INTRODUCTION

Ever since the days of Van Gend en Loos\textsuperscript{1} and Costa,\textsuperscript{2} national attitudes to the unilaterally proclaimed supremacy of EU law have invariably captured a great deal of academic and political attention. Since the mid-1990s\textsuperscript{3} most national constitutional courts have converged to the interpretative orthodoxy of a qualified acceptance of primacy,\textsuperscript{4} couched in a pluralist vision of the relationship between the EU and its Member States.\textsuperscript{5} As things stand at the moment, and especially against the backdrop of Declaration 17 of the Lisbon Treaty, primacy is expected to be the constitutionally recognised conflict resolution norm that national courts shall turn to in almost all circumstances.

The Greek Council of State in its judgment 3470/2011 does not break this pattern, even in the face of a politically sensitive issue. When considering whether an irrebuttable presumption of incompatibility between tenderers for public works contracts and owners or main shareholders of media corporations is permissible under EU law, the Greek court unequivocally accepts the relevant ECJ preliminary ruling in Michaniki\textsuperscript{6} and recalibrates its interpretation of the national constitution accordingly. In doing so, however, the Council of State reads an obligation for consistent interpretation into the constitution itself, thus turning the doctrine of indirect effect into a pragmatic tool for constitutional pluralism in action.

LEGAL BACKGROUND\textsuperscript{7}

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\textsuperscript{1} ECJ 5 February 1963, Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration.

\textsuperscript{2} ECJ 15 July 1964, Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.

\textsuperscript{3} In 1996 the German Constitutional Court set the tone for the qualified acceptance of primacy post-Maastricht with its seminal Brunner decision. See Bundesverfassungsgericht (2. Senat) (Federal Constitutional Court, 2nd Chamber) 12 October 1993, Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and Others v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57.

\textsuperscript{4} Instead of many see D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials (CUP 2010), pp. 194 et seq.

\textsuperscript{5} On constitutional pluralism within a European Union context see generally M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds.), Constitutional pluralism in the European Union and beyond (Hart, 2012).

\textsuperscript{6} ECJ 16 December 2008, Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v. Ethniko Simvolio Radiotileorasis and Ipourgos Epikratias [hereinafter Michaniki].

Legal proceedings before Greek administrative courts started with the applicant, Michaniki, seeking annulment of the certificate of financial independence issued to Erga OSE\(^8\) by the ESR.\(^9\) The competent fourth Chamber of the Greek Council of State, which was first seized, decided to refer the case to the Plenary\(^{10}\) due to the importance of the matter at hand.\(^{11}\) In doing so, however, the chamber was divided both on the correct interpretation of Directive 93/37/EEC\(^{12}\) and, most significantly, on the permissibility\(^{13}\) or usefulness of a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice under the circumstances. The majority opinion reasoned that there is no possibility of conflict between Article 24 of the Directive,\(^{14}\) which enumerates the grounds on which a contractor may be excluded from participation in public works contracts, and Article 14(9) of the Greek Constitution,\(^{15}\) which introduces an irrebuttable presumption of incompatibility between tenderers for public works contracts and owners or main shareholders of media corporations, because there is no regulatory overlap in the material scope of the two provisions. The grounds of exclusion of tenderers provided for in Article 24, in this view, relate solely to instances of ‘professional incompatibility’ [emphasis added],\(^{16}\) while the Greek Constitution creates an incompatibility of a ‘different nature’ for reasons of overriding public interest.\(^{17}\) This would fall outside the scope of Article 24 and remain permissible insofar as neither the Directive nor any other secondary EU law instrument has harmonised public procurement rules in their entirety.

This line of argument, however, was not unanimously accepted. In a thorough and well-considered dissenting opinion, two members of the chamber argued that Article 24 of the Directive appears to lay down an exhaustive list of grounds for the exclusion of tenderers according to the authoritative interpretation of the Court of Justice.\(^{18}\) As a result, the dissenting judges observed that a preliminary reference was necessary in order to clarify whether the Greek system that established an absolute incompatibility on different grounds was, in fact, compatible with EU law. The majority in the chamber responded by pointing out that a preliminary reference is ‘inconceivable’ when the national rule in question is of constitutional nature.\(^{19}\) According to this view, the authority of EU law in the domestic legal

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\(^8\) Erga OSE is a Greek public undertaking and a subsidiary of OSE, the Greek (national) Railway Organisation. It was set up in 1996 with the aim of managing the OSE group’s investment plans.

\(^9\) Greek National Council for Radio and Television.


\(^13\) Under Greek constitutional rules and especially in view of Article 110 of the Greek Constitution.

\(^14\) The Directive was incorporated into the domestic legal order through Law 3021/2002.

\(^15\) The relevant section of Article 14(9) of the Greek Constitution reads as follows: ‘[...] The capacity of owner, partner, major shareholder or managing director of an information media enterprise, is incompatible with the capacity of owner, partner, major shareholder or managing director of an enterprise that undertakes towards the Public Administration or towards a legal entity of the wider public sector to perform works or to supply goods or services. The prohibition of the previous section extends also over all types of intermediary persons, such as spouses, relatives, financially dependent persons or companies. The specific regulations, the sanctions, which may extend to the point of revocation of the license of a radio or television station and to the annulment of the pertinent contract [...] shall be determined by law.’

\(^16\) Greek Council of State (4\(^{th}\) chamber), judgment 3242/2004, supra n. 11, para 18.

\(^17\) Ibid.

\(^18\) ECJ 10 February 1982, Case 76/81, SA Transporoute et travaux v Minister of Public Works; ECJ 17 November 1993, Case C-71/92, Commission v Spain; ECJ 26 September 2000, Case 225/98, Commission v France.

\(^19\) Greek Council of State (4\(^{th}\) chamber), judgment 3242/2004, supra n. 11, para 19.
order stems from Article 28 of the Greek Constitution, which makes it normatively impossible for either primary or secondary European rules to take precedence over national constitutional provisions.

The Plenary of the Council of State followed a different interpretative route to the chamber judgment, which had already attracted a great deal of academic criticism in Greece. The Plenary decided that a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice was essential at least for reasons of procedural economy, as Article 24 of the Directive could not be regarded as acte claire. In doing so, it accepted that the application of national rules to the case at issue would depend on their compatibility with EU law and it dismissed the argument of the chamber that questions of application of national constitutional rules are ipso facto exempt from the preliminary reference procedure. Regarding Article 14(9) of the Greek Constitution the majority in the Plenary took the view that it established an irrebuttable presumption of incompatibility between owners, main shareholders or management executives of media undertakings and tenderers of public contracts.

It is the irrebuttable nature of the presumption, in fact, that renders national law incompatible with EU law according to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice in Michaniki. The Court explained that, in principle, Article 24 of the Directive provides an exhaustive list of grounds for exclusion of tenderers, but it accepted that member states have a certain discretion to adopt additional measures, insofar as these aim at safeguarding the general principles of equal treatment and transparency in public procurement. Although this was found to be the case with the Greek system, the latter failed to satisfy the proportionality principle due to the ‘automatic and absolute nature’ of the presumption of incompatibility that it established.

20 Which forms the constitutional basis of Greece’s accession to the European Union through Law 945/1979 (FEK 170A).
23 ECJ 6 October 1982, Case C-283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health.
25 Three members of the Plenary dissented, siding with the hard line of the majority in the chamber judgment that denied the possibility of a preliminary reference when the potential conflict involves a national constitutional rule, on grounds of Articles 87 para 2 and 93 para 4 of the Greek Constitution (Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3670/2006, para 21).
26 Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3670/2006, para 14. The majority in the Plenary did, however, go on to suggest that the presumption of incompatibility for intermediary persons (relatives of owners, main shareholders etc.) was, in fact, rebuttable both under the Constitution and under its implementing Law 3021/2002.
28 Ibid, para 43.
30 Ibid, para 44.
31 Ibid, para 60.
32 Ibid, paras 61 et seq.
33 Ibid, para 66.
The judgment of the Greek Council of State is effectively divided into three parts. The first part offers a brief overview of the factual background, as well as a summary of the domestic legal proceedings up to and including the decision to send a preliminary reference to the ECJ. The second part consists in a relatively detailed summary of the ECJ preliminary ruling in Michaniki, with translated sections of the reasoning quoted verbatim. In the final part the Greek Court develops its reasoning on the application of relevant national law, taking into account the preliminary ruling and focusing on the correct interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Greek Constitution.

In this latter part of the judgment the Greek Court explains that exclusion from or nullity of the public works contract is not envisaged in Article 14(9) of the Greek Constitution as a compulsory sanction when the incompatibility occurs. In fact, a textual interpretation of the constitutional provision reveals that the ordinary legislature is entrusted with discretion to determine the appropriate sanctions in cases of incompatibility, ‘in view of the developing social and economic circumstances [...] and of the State’s obligations as a Member State of the European Union’. The Court went on to observe that the objective of Article 14(9) is to ensure that the process of awarding public works contracts is free from ‘undue influence’ from bidders that also have financial interests in the media sector. The provision, however, does not aim at curtailing ‘any general influence’ of media groups on the exercise of political power, which is part and parcel of their role in modern democratic societies. Consequently, Article 14(9) allows the ordinary legislature to impose the sanction of exclusion or nullity only when the tenderer satisfying the conditions of incompatibility has ‘also acted in an unlawful or unfair manner during the process in order to be awarded the public contract’.

The Court pointed out that this interpretation of Article 14(9) resonates with the obligation to harmonise national constitutional provisions with rules of EU law, which stems from the interpretative declaration added to Article 28 of the Greek Constitution. Excluding tenderers solely on the basis of the presumption of incompatibility would fall foul of proportionality, which is a general principle common to both EU law and the national legal order. The Court concluded that Law 3021/2002 was unconstitutional as a whole because

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34 Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3470/2011, paras. 1-5.
36 Ibid, paras. 7-10, with the operative part of the judgment in para. 11.
37 In view of the presumption of incompatibility that Article 14 para 9 of the Greek Constitution establishes.
38 Ibid, para 9.
39 Which, in the Court’s view, coincides with the intentions of the constitutional legislator as expressed in the parliamentary discussions during the constitutional amendment proceedings in 2001.
40 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 The interpretative declaration added to Article 28 in the 2001 constitutional amendment reads as follows: ‘Article 28 constitutes the foundation for the participation of Greece in the process of European integration’ [translated by the author from Greek].
44 Article 25 para 1 of the Greek Constitution.
of the general and absolute exclusion of tenderers for whom the presumption of incompatibility applied.46

COMMENTARY

A Greek study in constitutional pluralism: Primacy through consistent interpretation

Michaniki has been criticised for the ‘striking’,47 albeit apparently deliberate failure of the ECJ to acknowledge the constitutional dimension of the matter at hand.49 Finding that the Greek rules in question were in breach of EU law was, in fact, ‘unsurprising’,50 in view of previous case-law.51 Nonetheless, there is no denying that the breach in the present case is more closely connected to, even if not directly stemming from,52 a ‘national constitutional assessment’.53 Leaving aside the technical aspects of the specific legal enquiry for the moment, one cannot but wonder why the Court of Justice did not find it necessary or appropriate to make an explicit reference to the notion of primacy of EU Law,54 reminding its Greek counterpart of the long-established obligation to set aside conflicting national provisions,55 even of constitutional normative calibre.56 The Luxembourg Court’s alleged choice to sweep the constitutional question under the proverbial carpet is further evidenced, according to this view, by the choice not to follow Advocate General Maduro57 in reiterating the Union obligation to respect the constitutional identity of its member states.58

After the recent judgment of the Greek Council of State on the substance of the dispute, however, such attempts to decipher the intentions of the Court of Justice seem to be

45 It should be noted that, while legal proceedings were pending before Greek administrative courts, two new implementing laws of Article 14 (9) entered into force (Law 3310/2005, FEK 30/A, 14-2-2005; Law 3414/2005, FEK 279/A, 10-11-2005), in an attempt to rationalise the relevant normative framework and streamline it with European law. See V. Tzevos, O ‘βασικός μέτοχος’ [The Main Shareholder] (Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 2006) p. 93-182.
46 Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3470/2011, para, 10.
47 Kosta, supra n. 7, p. 509.
49 Ibid, p. 506.
52 This was, in fact, the interpretative route adopted by the Greek Council of State in its judgment 3470/2011.
54 ECJ 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.; ECJ 8 September 2010, Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten GmbH v Bürgermeister der Stadt Bergheim, paras 53 et seq. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, one might also expect a direct reference to Declaration 17 that provides a textual basis for the doctrine of primacy. See Declaration 17 of the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference, O.J. 2008, C 115/344.
57 Opinion A.G. Maduro in Michaniki, supra n. 6, para 31.
58 Articles 4(2) and 6(3) TFEU.
beside the point. In underplaying the (potentially) constitutional root of the problem with the irrebuttable presumption of incompatibility, the Court of Justice invited the national court to assume its rightful role as ‘European court’. The latter was, in fact, able to resolve the conflict through an understanding of the relationship between EU law and national constitutional law that accords relative primacy to the former, while retaining the ultimate supremacy of the Greek constitution. This is, of course, far from ground-breaking, as the Greek Court did little more than follow in the recent footsteps of many of its European counterparts, most notably those of the German Federal Constitutional Court. What makes the Michaniki saga stand out, nonetheless, is the measured, albeit cryptic, way in which both the Court of Justice and the Greek Council of State appear to appreciate that the gap between the theory and practice of constitutional pluralism cannot be bridged without viewing primacy through the lens of indirect effect.

Insofar as the Greek Council of State is concerned, such realisation came slowly and gradually. The initial position was uncompromising and the fourth chamber appeared keen to sever any constitutional dialogue with the Court of Justice before it could even begin, by denying the very possibility of a preliminary reference that could question national constitutional supremacy. The chamber judgment was rightly criticised for completely disregarding the doctrine of primacy, while unnecessarily elevating the conflict with EU law onto a constitutional level. When the matter first came before the Plenary, however, it became evident that leaving the Court of Justice out of the equation was not a viable position. As explained earlier, the majority in the Plenary maintained that Article 14(9) of the Greek Constitution in and of itself establishes an irrebuttable presumption of incompatibility.

Nonetheless, the framing of the issue in the preliminary questions indicates that the Greek Court was, by that point, acutely aware of the need to avoid a direct conflict between the Greek Constitution and EU law. The key, in this regard, was not the irrebuttable nature of the presumption, but whether its very existence could be permitted under - or even despite of - the Directive. In its preliminary reference the Greek Court offered three possibilities for

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66 E. Venizelos, supra n. 21, pp. 98-99.


68 Ibid, para 14.

69 Corresponding to the three preliminary questions. See Michaniki, supra n. 6, para 26.
reconciling the two legal systems. Advocate General Maduro favoured the first solution, agreeing that the list of grounds for exclusion of tenderers under Article 24 of the Directive is not exhaustive, while the Court of Justice opted for the more complex second solution, whereby the exhaustive character of Article 24 extends only to ‘grounds for exclusion based on objective considerations of professional quality’. Additional grounds of exclusion are, therefore, permissible insofar as they are unrelated to the professional qualities of tenderers and are designed to further safeguard equality of treatment and transparency.

The importance of this finding cannot be overstated. Insofar as additional grounds of incompatibility are permissible in principle, the ball is back in the Greek court. Had the ECJ not found room for additional grounds, ‘saving’ the constitutional provision without openly defying primacy would require nothing short of contra legem interpretation by the Council of State, which goes above and beyond the duty of consistent interpretation bestowed upon national courts. The Council of State proved willing and able to employ all the tools in its arsenal in order to find a mutually acceptable compromise. Using a combined textual and historical interpretation of Article 14(9) Greek Constitution, the Greek Court concluded that neither the wording of the provision nor the intentions of the constitutional legislator imply that the sanction of exclusion or nullity can be imposed solely on grounds of the incompatibility. This is further reinforced by a teleological interpretation of both Article 14(9), in view of its express aim to shield public procurement from ‘undue influence’ only, and Article 28 Greek Constitution, in view of the interpretative declaration added to it with the constitutional amendment of 2001 that describes it as ‘the foundation for the participation of Greece in the process of European integration’. This enables the Council of State to read Article 28 as having a dual function. Article 28 is the primary constitutional basis for legal approximation between the Greek and the EU legal order, but it also creates a constitutional obligation to interpret all national law consistently with EU law.

What the Council of State manages to do, therefore, is to effectively ‘transpose’ the doctrine of consistent interpretation into a domestic normative context and translate it into a quasi-autonomous constitutional obligation. From a doctrinal point of view, this entails that conflict between national constitutional rules and EU law is internalised. Competing rules are seen as entrenched in the constitutional legal order, with Article 28 ‘standing for’ the European rule. In this way, ultimate national constitutional supremacy remains intact in principle, with national courts expected to treat conflicts with EU law as ‘infra-constitutional’. Resolving such conflicts, then, is no longer an issue of conflicting

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70 The three possibilities are as follows: a) the list of grounds for exclusion of tenderers under Article 24 of the Directive is not exhaustive; b) the list of grounds is exhaustive, but a national provision such as the one at issue can still be compatible with EU law insofar as it is designed to protect the general principles of equal treatment and transparency in public procurement; c) if neither of the above is the case, Article 24 of the Directive itself is in breach of the general principles of equal treatment and transparency, as it restricts the discretion of national legislatures to establish a higher threshold of protection that may be necessary in a given national context.

71 Opinion of AG Maduro in Michaniki, supra n. 6, para 24.

72 Michaniki, supra n. 6, para 47.

73 Ibid, para 44, where further references to: ECJ 7 December 2000, Case C 94/99 ARGE Gewässerschutz v Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, paragraph 24; ECJ 16 October 2003, Case C-421/01 Traunfellner GmbH v Österreichische Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG (Asfinag), paragraph 29.

74 Incidentally this approach is, in essence, identical to the one developed by the fourth chamber of the Council of State in its much criticised initial judgment 3242/2004.


76 Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3470/2011, para 9.

77 Undue influence, that is, that owners or main shareholders in the media sector may exert specifically with a view to achieving the award of a public works contract.
sovereignies and can be dealt with through the standard methodological approach of systematic interpretation of constitutional provisions.\(^7^8\)

Although this line of reasoning provides an interesting specimen of constitutional pluralism in action, it does raise doubts as to the limits of judicial power to second-guess constitutional arrangements. The Council of State seems to elevate Article 28 of the Greek Constitution into a Grundnorm that should serve as the basic guideline for constitutional interpretation, at least within the scope of EU law. Such a doctrinal position, even if not necessarily implying an undesirable infra-constitutional normative hierarchy,\(^7^9\) does beg the question of how far national courts can push the European integration agenda without rewriting the constitution. In the present case, the Council of State reverses the burden of proof implied by Article 14 of the Constitution, through finding that a tenderer with financial or family links to the media sector can only be excluded if ‘he is proved to have acted unlawfully or unfairly’.\(^8^0\) In theory,\(^8^1\) the Greek Court could have simply read Article 14(9) as allowing the tenderer to challenge the presumption of incompatibility before the deciding authority (ESR) or national courts. Instead, it effectively writes the presumption off altogether and renders the incompatibility utterly meaningless. It is obvious that, if a tenderer acts unlawfully, the ‘stricter’ penalty of exclusion or nullity can be imposed regardless of whether the tenderer has any financial or family links to the media sector. In the light of this unavoidable conclusion, the Council of State’s proclamations of deference to the constitutional legislator scattered throughout the judgment are normatively empty.

**Constitutional conflict and the common principle of proportionality**

The question that remains is whether the Council of State was, indeed, in a position to follow the interpretative route suggested above in view of the preliminary ruling in Michaniki. Once the substantive issue is stripped down to the bone, the legality of the Greek rules under scrutiny boils down to a question of proportionality. In theory, this enables the judicial dialogue between the ECJ and national courts to be carried out on the same normative register, given that proportionality is both a general principle of EU law\(^8^2\) and an integral part of national constitutions,\(^8^3\) including of course the Greek one. The Court of Justice often acknowledges that national courts may be better placed to apply the standard proportionality test\(^8^4\) and gauge whether the particular measure is the least restrictive means of achieving the legitimate public aim it pursues.\(^8^5\) In this case, however, the preliminary ruling seems to preempt a proportionality assessment at the national level, by proclaiming that an automatic and absolute exclusion of a category of tenderers is by default disproportionate.\(^8^6\)

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79 Whereby certain constitutional provisions, such as Article 28, could be seen as being of a higher normative ‘value’ compared to others. For a discussion (and a rebuttal) of this theoretical position in Greek constitutional theory see F. K. Spyropoulos, Η Ερμηνεία του Συντάγματος [The Interpretation of the Constitution] (Sakkoulas 1999), pp. 136-143.
81 On whether this was a realistic possibility see the discussion on proportionality below.
82 ECJ 17 December 1970, Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Solve 1).
84 ECJ 13 November 1990, Case C-331-88 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: Fedesa and others.
85 ECJ 20 May 1976, Case 104-75 Adriaan de Peijper, Managing Director of Centrafarm B.V.
86 Michaniki, supra n. 6, para 66.
This reading of Michaniki enables the Council of State to argue that the irrebuttable presumption could not have been a genuine constitutional choice as it contravenes the principle of proportionality. On the same token, the Greek court did not discuss the possibility that the incompatibility itself was a necessary, suitable and not excessively restrictive means of achieving the desired objective. It is conceivable, at least, that the presumption of incompatibility was, in fact, the least restrictive option available to the legislator at the time, given the Greek socio-political climate during the constitutional amendment of 2001. The point was actually picked up by a member of the minority opinion in the referring judgment to the Court of Justice, who defends the proportionate character of the presumption as the only effective means of shielding public procurement from undue influences. Disappointingly, the plenary of the Council of State in judgment 3470/2011 also fails to consider whether a rebuttable presumption of incompatibility would satisfy the proportionality test.

The silence of the Council of State on the matter is at once illuminating and puzzling. A rebuttable presumption would not be absolute in nature, but it would still exclude a category of tenderers automatically. Although Michaniki is not explicit as to whether both characteristics need to be absent for the measure to pass the threshold of legality, the Council of State is clearly willing to opt for this ‘safer’ option and avoid the possibility of an interpretation that the ECJ might frown upon. Paradoxically, this cautious and conservative approach to the interpretation of EU law is coupled with an adventurous attitude towards the interpretation of the national constitution. What is puzzling, however, is that the objectives of European public procurement law may, in fact, be better served through a rebuttable presumption in the particular national context. The directives on public procurement essentially aim at fostering genuine competition in this field through removing national barriers to freedom of establishment and free movement of services. Such barriers can, of course, go beyond protectionist legislation. They may also take the form of corruption, clientelism or favouritism towards tenderers that can yield considerable political influence through their position in the mass media sector. The incompatibility established by Article 14(9) of the Greek Constitution was devised specifically as a safeguard against such distortions of competition, in the spirit of primary and secondary EU competition law. One cannot but wonder, then, how the Council of State, although better placed than the ECJ to appreciate the idiosyncrasies of the Greek situation, engaged with proportionality only superficially.

Conclusion


[91] For an excellent overview of the relevant arguments that dominated the political and academic discourse in Greece during the and after the 2001 constitutional amendment see Kosta, supra n. 7, pp. 512-514, where further references.
Judgment 3470/2011 of the Greek Council of State is an interesting specimen of how constitutional pluralism can inspire acceptable compromises in ‘hard cases’ of constitutional conflict. Admittedly, there is nothing revolutionary in the qualified acceptance of primacy on the part of the Greek Council of State. Nonetheless, the methodology employed by the Greek court in attempting to reconcile national constitutional supremacy with the effective rewriting of the Greek Constitution should provide food for thought to constitutional and European lawyers across the Union. By internalising indirect effect and treating it as an obligation emanating from the national constitution, the Council of State manages to situate itself within the European judicial hierarchy without openly defying the limits of its democratic mandate under the national constitutional order.

Elegant as this interpretative solution may seem, it does beg the question of whether the substantive legal issue was successfully resolved in this case. Primacy through indirect effect may be an intelligent legal construct to mitigate the tensions created when national judiciaries are seen as sidestepping constitutional arrangements in favour of EU law. However, the constitutional conflict here was not one born out of protectionist or anti-European national instincts, but out of the apparent zeal of the constitutional legislator to align with the fundamental principles of EU public procurement law in the face of substantially idiosyncratic national circumstances. Whether or not the irrebuttable presumption was a step too far, therefore, is a matter dealt with through the lens of proportionality, which is a common denominator in the constitutional traditions of Member States. Although proportionality may very well be the European mechanism par excellence to resolve constitutional conflicts of this sort, the ECJ seems satisfied in this case with a formalistic application of the doctrine that allows for little more than a light-touch assessment of the national context. Despite the good intentions of the Greek court, then, it is difficult to see how the ‘primacy through indirect effect’ paradigm can serve its purpose without a simultaneous show of faith by the ECJ vis-à-vis its national counterparts.

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92 The general idea of proportionality as the most successful normative mechanism of resolving constitutional conflicts is borrowed from David Beatty. See D. M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Press 2005).