Chapter 5

Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo

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Given the burgeoning literature both on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and on Africa’s security challenges (see for example Howorth 2007, Franke 2009), it is surprising that there has been no attempt to explore in detail Anglo-French security collaboration in Africa. This chapter begins by showing the lack of any meaningful UK-French cooperation from the colonial era to the immediate post Cold War period. It then demonstrates how, in the wake of the 1998 Saint-Malo summit, collaboration has begun to take place in terms of the institutionalisation of the security relationship, peacekeeping missions and military training activities in Africa. Finally, recent developments in Anglo-French security relations are explained by reference to neoclassical realism. This theory usefully goes beyond neorealism’s focus on recurrent patterns of inter-state interactions in the international system by introducing as variables in the making of foreign policy both policy-makers’ perceptions of the state’s relative material power and the degree of state autonomy.

Before proceeding, it should be emphasised that this chapter does not cover the security challenges of Africa in general or indeed explore the outcomes (or lack thereof) of Anglo-French security collaboration. Second, cooperation between the French and British defence industries is not the subject of this analysis, although joint procurement and moves to integrate Europe’s defence industries are now realities that cannot be ignored (UK–France Summit 2010). Third, it does not attempt to cover intelligence sharing due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable data – although there are indications that the UK and France enjoy a semi-hostile relationship in this area. Under the ‘3Is’ arrangement information and intelligence are shared only with Canada and the US, while ‘5Is’ extends this arrangement to Australia and New Zealand. In each case France is excluded. Fourth, lack of space precludes treatment of the civilian dimension of security cooperation, such as police and security sector reform (SSR). As Chapter 9 of this volume demonstrates, there is some evidence of limited Anglo-French cooperation – or at least of avoidance of duplication of effort – in this field in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the UK has given funding and the French have provided ‘boots on the ground’ and where there have also been attempts to fuse missions such as EUPOL (police) and EUSEC (security sector). In Guinea-Bissau, too, there has been some coordination of effort on SSR. It should, however, also be noted that
there is some ambiguity regarding the civilian and military dimensions of SSR. This ambiguity can be discerned in the different perspectives that traditionally mark the thinking of the European Commission (‘soft’ civilian SSR) and that of the European Council (a ‘harder’ military/security perspective). In this chapter the emphasis will be on the latter.

8 History of Rivalry

Anglo-French military rivalry was a feature of the colonial period in Africa. The late 19th-century scramble for Africa frequently pitted the French against the British, and this rivalry came to a head, bringing the two countries to the brink of war when the forces of Britain’s Lord Kitchener squared up against those of France’s Captain Marchand at Fashoda in 1898. Marchand ultimately was ordered to withdraw, and as a result the term ‘Fashoda syndrome’ entered the French language and became shorthand for Anglo-French rivalry, and more specifically British perfidy, in Africa. Such rivalry was attenuated by the Entente Cordiale in 1904, by cooperation during the First World War against Germany’s colonies in Africa and by the ill-fated Anglo-French Suez expedition in 1956. But for a century after Fashoda, Anglo-French relations south of the Sahara were essentially characterised by competition rather than cooperation.

This rivalry continued during the Cold War and early post-colonial period. France adopted a ‘voluntarist’, unilateral military approach with pre-positioned forces in former colonies, advisers working closely with African governments, and military personnel embedded with African forces under the terms of French defence and military cooperation agreements with African states. The UK, in contrast, had no bases and undertook virtually no interventions (except Kenya 1963–4), although it did have British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs) working with the armed forces in ex-colonies. Furthermore, military academies in the UK, like their counterparts in France, took African soldiers from the former empire for training. All of this took place in a spirit of competition, occasionally even hostility, with Britain and France actually finding themselves on opposite sides over the Nigerian civil war in Biafra (1967–70). Indeed, these differences of approach were not confined to Africa, but reflected a wider lack of security cooperation at a European level and within NATO, particularly after France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966. This lack of cooperation continued into the early post-Cold War era (1990–97). In this new context, Britain and France initially seemed quite prepared for multilateral militarohumanitarian interventions, as the issue of sovereignty became less predominant, but events in Somalia in 1992 discouraged most Europeans as well as the US from undertaking such interventions. This reluctance was most clearly seen at the time of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda when the UK and US led the international community in its refusal to intervene and, subsequently, used the UN Security Council (UNSC) to limit the scope of
France’s Operation Turquoise, which was launched when the killing in Rwanda had largely stopped in June 1994 (Fenton 2004: 140). A similar scenario occurred in late 1996 when Britain and the US were instrumental in blocking French efforts to raise a multinational force to intervene in Zaire (now the DRC).

Throughout this entire period, Anglo-French divergences on security questions were compounded by the absence of a meaningful institutional framework in which Britain and France could work at a bilateral or bi-multi level. Franco-British summits provided a forum for wide-ranging discussions but did not focus specifically or even primarily on security issues. NATO was of limited use, even though from 1995 French President Jacques Chirac did begin to make overtures towards it. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) also failed to offer a forum within which security cooperation could be taken forward. The UNSC did provide a mechanism but could just as easily be used to block as to advance proposals, as the aforementioned examples of Rwanda and Zaire have illustrated. The same is true of the EU where the UK hampered France’s attempts to link up with the Germans within the purview of the Western European Union and through the creation of the Eurocorps in 1995 (Loisel 2004: 44).

Saint-Malo: A New Departure

The pivotal moment which brought about a shift towards greater cooperation was the 1998 Saint-Malo summit. The Saint-Malo I declaration is mainly noted for its role in laying the foundation stone of the ESDP (Howorth 2004: 4). In particular, it stated that the European Council ‘must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union’ and that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces … in order to respond to international crises’ (Howorth 2004: 4, 34, my emphasis). The word ‘autonomous’ marked a crucial breakthrough, as it made it possible for the first time for the EU to intervene militarily outside the framework of NATO. This was a key French foreign policy priority. Saint-Malo II actually made no mention of security cooperation but simply committed the two governments to ‘harmonise policies towards Africa and pursue close cooperation on the ground; promote the EU common position on human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa; [and] contribute to the stability of the continent’ by focusing on debt issues and development assistance. The intention to cooperate in the defence field was only made explicit at the Cahors Franco-British summit in February 2001.1

The Saint-Malo summit also served as the catalyst for efforts to create a more meaningful institutional framework within which the French and British, often alongside other Northern states, could engage in bilateral or ‘bi-multi’ cooperation.

1 Document obtained from the FCO, 2 April 2001.
cooperation. Since Saint-Malo, the French and British have developed more specifically bilateral links. Thus, the Franco-British summits now always include a section on Africa and the presence of both defence ministers at the 2001 Cahors summit symbolised the new spirit of cooperation in security matters. There have been joint statements by UK and French defence ministers and joint visits by foreign ministers Miliband and Kouchner to crisis-ridden countries such as the DRC in November 2008. Crucially too, institutional bridges have been built through Anglo-French secondments of personnel that are designed to improve the two countries’ mutual understanding of each other’s modus operandi in the peace and security field. Thus, the French and British ministries of defence exchanged chargés de mission from 2005–08, stationed reciprocally in the central policy-making departments of each ministry. The French attach considerable importance to these exchanges. However, the British abolished the post in 2008, which left one French official in London with no British counterpart in Paris. The UK also sends a British officer to Paris as deputy director of EURORECAMP (discussed later). In addition, a French officer is embedded with British forces in Nairobi and a British officer was seconded to French forces in Dakar until 2009, when British government cutbacks put an end to the arrangement.

Significantly too, Saint-Malo was the trigger for the creation of a number of fora in which cooperation and dialogue were possible at EU level, such as the 20 Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Military Committee. Anglo-French cooperation within the PSC has been a sine qua non for the approval of the ESDP missions (discussed below) and for a range of other initiatives on which joint actions or statements have been agreed, such as on Darfur and Chad for example (New York Times 2007, 20 July).

Another significant attempt by Britain and France to develop closer ties between themselves and with the United States in the security field has been the P3 initiative at the UNSC. While this informal mechanism for consultation between three of the five permanent Security Council members was announced in late 1997, it was not until after Saint-Malo that the P3 became effective as a forum for harmonizing British, French and American policies on peacekeeping, capacity-building and other security challenges in Africa and beyond. With around 70 per cent of the UNSC’s business relating to Africa in recent years, the P3 has been an important arena for Anglo-French security cooperation, particularly when the French and British ambassadors to the UN in New York have enjoyed a good personal relationship and even more so when relations between the UK and US Ambassadors have been strained, as they were between Sir Emyr Jones Parry and John Bolton (personal communications, former UK officials, New York and London, 2008).

During the Bush presidency, the P3 initiative would sometimes involve Anglo-French talks to coordinate their positions as a prelude to trying to get the US on board; for example, the Qatar initiative to get the Darfur rebels to join peace talks with the Sudanese government was initiated by the French with support from the UK and subsequently the US came on board. The Anglo-French initiative, 44
launched in late 2008, to improve UN peacekeeping mandates is also a good example of bi-multi cooperation, with the US now increasingly involved in the discussions along with the other P5 members. It should of course be noted that the P3 and EU are multilateral mechanisms, and the UK and France do not always share the same analysis within these fora. London and Paris therefore need wider support in these arenas in order to take certain initiatives forward. This is not always forthcoming, particularly in instances where the UK or France is deemed to be instrumentalising the UNSC or ESDP to serve their national interests. Britain’s stance on the 2003 Iraq War and France’s promotion of the EUFOR Chad mission might be cited in this context. Nevertheless, the fact that both the UK and France are permanent members of the UNSC, key players in Europe and major actors in the peace and security arena in Africa does offer unrivalled scope for working together in areas of mutual interest before bringing others on board (personal communications, former UK officials, London and New York, 2008–09).

The UK, France and the ESDP in Africa

There have been two main forms of Anglo-French security cooperation since Saint-Malo, namely peacekeeping missions and training African peacekeepers. We shall begin by focusing on the former, specifically ESDP military missions, of which there have been four in Africa: Operation Artemis, DRC, June–September 2003; EUFOR DRC, July–November 2006; EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic (CAR), January 2008–March 2009; and EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, December 2008–ongoing.

Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

Artemis was the first ‘autonomous’ EU military operation (that is, conducted without recourse to NATO assets) and the first ESDP operation outside Europe. France was the ‘framework nation’ for the operation and provided the operational headquarters and the majority – 90 per cent – of the 1,400-strong force on the ground, although the UK sent a special operations unit, which played a crucial role in resurfacing the runway at Bunia, as all supplies had to be flown in. The UK also provided invaluable support by persuading a reluctant Ugandan government to offer airport facilities at Entebbe (Bagayoko 2004: 103). The 2 This initiative now extends to the C34 Special Committee on peacekeeping, which includes around 120 members; communications with British officials, New York, 2009. 3 There have also been other civilian/military missions in Africa: EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, 12 February 2008–31 May 2009; EUPOL DRC, 1 July 2007–30 June 2009); and EUSEC DRC, 8 June 2005–30 September 2010. These operations will not concern us, as this chapter focuses on military missions.
operation was limited in time (four months) and had a mandate to protect civilian life and stabilise the humanitarian situation in Bunia (eastern DRC) following the withdrawal of Ugandan forces and the inability of the UN force, MONUC, to prevent renewed violence. In the aftermath of European divisions over the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, ‘France badly wanted a mission to show the EU was capable of acting alone, where NATO would not be involved’ (Gegout 2005: 437). While London’s go-ahead was mainly to prove that the UK was still interested in developing a European defence capability (personal communication, former UK official, New York, 2008). In this case Anglo-French cooperation was clearly the product of convergent agendas that were themselves the result, in the British case at least, of changing domestic policy preferences. This textbook operation was widely acclaimed and demonstrated that the EU could undertake a peacekeeping mission far from Europe’s borders (Helly 2009: 183–5).

Like Artemis, EUFOR DRC was a time-limited and targeted operation. Its mission was to support the UN force, MONUC, in supervising the 2006 election process in DRC. Germany provided the operational HQ; the largest troop contributors were France and Germany; and the largest bilateral contributor to the elections (£35m) was the UK, although it sent no combat troops. Here, in order to appreciate how France, without any offer of manpower from the UK, was able to ensure the launch of such an operation, we need to look more closely at the wider European context. Needless to say, France, and for that matter Belgium, had a strong national interest in using the EU ‘as an instrument to take care of their concerns for the DRC’s stability’ (Olsen 2009: 18). Paris also brought other states, notably a reluctant Germany, on board, despite German anxiety about potential troop losses, thanks to the prevailing political situation in Europe. There was, in particular, a perceived need to reassert the credibility of the EU following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by Ireland, France and the Netherlands. In effect, EUFOR DRC was ‘more about European form than African substance’, with the ‘actual reality on the ground in Congo [constituting] only a secondary factor’ (International Herald Tribune, 13 June 2006). The EUFOR operation also needs to be understood against the backdrop of the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa in 2005; the mission was seen by the operation’s French commander, Major-General Damay, as a test case for the strategy and a ‘laboratory’ for the ESDP (quoted in The EU’s Africa Strategy 2007: 5). More generally, there was a consensus between member states and the European Commission (EC) that the EU should contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in the DRC, and EUFOR DRC also provided the opportunity ‘to get some good coverage for the EU’ (Howorth 2007: 239). For the UK, the stability of the DRC was of paramount concern: it was a significant contributor to SSR and, through the work of the Department for International Development (DfID), was one of the country’s largest donors. French and British agendas in the DRC thus converged, in 2007, the UK was the third largest bilateral donor providing 121.3 M€, behind Belgium (153.1 M€) and the US (132.4 M€) but well ahead of France (52.1 M€), OECD

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with Britain keen to ensure the success of the elections and France concerned to 
stabilise the country and to demonstrate once again the EU’s capacity for military 
action.

EUFOR Chad/CAR was authorised by UNSC Resolution 1778. Described as 
‘a multi-dimensional mission to help create the security conditions necessary for 
reconstruction’ in Chad and the CAR, it was mandated to ‘protect civilians, facilitate 
delivery of humanitarian aid and ensure the safety of UN personnel’. Its scope was 
thus very limited, as it had no mandate to address the underlying political problem 
in Chad, which is the refusal of President Deby even to talk to the opposition.

Indeed, EUSR officials were specifically instructed not to talk to the Chadian rebels 
(personal communication, EU official, Addis Ababa, 2009). France was the largest 
contributor to the operation (2,500 out of 3,700 troops) and the operational HQ 
was in Paris, although the force commander was an Irish lieutenant-general, Pat 
Nash. Like its forerunners, it was a time-limited operation and was presented as a 
bridding mission that would stabilise the humanitarian situation while a UN force 
was put together. EUFOR Chad/CAR handed over to a UN force, MINURCAT II, 
in March 2009.

France’s support for this mission was based primarily on its concern for 
the stability of two of its key allies in central Africa, Chad and CAR (personal 
communication, French official, Addis Ababa, 2009). It also saw the operation as a 
way of further demonstrating the autonomous military capability of the EU (Olsen 
2009: 18) and of involving other European powers more fully in burden-sharing 
in the region. For the UK, however, the focus was more narrowly on Darfur and 
on the danger that events there could spark a truly regional crisis. The Foreign 
Office (FCO) began planning for this eventuality ahead of any mission and, with 
help from the British High Commission in Cameroon, it developed Whitehall’s 
understanding of the Chad/Sudan situation and held a joint meeting with France 
on both countries. Yet Britain’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) remained cautious, 
refusing to participate in the mission and initially blocking funding for it. It was 
only after a high-level exchange between President Sarkozy and Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown that the UK sent two staff officers to operational HQ in Paris and 
two to the field HQ in Chad, as well as later unblocking the money and even 
co-sponsoring the UN resolution that authorised the EU deployment (personal 
communication, UK official, London, 2009). This latter decision was no doubt 
prompted by the fact that the British public and the US administration were so 
exercised over the situation in Sudan/Darfur, that the killings in Darfur were being 
so widely reported in the UK media and that British NGOs were pressing for 
‘humanitarian intervention’.

The above account does not, however, explain how the two countries succeeded 
in getting the agreement of other member states to the ESDP mission; Germany, 
in particular, suspected France of using the international community to shore 
up its own African sphere of influence, or chasse gardee, a concern also shared 
2009: 122.
by the UK. In the end, EU support was forthcoming, primarily because both the
UK and France supported the mission and thanks also to widely shared concerns
about the refugee crisis and the possibility that genocide might be occurring in
Darfur, which gave rise to a diffuse sense that the EU needed to be seen to be
‘doing something’. From the limited perspective of Anglo-French cooperation
the authorisation of EUFOR Chad/CAR was a success.

Finally, Operation Atalanta broke new ground for the EU as it was the first
ESDP naval operation. The UN passed a declaration, co-sponsored by France
and the US, which authorised nations to enter Somali territorial waters with
the agreement of the transitional Somali government. This opened the door to
Operation Atalanta, the objective of which is to ‘contribute to the deterrence,
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali
cost’. With stakeholders including the UN, NATO and nine other countries,
Atalanta involves 1,200 personnel and 16 ships, not all from EU member states
(Gya and Herz 2009: 2). Crucially, it is the first ESDP mission to be led by the UK.

While there was widespread concern among EU member states about piracy off
the Somali coast, this alone does not explain the EU’s involvement or the specific
configuration of the operation. From the French perspective, Atalanta offered
another opportunity, in a new arena, to demonstrate the military capability of the
EU. However, although France was instrumental in securing UNSC authorisation,
it had played a key role in each of the three other ESDP missions in Africa and was
keen – for political reasons and also due to cuts in its defence budget – not to take
the lead on this occasion. This coincided with concerns within the UK permanent
deployment in Brussels that Britain, having participated in just one ESDP military
mission, might be criticised for showing insufficient commitment to ESDP or 25
to peacekeeping in Africa. Despite initial reluctance from the FCO and MoD in
London, the naval chief of staff was keen for the UK to be involved and France
was happy for Britain to take the lead. Northwood thus emerged as the command
HQ for the operation (personal communications, UK and French officials,
Brussels; former UK naval officer, 2009). Again this appears to be a successful
example of Anglo-French cooperation. But it would be wrong to explain the UK’s
involvement primarily in terms of support for ESDP; it was, rather, a response to
lobbying by private sector actors keen to maintain London’s status as the city that
hosts the International Maritime Organisation and a major international hub for
commercial shipping.

So what conclusions can we draw from these missions? The willingness to
deploy European troops in peacekeeping and conflict management operations is a
new feature of EU African policy since Saint-Malo. This willingness derives from the
fact that the European Council, rather than the EC, is increasingly playing the
lead role in EU African policy, as it is the Council that has been tasked with the
planning, launching and conduct of ESDP missions. Within this intergovernmental
context, France in particular has played a key role in pressing for EU military
interventions. It has been successful thanks largely to British support, or at least acquiescence, within the European Council. There is a sense in London, Paris
and Brussels that, when Britain and France agree, initiatives make progress. There are clearly synergies between the French and British positions, and from the UK perspective it is in Africa that there is most to be gained from these synergies. Nevertheless, cooperation remains far from automatic, and it is worth remembering that the UK intervention in Sierra Leone and French operations in Côte d’Ivoire were both largely unilateral, despite coming after Saint-Malo and being only partly driven by interests.5

Training Peacekeepers

Apart from cooperation to launch ESDP operations, the UK and France have been involved in training African peacekeepers. There are two closely linked aspects to this training: actions taken under RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) and related initiatives, and support for the peacekeeping efforts of African sub-regional organisations and of the African Union (AU). The focus here will be on the first of these aspects, as support for AU’s peacekeeping efforts is covered in Chapter 10, although brief mention will also be made of the backup given to African sub-regional organisations.

By the mid-1990s, African states were increasingly sceptical about French military interventions and Northern governments were – following their experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia – ever more reluctant to intervene directly in Africa. Against this backdrop, France, Britain and, indeed, the US, all came to recognise the importance of Africans taking greater responsibility for peacekeeping on the continent. They also acknowledged that African forces could not be expected to contain instability on their own. Initially, they launched separate programmes: RECAMP (France), the UK’s African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme and ACRI (US: African Crisis Response Initiative). However, the three countries quickly realised the need to coordinate their programmes and in late 1997 announced the ‘P3 initiative’ (discussed above), in an effort to harmonise their capacity-building programmes in Africa and also to get other actors involved (Franke 2009: 78). Subsequently, in 2001, the UK’s training programme was subsumed into a much larger initiative, the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), which included one fund specifically for Africa and another for conflicts arising elsewhere in the world. Under both the Africa and the Global CPP programmes, the FCO, DfID and MoD pooled their budgets for promoting conflict prevention and peace, with the Cabinet Office providing coordination at ministerial level. This was an example of ‘joined-up thinking’ by Tony Blair’s New Labour Administration.

The Africa CPP’s priorities were laid out in a jointly agreed UK sub-Saharan Africa Strategy for Conflict Prevention, with activities being programmed and agreed annually. Its budget for 2005–06 was £60m. This was a modest sum in the  

France nonetheless offered diplomatic support to the UK intervention in Sierra Leone. The UK also backed France’s request for UN peacekeepers in Côte d’Ivoire and financed a Ghanaian contingent subsequently deployed under UN auspices, Loisel 2004: 52.
context of overall DfID spending, but the Pool was principally seen as a ‘catalyst to ensure coherence and effectiveness of UK intervention’ (ACPP 2004). However, while the programme reflected much greater commitment to training and military exercises than was evident under the previous Conservative administration, the Pool has essentially functioned as a bilateral mechanism providing peace support in selected priority countries, such as Sierra Leone, and no formal mechanisms have been created for cooperation with other powers in the area of conflict management.

As for RECAMP, this represented a greater refocusing of France’s security policy, away from its traditional unilateral approach towards a more multilateral approach designed to develop the capability of African armed forces to conduct their own peacekeeping operations. RECAMP sought to contribute to this objective in three ways: through support for military training schools involved in peacekeeping training for African soldiers; through peacekeeping training for African units in sub-regional training exercises; and through equipment and logistical support for units engaged in peacekeeping.

With respect to the training of African peacekeepers, the UK and France took steps, in the context of RECAMP and in conjunction with the US, to coordinate their provision in West Africa by establishing a regional network of training centres that would complement each other and reduce duplication. Thus, the focus of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, which was initially UK-funded, is on operational level training; the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix in Bamako undertakes tactical-level training (the UK is represented on the School board) and receives support from the EU and several member states, as well as from the US, Canada and a number of other donors; and the National Defence College in Abuja undertakes strategic-level training.

The work of these centres is complemented by the efforts of a network of regional military training schools, established by the French in 1997 to provide training that meets ‘the needs of African army officers [and is] equal in quality to that provided in France while being adapted to local realities and resources’ (Les Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale n.d.). There are 15 such schools in eight francophone African countries. Some have been designated ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) centres of excellence and so now are eligible for EU funding. Like the three schools mentioned above, they are run by the hosting nations and recruit, in principle, throughout the region. However, as all are situated in Francophone Africa and French is normally the language of instruction and their recruitment comes largely from francophone countries.

This francophone bias has led critics to argue that RECAMP actually deepened ‘the Francophone-Anglophone divide that is endemic in West Africa’ and even undermined the sub-region’s security efforts (Kabia 2008: 185).

These criticisms are less easily levelled against RECAMP’s successor, EURORECAMP. This latter initiative emerged in the wake of the December 2007 EU Summit in Lisbon during which agreement was reached on the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, one of the four key aims of which was ‘to strengthen and
promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights … and regional and continental integration in Africa’ (The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 2007: 2). It was in this post-Lisbon context that France and the UK took the lead in transforming RECAMP, which was originally a national initiative, into an EU programme, EURORECAM. Based in Paris, as France is the ‘framework nation’ designated by the EU, EURORECAM has a French general as its director and a British officer as its deputy director. Like RECAMP, it aims to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity through education and training. Unlike its predecessor, however, it is ‘guided by the principle of African ownership’, and its focus is much more explicitly on the AU and Africa’s regional organisations to enable them to contribute more effectively to regional security (The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 2007: 5). A good example of this new focus by EURORECAM is the 2008 launch of its first training cycle, Amani Africa, (‘Amani’ means ‘peace’ in Swahili), which is discussed in Chapter 10.

The UK and France have also been keen to bolster the peacekeeping capacity of African regional organisations, such as ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa (IGAD). As mentioned above, the French and British first began to collaborate on African regional military exercises within the framework of RECAMP. For example the UK contributed equipment to the RECAMP exercise Tanzanite in 2001 and France took part in the UK-led map exercise, Blue Pelican, at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat in November 2000. Subsequently, between 2002 and 2006, the UK, alongside some other EU member states, provided ad hoc support to RECAMP military exercises. This was mainly in the form of logistical support, but was not on a large scale, was not linked to any institutional partnership and was largely symbolic. The UK nonetheless did provide more substantial support to a Franco-ECOWAS military training exercise in December 2007, which was funded 50 per cent by the French and 25 per cent by Britain (personal communication, UK official, Abuja, 2009). However, since 2009 a combination of budgetary constraints and a FCO strategic review of priorities have led to cuts in spending on peace and security in Africa, including a reduction in support for ECOWAS – for example, the UK has withdrawn support for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra.

The UK and France have undoubtedly helped ECOWAS to develop its peacekeeping capability. The two countries have often collaborated particularly effectively at the operational level, when it is a question of immediate problem-solving on the ground such as ensuring that a training exercise is able to go ahead. However, Anglo-French cooperation has been far from systematic at the political or strategic level. A case in point is their different approaches to the East African brigade (EASBRIG) of the ASF. The UK initially took the lead in supporting EASBRIG but, in so doing, ran into problems with the French, who have generally been reluctant to acknowledge UK leadership. In 2007, for instance, France provided a secure LAN for EASBRIG without discussing it with the UK. Such problems arise because, once again, there is no formal mechanism for deciding what the two countries can or should do together.
Finally, French and British interest in providing support to Africa-wide peacekeeping efforts was heightened when, in 2002, the AU replaced the OAU and moved away from a stance based on absolute respect for national sovereignty, to one which took greater account of the responsibility to protect (Mwanasali 2009: 42–4). The UK, France and other EU member states backed AU efforts to develop a framework for crisis management on the African continent, namely the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) although this backing was limited to conflict prevention work and not well targeted prior to the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa in 2005 and its successor, the joint Africa-EU Strategy, in 2007. One of the key objectives of this joint strategy is to strengthen African capacities, not least in the security field (Assessment Report 2009) and it was with this objective in view that the Amani Africa training cycle was launched, in November 2008 (see Chapter 10 for fuller treatment of Anglo-French cooperation in support of APSA and Amani Africa). The UK is the largest financial contributor to Amani Africa while France takes the lead role in agenda-setting and implementation as the framework nation for the EURORECAMP programme (Elowson 2009: 62–3). In practice, however, both continue to provide a significant proportion of their support for the APSA on a bilateral basis. French and, to some extent, British reluctance to give up or share sovereignty over African policy or to lose autonomy over spheres of influence and a more general lack of willingness on the part of EU member states to pass on information about what they are doing bilaterally with the AU remain significant obstacles to more effective cooperation in the security field. Overcoming these obstacles is again often down to individual personalities.

Neoclassical Realism, Policy Drivers and Constraints

As indicated earlier, neoclassical realism focuses on interests, preferences and power, as well as incorporating domestic political variables within foreign policy analysis. In other words, the systemic structure is not determinative, and states, through policy processes, do have some capacity for choice. Nonetheless, the key point to stress is that neoclassical realism builds on the neo-realist assumption that both the UK and France are ultimately driven by concern over their relative power within the international system. Within this analytical framework, how then are we to account for this significant yet ultimately limited Anglo-French security cooperation? In order to answer this question we will examine first the drivers towards cooperation, then the constraints on enhanced cooperation.

A key factor, under the reformist government of Lionel Jospin, was France’s wish to shed its reputation as the ‘gendarme of Africa’. After the debacle of its involvement in Rwanda and former Zaire in the mid-1990s, France was keen both to restore its image in Africa and to draw down discreetly from its costly African bases. Both these objectives pointed to the need for a more multilateral approach. Thus, French military policy in Africa sought to shift the risk of intervention by obtaining prior UN or EU approval and through burden-sharing with its allies,
notably in ESDP and other peacekeeping operations. Finally, on the security
front, France was becoming disillusioned with the UN’s peacekeeping efforts and
looking to the EU – and indeed NATO – to play a greater role (Utley 2006: 65–7).
On the UK side, the drivers were quite different. The New Labour government
of Tony Blair was beginning its move towards a policy of re-engagement with
Africa. However, given the regional, and often continent-wide, nature of the
security challenges facing Africa, the UK could not effectively re-engage without
having a relationship with Francophone Africa, and this indicated a need to
cooperate with France. Secondly, the creation of DfID, much of the work of which
is focused on Africa, helped to keep Africa centre-stage in policy terms, notably
within the Cabinet, in a way that had not previously been the case. Finally and
crucially, Prime Minister Blair needed to deliver on his promise to ‘put the UK
at the heart of Europe’. Following Britain’s failure to join the euro, cooperation
on African policy – particularly in the security field – provided an arena in which
the UK could play a central role within the EU (Porteous 2008: 5–15). That this
was a propitious domain for cooperation had already been demonstrated by the
understanding that developed between the two armed forces during the crisis in
Bosnia (personal communication, former British naval officer, Portsmouth 2008).
Thus the Saint-Malo process was launched at a key moment, when both the
UK and France were anxious about their continuing status as permanent members
of the UNSC and about their relative loss of influence, the former particularly in
Africa and the latter in Europe. As a result, the two countries had complementary
interests pushing them towards closer and mutually beneficial cooperation. Clearly
by working together in the security domain, these two middle-ranking powers,
with similar defence expenditures, could increase their influence over European
security, a fact of no small significance at a time of heightened British fears and
nascent French concerns about US abandonment. By coordinating their positions,
the UK and France could generally sway the PCS and other military committees
in the EU as well as have an impact at the global level, notably within the P3.6 By
collaborating, they could help to keep the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership on track
and ensure that European Development Fund monies continue to be earmarked to
support European peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. By working together, they
could also – importantly in an age of rapid international media coverage – better
respond to the often trans-sovereign security-related threats arising from Africa,
be they from illegal immigration, the spread of AIDS, drugs trafficking, money
laundering, international criminal activity or indeed the risk of genocide in fragile
states such as the DRC and Sudan.

By the early 2000s, other factors and events were also pushing the UK and
France to collaborate. The first of these was the al-Qa’ida attacks of 11 September
2001, which gave a boost to the idea of security and defence cooperation and

6 The UK and France are expected under Article 19 of the Amsterdam Treaty to
brief the other member states on UNSC proceedings and to represent the positions of the
EU at the Council.
contributed to the growing emphasis that has been placed on security in EU African 1 2 policy since 2001. The second was the emergence of seemingly intractable crises 3 in countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. As the former colonial powers, 4 the UK and France had to deal with these crises and needed the other’s political 5 support so as, at the very least, to avoid tripping each other up. The third catalyst was 6 the Iraq War, which initially led to deep divisions within Europe and at the UNSC, 7 where the UK and France competed aggressively for the votes of African Security 8 Council members (Angola, Cameroon, Guinea) in relation to the proposed second 9 UN Resolution. In the end, however, the invasion of Iraq actually encouraged the 10 UK and France to look for areas for cooperation in other parts of the world, not 11 least Africa (personal communications, former UK officials at the UN, New York, 12 2008; see also Loisel 2004: 55). Indeed, the Franco-British summit declaration of 13 November 2003 laid considerable emphasis on the two governments’ commitment 14 to cooperation in Africa and ‘to the continued development of the EU’s capacity to 15 take decisions and act in crisis management’ (Franco-British Summit Declaration 16 2003). A final factor has been the emergence of new partners that are playing an 17 ever greater role in Africa (China, India, Japan and the Middle East countries). The 18 UK and France have, in recent years, become an increasingly less significant part 19 of Africa’s foreign relations, with the result that their power to do things in Africa 20 and their leverage over African leaders have declined. This has put further pressure 21 on British and French governments to pool their efforts in order to maintain their 22 relative influence.

However, given these pressures to cooperate and the benefits that both 23 countries derive from enhanced collaboration, it is perhaps surprising that Anglo- 24 French cooperation has not been taken further. The explanation would appear to 25 lie in the fact that French and British leaders have had to take account of other 26 variables, not least their perceived divergent national interests, the capacity of 27 their states to act and the views of the wider domestic polity on state preferences. 28 On the first of these variables, it is important to underline that Paris and London 29 attach different relative importance to Africa and this, in turn, affects both their 30 readiness to collaborate on African policy and the areas (often outside the former 31 French and British empires) in which they seek to cooperate. For France, Africa 32 plays a crucial role in enhancing its rank in the international pecking order, while 33 for the UK Africa is much more centrally a development issue. There is also a 34 key difference between them over NATO. While neither country would deny 35 the existence of a ‘spatial differentiation’ between ESDP and NATO missions, 36 whereby Europe operates in sub-Saharan Africa whilst NATO is active in more 37 geo-strategically important zones (Dyson 2008), the fact remains that France 38 sees cooperation ultimately as a way of affirming an autonomous European 39

7 However, French concerns about Chinese economic penetration apparently 41 outweigh those of the UK, which in 2009 provided $250,000 to support the China-Africa 42 Business Council, www.crid.asso.fr/spip.php?breve58 and www.number10.gov.uk/ 43 (accessed 18 March 2010).
1 security identity (beyond even ‘Berlin Plus’), whereas the UK sees the ESDP as 2 complementary to NATO.
3 Furthermore, neo-classical realists would argue that the level of cooperation 4 depends ultimately on the ‘extractive capacity’ of the two states. In France, the 5 state’s capacity has been limited by its membership of the European Monetary 6 Union and by internal spending cuts. The UK government has also faced budgetary 7 restrictions, particularly in the 2008–09 global financial crisis. Moreover, its 8 long-term commitment to SSR is in doubt: in August 2008, the UK’s two conflict 9 prevention pools were combined, and, in March 2009, the conflict prevention 10 budget, which had never allocated more than £65m per year to Africa, was 11 merged with the Stabilisation Aid Fund and the peacekeeping budget (which pays 12 for the UK’s peacekeeping responsibilities at the UN). In the process, the overall 13 amount of funding for these activities was cut and the budget for Africa reduced to 14 £43 million (Hansard 2009: 25 March). Significantly too, parliamentary and civil 15 society constraints mean that the British government has more difficulty getting 16 military missions approved than is the case in France, where the French president 17 finds this comparatively easy. Other domestic constraints relate, especially in the 18 UK, to the small size of available armed forces due to commitments elsewhere. 19 The rise to prominence of DfID, which has no equivalent in France, is another 20 factor of which the British government has to take account in decisions about 21 security cooperation in Africa. While DfID potentially offers new opportunities 22 through the creation of the Africa CPP, this is not primarily intended for ‘hard’ 23 operations of the type that France is particularly well placed to undertake thanks 24 to its pre-positioned forces in Africa.

27 Conclusion
28
29 This chapter has demonstrated how Britain and France have, since Saint-Malo, 30 built new institutional bridges and cooperated more freely in ESDP missions and 31 the training of African peacekeepers. It has also shown that there have been clear 32 limits to this collaboration between Europe’s leading military powers and that 33 cooperation has often been a function of individual personalities. Clearly, the P3 34 initiative has enabled Britain and France to cooperate more at the level of the 35 UNSC. The creation of the PSC has facilitated cooperation in Europe, as has the 36 fact that the UK and France, as well as regularly holding the EU Presidency, have 37 increasingly been called upon to chair European Council meetings in African 38 capitals in which European member states and incoming Council Presidents, such 39 as Slovenia and the Czech Republic, are not represented.
40 At the same time, there has been a convergence in understanding of the 41 problems confronting Africa and of the link between security and development. 42 Against the background of globalisation, the emergence of major new actors 43 in Africa and the heightened perception of the economic and strategic threats 44 posed by the African continent, Britain and France have felt the need to align 45
their agendas, either bilaterally, as has happened to a limited extent in the DRC, or bi-multilaterally, as was the case with the development of the Africa-EU strategy in advance of the Lisbon summit (Elowson 2009: 27). However, there remains a strong sense of ‘division of labour’ between France operating in Francophone Africa and Britain in Anglophone Africa. Cooperation has taken place on particular issues, thanks to a shared understanding of challenges and a shared interest in addressing them, or an acknowledgment of the ‘comparative advantage’ of the other country. But it has not been systematic. Nor has it been accompanied by the degree of institutionalisation that might be implied by the term ‘partnership’.

The signs are that cooperation will continue to be patchy for the foreseeable future. There is, for example, evidence to suggest that the French are increasingly interested in developing a stronger security relationship with the US in Africa, notably in the Sahel. On the British side, following the election of a Conservative-led coalition government in 2010, the UK may well play a much less constructive role in future ESDP missions. Furthermore, almost any future British administration is likely to consider with trepidation the idea, propounded by France, that such missions, given their sheer number and complexity, require the establishment of a separate European HQ operating autonomously from NATO. At the same time, however, future governments in both countries will be under pressure to make savings, which may push them towards increased burden-sharing in certain situations. Moreover, the creation of the European External Action Service, post-Lisbon, will increase pressure for policy coordination, not least in the security field where the two countries clearly have shared interests.

Hitherto, this relationship seems to have been an exclusive one, although in 2009 the UK government announced its intention to re-open an embassy in Mali in response to the execution of a British national and the wider threat of terrorism, migration and organised crime.