Rip it up and start again? The contemporary relevance of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity

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Abstract

Since its adoption in 2005, the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions has become a central reference point for cultural policy around the world. However, there remains little scholarly scrutiny of how effectively this instrument frames the international policy agenda around culture, economy and development under contemporary conditions of rapid, and contested, global transformation. Through a critical review of the core content of the Convention, and some of the experiences gained from its implementation over the first decade, one of the arguments proposed in the paper is that the Convention has had the effect of reinforcing a one-dimensional, ‘economistic’ language of cultural and public policy, in a way which offers limited progressive intellectual or political resource for cultural policy today. In response, we outline key areas where new thinking might be undertaken and from which UNESCO might offer new resources and framings for global cultural policy. We argue less for ‘ripping it up and starting again’ and more for the need to, critically, take stock and explore new ways forward in the search for progressive responses to the current conjuncture.

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Introduction
Global political and economic volatility over the last decade has created an uncertain policy landscape. The established political frameworks of neoliberalism and Keynesian social democracy have been brought into question by financial crisis, recession, and slow ‘recovery’, but also more pointedly, by the rise of new political forces – ‘populist’, authoritarian, protectionist, anti-science – that seem to cast the post-1945 global settlement into doubt. Related concerns around climate change, migration, and a new wave of job-threatening AI-led technologies have added new stresses and anxieties to this geopolitical turbulence.

This paper seeks to raise some of the critical issues facing international cultural policy in this contemporary scenario, focusing on one of the key measures of the last decade: UNESCO’s Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CDCE) (UNESCO, 2005). This instrument has come to occupy a special place in the framework of international cultural law: adopted in 2005, and entering into force in 2007, the CDCE became widely received as marking a standard-setting and progressive breakthrough for cultural policy globally — particularly in the way that it linked the areas of culture, economy and development — even if there have been a number of reservations about its legal weight and status. One decade on, we now have an opportunity to begin to reflect on the CDCE’s contributions and contemporary relevance.

As the CDCE has now been in force for over a decade, a picture has begun to emerge of its record of implementation and some of its impacts, contributions and limitations. Most notably, UNESCO itself has produced two global monitoring reports that draw in particular on the periodic reports that Parties (signatories) are required to submit to the organisation every four years and which detail their experiences with implementation (UNESCO 2015; 2017a). These periodic reports, together with data and analyses drawn from other sources, have allowed the authors to build up a detailed account of trends in cultural policies and measures in a number of different areas, while enabling emergent trends in the cultural field to be identified so as to provide guidance for implementation looking forward. The reports also reflect some of the attempts that there have been to widen the focus of the CDCE from the issue of the regulation of the trade in cultural goods and services to a number of other issues that were given less prominence by the instrument’s drafters but which have demanded greater attention in recent years – such as questions of artistic freedom, the status of the artist, and gender equality.

It is important from the outset, however, to recognise the limitations in the kind of picture that is presented in these reports: firstly, due to significant gaps in the relevant data and in the availability of Parties’ periodic reports; ¹ and secondly due to the nature of the periodic reporting process itself, which tends to reproduce the perspectives of the particular states/governments that draw them up, leaving a gap in critical engagement with the CDCE — a situation that has been compounded by a lack of civil society involvement and reporting on its implementation, at least until recently. In the opening to the 2015 monitoring report (UNESCO, 2015), the organisation’s Director-General had written of the need for ‘new discourses and approaches to guide cultural policy’, yet there remains remarkably little work that aims at critically scrutinising the fundamental framing assumptions, operational discourses and inherent tensions of the contemporary international policy agenda around culture, economy and development under conditions of rapid, and contested, global transformation.

With the above points in mind, this paper interrogates the role, purpose and limitations of the CDCE as an international keystone of cultural

¹ The two global monitoring reports have been based, respectively, on an analysis of the 71 and 62 periodic reports that have been submitted so far (which is less than half of the total that had been expected for submission; there are currently 146 parties to the CDCE) and by a lack of data on particular areas (see for example UNESCO, 2017: 28).
policy in the contemporary context. This task was initiated as a response to a set of priority issues that were agreed upon as part of a series of discussions between an international network of thinkers, activists and representatives of civil society organisations that first gathered in 2017 to address the contemporary relevance of the CDCE (these priority issues are summarised in van Graan and Brennert, 2017). The paper also draws on an Australian Research Council project ‘UNESCO and the Making of Global Cultural Policy: Culture, Economy, Development’ — a project framed by an urgent need for cultural policy studies to look beyond its own policy areas to the wider social and political context. The argument made is less for ‘ripping it up and starting again’ and more for the need to critically take stock and explore new ways forward in the search for progressive responses to the current conjuncture.

The paper therefore goes on to reflect on some of these changes and sets them alongside a critical review of the core content of the CDCE and some of the experience gained from its implementation over the first decade. In doing so, we suggest that the CDCE has failed to challenge, and sometimes reinforced, an essentially ‘economistic’ language of cultural and public policy, and that it needs to revisit its core values and intellectual underpinnings if it is to provide a cultural policy resource adequate for today’s challenges. We will outline some key areas where new thinking might be undertaken and from which UNESCO might offer new resources and framings for global cultural policy.

Framing the CDCE

The CDCE was forged in the context of a long-running ‘trade and culture’ debate that had flared up again significantly in the late 1990s. The main sponsors of the CDCE — led by France and Canada — sought a binding international instrument that could reassert the legitimacy of cultural policy mechanisms, such as quotas and subsidies, that were seen to be under threat from the growing pressures of trade liberalisation and the market dominance of powerful global cultural exporters (particularly those from the US, who was the CDCE’s main opponent). In achieving this, the CDCE was built upon the concept of the ‘dual nature’ of cultural goods, services and activities, a formula that first gained expression in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity adopted at UNESCO in 2001 (UNESCO, 2001). This stresses the complementary links that can exist between cultural and economic objectives in policy and affirms the simultaneously commercial and cultural values of cultural commodities as both objects of trade and expressions of ‘identities, values and meanings’ (UNESCO, 2005).

This intervention in the trade and culture debate was the key contribution of the CDCE and a key test for observers has therefore been its impact in the trade context. There have been a number of references to the CDCE in trade agreements concluded over the last decade (for an overview, see Guèvremont in Chapter 7 of UNESCO, 2017a). However, these have been relatively few and far between as bilateral and other trade deals have
proliferated outside of the WTO arena, and the achievement of a number of the core objectives of the instrument’s sponsors has been restricted by some of the compromises and vague/hortatory language that ended up in the final draft.\footnote{One of the most commented upon weaknesses of the CDCE in this regard relates to the force with which the instrument can act as the kind of ‘counterpoint’ to the WTO that its supporters had hoped for. This stems from a number of points in the text of the CDCE, such as Article 20 (which concerns the relationship of the CDCE to other treaties). Neil (2006: 260) for example was among a number of commentators to note soon after its adoption that: ‘[Article 20] does not provide the clarity necessary to prevent further erosion of cultural sovereignty, let alone begin the difficult process of rolling back the extensive influence of the WTO and other bilateral and multilateral agreements.’}

A key early test case of the relevance of the CDCE in the context of trade regulation and dispute was the dispute between the US and China that opened in 2007 at the WTO, soon after the CDCE’s entry into force. China was the first country to cite the new UNESCO instruments on cultural diversity (the CDCE and the \textit{Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity} which had preceded the CDCE in 2001) in a dispute at the WTO, following a complaint that had been filed by the US regarding Chinese restrictions on the import of cultural goods and services. When the WTO panel eventually ruled in favour of the US, many observers responded by noting that this offered proof of the limited legal and political relevance of the CDCE in the context of disputes over trade and culture — although there is also some ambiguity and disagreement over how the WTO ruling should be interpreted in this regard (Garner, 2016: 120-122).

Looking beyond such questions surrounding the CDCE within the context of the trade and culture debate, the CDCE has established mechanisms for integrating culture within development policies and for fostering international cultural cooperation. These have had some influence in the content of trade agreements — such as the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the Caribbean regional grouping CARIFORUM concluded in 2008, which marked a breakthrough in a number of areas linking culture, trade and development, including in the application of Article 16 of the CDCE relating to preferential treatment for developing countries— and in the development of new policy frameworks — such as the joint adoption of a Strategy for International Cultural Relations by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (European Commission, 2016). The CDCE meanwhile continues to provide a central reference point for advocacy and research that makes the case for culture-led development projects, including the formation of a number of campaigns that called for the inclusion of a goal for culture in the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (which was ultimately unsuccessful, although culture is given some [brief] mentions in other goals); more recently, we see the creation of a monitoring framework that attempts to link the implementation of the CDCE to the achievement of the various SDGs.

The actual impacts of such initiatives in practice, however, have so far been quite limited (see for example Garner, 2017; Duxbury et al, 2017). This has been for a variety of reasons, but it runs much deeper than questions of the legal or political efficacy of the instrument. The CDCE’s drafting, adoption and ratification around the world had drawn momentum from a number of factors. It coincided with, and has been an important contributor towards, the global rise of the ‘creative economy’ and all the attendant developmental, commercial and political narratives that spread with infective optimism over the 2000s (and which have tended to resist close scrutiny, at least until recently) (Banks and O’Connor, 2017). This narrative around the ‘value’ of culture and the creative economy became fused in the CDCE, and in a number of other cultural policy fora in this period, with an ascendant liberal narrative of diversity and sustainable development in a way which appeared able to overcome divides between hitherto adversaries: including between the conceptual and policy domains of culture and the economy (expressed in the concept of the ‘dual’ — cultural and economic — value of cultural goods and
services), and even between the formerly antagonistic positions of the North and the South on questions of international cultural regulation (as had been seen with the controversies over the New World Information and Communications Order in the late 1970s and early 1980s). Over the previous decade, there had already been a number of efforts to better theorise the links between culture, economy and development — most notably the 1995 report of the UN-UNESCO World Commission on Culture and Development, Our Creative Diversity (UNESCO, 1995) – and to fold this into a new international agenda for culture and development. However, they lacked the kind of political momentum and support that the campaign for the CDCE brought to the issue from the late 1990s as the trade and culture debate rose in significance.

The process of conceptual and political rapprochement that came to be forged through the campaign for the CDCE has thus involved some narrowing of the issue of culture, diversity and development, to a particular set of concerns that came to be prioritised by governments and others immersed in the trade and culture debate of the late 1990s and early 2000s: namely, the regulation of trade, the growing economic and political significance of the cultural and creative sectors, and anxieties over the erosion of sovereignty regarding questions of cultural policy. Although the adoption of the CDCE did indeed signify a new international consensus on these issues of cultural policy (minus the two states that opposed the instrument, the US and Israel), it was a consensus rooted in a particular set of governmental and commercial concerns centred on questions of market regulation and the ‘new’ creative economy (Garner, 2016: 103-146).

In this way, the CDCE came to provide a useful reference point for a number of stakeholders working in the cultural and creative sectors, but it also involved relegating many of the other visions for cultural policy and cultural development that had been articulated over the previous decade. Vickery (2018) has argued that this was part of a moment in which an ‘ideological chasm’ began to open up in the international discourse on cultural policy, as the ascendance of the creative economy agenda at UNESCO (and partner UN organisations such as UNCTAD) increasingly framed the narrative on culture and development in terminology derived from the neoliberal revival of neoclassical economics (terminology which much of the work in Our Creative Diversity, as well as in a number of other fora, had been at pains to problematise). This had the effect of truncating the various attempts that there had been at the international level to theorise culture and economy outside of terms of reference derived from an essentially orthodox economics, while relegating attempts at developing an agenda for cultural policy that spoke to the themes of radical democratic pluralism and related questions of gender equality, minority and indigenous rights. This had already been noted by Albro in 2005 soon after the Convention’s adoption:

“[D]ebates over the diversity Convention were not so much about the relationship of culture to the marketplace, or the relevance of culture outside the marketplace, as about what the rules of the cultural marketplace should be […] The diversity of voices that might advance claims turning on the recognition of cultural differences within or between states, or outside any obvious market calculus altogether, are largely marginalized.” (Albro, 2005: 252).

There was also an important geopolitical backdrop to the CDCE’s adoption, characterised by the post-Cold War dominance of the US and a pressing sense, after 9/11 and the declaration of the War on Terror, of the need to avert the ‘clash of civilisations’ that had been famously predicted by Samuel Huntingdon and others. This was a concern which found resonance in UNESCO’s mandate to promote peaceful international cultural exchange, and it filled the air of the General Conference immediately preceding the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in November 2001 (UNESCO, 2001: President’s Foreword), an important milestone in the campaign for the CDCE. Adding to this air of urgency and solemnity around the kinds of narratives that were now being articulated about cultural diversity, many also drew parallels with the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity (in 1992) and the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity broke new ground here by making formal reference to the diversity of the
world’s cultural resources as being as ‘necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature’ (UNESCO, 2001: Article 1).

Such claims for the importance of the cultural sector informed a powerful narrative with which to build support behind the CDCE in the 2000s. They provided a fertile formula with which the instrument’s core supporters — the French and Canadian governments in particular, as well as a number of cultural sector and other stakeholder groups — were able to build support behind the draft at UNESCO. In the process, it gave a new lease of life to arguments about the unique or ‘exceptional’ nature of cultural goods and services which were struggling to gain political support in the late 1990s (in what, after all, had until then been primarily a North American and trans-Atlantic dispute over the status of the cultural sector in international trade). As the issue of the cultural exception widened to encompass questions of cultural diversity and was placed on the agenda at UNESCO, it found greater international resonance and was able to accommodate a number of other causes on the international agenda (sustainable development, artistic freedom and mobility, human rights and fundamental freedoms, among others), even if these largely remained embellishments to the central aims of the CDCE to set up mechanisms for the protection, production and exchange of cultural goods and services. Over the last decade however, many of the limitations to the kinds of conceptual and political formulae that were expressed in the CDCE, have become more apparent and the progressive momentum that had built up around the drafting and adoption of the instrument has diminished. In the following sections, we therefore begin to explore some of the consequences of this in greater depth.

The CDCE, Digitalisation and the Sustainable Development Goals

The need to ensure that the implementation of the CDCE keeps up with digitalisation and media convergence, along with the emergence of new players in the global trading environment and the evolving needs of the cultural sector, form a cluster of issues that have demanded growing political, legal and academic attention in recent years (see, for example, Richieri Hanania, 2016; Garcia Leiva and Albornoz, 2017; Vlassis, 2017; Hesmondhalgh, 2018). The regulatory, commercial and socio-political implications here are immense and pose a number of challenges, although as the most recent global monitoring report notes, the CDCE text was drafted to be ‘technologically neutral’, so as to ensure its continued relevance in significantly changed technological conditions (UNESCO, 2017a: 20). Whilst this is an understandable policy approach, drafted several years before the first smartphone or tablet had even appeared, the sheer scope and scale of the digital transformation, and the serious lack of policy preparedness as its ramifications became clear, need to be more fully registered.

The guidelines that were adopted at UNESCO in 2016 to support the implementation of the CDCE in the digital environment restated many of the key principles of the CDCE: equal access to digital space, artistic freedom and fair remuneration (piracy included), provisions for preferential treatment for the Global South, the rights of states to introduce relevant legislation in support of culture, and so on (UNESCO, 2017b). The initial discussions at the intergovernmental committee that had led to the generation of these guidelines made reference to the need to make specific provisions concerning issues such as the ‘influence of data and algorithms on the production and distribution of cultural goods and services and the issue of media diversity’. The guidelines themselves go on to contain a series of recommendations regarding the role of the digital in creation, production, dissemination, and in reformatting the local cultural industries systems, diversifying platforms and providing equal visibility, especially for local content. Taken together, these would represent a radical reappraisal of ‘platform capitalism’ in the cultural field. However, they lack a narrative capable of encompassing the full extent of this new platform capitalism – the new powerful monopolies it has spawned, the extensive extraction of personal data and the new business models around commodification and surveillance this has introduced, the transformations of multiple aspects of social life, and of the media-landscape and the sphere of culture itself. That is, though
the guidelines cover many crucial aspects of the new digital environment for culture, they read as a rather bloodless attempt to apply the principles of a previous era – culture and economy as win-win – to this new landscape. Beyond the intrinsic limitations that are generally found in operational guidelines within the UN/UNESCO systems, there is also an absence of a viable counter-narrative to that of digital utopianism, the entrepreneurial ethos (‘start-ups’), and the on-going commodification not just of culture but everyday life itself.

As the challenges of digitalisation have become a focus of political and regulatory attention, other issues relevant to the CDCE have found themselves commanding less attention than in the previous decade. In one sense, such evolution can be seen as inevitable outcome of technological transformations and shifts within the cultural sector, but it also reflects a prioritisation of the issue over others. This is pertinent when considering the issue of culture and sustainable development, since the CDCE’s contributions on this point had been highlighted as among its key contributions and had provided an issue around which both developed and developing countries could find common ground in the 2000s, generating momentum towards the instrument’s adoption and entry into force. The commitment that the developed countries had shown on this issue during the 2000s, however, has waned as their focus on the CDCE’s implementation has been channelled by digitalisation, media convergence and the management of the economic and political implications of financial crises. This was a pattern that was seen for example in the relative lack of support that developed countries had given to the campaign to include culture within the new SDGs as they were being formulated prior to 2015 (Garner, 2016: 236-237; Vlassis, 2015). The theoretical and policy connections between culture and environmental sustainability meanwhile remain particularly underdeveloped, and the field of cultural policy more broadly has been very slow to acknowledge the environmental impact of cultural production and artistic practice. The CDCE itself only pays lip

service to the notion of sustainability, and although the first global monitoring report on the CDCE provides a stronger engagement with sustainability than the CDCE itself, it remains overall more focused on ‘sustainable systems of governance for culture’ than the integration of ‘culture in sustainable development frameworks’ (Throsby, in Duxbury et al, 2017: 218).

The relatively disappointing outcome regarding the place of culture in the post-2015 development agenda, has meant that it is proving difficult to keep culture high on the agenda as more recent development policies and funding streams are being formulated. This simultaneously weakens UNESCO’s attempts to draw links between the SDGs and the implementation of the CDCE, particularly as the organisation once again finds itself struggling under budgetary and other pressures. It is telling that the proportion of total development aid spent on culture fell by 45% in the decade after the Convention’s adoption, despite mechanisms in the CDCE such as the International Fund for Cultural Diversity (IFCD) which were designed to encourage Parties to make [voluntary] contributions to a pot of funds that can be drawn upon for cultural development projects. Meanwhile, of the 111 Parties to the CDCE that have drawn up national development plans or strategy documents, only 40% have formulated outcomes or actions specific to the goals of the CDCE (UNESCO, 2017a: 171 & 15).

In parallel with this has been a more general lack of commitment from the Global North to many of the cultural rights initiatives addressed to the claims of indigenous peoples. The United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, adopted 2007) for example has received much less backing from the Global North – including by key sponsors of the CDCE such as

3 There have been some exceptions, particularly at

more local levels. The UNESCO 2015 monitoring report notes for example how a number of municipal governments around the world have begun to develop some pioneering approaches in this regard connecting the cultural and creative industries to sustainable development, although it gives very little detail on these initiatives (UNESCO, 2015).
Canada (which, along with New Zealand, Australia and the US, was 1 of the 4 countries that had voted against the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007, only reversing their positions after registering a number of reservations about its domestic applicability) (Gover, 2015). As a Declaration, the UNDRIP remains weaker as an instrument of international law and has not given rise to the kinds of international legal and policy mechanisms that have been seen with the CDCE. The relationship of UNDRIP to the implementation of the CDCE has not received close attention, neither by the Parties nor the various expert facilities with which the CDCE has been associated. In part, this relates to the divisions within UNESCO between the cultural/creative industries focus of the CDCE and the tangible and intangible heritage focus of the other conventions, under which craft and traditional performance are (mostly) subsumed. Attempts to discuss crafts within the context of cultural industries have frequently met with disapproval by UNESCO, even though the visual and performing arts are included in the CDCE, and crafts can be mainstays of many smaller cultural economies.

The kind of turf demarcation noted above is not uncommon in policy, but the division speaks of something deeper. That is, the ‘culture’ that is the object of the CDCE tends to be already conceived as market ready product (even if produced for the public sector). As we suggested above, despite the efforts of groups such as the World Commission on Culture and Development and others in the 1990s, the CDCE speaks primarily to questions of market regulation and much less to notions of cultural diversity conceived outside of a market calculus, or to the market’s relationship with the wider socio-cultural world from whence it sprang. The strands of anti-development, slow- or no-growth in the sustainability movement, and the deep suspicions of ‘development’ and ‘growth’ as intrinsically destructive that are found amongst indigenous communities (and other non-orthodox perspectives on development), thus go together in representing an ‘outside’ to market regulation that the CDCE and the activities around it continue to have little engagement with in practice.

The Tiring of the Creative Economy Narrative

This leads us to a number of rather fundamental questions surrounding the continued purpose of the CDCE in the contemporary context. One is that the ‘infectious enthusiasm’ that has surrounded the creative economy agenda for the last two decades, and which has given the CDCE much of its political momentum, is beginning to tire. This is apparent in a number of contexts. Firstly, the kinds of claims about the instrumental value of culture that had gained ground from the late 1990s have simply become increasingly easy for policy actors to ignore, particularly at national levels. This is partly because of a continued lack of convincing evidence of the cultural sector’s impact or value in particular policy domains, and partly because once the value of culture is articulated in primarily instrumental terms (i.e. its economic, social, etc. benefits) then the rationale for policy addressed to something called culture — as distinct from, say, industrial policy — becomes increasingly uncertain (particularly as economic concerns have risen on the political agenda).

This logic has left many actors within cultural sector in an increasingly uneasy position: as Hadley and Gray (2017: 97) write, if instrumental outputs are the basis upon which public policy concerns itself with culture, and if it cannot be convincingly demonstrated that culture contributes to these outputs, then why continue to fund or support it? Bhakshi and Cunningham’s (2016) proposal for a separation of cultural and creative industry policies is a reflection of such unease with the kinds of connections that have been built between cultural and industrial policy areas over the last two decades, framing their argument with the observation that ‘the conflation of culture with creative industries since 1997 has harmed both cultural policy and creative industries policy in the UK’ (Bhakshi and Cunningham, 2016: 3). The tendency of governments to focus on the faster growing sections of the creative industries – digital media, advertising and marketing, design – at the expense of the slow or static ‘lifestyle’ sectors (i.e. artists of various kinds) is clear. The exception has been the large-scale cultural flagships, which along with media and digital ‘hubs’ or ‘cities’, have been used to position cities on a global creative map. This sense of policy fragility is echoed in the
waning of the ‘creative imaginary’ which formed around the creative industries moment. That ‘creative imaginary’ envisaged that in the coming together of culture and economy, so long set against each other, culture would get greater policy recognition of its economic importance but would also bring to bear some of the values of that culture to the policy making process. Valuing culture and creativity as part of a contemporary economy, it was argued (cf. Landry and Bianchini, 1995), required a different kind of policy-mindset than that of Fordist industrial policy. But the ‘culturalisation of the economy’ (Lash and Urry, 1994) turned out to be the ‘economisation of culture’ (Oakley and O’Connor, 2015). This could be seen in the increasing precarity of creative labour (McRobbie, 2016) as well as a significant decrease in their sense of creative autonomy (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011). This is a global phenomenon, and one which is not just about rate of pay and conditions of work but impacts on the subjectivities of the once vaunted ‘creative class’ (or at least that part of it that was actually involved in the creative industries – Florida included a wide swath of the professional and managerial classes). The association of the creative industries moment with the bundle of artistic autonomy, grass-roots small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and a loosely networked creative milieu, giving rise to a sense of a different kind of creative future, has, we would argue, largely dissipated (O’Connor, 2019b). Equations of ‘creative’ with ‘precarious’ labour, and with exclusionary practices of gentrification, have become commonplace, and easily merge amongst the young with a sense of being a ‘surplus’ population (Shin, 2019), often fuelling anger and alienation (Mishra, 2017).

Underlying these changes in the imaginary are transformations in the structures and dynamics of the cultural/creative industries themselves. The creative industries moment coincided with the emergence of a new set of digital technologies based in ‘Silicon Valley’, which was less a location than an imaginary – or ideology (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996) – in which ‘start-ups’ fuelled by adventurous investment capital would ‘disrupt’ the technologies and business models of the incumbent capitalist order. It was a Randian/Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ that would deliver not just new growth but a new digital democracy – an imaginary that was easily rolled into the European discourses of cultural economy. However, digital democracy gave way to ‘platform capitalism’, in which the successful start-ups — in a winner-takes-all scenario — are now bigger than many of the older cultural industries corporations (Srnicek, 2016; Zuboff, 2019). Even so, these older corporations, through a series of mergers/de-mergers, vertical and horizontal integration/divestment, financialisation and legislative/regulative clout, remain very much in place (Hesmondhalgh, 2018). The creative industries have not opened up the kind of development possibilities envisaged by the supporters of the CDCE (O’Connor, 2019a). Indeed, the new powers of FAANG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, Google) and the telecoms corporations with which they are intertwined (both predicated on the control of the global information and communications infrastructure that the Global South had unsuccessfully challenged in the 1970s and 1980s in the calls for a New World Information and Communications Order at UNESCO) are more extensive and intrusive at the local level than the older companies ever were. Nevertheless, through enhanced intellectual property legislation and enforcement, through the logistical possibilities afforded by the digitalisation of cultural production, and through a proliferating set of bilateral and other trade deals that bypass the CDCE, the cultural industry corporations continue to be dominant at the global level (with a few exceptions, such as in China).

Such developments could be read as confirming the continued need for the CDCE as a resource for policymakers to pursue certain ‘public’ objectives by limiting the power of dominant players in the global cultural marketplace. However, it is limited in its power to do this on a number of levels. As Cornelia Dümcke (a member of the 2005 Expert Facility) wrote recently: ‘Globalisation’s promise was diversity; its result is the endangerment of diversity’ (Dümcke 2017: 43). This is not just at the level of nation-states. The localised, embedded networks of cultural SMEs and ‘start-ups’ of the creative imaginary have also been reconfigured. It certainly is possible now for local companies to
reach a global audience through the internet, and this should not be underestimated. However, the platforms on which this access takes place are not owned locally (hence the CDCE’s 2016 Operational Guidelines). And as before, once a small local business tries to scale up, it encounters some very powerful corporate entities which vitiate the promise of a creative industries-led economic development process. Plus ca change, one might say.

The changing cultural policy landscape – and the revenge of culture

Yet the cultural policy landscape has changed – and profoundly. One reason for the re-enforced dominance of the global cultural industry corporations and the expansion of ‘platform capitalism’, is that ‘culture’ as a public policy object has been effectively marginalised and hollowed out. The rise of neoliberalism in cultural policy is not simply a growing emphasis on economic benefits or econometric performance indicators – the rule of the ‘bean counters’ as it is commonly described – but involves a distinct form of governance (Davies, 2015). Something more tectonic has been underway. Neoliberalism’s reconfiguration of the state, individual and market is one in which the kind of symbolic governance associated with culture since the late 18th century has diminished in importance. At its core, the neoliberal strategy of government is one based upon a transformation of everyday individual behaviour through tools and metrics, rubrics and techniques centred around market (or market-like) participation and choice. It has little place for the sorts of ideological or symbolic subject formation associated with liberal cultural policy (nation-building and imagined communities; self-governing citizens; ideological state apparatuses, and so on). The neoliberal attack on public culture is not aimed just at the public, but at culture as part of citizen-formation. Neoliberal cultural policy focuses on the proliferation of ‘content’, points of access, and means to pay of the sovereign individual consumer and the aggregation of these individual rational choice-acts represents the market-collective to commercial providers and policy makers.4

In this scenario, the CDCE — focused as it has been on questions that revolve around the market regulation of cultural goods and services — has decreasing traction. Its emphasis on the economic benefits of culture — along with the promotion of entrepreneurship, business development training, value chain development, exports and so on as the primary routes to diversity and inclusion — have further re-enforced the marginalisation of its cultural aspirations. This was not the intention of many of its supporters and promoters — and most continue to hold onto various other notions of a ‘cultural’ value of culture — but where the CDCE agenda gets closer to the centre of decision making, the more it has tended to rely on and re-enforce an economic agenda. Market regulation, which in the 1990s might have implied the state setting limits to monopolies, to rampant commercialisation, to the penetration of international capital into the heart of the culture-media system, now tends to mean how to adapt local cultural production systems to the requirements of the international market (O’Connor, 2019a). The linguistic and conceptual resources for any other kind of challenge to the economic logic of the creative industries agenda is lacking. It is here, we believe, that a key challenge for CDCE lies.

We can see something of this in recent developments, what we might call ‘the revenge of culture’. As we argued above, the CDCE set out to regulate global flows of cultural goods and services in the name of global diversity, and to do so in ways that evoked the theme of development in ways that could benefit the Global South. These global cultural flows remained very much in the hands of the Global North, and, like the discourse of globalisation itself, these flows could easily become associated with the import of ‘Western’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ lifestyles. Indeed, at certain times and in certain places the ‘creative class’ — at

4 A crucial part of neoliberalism was the theory of the sovereignty of the consumer in which every act of purchase was an exercise of everyday democracy, or as Von Mises had it ‘every dollar was a ballot’. (Slobodian, 2018) p. 176
least the younger end of it – became associated with radical political change (e.g. the ‘twitter’ revolution), or with a challenge to the cultural legitimacy of local conservative regimes. These cultural flows were underpinned by a number of very real geo-political/economic flows, backed by military and legal power, reorganising local agriculture, manufacture, telecommunications, retail and logistics, water conservation, education, health as well as media and cultural industry systems. They could alter the very forms and rhythms of everyday life (especially in cities). What many in the global creative class might see as the ‘regressive sameness’ of national cultures (Appadurai, 1990) might also speak of a necessary sense of local identity and solidarity not just against some global ‘difference’ but as a response to the real disruption of local lives. The non-cultural power behind these global flows of capital is mostly not amenable to ‘indigenisation’ (processes that Appadurai, and other post-colonial theorists, saw as giving rise to multiple and de-centred modernities) without some concerted action from the nation-state. Such action can often mobilise progressive local political actors and coalitions taking a calculated stand with that nation state against ‘globalisation’. Which is to say, the nation-state remains a touchstone for forms of local solidarity and control, and this can have powerful cultural dimensions. Wolfgang Streeck has made the point, against some vociferous opposition from a globalising left, that global capitalism’s ‘deteritorialisation’ positions the nation-state as a looked-for source of local control (Streeck, 2017). Perhaps we might also relate this to Karl Polanyi’s notion of the ‘revenge of the social’ (Polanyi, 1957) in a prior period of rampant capitalism before 1945 (and which he believed had been definitively placed behind us). Unfortunately, the revenge of culture is by no means guaranteed to bring a progressive politics.

The rise of localist and nativist authoritarian governments and movements – in Russia, Brazil, the US, India, the Philippines, Turkey, Hungary, Poland and a host of other nations and regions – indicates that the ‘revenge of culture’ can be as anti-democratic as the globalising forces it seeks to resist. Worse, authoritarian states can operate in the register of strong local cultural autonomy even whilst in practice accommodating forces of global (and local) capital (Turoma et al, 2018). The ‘revenge of culture’ concerns those elements that creativity frequently did not include – traditions, rituals, collective sense making (aesthesis). In the face of the multiple challenges that globalised modernisation brings, many conservative groups and states can easily present ‘creativity’ – and the people, lifestyles and political agendas which go with it – as the personification of global forces anathema to local cultures. Conservative or authoritarian states rarely blame the erosion of cultural cohesion and values on those systems of commercial culture that they themselves did so much to bring into being and on which they often rely for legitimacy. The ‘liberal’, ‘westernised’, creative class are stigmatised as the carrier of global discourses of human rights, individual freedoms and other cultural intrusions which find their way into indigenous culture only then to undermine it.

In the face of these developments, those invested in and around the CDCE would have to articulate not only a new language of public value and market regulation but also a version of global cultural flows that does not play so readily into the hands of global corporations and local elites. The two are, of course, related.

**Rip it up and start again?**

Are we saying, then, that we need to ‘rip it up and start again’? That’s a luxury. CDCE has become established as a key international reference point addressed to cultural industries and cultural diversity. What this paper has tried to do is offer some critical engagement with the evolution of the CDCE from its genesis in the late 1990s and through the first decade of its implementation. We have attempted to identify some of its limitations in the contemporary context and to account for its loss of momentum as an international standard bearer for cultural policy. In what follows, we suggest some pointers to a renewal of the language of the CDCE and to some possible ways out of the current cul-de-sac.

First, we can’t go back in search of ‘balance’ between those two aspects of ‘dual’ value which worked so well to set up the CDCE: it is too late. The cultural policy landscape has irrevocably
changed, so that there are no longer any easily accepted links between ‘culture’ and wider public policy goals. The ‘elite’ cultures that received most public funding have become more not less contentious over the last 20 years. It is no longer clear that the actual elites use such culture, or if they do it is a long way from classical ideals of citizenship, improvement, and social distinction. The thrust of post-modernist cultural studies has been to place any form of cultural judgement in a deeply invidious position, indexed to the (personal or class) interests of those seeking to make such judgements. And such postmodern tropes have now been adapted by the ‘alt-right’ and supporters such as Jordan Peterson. Moreover, the structural distinction between culture as art and an anthropological ‘culture as a way of life’, have become hopelessly confused. The latter has been used to evoke a popular or everyday culture against a reified elite culture, but the values of the former have deeply infused the culture of everyday life. The cross-overs between art and popular culture are well-documented (Frith and Horne, 1988; Fisher, 2014) and the ‘creativity’ at play in the creative industries drew extensively on modernist, bohemian and avant-garde tropes.

Indeed, a key premise of the cultural/creative industries was that everyday life was increasingly inflected by aesthetic forms of consumption and notions of self (Featherstone, 1991; Lash and Urry, 1994). In any event, both art and ordinary culture have become pervaded by a commercial logic. Indeed, art’s accelerated commodification, driven by an expanding global art market, has come about less through its reduction to a mass reproduction commodity (Adorno’s and Bourdieu’s fears) but through the artwork coming to exemplify the contemporary commodity itself (Boltanski and Esqueere, 2016; Lutticken, 2016). The experiential, the post-material, the relational – these are the desired qualities of a high-value added contemporary commodity. The market value of an artwork is in inverse relation to its heteronomous functionality; its autonomy is precisely the site of its commodification.

The problems of judgement in culture – how are decisions to be made if not by the market – have multiplied, which is why debates around participation – not just consumption but active involvement in the on-going process of cultural decision making – have become more important. These concerns are there in the CDCE but remain at the rather abstract level of ‘civil society’ involvement. But these questions are not simply about the allocation of public funding for culture.

One of the problems of ‘balance’ is precisely how to make judgements of cultural value across the whole spectrum of the cultural sphere – which includes the media of course. The cultural industries were an attempt to achieve public policy goals for culture in the realm of industry; post the creative industries the rule-of-thumb was public policy goals for art and culture, economic goals for the creative industries. This distorted version of ‘dual value’ has meant that the media and design-led industries have been given over to the task of delivering economic growth. The small-scale creative ecosystem is conceived as local, developmental context for these large-scale industries. Again, the CDCE has been concerned with media diversity — increasingly so in the last few years — but at operational level too often it is the economic development arguments that have dominated. How to reconfigure the cultural/creative industries as a system that produces the ‘social horizon of collective experience’ (Negt and Kluge, 1993) and what kind of cultural industrial policy that might be applied is a crucial question.

But the problem of ‘balance’ is deeper still. It cannot be a question of giving the cultural aspect more autonomy or weight; the very notion of ‘economy’ is now deeply destructive and debilitating in itself. That is, the ‘economic’ with which culture seeks to achieve a balance is no longer simply about the necessary resources required to produce culture, nor the economic benefits that might come along with its cultural outputs. The ‘economic’ is now a kind of ‘second nature’, a set of laws (like those of physics) about which we are told we can do nothing other than seek to serve (Latour, 2015). The economy is now a transcendent realm and talk of balancing culture makes no sense. The route to ‘balance’ now of necessity goes via a thorough-going critique of economic reason, of the very bedrock of neo-classical economics. Culture has been very bad at doing this. There is much to be gained from closer
engagement with the environmental movement, to feminist economic critiques, and to the more fundamental critiques of ‘development’ that include the work of the decades for culture and development in the 1990s (e.g. Esteva and Escobar, 2017; Sachs, 2017). There has also been a lot of valuable work and experience gained from the recent developments in indigenous rights and Buen vivir (even where the claimed contributions from these have been restricted in practice) (e.g. Zamosc, 2017; Lalander, 2017). In the Global North discourses of ‘well-being’ and ‘eudemonia’ have similarly begun to proliferate (Hesmondhalgh, 2017; Banks, 2017), often with a revisiting of the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum and some of the innovations of Human Development. Even within the digital imaginary, Postcapitalism has become a more widespread term, suggesting in various ways that the current capitalist configuration of the economy is holding back the human potential of the digital revolution (Gibson-Graham, 2006; Mason, 2015). And, as noted above, that fraction of the ‘creative class’ that bought into the creativity moment, and which formed much of the epistemic community for the CDCE, has become disaffected. A different kind of cosmopolitan subjectivity, which feels global and surplus at the same time, might be identified across various locales. So far, the CDCE has had very little connection with these groups – and the recent attempts to create more mechanisms for civil society engagement must generate meaningful exchanges and outcomes if the instrument is to have continuing traction.

But to repeat, we do not advocate ripping it up and starting again. Perhaps the failure to get culture into the SDGs might flag up a moment of crisis. Perhaps the CDCE is best off out of such a process, given the extensive and on-going critiques of the development agenda at multiple levels (Sachs, 2017). The CDCE is the only viable global instrument for informing cultural/creative industry policy. We have suggested that it has been fatally intertwined with an ever more destructive economic development agenda, and that it might re-examine some of the clever contrivances and theoretical innovations that allowed the global discourse on ‘culture and development’ to be positioned as a new ‘driver’ of economic development. This re-examination might allow for the CDCE to be reconnected with a more radical set of questions around culture, politics and the economy; more radical because they are facing the sharp consequences of the global expansion of the creative economy, as well the multiple crises of the neoliberal counter-revolution of the 1970s. In so doing it would also have to identify a new kind of global constituency, as the one that drove the creation of the CDCE has now dissipated, lost momentum or has their attention trained on other matters. The CDCE remains crucial because it does act as a crystallisation point for a currently dispersed and demoralised global epistemic community of cultural activists and policy makers. It also acts as a source of cultural policy memory in a world where public policy in this area has the recall capacity of a goldfish. Those working directly from and around the CDCE have a vast knowledge and experience involved in developing cultural and cultural industries policies at local, regional and national levels. As we said above, any renewed cultural policy will have to deal with complex issues of resource allocation, markets, training, ecosystem management, participative governance and international cooperation which barely exist outside of the CDCE community. A period of deep reflection is required, not ‘rip it up and start again’ but reculer pour mieux sauter.

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