffective.

Recommendations for Change in Legislation/ Policy

A number of chief constables and PCCs during their interviews made suggestions as to changes in legislation and policy with a view to improving aspects of the policing governance structure. The suggestions are recorded here. Chapter seven that follows will inter alia discuss recommendations that arise from this research;

CC

‘The inability to put restrictions, controls or dispense with a PCC needs looking at. If you are a PCP holding a PCC to account and you’ve got concerns, actually they are pretty impotent at being able to do anything about that … I think there needs to be some thought and the South Yorkshire example is a good example of that … maybe there needs to be something that strengthens that [PCP ability to recall PCC], but puts the ability into not just one individual but a wider group. That then and reduces the risk of someone being power crazy and doing things that are not in the best interests of communities’.

CC

‘An elected mayor is a better model than PCC’.
‘There is a need for marketing to explain the role of PCC’

‘A weakness of the system is that there is no proper national oversight over Chief Constable] appointments I think that is the area of weakness, things like decisions to extend contracts appointment processes I think that is the bit where there is too much power in one hand. Where there is potential for soft corruption on both sides so I’ve been arguing that there should be a national system because there are too many internal appointments too many DCCs almost automatically getting the job. And what that is, is a sign that govt in its wish to push more and more stuff down has gone too far.

‘There must be some power so that if a PCC is barking mad we should be able to control them’.

‘With sensible safeguards there should be a power of recall for PCCs.’

‘There should be a mechanism so that they [Chief Constables whose contracts are not renewed] are not unfairly penalised if they feel they have to make a stand on their principles.

‘There may be something that needs to be done in terms of early access to a pension [for Chief Constables whose contracts are not renewed] to facilitate the underlying
intention of the whole process which is to enable the PCC to hold the Chief Constable to account and a Chief Constable stand by their operational independence with integrity and if necessary walk away if they feel its impossible without undue penalty...then that arrangement needs to exist...the intention is to allow that accountability on the part of the PCC, but also to allow the CC, not to unduly penalise them for taking a principled stand. that needs to be there. But that is not a reason for fettering further the power of a PCC to make decision about a Chief Constable. Or granting to Chief Constables that they are more than operationally independent of PCCs.’

PCC

‘It is an important power (hire & fire Chief Constables) there must be the ability to change the top management in practice its much more difficult. If I were considering that some sort of double lock. Just having that power in the PCC is dangerous’.

PCC

‘Without funding only political parties will be successful and that leads to political influence in policing.’ [fund PCC candidates].

The recommendations made by both chief constables and PCCs during the interviews focused upon delivering something that in the view of the individual participant would significantly improve the current policing governance framework, their recommendations were; firstly, PCC candidate issues (e.g. candidate funding/ party affiliation). The need for improvements to scrutiny arrangements for PCC along with consideration of recall arrangements for PCCs. There is a need to address chief constable terms and conditions with particular reference to selection and contractual issues. Finally, there was still felt to be a need to consider an alternative governance model.
Summary

This chapter has laid out in detail the findings across all 31 semi structured interviews conducted with chief constables and PCCs. Each of the thirteen themes has been examined in terms of the underlying issues that were articulated. The analysis has separated the two interview cohorts, in some themes there were significant differences in the issues raised and their weighted importance as between chief constables and PCCs. However, it is interesting to see the extent to which both cohorts have agreed in terms of the key issues that impact upon the effectiveness of the new policing governance arrangements.

This analysis and reporting of the findings brought the author significantly closer to answering the research questions that guided this study.

Chapter seven will now move to a discussion of the findings in the context of the research questions and the articulation of recommendations that arise.
Chapter Seven.

Conclusions and Implications for the Future

Discussion

In Chapter six of this thesis, the author identified the key findings that arose from the research that included a wide ranging literature review and the analysis of the semi-structured interviews of 16 chief constables and 15 PCCs across England and Wales. The key findings were recorded in Chapter six within themed categories that were identified during the content analysis phase. Here those findings from the two cohorts of participants are represented in terms of their saliency to, and their ability to answer the four research questions that have guided this study;

‘What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across England and Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a strategic and operational level?’

The introduction of PCCs has led to reduction in organisational bureaucracy and to the personal bureaucratic demand upon chief constables this has led to improved, quicker decision making at the strategic governance level.

There has been, according to these participants, a significant improvement in police accountability and enhanced community representation, though in some areas more work needs to be done. These improvements have occurred alongside improved public engagement in policing, however there remains a lack of understanding across communities of the policing governance structure. As regards the interaction of PCCs with police officers and staff, whilst there is variability across the country in the manner and extent of that interaction, this does not appear to be a significant issue.
In terms of the political dimension inherent in this policing governance model, the majority of both the chief constables and PCCs who were interviewed saw this as an acceptable situation. Political issues did not, according to these interviewees generally lead to problems in terms of policing delivery. However, some participants saw the potential for inappropriate party-political influence, particularly in the run up to elections.

There has, according to the participants in this study been a significant change in the tripartite structure of policing governance, echoing the work of Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry (2016) who saw an increased complexity in the governance structure alongside a reduction in the influence of chief constables. The development of policing governance over time must be seen within the context of wider development within the criminal justice and public safety domains. For example, since the 1980’s alone there have been the changes in the independence of police conduct accountability, from the PCA to IPCC and more recently the IOPC (Home Office 2018). In 1986, charging decision making and prosecutions were taken away from the police and vested in the Crown Prosecution Service (National Audit Office, 1997). Gilling (1997) draws attention to the development at the same time of a multi agency approach to community safety sharing some of the responsibility for public safety and crime reduction previously the domain of the police with other public bodies within Crime and Disorder Partnerships and more recently other fora such as youth justice panels (Home Office, 1998a) and hate crime panels (Winstone and Pakes 2005). The development of policing governance that led to the introduction of PCCs was therefore part of a wider continuum of development across the domain. In this research, a potential consequence of this change was that chief constables were seen as now having less influence within the governance framework. In addition, there was seen to be to be a retreat by central government, the latter seen by some as an attempt by government to distance itself from responsibility in a time of austerity.
The attitude of chief constables as to the demise of ACPO was somewhat sanguine and seen as inevitable. The transition to the NPCC was seen as maintenance of the status quo. PCCs, however saw the removal of ACPO as a more significant event in terms of reforming the governance structure and in effect reducing the traditional power of chief constables. There was a difference in views of HMIC and its role, seen by PCCs as a reactionary influence, whilst chief constables merely lamented the loss of the HMIC role in the selection of chief officers.

“What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in terms of improving the effective delivery of policing and community safety?”

In addition to a significant reduction in bureaucracy for the police as an organisation, and for chief constables personally, the introduction of PCCs was seen by both cohorts to have improved partnership working as regards community safety.

In addition, police accountability frameworks were seen as having improved in terms of effectiveness and openness along with the representation of communities and police engagement with them.

“What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the delivery of effective policing and community safety?”

There was a perceived lack of accountability of individual PCCs and in particular there was an absence of a mechanism to moderate inappropriate behaviour by PCCs. Participants also saw the potential for inappropriate political and party-political influence upon policing. These issues were seen in the context of the potential for the PCC structure to have to have led to, too much power vested in one individual. This coupled with a strong perception of a lack of scrutiny and moderation of PCCs was particularly exemplified by the cases of Sean Wright, PCC for South Yorkshire (Evans,
The view of both chief constables and PCCs was that the PCPs put in place to support and scrutinise the PCCs were ineffective in doing so.

Both cohorts also saw the lack of personal resilience in PCCs leading to strategic vulnerability. This was tragically demonstrated by the death of Bob Jones, PCC for the West Midlands (BBC, 2014) and the consequence of the resignation of Sean Wright, PCC for South Yorkshire (Evans, 2014) which cases highlighted the fact that only the PCC themselves held the electoral mandate to hold the post. There is no statutory replacement for a PCC leaving office between elections, and this may be a vulnerability in the structure.

A positive professional interpersonal relationship between the chief constable and the PCC in a force is essential in delivering effective policing to communities. If a positive relationship does not exist there are risks to effective policing.

The concern around the relationship between chief constables and PCCs was seen by these participants to link to; Risks inherent in the fact that a PCC alone can appoint or dismiss a chief constable. This presents a potential risk in terms of the potential impact upon the professional judgement decision making of chief constables who may feel inappropriately obligated to PCCs. There were also perceived problems inherent in the selection process that has led to a reduced pool of candidates for chief constable posts, coupled to the perception that a disproportionate number of deputy chief constables are being promoted to chief constable in the same force both issues which were also highlighted by Roycroft (2016, pp. 97-99). This was seen as leading
to a reduction in the potential for the best candidates for chief constable to either apply for posts or to have a fair chance of being selected. In respect of the contractual arrangement for chief constables, in particular the pension arrangements that require the completion of 30 years service in order to receive a full pension it was feared that this may lead to younger chief constables being inhibited in their professional judgement and decision making if they felt that their professional and fiscal position were threatened. This, in particular linked to concerns regarding the operational independence of chief constables. These responses supported the early concerns regarding the effect of poor relationships between PCCs and chief constables caused by the comments made to the author by chief constables who declined to participate in this research, in particular the chief constable who called the author to explain that they feared the implications of their PCC learning that they had been a participant (see Chapter five above). Another example was provided when the author and his first supervisor were preparing their submission to the Committee on Standards in Public Life. A chief constable approached them asking if issues could be included in the evidence anonymously as he was not confident in providing the evidence himself because of the implication of his PCC being aware of his comments (Loveday et al, 2014). This was clearly an issue of great concern to chief constables.

These findings were supported in June 2018 when in his evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, Chief HMICFRS Tom Winsor reported his worries that fewer candidates were coming forward for chief constable vacancies, and that this may be connected to a reduction in the ‘professional freedom’ of chief officers and PCCs putting undue pressures upon them. He identified examples such as Greater Manchester Police when in the early 2000’s there were eight candidates for the chief constable post, but under the PCC regime there were only two applicants and when the role of chief constable in West Midlands, the second largest force fell vacant recently, there was only one candidate, the incumbent deputy (Winsor 2018).
The operational independence chief constable was also discussed by the cohort in terms of tactical operational policing delivery. There was a general recognition of the independence of the police in operational response. However, there remained a number of areas of concern where decisions by the PCC could affect the ability of a chief constable to deliver effective policing in decisions that impact upon resourcing elements of operational delivery in particular.

‘What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that may have the potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and community safety?’

The democratic legitimacy of PCCs, questioned by commentators (Loveday 2012, Berman et al, 2012) was completely accepted by both chief constables and PCCs as a fait accompli. However, both cohorts felt that the perception of legitimacy would be improved by increased voter involvement in the electoral process for PCCs. In this regard, participants recommended that strategies including a commitment from government to raise awareness of the role in addition to improved funding for non party-political candidates. More radically, some participants suggested that candidates to be PCCs, in spite of the political nature of the role should not have a party affiliation.

Some participants questioned the governance structure more fundamentally, suggesting other models such as panels with an elected chair.

There was a significant consensus for improvements to be put in place to improve the scrutiny arrangements for PCCs, focusing on the perceived ineffectiveness of PCPs. Discussions in this regard included the consideration of recall arrangements for PCCs.
In recognition of the ‘grey area’ at the margins of police operational independence, there was some support amongst both cohorts for the provision of clarity regarding the parameters of ‘operational independence’. This appears to be more important given the judgement on operational independence in the seminal case R (Crompton) v PCC South Yorkshire QBD 2017.

An important issue as far as chief constables were concerned with some support from PCC participants was the need to address the terms of service, selection and contractual issues pertaining to chief constables. This was seen as in order to minimise the potential detrimental effect upon the confidence of chief constables to make the best professional judgments and decisions even if they do not accord with the views of the PCC, without concerns for their personal professional position. Again, this position was supported by Chief HMICFRS Tom Winsor who highlighted an example of problematic contractual issues affecting chief constables when in 2018, the chief constable of Leicestershire was offered five 12 month contracts (Winsor 2018).

These factors coalesce around the key issue of police operational independence, certainly in his service as a chief police officer, the author experienced the attempts by central government to direct policing, particularly around major incidents such as the widespread riots in 2011 which was highlighted in the public argument in the lead up to the implementation of PCCs between Sir Hugh Orde the chair of ACPO and the then Home Secretary Theresa May. She asserted that she had instructed police to deliver more robust operational tactics (Churcher, 2011). There was certainly a perception by chief officers that the government saw the operational independence of chief constables and their lack of ability to control operational responses as at best an irritation and more often as obstructive to the will of government. This debate has continued into the era of PCC governance where the police are arguably closer to
political control. This was indeed one of the objectives of the policy (Conservative Party, 2010) whereby an increased level of political control was seen as necessary to provide greater public accountability in policing. The effect, demonstrated by this research is that there has been an increased concern that local politicians are able to influence policing to the extent that chief constables are inappropriately influenced in their operational decision making by factors such as their potential employment vulnerability. Where the PCC is affiliated to national political parties, the proportion of which increased in the 2016 PCC elections (Electoral Commission, 2016), there is concern that policing priorities and operational delivery may be skewed according to party political agendas. These concerns are fuelled by a number of factors including the reduction of the pool of chief constable candidates and the concomitant increase in single applicants for chief constable vacancies. Often, the only applicant was the incumbent deputy chief constable within the force (College of Policing, 2019). This combined with an increase in the number of serving chief constables that would need to obtain from the PCC one or more extensions of contract in order to achieve pensionable service this research identifies the increased risk that chief constables will become less likely to robustly assert their professional judgement in the face of an inappropriately assertive PCC to the detriment of communities.

Implications of the Research

The research conducted during this study therefore, when considered against a critical review of the extant literature in the area indicated that the introduction of PCCs as a policing governance model across England and Wales was generally positive. However, there are significant areas of concern that suggest a need for review and change. The implications of the findings for the policing governance structure are significant in terms of identifying a need for a fundamental review of key aspects of the current policing governance structure. These include the issue of police ‘operational independence’, and the way in which the interpersonal relationship between the chief
constable and the PCC has the potential to detrimentally affect the strategic and operational delivery of policing to communities. Participants, in particular chief constables expressed very forcefully their fears regarding the potential vulnerability of chief constables in terms of their ability to make unbiased professional judgements dependant upon their contractual position. This issue should therefore be addressed as a matter of urgency. Other areas for reform identified by this research include scrutiny and monitoring arrangements for PCCs and issues of political legitimacy.

There are a number of issues that arise from this research that merit consideration by decision makers and further research.

Firstly, there is a need for a review of the current structure of police governance which addresses the concern that the PCC as a single executive has too much responsibility. This should examine alternative structures that will provide improved resilience and rationality of decision-making. Potential measures may be the PCC operating as the chair of a panel, and PCC candidates declaring their deputy during the election so that both are elected and therefore both carry a mandate.

Consideration should be given to review of the process for selecting new chief constables that addresses the potential that the sole responsibility for this lying with the PCC has reduced the number of high quality candidates and has led to a disproportionate number of incumbent deputy chief constables being appointed to chief constable posts. This may include reinstating the professional role of HMICFRS or a requirement for partner agency participation at a senior level.

There is a need for a review of the contractual arrangements and career paths of chief police officers in order to minimise the potential detrimental impact upon the professional independence chief constables potentially caused the ability of PCCs to
dispense with chief constables at the end of a contract period or to require them to resign or retire. Potential measures may include the requirement for PCCs who intend to dismiss or end the contract of chief constables to have to demonstrate cause to the satisfaction of the PCP (or any replacement body) and HMICFRS. Either body should have the power to veto the proposal and refer the matter to the Home Secretary. Any dispute of the decision of the Home Secretary advised by HMICFRS should be subject to judicial review. In addition, consideration should be given to contractual arrangements and career structures that reduce the fiscal vulnerability of chief constables in this regard, for example contract period that overlap the electoral tenure of PCCs.

Consideration should be given to providing statutory or regulatory clarification of the status of the concept of police ‘operational independence’ in order that it is clear where and to what extent the concept exists and what responsibility the PCC has to hold the police to account for effective and ethical operational delivery. It may be that this needs to be set in place by a regulation or amendment to the Policing Protocol 2011 (Home Office 2011) that includes an indication as to the skills that the PCC will need to access in order to discharge those responsibilities.

There is a need for a review of scrutiny and monitoring arrangements for PCCs which addresses the need to ensure that the PCC is effectively held to account and that his/her decision making is subject to rigorous scrutiny that ensures the best interests of the community are achieved. Such a review should address the perception of the ineffectiveness of the current PCP arrangements.

A review is required in respect of the arrangements for the election of PCCs in order to address the issues of low voter turnout that gives rise to questions of the democratic legitimacy of the role. In particular there should be consideration regarding voter awareness of the role of the PCC and the timing of elections.
It is suggested by the author that if these issues are addressed, then there are likely to be improvements to the current policing governance structure, making it more effective in delivering policing that balances the needs and expectations of communities with independent professional operational policing judgement.

**Limitations of this Research.**

This was a relatively extensive research project generating over 31 hours of qualitative data from which a rich insight was gained as regards the operation of the current policing governance model from the perspective of the key actors. However, as with all endeavours limitations of time and physical resources intervened. In Chapter four the author discussed his consideration of both quantitative approaches and qualitative methodologies such as ethnographic and hermeneutic strategies. He still takes the view that the strategy to use semi-structured interviews was appropriate. He recognised that whilst interview methodologies can elucidate the perceptions of key actors within a paradigm, they cannot not provide empirical evidence of changes in operational policing delivery. Future research in this area may address this dimension, however in order to have validity it will need to demonstrate causal links between the changed governance structure and operational delivery. This will be challenging, given the wide range of variables that bear upon policing outcomes, including resourcing and wider societal changes.

Another strategy that could have been deployed that may have generated additional or different insights would have been similar semi structured interviews with other players within the tripartite structure and beyond. These may have included central government, HMICFRS, PCPs, local government and indeed the public who are the
recipients of the policing delivered by this governance construct. Such an approach may have provided a greater understanding of the domain from a wider range of actors, and may well have strengthened some of the findings and recommendations, in particular those that related directly to the delivery of policing services. This may be a fertile area for future research, but in the view of the author, this does not detract from the significance of this study that accessed the views of the two key players in this arena in a way that focuses the learning as a contribution to the body of knowledge in this area.

It is unfortunate that the cohort of chief constable participants in this research was self-selecting in that they were those that agreed to be subject to interview. Whilst the research cohort gave valuable rich data upon which rational findings were based, this may have been improved by accessing their more reluctant colleagues. The comments of some of those that declined, in particular the chief constable who took the time to telephone the author to explain their decision strongly suggested that there was a significant group of chief constables who due to concern for the potential consequences did not feel confident in participating. This view was supported in the reports by some of the chief constables interviewed about the negative experiences of many colleagues, some of who had suffered with their health as a consequence.

In any future research in this area, the author takes the view that more work should be done to convince reluctant potential participants to become involved, perhaps by one to one meetings in which the aims and conduct of the research can be discussed and, in particular detailed reassurances can be expressed. In this way, those reluctant potential subjects may be given the confidence to participate with fully informed consent.
An additional factor that may have impacted upon the volume and validity of participant responses is the fact of the author's status as a former chief officer. All participants knew this fact. The author has already discussed the potential for his cognitive biases to affect the interviews, and his strategy for reducing the detrimental impact upon the data collection, such as unconscious self-censorship in the questions asked. It was also recognised that, in particular the chief constables respondents may have been subject to cognitive biases generated by the previous police experience of the researcher, or indeed his previous personal interactions and relationships with them, which may have led to guardedness in their responses. These risks must however be set against the fact that the status of the author undoubtedly facilitated the level of participation of respondents.

In terms of the contemporary saliency of the research to the current position, there may be an argument to have conducted follow up interviews of a large proportion of the participants in this study following the PCC elections in 2016. This was considered in the knowledge of the potential size of such a project and the impact upon the imperative to deliver the thesis in a timely manner. In order to test the potential for such an exercise to significantly change the findings and recommendations in this thesis, the author who is still professionally active within the policing, security and counter terrorism domains has spoken to chief constables and PCCs informally, and it is clear that the issues uncovered in the findings of this research are still current views and concerns. This was further reinforced by the author's attendance at the Policing Governance Summit that took place in June 2018; the currency of the issues was evident in the conference debates and in private conversations (CoPaCC, 2018). However, the author found it significant that the attendees at the summit were predominately PCCs and their chief executives. There were no serving chief constables or representatives of the Home Office, raising the question as to how
engaged the police and the government are in the development of this still new governance structure.

The recent work carried out by Wells (2015) and by Caless and Owens (2016) that involved the interviewing of chief constables and PCCs disclosed findings that closely resonate with those in this thesis. The author therefore took the view that the data remained robust and salient and that there was no imperative for a further round of formal interviews.

**Final Reflections.**

The journey undertaken by the author in this research project has been considerable. Earlier in this thesis he was open about the fact that as a former chief police officer, having worked for 32 years in the governance construct put in place by the Police Act 1964 (Home Office 1964) he was, like other operational police officers, in the early part of his career completely unaware of the role of the police authority. When he assumed more significant positions of leadership he became part of the governance paradigm within his police force. By the end of his police career in 2008, there were discussions within government and academic circles regarding the need for change in the way that policing was governed and held to account. Indeed in 2005, the author had a conversation with David Cameron, then leader of the Conservative opposition following Cameron’s return from the USA when he began to promote the notion of directly elected individuals. It was clear that Mr Cameron was set upon the idea and was not prepared to listen to an alternative view. Therefore when in 2010 the concept became a key plank of the coalition government’s reform programme, the author was volubly sceptical about the whole PCC project, questioning why a structure that, in his view had delivered effective policing for the whole of his career should be changed.
On reflection, from the distance provided by time and in the light of the critical thinking skills acquired during the doctoral programme that has led to this thesis, the author can see his experiences of the tripartite policing governance framework of which he was a part through a different lens. He has discussed in this thesis the potential for his experiences to cause unintentional bias that may skew the findings and the measures that he put in place to avoid this as much as is possible.

In terms of the criticisms of the police authority and of the ACPO, discussed in this thesis, the author can now see exactly those issues in his memories of operating within that paradigm. The police authority was a group of often, well meaning, part time individuals each with an agenda to do good or to feed personal kudos or other ulterior aims. The part time nature of their role meant that they often did not have the capacity to focus on issues at a strategic level. In some cases he questioned their intellectual capacity. The author recalls delivering a briefing to the police authority of his force regarding the policing arrangements for a large-scale public event with very significant security, public order and terrorist risks, including threats to the royal family and visiting international heads of state. He was bemused when one member in all earnestness said;

‘Yes that’s very good, but in one of the roads near me there has been a mattress on the pavement for weeks now and the police have done nothing about it.’ (Personal conversation with the author, 2005)

This was an extreme case, but makes a point as regards the often very low level, parochial nature of the interests represented on the authority.
In terms of engagement with communities, the authority did not see the issue as a priority, the councillor members saw their local mandate as demonstrating their representativeness and the independent members did not see it as their role to represent communities, but to provide skills required by the authority such as financial or business experience.

As far being held to account, the author as a chief officer was part of a governance culture where the ‘board of directors’, the chief officers of the police force did not see the police authority as having any relevance in decision making at either an operational or strategic level. The chief officers set the strategy, wrote the plan and delivered the operational response. Having done so a virtual fait accompli was presented to the authority. The author reflects that he certainly treated individual members of the police authority in a patronising manner often providing them information tailored their ‘pet’ interests in order to develop a supportive rapport. Regularly a tactic employed to obtain police authority buy in was to arrange for a member to sit on various project boards, more to make them part of the process and therefore an advocate for that particular issue on the authority than to benefit from their insights within the project. Chief officers saw it as a key skill to have the ability to articulate in writing or verbally a case in such a way that the authority would accept whatever he/ she was reporting or proposing. There were often conversations with colleagues as to how best to present an issue so as to maximise the chance of the authority agreeing to it. Nothing in this was inappropriate or corrupt in terms of misrepresentation or obfuscation, but there was certainly perceived to be an art in ‘bringing the authority on board’ in order to maximise the potential for them to agree to the proposal in question that were always focussed upon delivering policing benefits to communities. In many ways the authority were seen as an encumbrance, particularly as regards the bureaucratic demand rather than a realistic accountability framework.
Indeed the author and his chief police officer colleagues saw themselves as more accountable to government and HMIC, particularly by way of performance targets. For much of his time as a chief officer, the governing party was New Labour and therefore the predominant approach from the centre was that of ‘New Managerialism’ (Hood, 1995). Each year brought a new suite of performance measures requiring increasingly bureaucratic resources to deliver what appeared to him and colleagues statistics that were largely irrelevant to delivering effective policing to communities. The HMIC provided a regular round of inspections that were focussed as much upon ensuring that government requirements were in place as they were upon whether the public were receiving effective policing.

As a chief officer, the author was active in leading on several national business areas in the investigative and operational policing domains on behalf of ACPO. In his experience, the efforts of ACPO were directed at improving the delivery of policing. However, as an organisation and as individuals ACPO saw the government and police authorities as hurdles to be scaled, or on occasion adversaries to be overcome. This, on reflection he now sees led a less than effective relationship between the three elements key to delivering policing. The demise of ACPO eventually occurred due to the open warfare between the then Home Secretary Theresa May and the Chair of ACPO Hugh Orde (Blackburn, 2011). It is interesting that while participants in this study recognised this explanation for the demise of ACPO, they did not see its replacement body the NPCC as a materially different.

The author therefore, over time saw the need for change in the policing governance paradigm if policing was to be more effective and really accountable to communities. To the extent that he gave any thought to the issue prior to undertaking academic study, he considered that the police authority body should comprise full time members
selected for relevant skills with some form of direct election. Once he had embarked upon this research journey he was attracted to the recommendations of Loveday & Reid (2003) as they are explicitly stated;

‘Police should be made directly accountable to mayors and council leaders’

(ibid p.59)

Rather than the interpretation placed upon that work by David Cameron and the Conservative Party that led to the single directly elected individual model, they had in the words of Carswell (2010) ‘sent for the Sherriff’.

In terms of self-reflection, in addition to the author’s police service being directly relevant to this research, so too is his experience in standing as an independent candidate in the PCC elections in 2016. Having conducted a significant tranche of the research, the author formed the view that he would be able to offer himself as a credible candidate. This was in no regard an attempt at an ethnographic study of the PCC candidature and election process, indeed the author was aware that he had no ethical approval to engage in such research. His reflection on the process therefore will not identify individual rival candidates or their party affiliation, but will be confined to more general reflections upon the process.

The process mitigated against individuals with no support infrastructure such as would be provided by a party political structure or available to independent candidates with significant funding. A candidate for election to parliament, requires 10 persons on the relevant electoral roll to nominate him or her and to deposit £500.00 returnable if the candidate receives 5% of the overall vote, (Electoral Commission 2009). The candidate for PCC, however is required to provide 100 persons on the relevant electoral rolls, and deposit £5000.00 (Electoral Commission, 2016 a). For the author
this was a very significant logistic and financial consideration when deciding whether to stand for PCC. There was a complete lack of government support, including the failure to provide free postage for candidate election material (Electoral Commission 2016). However, the author decided to continue and risked his own funds in the endeavour.

An early, unexpected issue that arose was that an independent candidate is only allowed to describe him/ herself as ‘independent’ on the ballot paper, whereas party political candidates may append their party name against their name on the ballot paper. In his electoral area there were three other independent candidates. He took the view that many voters would either vote upon party lines or would make a decision upon entering the ballot box. He therefore felt the need to differentiate himself against the other independent candidates. This necessitated him either forming a political party himself or joining one that aligned with his strategy. It was too late to do the latter, so he technically joined a party that an existing PCC with whom he was acquainted had set up with himself as the sole member. The name of the party had been constructed so as to describe in headline terms his policy ‘Zero Tolerance Policing, Ex Chief Cop’. In a very broad way it was felt that this gross statement would at least describe to voters the policy and attribute of his candidature. In spite of aligning with a political party registered at the Electoral Commission, no additional funding accrued.

During the election campaign, it proved impossible for the author to effectively communicate across a large geographical area with an enormously diverse demographic of over 1.2 million voters. He worked hard to communicate using print and broadcast media, social media and personal interaction, both in groups and individuals, however it was clear that he would never be able to match the ability of the
large political parties to communicate across the electorate. Indeed at an early stage, the fact that the elections for PCC were being held on the same day as local authority elections was a clear advantage to the large political parties who were able to include in their election material references to their PCC candidate.

The author was particularly dismayed with the other candidates, both independent and party political. None of the candidates, with a single exception (who was the incumbent PCC) had any understanding of issues connected with policing, community safety or security. It was apparent that the party political candidates were constrained by their party policies; this was particularly visible in their attempts to answer questions from members of the public in public fora. As a candidate who was solely focussed upon delivering effective policing, the author was able to provide a response that was not contaminated by national party policy, as was the case for the party candidates. It appeared to the author that their candidature was more about imposing their party’s control upon local policing than addressing real community concerns and needs.

Over time it became clear to the author that the result of the election was a foregone conclusion. Given that there was a dearth of information provided to the public about the role of the PCC, and the fact of the upcoming election, it was likely that voters would in the absence of and information on the specific policies of the PCC candidates vote in accordance with their customary party preference. This apparently proved to be the case. Anecdotal evidence provided to the author by persons known to him acting as returning officers at the polling stations indicated that the majority of voters turned out to vote for their local councillors. They were surprised to be offered an additional ballot paper in respect of the PCC election. A large number of voters indicated that they had no idea what a PCC was, they had heard nothing about the candidates and therefore would vote for their party’s candidate. It was no surprise, therefore that the
candidate for the party that traditionally returns the most MPs across the area provided the successful PCC candidate.

The author accepts that this is an extremely subjective view, and this narrative is not provided in any way in support of his research, but for him it does underline the volatility of the selection process for PCCs which underpins his questioning of the suitability of the PCC structure as the right governance structure for an area as important as policing and community safety.

This research has demonstrated that there have been benefits as a result of the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners. In terms of a greater speed and efficiency in decision-making, reduced bureaucracy, more effective partnership working and a more focussed approach that comes with a full time role. There are, however significant concerns that need to be addressed if the project driven by the Conservative Party of the early 2000’s is to become an effective governance structure that both enables the police to serve and protect communities, while also being effectively held to account.
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Appendix A

Ethical Review Documentation
Introduction

All research involving human participants, animals and/or sensitive data undertaken by students and staff must receive a favourable ethical opinion before it can be undertaken and, if appropriate, subsequently used for publication.

The completion of this ICJS Ethics Self-Assessment Form is the start point for applying for favourable ethical opinion and as such it is a record of the ethical considerations that have been addressed in planning the research proposal.

The ICJS Ethics Self-Assessment Form has 4 sections, all of which must be completed.

Section 1: Student details and proposed research topic

Section 2: Preparation; and details of ethical issues identified in the proposed research

Section 3: Ethical Narrative

Section 4: Ethical Opinion Outcome Record
A copy of this completed Self-Assessment Form should be supplied with your research proposal. It will then be passed on to your dissertation supervisor.

You may not proceed to data collection until you have received a favourable ethical opinion.

Please see the document: ‘How to Apply for Ethical Review’ for the process that you will need to follow in order to receive a favourable ethical opinion.
Section 1: Student details and proposed research topic

Student name: ......Steven A. Watts

Student number:....UP670108

Proposed research topic:

An examination of the impact of the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 on the governance of Policing across England and Wales.

In November 2012, HM Government policy was enacted in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/13/contents/enacted). This established the role of democratically elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) across 41 Police Forces in England and Wales. At the same time the pre existing Police Authorities were disbanded, effectively introducing a completely new paradigm in policing governance across England and Wales.

Secondary legislation in the form of the Policing Protocol Order 2011 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/2744/pdfs/uksi_20112744_en.pdf), set out the way that PCCs, Chief Officers of Police and Police and Crime Panels should exercise their functions in relation to one another, with particular reference to the operational independence of the police.

The Metropolitan Police Service, responsible for the policing of London was not subject to this legislation, and in its case governance of policing was vested in the office of the directly elected Mayor of London.

This research is aimed at identifying developing issues in this changed policing governance structure and how that affects the delivery of policing to communities. In this study it is proposed to conduct semi structured interviews with Chief Constables, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and a representative of the Mayor for London’s ‘Mayor’s office for Policing and Crime’ (MoPaC). Qualitative data in the form of audio recorded interviews will be analysed with a view to providing an insight into effect of the implementation of the new structure, how since the inauguration of PCCs the relationship has developed and how it has affected the way that policing is delivered across their area of responsibility in addition to issues and potential challenges for the future.

This research study is advised by an earlier pilot study involving semi-structured interviews of five Chief Constables in this regard carried out in April 2013 following a favourable ethical review.
Section 2: Preparation and details of ethical issues identified in the proposed research

1. Student has read the British Society of Criminology ethical guidelines.  
   [http://britsoccrim.org/docs/CodeofEthics.pdf]  
   Yes [ X ] No [ ]

2. Student has participated in research ethics sessions (lecture/seminar/workshop/other on-line or face to face activity) provided by their programme of study.  
   Yes [ X ] No [ ]

3. Will the research involve the collection and analysis of primary or secondary data? 
   Primary data  
   Yes [ X ] No [ ]
   Secondary data  
   Yes [ ] No[X]

Note: Secondary data is data that has already been collected by other researchers or an organisation for another purpose. Data may be in the public domain or available under the Freedom of Information Act (2000).

If 'No' to both parts of Q3, go to Q16.

If 'Yes' to both or either parts of Q3, go on to answer ALL of the questions on the following pages.
4. Does proposed research involve face-to-face contact with members of the community (including professionals and those held or 'looked after')?  

   Yes [x]    No [ ]

5. Is access to personal or confidential data sought?  

   Yes [x]    No [ ]

   Note 1: This question applies to both primary and secondary data.

   Note 2: You should be aware that privileged access to contact details or information as a result of a professional role, links to a host organization or personal association is considered to be ethically problematic and arrangements should be made for third party anonymised access.

6. Are you aware of the need to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of research participants?  

   Yes [x]    No [ ]

7. Are there potential risks (to you and/or research subjects) in the research? (If 'Yes', then specify these risks in the spaces provided.)

   Physical risks – to participants  

   Yes [ ]    No [x]  

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Psychological risks – to yourself

Yes [ ] No [x]

………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……..

Compromising situations – to participants

Yes [x ] No [ ]

Views expressed by Chief Constable participants during the interviews may, if the identity of the participant is known give rise to disagreement with the PCC consequently a difficult interpersonal dynamic may arise, and given the fact that the PCC is responsible for appointing and renewing the contract of the Chief Constable, this may give rise to concerns as to their employment security. There is no such issue for the PCCs and MoPaC participants, however since the PCCs are subject to election to their position, and the MoPaC participant represents the elected Mayor for London, they may feel compromised depending upon their responses if they were in the public domain.

Compromising situations – to yourself

Yes [ ] No [x]

………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……..

8. Do you believe you need to deceive research subjects? (e.g. by not being clear about the purpose of your research)

Yes [ ] No [x ]

9. Is there any likely harm to participants involved in the research?

Yes [x ] No [ ]

10. Is participation in the research entirely voluntary?

Yes [x ] No [ ]

11. Have you considered how you are going to obtain informed consent from research participants?

Yes [x ] No [ ]
12. Is there any potential role conflict for you in the research?  Yes [   ]  No [x ]

Note: Role conflict is defined as any contact with a participant who knows you (the researcher) in another capacity. Commonly this is a professional capacity.

13. If you are using secondary data, is the data available in the public domain?

Yes [   ]  No [   ]  Not using secondary data [x]

If “No”, please explain:
- how you have access to the data ..............................................................
- the arrangements you have made with the host organisation/holder of the information to receive the data in an anonymised state which conforms to the Data Protection Act (1998)
  ...........................................................................................................
  ...........................................................................................................
  ...........................................................................................................

14. If access to data outside of the public domain is proposed, have you consulted with your data protection officer?  Yes [   ]  No

N/a

15. Are there any other data protection issues?  Yes [   ]  No [x]

16. Are there any other potential sources of ethical issues or conflict in the proposed research (e.g. political considerations, sensitivity of the topic, reputational issues for researcher, participants and/or host organisation)?  Yes [x ] No

If ‘Yes’, then specify these risks –

This research is focused upon a changed governance paradigm for policing across England and Wales that has been put in place by the Coalition government as part of the Conservative Party Manifesto. As such it is a significant national issue in terms of government policy and given the debate surrounding its appropriateness and effectiveness it is still a live political issue on the national stage. This research and its findings may be picked up and fed into that debate.

Negative risks in this regard will be mitigated by the researcher ensuring that the research is conducted professionally and in accordance with the regulations of the University and in accordance with best practice. At all times the research will be
subject of close scrutiny by the first supervisor Dr Barry Loveday who is an experienced and respected figure in this field.

I confirm that:

• the information provided is a complete and accurate record of my plans at present;
• I have read and understood the process for obtaining a favourable ethical opinion as contained in the document: ‘How to Apply for Ethical Review’; and
• I shall resubmit an amended version of this form should my research alter significantly such that there is any significant variation of ethical risk.

Signed: Steven A Watts................................. Student

Signed: Dr Barry Loveday .......................Research Supervisor

Date: ......January 2015......................

**Advice/ decisions/ responsibilities**

Answers in bold and **underlined** require further consideration as they pose potential ethical issues.

If any of the questions you have require further consideration, you must:

• attach additional details in an Ethical Narrative (see following page) of how you plan to minimize any risks identified; and
• discuss these issues with your dissertation/research supervisor/tutor

Once your dissertation/research supervisor/tutor has agreed that you are ready to apply for ethical review, you must follow the process for obtaining a favourable ethical opinion as contained in the document: ‘How to Apply for Ethical Review’. **You may not proceed to data collection until favourable ethical opinion** has been given by the ICJS Ethics Committee or the Faculty Ethics Committee (FEthC) (as appropriate).
Section 3: Ethical Narrative

Introduction;

In its guidelines, the British Sociological Association state clearly that researchers have;

“...a responsibility both to safeguard the proper interests of those involved in or affected by their work, and to report their findings accurately and truthfully. They need to consider the effects of their involvements and the consequences of their work or its misuse for those they study and other interested parties...” (2002 p.2).

This requirement along with a large body of literature on the subject of ethics in research properly places a responsibility upon the researcher to consider at all stages of the research journey issues that may affect the subjects of that research, stakeholders and the wider community, as well as ensuring the integrity of the methodology and any results reported.

Many professional bodies and authors provide models which are aimed at facilitating ethical practice throughout the research project, there is much debate and advice in respect of issues such as informed consent of subjects, treating them fairly and with respect, to being clear about the nature of the research and how the data will be used. The literature review carried out by the author in the preparation and planning of this research project has significantly raised his awareness of the need to ensure that the research is conducted within a strong ethical framework and has enabled him to put in place a methodology that will maximise the ethical imperative. The narrative will describe the proposed methodology and how this will be conducted within an ethical framework. This application has been prepared in close consultation with the first supervisor Dr Barry Loveday of the ICJS.

Research Methodology;

In order to access qualitative data from Chief Constables, PCCs and a MoPaC representative in respect of their experience of the introduction of a new policing governance paradigm, it is proposed that semi structured interviews are carried out with individuals on a one to one basis. The research will be conducted in accordance with the protocol contained within the research protocol at Appendix 1. This research project was approved on 11/6/14 assessors of the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies.
The interviews will be guided by a template of broad question areas in order to manage the conversation and in an attempt to ensure that the maximum areas of relevance are covered within the time constraints (see Appx 2).

**Selection of the Subjects**

The Chief Constable, PCC and MoPaC participants will be approached directly to seek consent for their involvement. The participants are all high status individuals within the Police governance hierarchy. Many researchers would therefore expect difficulty in obtaining access to them. However, this author is a retired Chief Officer and is personally acquainted with over 25% of Chief Constables in England and Wales and with approximately 20% of PCCs. It is anticipated therefore that access will be forthcoming. However, it is important for the author to consider the potential pressure that subjects may feel to comply with the request for interview and the impact upon their informed consent of the extant personal relationship. It has to be said that the subjects are generally as a group somewhat assertive and resilient, particularly the Chief Constables (Reiner 1991). However in order to minimise this potential ethical issue, the author will be careful to ensure that the subjects do not include individuals with whom he has a close friendship and that within the letter and any supporting briefing it is made absolutely clear that the decision to participate must be informed, free and independent. This is addressed in the wording of the letter of invitation to potential participants (see Appx 3) and the Participant Information Sheet (see Appx 4).

**Participant Consent;**

It is absolutely essential that the participants provide informed consent for the interviews to take place and for the resultant data to be used in accordance with the research protocol (see Appx. 1). The researcher will ensure that the participant fully understands the proposed conduct of the research and how the data will be used.

Informed consent by the participant will be recorded at immediately prior to the interview taking place, the participant having read the Participant Information Sheet (see Appx 4) and the researcher having explained it to the participant and his inviting the participant to raise any issues or concerns. Once the participant is content they will be invited to sign the Participant Consent Form (Appx. 5).

**Sensitivity of the Topic**

The need to consider sensitivity in a topic under research is relative to the potential impact upon the participant which will always be subjective;
‘...a sensitive topic is one that potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, the emergence of which renders problematic for the researcher and/ or the researched the collection, holding and/ or dissemination of research data.’ (Renzetti and Lee, 1993, p.5).

Considerations regarding the Chief Constables;

The Policing Protocol Order (Home Office 2011) makes a requirement for a close working relationship between the PCC charged with driving a policing strategy that meets the needs of local communities. The Chief Constable is charged with delivering an efficient and effective policing response. In pragmatic terms, in order for the Chief Constable to deliver, he/ she needs a positive working relationship with the PCC. In addition at a more individual level, Chief Constables are subject to time limited contracts of employment, and the PCC is the appointing authority who has the power to decide whether or not to renew that contract, or in cases of discipline whether to dismiss the Chief Constable. It is reasonable to anticipate therefore that the Chief Constables who are subject of this research may be concerned as to their position and their relationship with the PCC into the future if their views are put into the public domain. Indeed, this is also a concern as to the validity of the research itself in terms of the potential for subjects to be reluctant or inhibited in their responses. This provides an additional imperative to minimise the potential for the subject’s participation to impact upon that important professional relationship.

It is not proposed to approach the PCC to seek permission to interview the Chief Constable participants for the reasons explored above. The relationship is such that statutorily although the PCC appoints the Chief Constable, he/ she is not in a legal sense the employer of the Chief Constable who is an independent officer of the crown. To inform the PCC would compromise the strategy to ensure the anonymity of the Chief Constable participants and this is a significant motivation against doing do.

The author recognises that in part the decision not to approach the PCC may be driven by a concern that he/ she may veto the research by putting pressure upon the Chief Constable not to take part. However, this is a subordinate concern to that of protecting the identity of the Chief Constable participant.

Maintenance of confidentiality is therefore critical for the Chief Constable participants, and the measures to provide this will be discussed below.

Considerations regarding the Police and Crime Commissioners and MoPaC Representative;

The PCC and the MoPaC representatives are statutorily separated from the Police hierarchy, and indeed they appoint Chief Constables as well as renewing their contracts, it is therefore not the case that they would be vulnerable in that regard, however research to date has indicated that the interpersonal relationship between the Chief Constable and PCC is critical. It is therefore important from this perspective to maintain the confidentiality of the PCC/ MoPaC participants so as not to compromise that working relationship.
In addition, as alluded to above, the PCCs and the Mayor of London are subject to election to their positions and it is important that their comments are not inappropriately put into the public domain without their informed consent.

Maintenance of confidentiality is also therefore critical for the PCC and MoPaC participants, the measures to provide this are discussed below.

**Participant Confidentiality**

In view of the potential serious detrimental impact upon the participants and indeed potentially confidence in the policing governance framework, if the participation of individuals and/or their comments were made known in the public domain, confidentiality of the data and anonymity of the subjects will be a crucial issue in this study.

The author addresses these issues in some detail in the letter of invitation to potential participants (see Appx 3), highlighting them to ensure that they are considered by the participant prior to engaging in the research. The letter and Participant Information Sheet (Appx 4) detail the measures that will be taken to ensure anonymity. These measures will need to be relatively sophisticated given the small number of potential subjects nationally. The measures to be adopted will be;

+ When approaching the potential participant for interview, in order to maintain confidentiality, given the sensitivity of the subject matter it will be important to confine any approach to the participant and/or trusted staff members. Approaches will, therefore be made by the author in a letter (as at Appendix 3) directly to the individual, or via the Personal Assistant (PA) or Staff Officer. Both these members of the participant’s staff work closely with him/her and are very experienced in maintaining confidentiality in respect of their principal. They will be clearly advised of the need for confidentiality.

+ The interviews will be conducted in a manner that does not compromise the participant. In particular, it will not be necessary for the author to identify himself as a researcher to individuals or staff who have no legitimate interest in knowing the purpose save the participant and his/her PA or Staff Officer.

+ Personal data will be kept in secure IT which is password protected and only accessible to the author and his academic supervisors. Personal data will be managed in a manner compliant with the Data Protection Act 1998.

+ Subjects may be concerned about the proposal for the interviews to be audio recorded, or the use of an online communication such as ‘Skype’. Measures to secure the digital material produced will be put in place to control very tightly access to the recordings. The digital recordings will be secured within password protected devices to which the researcher has sole access.
+ It must be anticipated that some participants may object to the interview being recorded. In those circumstances, the author will be sensitive to those concerns and he will need to be flexible to the extent of not insisting on recording the interview, but reverting to note taking.

+ No reference will be made in any report or document arising from study that identifies or tends to identify any individual. This includes no reference to gender, ethnicity, age, policing or other professional experience, geographical location any other factor that may allow readers to narrow down the identity of the participant in a relatively small pool.

+ It is recognised that in some cases, a verbatim quote could inadvertently give clues to the participant’s identity. Should it be considered necessary to include in any report verbatim quotes by the participant, these will be recorded in such a way that there can be no direct or indirect identification of the participant. In addition, the quote will be discussed with the participant and only included with his/ her consent.

+ Should the report be submitted for publication outside of my academic supervisors, then the participant will be provided with a copy of the draft publication with a view to identifying and removing any text that may tend to identify them as an individual.

+ All documents, records and recordings made will be securely stored within a password protected device, or in secure storage to which only the author and his academic supervisors have access.

**Political Considerations:**

This research is focused upon a changed governance paradigm for policing across England and Wales that has been put in place by the Coalition government as part of the Conservative Party Manifesto. As such it is a significant national issue in terms of government policy and given the debate surrounding its appropriateness and effectiveness it is still a live political issue on the national stage. This research and its findings may be picked up and fed into that debate.

Negative risks in this regard will be mitigated by the researcher ensuring that the research is conducted professionally and in accordance with the regulations of the University and in accordance with best practice. At all times the research will be subject of close scrutiny by the first supervisor Dr Barry Loveday who is an experienced and respected figure in this field.

**Inappropriate Disclosures:**

The legal position of the researcher in respect of the disclosure of criminal matters by subjects during interviews is very clear. There is no principle of legal confidentiality and any such disclosures will be dealt
with by reporting to the appropriate authority. However, given the position and status of the individuals concerned, this eventuality is very unlikely.

Ownership of Research Data;

The issue of the ownership of the data obtained during a research project is crucial. In accordance with the guidance issued by the UK Research Integrity Office at 3.10 of its policy on retention of data:


The issue will be established within the participant consent process. The data will remain the property of the University of Portsmouth with the caveat that in that the data will be available for review by the participant who may withdraw consent up until the point that the data has been analysed.

Conclusion;

This is a research project that is not without potentially significant ethical considerations. In the submission of the author those considerations have been identified and in so far as is possible the risks have been effectively mitigated.

This project has the potential to uncover significant knowledge in respect of the operation of a new governance paradigm in policing across England and Wales. It is asserted therefore that the ethical considerations are proportionate to the project that is proposed and are appropriately managed.

References;


Researcher name: Steven Alec Watts (UP670108)

Supervisor name: Dr Barry Loveday

Project title:

‘Yes Prime Minister'; An Examination of the impact of the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 on the governance of Policing across England and Wales'.

Brief summary of the project:

This research will seek to identify what the impact has been on Policing governance at a strategic and operational level following the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012.

The knowledge obtained will enable an assessment of the level of success of the change in governance and it will, potentially identify amendments or changes that have the potential be relevant in the strategic framework and/ or day to day functioning of the governance arrangements. This study has the potential to improve the delivery of policing and community safety.

In the 1950s, scandals arose involving English police forces governed then by local ‘Watch Committees’. Officials were allegedly exerting an undue and corrupt influence on local policing. This prompted a Royal Commission into Policing with a remit to review the constitutional position of the police (Home Office, 1962). The findings led to the Police Act 1964 that introduced Police Authorities, governance bodies, comprising committees of local councillors, magistrates and independent members responsible for scrutinising and holding Police Forces to account (Home Office, 1964). Police Authorities formed part of
the ‘tripartite system’ of police governance (Lustgarten, 1986 p.113, Mawby & Wright, 2003, pp.169-195) where responsibility was shared between Police Authorities, central government, and chief police officers, the latter responsible for operational delivery.

Prior to the 2010 UK elections, the Conservative Party Manifesto made a commitment to introduce;

‘...a directly elected individual who will set policing priorities for local communities’ (Conservative Party, 2010 p.57).

In November 2012 Police Authorities were dissolved by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011), local directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) were established in their place across 41 Police Forces in England and Wales.

In April 2013, a qualitative pilot study in this field was conducted by the author exploring early indications of the impact of the change. That research focussed upon five Chief Constables. The cohort had been directly affected by the change, working now with a PCC, who has a de facto democratic mandate to deliver policing and crime reduction (Home Office 2011a), in a way that was not the case with Police Authorities, whose remit was confined to scrutiny of the Chief Officer in respect of his/ her delivery of efficient and effective policing (Home Office, 1994), and under whose scrutiny they had previously worked for their entire police service.

The study, an analysis of semi structured interviews, found that the cohort of Chief Constables took the view that the change in governance had not been as difficult as they had expected, though there were reports of colleague Chief officers having had more negative experiences. The cohort were, however concerned about how the situation may develop into the future.

The research suggested that the interpersonal relationship between the PCC and the Chief Constable is crucial in the way that the Police Force is directed particularly in terms of policy and operational deployments. Concerns were evident as to whether the ability for the PCC to recruit their Chief Constable, and their remit to continue or end the Chief Constable’s fixed term contract will mean that the relationship into the future may become one of Master/ Servant driving a further blurring of the line in the sand of operational independence, a distinction seen as critical by the Chief police officer cohort.
This research will build upon the pilot study, adopting a similar qualitative approach to data collection and analysis, involving semi-structured interviews of Chief Police Officers, along with similar interviews of serving Police and Crime Commissioners and a representative of the Mayor for London Office of Policing and Crime.

The results of the research will enable an enhanced understanding of the changes to the policing governance framework and its impact upon the delivery of policing and community safety. It is anticipated that issues will be identified that may allow recommendations for change to be made with a view to improving service delivery. The potential for useful recommendations to be made in this regard means that the research is of importance and has the potential to significantly contribute to the body of knowledge.

The audience for this study, in addition to the academic criminology community, will be national and local actors in policing and community safety including government, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, the Association of Chief Police Officers and the College of Policing as well as individual Police and Crime Commissioners, Police Officers and staff and local partner agencies with an interest in community safety.

It is also likely that the findings may potentially be of interest to the broadcast and print media given the criticality of the subject to communities, in this regard consideration will need to be given to the management of any communication of the findings, particularly if a publication ensues.

**Project aims and outcomes:**

The overarching objective of this research is to gain an understanding of the way in which the governance paradigm in policing across England and Wales has changed, what it now means for the effective delivery of policing and community safety, and the key issues from the perspective of significant actors that have arisen since the introduction of the role of Police and Crime Commissioner. Having addressed research questions around the impact of the new governance paradigm, the study will go on to identify potential recommendations for changes or improvements that may improve underlying policing delivery.
There is a paucity of literature looking at the way in which the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners has impacted on governance and on the delivery of policing. Those reviews that have been written following the first anniversary of the Police and Crime Commissioners taking up their roles have focussed upon public consciousness of the role (Gilmore, 2013) or take the form of governmental reviews of effectiveness in setting budgets or holding Chief Officers to account (Home Office, 2014). There is some insight into the views of the views of Commissioners in a collection of essays drawn together by the Policy Exchange (Chambers, 2013). In addition, the relationship between Police and Crime Commissioners and the body set up to support the Commissioners and to scrutinise their activities; Police and Crime Panels is examined in a report by the Centre for Public Scrutiny (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2014). However, there is no academic work on the way in which the new governance structure is working in practice and how professionals perceive the way in which the new paradigm has affected the delivery of policing and community safety in a professional context. This research will address that apparent gap.

The research questions for this study are;

1. What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across England and Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a strategic and operational level?
2. What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in terms of improving the effective delivery of policing and community safety?
3. What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the delivery of effective policing and community safety?
4. What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that may have the potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and community safety?

**Summary of design and methods:**

In this study, qualitative techniques, semi structured interviews will be used so as to fully understand the issues.

A semi-structured interview model (Noakes and Wincup, 2004) will be used to obtain data from cohorts of Chief Police Officers and Police and Crime Commissioners. There will also be consideration of interviewing the head of the London Mayor’s office for Policing & Crime (MOPAC), which in fact represents the model of policing governance recommended by Loveday & Reid (2003).

The semi-structured interview is the most appropriate method, given that the participants are part of a small population discussing a subject in respect of which they have a good understanding Bryman & Bell (2003).
The sampling of participants will ‘purposeful’ in nature, where the participants selected are those likely to be most productive in answering the research question (Marshall, 1998, p.523). In terms of the size of the cohort, this will be determined in discussion with the first supervisor, balancing the need to obtain a sufficient body of data against the pragmatic constraints of the real world. The entire population of this group is, however only 41 Chief Constables and 41 Police and Crime Commissioners and one representative of the London Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime.

In the context of this study in respect of the impact of Police and Crime Commissioners on policing governance, the author has constructed a range of question areas that address the research aims, and in doing so he will draw upon the themes identified by the pilot study emerging from qualitative interviews. This approach has the potential to elicit rich data from interviews that can allow an exploration of the perceptions of the key actors in the governance paradigm, and enable comparisons of those themes across the governance environment using techniques appropriate to qualitative data sets.

Participants:

The Chief Constable, PCC and MoPaC participants will be approached directly to seek consent for their involvement. The participants are all high status individuals within the Police governance hierarchy. In terms of the provision of permission, all individuals have the authority to provide consent to their participation in the research without reference to others, there are therefore no ‘gatekeeper’ issues.

Many researchers would expect difficulty in obtaining access to individuals from such a high status cohort. However, the researcher is a retired Chief Officer and is personally acquainted with over 25% of Chief Constables in England and Wales and with approximately 20% of PCCs. It is anticipated therefore that access will be forthcoming. Given this fact, it is important for the author to consider the potential pressure that subjects may feel to comply with the request for interview and the impact upon their informed consent. It has to be said that the subjects are generally as a group somewhat assertive and resilient, particularly the Chief Constables (Reiner 1991). However in order to minimise this potential ethical issue, the author will be careful to ensure that the subjects do not include individuals with whom he has a close friendship and that within the letter and any supporting briefing it is made absolutely clear that the decision to participate must be informed, free and independent. This is addressed in the wording of the letter of invitation to potential participants (see Appx 3) and the Participant Information Sheet (see Appx 4).
Participant Consent;

It is absolutely essential that the participants provide informed consent for the interviews to take place and for the resultant data to be used in an ethical context. The researcher will ensure that the participant fully understands the proposed conduct of the research and how the data will be used.

Informed consent by the participant will be recorded at immediately prior to the interview taking place, the participant having read the Participant Information Sheet (see Appx 4) and the researcher having explained it to the participant and his inviting the participant to raise any issues or concerns. Once the participant is content they will be invited to sign the Participant Consent Form (Appx. 5).

Summary of known ethical concerns and strategies to manage these:

This study will utilise a qualitative approach that requires semi-structured interviews of Chief Police Officers and Police and Crime Commissioners. Intuitively a research project looking at issues of policing governance may be seen as relatively anodyne and lacking in any sensitivity as far as the subjects are concerned. However, the need to consider sensitivity in a topic under research is relative to the potential impact upon the participant which will always be subjective; ‘...a sensitive topic is one that potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, the emergence of which renders problematic for the researcher and/ or the researched…’ (Renzetti and Lee, 1993, p.5).

The Policing Protocol Order (Home Office 2011) establishes the requirement for a close working relationship between the PCC charged with driving a policing strategy that meets the needs of local communities and the Chief Constable charged with delivering an efficient and effective policing response. In pragmatic terms, in order for the Chief Constable to deliver, he/ she needs a positive working relationship with the PCC. In addition at a more individual level, Chief Constables are subject to time limited contracts of employment defined by Regulation 11 of the Police Regulations 2003 (Home Office 2003) and the PCC is the appointing authority he/ she has the power to decide whether or not to renew that contract. It is, therefore reasonable to anticipate that the Chief Constables, subject of this research may be concerned as to their position and their relationship with the PCC into the future if their views are put into the public domain. In addition, PCCs are likely to have concerns as to how some of their comments if made known will affect their ability to operate effectively. In this regard therefore, confidentiality of the data and anonymity of the subjects will be a crucial issue.
The author will directly address these issues in the letter to potential subjects, (Appendix 3) highlighting the issue to ensure that both the general ethical issues and those specific to the PCC/Chief Constable dynamic are considered by the participant in order to ensure informed consent is provided. In addition, the letter and Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 4) will also detail the measures that will be taken to ensure anonymity including the security of physical notes and audio recordings. These measures will be relatively sophisticated given the small number of potential subjects nationally, for example reports and documents (other than consent forms) will not contain reference to name, gender, ethnicity, length of service or geographical location of their area of responsibility. In recognition of the fact that the cohort of participants is so small that small details may by triangulation enable the identification of the participants not only will the demographic details of the participants be excluded from reports, so also will direct quotations. In circumstances when it appears to the researcher that it would be helpful to include a direct quote from a participant, care will be taken to ensure that it does not contain any information that may tend to identify the participant, and the quote (in the context of the surrounding narrative) will, as discussed in the ‘Information to Participants’ form, (Appendix 4) be offered for review by the participant to ensure that he/she is content that the material does not identify them to a degree that causes them concern.

The PCC and the MoPaC representatives are statutorily separated from the Police hierarchy, and indeed they appoint Chief Constables as well as renewing their contracts, it is therefore not the case that they would be vulnerable in that regard, however research to date has indicated that the interpersonal relationship between the Chief Constable and PCC is critical. It is therefore important from this perspective to maintain the confidentiality of the PCC/MoPaC participants so as not to compromise that working relationship.

In addition, as alluded to above, the PCCs and the Mayor of London are subject to election to their positions and it is important that their comments are not inappropriately put into the public domain without their informed consent. Maintenance of confidentiality is also therefore critical for the PCC and MoPaC participants, the measures to provide this are the same as those discussed above in respect of Chief Constables; reports and documents (other than consent forms) will not contain reference to name, gender, ethnicity, length of service or geographical location of their area of responsibility. Not only will the demographic details of the participants be excluded from reports, so will direct quotations. In circumstances when it appears to the researcher that it would be helpful to include a direct quote from a participant, care will be taken to ensure that it does not contain any information that may tend to identify the participant, and the quote (in the context of the surrounding narrative) will, as discussed in the ‘Information to Participants’ form, (Appendix 4) be offered for review by the participant to ensure that he/she is content that the material does not identify them to a degree that causes them concern.
Access to Participants;

It is not proposed to approach the PCC to seek permission to interview the Chief Constable subject for the reasons explored above. The relationship is such that statutorily although the PCC appoints the Chief Constable, he/she is not in a legal sense the employer of the Chief Constable who is an independent officer of the crown. To inform the PCC would compromise the strategy to ensure the anonymity of the Chief Constable participants and this is a significant motivation against doing do.

The author recognises that in part the decision not to approach the PCC may be driven by a concern that he/she may veto the research by putting pressure upon the Chief Constable not to take part. However, this is a subordinate concern to that of protecting the identity of the Chief Constable participant.

Maintenance of confidentiality is, as discussed above critical for all potential participants, Approaches will, therefore be made by the author in a letter (as at Appendix 3) directly to the potential participant, or via the Personal Assistant (PA) or Staff Officer. Both these members of the participant’s staff work closely with him/her and are very experienced in maintaining confidentiality in respect of their principal. They will be clearly advised of the need for confidentiality by a personal briefing by the researcher in this regard before the letter is sent to them.

Management & Security of Data;

The data acquired in this project becomes and remains the property of the University of Portsmouth, and this will be made clear to the participant in the ‘Participant Information form’;

‘Up to and during the interview you may withdraw at any time, this is also the case immediately following the interview. However once the data has been analysed and coded it may not be possible to extract that material. By that time, however, the data will be anonymised’

The preceding discussion identified the ethical considerations that are particular to this proposed cohort of high status and low population of participants and the imperative to ensure that effective measures are put in place to ensure anonymity of the participants in the data collection phase.

It is equally important to put in place a regime that means that once acquired, the data is handled and stored in a secure manner that ensures anonymity for the participants and at the same time is in
accordance with best practice of the University of Portsmouth and in respect of material that contains personal information, complies with the Data Protection Act 1998. (Home Office, 1998). The Act requires that;

Personal Information must be:

- Fairly and lawfully processed
- Processed for specified purposes
- Adequate, relevant and not excessive
- Accurate and up-to-date
- Not kept for longer than is necessary
- Processed in line with individuals’ rights
- Secure
- Not transferred outside the European Economic Area without adequate protection.

In order to comply with these ethical and legal requirements to use the personal data acquired during this research project, the researcher will ensure that the data is handled in accordance with the requirements of the act and in particular ensure its security.

The digital material, including audio recordings and textual notes or reports will be held in password protected devices to which only he and his academic supervisors have access.

Documentary material including consent forms and copies of letters to participants will be secured in locked cabinets to which only he and his academic supervisors have access.

Material containing personal information will only be accessed by the researcher and academic supervisors, who have a need to verify the veracity of the research. Following the completion of his degree, should there be a requirement for the data acquired to be used for further research, the only data that will be accessed for that purpose will be that which has been anonymised.

All material will be retained for at least 7 years after which it will be securely destroyed, in the case of the consent forms, they will be securely retained for 30 years.

Finally, application will be made for the resultant thesis produced in this project will be placed under restriction in the University of Portsmouth library.
Conclusion;

The author is confident that by adhering to the principles described in this research protocol, that this significant research may be conducted and written up in an ethical manner with proper consideration for all participants who will be given full information before being asked to provide informed consent to their participation.

Given the very real issues attached to the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants, effective measures are in place to maintain confidentiality as to the identity and comments made by participants. In addition, the personal information and data acquired during this research will be handled and stored in a secure manner that accords with the requirements of the University and the Data Protection Act 1998.

References


Appendix B

Letter of Invitation to Chief Constable Participants
Dear Chief Constable,

I am Steven A. Watts, a Professional Doctorate student at the University of Portsmouth Institute of Criminal Justice Studies.

I was, until September 2008 a serving Chief Police Officer, retiring as Assistant Chief Constable ‘Specialist Operations’ of the Hampshire Constabulary with 31 years service.

I would like to invite you to participate in a research study which is focused upon the changes in policing governance following the implementation of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, and the Policing Protocol Order 2011 which in November 2012...
established the role of democratically elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) across 41 Police Forces in England and Wales.

This research is aimed at identifying developing issues in this changed policing governance structure and how that may have affected the delivery of policing to communities. The findings will contribute to the production of my thesis in partial fulfilment of my Doctorate. It may be that the findings and any recommendations that arise will be reported in an article within an academic journal. It is anticipated this research will add to the body of knowledge in relation to policing governance models and their effect.

The study is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, and the project has been approved by the University in terms of both its academic and ethical approach.

I am supervised in this study by Dr Barry Loveday, a senior member of the Institute.

Chief Constables, have been significantly affected by this change in governance and they now need to work with the local Police and Crime Commissioner to deliver policing across their communities. In this study it is proposed to conduct semi structured interviews with Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners to obtain qualitative data that may provide an insight into perceptions prior to the implementation of the new structure, how since the inauguration of PCCs the relationship has developed and how it has affected, or not the way that policing is delivered across communities as well as the issues and potential challenges for the future.

I recognise that some Chief Constables may be concerned about being involved in such a project, given the importance of the Chief Constable maintaining a positive working relationship with their PCC. There may be understandable concerns that comments made by them as part of the research may potentially impact upon that relationship. I take this issue very seriously, and measures are in place to ensure that absolute anonymity of the participants is maintained. Those measures are described in detail in the attached Information sheet. The information sheet also provides a full resume of the conduct of the research and how the data will be used.

Participation in this research project is entirely voluntary, and prior to its commencement you will be invited to sign a consent form, a copy of which is attached. Withdrawal from the project can be facilitated at any time up to the point of data analysis.
I anticipate that the interview will take no more than one hour to complete.

Should you have any queries at all, please do not hesitate to contact me at the above e mail or by telephone on the number provided. You may also contact my supervisor Dr Barry Loveday, if you so wish his contact details are on the attached Information sheet.

If you are content to become a participant in this project, I would be grateful if your PA or Staff Officer could contact me on the above e mail so that we may arrange a convenient time and place to meet and conduct the interview.

Thank you for taking the time to read this letter and, if you chose to participate I look forward to meeting you.

Yours Sincerely

Steven A. Watts MSc, D.Crim. (Cantab) DPM, FCMI, FSyl
Appendix C

Letter of Invitation to Police and Crime Commissioner Participants
Dear Police and Crime Commissioner,

I am Steven A. Watts, currently a Professional Doctorate student at the University of Portsmouth Institute of Criminal Justice Studies.

I was, until September 2008 a serving Chief Police Officer, retiring as Assistant Chief Constable ‘Specialist Operations’ of the Hampshire Constabulary with 31 years service.

I would like to invite you to participate in a research study which is focused upon the changes in policing governance following the implementation of the Police Reform and Social Governance across England and Wales.


Steven A. Watts MSc, D.Crim. (Cantab) DPM, FCMI, FSyl
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies
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Fax: 
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3939
Email:
up670108@port.ac.uk

This research is aimed at identifying developing issues in this changed policing governance structure and how that may have affected the delivery of policing to communities. The findings will contribute to the production of my thesis in partial fulfilment of my Doctorate. It may be that the findings and any recommendations that arise will be reported in an article within an academic journal. It is anticipated this research will add to the body of knowledge in relation to policing governance models and their effect.

The study is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, and the project has been approved by the University in terms of both its academic and ethical approach.

I am supervised in this study by Dr Barry Loveday, a senior member of the Institute.

The change in governance means that Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioner need to work together to deliver policing across their communities. In this study it is proposed to conduct semi structured interviews with Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners to obtain qualitative data that may provide an insight into perceptions prior to the implementation of the new structure, how since the inauguration of PCCs the relationship has developed and how it has affected, or not the way that policing is delivered across their communities as well as the issues and potential challenges for the future.

I recognise that some Commissioners may be concerned about being involved in such a project, given the importance of PCCs and Chief Constables maintaining a positive working relationship. There may be understandable concerns that comments made by them as part of the research may potentially impact upon that relationship. I take this issue very seriously, and measures are in place to ensure that absolute anonymity of the participants is maintained. Those measures are described in detail in the attached Information sheet. The information sheet also provides a full resume of the conduct of the research and how the data will be managed and used.

Participation in this research project is entirely voluntary, and prior to its commencement you will be invited to sign a consent form, a copy of which is attached. Withdrawal from the project can be facilitated at any time up to the point of data analysis.
I anticipate that the interview will take no more than one hour to complete.

Should you have any queries at all, please do not hesitate to contact me at the above e mail or by telephone on the number provided. You may also contact my supervisor Dr Barry Loveday, if you so wish his contact details are on the attached Information sheet.

If you are content to become a participant in this project, I would be grateful if you or your representative could contact me on the above e mail so that we may arrange a convenient time and place to conduct the interview.

Thank you for taking the time to read this letter and, if you chose to participate I look forward to meeting you.

Yours Sincerely

Steven A. Watts MSc, D.Crim. (Cantab) DPM, FCMI, FSyl
Appendix D

Participant Information Sheet
Participant Information Sheet

Interview Participants

Study Title:

Researcher;
Steven A. Watts MSC, D.Crim (Cantab), DPM, FCMI, FSyl.

I would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you decide it is important that you understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. If after reading this document you have any queries or require clarification please do not hesitate ask.

The study is being carried out under the control and supervision of the University of Portsmouth Institute of Criminal Justice Studies. I am the researcher and my details are above. I am a Professional Doctorate Student based at the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies of the University of Portsmouth. My Academic Supervisor in this project is Dr Barry Loveday who is based at the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Portsmouth. We would both be happy to answer questions or provide clarification if required.

The purpose of the study
This study forms a part of my Doctoral Thesis that will be examined by the University of Portsmouth.

The research is aimed at identifying developing issues following the changed policing governance structures consequent upon the implementation of the legislation that introduced the position of Police and Crime Commissioners. In particular it will examine the professional relationship between Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners and the extent to which that has affected the delivery of policing to communities.
The findings will contribute to the production of a Doctoral Thesis and, if appropriate the publication of articles in academic journals based upon those findings.

This research and any recommendations that arise will, it is anticipated add to the body of knowledge in relation to policing governance models across England and Wales.

**Why have you been invited?**
Chief Constables now need to work with the Police and Crime Commissioner to deliver policing across their communities. You are therefore in a key position to contribute to this research.

It is proposed to conduct semi-structured interviews with Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners to obtain qualitative data that may provide an insight into perceptions prior to the implementation of the new structure, how the professional relationship between Chief Constables and PCCs has developed since the inauguration of PCCs and how it has affected, or not the way that policing is delivered across communities, as well as the issues and potential challenges for the future.

**Do you have to take part?**
No.

Taking part in the research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether to join the study. Prior to conducting the interview, I will describe the study and go through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a consent form.

**What will happen to me during the study**
If you agree to take part in the study, I will make arrangements with you or a representative that you may nominate for a convenient time and place for an interview to take place. The arrangements are entirely at your discretion and may be changed at any time. The interviews would ideally be face to face, but may be conducted by telephone, or video conferencing if necessary.

The interview will take no more than one hour, and will involve me asking you some open questions and inviting your response to them.

I propose to record the interview and to take trigger notes. Details as to the security of the recording are mentioned below. You may decline to be recorded during the interview and this fact will be noted on the consent form. In those circumstances I would make written notes.

**What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?**
Participating in the study may cause you inconvenience, I do appreciate your taking the time to support this research and I will do all that I can to minimise any inconvenience to you.

I also recognise that you may be concerned about being involved in such a project, given the importance of the Chief Constables and PCCs maintaining a positive working relationship. You may have understandable concerns that comments made as part of the interview may potentially impact upon that relationship. I take this issue very seriously, and measures are in place to ensure that your anonymity is maintained.

**What are the possible benefits of taking part?**
It would be quite wrong for me to make unrealistic claims for this research, but it is of considerable significance given the importance to policing and community safety, and it is hoped that the findings will take forward the understanding of how the governance framework delivers community safety.

Any insights gained into how this fundamental change in policing governance is working will increase our understanding of how that impacts upon the delivery of policing to communities and may lead to recommendations for improvements. I hope that you will be keen to contribute to that progress in knowledge.

**Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?**

Yes, confidentiality is of utmost importance in this study, recognising the criticality of the Chief Constable, PCC relationship. I am very aware of the fact that you are part of a very small cohort of potential participants, each with a local and national profile, and therefore any indication of personal or professional details may enable your identity to be deduced. The following measures will, therefore, be put in place in order to so far as is possible maintain confidentiality of your comments and your anonymity;

1. No reference will be made in any report or document arising from this study that identifies or tends to identify any individual. This includes no reference to gender, ethnicity, age, policing experience, geographical location any other factor that may allow readers to narrow down the identity of the respondent in a relatively small pool.

2. Should I consider it important to include in any report verbatim quotes by you, these will be discussed with you and only included with your consent. It is recognised that in some cases a verbatim quote could inadvertently give clues to the participant’s identity.

3. Should the report be submitted for any sort of publication outside of my academic supervisors, then you will be provided with a copy of the draft publication with a view to you identifying and removing any text that may tend to identify you as an individual.

4. Any recordings made will be securely stored within a password protected device to which only my academic supervisors and I have access.

5. Documents produced by the research including consent forms will be securely retained for 30 years and the data in electronic for 7 years.

6. If you join the study, it is possible that some of the data collected will be viewed by authorised academic staff working under the authority of the University in order to check that the study has been carried out correctly and to ensure its validity. All will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant.

Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained during and after the study.

**What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with my participation in the study?**

Up to and during the interview you may withdraw at any time, this is also the case immediately following the interview. However once the data has been analysed and coded it may not be possible to extract that material. By that time, however the data will be anonymised.
What if there is a problem?
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to me, or ask to speak to my supervisor, who will do their best to answer your questions (contact details below). If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this directly to the Institute Manager or the University Complaints Officer.

What will happen to the results of the research study?
This study will be analysed and written up before being submitted as part of a thesis to academic supervisors for assessment. It may at a future date be refined and submitted for publication. If this happens you will be contacted and be given sight of the draft publication so that you can consider whether you are content that the text does not identify you as an individual, and if so ask for its amendment.

Who is organising and funding the research?
This study is organised entirely by myself at my own expense, no other organisation or individual has any interest in it financial or otherwise. The research is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth this means that it will be subject to proper supervision and insurance. The research is for academic purposes and no other organisation is involved in any way.

Who has reviewed the study?
Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of people, the Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given a favourable opinion by the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies Research Ethics Committee.

Further information and contact details
The researcher Steven A Watts can be contacted at:

Institute of Criminal Justice Studies
Ravelin House
Museum Road
Portsmouth
Hampshire
PO1 2QQ

Telephone:
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3933

Fax:
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3939

Email: up670108@port.ac.uk

Should you wish to contact the supervisor of this research, Dr Barry Loveday or the head of department at The University of Portsmouth Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, you may do so using the contact below;

The Institute Manager
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies
Ravelin House
Museum Road
Thank you for taking the time to read and consider this proposal, if you decide to participate in the study you will be asked to sign a copy of this form, and a consent form, copies of which will be provided to you.

Steven A Watts MsC, D.Crim (Cantab), DPM, FCIM, FSyl.

* I confirm that I have Received a copy of this Participant Information Sheet.

Time/ Date ............................

Name:..................................

Signed...................................
Appendix E

University of Portsmouth Favourable Ethical Opinion Letter
January 2015
Mr Steven Watts Professional Doctorate Student Institute of Criminal Justice Studies
University of Portsmouth

REC reference number: 14/15:25 Please quote this number on all correspondence.

30th January 2015 Dear Steven,

Full Title of Study:

Documents reviewed:

‘Yes Prime Minister’; An Examination of the impact of the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 on the governance of Policing across England and Wales’.

Consent Form Ethics self-assessment Interview Schedule Invitation Letter Participant Information Sheet Protocol

Further to our recent correspondence, this proposal was reviewed by The Research Ethics Committee of The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.

I am pleased to tell you that the proposal was awarded a favourable ethical opinion by the committee. Please could we just ask that you amend ‘understand’ on the consent form to ‘understood’ in order for it to read more fluently?

Kind regards, FHSS FREC Chair

Dr Jane Winstone

Members participating in the review:

7. Richard Hitchcock

8. Geoff Wade

9. Jane Winstone
Appendix F

Participant Consent Form
Study Title:

Name of Researcher:
Steven A Watts

Name of Academic Supervisor:
Dr Barry Loveday
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Please initial the relevant boxes below if you are in agreement with the statement given;

10. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the Participant Information Sheet, and to ask questions, where I have done so they have been answered satisfactorily.

11. I agree that I am able to give my own consent to be interviewed about the impact of the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners on Policing Governance across England and Wales without reference to others.
12. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time prior to, during or immediately following the interview without giving any reason.

[ ]

13. I agree to my interview being tape recorded Yes/No

[ ]

5. I agree that verbatim quotes from my interview may be used in the report in respect of this research subject to my consent to each proposed quote Yes/No

[ ]

6. I understand that data collected during the study, may be viewed by individuals from The University of Portsmouth for audit purposes. I give permission for these individuals to have access to my data.

[ ]

7. I understand that the researcher may publish the findings from this research.

[ ]
8. I agree that the data that I provide may be used for future ethically approved research

9. I agree to take part in the above study.

Name of Participant:

Date/ Time:

Signature:

Name of Person taking consent:

Date/ Time:

Signature:

When completed: One Copy for participant; One Copy for researcher’s file;
Appendix G

Semi-Structured Interview Schedules
Questions to Police and Crime Commissioner Participants

Semi Structured Interviews

I am going to ask you a series of open questions about various aspects of the recent changes in policing governance. Please answer them as fully as you can. As explained in the information sheet, your verbatim responses will be completely confidential. If you need any clarification, please ask me.

1. What are your views about the principle of the introduction of locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners?

2. What do you see as your role as PCC?

3. How do you interact with the Chief Constable on a day to day basis:
   • Formally
   • Informally
   • In formal settings

4. What do you think has been the impact upon the Chief Constable of your arrival in post?

5. Since the inauguration of the PCC, how, if at all do you think has the delivery of policing been affected?

6. As PCC what governance framework have you put in place for policing in your area of responsibility?

7. What in your view has been the effect of the introduction of PCCs on the governance of policing generally across England and Wales?

8. What do you see as the role of the Police and Crime Panel? How effective are they?

9. What do you see as your role with partner organisations involved in delivering community safety?

10. As PCC what is your relationship with the public?

11. As PCC what is your relationship with the government?
12. How important is your relationship with the Chief Constable in delivering policing and crime reduction?

13. Is the fact that you, as PCC has the power of appointment [and in some circumstances] and dismissal of the Chief Constable a significant issue in your relationship with the Chief Constable?
   - Supplementary – Do you think that this fact affects in any way the decision making of the Chief Constable in any way at a Strategic or operational level, if so do you have any examples?

14. How do you as PCC approach the traditional ‘operational independence’ of the Chief Constable?
   - Supplementary – Have there been any occasions when you have given a view or taken any role in operational decision making, or have you been tempted to do so?
   - If so do you have any examples?

15. What positive changes do you think there have been as a result of the new governance structure?

16. What negative changes do you think there have been as a result of the new governance structure?

17. How do you see the governance structure developing over the short, medium and long term?

18. Do you think that any changes need to be made to the current governance framework? If so what do you think should be done to improve the effectiveness of police service delivery;

   • In your organisation
   • In policing across England and Wales.

19. Is there anything you would like to add that you think I have not asked or has not been covered in your responses?
Questions to Chief Constable Participants

Semi Structured Interviews

I am going to ask you a series of open questions about various aspects of the recent changes in policing governance. Please answer them as fully as you can. As explained in the information sheet, your verbatim responses will be completely confidential. If you need any clarification, please ask me.

1. What are your views about the principle of the introduction of locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners?

2. How have things changed following the inauguration of the PCC?

3. How do you interact with the PCC on a day to day basis;
   - Formally only or
   - Informally
   - In formal settings
   - Mix of these

4. Since the inauguration of the PCC, what has been the impact upon you the Chief Constable?

5. Since the inauguration of the PCC, how, if at all, has the delivery of policing been affected?

6. What has been the effect of the inauguration of the PCC on the governance of policing in your force.

7. What in your opinion has been the effect of the introduction of PCCs on the governance of policing generally across England and Wales.

8. How do you see as the role of the Police and Crime Panel. How effective are they?

9. Since the inauguration of the PCC has there been any change in your relationship with partner organisations?
10. Since the introduction of the PCC has there been any change in your relationship with the public?

11. Since the inauguration of the PCC has there been any change in your relationship with the government?

12. How important is your relationship with the PCC in delivering policing?

13. Is the fact that the PCC has direct responsibility for appointing and in some circumstances dismissing the Chief Constable a significant issue in your relationship with the PCC?  
   [Supplementary – Does this fact affect your decision making in any way at a Strategic or operational level, if so do you have any examples?]

14. Has the PCC role affected your traditional ‘operational independence’ as Chief Constable?  
   – Supplementary – If so – how, and any examples.

15. What positive changes, if any have there been as a result of the new structure?

16. Have there been any negative consequences arising from the new structure?

17. How do you see the governance structure developing over the short, medium and long term?

18. Do you think that any changes need to be made to the current governance framework? If so what do you think should be done to improve the effectiveness of police service delivery?

   • In your organisation
   • In policing across England and Wales.

19. Is there anything you would like to add that you think I have not asked or has not been covered in your responses?
Appendix H

Schedule of Comments of Chief Constables
1. **Positive Views of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure**

CC
‘Flash to bang time is quicker... There’s definitely innovation around the country... that probably wouldn’t be set up under a Police Authority’.

CC
‘Governance and holding us to account is always going to be tricky. There are strengths and weaknesses with the PCC model having one person who is here full time makes things easier. However, there’s got to be a significant question around has the public bought into PCCs... I was fortunate to have enjoyed working with a PA who were incredibly supportive of the Chief Officer team in *** and had been for over a decade...they were prepared to invest in the organisation be supportive of the organisation critical when appropriate...so the governance arrangements here I was always very comfortable with and I thought they were effective. I had always had very good experience of PAs But Govt made it very clear there was going to be a change, it wasn’t for me to pass comment or take a particular view, that’s not my role, but I subsequently got on very well with the new governance arrange.’

CC
‘With a Police Authority with 17 people you were constantly being lobbied, engaged in conversation, about local issues...I would go to (PA) meetings trying to focus on the corporate ... Inevitably there were conversations raised around local issues. The things that local people are speaking to the PCC about are the same that they were at the PA. In some ways that’s a good thing because you only have to have that conversation once. The plethora of meetings and committees we had under the Police Authority have been swept away’.

CC
‘At the time I could see some advantages of having one elected individual ... which should have ensured a more stream lined and less bureaucratic relationship with the OPCC and the PCC when you compare it to the Police Authority.’

CCS.
‘I am completely supportive, but issues around the fact that the PCC can only be voted out once every 4 years...We worked under one good PA that held policing to account and one poor one that did not add anything to policing... This is a better system now but it could be made better’.

CC.
‘I felt that the link between police and the community is essential. Separate to the police a route that communities and partners can engage with policing. I’m not sure there’s an ideal way of that being delivered. I think the system was appropriate for change. Is it right that one individual represents just shy of 600,000 people. Actually here having a PCC for a small geographic area..is more likely to have a broad understanding of the whole community than during my days in ** (Force) working with a PCC that’s got this enormous area. At the time I could see some advantages of having one elected individual ... which should have ensured a more stream lined and less bureaucratic relationship with the OPCC and the PCC when you compare it to the PA I suppose I was in favor, because change is important because if we don’t we just stand still and fester.’

CC.
‘My only difficulty with the arrangement is the fragility because it is down to one individual I have no difficulty in being governed the police being governed, I think there should be robust government We are not a totalitarian state and we are not puppets of the state ... so my sense is that we should have strong democratic governance.’

CC.
‘Actually here having a PCC for a small geographic area..is more likely to have a broad understanding of the whole community than during my days in ** (Force) working with a PCC that’s got this enormous area with huge differences in demographics.. And cant possibly even try to understand all of the demands and all the different things the communities are facing’.

CC.
‘You need to see it [introduction of PCCs] as part of a general movement to strengthen accountability across public service an era of greater transparency, .... Its been seen more that the way to strengthen accountability is through that direct political relationship.... A form of governance for such a crucial public service which is very much about the way that powers are used against the citizen having a committee to oversee that was fine for its time, but the world has moved on really... I think I probably would also say because of the degree of change we have gone through this fundamental shift in the level of resourcing that having one single person responsible for that and accountable for that is probably something that is really important for us to get through this you need that sense of focus, that direct accountability... Where I am now I would see it as a positive development.... Police Authorities were great through periods of growth when the answer to anything could be money.... I would argue yes its been extremely helpful with the austerity I don’t think you can put aside the austerity, what the Police is calling austerity I don’t think is austerity I think it is some kind of fundamental challenge to the way that we’ve delivered policing and polices with the ability to deal with some of the really wicked problems in society. We spend a lot less time on governance, the Police Authority tended to be more bureaucratic accountability rather than political accountability’

CC.
More effective than Police Authority. But not quite sure (PCCs) understand the risk ... the risks we face on a daily basis around have we got it right where we put our resources? The Police Authority was very formulaic, very committee focused ...It was slow and laborious lots of scrutiny but it was a kind of chess match. This can be far more dynamic because there are two individuals, if those individuals agree it tends to happen. But then there’s the question who is constraining those individuals to make sure they make the right decision. There was a desire or a hope (on the part of govt.) that somehow the election would have resulted in a change to the arrangement so there would be more checks and balances.

CC.
‘(the PCC) was former chair of PA this made the transition seamless’.
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<th>2. Negative Views of Police &amp; Crime Commissioner Governance Structure</th>
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<td>CC</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘The review of PAs should have been a much more hard hitting review and they should have reformed PAs and made them much stronger I would have gone for an all elected PA. That would give local accountability and the breadth that The problem was that we didn’t get the right quality of people on the Police Authority’.</td>
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'It was a slightly alien concept not aimed at a particular set of issues. Was very hurriedly pushed thru at a time when relationships at the top end of policing were quite adversarial. Without having a great deal of public discussion or warmth to it and a lot of loose ends in terms of how it was going to work. It felt heavily doctrinal and not particularly cleverly crafted'.

'The line of business that we do is not like other public services.... We often make decisions not based on who pays the most its (about) our most vulnerable people. To introduce politics with a big P into that has got some risk. If that's not controlled properly that risk can be considerable. So a personal view on the introduction of PCCs was a concern for me. However in practice as its worked out for me its been a pretty positive experience. ...very high risk.... [the Police Authority] governance of 17 people has got checks & balances in it which governance by one person hasn't. It was easier working with a PA because we decided we got on with it, I spoke to the chair of the PA who said 'oh that sounds a good idea'. It was much less hands on. There were benefits to that because you didn't have someone you had to constantly brief on everything. ... You didn't have someone with a view as to where the organisation needs to go when sometimes they are not that well informed.

'I don't like the principles, there was always a clear distinction between the executive and police one of the principles I've always worked to is that of PCCs has and was bound to introduce politics with a big P into policing. I don't agree with it and I don't like it. It was a poor decision. I agree CCs needed more accountability...they had a degree of autonomy unlike other public services I accept those days are gone, but the way in which this operates its too much on the other side of the pendulum. There is too much political control. [Police Authorities] Did not really work they were variable in quality, and I worked with three or four PAs and they allowed CCs far too much independence and did not hold them to account sufficiently. They could have been made much better. But I always felt that having 17 heads discussing an issue was better than one, which is what you have now. The PA model had its faults but contained a variety of views and perspectives. Which was much richer and broader than the PCC model is'.

'I feel that the placing of so much power in the hands of one person there's a real departure for governance in the UK. Particularly in such a sensitive complex, and difficult arena as policing... We had a Police Authority of 17.... We had a couple of very strong leaders of the PA... I didn't see the deficiencies of the old system in the same way that the Conservatives in particular did. The deficiencies of the previous system were overstated if you wanted to make some changes they could have done something a bit different such as an elected chair of the PA'.

'Too much power vested in one person I've seen the good and bad of that the trouble is you are just too dependent upon the intellect, the politics the personal characteristics of the individual that gets the job.'

'Fundamentally I disagreed with it. On the basis that it all becomes an individual ... It's a big role in the hands of one person. The bits that are positive re it gives a human face where people know they can contact somebody where PAs were anonymous... I don't think its right for one to have such an influence over something as important as policing. '

'If you look around the country there's a real mixture, some are good, some not so good and some are quite extreme. And that's all about individuals and skills or experience they have... So for an individual to have that much influence on policing is worrying'.

'I was quite troubled by it there was a huge degree of uncertainty about how it would work I was worried about the big P politicisation of policing. I didn't agree with the formal ACPO position that we should resist it because as Chiefs if a democratically elected Gov. says in their manifesto they are going to do x and they pass a bill they are perfectly within their rights. What they should do s that behind the scenes we should do everything we can to shape that bill make it work as positively as possible. ...... My biggest worry was too much power vested in one person and I think that is definitely still the case, insufficient checks and balances ... I do think the devil was more in the detail in many respects. Too much power vested in one person with totally ineffective PCP sitting above it.'

'Before the introduction, I was pretty skeptical about how one person could represent the communities ... And the views of those communities I was pretty open minded about how it could be done. Didn't really understand how it was going to work. At the time I didn't see the Police Authority structure was broken I think that depended on where you worked, I felt that we were accountable to the PA. Although the PCC does highlight the things that were deficient in the PA structure. ... (too many, with no understanding of policing and a part time commitment).'

'I don't agree with it, its too much power in one person and its too personality driven (however) My own PCC has been breath of fresh air. ....It's too much power in one pair of hands if they choose not to use it properly or proportionately or fairly or listen... The power in the hands of one person if they use it appropriately can be enormously helpful, as it is here but it is too dependent on one personality...[The Police Authority was] Bureaucratic, self serving, corrupt and ineffective'.

'... so my sense is that we should have strong democratic governance. albeit, I thought the Police Authorities were entirely serviceable certainly better than the watch committees which thru various iterations they replaced. When you look back at what was happening in Notts & S. wales in the 50's and early 60's ... I wouldn't want to go back to those bad old days. There is a sense in some of my colleagues that that is what is the case.

'I think the model of governance is fundamentally flawed on a whole series of levels. One thing that was talked about was the introduction of politics into policing and I think that has manifested itself, not so much as party politics, but the mechanics and the day to day focus of somebody who is elected and therefore is a politician, in an organisation to influence views and deliverables which I as a police professional don't always agree with. Whilst there is a Policing Protocol that talks about 43 CCs independent operational Chief Constables and the PCC not fettering the ability of the Chief Constable to deliver their business. The reality is that its not anything like as black and white as that gets presented. Because at the end of anything you
might want to do there is money and/ or reputation.’

3. Perceived Dangers of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure

CC
(Re PCC being unavailable) ‘It showed the fragility of the system, the resilience was non existent there is no statutory position for the deputy, so that at the point (PCC became unavailable) we had no governance for a period. The panel which is one of the elements in the new governance arrangements that has just not functioned. The panel had responsibilities but didn’t appreciate their significance, couldn’t act quickly. We had all sorts of fun and games with the HO, trying to work out what the rules were.’

CC
[CC described the situation when PCC was unavailable long term]. ‘...This meant that policing would be affected - the CFO was identified as the person who would sign matters off in the absence of any guidance. He avoided taking decisions that an elected PCC would, so was seen as there to only enable the Police to conduct business, and not to determine long term strategy.’

CC
‘Too much power vested in one person i’ve seen the good and bad of that the trouble is you are just too dependent upon the intellect, the politics the personal characteristics of the individual that gets the job. ... If they don’t get checked by the PCP then it can be very different to the old days of the Police Authority.’

CC
‘Delivering policing services and delivering a business based upon the relationship between two people which is absolutely critical is flawed. It doesn’t work to the benefit of the public, and as we go into austerity, having to think about what do the public really need from a professional police service as opposed to what does the PCC want to do because its popular with the public then we are likely to get into some difficult territory.’

CC
‘The trouble with the system is that it is a very personal system its designed to be very personal... so you make an assumption that you set up arrangements for how the working relationship should work.... there’s a great deal of instability in it all... its possible you may have to undo all the arrangements (when a new PCC arrives). ...the arrangements between the two corporations sole are only as good as the agreement of the current PCC. ...it seems to me that because its based upon the individual its inherently unstable.’

CC
‘...what you’ve got with a PCC is a personality who has been put into a role with no prior qualifications no prior experience...and then in effect (though CHMI) would disagree with this, but has in effect unfettered power within an organisation. It really is dependent upon the CC setting the ground rules, developing the relationship, working out where the line is.’

CC
‘There are risks if it goes wrong. That’s the greatest weakness (of the paradigm) the reliance on the relationship between two people even more so if there isn’t a filter. My PCC doesn’t have a Deputy, you can mitigate some of the tensions if you’ve got that... Its too much personality based. I think that’s a risk I think if people aren’t able to maintain effective professional relationships then it is easy for it to be undermined. We’ve had some examples, Lincolnshire was the classic. There need to be a few more safety nets...and the PCP, doesn’t really have much teeth.’

CC
‘What we have got with the PCCs is a great governance model, but it is precarious. Because they are unfettered the courts are now fettering their power, you only need to look at the Rhodes case in Lincs, and I think if the Gwent case had been taken to Judicial Review by Carmel Napier I think that would have led to some fettering of the PCC. But when you look at the Dyfed Powys case where there was a very powerful and eminently competent CC, because she was temp when the PCC joined the force she wasn’t selected. It may be that she wasn’t the best candidate, but an observer looking in from outside would see that as being rather odd’. 

CC
‘Its too much power in one person and its too personality driven ...Its too much power in one pair of hands if they choose not to use it properly or proportionately or fairly or listen... The power in the hands of one person if they use it appropriately can be enormously helpful, as it is here but it is too dependent on one personality.’

CC
‘The police service have invested huge amount of time effort and energy and money to enable me to operate at the executive level that’s not the same for the PCC... There are things that he has got badly wrong, he has an emotional lens we spend - less so now, quite a lot of time clearing up behind ** (PCC). At regional meetings the behaviour of PCCs was just amazing, in the first 12-18 months. Its better now their behaviour and the way they treated us professionals, table thumping just unbelievable behaviour.... These are people who have just been transported into policing with a greater or lesser knowledge of policing but all had different levels of humility about their understanding and being able to table thump with some authority.

CC
‘I think the PCC finds policing quite complex, the reality is that if you applied a pure resources to risk basis, I’d be pulling a lot of resources out of the rural areas and putting them into XX & XX (urban areas) but that is politically difficult, not only from the PCCs perspective but also from the community engagement aspect for me.’

CC
‘He [PCC] misses the point its more powerful for me to have someone to say I’ve challenged the CC and I’m satisfied rather than were doing this and that. The public do not get the scrutiny they deserve.’

CC
‘... My only criticism would be it can range (the PCC/CC meeting) from the big stuff like what’s happening post election, down to Mrs Miggins cat. So some times I have to say, just send that thru the system, I’ll get it looked at it doesn’t need to come here...[the PCC] likes stories and anecdotes.’
CC

‘If you are one of those CCs with a PCC at either end of that curve of normality, particularly if you’ve got the more aggressive bombastic, throwing their weight around type of PCC, it’s incredibly stressful because its a one on one relationship... it does make a difference as to how stressful your life is massively .....You’ve got *** (CC who went sick) who’s gone off how open people will be I don’t know but that’s all PCC driven. I never got there because I got my head around it... But that’s ok for me to say who’s kids have left school ... But if you’re (referred to another CC with younger family who had gone sick ) ... In a more vulnerable position with younger kids and you saw what happened to ** (referring to the CC in question). Its all very easy for me to say get your head around it, perhaps my particular situation meant it was easier for me to get my head round it, if Id been just over 25yrs, kids 10 & 11 ...different ball game.’

CC

If you are one of those CCs with a PCC at either end of that curve of normality, particularly if you’ve got the more aggressive bombastic, throwing their weight around type of PCC, it’s incredibly stressful because its a one on one relationship... it does make a difference as to how stressful your life is massively .....You’ve got *** (CC who went sick) who’s gone off how open people will be I don’t know but that’s all PCC driven. I never got there because I got my head around it... But that’s ok for me to say who’s kids have left school ... But if you’re (referred to another CC with younger family who had gone sick ) ... In a more vulnerable position with younger kids and you saw what happened to ** (referring to the CC in question). Its all very easy for me to say get your head around it, perhaps my particular situation meant it was easier for me to get my head round it, if Id been just over 25yrs, kids 10 & 11...different ball game.

CC

‘I know it different for others, ** (adjacent force) their PCC is very difficult’.

CC

‘Although our relationship is good I didn’t like operating in it. I never felt relaxed I always had to watch every decision and every policy and every thing had to be carefully managed. It puts political control into CCs too directly I agree CCs needed more accountability...they had a degree of autonomy unlike other public services I accept those days are gone, but the way in which this operates its too much on the other side of the pendulum. There is too much political control’.

CC

‘You will not get consistency...its the same as CCs, we’d love to have consistency across all CCs on a particular issue but you don’t get it. with a one person PCC, as opposed to multi person commissions, you are going to have mavericks, I cant see it changing at all. In fact I think it can only get worse as they embed different ways of doing things’.

CC

Too much power vested in one person (I’ve seen the good and bad of that the trouble is you are just too dependent upon the intellect, the politics the personal characteristics of the individual that gets the job. ... If they don’t get checked by the PCP then it can be very different to the old days of the Police Authority’.

CC

‘PCC must be brief re things happening in the area he lives’.

CC

‘It becomes very localised around bad headlines, local issues. The PCC comes from ??? There was the loss of (police facility), that was a big issue at the same time we were closing (another facility) - not really interested’.

CC

‘All of my problems with the PCC have been because the Policing Protocol is wishy-washy and doesn’t tie people down. More clarity (is needed) around operational independence does it mean can you go and arrest X&Y—no that’s not your role commissioner, that’s my (CC) role, is it I’ve looked at your review of policing (PCC to CC) and Id like you to put 55 officers at x and 100 at Y. Or is it I want you to concentrate on roads policing, I want you to concentrate on CSE and I don’t want you to have any dog handlers or is it. There’s my Police & Crime plan go and deliver it ... apart from the first every single one of those situations you can read into the Policing Protocol if you choose to’.

CC

‘...governance of 17 people has got checks & balances in it which governance by one person hasn’t. If somebody (PCC) digs their heels in when they’ve got something wrong you cant get rid of them. I’m not sure there’s anywhere else in political service where you’d see that happen. That has got to be high risk.

CC

However in practice as its worked out for me its been a pretty positive experience. But I think that’s a bit of a lottery, I’m not sure there’s enough regulation around a PCC who might want to be making operational decisions, when they are paying my salary and responsible for sacking me or not. ...I’ve seen it with neighboring forces where their relationship is just not the same as ours. but I really think if you’ve got those three criteria right (boundaries, equity & trust) it works. ...clearly there are some (PCCs) that are politically motivated - party political. ... there are CCs around the country who have no relationship with their PCCs ...you have also got some PCCs around the country who have come into office and think they have to have all the ideas about changing the service and forget we’ve done this for 150 yrs., and are not dull people.

CC

‘There’s very much a mixed bag (of PCCs) across the country. I speak to colleagues who are having a terrible time, for some its working very, very well’.

CC

‘Significant differences in the way that the governance process works in the adjacent force. In the other force, the PCC is often absent and matters are dealt with by the deputy, here the PCC is daily involved and does everything he can to be visible. An example is the different approach by PCCs to operational force collaborations. Some want to deal with them under Sec 22a, others not. You will not get consistency...its the same as CCs, we’d love to have consistency across all CCs on a particular issue but you don’t get it’.

CC
‘I would say they [PA] would moderate each others behaviour. … You’ve got one individual that has got so much power its difficult sometimes for people around them to moderate their behaviour at times - and their views’.

CC
‘I feel sometimes they have recreated the silverbacks of policing but called them something different. So some of the worst excesses of some of the CCs who thought they were running their own fiefdoms it does create the environment for that to happen because who’s going to stop them’.

CC
‘…governance of 17 [PA] people has got checks & balances in it which governance by one person hasn’t. If somebody (PCC) digs their heels in when they’ve got something wrong you cant get rid of them. I’m not sure there’s anywhere else in public service where you’d see that happen. That has got to be high risk’.

CC
‘My biggest worry was too much power vested in one person and I think that is definitely still the case, insufficient checks and balances … I do think the devil was more in the detail in many respects. Too much power vested in one person with totally ineffective PCP sitting above it’.

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### 4. Police & Crime Commissioner Election/ Legitimacy Issues

CC
‘You’ve really got to question the democratic process where a person has been elected by 14% of the electorate is now responsible for such a big budget with big responsibilities…”

CC
‘Whatever the turn out - that’s democracy’.

CC
‘Very poor turnout, that was a national thing. A lot of lessons learned as to how we are going to give more people a voice’.

CC
‘There’s a mixed bag across the country, I don’t think it delivered what they (HMG) thought it would deliver. Trying to bring in the captains of industry, ex military I think what we got was the usual kind of people who get involved in these kind of things’.

CC
‘I was not the first CC to work in this force under this PCC, the organisation had decided they were not going to work with it. The incumbent top team behaved badly to the PCC i.e. giving him and his staff poor accommodation. restricting access to buildings. Regardless of what you thought of *** as an individual (ex Supt - not popular) he was the elected PCC and I don’t believe that they dealt with him properly, fairly proportionately, giving due deference to him now being commissioner of policing. There was nothing in place here, so I spent the first six trying to build relationships with the PCC.’

CC
‘The police service have invested huge amount of time effort and energy and money to enable me to operate at the executive level that’s not the same for (the PCC).’

CC
‘… There are things that he has got badly wrong, he has an emotional lens we spend - less so now quite a lot of time clearing up behind ** (PCC). At regional meetings the behaviour of PCCs was just amazing, in the first 12-18 months, its better now their behaviour and the way they treated us professionals, table thumping just unbelievable behaviour. … These are people who have just been transported into policing … Which had greater or less knowledge of policing but had different levels of humility about me understanding and being able to table thump with some authority’.

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### 5. Public Engagement

CC
‘…the public still recognise the head of the police service as being the CC rather than the PCC. There are some PCCs who would say they are the boss. and that has undoubtedly caused some real problems’.

CC
‘I am a fan of his Police & Crime Plan…he crafted a plan that was framed around some priorities that would be meaningful to the public. The public are better engaged into policing due to [the PCC].’

CC
‘They [PCCs] are more out there in the media and sometimes they can add to the public debate in a way that i, it would be inappropriate for me to do…He will get engaged in political conversations and can say what he wants’.

CC
‘The PCC will say that the PA received about 60 letters a year and he gets thousands …the relationship with the public from that sense they do a lot of work to promote that activity. They also are very good at interacting with different parts of the community. The PCCs role has enhanced the publics access to the governance of policing’.

CC
‘The PCC brought more surveys (e.g. Road safety) the PCC is an example of bringing a diversity into police governance’.

CC
‘The PCC is well respected locally as someone who is focused on the community. PCC has been to over 300 community groups [the PCC] does a huge amount of engagement across the Force, with communities, business and public sector organisations that helps him shape his Police & crime plan.’
"They are incredibly hard working they try to meet as many people as they can my only criticism is that sometimes its not coordinated. ... I cannot fault their commitment and public spiritedness."

"Much better than the Police Authority."

"There's been two or three specific areas where if I'm honest we probably took a paternalistic view, about we knew better than you the public how serious this is. Rural Crime, Business Crime then speeding they were high up on our agendas of public concerns but we tended to say well, we think we are doing a quite decent job and we've got more important things to do bigger centers of population, and you do live in a low crime area, and you'll be fine." **the PCC** will say they don't feel fine they don't feel secure or well looked after you are not doing a good enough job. I cannot hand on heart say the PA would not have brought about that shift, and I can't hand on heart say I would have done it without pushing'.

"If you ask the people of *** who is in charge of the police its the CC... They see the PCC as a politician and the CC as head of the police service'.

"The public are confused, they don't understand that the PCC is separate to the police and the PCC is there to hold me to account The public and the media sometimes believe that the PCC runs the operational side of the organisation. and it is not uncommon to see headlines where they talk about the police chief when they talk about the PCC. So I do think there is utter confusion. There is a need for marketing to explain the role of PCC'.

"They get confused over what's the role of the PCC, I think there's still an element of that, they don't quite get it'.

"The vast majority of people in this country aren't really interested in policing until they want the service. If they get the service they are content with they go back to being ambivalent, there is a very small group of people that have any genuine interest. I think the bigger question is do the public understand the role of the PCC? And I genuinely don't think they do. I think its all focused on Police and not the much wider role that [the PCC's] got around & crime'.

"The public, I think they channel things through to PCCs in a way they never did with the Police Authority, because they are much more visible, I think people are getting answers I think they are seen as more responsive and more accountable."

"The public have more understanding of policing as a result of the introduction of PCCs.'

"A 6 week accountability meeting in public but they are not interested, 3 members of the public turn up and its the same 3 each time. Its a joke, there's no public interest in this'.

"The vast majority of people in this country aren't really interested in policing until they want the service. If they get the service they are content with they go back to being ambivalent, there is a very small group of people that have any genuine interest'.

### Partnerships

"...has the PCC done in partnerships anything were not doing or going to do. I don't think they have. ...I don't think the PCC has added much there at all. Because that's what we do'.

"We are one of the places where it (partnerships) has been disastrous....the PCC is perceived in a very hostile way by local leaders, seen as mayoral rival and a point of influence that they don't control. Its made it harder for us to get engaged in partnerships. ...It shows how if you drop a political figure into the pool of local govt and local control anf you cant judge where the ripples will go to. In our case its created more tension. We, me and the Chief Exec get on well ...but as soon as the PCC is introduced into that mix its difficult so we try not to do it. PCC not at the partnership meetings. PCC has high media profile and often says the wrong things because he is not part of the debate.‘

"The PCC is very engaged in partnerships some times I have to pick up the pieces. But he can say things I can't that is a really blunt instrument. So on the one hand I think oh goodness I have to pick up the pieces but on the other hand he really does say the things you want to say yourself. CC/ PCC sometimes agree things they think need to be said. He (PCC) is good enough to ask me before he says it.’

"...no alignment between operational activity and funding. Some local commanders did not know he was funding projects in their areas’.

"We have brought the PCC into some of the strategic management performance meetings so that he can engage and listen, more important I give access to senior leaders of the Force to help (PCC) understand some of the challenges they’ve got, perhaps with strategic partners. Then in his role as PCC, can go out and have additional conversations for us.... There’s quite a few areas where because of the new arrangements (the PCC) has helped us move things forward. .... A good example is recent work with fire, at officer level they are quite resistant to working together but through (the PCCs) work through the chair of the fire authority we’ve been able to influence down to the officers. We are now working on a number of collaboration fronts’. 
7. Politics (HMG, HMIC, ACPO)

CC
'It has changed because partners know they can go to the PCC and get money and the Chief Constable can provide resources.'

CC
'Lack of structure and planning means that partnerships have been a bit of a dogs breakfast.'

CC
'PCC is able to get traction where we struggled.'

CC
'That's more difficult (than public relationships), ... Every partner wants us on every forum... They are very supportive of policing, we have a can do attitude we get things done. We've always said yes and we haven't criticised any other agency. The PCC where partners haven't played their full part, met their responsibilities or done what he feels they should do he's pretty vociferous about telling them. Its positive for policing, and he knows this because we've been able to distance ourselves from that'.

CC
'Yes it has (changed CC relationship with partners) I'm much more of an equal with the other Chief Execs because I'm no longer held to account by somebody who’s not in the top tier of governance. That's worked for us, you've got one person who is a much stronger public figure a much stronger political figure.'

CC
'In partnerships, the Chief Constable does professional business, the PCC does politics.'

CC
'Its a dogs breakfast, [commissioning] they cant work out how to effectively fund and measure so what happens is .... Somebody will come and see him with a project and wow him then they'll fund him. ... But they never ask the so what factor'.

CC
'He [PCC] has done a lot of good in communities with spending and commissioning'.

CC
'...I think the area where (the PCC) is starting to develop more into is ...he's going beyond the police ... its taken a long time and a number of PCCs colleagues across the country to go - not just the Force what about the wider - criminal justice world - health and the roles he's got in terms of that and he's now doing that.'

CC
'The Home Office would lead you to believe they have stepped out of this now I don’t think they have. They have created a bit more distance between them and the local governance arrangements. ...the current govt wanted to step away from running police forces ...but they have set a very clear position on the strategic policing requirement which binds in the local governance.'

CC
'The relationship with govt has not been good for a number of reasons shooting ourselves in the foot ... There’s been a perception around the integrity of the force, particularly Chief Officers. So all of that is swilling about'.

CC
'I’ve not seen it really change, we have quite a lot of engagement with the Home Office through various groups. I think the APCC has more of a voice with the Home Secretary than perhaps the Association of Police Authorities had. But I suppose they (HO) were always going to, it was their baby. I've not seen it in a detrimental way at all. In fact some positive bits actually'.

CC
'If the PCC agrees with the Chief Constable re a contentious issue (Drug policy) the Chief Constable is ‘protected from above by my PCC. But if he didn't agree with me I wouldn't have been able to say it or it would be a different dynamic. I hoped that the PCCs would be more politically savvy in the way that they influence the Home Office and Govt. But they haven’t been that at all. Some of them being party political hasn’t helped. I think Lab PCCs have had less influence than Tory PCCs ... That’s disappointing .... There are independents and good luck to them, but that machinery of getting elected need party funds. I don’t think PCC have filled that hole as well as they might. That said Police Authorities were pretty inert there as well'.

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CC
‘I think the relationship between CCs and Govt is dreadful ... Our relationship with the Home Secretary is almost non-existent. We go down for bollockings, that’s how it feels. (not because of PCCs) I think PCCs are pretty appalled by it too’.

CC
‘The distance from the govt for that direct accountability has been a real positive step for policing...That’s allowed us in ** to do the right thing so if we want to put the resource into, no ones going to come back and say what about your performance in theft from motor vehicles for example’.

CC
‘The relationship with government has never been much poorer to be honest. The whole movement to PCCs was to push power down and for the HO not to be responsible for the things they were responsible for in the past. Very little point in talking to the home office because they don’t hold the power anymore, its a waste of time to be quite honest. I think this govt went too far in pushing power down and not taking responsibility for anything or providing any national leadership. ... There’s a whole host of reasons why with this govt relationship with the HO has not been good, but that’s not to say because we’ve got PCCs its a wider movement’.

CC
‘Sometimes it not the [political] colour its the way they operate he’s become the sort of PCC holding policing to account that the govt envisaged.’

CC
‘...because he’s a Tory has very close relationships with ministers that’s helpful or can be helpful sometimes.’

CC
‘I don’t think it [PCC’s political affiliation] does really (affect PCC behaviour) It doesn’t play out at all’.

CC
‘Some Con PCCs have influence with govt...there’s no great pattern to how they are influential from where I sit. The influence seems to be a combination of where they are as individuals, things that they are interested in committees that they are on, the other people of power that they know and can influence.’

CC
‘What I have seen is ** (PCC) for the majority of the separate himself from his [party], political roots. acting in an apolitical way. I know he has found that really difficult in the run up to the election [General Election], we’ve had to have some quite strong conversations with regard to you are going to, actually this is electioneering and you need to be really careful, don’t get yourself tied up in breach of purdah and those sorts of things. He’s found that difficult but I think he manages it really well’.

CC
‘I haven’t experienced too much of that I know he has political meetings. I know the Cons call them all together for briefings which is worrying. local Cons have considerable influence.

CC
‘...we have lost a lot, an awful lot with the HMI and their role and the fact that the HMI now has zero impact on the appointment of CCs is a huge loss’.

CC
‘I’ve got a view about this government and the way I think it has emasculated policing and police leadership I’ve been in a position.. When I’ve had some difficult conversations with senior civil servants about what politicians think they can & cant do and direct as opposed to what I as an operational Chief Constable think they can do and direct. To the extent that ...if David Cameron wants to walk into my office and tell me to do that stuff he can do that but I’m not doing it’.

CC
‘The tripartite arrangement is dead ...firstly (no part by Govt) in the selection of Chief Constables. Secondly, the PCCs have not established themselves as a body. It (the tripartite arrangement) has gone, by design I think ... To distance herself (H.Sec) from decision making and to make the PCCs a disparate rather than a coherent group...Its essentially a dead duck’.

CC
‘I don’t see the change. The way that the Home Office influence now is that they centralise and top slice. No big difference in the tripartite’.

CC
‘Not now balanced, depending on what PCC you are depends on what engagement you have with the Home Office. The relationship completely depends on which party you are in (ie Cons are favored)’.

CC
‘That’s completely unbalanced now its a linear polar model now where it goes straight from the politician to the police. The govt don’t have anything to do with it, they can wash their hands of what’s going on’.

CC
‘...its not the governance arrangements that potentially undermine the role of the CC in operational independence its the financial arrangements. Chiefs council and ACPO have lost a lot of influence the world has been muddied a bit over where do the PCCs sit in all of this? You would expect the PCCs to be influencing the local politicians and national politicians from a purely political point of view. And the CCs trying to influence the senior civil service and local chief execs. ... As a body the APCC is relatively new Where are PCCs when policing is moving to a more functionally based model, tiers provision of national i.e. CT etc. and local funded by the precept - how do you provide governance in a regional structure with very local PCCs.’
‘Of course it’s changed [tripartite structure] its changed in the sense that one party has the powers to hire and fire, interesting that the govt talked about firing CCs till someone pointed out they needed to hire some first. So hiring and firing became what they said rather than firing. I think it an iconoclastic revolutionary policy that was forces thru because there was a feeling that Chief Constables were overwhelmingly powerful, and weren’t listening probably caused a bit by the previous administration... I think that plays to a populist political agenda than reality, but I do accept there was some evidence of that powerbase being used in ways that politicians wouldn’t be happy with.’

CC
‘PCCs are far more influential than Police Authorities were the Home office similar, Chief Constables less. Its still there [tripartite structure] but the relative weight afforded to the different bits has changed.

CC
‘I do, [think that PCCs are about government pushing responsibility down to local levels to avoid accountability] you look at CSE classic example of well that’s a local issue. I think we will see that more as the police cuts begin to bite.’

CC
‘Yes, [think that PCCs are about government pushing responsibility down to local levels to avoid accountability & risk] to give them a bit of credit that was localisms doctrinal position. I suppose one has to respect that as a political doctrine. The effect is that it does push down risk.’

CC
‘I don’t see that look at CSE that’s very much being held by the Home Secretary in terms of where we are going so I don’t see that at all.’

CC
‘If the government don’t have anything to do with it, they can wash their hands of what’s going on. They just say its down to the local PCC. CCs are pragmatic they want to deliver they delivered the cuts without moaning about it too much between themselves and the consequences of those cuts’.

CC
‘Yes, I think the whole devo max to Manchester that’s a good movement of the NHS social care issues to local government. There is something around national govt over the past decade or so putting a bit of a gap between what’s happening on the ground and themselves.’

CC
‘I would argue yes [it is] its been extremely helpful with the austerity I don’t think you can put aside the austerity, what the Police is calling austerity I don’t think is austerity I think it is some kind of fundamental challenge to the way that we’ve delivered policing and polices ability to deal with some of the really wicked problems in society. The relationship with government has never been much poorer to be honest. The whole movement to PCGs was to push power down and for the Home Office not to be responsible for the things they were responsible for in the past. Very little point in talking to the home office because they don’t hold the power anymore, its a waste of time to be quite honest. I think this govt went too far in pushing power down and not taking responsibility for anything or providing any national leadership’.

CC
‘When you’ve got one local figure who’s been elected very clearly... They are actually in a far stronger position (than PA), to say no govt, I’m not going to because I’ve got a lot more political legitimacy because I’m the only person elected by all the people of ** (force area)’.

CC
‘There is a lot more about reputation because I do think what’s this difference between political accountability (PCC) and bureaucratic accountability [PA] quite a bit of it is the more immediate reputation really, its the more reputational impact which is the sort of thing on the whole that the PCC is more concerned about’.

CC
‘There’s no question that fewer CCs are speaking out and saying things and I think there are a number of elements at play there. One is absolutely they are being man to man marked by their PCCs. Some of it is because of that shift in power its the PCC that say things rather than the CC, some of it is the weakness of the profession that we have not, made that distinction that is much clearer in medicine [professionalism] And yes, its an uncertain world where people are on contracts... I think that all affects it. CCs get confused between thinking that I’m accountable in this way and I’ve got this relationship with the PCC... There’s got to be an honesty about that, the world has changed whether you like it or not. Its changed across the public service. I think what Chief Constables find difficult is making this distinction about saying, no its now the college of policing that should have the voice.’

Re demise of ACPO

CC
‘...I didn’t know anything had happened [ironically] ...I don’t think its made any difference.’

CC
‘Has it changed? I’m still the national lead for X & Y, my meetings haven’t changed. I think this is Sir Hugh’s relationship with the Home Secretary etc that caused a lot of the issues, its between the two and the change in name, I don’t think will alter one jot the work that’s been undertaken. Different re the things that should never have been part of ACPO the Limited company status that will go but I don’t think it will change’.

CC
‘This administration wanted to remove the perceived power, some PCCs felt threatened. The incentive for chief officers to take national role has reduced given that PCCs are locally focused etc. The relationship with government was damaged during the time with Hugh [Orde], it is better with Sara, she spends more time in the Home Office. We have to change, you can no longer operate the way some Chief Constables did [big Silver back Gorillas] those days are gone’.

CC
‘It has been decapitated by the Home Office when you put that all together, the CC role has been downgraded. I’m not sure that the NPCC as a coordinating can maintain the independence of policing’.
There’s no question about it, this govt took a decision to in effect weaken and challenge ... Three of the key police institutions, NPIA ACPO and the Fedn. And all of those have either been pretty fundamentally abolished or reformed... That clearly has affected the relationship with govt'.

'Selling Bramshill and deconstructing ACPO was symbolic... We didn’t cover ourselves in glory, I didn’t like how ACPO behaved at the time'.

8. **Police & Crime Commissioner Scrutiny & Accountability role in Policing**

'It's just a different name. It was political, ACPO had become a toxic brand'.

'‘The PCC has a very formalised process... “The PCC doesn’t particularly like papers doesn’t particularly like structure. He likes people, he likes stories, so you would have a very formalised process...” PCC doesn’t particularly like papers doesn’t particularly like structure. He likes people, he likes stories, so you would have a very formalised process...”

'...Its not the most robust accountability framework that I have ever worked within or had to report to. Id say it was the same (as the PA). Across the country you may see PCCs saying next week I’m holding the CC to account because, but that’s only showboating. ...there’s no huge interest in these public meetings... They’re held in the middle of the morning on a working day - who’s going to want to come and listen to that?'

'We have a clear line on governance, we talk to each other daily we every meeting every week just me and (PCC) no one else in the room, where we will have an agenda then we have more formal structures like our force performance board in public'.

'The PCC produced a Policing Plan which I was involved in the creation of. I then wrote a delivery plan for 5 years to deliver that plan. The problem was that some of his objectives were very tactical in nature receive a call from a neighbourhood officer every year. Monitoring meeting every month. He hold me to account more effectively than the PA did. Its not a theatre where you could walk into a PA and perform in uniform and that was the end of it, this is much more intimate, more regular and it reacts more quickly to local concerns'.

'The PCC holds me to account for the delivery of policing services, but at the same time I hold the Chief exec to account for the delivery of services to enable me to deliver my services. ...I actually think its a closer form of scrutiny than a very formalised meet once a month here are your papers, you know have those kind of conversations. ...It depends what you mean by ‘hold to account’, because the strategic direction being taken forward is now the remit of the PCC, who sets the strategic direction through the Police & Crime plan and then you have this kind of rub where the CC determines where the resources go. So if you get a steer that the priority is rural crime, but over here I’ve got a cyber problem or a ct issue I think that’s where the rub comes'.

'... I don’t think there is that much that is different because we have sat down together and the governance arrangements are such here that we get together fairly regularly, he is in a position to hold me to account. The plethora of meetings and committees we had under the PA have been swept away. We’ve got a much tighter governance process. I invited the PCC and Chief Exec into the most strategic decision making meeting, because as I said everything is about relationships. I wanted to get [PCC] in close to me and see the issues I was wrestling with and he can share some of that accountability with me. ... I just think this organisation will be better for me being very clearly held to account and so were bent over backwards to help (PCC) and the OPCC to be able to focus on the right areas. We made it easier for the PCC to hold us to account and be more effective. If I had, had a more difficult intransigent confrontational PCC, then I wouldn’t have done it'.

'... Would have a very difficult intransigent confrontational PCC, then I wouldn’t have done it'.

'Good strong governance here.'
9. **Police & Crime Commissioner Relationship with Police Officers & Staff**

CC

'I spend a lot of time with staff, I'm a very visible CC. I'll talk about our working relationship I'll talk about his thinking and the direction of travel, so they understand that'.

CC

'Sometimes there are people inside the organisation that do not understand the role of the PCC. They will send him emails asking him to permit certain things, I think there is a general misunderstanding about the role of the PCC'.

CC

'I have had to tell my staff that sometimes a political decision may be as legitimate as a decision on thinking through all the objectives (example of closed police stations being re opened because of public feedback to PCC rather than on demand) ... I don't think they really care'.

CC

'They take much more notice of the CC than PCC, I try to make sure that he doesn't communicate with them directly (laughs). He doesn't do himself favours because he doesn't think before he speaks'.

CC

Particularly the cops just get on with it. We are looking at our estate like everyone else, we may end up reducing opening hours or the number of stations. The staff are saying this is the PCC getting rid of staff they are not saying its the CC, its the PCC ... the PCC said people will always remain loyal to the CC because you are seen as the institution of policing and I'm a politician. And you cant get away from the fact that the public have a particular view of politics and politicians in particular so they will always query the motivations for any particular decision and in reality the review was instigated through the operational policing review'.

CC

'...some do some don't... Some have said on retirement I hate the fact that hes your boss!' When I go around the force Ill sometimes allude to the relationship and try to give them a bit of information. I say look, I could be in a lot worse a place than I am. I think it is to my advantage for my staff to understand the roles a bit better and to hear from me that things are fine'.

CC

'At a senior level, less so lower down i.e. At a strategic level, they are really comfortable around him. At a lower level, Insps, there is a bit of deference, they see him as the boss, there is a little bit of that'.

CC

'Staff have got more to think about than the PCC'

CC

'... sometimes people have a confusion they're not quite sure what the role is'.

CC

'PCC is very media savvy, he is a politician who likes to get in the press. The staff are asking who's making the decisions. We have had to go on a concerted effort to make them understand that actually CC and the executive team are running Policing, but he (PCC) is accountable to communities'.

CC

'(PCC) said some things around performance that suggested officers and staff were not trying hard enough. The CC commented that this was the closest he had seen in his staff to mutiny, they were asking if it was possible for them to take a vote of no confidence. 'There was no way after that that the PCC could get back his positive relationship with the organisation. The legislation is set up on the basis that the CC and PCC have a relationship and can get along, but we had ended up in a place where the PCC had so little credibility that I had to constantly tread a line where if I was seen to be openly supportive Id have had no credibility myself.... So you had to tread a line where you weren't openly criticising him, but you weren't openly that supportive either.

CC

'We have an open relationship with staff & PCC I know some forces have a fire wall between staff and the PCC. If (the PCC) feels he needs to know something more operationally, Im really open to the Supts/ CSupts or Insps - him asking questions and engaging with them. At a strategic level, they are really comfortable around him. At a lower level, Insps, there is a bit of deference, they see him as the boss, there is a little bit of that.'

CC
‘Often the PCC will put things in the media e.g. twitter before discussing with the force so the staff get confused and frustrated’.

CC
‘If you are one of those CCs with a PCC at either end of that curve of normality, particularly if you’ve got the more aggressive bombastic, throwing their weight around type of PCC, its incredibly stressful because its a one on one relationship... it does make a difference as to how stressful your life is massively ... You’ve got *** (CC who went sick) who’s gone off how open people will be I don’t know but that’s all PCC driven. I never got there because I got my head around it... But that’s ok for me to say who’s kids have left school... But if you’re (referred to another CC with younger family who had gone sick)... In a more vulnerable position with younger kids and you saw what happened to *** (referring to the CC in question). Its all very easy for me to say get your head around it, perhaps my particular situation meant it was easier for me to get my head round it, if Id been just over 25yrs, kids 10 & 11 ...different ball game.’

CC
I know it different for others, ** (adjacent force) their PCC is very difficult.

CC
‘Its far too important, what I mean by that is that I’m incredibly lucky here I will finish my time and feel - not a friendship (with PCC) we deliberately don’t even have a drink together, we don’t have meals together. We’ve kept it very professional...However, it could be the other way, and because there’s no checks and balances... It could be if we didn’t get on there’s very little to make it work, the PCP certainly couldn’t, it doesn’t have the time influence, power to bash heads together, and our relationship could be very fractured and fraught and counter productive... that does worry me that too much is predicated on that one to one marking... I sense most CCs are saying its working ok but its a risky model. The one thing a PA had, it did have moderating impacts... I don’t think there are any ways that it can be mitigated now (conflict between PCC & CC) I think its a really tricky scenario’.

CC
‘Whereas a lot of people were worried very much around what happens if we are in conflict, my bigger fear is what happens if we are too close. If our destinies seem intertwined...May 2016, elections will be coming up, ... In theory people (CCs), may be seeking contract extensions to what extent is it healthy or unhealthy that you start to see the world thru the same lens. I’m not suggesting big C corruption, choose targets you both know you can get or manipulate figures... I’m just suggesting that there is a risk that that degree of objectivity and separation of roles can become blurred’.

CC
‘Delivering policing services and delivering a business based upon the relationship between two people which is absolutely critical is flawed. It doesn’t work to the benefit of the public, and as we go into austerity, having to think about what do the public really need from a professional police service as opposed to what does the PCC want to do because its popular with the public then we are likely to get into some difficult territory’.

CC
‘I was not the first CC to work in this force under this PCC, the organisation had decided they were not going to work with it. The incumbent top team behaved badly to the PCC i.e. giving him and his staff poor accommodation. restricting access to buildings. Regardless of what you thought of *** as an individual (ex Supt - not popular) he was the elected PCC and I don’t believe that they dealt with him properly, fairly proportionately, giving due deference to him now being commissioner of policing. There was nothing in place here, so I spent the first six trying to build relationships with the PCC.’

CC
‘...what you’ve got with a PCC is a personality who has been put into a role with no prior qualifications no prior experience...and then in effect (though CHMI) would disagree with this, but has in effect unfettered power within an organisation. It really is dependent upon the CC setting the ground rules, developing the relationship, working out where the line is.’

CC
‘I’ve known (PCC) for many years, there are three criteria that have to exist or else our relationship is built on sand. First a shared vision. ...second, there’s equity in the relationship ...that equity works well so we don’t fall out we have difference of opinion but we don’t fall out ...the third one is that we trust each other’.

CC
‘However in practice as its worked out for me its been a pretty positive experience. But I think that’s a bit of a lottery, I’m not sure there’s enough regulation around a PCC who might want to be making operational decisions, when they are paying my salary and responsible for sacking me or not...I’ve seen it with neighboring forces where their relationship is just not the same as ours. but I really think if you’ve got those three criteria right (boundaries, equity & trust) it works. ...clearly there are some (PCCs) that are politically motivated - party political. ...there are CCs around the country who have no relationship with their PCCs ...you have also got some PCCs around the country who have come into office and think they have to have all the ideas about changing the service and forget we’ve done this for 150 yrs., and are not dull people.

CC
‘If you have a relationship that works and you understand who has what and where the lines are, in the main because there re always grey areas, then that can work quite effectively. Its more dynamic’.

CC
‘Although our relationship is good I didn’t like operating in it. I never felt relaxed I always had to watch every decision and every policy and every thing had to be carefully managed. It puts political control into Chief Constables too directly I agree Chief Constables needed more accountability...they had a degree of autonomy unlike other public services I accept those days are gone, but the way in which this operates its too much on the other side of the pendulum. There is too much political control’.

CC
‘We have had heated exchanges. I have to resist him trying to be the boss. Although our relationship is good I didn’t like operating in it. I never felt relaxed I always had to thing had to be carefully managed and that’s extremely tiring. It puts political control into CCs too directly.’
...everywhere we went...every time he tried to describe himself as my boss I would stop him. It became joke between us, but its important...It is an effective relationship, he has become more relaxed over the 3 years...we treated each other with kid gloves whilst we established the working relationships. On a personal level we like each other, I respect him because he is a public servant...he has a real social conscience...

The Police Authority was very formulaic, very committee focused...it was slow and laborious lots of scrutiny but it was a kind of chess match. This can be far more dynamic because there are two individuals, if those individuals agree it tends to happen. But then there’s the question who is constraining those individuals to make sure they make the right decision.

There are risks if it goes wrong. That’s the greatest weakness (of the paradigm) the reliance on the relationship between two people even more so if there isn’t a filter. My PCC doesn’t have a Deputy, you can mitigate some of the tensions if you’ve got that.

What we have got with the PCCs is a great governance model, but it is precarious. Because they are unfettered the courts are now fettering their power, you only need to look at the Rhodes case in Lincs, and I think if the Gwent case had been taken to JR by Carmel Napier I think that would have led to some fettering of the PCC. But when you look at the Dyfed Powys case where there was a very powerful and eminently competent CC, because she was temp when the PCC joined the force she wasn’t selected. It may be that she wasn’t the best candidate, but an observer looking in from outside would see that as being rather odd.

Its improved our lot significantly we no longer have the bureaucratic burden of interminable sub committees...the one thing we have lost are the co-opted members who gave it a healthy diverse mix...but overall its been a good thing because we have a PCC who gets it who doesn’t want to be bogged down by bureaucracy. I’m lucky, but I know some of my (CC) colleagues aren’t and I think those forces are suffering for it...Not all of those are with young CCs. I think there is an acuteness to the issue if they have less than 30 years in but I don’t think there is a straight cut off.

Essential that we both work on making sure the relationship is right.

The trouble with the system is that it is a very personal system its designed to be very personal...so you make an assumption that you set up arrangements for how the working relationship should work....there’s a great deal of instability in it all...its possible you may have to undo all the arrangements (when a new PCC arrives)...the arrangements between the two corporations sole are only as good as the agreement of the current PCC...it seems to me that because its based upon the individual its inherently unstable.

...its very relationship invested. The positive side is that if you have a relationship that works and you understand who has what and where the lines are, in the main because there re always grey areas, then that can work quite effectively. Its more dynamic.

I know there have been some very difficult relationships around the county to the extent that some CCs haven’t coped and have broken down. That’s because of the relationship issue. I don’t think that what the Cons wanted in high profile PCCs was what they got The quality of people was not what they wanted, some of the people I wouldn’t allow to run a chicken farm.

I think it only takes...something will test the current system and it will be found wanting its not robust. Its too dependent on personalities.

Its too much personality based. I think that’s a risk I think if people aren’t able to maintain effective professional relationships then it is easy for it to be undermined. We’ve had some examples, Lincolnshire was the classic. There need to be a few more safety nets...and the PCP, doesn’t really have much teeth.

Too much power vested in one person I’ve seen the good and bad of that the trouble is you are just too dependent upon the intellect, the politics the personal characteristics of the individual that gets the job. ...If they don’t get checked by the PCP then it can be very different to the old days of the Police Authority.

Chief Exe are have come more to the fore they are not part of the politics of this, but part of the dynamic of this that has started to emerge gradually in some places you can have a reasonable PCC but a Chief Exec who is quite manipulative, or ambitious and therefore exerts undue influence over the PCC or you might get a reasonable Chief Exec and a difficult PCC which was my situation (with previous PCC) he was difficult to deal with the Chief exec was the route into him to try and get some influence.

At first, the PCC would come into meetings with a completely preconceived idea about what the outcomes would be and would not be persuaded by the arguments or logic. As a Chief Constable you then had to decide am I going to die in a ditch over this issue or are we going to try and find a way of accommodating it. We save the proper rows for the die in a ditch issues, which is where you end up. Part of that is about managing the relationship with the Force. The whole point of the legislation is that its founded on there being a reasonable relationship and its difficult to do business if its not. Your personal resilience in being up for a row every time you have a meeting. Secondly, the PCC is a much less politically ambitious person, still (political party) but with a small ‘?’, politician with a small “P”, intelligent man, happy to sit and debate the issues, happy to be advised, happy to be persuaded by the strength of the argument, but that’s not to say that he doesn’t have a red line...Looking to be supportive and is not looking for much in the way of a public profile...He only does media when he feels he needs to, whereas his predecessor took every opportunity to try and wring every ounce of juice out of the machine for his profile. You manage the force in a different way first set of circumstances you are looking to accommodate
things that you don’t agree with, they might not impinge on your operational responsibilities as a CC, but there is stuff there you don’t agree with. The legislation is set up on the basis that the CC and PCC have a relationship and can get along, but we had ended up in a place where the PCC had so little credibility that I had to constantly tread a line where if I was seen to be openly supportive I’d have had no credibility myself…. So you had to tread a line where you weren’t openly criticising him, but you weren’t openly that supportive either.

CC
‘There are undoubtedly some CCs who have got a difficult relationship to manage. I thankfully am not one of them and I’m very pleased with the situation I find myself in’.

CC
‘…actually I am in a much better place. Than many CCs. Because this drops down to personalities and relationships …everything in life is about relationships as things stand now here in ** (the PCC) had been on the Police Authority…I have known him for a long time. He is very much a politician through and through…he is somebody that I can speak to and have conversations with and we understand what it is that we are each trying to achieve …essentially around our mission of keeping people safe and especially the most vulnerable. I invited the PCC and Chief Exec into the most strategic decision making meeting, because as I said everything is about relationships. I wanted to get (PCC) in close to me and see the issues I was wrestling with and he can share some of that accountability with me.

CC
‘(our) PCC has had a previous role with the PA in some ways that’s been really helpful because there’s somebody who more of policing than someone who’s come into it totally fresh. In ** (previous Force) the PCC there had only a knowledge of policing made by what they had seen on TV or read in newspapers and it took a long time to get (the PCC) to understand lots of things in terms of that’.

CC
‘Its been ok (for me) because I have a PCC who was on the Police Authority for ** yrs (long time). And was chair, so its been a fairly smooth transition. The PCC has never once sought to influence my operational independence …and he’s allowed me to get on with the job’.

CC
‘I can’t imagine not having a good working relationship because if you don’t, whilst it may never become public, it makes life very difficult. I’ve got too much responsibility, too much going on professionally to be concerned about is my PCC ok, is he happy with what I’m doing. …each CC having the ability to negotiate and influence and build a working relationship but for some it’s difficult and nigh on bloody impossible’.

CC
‘Because I’m his pick…He is a good man…I have described it like working for your Nan, its a positive, but its not e.g. if we were talking about air support - he’ll say I was talking to some one who fly’s a helicopter!’

CC
Its importance is immeasurable I would say that because of the relationship we’ve got but I cannot begin to imagine a (poor) relationship I’ve heard of colleagues who, the PCC has never been in their office, if the PCC wants to see the CC they call them over and keep them waiting until they are ready to see them… That’s unimaginable to me and non productive absolutely the wrong sort of relationship… If I had a relationship like the one I described or like I’ve got to be a yes person then I wouldn’t still be in policing there wouldn’t be any point. The CC needs to feel without threat of a job loss that they can do the right thing, but that the PCC views need listening to’.

CC
The relationship is crucial, you’ve even got a tame PCC, in which case its no different to PAs and the CCs not accountable I’ve heard CCs talk like that, I’ve heard one CC actually say to me - PCCs lovely, but I have no accountability to him and that really uncomfortable for the CC, the CC didn’t like it. … I know of one or two (forces) where the CC does just what they want to do because the PCC is totally tame and really rates the CC and just lets them crack on’.

CC
‘Its vitally important there’s got to be a relationship of trust, there’s got to be a relationship of quite a high degree of a shared vision and shared values. … I’ve not seen anything that’s been about any compromise to operational independence or any PCC certainly here wanting to interfere in any operational decision. But I think it is more about having a clear joint strategy with national oversight. If you as a Chief Constable, as a Chief Exec cant manage your form of governance to gain their trust and make sure they are really well provided with the information to enable them to bat for you in line with their own needs then really you shouldn’t be here should you. I think that’s a difficult message there as well’.

CC
‘Having seen what I have in other areas, its obviously important in that he is supportive so I don’t have to waste a load of time and energy dealing with that’.

CC
‘The police service have invested huge amount of time effort and energy and money to enable me to operate at the executive level that’s not the same for (the PCC).’

CC
‘I tried to make sure there was a distance between us that our roles were clearly understood. And that the distinction between the strategic over view of policing and the operational That of course is very difficult to do when the person that sets the strategy also has the money and has control of the money. That is a difficult environment to work in. I believe that some CCs have taken the line of least resistance and allowed the border between direction of operational policing and the setting of strategy to become very blurred’.

CC
‘He (PCC) has courted controversy on occasions I have not welcomed that but I recognise that he has a public profile that he works to maintain, and candidly that’s going to get worse before May next year (elections) because he will want to get re elected.’
PCC had a ‘Taliban’ attitude to holding CC to account. If there was a criticism he would make critical comments in the media. CC feels that for politically ambitious PCCs negative comments in the media are more personally beneficial than supportive stories. But the PCC did it so much that even the public worked out that he only wanted to be associated with good news. This came back from the media and social media.

CC
‘If we get to the stage when (the PCC) and I fundamentally fall out that means I have to leave and I don’t think that’s in the best interests of the organisation … So I work very hard, and sometimes I want to smash my head against a wall to try to make sure that regardless of what’s going on then (the PCC) and I maintain a position where we have a strong working relationship that’s in the best interests of delivering policing for the public’.

CC
‘We argue but we don’t fall out… there’s the things I’m prepared to have a fight on because actually they mean too much financially or they mean too much to our communities and there are things are on the margins that are not worthy having a fight about even if I think they are the wrong decision.’

CC
‘…there’s always going to be tensions, in this arrangement with political PCCs with the financial situation and those kinds of things. … You get difficult and complex cases that need to be aired without it being fully minuted and you need to have that robust conversation. .. Even if we disagreed it was done in a very professional way. We have an MoU that talks about how you deal with disagreement.’

CC
‘We generally see things eye to eye, and we haven’t had any major fallouts we have disagreed and sometimes strongly over a few things We have both compromised. We have probably stayed with a greater commitment to PCSOs than I would have liked. … I don’t think there is that much that is different because we have sat down together and the governance arrangements are such here that we get together fairly regularly, he is in a position to hold me to account I will have had those similar conversations’(with the PA)

CC
‘We have not come anywhere near that [CC resigning] yes there would have to be things like the number of PCSOs that’s for me to determine, he has a very strong view on it but I have to determine how I put resources to risk … We could get edgy around that’.

CC
‘Our PCC dos not want a yes person, he actually enjoys a bit of sparing and every thing that goes with it - he wants people to challenge him. … There are several times when he’s come to me with stuff and I’ve said you haven’t thought this through, let me put this, this & this to you and he’s said you’re right I haven’t thought it through’.  

CC
‘You have your disagreement in private, and if that doesn’t work make the decision, right I’m going to go because as a Chief Constable you’re never going to win against a politician, once you take on a PCC, there’s only one loser. So you then say right I’m going to stand on principle, but accepting the fact that’s going to cost you your job’.  

CC
[if the PCC changed at the next election] ‘I would have to get on with working with a new PCC. Next election Cons & Lab will put the weight of the party machinery behind their candidates …they will try and win a lot of the independent seats. I think we will see a change and all this will be sucked up into the devolution debate’.

CC
The only potential negative for me is when [PCC] is gone what the next one [PCC] looks like and what they behave like (CC gave example of extreme right wing candidate at 2012 election who suggested police did not investigate DV etc.) …on very low turnouts strange things can happen if that kind of individual had been the PCC there’s absolutely no way I would have been as open as I have been. … I thought long and hard if he got elected whether I would resign’.

Contractual Relationship (as a sub theme).

CC
‘I absolutely believe that it [PCC ability to ‘hire & fire Chief Constables] affects the nature of the relationships with CCs and PCCs. Its got to hasn’t it? …In Chiefs council, people have said to what sounds like a really good professional idea, I wont be able to do because I’ve got a PDR priority, I’ve got to work very closely with the PCC. !! The example is the Police Innovation fund we said, why not pick three things from policing that will help advance professional policing, Rather than competing with each other… I was a big supporter of it, but there were people saying that ‘I’ve got that as a PDR priority, and I wont be able to go back to the PCC other than, I will be pursuing money on behalf of the organisation. People wont necessarily say I’m concerned about my position but we’ve got people (CCs) in the country that are in quite a difficult position because of their relationship with the PCC’.

CC
‘I’m fairly confident that the whole ethos was very much based upon …we don’t like the power that Chief Constables have and we are going to put in place this system whereby the power and independence of the Chief Constables will be curbed. And in some cases it undoubtedly has’.

CC
‘Its always fragile, if you get somebody new (PCC) and you’ve worked very well with the previous PCC, they are going to be suspicious of you’.

CC
‘The pension is one thing that locks you into a particular career if you had a flexible pension that you are able to tap into …you could see people taking much more of a risk… Where you have the potential that you may not be able to take it until you are 60 (due to pension changes) it stuffs you’.

CC
‘A lot of CCs depend on their contracts with PCCs and that means that they don’t have the strength to stand their ground. To stand up and resist it as they did before. PCC I’m not worried about my pension. Or getting my contract extended, a lot of people are not in that position. The CCs wanted to
write a collective letter, to the H Sec from all 43 CCs saying that we believed that the cuts could no longer be maintained without a serious impact on public safety…at the last minute in Chiefs council, 7 or 8 CCs said our PCCs have told us that if we sign that letter it will have consequences for us. (all CCs with less than 30 yrs service) That demonstrated to me …...they are beholden to PCCs.

CC
‘Its there in the back of your mind, but it would have to be something relatively seismic for me to think, I’m not going to challenge on this because they might not extend my contract. I think the concern for the CCs is that they don’t really need a rationale to do it. Say crime figures start going south, what a great thing to do (for PCC) I’ve decided this is not acceptable I’ve asked the Chief Constable to resign… Your ability (as CC) to influence crime figures in any given year is subject to so many vagaries’ …...its a degree of insecurity one of the things that we’ve negotiated for Chief Constable pay to go to the senior salaries review board, because we wanted to take the PCCs out of it. One of the arguments we put forward is that Job security has really changed for Chief Constables … its now more open than its ever been I’m sure in the next five years there will be some American CC posted in. …the safety net is not there any more. If you’ve got 22 yrs service you are going to view the world in a different way’.

CC
‘If you’ve got a PCC who is extremely negative, who doesn’t get on - I’ve worked with (a senior officer) and we were never going to get on…if that had been a PCC to CC relationship, I think my days would have been numbered’.

CC
‘It helps that I’ve got over 30 years in - that was a very liberating milestone. Because I’ve got that in my back pocket he can make me a retired person I’d be disappointed because I’ve still got a lot to do… I’m not going to deny my selflessness is influenced by that 30 years’.

CC
‘If I desperately wanted the job and I only had 25 years service, wanted the CC Job - could I potentially be … More agreeing with him etc. Yeah absolutely. Would it make a difference you’ve got to be honest, if you’ve got 25 years service in and you desperately wanted the job, but with him (PCC as an individual, I’m not sure that it would…if Id got 25 yrs service and Id taken it to the wire and I wanted the job and I thought that could affect whether I got the job or not, there’s a real chance I wouldn’t [push the matter] but its easy for me to say this because I haven’t got 25 yrs service in. On a matter of principle, I would really struggle not to do what I thought was the right thing, just because that might upset a PCC. But it is hypothetical, I haven’t been in that position and he doesn’t operate like that. But I know some colleagues, I’ve sat in at CC council where a colleague has old us that he’s been told by his PCC not to do something , something national if he does, his jobs on the line’. (letter to Home Sec)

CC
‘It doesn’t really (affect me) because he is so supportive. He appointed me and we have been working towards the restructuring…’

CC
‘There are risks in the system around that (contracts for CC) … You’ve got to build up the profession through the college of policing, that to be the voice, Ccs get confused between thinking that I’m accountable in this way and I’ve got this relationship with the PCC… There’s got to be an honesty about that, the world has changed whether you like it or not. Its changed across the public service. I think what CCs find difficult is making this distinction about saying, no its now the college of policing that should have the voice’.

CC
‘… the fact that the HM now has zero impact on the appointment of Chief Constables is a huge loss. There’s now no movement around the country…there are very few appointments being made outside what the PCC already sees (incumbent DCC) I’m not sure that’s good for policing …the HM brought a degree of independence and transparency, that’s not there now. The HM knew the cohort of people coming through and could look at the fit and that doesn’t take place any more’.

CC
‘I had a good panel but you hear tittle tattle, but there is a vacancy at the moment and there is somebody who has only just got there as an ACC. The PCC likes them, and is saying do you not want to be Chief Constable ? You shouldn’t be selecting people on whether you like them or not. The issue around the selection of people (CCs) and hiring and firing needs greater checks and balances and that may be a greater involvement of the HMIC, or the PCP.

CC
I had a positive experience thru SAP, but I dunno, I’ve got a view that I’m less worried about external people applying to become CCs. Lots of the things we hold up like the firearms one, most gold commander firearms are at Supt/ C.Supt level now. I think we kid ourselves that no body else can do our jobs. But having had experience working with a big strategic partner (Steria), that pool aint as rich as some people think it is. The dynamic decision making That I think we don’t have in terms of business, I’ve not been impressed with what I’ve seen here. Whatever process you have for selection some people are happy with it, usually those who were successful and some unhappy with it often those who aren’t successful’.

CC
‘But when you look at the Dyfed Powys case where there was a very powerful and eminently competent CC, because she was temp when the PCC joined the force she wasn’t selected. It may be that she wasn’t the best candidate, but an observer looking in from outside would see that as being rather odd. That selection process just seems whimsical you’ve got someone as important as the Chief Constable in the constitution of the fabric of society, I don’t think you should be whimsical. Its not really a PCC issue, its because they got rid of SAP so all those checks and balances that would have supported the PCC e.g. HMIC are no longer allowed to be part of the selection process. I rang the HMIC when I was looking to appoint a Deputy and he said I can’t get involved, I would have loved him to get involved’.

CC
‘Another effect was the loss of something like SAP there is nothing there the college has done some good work to put some best practice, some guidelines around it (selection of CCs), but not to put too finer point on it, it really is down to PCCs to pick their person. There is no coordination of Chief Officer careers the quantitative stats would suggest they are safer than ever, there’s less movement of Chief officers, more Deps get put in Chief Constable slots than ever before…. So any sense that bringing PCCs in would create a healthier refreshing, that’s not happening’. 
CC
'I have a colleague who was unexpectedly and surprisingly appointed (as CC) by his PCC. Who now feels obligated to the PCC and its a particular PCC who’s outspoken and dictatorial that can be good for policing...The removal of SAP, HMI involvement and introduction of local appointments by the CC and the PCC, because I appoint the rest of the team, means that the pool is massively reduced. There some chief officers whose ego is so big they wouldn’t want work with a PCC who was heavily involved and held them to account and there’s some PCCs who want a tame CC, that cant be good’.

CC
A weakness of the system is that there is no proper national oversight over (CC) appointments I think that is the area of weakness, things like decisions to extend contracts appointment processes I think that is the bit where there is too much power in one hand. Where there is potential for soft corruption on both sides so I’ve been arguing that there should be a national system because there are too many internal appointments too many DCCs almost automatically getting the job. And what that is, is a sign that govt in its wish to push more and more stuff down has gone too far. And there needs to be a bit of adjustment back up to say that within this process there are some really crucial decisions like the appointment of the CC... Going to some form of SAP process some form of external accreditation, some form of national talent mgt.

CC
'That was part of the reform that swept under the wire (CC appointing his/ her Chief Officer team) its actually given CCs more power than they’ve ever had before. ... it also threatens CCs because it starts throwing open the allegation that he may not be diversity friendly’.

CC
'The removal of SAP, HMI involvement and introduction of local appointments by the Chief Constable and the PCC, because I appoint the rest of the team, means that the pool is massively reduced’.

CC
'There’s now no movement around the country...there are very few appointments being made outside what the PCC already sees (incumbent DCC) I’m not sure that’s good for policing.

CC
'That was always going to be the case, I still think that (the regulation) that said you could not be an ACC, a DCC and CC in the same force I still think it was wrong to get rid of that. I can understand why PCCs would choose the DCC. The likelihood of them picking somebody else is just think unlikely’.

CC
'I think that one of the truly constitutionally worrying issues is the number of CCs now being appointed from deputies in their existing force ...there’s a number who have never served in forces other than the one they are about to be CC of, I don’t think its good. Also I think it creates a sort of mutual dependence that’s not great. Almost it could take us back into the Cleveland scenario of mutual support. ...there is something not very healthy where two people work together and one gets picked as the next CC. It’s very hard then to get clarity, separation and to dig in on the points that perhaps you would want to dig in professionally around’.

CC
'I don’t think its any different than before. The thing that worries me most is the change in legislation around Chief Officers - (in some forces) their entire Chief Officer team has never left the force they are in. That to me is utterly wrong’.

CC
'Figures have been passed on to the Senior salaries board around the number of people applying for jobs (as CCs) and a relatively significant proportion has just been one candidate. It tends to be the deputy From my own experience looking to see what jobs were coming up, and you could see, there’s no point applying there with the incumbent Dep. This is another issue around the PCCs - why would you throw yourself into a competition with somebody who has had a 2 or 3 year relationship with a PCC, and who do you ask is it going to be a fair competition. I came here because it was the second interview nobody got it including the incumbent deputy, so I thought ok an open competition. I’m not sure how many of them there have actually been’.

CC
'Going from PC to Chief Constable in the same force, there’s something nice about that, but I don’t think its healthy for the Force ...there is a lack of Chief Officer circulation at the moment its not a fear of nepotism but it’s a fear of sharing experience and moving experience round, because before you know it ... that cant be healthy in terms of continuing the development. of an organisation. I can understand why it would happen, and I suppose it depends where the Dep has come from, if you’ve got a Dep that’s come from another Force and has got that experience then that’s maybe less of an issue than someone who’s come all the way through...but there’s a number of Forces now that have got Chief Constables that have come through, I think history will tell us (if it was a good thing) or not’.

CC
'The rewards of doing the job staked against the risk associated with doing the job are nothing like they once were the rewards are certainly less the risks are certainly more. The lack of mobility around the country, and applicants for jobs its another part of the conversation we were having a moment ago [re dangers of CCs being influenced by having less than 30 yrs service].

CC
'I don’t know any of the detail, but I think ** (Force where a CC resigned shortly after arrival of PCC) is one of the occasions where people might have looked and wondered about that’.

CC
'The DCC deals with OPCC and often delivers bad news, It surprises me that more DCC’s are getting thru I would have thought more DCCs would have been tarnished by their role than not. Of course there is always the risk as there was with Police Authorities that if the Police Authority didn’t like the Chief Constable or the PCC didn’t like the Chief Constable, then they could play one off against the other that just comes down to individual integrity…’

CC
'The role of HMIC in (CC) appointments was critical because if you’ve got a dysfunctional chief officer team who are going to select the next person who comes in and joins them sometimes its really wise that the HMI that sits outside of it and has that view that ‘bloody hell, this force is going down the pan’...that to me was absolutely essential as part of the process with SAP I can understand that. But the trouble was it was inconsistent,
wasn’t listened to at least people can get thru to the next stage of the interview, but it does have its dangers.’

CC
’saw that in ** force and the Chief Constable told me I’ve been undermined here because the deputy has formed a very good relationship with the PCC.’

CC
’I look round the room at Chief Constables council and there are too many people in that room who are not capable I don’t believe of standing up to their PCCs and saying this is operational policing this is none of your business and being prepared to fight their corner. Easy for me to say that from my position of strength, they are vulnerable nothing to loose I just want to come into work and do a good job in an in terms of their appointment and their longevity as CCs it doesn’t seem to me terribly healthy that you’ve got that situation and something needs to be done about it. One thing you could do is change the selection process for CCs take it out of the hands of the PCC and say that’s a decision for the panel or for whoever takes the place of the panel’

CC
’I was appointed by the PCC, it makes it easier for me he’s very positive about me because I’m his pick so on a personal level we would all see the benefits of that but for me it doesn’t particularly change it because I try and keep it to what I believe to be right. It is not difficult to agree with his policing plan, its like world peace, wed all agree with that’.

CC
’If we carry on with PCCs this problem will become more acute. The age & service profile in comparison with pensionable age will become more difficult to achieve ... That level of influence, that leverage potentially will be there to a greater extent in the future than it is now. I wasn’t the PCCs choice (appointed by PA), so that also played into this as well (difficulties with PCC). Had I been the PCCs choice, then it might not have been the same, but we’ll never know’.

CC
’A lot of CCs depend on their contracts with PCCs and that means that they don’t have the strength to stand their ground. To stand up and resist it as they did before. I’m not worried about my pension. Or getting my contract extended, a lot of people are not in that position. The CCs wanted to write a collective letter, to the H Sec from all 43 CCs saying that we believed that the cuts could no longer be maintained without a serious impact on public safety...at the last minute in Chiefs council, 7 or 8 CCs said our PCCs have told us that if we sign that letter it will have consequences for us. [all CCs with less than 30 yrs service] That demonstrated to me ....they are beholden to PCCs Policing is different we are not a commercial company.’

CC
’You can see with some that the fact they’ve got a contract that takes them through to 27 years, they need an extension, the whole contractual arrangements the pension arrangements - that cant be good for policing, that a CC has got in the back of their mind I’ve got a contract coming up for review’.

CC
’I see it as a huge issue ... I wonder how many people will want to be Chief Constables in the future with the politics, the risk that comes with it, the personal risk ... We are now in a world whereby ... The extreme of that is if proven is gross misconduct which means now you cant leave the service’.

CC
’Its no different than under the PA, but In the right circumstance that could make it more difficult. But the bigger hurdle for me is the appointment process.’

CC
’Absolutely, there are two risks for me one those that can finish with one contract those (CCs) with less that 5 years service to do can be influenced if they believe their job will be in jeopardy if they didn’t go down a particular route., That said I think the 'fire' bit of ‘hire & fire' has had absolute clarity given to it. and I think there is a recognition that you cant just get rid of somebody just because they don’t agree with you. Whereas at the beginning I think they think if they (PCCs) didn’t like you, they didn’t get on with you tough luck. ... My dilemma was can you take the Chief Constables job before 30 years service and be true to yourself. That is a real dilemma you have to work thru and you can because of the clarity we’ve been given ... I’ve got a friend with 21yrs service and is applying for Chief Constable jobs. ...because there’s no flexibility in the pension, you have to make sure you do keep your job and of course people will sit there and bend towards it.’ (will of the PCC)

CC
’I suppose you can only answer that from your own circumstances ...I’ve got over 30 yrs service so if I was asked to leave the job tomorrow there’s no detriment to me financially. Its given me a greater degree of confidence in the way that I can say who I am and what I do. ...If I had ten yrs left to do its really high risk if my relationship with the PCC breaks down regardless of my competency, if I haven’t got a relationship that works then ...what do you do in those circumstances. Do you compromise your values ? Compromise your ethics?’

CC
’We joke about this at Chiefs [CC Council] which is you have a different conversation if you’ve already got your 30 years in I don’t know how much that’s just cops doing their usual joking. I think it is a factor I suppose it depends on your individual circumstances and your view of the world, because I certainly know that people (CCs) have bitten their lip around things. Prior to Xmas, when we found out the top slicing (by govt) was a lot more than we thought ...a letter to the H sec... The letter was devised by Peter Fahy and he was going to do it on behalf of the Chief Constables and was getting all the Chief Constables to sign up to it... Tony Lloyd, his PCC sent a circular around to all the other PCCs. It was then interpreted as a Labour led letter. And you ended up with 6 or 7 of the CCs who have Conservative PCCs being contacted in various ways one of whom was literally told not to ... I actually didn’t support the content of the letter .... Some of that was around, people need to keep that relationship which means I need to do X in order to get beyond my 30 years. So I do think it has an influence. ...when people get to 30 there’s a sigh of relief because ultimately you can say - Oh sod you. Its there in the back of your mind, but it would have to be something relatively seismic for me to think, I’m not going to challenge on this because they might not extend my contract. I think the concern for the Chief Constables is that they don’t really need a rationale to do it’.

CC
’...other Chief Constables are in a very different position, either because they fall short of their 30 and they want to stay so they need to get that
support from the PCC ... or they have been appointed by that PCC and I don’t know what conversations go on around the recruitment process and the priorities for that force. I’ve seen some of it play out including at CC council, in the last 6 months or so where CCs as a group were talking about a particular course of action which involved writing a letter to the H Sec, and one (CC) spoke very powerfully about if I were to put my signature to that letter, I’d be committing professional suicide. (that was someone needing additional contracts) That to me is unacceptable, but I’m not so naive as to think that those dynamics don’t play out. I bet it does go the other way, more CCs have persuaded their PCCs to be supporters of them and their force. Than have found themselves in regular battle with their PCCs. We are pretty good in policing in getting people close to us, looking in their eyes persuading them that we know what were doing we are pretty professional’.

CC ‘If you look at what’s happened nationally, there’s been some quite high profile ones look at Carmel Napier’s experience with her PCC. And there are other ones where if you weren’t at your 30 yrs service, lets say you had 4 or 5yrs to do because there’s a lot of young Chief Constables that have got a long time to serve. How strong would they be if they thought that’s going to cause real difficulties with their employer ... now I don’t think we should shy away from those (challenges) regardless, but it is probably easier to say when you’ve got 29, 30 years service in than if you had 24, 25 years service in. That’s where were heading to, a fixed term contract that takes you to still 2yrs away from your pensionable service, and you need an extension. I think there is potentially, although regulations still give quite a lot of protection to Chief Constables but its not about the regulations sometimes, its about whether you get to a position where you just cannot do your job because the relationship breaks down to such an extent. I think its always there as a danger, its got to be recognised as a danger lots of CCs work really hard to prevent relationships breaking down to that level - but you could always end up with (S.Yorks PCC) ... I would guess the Chief Constable there had some very difficult times with him’.

CC [CC needed a contract extension to get to pensionable age] … which didn’t help’... It did influence the Chief Constable .. It did in the sense of where do you draw the line ... I got to a position in my own mind where I’d accepted the fact that there might come a day where we would fall out so spectacularly that it wasn’t going to be possible to get to 30 yrs and I was accepting of that fact... The only way to look at yourself in the mirror in the morning having got involved in some of the discussions I was involved in was to be prepared to say no and take what came with it... You could see that the day would dawn where you absolutely would have to say I am not doing that... He was a difficult guy to work with probably the most stubborn person I’ve ever met.... You just have to get your head around, I may not get to 30 here, but I’ve got to run the force and I’ve got to have a means of doing it, that is to accept you’re not going to get to do 30 years but the trade off for that is that it becomes easier to make some of the decisions about fronting him up then so be it (This CC would have fallen 9 months short but still would have lost several thousand pounds on commutation), [CC indicated that things had come close when the PCC demanded that the command team change], ‘Its ok quoting stuff out of the book, but you’re still got to do business the day after...You’ve got ** (CC who went sick) who’s gone off how open people will be I don’t know but that’s all PCC driven. I never got there because I got my head around it... But that’s ok for me to say who’s kids have left school ... But if you’re (referred to another CC with younger family who had gone sick ) ... In a more vulnerable position with younger kids and you saw what happened to ** (referring to the CC in question). Its all very easy for me to say get your head around it, perhaps my particular situation meant it was easier for me to get my head round it, if I’d been just over 25yrs, kids 10 & 11 ...different ball game. You can genuinely take it out of the equation if you are one of those people who’s got a reasonable relationship and a reasonable PCC the likelihood is your PCC is going to give you some security’.

CC ‘You have to be able to say I’m not doing that and not say how can I live because there is no CC who gets sacked by a PCC is going to get another job its never going to happen... A CC may need to be chosen 3 times by 3 PCCs and that’s genuinely scary. That’s one of the reasons my job is not easier but its more comfortable because I know I could say ** (PCC) I’m not doing that and now do your worst sort of thing. But I do think its worse for, I cant name them but there are Chief Constables who, with mid 20s (yrs service) who have been in very scary positions. So you have touched on a very important point there. I’m not saying they would do anything corrupt or unethical, but can you hand on heart say it couldn’t potentially influence you or be seen to influence you your integrity is then up for grabs and I think you are weakened by that internally and externally You are then into, its that old thing of the extent to which your destinations are intertwined . Its not good for the public and its not good for policing’.

CC ‘There are [risks] and I think its exactly that point where the potential for corruption... I think before PCCs came in there was this fear that there were going to be big fights and big hostility, and initially there was but I think if anything the problem is the other way, is over cosiness. And that potentially corrupting decisions like appointments, extensions, ... I think there are two aspects to that some form of independent oversight which is certainly not being provided at the moment by PCCs ... And recognise this is a really difficult emotive issue ... I do see generally in policing that the idea of a job for life has gone and its just as much a challenge for some of those CCs about are they going to get a contract extension as it is with some of the PCs that I talk to who have got no hope of promotion’.

CC Had I gone (if a racist candidate had become PCC), somebody would have taken over with probably 23 or 24 yrs service with far less ability to stand up to the PCC and possibly not enough contract to get them to a pension. I have spoken on why it works so well here, and the PCC and I have identified why [Because of the long service of the CC] I’ve got nothing to prove, and I’ve got an organisation I care passionately about. ... What I’m doing here is not being done with a view to me going onto another role the PCC is the same [the PCC is] an experienced politician has not got ambition or ego stamped across their head [the PCC] comes to work because they care about public service... So that makes for a very easy relationship. What we are seeing in other parts of the country are people with very big egos and certainly some who see the role of PCC as a stepping stone to either higher political office or building the cv for some other purpose. Then you add to that the dynamic of my boy or my girl, because I’ve appointed this person and they are going to do exactly as I say and do you know what they’ve got 22 yrs service I’ll give them a 5 yr contract that still leaves them 3/4yrs short - they cant really stand up to me. There’s one Chief Constable off sick at the moment because of the relationship with the PCC and I’m told that person is going to go on a medical pension.

CC ‘Absolutely, you can see it, [a new PCC not renewing contract of the incumbent CC] I do think there are people (PCCs) who will come in there and try to make their mark on it saying I’m a different politician I’m a different colour ...there’s a real risk that somebody saying I need someone (CC) associated with me as an individual its a huge risk’.

CC ‘This is one of the concerns that we were raised at CPOSA when this was all being proposed under the PSRA, which is the is the American system literally you come in as a new administration and all those people go. There’s a prospect here if my PCC decides not to stand at the next election, there will be a perception that I was their choice and whoever comes in may decide they want somebody else. And this is the issue around checks and balances, in
effect they could ask me to retire or resign and I’ve got very little in the way of … Hang on I’m doing a good job. I’m as qualified better than the next man…this isn’t right, but there isn’t anything there to … Its there in the back of your mind, but it would have to be something relatively seismic for me to think, I’m not going to challenge on this because they might not extend my contract. I think the concern for the Chief Constables is that they don’t really need a rationale to do it’.

CC
This [a new PCC not renewing contract of the incumbent CC] concerned the CC more than being sacked by the current PCC ‘That worries me more than [PCC] slacking me because you do feel vulnerable if some body comes in and thinks мм… It goes back to my point about individuals a lot of it is at a whim’.

CC
‘People putting themselves forward [for CC roles] are now looking at their length of service, at the time the contract will last. And making a decision to wait until they are in that safe zone where a 4 year contract takes them to 30 yrs it is happening, people are making that decision. You are not getting the movement around the country that you used to get’.

CC
‘Without a doubt, no doubt at all I’m convinced that’s the case [CC Candidates are choosing forces to apply to based upon the reputation of the PCC]. I can’t prove it, but I think absolutely. Would I apply for a post knowing that I was going to come into work every day hating the fact, knowing I was going to have another battle…your policing career is too short. I can’t imagine coming into work where you know that you are going to be at loggerheads with your PCC.’

CC
‘I think it will (affect candidates applying for CC jobs) absolutely if you’ve got a PCC who has a legend of being difficult and extreme behaviors, I think that would limit who’s prepared to go work for them. Northumbria Chief Constable is advertised at the moment, I don’t know how many applicants they’ve had but its not many’.

CC
‘I’ve had it said to me by a number of DCCs said if your job came up tomorrow there’s no way I’d apply for it’.

CC
... If you are a Chief Constable candidate you’d be bonkers not to look at that person (future PCC) if they have a reputation for being really good to work with for being personable they get policing they get the division of responsibilities they’re doing great stuff together, are you going to look at that exactly the same way if somebody is perceived (PCC) as take S. Yorkshire as an extreme (Sean Wright) would you want to work for that guy? … Are you really going to say that has no bearing - course it does. There’s an argument for saying that’s just like Police Authorities, some Police Authorities were known to be really good to work with and others were known to be really difficult.’

CC
‘Out of the 43 Chief Constables, currently 23 are under investigation, I don’t think we are an inherently corrupt generation of police officers, I think it because previously that complaints against Chief Constables were dealt with more effectively more fairly and more proportionately. than they are by current PCCs. Because they cover their backs by referring straight to the IPCC any complaint against a Chief Constable. The Police Authority had a sub committee to consider complaints against Chief Officers that would consider the complaint, the seriousness, corroborate…. and come to a balanced view about how to deal with that complaint. Chief Constables get complained about a lot so we become so risk averse that we refer everything to the IPCC’.

CC
Chief Constable needed a contract extension to get to pensionable service. ‘…which didn’t help’… [It did influence the CC]… It did in the sense of where do you draw the line … I got to a position in my own mind where I’d accepted the fact that there might come a day where we would fall out so spectacularly that it wasn’t going to be possible to get to 30 yrs and I was accepting of that fact…The only way to look at yourself in the mirror in the morning having got involved in some of the discussions I was involved in was to be prepared to say no and take what came with it…. You could see that the day would dawn where you absolutely would have to say I am not doing that…. He was a difficult guy to work with probably the most stubborn person I’ve ever met…. You just have to get your head around, I may not get to 30 here, but I’ve got to run the force and I’ve got to have a means of doing it, that is to accept you’re not going to get to 30 years but the trade off for that is that it becomes easier to make some of the decisions about fronting him up then so be it (This CC would have fallen 9 months short but still would have lost several thousand pounds on commutation), [the CC indicated that things had come close when the PCC demanded that the command team change]. ‘It’s ok quoting stuff out of the book, but you’ve still got to do business the day after.’

CC
‘…a lot of it is at the whim of an individual the whole barking misconduct stuff, some PCCs suspend some don’t… We shouldn’t be surprised because you’ve got amateurs in those roles a lot of them’.

CC
‘If you are in the strategic leadership, its more and more about strategic leadership in the public sector to some degree then whether you get that contract or not you’re not worried about -I’ve only got 42 police forces, to get a job no actually there’s all over the health service, etc’.

11. Police Operational Independence

CC
‘Because of the Policing Protocol, the PCC does not know what their role is they think they know what the role is the Chief Exec thinks they know, but that will be completely different to - if you go round the country to what every other PCC there is. To me the issue in *** has been does (PCC) run the Police service or do I (CC) run the police service. There are two areas where he has got more control. One is around collaboration, if (the PCC) doesn’t sign the sec 22 framework agreement it doesn’t happen. He can therefore decide whether or not an operational proposal goes forward or not.

CC
‘It’s been ok (for me) because I have a PCC who was on the Police Authority for ** yrs (long time). And was chair, so its been a fairly smooth transition. The PCC has never once sought to influence my operational independence …and he’s allowed me to get on with the job’.
CC
In terms of one individual, not in my force but across the country, at national meetings thinking what planet is that person (PCC) on’.

CC
‘I tried to make sure there was a distance between us that our roles were clearly understood. And that the distinction between the strategic operational and the operational. That of course is very difficult to do when the person that sets the strategy also has the money and has control of the money. That is a difficult environment to work in. I believe that some CCs have taken the line of least resistance and allowed the border between direction of operational policing and the setting of strategy to become very blurred’.

CC
‘...around collaboration, if (the PCC) doesn’t sign the sec 22 framework agreement it doesn’t happen. He can therefore decide whether or not an operational proposal goes forward or not. Eg CC can put together with adjoining CC a joint team if PCC doesn’t sign it I cant do an operational team.’

CC
‘...we have never had any tussle with PCCs around operational decisions ... So the worst fear that you’d have a PCC directing that someone is arrested or directing the use of resources, that’s never been, we’ve never been anywhere close to that’.

CC
‘So if you get a steer that the priority is rural crime, but over here i got a cyber problem or a CT issue I think that’s where the rub comes. It becomes very localised around bad headlines, local issues. Where the PCC comes from there was the loss of (police facility), that was a big issue at the same time we were closing (another facility) - not really interested.’.

CC
‘I think this is widely misunderstood...people say you cant talk about that, its operational what they mean is you cant get involved in the day to day command of the organisation. But I think its perfectly legitimate for a PCC to speak about what we should focus on...the PCC represents the public ... (re Critical Incident Gold Groups). PCC does not attend Gold groups, if he did then he may become enjoined with the decisions, but it is legitimate for his Chief of Staff to attend and observe’.

CC
‘PCC does not tend to stray, he’s more interested in local and community policing, we tend to have conflict round the estate and PCSOs’ (CC sees this as affecting the operational as keeping stations open impacts upon resources.).

CC
‘They [OPCC] have effectively an open invitation to every critical incident Mgt meeting but they will very often listen to my advice ** (PCC) this is one where its absolutely critical you’re here, and this is one where (example given ) you are welcome as always but I don’t think you can add much. What (PCC) tends to do is send one of the Officers that works well, they’re not actually in there they can genuinely say I was not part of the decision making. They [OPCC Officers] will give an input if they feel they can help, I’ve never once felt it was inappropriate never even bordering on it...its a useful addition to our thinking’.

CC
‘... I’ve not seen anything that’s been about any compromise to operational independence or any PCC certainly here wanting to interfere in any operational decision. But I think it is more about having a clear joint strategy with national oversight.’

CC
‘...with a PA the lines (of Operational independence) were less likely to become blurred because you had a group of people some of whom were independent holding each other to account, so you didn’t get close to that operational line whereas now there is one person, far more immersed in it, feel they are the public face of policing ... I am concerned around what I perceive to be the increasing position that PCCs are taking in terms of starting to affect some CCs operational independence. In some cases they are dictating what is happening operationally’.

CC
‘Whilst there is a Policing Protocol that talks about 43 CCs independent operational CCs and the PCC not fettering the ability of the CC to deliver their business. The reality is that its not anything like as black and white as that gets presented. Because at the end of anything you might want to do there is money and/ or reputation The delivery model is my business, is it costing more, are we using our buildings effectively is territory for the PCC. ... ** (the PCC) will say I’ve been to wherever and they haven’t seen the PCSO recently. We have reviewed what we have got and where we are putting them on the threat risk and harm and demand. (he says) well I think we should have Fred Bloggs back at wherever, so you know, at a very tactical level he tries to do that at a strategic level we still work through him understanding what does governance mean and what’s governance of the delivery of policing’. 

CC
‘There are significant areas of greyness in the way in it is set up one test of it is to ask the question, ‘who owns the IT strategy?’ ...I’m not sure I can answer you, if it was the PCC on their own then presumably they are taking responsibility for all sorts of issues, around information and if theoretically we had some kind of breakdown Soham style in terms of information handling then its very difficult to see how the PCC holds me to account if its their thinking and systems - if its my strategy then its one that I cant always execute without contractual oversight... I don’t allow them [OPCC] into gold groups, you are (if you do) fudging the accountability you are inadvertently signing them up to a collective approach to something that at some point they may want to hold you to account for - so its quite dishonest to do that really’.

CC
‘There is a classic one at the moment where a PCC ... Who has posed the question about armed policing to the electorate and whether his CC should allow police officers to have side arms or not. ...to me that’s clearly an incredibly sensitive operational decision based upon intelligence that the PCC wouldn’t get to see’.

CC
‘I always brief him I always make sure he knows. ...straight on the phone to (PCC) as much detail as I can give, because he is going to get asked questions by people in the locality. My brief to the Chief Officer team is that you need to keep the PCC informed does he have any direction or control
around that - no. I always invite [PCC] onto gold groups as observer.’

CC
‘I believe that some CCs have taken the line of least resistance and allowed the border between direction of operational policing and the setting of strategy to become very blurred. And almost let the PCCs role’.

CC
‘Its grey, people talk about operational independence of the CC and political interference in policing. I think this is the latest iteration of that kind of arrangement…its not the governance arrangements that potentially undermine the role of the CC in operational independence its the financial arrangements’.

CC
‘I invited the PCC and Chief Exec into the most strategic decision making meeting, because as I said everything is about relationships. I wanted to get [PCC] in close to me and see the issues I was wrestling with and he can share some of that accountability with me. He did that for a couple of years then a new C Exec arrived and he reflected that [the PCC] was probably getting a little too close to the operational decisions and I could see that, so he has stepped out of that meeting. But I think it worked for us because of a trust issue, me bringing him in there him seeing me with commanders trying to wrestle with some difficult stuff. We’ve tried to be clear where’s the line and he has not been predatory at all. … If there is anything (operational incidents) that has either a reputational issue attached to it…or whether its something that’s got something political attached to it or is so unusual or of a particular nature that he should know about it, then he will get a call. (re Gold groups) … For some things (PCC/ OPCC would be invited onto gold groups). But its not something they’ve pushed for’.

CC
‘There’s nothing that I haven’t been able to resolve and work through with him, and it is about characters and personal style. I’ve had to tell him some times you are overstepping the mark now putting that foot over into direction and control … we’ve had to have those conversations. E.g. there are some groups that he engages with that feed him information about potential rt wing protest where he was almost on the cusp of being an informant. Certain areas around work we are doing re hate crime where he’s almost directing us to do things rather than helping us to understand the challenges. He gets that. If you’ve got a PCC who is extremely negative, who doesn’t get on - I’ve worked with [a senior officer] and we were never going to get on…if that had been a PCC to CC relationship, I think my days would have been numbered. Re Critical incidents, we engage with him and keep him briefed (during a protest policing event) the PCC wanted to come out and walk around engaging with staff...we chaperoned him as much as anything to make sure he didn’t appear to be aligning himself with any of the groups down there for a politician he’s a bit naive in terms of how things like can be used. PCC does sometimes attend Gold groups as a participant, he is helpful’.

CC
‘I have never once felt ‘you should investigate this or you shouldn’t investigate that’, never felt the hairs on the back of my neck go up thinking ** (PCC) this is dodgy. However, I’ve already said they [OPCC] need you to put more into rural business so they are affecting it…... its a completely redundant argument about interfering in operational policing, because if they want to they just say you won’t have the cheque you wont have the money to do that. (eg MPS Water cannon, other PCCs said they would not have them whatever the CC said because they would not provide the money & eg locally two CCs and one PCC wanted a joint control room other PCC said no and would not fund it). I get highly amused by the huge amount of time and effort spent on drafting up that Protocol that seemed to defy the relationship, that to me never bore any resemblance to realities. All it needed to do was to have concentrated on the separation of powers over operational decision making in the are we going to deploy Taser if I think its the right thing to do we are going to do the same thing whatever the CC says...I've worked with [a senior officer] and we were never going to get on…... its a really blurred line. Someone would have to convince me not to brief them, not to have them involved in almost every instance I can think of… I don’t think you can write it down because there’s too many different permutations of what could happen. (example of reducing numbers of neighbourhood officers to supplement response. CC recognised that this would be a concern for PCC so discussed with PCC, arrived at a compromise recognising community concerns - CC sees this as positive.’

CC
‘A lot of us in policing thought that it would be really clear [Op independence] actually its a really blurred line, because there are very few instances where its an operational policing issue whether something planned or spontaneous that doesn’t have some sort of community impact, media involvement. I think its really blurred line. Someone would have to convince me not to brief them, not to have them involved in almost every instance I can think of… I don’t think you can write it down because there’s too many different permutations of what could happen. (example of reducing numbers of neighbourhood officers to supplement response. CC recognised that this would be a concern for PCC so discussed with PCC, arrived at a compromise recognising community concerns - CC sees this as positive.’

CC
‘I can give numerous examples here where I’ve wanted to do something for the public and the politicians looking at the protocol say that’s absolutely a matter for the CC but I’ve had to work really hard with my PCC to get to a position where taking decisions that are in my domain did not impact negatively on the relationship between me and the PCC.’

CC
‘Who is responsible for shaping the future of the force. And the idea that you jointly own future strategy is fine as long as you both agree on direction of travel. I suspect that across forces, thus far on the whole people (PCCs) have generally listened to professional advice and reached agreement.@(CC).’

CC
‘No problems in this area PCC understands the line. sometimes PCC will ask for a briefing so that he is not wrong footed and that is appropriate…he never has said you should be doing this or that. PCC does not attend Gold groups, but CC would welcome him doing so as a voice not a decision maker’.

CC
He (PCC) has never, he has come close, but he has never overstepped the mark on a policing issue. He would rather put one of his officers on a gold group, rather than him sitting himself…. Full understanding from them because we don’t have to involve them in a gold meeting but much better for them to be able to say we sat thru the police planning of this and they did consider community impact etc. They are absolutely clear it’s as an observer.

CC
(CC indicated that things had come close when the PCC demanded that the command team change). ‘It's ok quoting stuff out of the book, but you've still got to do business the day after.’
‘We made it easier for the PCC to hold us to account and be more effective. If I had, had a more difficult intransigent confrontational PCC, then I wouldn’t have done it. I’d have been just trying to fight my corner and make sure that operational independence and direction & control was absolutely clear. ...but he does not try to step over the line’.

CC

‘We have a clear understanding that the CC runs the police force and my accountability is for operational delivery. The setting of the strategy based on his manifesto is something we agree on. In the early days he tried to control me by setting the budget and allocating sums of money for policing functions ie £3M for local policing. I refused to play that game because what that would lead to would be a way of him having long term control over what I did. It could force me into making cuts in specific areas of policing. I don’t think he intended that I think he thought that was holding me to account by controlling the budget tightly. What we agreed was for him to fund my delivery plan. A lot of smoke and mirrors and the money passed to me the same as every other year.’

12. Police & Crime Panels

CC

‘...governance of 17 people has got checks & balances in it which governance by one person hasn’t. If somebody (PCC) digs their heels in when they’ve got something wrong you cant get rid of them. I’m not sure there’s anywhere else in political service where you’d see that happen. That has got to be high risk.’

CC

‘Who is holding to account the PCC its a bit glib to say the electorate. South Yorkshire showed that is not a very effective ...it became a source of embarrassment for other PCCs that there is no recall mechanism that would be completely unacceptable if that was a PCC. There are 42 PCCs each with their own personalities; strengths and weaknesses odds are there are one or two who may stray to some degree. Some of the excesses of previous Chief Constables you see in PCCs who seem to be operating their own fiefdoms, as opposed to more checks and balances through a more robust PCP. I think there is a relatively naive view that you are held to account by the electorate ..I think that’s spin to some degree. The ability to recall (the PCC) needs to be in place.’

CC

‘PCC (local) is very arrogant, wont take any shit from anyone he takes the view this is just something I have to do and I really don’t care what you say. The PCC has a political mandate they have been elected on a broader mandate than my MPs, ... you’ve then got a bunch of councilors elected on a far smaller level now holding him to account. Do they understand Policing - no Have they been involved in policing - very few... so you’ve got to question what’s their knowledge, what are their attributes and skills to really be incisive and understand what’s going on. I don’t think its there personally’.

CC

‘They are rubbish - the chair of the PCP hated ** (the PCC) he was a mason and a conservative. Again, just awful. We spent 3 and a half hours at my confirmation hearing where their behaviour was discourteous and disrespectful to both to me and to ** (PCC) You have a range of people with a range of knowledge, so I think their ability to hold the PCC to account is limited, very limited’.

CC

‘What the hell is the PCP ? What’s it there for ? was it put in there to placate or for a purpose and I don’t see the latter. I think one of the biggest issues is the lack of any true role that the PCP has there is no real power that the PCP has and as a consequence its an untamed individual (the PCC) that can do what they want. With very little recourse than to wait a number of years before the next election when the electorate will decide whether they get through or not. I think its (the PCP) is the same as every other one in the country its benign. They will receive reports and discuss issues but it is fairly benign.’

CC

‘They are non existent they can veto certain things but he can say no - the chair of the Police Authority could not say no to the Police Authority, there would be a vote’.

CC

‘The PCP consists of people the Local Authority don’t want they are not strong their remit is very limited and if a PCC doesn’t want anything to do with them then they don’t have to and quite a few of them don’t’.

CC

‘Lincolnshire was the classic. There need to be a few more safety nets ...and the PCP, doesn’t really have much teeth Who is holding to account the PCC its a bit glib to say the electorate. There are 42 PCCs each with their own personalities, strengths and weaknesses odds are there are one or two who may stray to some degree. Some of the excesses of previous Chief Constables you see in PCCs who seem to be operating their own fiefdoms, as opposed to more checks and balances through a more robust PCP’.

CC

‘Its ok...leaders of the Local Authorities form the PCP. I think the (PCC) would say he generally gets a good hearing, they are Local Authority leaders so they know their way round’.

CC

‘The challenge that wee still got to crack locally is how the PCP operate although we are starting to see some changes in that their role is to hold the PCC to account, I think they hold him more to account than they did 2 years ago, , eg still as the Police Authority did, being concerned re TOIL levels in Force’.

CC

‘They are finding their feet the PCC has allowed them a lot of freedom than the act of parliament gives them. ... There are some very astute people on the PCP - they hold bthe PCC to account the best they can with their limited powers.’

CC
In quite a few areas, the PCPs don’t exercise that much in the way of proper challenge to the PCCs. That’s totally true here. Going back you have **(PCC) died in the wool Lab, virtually every other person on the PCP died in the wool Lab. The PCC would have a pre PCP meeting where they would all agree what was going to be discussed what was going to be asked, then they’d go in and put on a show so a lack of challenge because everyone is coming from the same background, and as unhelpfully, another PCP not a million miles away from here where they take on the PCC for fun to score political points, neither of those two ends of the spectrum is helpful to anybody. It’s not the way the system was meant to work. The system works well where you’ve got reasonable people as in the CC and the PCC are both reasonable... Making reasonable decisions in a reasonable environment. Now it works better (with new PCC) Its now appropriately challenging.’

CC
‘PCP here has not been very effective at all. Its because its not a cohesive area and its not very high status (so people don’t want to do it) They do not have a huge amount of interaction with the PCC at all you had people on it who were on the PA but left because it was so dysfunctional. They don’t make much impact on us as a force or on (the PCC) to be honest. He’s not dismissive but he doesn’t worry about what they think.’

CC
‘My biggest worry was too much power vested in one person and I think that is definitely still the case, insufficient checks and balances ... I do think the devil was more in the detail in many respects. Too much power vested in one person with totally ineffective PCP sitting above it’.

CC
‘Their role is to scrutinise the PCC, not the police, they started off wanting the police to go to every session...we’ve come away from that now to them scrutinising the PCC, but not in any real meaningful accountable way because they don’t understand it’.

CC
‘... On the whole its a weakness in the model’.

CC
‘But you’ve got to look at the politics of the PCP, because the chair of our panel...stood against the PCC. So he has an axe to grind. The members of the panel were the same members of the Police Authority so the people who were disempowered were given the role of holding the PCC to account, and it was quite lumpy for a while... There are issues about how under the legislation how effectively the PCP are able to hold the PCC to account and what levers they have to do it, and on the face of it they don’t appear to be very strong.’

CC
[CC attends PCP] ‘To be honest most questions are operational so without me there would not be much said.’

CC
‘We provide joint leadership, I sit beside the PCC [at PCP] and I will help where I can’.

CC
‘I have been to the odd one [PCP], but if I go it becomes about me. By not going it means they talk to him [PCC]’.

CC
[[(PCC) will not take me, if the Chief Constable goes they love it, it makes them feel good’

CC
‘[CC attends] As a guest, I know there’s some debate as to whether I should. A lot of the PCP are ex Police Authority, and having the Chief Constable there then people start getting into very localised issues, rather than strategic oversight’.

CC
‘I go to all PCP meetings with the PCC it is helpful because it helps us to manage the demand from him, because if there’s things that I can answer there and then, and help him to answer its better than him coming back and saying can I have a report. More importantly to help move the PCP on they are made up of predominantly ex PA people at those meetings if they steer a question straight at me I say - what I think you are asking (the PCC) is how does he hold the CC to account for...Over time gradually we have moved them to a position of being more appropriate in the questioning.’

CC
‘Most of the questions [from PCP] ... If I remove the signing of the policing plan and the budget, most of the questions come to the Chief Constable .. If we [Police] didn’t feed the agenda it would be Mrs Miggins cat. That sounds dreadfully patronising but it doesn’t work’.

CC
The inability to put restrictions, controls or dispense with a PCC needs looking at. If you are a PCP holding a PCC to account and you’ve got concerns, actually they are pretty impotent at being able to do anything about that ... I think there needs to be some thought and the S Yorks example is a good example of that ...maybe there needs to be something that strengthens that (PCP ability to recall PCC), but puts the ability into not just one individual but a wider group. That then and reduces the risk of someone being power crazy and doing things that are not in the best interests of communities’.

CC
‘...the middle ground between some of the advantages of PCCs and the advantages of PAs with a number of people who could bring different views to the table... PCPs were an after thought politically they were never given the clout, they’ve not been given the budget so nobody who’s got any sense wants to be on a PCP... they meet on a minimal number of occasions because they don’t have the money to support otherwise. They are not doing what Police Authorities’ used to do’.

13. Recommendations for Change in Legislation/ Policy

CC
’... so my sense is that we should have strong democratic governance. albeit, I thought the Police Authorities were entirely serviceable certainly better than the watch committees which thru various iterations they replaced. When you look back at what was happening in Notts & S. wales in the 50’s and early 60’s ... I wouldn’t want to go back to those bad old days. There is a sense in some of my colleagues that that is what is the case. Because they feel
a precariousness around their decision making should it impinge on the personal views or priorities of the PCC. So the checks & balances that one had with the Home Secretary, Police Authority & Chief Constable and the CC having his team chosen by the PA ... In Britain we have all sorts of triangulation the Judiciary, the legislature, and the executive. So we have all sorts of balancing constitutional - and the triangle is a very useful balance'.

CC
‘All of my problems with the PCC have been because the Policing Protocol is wishy-washy and doesn’t tie people down. More clarity (is needed) around operational independence does it mean can you go and arrest X&Y-no that’s not your role commissioner, that’s my (CCs) role, is it I’ve looked at your review of policing [PCC to CC] and I’d like you to put 55 officers at x and 100 at Y. Or is it I want you to concentrate on roads policing, I want you to concentrate on CSE and I don’t want you to have any dog handlers or is it. There’s my Police & Crime plan go and deliver it... from the first every single one of those situations you can read into the Policing Protocol if you choose to’.

CC
‘Because of the Policing Protocol, the PCC does not know what their role is they think they know what the role is the Chief Exec thinks they know, but that will be completely different to - if you go round the country to what every other PCC there is. To me the issue in *** has been does (PCC) run the Police service or do I (CC) run the police service. There are two areas where he has got more control. one is around collaboration, if (the PCC) doesn’t sign the sec 22 framework agreement it doesn’t happen. He can therefore decide whether or not an operational proposal goes forward or not.

CC
‘Who is holding to account the PCC its a bit glib to say the electorate. South Yorkshire showed that is not a very effective ...it became a source of embarrassment for other PCCs that there is no recall mechanism that would be completely unacceptable if that was a PCC. There are 42 PCCs each with their own personalities; strengths and weaknesses odds are there are one or two who may stray to some degree. Some of the excesses of previous Chief Constables you see in PCCs who seem to be operating their own fiefdoms, as opposed to more checks and balances through a more robust PCP. I think there is a relatively naive view that you are held to account by the electorate. ..I think that’s spin to some degree. The ability to recall (the PCC) needs to be in place...’

CC
‘The American model which is having three. A commission of 3 people it adds moderation, its not as cumbersome as a authorities, but moderation of thought, discussion, debate and democracy, but how you get to having 3 would be really tricky...its the least number that you can have and still have an odd number to allow some form of voting to deal with the issue.’

CC
‘Elected mayor is a better model than PCC’.

CC
‘There is a need for marketing to explain the role of PCC’

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CC
‘Elected mayor is a better model than PCC’.

CC
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CC
A weakness of the system is that there is no proper national oversight over (CC) appointments I think that is the area of weakness, things like decisions to extend contracts appointment processes I think that is the bit where there is too much power in one hand. Where there is potential for soft corruption on both sides so I’ve been arguing that there should be a national system because there are too many internal appointments too many DCCs almost automatically getting the job. And what that is, is a sign that gov't in its wish to push more and more stuff down has gone too far. And there needs to be a bit of adjustment back up to say that within this process there are some really crucial decisions like the appointment of the CC... Going to some form of SAP process some form of external accreditation, some form of national talent mgmt.

CC
‘I look round the room at Chief Constables council and there are too many people in that room who are not capable I don’t believe of standing up to their PCCs and saying this is operational policing this is none of your business and being prepared to fight their corner. Easy for me to say that from my position of strength, they are vulnerable nothing to loose I just want to come into work and do a good job in an in terms of their appointment and their longevity as CCs it doesn’t seem to me terribly healthy that you’ve got that situation and something needs to be done about it. One thing you could do is change the selection process for CCs take it out of the hands of the PCC and say that’s a decision for the panel or for whoever takes the place of the panel’.

CC
The inability to put restrictions, controls or dispense with a PCC needs looking at. If you are a PCP holding a PCC to account and you’ve got concerns, actually they are pretty important at being able to do anything about that ... I think there needs to be some thought and the S Yorks example is a good example of that ...maybe there needs to be something that strengthens that [PCP ability to recall PCC], but puts the ability into not just one individual but a wider group. That then and reduces the risk of someone being power crazy and doing things that are not in the best interests of communities’.

CC
‘Needs to be a body that scrutinises PCCs along with other parts of local govt. Similar to the Audit Commission.

CC
‘PCP should be the policing board and the PCC the elected chair of the board. That’s a stronger check and balance’.

CC
‘They (PCCs) would be accountable to a board probably appointees with a mixture, some from Local Authorities . It would be part of the selection of Chief Constables. You write in there [law] that firstly they hold the PCC to account ... They are a board that makes sure the PCC is doing what they are expected to do they have teeth over appointments, they have teeth over the way the PCC runs his office. Proper confirmatory hearings (for CC selection) . They have some financial clout and the audit function’.

CC
‘The American type of system of a public safety board a group of individuals...a very strong mayor that board reports to’.
? A central service role for CCs who do not get contract renewals would be positive?

CC
‘I think the world has moved on, look at the public who are loosing jobs... Who are used to insecurity, to zero hours contracts. The idea that somehow CCs are going to be protected in that way no I just don’t think you can do it’.

CC
‘It would certainly enable more security ...it would allow you to realise that you didn’t have to comply to keep your job’.

CC
‘College of Policing where you could spend a few months, but there’s just no mechanism to do it’.
Appendix I

Schedule of Comments of Police and Crime Commissioners
Common Interview Themes
Comments of Police and Crime Commissioners

1. Positive Views of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure

PCC
‘One person for 4 years representing the community is quite difficult I was anxious about it now It think its an important role’.

PCC
‘Police Authorities did not do the job they were paid to do. The relationship between Police Authority and Chief Constables was one with too much familiarity. Police forces had more money than they needed and were not used to being held to account’.

PCC
I did not think there was a need for change. As a PCC one person far more identifiable to communities. There is a benefit in having a full time person we can influence business cases much earlier Louder voice for victims, louder voice for the public. Internally much more attention to detail. Far more transparency and accountability’.

PCC
‘The core principle of democratically accountable policing I supported. Having taken it on I really think it’s a good idea. The public identify Chief Constables who have failed but for each of those there was a Police Authority that allowed them to fail. There has been inadequate policing governance in the past and the principle of making that governance sharper, open, transparent, locally democratically accountable is a really good principle’.

PCC
‘I did not see the Police Authority system needed fixing saw it as a move by government to blame PCCs for the failures that were inevitably going to result from cutbacks. Although I was an opponent, it is a better system’.

PCC
‘The role is meaningful and implemented with the best intentions. From the public’s point of view there are real benefits...I’m talking about the role rather than the individuals in the role because that’s where some of the issues have been.’

PCC
‘On the whole its fairly satisfactory, a huge improvement on Police Authorities, for example in speed of decision making. We get things done its a proactive system rather than a reactive system as Police Authorities were. for example five PCCs and 5 Chief Constables could sit down and agree a regional crime arrangement’.

PCC
‘Important that Police forces are democratically accountable to the people rather than as they have for the past 100 odd years being accountable only to themselves. And jumping only when the Govt issued dictats - I think it is a very good thing’.

PCC
‘I thought ... After Cameron had come back from what you might call the Policing family were at that time. All Police Authorities and Police Forces were skeptical, ... I was encouraged to stand as PCC...The transition for me has been relatively easy’.

PCC
‘Policing in a difficult period has moved forward pretty well under PCCs’.

PCC
‘I cant think that any aspect of policing is the worse for PCCs’.

PCC
‘They [Pas] did a competent job but I saw nothing at all that convinced me that they were properly holding the CCs to account on behalf of the public. PAs were cowed by the sight od someone in braid. However on the technical side they were quite effective I don’t think they were a waste of time but they were invisible.’

PCC
‘I think the PCC model works, or ... The PCC model can be made to work some people work it more successfully than others, some people have been quite unsuccessful, some have learned along the way’.

PCC
[PA’s] ‘...Did not represent the public.’

PCC
[Pas were] ‘Next to useless.’

PCC
‘...they [the public] get a direct line of accountability that they’ve never had before. With PAs they were never elected to represent the authority’.

PCC
‘People seem to forget that decisions can be made very quickly, not hastily, but the decision making process which helps the force, helps the CC they
need to know where they stand on funding and a million and one other things. I can say to the CC, and nobody can gain say me, I can say you will have this, this is the amount of money you will have...it's not just a steer, making a decision is another, I can give the CC certainty I don't have to ask anybody else, I do, obviously have my own team of advisors every PCC does...but that decision cannot be made within a day, within an hour so we can react very quickly, that is a really good...thing for a CC to know. We can rule out any uncertainty’.

PCC
‘If we decide to move in a certain direction we can do it much quicker than the old system’.

PCC
‘It would be very hard for me in this role to operate in a secret perverted way or be corrupt, I think there’s more likelihood of that in a Police Authority type setting where you've got part time members who are occasional visitors ...I think when you've got a full time person in that role they {others} are far better informed far more aware of what’s going on’.

2. **Negative Views of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure**

   PCC
   ‘Not strong enough checks and balances on the PCC to do things that are disruptive.’

3. **Perceived Dangers of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure**

   PCC
   ‘Must be a system that prevents mad people being PCCs.’

   PCC
   ‘If there was a PCC where it had gone to their head and there was no check on them, it invites that kind of egotism and flamboyance’

   PCC
   ‘Third of PCCs are really good a third need improvement a third are crap and we don’t have a mechanism for sorting the wheat from the chaff.’

   PCC
   ‘It’s unproven whether the model is sustainable by investing it in one person particularly when we are doing it with meager resources its about resourcing and personal resilience.’

   PCC
   ‘Are we going to find those people who will carry the responsibility and the media and have the skills and attract the staff and manage the office and maintain the relationships ...on balance probably yes but there are some risks’.

   PCC
   ‘Personal resilience is an issue The age profile of PCCs is quite high. The statistical chance of someone dropping dead in the next 4 years is very high. At the moment two are seriously ill and one has died.’

   PCC
   ‘There is also a succession planning issue, if the deputy was elected with the PCC they may be able to take over after 2 years for example.’

   PCC
   [re potential dangers] ‘Not if there is effective scrutiny.’

   PCC
   ‘If you have a maverick what do you do. PCCs should have same power of recall as MPs.’

   PCC
   ‘I often feel I don’t have much power. Unless you are doing something very stupid your power is pretty limited You have the PCP and you are constrained by the law. I do appoint the CC but I don’t do it by myself, I have a committee and an independent person appointed by the Police College. I’m told by some that I have unfettered power. But I seem to be fettered by law at every step. A lot of responsibility but fettered power’.

   PCC
   ‘The PCC has a lot of responsibility but not much exercisable power There is a risk from maverick PCCs, but they would be recognised and weeded out the big risk is from mediocre PCCs who might coast along not take decisions etc’.

   PCC
   ‘It’s a hugely powerful role (PCC) ...I don’t think it places too much power in the hands of one person I’m an Individual, I’m a PCC, I’m a Corporation Sole, and I’m a Local Authority all rolled into one nobody has ever had that before - never. I don’t think its too much power and the govt are going to give us even more power. It would be nice if I could employ more staff, or a deputy I don’t have one’.

4. **Police & Crime Commissioner Election/ Legitimacy Issues**

   PCC
   ‘There is a single elected person and it doesn’t matter if it was 16.38% or 60%.’

   PCC
   ‘Having the election in November was crazy and it affected the whole process’.

   PCC
   ‘...they [the public] get a direct line of accountability that they’ve never had before. With PAs they were never elected to represent the authority’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PCC</th>
<th>‘I represent the county, every person in the county is my boss...I am accessible, accountable, open and transparent. I am there to make sure that the people of this county get the best possible deal from the police force’.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘Previously the Police Authority set the [policing] plan without accountability [to the public]’.</td>
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### 5. Public Engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PCC</th>
<th>‘94% didn’t know a PA existed... at least 70% of people know they have a PCC.’</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘...the frustration from the public early on was a) there was no point complaining because nobody listened and b) if you did complain it put you at a disadvantage ... A sense of there’s no way into this organisation, no way to challenge it. The very fact of there being someone who is not the police but has some authority over them, that in itself is a reassurance’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘It is difficult to engage with the public across a large force. The size of my area is such that I needed a part time one driver/ staff officer. I was accused of having a chauffeur, I was hammered by the BBC and the papers MPs and Local Councilors can claim expenses to go to their place of work PCCs cant. It could put people off doing the job, particularly rural ones’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘...the PCC job is to be the bridge with the public.’</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘Some PCCs don’t, but Public meetings and surgeries are essential’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘PCC job is to open up not only police but other authorities to the public.’</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>[PCC attends public meetings accompanied by senior police officer] ‘So that the Chief Constable or the senior Officer can cover operational things.’</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>[PCC must] ‘...focus upon the priorities that are based on public expectations sourced thru surveys. The PCC must identify all groups and engage with each.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘I have public meetings but unless there is a local issue nobody turns up. I go to council meetings... They are the democratic representatives of the public that is probably the best way...’ [to engage with the public].</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘Most of the public know they have a PCC something like 78%.’</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘In the first year I got a lot of anger, asking me what the PCC was, they are now much more aware’.</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘The PCC receives more mail in a month than the Police Authority received in year’.</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘Most people don’t spend their life thinking about [police] governance, as a result there is a bit of vague confusion. But they have got somewhere to go.’</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘Various editorials were very aggressive, for example the Times reported that 24 PCCs were under investigation, when many of those matters related to things years before PCCs were created. I think the press have now woken up to PCCs being quite a good thing’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘The PCC becoming thru the media exposure is the most visible politician in every county. PCCs have become influential in forming public opinion.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘Much more to the fore than with the Police Authority, part of the PCC’s role is answering to the public.’</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>‘A good example is that the public were very concerned about policing of a demonstration. In one of my web cast monthly reviews I asked the Chief Constable the questions that the public needed answers to’.</td>
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### 6. Partnerships

| PCC | ‘I think the ‘and Crime’ bit of the role is important.’ |
PCC  
‘PCCs have significant soft power to influence and drive activity’.

PCC  
‘A big part of my job is to bring organisations together...to have sensible conversations often quite difficult ones. E.g. Community safety partnerships. I aligned all their priorities to the police & crime plan priorities’.

PCC  
‘We hear this cry of partnerships if we are not careful partnerships get into some very blurred areas. Who is responsible...in a time of budgets dropping there is a tremendous sloping of shoulders by people trying to avoid responsibility.’

PCC  
‘All on a case by case basis. As far as possible PCC deals with leaders of councils to determine where we are going, CC with officials deliver. Concerns regarding governance of the police can be multiplied by 10 and applied to local authorities’.

PCC  
‘...we face the same challenges...based on what I learn I can make better informed decisions. It’s important to get out and speak to as many partners as possible - public too’.

PCC  
‘You have to get commissioning right to lower the load (on Policing).’

PCC  
‘Funding is important to pull levers with partners’.

PCC  
‘But, they [partners] need to be motivated by someone asking the difficult questions that others can’t’.

PCC  
‘Co-Commissioning with partners can bring better value.’

PCC  
‘You must gain peoples trust ...once they work with you on one thing and you deliver that successfully they will work with you on other things.’

PCC  
‘I have supported about 150 projects we have also taken on victims services’.

PCC  
‘CPS fear being held to account. Courts too traditional.’

PCC  
‘Collegiate approach important.’

PCC  
‘...often its politician to politician.’

PCC  
‘Joint commissioning is effective.’

PCC  
‘The Chief Constable and staff are good at building partnerships.’

PCC  
‘The Chief Constable has very good relations with partners’.

PCC  
‘Its about parking your ego and saying what can we do.’

PCC  
‘I’ve been able to make alliances that perhaps the authority because of the way they work and they were very geographically confined. I can move out nationally as well for example a CSE project with the Children’s Commissioner.’

PCC  
‘Partners saw police as difficult to work with and unresponsive. PCC tried to force more openness’.

PCC  
‘I’ve got good relationships with the local authorities’.

PCC  
‘The PCC can think outside traditional policing solutions’.

PCC  
‘They [PCCs] just haven’t had the time to fully engage with partners’.
Politics (HMG, HMIC, ACPO)

PCC
‘The government did not do enough to create the legitimacy of the new post.’

PCC
‘I don’t think I would instruct them (police re policing of demonstrations) ... but I can see conflicts with police if I went to a demonstration and they weren’t happy I was there.

No, The role of the PCC from my point of view, I would say there are several aspects to that, there is the traditional role of holding the Force to account holding the CC to account and introduce an accountability structure that works ... [this PCC did not add anything else to performance monitoring].

PCC
‘Good policing underpins society by underpinning the tax base. You can only have a healthy and fair society by paying for it from taxes. The Guardians of order, police, courts prisons etc protect the tax base by controlling crime’.

PCC
‘It’s the opposite of being politicised... most of the PCCs don’t have political differences about policing in the APCC unless you looked them up you’d be hard pressed to tell if they were representing Conservatives Independents or Labour Its a red herring The government has less direction [of policing] at a local level it has been devolved.’

PCC
‘For cities, I can see the benefits [of elected mayors being in charge of policing], but I don’t think the issues for large county forces has been thought through’.

PCC
‘Not a danger [politicisation of policing], policing should be subject to democratic scrutiny this makes it political, but not party political.’

PCC
‘The relationship has become more political since Police Authorities . As an example, last year when the announcement was made about further cuts, the APCC said this cannot continue ...we decided to write to the Home Secretary saying we are happy to take our share, but this is now getting dangerous... the conservative PCCs to a man and woman refused to sign it. On a more local level, an MP summoned me to a meeting, I declined the PCC from ** went they are from the same political party. You get it from both Tory and Labour saying they cant go or express a view because their party allegiance is stronger.’

PCC
‘The PCC can contribute by supporting the police to legitimately. Funding is difficult for Police leaders to speak on this without straying into party politics whilst the PCC can.

PCC
‘A PCC does not agree with a local Chief Constable what might be said but at a National level the APCC will work with the NPCC for example particularly around austerity issues.’

PCC
‘PCCs have significant soft power. to influence and drive activity’.

PCC
‘The difference is that I can say what I want, the CC is not a politician.’

PCC
‘Policing damn well ought to be under political control ! In any democracy the police answer to the civilian authority that is a fairly fundamental principle. All civilian authorities in a democracy are political because they are elected The police answer to someone not run around doing what the hell they think they should be doing.’

PCC
[The PCC] ‘...good relationship with the Home Secretary & Police Minister. I deal with MPs behind the scenes, don’t embarrass them publically.

PCC
‘Government ministers have said we have devolved policing to local areas, now get on with it. I don’t think that’s acceptable or helpful’.

PCC
‘Very supportive good relationship’ [with government].

PCC
‘It’s a very hands off localist agenda. The government need to show leadership. It’s the terms of the deal’.

PCC
‘You [the PCC] becomes the wicked stepmother... reduction of the number of officers will be seen as my fault’.

PCC
‘The Home Office in some ways wish they had not let the Genie out of the bottle, I think they would like to have a bit more control than they do. Look at the Rotherham case where they realised they couldn’t sack a PCC that was a wake up call to them’.

PCC
‘I Feel abandoned by central government.’
PCC: ‘A cynical view - this Home Secretary has a really strong agenda to transform the police.’

PCC: ‘Government relationship is thru APCC so not particularly good. The current Home Secretary will not listen to anybody.’

PCC: ‘Politics does not get in the way of being PCC’.

PCC: ‘The Police have not been very politically astute, they have had things done to them in the past...PCCs use their political leverage to get a better deal...that is healthy for the Chiefs because it keeps them out of the political side’.

PCC: ‘Direction [in policing] has been devolved to a local level’.

PCC: ‘Funding formula is gobbledygook cuts are undermining law and order which underpins society you are undermining the foundations of democracy.’

PCC: ‘We’ve got access to them [government] in meetings The Home Office doesn’t trust us, so there’s always going to be that central/local tension’.

PCC: ‘I think it [relations with HMG] depends on the Government of the day. The APCC relationship is ok with government’.

PCC: ‘I think there’s a tactic there but that central/local buck passing doesn’t worry me. I can look after myself. We can fight our corner and the public aren’t stupid’.

PCC: ‘Tom Windsor [Chief HMI] is a bully and a bigot’.

PCC: ‘The PCC [policing] plan skewed when HMIC tell the Chief Constable to do x & y They have no regard to the PCCs plan.’

PCC: ‘I thinke it [government favouring Conservative PCCs] Mainly those with an eye to their next political job’ [are affected].

PCC: ‘I don’t see it [government favouring Conservative PCCs]. We meet together as a group but the other groups do too. The Home Secretary will always praise the work of PCCs irrespective of political party.’

PCC: ‘The majority of PCCs have no further political ambition and do a good job irrespective of political views, there may be one or two who are still ambitious and might be constrained it from going against their parties views’.

PCC: ‘Probably a greater difference between types of forces than political lines. Governance is politics, you cant escape that...governance at any level is about choices...the PCC brings a particular view and is elected on that mandate, that’s not to say if the Home Secretary tells the PCC they jump, its not party political. The introduction of PCCs has now made explicit politics, that which was implicit politics. I refuse to believe there was no politics in the Police Authority.

PCC: ‘The Police have been thoroughly reformed, HMIC still reflects policing of yester year’.

PCC: ‘The Tory PCCs and the Home Office are getting on really well. Too well at times. The Independents and Labour feel.. somewhat excluded’.

PCC: ‘With reductions in the number of police officers its going to be very difficult to meet our Strategic Policing Requirement if we have a problem back home I’m not going to send half our police force off to’ [big city].

PCC: ‘People seem to forget that decisions can be made very quickly, not hastily, but the decision making process which helps the force, helps the CC they need to know where they stand on funding and a million and one other things. I can say to the CC, and nobody can gain say me, I can say you will have this, this is the amount of money you will have...its not just a steer, making a decision is another, I can give the CC certainty I don’t have to ask anybody else, I do, obviously have my own team of advisors every PCC does...but that decision can be made within a day, within an hour so we can react very quickly, that is a really good...thing for a CC to know. We can rule out any uncertainty’.

PCC: ‘In the late 1990s when he [Cameron] was talking about PCCs, he said under no circumstances can we have anyone with a political label standing for these jobs. If we could go back to PCCs not being political representatives that would be good’.
I saw the silver backs in action, they had to go [ACPO].

PCC

'It was an anti democratic organisation [ACPO] They had to change'.

PCC

'The NPCC is developing well.’

PCC

'Some [in ACPO] thought they were bigger than the Government. The NPCC a better model'.

PCC

'ACPO did not have the wisdom to see where they fitted in the governance arrangement’.

PCC

'ACPO is significantly responsible for the reduction of influence of the police in policing.’

PCC

'There is no difference [since demise of ACPO] the NPCC and College [of Policing] take the roles.’

PCC

'There were significant problems with ACPO making up the rules as they went along. A lot of their guidelines became almost law without outside scrutiny or thought. The companies they set up were wrong’. 

PCC

'The establishment of NPCC and College of Policing is a good thing’.

PCC

'[ACPO was] Not a model that allowed democratic accountability’.

PCC

'ACPO had forgotten who it worked for, the public or the police.’

PCC

'It [ACPO] was not too strong, it was a way of organising themselves Some of the political PCCs see it as as a challenge, the Chief Constables consiping. I see it as them talking about the challenges and what they can do together to address them’. 

PCC

'The way the Home Secretary dealt with ACPO was quite damaging. It didn't do the PCC/ Chief Constable relationship much good. Some PCCs who like to flex their muscles used that time to reinforce the fact that they are in charge. The loss of ACPO itself is not that important NPCC will take it forward’.

PCC

'We've got rid of most of the ACPO bunch ...who wanted to strangle PCCs before they were born - That ludicrous Stevens report which was just pathetic in the extreme [Stevens report was sponsored by New Labour!]) we've got rid of all that. ACPO have changed the name, because we PCCs made them change the name. But I think that change of name is a recognition of the changing and changed aspects of policing in this country. You've got the College of policing which is a force for good.’

PCC

[Does PCC behaviour change in the lead up to elections] 'It must do, this is a particular problem for those with political colours.’

PCC

'Candidates and parties begin to attack the police [in the lead up to elections] as a way of getting at the PCC, that impacts on public confidence.’

PCC

'For career politicians this [the election] will loom large the need for votes will drive lots of things’.

PCC

'Always aware there is an election, there are going to be big budget cuts and I've got to get out and explain that’. 

PCC

'I’m already seeing evidence of PCC colleagues acting in a way that they have one eye on May 2016. Its already started. That is counter productive. Its a demanding job, they should be concentrating on the job and delivering for the public. There is one PCC who has said to me that they are taking 3 months off from February to May to prepare.’ 

PCC

'Who can blame them [PCCs who see the role as a career step] I've got no problem with that’. 

PCC

'Without funding [of PCC candidates] only political parties will be successful and that leads to political influence in policing’. 

PCC

'There are young Tory Turks who do not listen.'

PCC

'Even with the ones who belong to political parties - ...I have never ever seen or heard of a decision that is politically motivated ...’
8. **Police & Crime Commissioner Scrutiny & Accountability role in Policing**

- **PCC**
  
  'I see the role as making sure that the public know what the Police are doing. Police had lost sight of the fact that they were to serve the public, the fixation was on recorded crime.'

- **PCC**
  
  '...I had a very low opinion of the police...in 2 1/2 years [as a PCC] I have a much greater respect for the police that I’m able to portray to the public.'

- **PCC**
  
  'Things were being done with taxpayers money that the police were not being held to account on'.

- **PCC**
  
  'The role of the PCC from my point of view, I would say there are several aspects to that, there is the traditional role of holding the Force to account holding the CC to account and introduce an accountability structure that works ... (did not add anything else to performance monitoring).

- **PCC**
  
  'Media exposure demonstrates [the PCC] holding Police to account.'

- **PCC**
  
  'PCC needs to send that message that the force is being held to account'.

- **PCC**
  
  'Policing damn well ought to be under political control! In any democracy the police answer to the civilian authority that is a fairly fundamental principle. All civilian authorities in a democracy are political because they are elected. The police answer to someone not run around doing what the hell they think they should be doing.'

- **PCC**
  
  'I sense with the departure of the dinosaurs in policing.... there is a genuine desire to reinvigorate policing.... in the past if the boys club has decided something will happen its damn well happened. PAs Govt or not. But now I think there is a wind of change.... but not unfortunately enough yet to re-shape and re-model policing at the top.... I sense there is the appetite for change and if the government would give policing the respect it deserves, the govt would be repaid... the police need to be shown that the govt are confident in them not being bashed right left & centre.... I think this would be a better policed country'.

- **PCC**
  
  '(my CC) is of the current age of Chief Constables, ... going back you got some Chief Constables who probably fed the government’s desire for reform by their demeanor, behaviour which has probably got peoples backs up.... I think the former generation of CCs have contributed to part of this reform agenda'.

9. **Police & Crime Commissioner Relationship with Police Officers & Staff**

- **PCC**
  
  'No I don’t do that [meet with police officers & staff]... I meet at a regular forum with the Federation and Unison'.

- **PCC**
  
  '... don’t think they [police officers and staff] really think about it, they get on with the job, the PCC pops up occasionally Police Officers are concerned more about what’s in front of them on that day'.

- **PCC**
  
  'There was a lot of anxiety when PCCs first came in. I have spent a lot of time building that relationship with the police by being professional, breaking down worries and concerns.'

- **PCC**
  
  'At commander level, they [the police] definitely understand, 'below that I think no'.'

- **PCC**
  
  'There is no misunderstanding in force as to what PCC can & cannot do PCC must stand up and say I am not the Chief Constable, the PCC job is to be the bridge with the public.'

- **PCC**
  
  'I go on patrol with teams but very clear the Chief Constable is my route into the force. I get email from staff, the Chief Constable is ok with that'.

- **PCC**
  
  'Some aggression from junior cops until they meet PCCs and understand the role'.

- **PCC**
  
  'If you get the relationship wrong, it will damage most of the PCC/Chief Constable problems around country due to clashes of egos.'
‘It matters that there is interpersonal trust and that his vision of where policing lies in the 21st century is not identical but similar to mine’.  

PCC  
‘He [CC] is my key partner.’  

PCC  
‘PCC & Chief Constable understand each others roles.’  

PCC  
‘That cooperation is key. There has to be trust, a lot of integrity openness and transparency. In Police Authority times that was not present.’  

PCC  
‘There are some cases and When I see some of the PCCs I couldn’t get on with them.’  

PCC  
‘There must be clear blue water between the governance and the PDR side’.  

PCC  
‘Vital, really important that you’ve got a good working relationship. It would be very difficult to do your role effectively if you haven’t got that. I’ve seen it in some areas where its not. I like to think we’ve got a good balance... He (CC) has a wealth of experience.’  

PCC  
‘It would be very awkward if you didn’t get on’.  

PCC  
‘The most important relationship that I have. We must get on but that doesn’t mean we have to agree on everything. In some senses its quite healthy that we don’t agree on some things. It is important that we share an understanding and an ability to understand each other and what it is we are trying to get to. There is no structure anywhere in the world that will work regardless of who you put in it’.  

PCC  
‘Absolutely vital, weekly we have robust discussions, but when I leave the room we still have a good working relationship.... We get on we don’t agree on anything, we talk, we never disagree in public, only in his or my office.’  

PCC  
‘Its vital, that we should have a good working professional relationship and mutual respect. without that policing isn’t going to reach the high standards that the people of this county deserve.’  

PCC  
‘Its evolved to a degree but common sense plays a part in this, (CC) understands the engagement with the public is now largely down to me. I understand that the delivery of operational policing is down to **(CC). its (the relationship) critical, ...I would have thought if you don’t have a constructive relationship between the PCC & CC, then I think you’ve really got a problem...if the two people at the top of the organisation, the professional and the policy maker, don’t get on there’s a problem there and that’s down to both to be mature, to be realistic and to be constructive. On occasions to be critical, on occasions to be supportive...’

10. **Police & Crime Commissioner/ Chief Constable Relationship**

PCC  
‘The PCC drives the strategy.’  

PCC  
‘PCC is the chairman Chief Constable is CEO The sole shareholder is the PCC but the management comes from the Chief Constable. Neither role with work if the other doesn’t and you don’t communicate’.  

PCC  
‘You can make any governance system work provided you’ve got the right individuals involved. If You have got people who are reasonably mature, proportionate balanced then you would have a reasonably constructive working relationship. If you’ve got individuals who are flawed in whatever been one or two examples... I think there should probably be some reforms to the role’.  

PCC  
‘Chief and I work very much as a team i go out of my way to make sure we are saying the same thing’.

PCC  
‘But the PCC is in charge.’  

PCC  
‘The PCC deals with the Chief Constable, he goes to others within the force by invitation’.  

PCC  
‘PCC job is to enable the force to deliver for the public.’  

PCC  
‘PCC gives Chief Constable the priorities from the public to deliver PCC then deals with the politics and the funding.’
'I want him to be the best Chief Constable in the country because that delivers better policing. ...its not about publically humiliating him because the only person that shows up is you. I have seen that done unfortunately and its been quite unedifying'.

PCC
'The CC doesn't contribute to formulating the policing plan.'

PCC
'We are not best mates, that's not how it works, we have a mutual respect...he's got a job I've got a mandate. In the balance a mandate is far more powerful than a job...we get on very well'.

PCC
'We don't live a life of compromise I produce a police and crime plan that plan is followed by the Chief Constable... on behalf of the people of*** whose views I have sought before drawing up the plan, I make sure they get the sort of policing they tell me they want'.

PCC
'I try to work constructively with the force, and we've got a good relationship for several reasons. firstly we are co located in the same building...secondly, I have a track record locally so I'm reasonably respected by people in the Force I've got reasonably good interpersonal skills so I get on well with the Chief Officer team. They understand where I am and what I have to do and I understand where they are and what they have to do. I think it works reasonably well. We will be mutually supportive (CC/ PCC) The Chief Constable will make the decisions about operational policing, decisions about wider strategic issues that are relevant to community safety are for me'.

PCC
'A partnership, but the PCC leads.'

PCC
'If the PCC and Chief Constable don't get on one of them has to go, and its probably the Chief Constable'.

PCC
'Problems occur when PCC sees themselves as superior or Chief Constables often resent the PCC role. Its all about relationships'

PCC
'We spent 6 months exploring the relationship.'

PCC
'The Chief Constable understands PCC has a role vis a vis the public and may have to say things the Chief Constable does not like.'

PCC
'I need him and he needs me'.

PCC
'The Chief Constable and the PCC have different roles but it is clear that the Chief Constable is accountable to the PCC'.

PCC
'PCC supports the CC, but is clear that he is the vox populis of the public and will hold the CC to account'.

PCC
'However, in meetings with only PCCs and CCs it is clear that all the relationships are different.. there is no model. More and more are getting on. But still some exhibit behaviour as if they constantly want to remind the chief who is in charge...they tend to be more on the Tory side.'

PCC
'It is important to work out how we work together'.

PCC
'I think the Chief Constable would find it better than the PA, the advantages are, decision making is swift, we can turn decisions around in a couple of hours if we need to. ... (the CC) has the advantage of working with someone who is full time, as opposed to part time Police Authorities and someone who knows their way around the *** area I can keep (CC) reasonably well informed about what is going on in the **** area'.

PCC
'I have a good relationship with the Chief Constable because personalities match with the DCC, our two emotional personalities clash.'

PCC
'In some forces the relationship is poisonous its no way to work'.

PCC
'Is the regime as strict as it might be, no because I trust him and it works both ways'.

PCC
'We disagree on things and discuss them'.

PCC
'I meet with the Chief Constable 3-5 times a day.'

PCC
'I meet with the Chief Constable]at least 2 times a week.'
PCC 'I meet with the Chief Constable] a couple of times a week informally'.

PCC 'I meet with the Chief Constable] every week.'

PCC 'Not a daily basis but regular minuted and public'.

PCC 'I interact with the Chief Constable once a week in a formal meeting.'

PCC 'I give the CC the resources to achieve the plan and he gets on with it. There are no disagreements.'

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<th>11. Police Operational Independence</th>
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| PCC 'I don't know of any major fall outs, but operational policing is the responsibility of the CC It would have to be a huge clash of personalities'.

PCC 'There are some PCCs who are getting involved in operational things that are nothing to do with them I don't want anything to do with it. The day I go there it all unravels'.

PCC 'If we got to the situation if something was... something had happened, an event or a particular issue, where I felt the force was wrong, and I'd had those conversations and made those points and we still had a difference of opinion then I would go because I think that's my role. So I might be critical publically. I don't think I would use my authority as PCC to try and instruct the Chief Constable I think that might be - because if you're heading down that road then you are basically saying, my instruction is do this, and if they don't then you are on a collision course that is then ultimately going to lead to a parting of the ways...because in a dispute situation there is only ever going to be one winner and that is the PCC, but that not where I would want to be... ...I'll tell you when it will happen, if this government is re elected, and there is a further round of public sector cuts I can foresee a winter of discontent emerging, and I think that will be an extremely testing time for the police service. and for PCCs because I suspect that what will happen is that ...I can see a real dilemma for Chief Constables in having to maintain the peace...I can see a situation where, and this has happened we have days of action where the **** went on strike and I went down to (the picket line) the police got very nervous about that. Its not a major problem as far as I'm concerned its a peaceful protest... I don't think I would instruct them (police re policing of strikes) ... but I can see conflicts with police if I went to a demonstration and they weren't happy I was there'.

PCC 'Difficult [operational independence] but not for me as an ex cop.'

PCC 'I will ask for a report if constituent complains.'

PCC 'Every decision that I make has an operational effect'.

PCC 'PCC might look at operational things if there are concerns that is part of holding the Chief Constable to account'.

PCC 'The division is clear PCC does not get involved in tactics but holds the Chief Constable to account'.

PCC 'It's the PCC's job to support the Chief Constable during a critical incident'.

PCC 'We know intuitively where those lines [operational] are and there has never been a problem, we have a scheme of delegation to guide us'.

PCC 'How they achieve the aim is up to them, they are the experts. Where you put operations is to do with the police plan..'

PCC 'I will engage in all critical incidents.'

PCC 'There can be areas like closure of Police Stations you might say it is operational I think its budgetary, reputational, efficiency and effectiveness, and it affects public confidence ... So that is when it comes together if its about directing operations and operational policing, that's an easy one, that's the Chief Constables job. With some PCCs who have little knowledge of policing they are dipping into areas I wouldn't get involved in'.

PCC 'I just get a few details from the on duty ACPO, that's all I need.'
No I’ve not found that, I’m very clear about what’s operational and what’s not. I am always kept in the loop about operational matters, there is hardly anything that happens that I’m not briefed about. I keep a finger in that pie. I’m kept updated... That goes into my mental record. Never commented on operations I know other PCCs have expressed concerns about operations.’

The PCC needs to be informed [of critical incidents] so that PCC can understand any community issues.’

‘PCC staff attend ‘Gold Groups’ to understand reputational issues. The PCC would not attend.’

‘Only [attend Gold Groups] in thematic organisational matters or very significant operations i.e. CSA then as observer.’

PCC has observed a Gold group, but does not see it as his role. PCC will have staff attendance on Gold groups re organisational failing as participant to the extent of commenting, but not designing the response. Will not sign up to the decisions.

The PCC needs to know [about critical incidents] because of force reputational issues and impacts on public confidence.’

‘Where the public are concerned about an extraordinary police operation I think it is the PCC role to ask those questions.’

‘The PCC has a part to play in those meetings [Gold groups] along with the other agencies, but actually directing the police how they deal with the [incident], its up to them. But later in private, I think its fair enough for me to say, I don’t think we handled that very well or why didn’t we do something. If I don’t think something is handled particularly well operationally, then I would probably say that, but the decision is the Chief Constable’s’.

Sub Theme re Contracts

‘I can see that the fear that PCCs may use the power [to decline to renew a CC contract] arbitrarily is true’.

‘I come across Chiefs who appear to be a bit frightened of the PCC. There was an occasion when a group of Chiefs wanted to write a letter to the Home Secretary...’[repeated story of some CCs declining to sign fearing repercussions from their PCC].

‘I understand their concerns [re PCC declining to renew a CC contract] and it depends on the PCC but I don’t know’.

‘I can see it would be a concern for some Chief Constables. But a 5 year contract not a bad thing, because Chief Constables can go on for years. I suppose Chief Constable could act in this way, but they should not be Chief Constables’.

‘It is a concern [re PCC declining to renew a CC contract] because I have discussed it with the Chief Constable What we want in our Chief Constables is Honesty, integrity and truth and operational independence ... one would hope that there is a healthy relationship between PCC & CC... This creates a politically controlled because younger CCs will bend to the wishes of whoever the politician is [because of the pension situation] They will jump to the tune of a Tory Turk because they are a £150,000 package that can be terminated in 2 years time if they don’t do what they are told... you cannot expect a 40yr old Chief Constable with a young family to challenge a a headstrong PCC who wants to interfere operationally’.

‘It would depend on the Chief Constable [re PCC declining to renew a CC contract] and how confident they are in themselves. Suppose there is always a potential for a PCC who thinks that way, I hope that colleagues would rein them in, but some PCCs are independent minded, its not the way I do business’.

‘As to whether a Chief Constable requiring a further contract would tell the PCC what they think they want to hear. I would really earnestly hope that doesn’t happen, but I suspect that it probably does. I can only speak from my own experience and it doesn’t happen here. But we are dealing with human nature, and I can quite see that might be the case...I have no evidence at all that it is elsewhere, but it would not surprise me. But if you looked into it and it was the Chief Constable fulfilling the police & crime plan, I don’t regard that as brown nosing, that’s doing your job. As I said Commissioners have a mandate, everyone else has a job. Chief Constables should be well remunerated, which they are, but they shouldn’t expect a job for life. They shouldn’t expect to complete their 30 years and then kick up a fuss I don’t think members of the public appreciate it.’

‘Similar to military a tenured appointment when pensionable at a certain rank. You leave with a pension. If CCs were appointed on the understanding that at the end of a contract they would be pensionable this would prevent political control’.

‘We need to appoint people who have a business brain. I’m not saying they need to be Chief Constable but they need to be right up there in the top team...it doesn’t matter if they know how to catch crooks as long as they know how to run a business.’
PCC
'[DCCs being appointed to CC posts in the same force] Huge danger, just not healthy. One PCC got on with his DCC and could not be bothered with a wider process. This happened with Police Authorities, DCCs groomed Police Authority reps.'

PCC
'Big danger [single CC candidates for vacancies]. I increased the pay rate for my Chief Constable to get more applicants. I'm considering international applicants'.

PCC
'I don’t like it [DCC getting posts in the same force]. People from outside is challenging brings new ideas. Its bad practice, sign of a cosy relationship'.

PCC
'I’ve been surprised at the [CC] posts with only one or two applicants. I’m very concerned about the available pool'.

PCC
'I’m not sure more DCCs are getting Chief Constable jobs in the same force.’

PCC
‘It’s not good enough [single CC candidates] there’s a real issue about quality’.

PCC
‘Not healthy [single CC candidates] but its real politic.’

PCC
'...but that was always the way with Police Authorities’[DCC getting CC posts in the same force].

PCC
' We are tending to see more promotions in force due to the lack of mobility of senior police officers for smaller forces its more of a problem... If a person is chosen from inside he knows where the worms are.’ [re corruption]

PCC
' I appointed the current Chief Constable he was the only person who applied. a wider field may have given people a warmer feeling but I don’t think it would have benefitted because I think we would have come to the same conclusion. People need to have a reasonable thought that they are that they are going win...it was fairly obvious that XX would stand (the incumbent DCC) for the job and people were not prepared to stand against him and I understand that’.

PCC
'This happened because with the new governance, some Chief Constables decided to go because they had done their time, a cohort who said I will see how it is, give it 6 months then see if I want to go or not. There was a few, very few (of CCs) who could not make the adjustment at all to the new governance model. So we (PCCs) appointed so many Chief Constables in an 18 month period that political opponents were saying, you are only getting one applicant and it’s a done deal. It wasn’t that we didn’t enough candidates’.

PCC
'I don’t see that as healthy at all. It reinforces what I say about the shallow pool (of CC candidates) I don’t blame a PCC for appointing a Deputy as a Chief Constable as long as there has been a rigorous process... You’ve got someone who knows the force inside out, but I don’t think its a very good thing, its usually expedient’.

PCC
'[re CCs not applying for posts in forces with perceived difficult PCCs] ‘This may alter the culture of police leadership which will be regrettable.’

PCC
' I understands the issue, [re PCC declining to renew a CC contract] but PCC must have the power to ensure delivery’.

PCC
'The only reason you could do [decline to renew a CC contract] it is if a force wasn’t performing and the responsibility lay with the CC. In those circumstances bad luck I’m afraid ! But I don’t think that situation has arisen except on one occasion early on’ [Gwent].

PCC
'There should be a mechanism so that they [CCs whose contracts are not renewed] are not unfairly penalised if they feel they have to make a stand on their principles’.

PCC
'There may be something that needs to be done in terms of early access to a pension... to facilitate the underlying intention of the whole process which is to enable the PCC to hold the Chief Constable to account and a Chief Constable stand by their operational independence with integrity and if necessary walk away if they feel its impossible without undue penalty...then that arrangement needs to exist...the intention is to allow that accountability on the part of the PCC, but also to allow the CC , not to unduly penalise them for taking a principled stand. that needs to be there. But that is not a reason for fettering further the power of a PCC to make decision about a Chief Constable. Or granting to Chief Constables that they are more than operationally independent of PCCs.’

PCC
'[The situation for CCs in the position of not having contract renewed] ...is no more that anyone else who’s got a job would be my answer to that. The realities of the world have always been if you have a job and you cock up, then you’re out on your ear, or if you’ve got a fixed term contract and it expires then off you go. I don’t want to appear to be hard hearted, but I don’t think because a Chief Constable has a particular job he or she should
regard it as a job for life...I think that members of the public would be not very pleased with the PCC who simply went ok mate, I’ll give you 18 months or however long it is...members of the public are already browed off with officers who have resigned on full pension when they have been caught doing whatever.’

PCC
‘I suppose that’s always a possibility [CC more likely to do all that the PCC asks due to contract issue] I wouldn’t ask anyone to deliver beyond what I thought was appropriate in terms of the police and crime plan or whatever. I’m acutely aware that this is a powerful role, no doubt about that, the individual (PCC) could overstep the mark and move into operational policing. I think here the relationship is pretty good, they (Police) would say you are getting into operational policing matters here ** (First name of PCC) and I would probably say I’m giving you the views of the community and now its down to you...if the Chief Constable was moving in a direction that I thought was dangerous for them and for me ultimately then I would say so but I don’t think I would say police this ward more than that ward because you know my family lives here... When I recruit a new Chief Constable I won’t be thinking of that (contract issue), I’ll be thinking of appointing somebody to do a job and letting them get on with it and where appropriate encouraging and supporting. The age and length of service of the individual will be irrelevant to me all i will want is the best one for the job...’

PCC
‘If I have to fire the Chief Constable I’ve failed...I think its dismissal an act of failure. Unless there’s been some gross misconduct...but on a day to day basis there’s an onus on individuals to work professionally and constructively...the instances I’ve seen or read about where there’s been breakdown in that relationship, I think the individuals involved need to take a look at themselves...If as a Chief Constable you’ve got responsibility for a force area and the welfare of several thousand people, and you’re a PCC responsible for several hundred million pounds worth. of service, and the interests of hundreds of thousands of people, you’ve got to...I think the police have been going thru some cultural changes of their own and that’s been overdue.

PCC
‘When I appointed ** [current CC], I set my own process up, we had a series of stakeholder meetings, I had the various partners involved...I had an interview panel’ [partner involvement not community].

PCC
‘In that respect PCCs have less power than the old Police Authorities ...now the Chief Constable appoints his own chief officer team, and that’s a good thing. A lots been made of it (power to hire & fire) but its always been that way ...in the past the HMI had the list of suitable people, which was a bad thing.’ (SAP)

PCC
‘I think its a very healthy system now’.

PCC
‘It is natural that a Chief Constable appointed by a PCC is more likely to acquiesce to the requests of the PCC. If as PCC you don’t like the look of who is applying, you are not going to appoint them. If you are not getting on then there has been a mistake in the selection process’.

PCC
‘The importance (of the PCC) being able to appoint the Chief Constable is crucial. If you ‘carry the can’ you must have the power to make changes (to the CC) I appointed (the CC) and I did so because he met what I was looking for. He understood what an area like this needed. I wanted someone focused on fighting crime not chasing figures. (the power to sack the CC) ...is vital in fact it would be impossible to do this job without that ability. But the fact of having that ability makes it less likely that you will need it. All that ability is a reflection of the accountability one to the other. Its not unfettered... if you were to say, you are PCC, but we will give you a Chief Constable, how on earth do you account for what is done in your name if you do not have the power to influence what is done in your name...’

PCC
‘The whole thing [hire & fire issue] has been overstated by the press’.

PCC
‘If you have to fire someone you have failed that’s a real indictment on you as a person that you have got to that position.’

PCC
‘If the relationship with the CC has broken down to the extent you are looking to fire there are issues with ACPO and HMI, mediation etc. But if it has got to the stage where you think it has got to end then probably its got to end the relationship is so important. I don’t think you can be effective if you are at constant loggerheads with the Chief’.

PCC
‘It is critical [the power to hire & fire] If you can’t find a Chief to do that eventually you will’. (deliver the plan)

PCC
‘It is an important power (hire & fire) there must be the ability to change the top management in practice its much more difficult. If I were considering that some sort of double lock. Just having that power in the PCC is dangerous’.

PCC
‘I suppose it is a thing that could weigh on the mind of the Chief Constable.’ [power of PCC to dismiss]

PCC
‘No one should do ten years as a Chef, look at all the silver backs, all Chiefs for more than 10 years, the aggressive culture of aggressive Chiefs’.

PCC
‘Never even discussed it [contract renewal]. That’s not nuclear, its Armageddon.’

PCC
‘You wouldn’t start off with the view that you would sack the Chief. I think it would be a slow dawning realisation’.

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PCC
‘In my view, CC contracts are now open ended unless the CC insists on it (not mentioned by any others) In the APCC we tried to put in place a new model but we couldn’t agree so each PCC can do their own thing now’.

PCC
‘That may well happen [issues re contract renewal] **[the CC] is due to retire **** and they are over the 30 years so its not a problem for me at this point in time. But if I get someone earlier in their career that’s an interesting question. I’m not sure of the answer.’

12. Police & Crime Panels

PCC
‘They are a joke, they don’t hold me to account. The legislation is flawed. Councilors with no experience in policing or budgeting I go in with 1.99% they say no, I go back with 1.98, thanks very much ! My biggest regret is that I’m not held to account’.

PCC
‘PCP Councilors need to be better trained and more committed.’

PCC
‘...one of the problems is that I interact closely with the members in other areas.’

PCC
‘It’s the only body I’ve got I go out of my way to work with the PCP, but do I think its satisfactory - no. They don’t ask hard questions.’

PCC
‘They make me think, they ask good questions.’

PCC
‘They do scrutinise me and challenge.’

PCC
‘Their role is to scrutinise my decisions, but they talk about expense claims and utter trivia’.

PCC
‘...they are quite effective but it has been a journey. We educated the panel setting up working groups around key issues, e.g. Policing plan and the budget. ...we were careful not to get them involved in the decision making’.

PCC
‘They support me very well for example regarding the police cuts they provide support and understanding.’

PCC
‘They struggled and still are struggling to find their role. They are a channel for the public to if a PCC were resisting giving information the public can force it through the PCP.’

PCC
‘They struggle they are coming to terms with scrutinising the PCC not dealing with local issues as PAs tended to do’.

PCC
‘It was difficult to start with many of them were ex Police Authority.’

PCC
‘Sometimes they [PCP] are operational, but not a problem’.

PCC
[PCP] ‘Not too many the CC answers operational questions.’

PCC
‘The PCP do give me a hard time, particularly around finance’.

PCC
‘They do scrutinise me pretty effectively/ some PCPs think they are there to tell the PCC what to do. They are not there to hold me to account they are there to scrutinise, once that was sorted here, that was fine’.

PCC
‘They are not part of my decision process, but certainly are influential. Support was not much in evidence in the early months, but it is now and that’s because the PCP, myself and the Chief Constable with the way that our relationship has matured, over the last couple of years we are very much on the same side. I find them now very supportive, for example over fairer funding for police.’

PCC
‘ [The CC] Does not have to [attend the PCP], but the Chief Constable or DCC does often the PCP ask questions re operational issues, I can only give headlines’.

PCC
‘The DCC attends PCP with me when they stray into areas of operational policing which they inevitably will do, he is there to be able to answer questions around that or I would have to say I will come back to you on that.’
The DCC attends PCP with me when they stray into areas of operational policing which they inevitably will do, he is there to be able to answer questions around that or I would have to say I will come back to you on that.

Sometimes the Chief Constable attends to discuss operational issues.

Not his place [CC in the PCP] the PCP is there to scrutinise the PCC if there are operational questions I get Chief Constable to give me an answer.

They are challenging in a constructive way. I have to feed them things from time to time - suggest you know this might be worth looking at...otherwise they would tend to stick to the traditional Police Authority role crime performance and it isn’t about crime performance, it’s just a part of it. It works reasonably well, they ask me questions about decisions I’ve made, about community engagement, about policies that I might be seeking to advance.

They will occasionally revert to being a PA, which is understandable. They can ask questions and I will try to answer them, but they tend to revert to questions about operational policing. I’m not saying they are an unreformed PA, but that does happen.

Aspects of the PCP legislative scenario are quite restrictive ...should have far more far broader far more leeway to look at all aspects of policing and crime. As a scrutiny panel they should have to power to scrutinise other people too, partners and agencies.

The powers at the moment don’t work. For example if they don’t agree with my precept figure, I just have to change it and take it back, it might be 0.001% different but they have to accept it. There must be a greater level of scrutiny of the PCP.

They [the PCP] have got the powers its about knowing how to use them.

They [PCPs] are not properly funded to be very effective. They need a professional secretariat. To support regional PCPs.

The PCP are not elected, the public should decide by the ballot box. Members of the PCP were not elected to scrutinise the police.

The PCP was a half baked idea no different to the Police Authority.

[The PCP] ‘Should be a strategic panel holding the PCC to account’.

The membership of the PCP are vested interests and their powers are poor and illogical. They are unable to rise above petty politics. They should be disbanded.

‘They [the PCP] need to understand what they are expected to do’.

There must be some power so that if a PCC is barking mad we should be able to control them.

With sensible safeguards there should be a power of recall for PCCs.

Similar to military a tenured appointment when pensionable at a certain rank. You leave with a pension. If CCs were appointed on the understanding that at the end of a contract they would be pensionable this would prevent political control.

There should be a mechanism so that they [CCs whose contracts are not renewed] are not unfairly penalised if they feel they have to make a stand on their principles.

There may be something that needs to be done in terms of early access to a pension...to facilitate the underlying intention of the whole process which is to enable the PCC to hold the Chief Constable to account and a Chief Constable stand by their operational independence with integrity and if necessary walk away if they feel its impossible without undue penalty...then that arrangement needs to exist...the intention is to allow that accountability on the part of the PCC, but also to allow the CC, not to unduly penalise them for taking a principled stand. That needs to be there. But...
that is not a reason for fettering further the power of a PCC to make decision about a Chief Constable. Or granting to Chief Constables that they are more than operationally independent of PCCs.’

PCC
‘It is an important power (hire & fire) there must be the ability to change the top management in practice its much more difficult. If I were considering that some sort of double lock. Just having that power in the PCC is dangerous’.

PCC
‘If you have a maverick what do you do. PCCs should have same power of recall as MPs.’

PCC
‘PCP Councilors need to be better trained and more committed.’

PCC
‘Aspects of the PCP legislative scenario are quite restrictive ...should have far more far broader far more leeway to look at all aspects of policing and crime. As a scrutiny panel they should have to power to scrutinise other people too, partners and agencies’.

PCC
‘They [PCPs] are not properly funded to be very effective They need a professional secretariat. To support regional PCPs.’

PCC
‘The PCP are not elected, the public should decide by the ballot box. Members of the PCP were not elected to scrutinise the police’

PCC
‘Without funding only political parties will be successful and that leads to political influence in policing.’ [fund candidates].

PCC
‘In the late 1990s when he [Cameron] was talking about PCCs, he said under no circumstances can we have anyone with a political label standing for these jobs. If we could go back to PCCs not being political representatives that would be good’.
Appendix J

Form UPR 16 – Confirmation of the Ethical Conduct of the Research
FORM UPR16
Research Ethics Review Checklist
Please include this completed form as an appendix to your thesis (see the Research Degrees Operational Handbook for more information)

Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information

PGRS Name: Steven Watts
Department: ICJS
First Supervisor: Barry Loveday
Start Date: (or progression date for Prof Doc students) Sept 2012
Study Mode and Route: Part-time [ ]
                     Full-time [ ]
                     MPhil [ ]
                     PhD [ ]
                     MD [ ]
                     Professional Doctorate [ ]

Title of Thesis:
Yes Prime Minister!
Early Indications of the Impact of a Change in Policing Governance and the Introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners Across England & Wales

Thesis Word Count: 40,007
(excluding ancillary data)

If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee for advice. Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University’s Ethics Policy and any relevant University, academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study.

Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s).

UKRI-o Finished Research Checklist:
(if you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics Committee rep or see the online version of the full checklist at: http://www.upto.org/what_we_do/ethical_practice_for_research/

   a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and within a reasonable time frame?
      YES [ ]
      NO [ ]

   b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged?
      YES [ ]
      NO [ ]

   c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, publication and authorship?
      YES [ ]
      NO [ ]

   d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form and will it remain so for the required duration?
      YES [ ]
      NO [ ]

   e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements?
      YES [ ]
      NO [ ]

Candidate Statement:
I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully obtained the necessary ethical approval(s)

Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee or from NRES/SCREO: 14/15/25

If you have not submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered ‘No’ to one or more of questions a) to e), please explain below why this is so:

Signed (PGRS): [signature]
Date: [date]

UPR16 – April 2018