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The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on European integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries who work on contemporary history.

The Liaison Committee:
– gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War;
– advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history.
Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions;
– enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;
– promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research:
seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published.

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Being the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum.

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In memoriam Alan S. Milward (1935-2010)

With deep gratitude we bid farewell to Alan Milward. The great British economic and European historian, member of the EU Liaison Committee of Historians since its foundation in 1982, passed away on 28 September 2010.

The work of Alan Milward has enriched historical research in manifold ways. Broad horizons that transcended again and again national standpoints and the self-defined limits of the disciplines, combined with his readiness to pursue an intensive study of sources in the most varied archives and languages and his inclination to develop explicit and sometimes provocative theses, all this made him become a genuine European historian, who has contributed substantially to the understanding of European history since the age of National Socialism.

These qualities have become plain already in his first major work *The German Economy at War* (published in 1965), where Milward pointed out that, already before the outbreak of World War II, the German economy had been a War economy and that German politics therefore were clearly heading for war. At the same time he described the German strategy of warfare as economically sound: *Blitzkriege* against single weaker enemies were meant to supply the German Reich with the resources necessary for each next step of expansion. Studies of the modus operandi of the German occupying forces in France (*The New Order and the French Economy*, 1970) and Norway (*The Fascist Economy in Norway*, 1972) showed how the economic exploitation of the occupied areas was working. National Socialist Germany could thus pursue a consumer friendly policy, which sustained war morale and avoided the collapse of the internal front, a risk, which Hitler was continuously worrying about. Milward provided with that work a key to the understanding of Hitler’s rule over Europe, its genesis and its long duration.

In *War, Economy and Society 1939-1945* (first published in German language in 1978, followed afterwards by an English, Italian and Spanish version) he integrated these former findings into a general account of the economic and societal developments during the time of World War II, which included all countries of the European continent, independently of their position in this war. Implicitly he thus made also aware of the consequences of the war that went beyond the shifts occurring on a purely political level: another disintegration of economic equilibriums, the unproductive destruction of resources and the manifold destabilization of societies. The complex economic and societal realities at the end of the war, hiding behind the sweeping cliché of the *Stunde Null*, the new starting point of a war-torn Europe, have thus been brought to the attention of historians for the first time.

So in his following major work *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51* (1984), Alan Milward was well prepared for investigating on a realistic basis the genesis of the postwar boom and analyzing critically the reconstruction policy of the USA and the European Governments. In the process he reached two fundamental theses, which greatly influenced the discussion on the construction of post-war Eu-
rance: on the one hand he argued that from a purely macro-economic point of view the Marshall plan had been unnecessary. When American help arrived, the European countries were already on the way of recovery; the means of the Marshall plan just accelerated it. On the other hand, Milward showed that often strong national interests were hiding behind the European policy that led to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC): With the Schuman Plan France wanted to back the reconstruction strategy that was based on the control of West-Germany’s resources; Belgium depended upon support for the modernization of its ailing coal-mining industry.

By carrying out fundamental research on the reconstruction of Western Europe, Milward entered the field of European integration history. After having held since 1971 a chair of European Studies at the University of Manchester, he was offered the chair of European contemporary history at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence in 1983. In the year 1986 he was appointed to the chair of economic history at the London School of Economics. He accepted for a second term, from 1996 to 2002, the chair in Florence, which he combined in the end with the position of an “Official Historian” of the British government for research on the British European policy.

During the time of his first residence in Florence, he integrated the findings of his study of the Schuman Plan into a general thesis: In controversy with the neo-functionalist theory of the integration of nation-states and the official mystification of the founding fathers of the European communities, he considered European integration as an instrument that assisted weakened nation-states in coping with problems of national welfare. National governments resorting to this instrument secured in this way their legitimacy towards their citizens and contributed to reassert the principle of the nation-state. Milward called this *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* and triggered off a fierce debate with a book published in 1992 under the same title.

As an Official Historian of the British Government Milward wrote a comprehensive history of the British European policy between 1945 and 1963, and, in his utilization of internal documents, he went far beyond that, what had been possible up to then in other member states of the EU (*The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963*, published in 2002). In the process he extended once again his field of study: In addition to the economic and welfare aspects he also analyzed the geopolitical conditions of a, how he put it, “small, rich country with a medium-sized economy”, which had overstrained itself during war and had at its disposal an “extensive, but poor, colonial empire”. At the same time he reassessed his methodical approach by making a shift in emphasis: Following on from his former studies of the National Socialist politics, he now tried to identify national strategies, which were developed by responsible politicians in engagement with divergent opinions and competing influences. According to his new wording, these national strategies had a greater influence, at least until 1963, on the creation and the development of the European Communities than the European movement.

Milward’s theses have always been open to dispute. Particularly the provocative slogan of the “European Rescue of the Nation-State” was considered by many critics
as too one-sided. It was also frequently misunderstood as a claim for a pure inter-governmental understanding of the European construction. Though he liked resorting to pointed emphasis, Milward nevertheless has always remained a seeker, left unsatisfied by his own answers and looking out for better explanations in dialogue. He has stimulated research through his many suggestions and he for his part also took up in his works proposals of colleagues and students. To a large extent, the credit belongs to him that research on the history of European integration has been developing so dynamically for the last 30 years, not thanks to the striving of historians for personal distinction or delimitation, but thanks to constructive dialogue. With his acute analyses he has also helped the science of history gain attention and credit among the theorists of European integration as well as among the practitioners of European integration policy.

It fits the picture that Alan Milward has been one of the most reliable members of the EU Liaison Committee of Historians. From the creation of the Committee in January 1982 up to his tragic illness in October 2007 he had not missed one single meeting of the group. At international conferences, organized by the Committee, his contributions used to be highly valued; he himself had organized one important conference together with Anne Deighton (*Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957-1963*, published in 1999). He was an extremely congenial and positive colleague, always well informed, with plenty of wise ideas, but modest through and through, endowed with an unflaggingly inquiring mind. We hold him in high esteem and we miss him very much. We are grateful that we may have shared his friendship.

*Wilfried Loth*

*Chairman of the EU Liaison Committee of Historians*
Preface

Ambitions and Reality of the Common Agricultural Policy:
Historical and Interdisciplinary Perspectives

Carine GERMOND/Katja SEIDEL/Mark SPOERER

It is a paradox that since its beginnings in the 1950s the European integration process has been closely tied to agriculture – a sector in decline. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) became the European Community’s (EC) first common policy and it was and still is its most expensive single budget item. Due to the annual price negotiations and the important surpluses that emerged already in the mid-1960s – often caricatured as butter mountains and milk lakes – the CAP was by far the most visible and the most contested EC policy. Conversely, repeated attempts to reform the policy over a period of more than two decades failed to bring about the required corrections.¹

As the CAP has turned around billions of euro scholars have studied the policy and published expertises, analyses and studies since its inception. This engagement led to a number of valuable syntheses by economists, sociologists and political scientists.² Historians have only recently started to become interested in the CAP.

These historians usually do not have a background in agricultural history. It was rather the interest in the European integration process that brought the beginnings of the CAP into the focus of historical research. The importance some member states attributed to a common agricultural policy and the subsequent efforts by the European Commission of designing the policy may explain why studying the CAP became necessary when analysing the early phase of European integration. The ever-increasing expenditure for the CAP in the EC budget was another factor which meant that no serious history of the beginnings of the European integration process could evade agriculture.³ Hence, historical accounts have so far focused on the ‘Pool Vert’, a plan

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1. The authors are grateful to the German Historical Institute Paris for generous financial support of their research.
for a European-wide agricultural market that never materialised, as well as the foundations and the formative years of the CAP.

Research on the beginnings of the CAP takes three perspectives, which are often interrelated. Using original archival material, one strand of the literature takes a mostly state-centric perspective but includes transnationally organised societal players such as farmers’ lobby groups. The issues brought to the fore by this research have opened up other perspectives which have until recently only been taken up by political scientists. In the second perspective the history of the CAP is embedded in the larger issue of the emergence of the European welfare state. Finally, a third perspective has recently emerged with economic historians and agricultural economists analysing the long-term economic effects of the CAP. It is in addressing this long-term perspective of the CAP and in bringing together previously separated approaches and disciplines that this special issue breaks new ground.

The contributions to this volume were first presented in May 2009 at a conference at the German Historical Institute in Paris, convened by the three guest editors. The final versions of the papers were discussed further at a workshop organised at Maastricht University in April 2010. Driven by the puzzle why it took three decades to undertake a major reform of the CAP, the guest editors believe that it is pivotal to analyse this question from an interdisciplinary angle. So far, there has been little dialogue between political scientists, economists and historians on this subject. We


argue that it is vital to look at the temporal as well as the ideational, political and economic dimensions in order to understand the CAP and its (non-)reform.

To understand why the CAP proved to be resistant against any major reform – until the MacSharry reforms of 1992 – requires an in-depth analysis of the main actors. An often neglected driving force behind attempts to reform the CAP were the agricultural trade unions that have so far only been analysed from a national perspective. Rainer Fattmann (social historian) takes a European perspective and shows why the unions were in favour of CAP reform.

The article by Carine Germond (historian) focuses on the formative years of the CAP and explores how the conflicts of interest between France and Germany shaped the setting-up of the policy in the first half of the 1960s. Focusing on three key agricultural negotiations, the article brings to light the power relations within the Franco-German couple and assesses the impact of the intermediation of bilateral disagreements within the consultation framework of the Elysée treaty on European integration. It concludes that France and Germany, albeit for different reasons, contributed to shaping the CAP path protective of the farmers’ interests.

Katja Seidel’s (historian) piece analyses the Commission’s first attempt of reforming the CAP, the so-called Mansholt-Plan of 1968. It sheds light on the preparation of the reform Memorandum, explores the policy and decision-making process leading to its adoption by the Commission, and discusses the different actors that were involved in the process. A far-reaching reform proposal, the Council rejected the Mansholt-Plan as an overall programme but adopted it in parts, thus marking the beginnings of a Community structural policy.

The following article by Robin Allers (historian) approaches the CAP from the perspective of an applicant country – Norway. He shows why the accession negotiations with this Nordic country in 1970-72, whose agricultural sector was quite different from those of the EC6, offered an opportunity to reform the CAP in the early 1970s. While the Community was willing to go a long way to accommodate Norwegian demands regarding a long transition period for this sector, any permanent exemption from the CAP and the Common Fisheries Policy, and thus from the acquis communautaire, was considered impossible as a matter of principle.

Explaining the institutional inertia displayed by the CAP is at the heart of Robert Ackrill (economist) and Adrian Kay’s (political scientist) contribution. By analysing the key CAP reform milestones the article shows that in the case of the CAP policy change has more often been achieved through incremental changes in the policy means while the policy ends have changed less frequently.

Why, after more than 20 years, the CAP finally underwent a major reform is the subject of the contribution by Chris Elton (political scientist). Drawing on new institutionalist concepts, Elton shows that the ideas underpinning the original formulation of the CAP were challenged in the 1980s. The reforms of the CAP, this article argues, were thus also due to a paradigm change setting in in the 1980s.
Mark Spoerer (economic historian) provides an overall assessment of the fiscal and economic costs of not reforming the CAP. He argues that the protectionist effects of the CAP between the 1960s and the 1980s were larger than those of its national predecessors. Moreover, he finds evidence that already the piecemeal reforms of the 1980s reduced the level of protection and support in the EU – that is prior to the MacSharry reforms of 1992.

The last three articles, although looking at the CAP from different perspectives and with different research questions, thus come to similar conclusions: the CAP underwent incremental changes from the mid-1980s onwards. As Spoerer’s piece shows, these incremental changes in policy means should not be underestimated with regard to their economic and trade effects.

The articles in this volume can only capture a fraction of the development of the CAP and the attempts of reforming the policy since the 1960s. With the opening of new archives historians will soon be able to study the CAP up until the reforms of the 1980s and even the MacSharry reforms of 1992. Political scientists, whose works have predominantly focused on the developments since the MacSharry reforms, may also benefit from these new historical insights. Conversely, cross-fertilization with social science research would help historians to theoretically underpin archive-based research. With regard to this evolving research the editors think that it is crucial that historians, economists, political scientists and sociologists take into account each others’ research, if not develop genuinely interdisciplinary studies. The editors hope that the work of this group of scholars and the results of their research published in this thematic issue will contribute to this.
Introduction to the Special Issue on CAP Reform

Fernando GUIRAO

Any scholar dealing with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) today, no matter in which field the scholar is working, has to take into consideration a multiplicity of questions and, above all, the longue durée which is involved in this subject. Any mono-disciplinary approach to the subject or one which isolates decisions made at any specific juncture from their subsequent cumulative impact is bound to fail in the attempt to improve our collective understanding of one of the most complex existing public policies. This complexity is not intrinsic to but imposed on the sector. Agriculture was the third economic sector to receive the particular regulatory attention of policy makers within the European Communities. The first was coal and steel under the aegis of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. The second was trade in industrial commodities through the customs union provisions of the European Economic Community (EEC). After the competition policy central to the common coal and steel market and the commercial policy built into the customs union provisions, the CAP was the third successful attempt at a common policy among the Six. Since its inception though, the CAP has been the most significant among the set of existing common policies in terms of the Community’s budget, administration, legislative and judicial action. And, for these very same reasons, the most contested one.

The amount of resources devoted to the CAP should not be taken as an indication of how essential this policy is for the population of the European Community. The non-agricultural activity, as well as non-agricultural commodity and service trade within the EEC area and between the latter and the rest of the world, have always been, and will continue to be in the future, much more important for the citizens of the member States of the European Community (EC) / Union (EU) than agriculture. The high amounts of collective resources traditionally devoted to the CAP only show that protectionism is expensive and cumbersome to handle.

Despite the fact that agriculture represented, in 2009, 1.7 % of the combined gross added value of the 27 member States of the European Union (EU27) and 5.6 % of EU27 total active population, CAP expenditure amounted to 41.9 % of the EU budget.1 Thus, in spite of agriculture’s limited weight in gross domestic product and

1. Gross value added of agriculture, hunting and fishing, at current basic prices and current exchange rates, as a percentage of all branches, and agriculture as a percentage of total employment in 2009, both values according to the European Commission’s Eurostat National Accounts and employment (LFS adjusted series) data (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables and http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database respectively - last accessed on 8 September 2010). The budget figure is that given under the heading ‘Natural resources’ (including: market related expenditure and direct aids, as well as rural development, environment and fisheries) as reported in EUROPEAN COMMISSION, General Budget
employment terms for the whole of the EU, the CAP still deserves careful attention for, at least, a twofold reason. First of all, the size of overall CAP expenditure and its unequal distribution among designated recipients – agricultural producers in the different EU member States – mean that any future budgetary discussion among EU member States will necessarily involve a very lively debate on the agricultural dimension. Secondly, since the EU is the largest world importer and producer of agricultural goods, its policy on agriculture affects producers and consumers worldwide, not only within the EU itself. This implies that, in spite of the reduced importance of the agricultural sector – no matter how it is measured – the CAP plays a large role in conflicts both within the EU and between the EU and the rest of the world.

The desire to dispel war-time memories of hunger, the widely held idea that price instability had provoked the breakdown of the liberal European regimes in the 1930s, the dollar-import-substitution rationale which was particularly strong after Western Europe’s balance of payments crisis during the first half of 1947, the strategic electoral value of the agrarian community in most West European countries during the reconstruction period, and the capacity of agricultural producers’ organisations to express their immediate interests effectively, led most Western governments, during the late 1940s, to provide emergency support to their domestic producers in order to increase domestic food output. Post-war States resorted to a wide range of procedures among those at their disposal, but the most persuasive one for farmers was, everywhere, State assurance of guaranteed State purchasing of outputs at stable and high prices so that the incomes of agricultural producers and their families would no longer be subject to the variability in market conditions.

The CAP was the instrument which was conceived to further sustain all the six original member States in their common attempts to cover the existing income gap between the agricultural sector and other socio-economic sectors, once all post-war efforts at the modernisation of agricultural production had failed. This explains why the CAP acted through market policies, via price regulation, instead of the alternative system of deficiency payments or direct income support which had been adopted in Britain. The reason for this option was no major secret: in all six founding member States market policies were already central instruments in agricultural policies and the Community adopted this policy pattern not because it was sound but because national policy makers were unwilling to face the social and political consequences of putting agricultural producers under any productivity pressure.²

The problem was, however, to determine at what level agricultural prices should be fixed and who should bear the cost of financing the heavy spending consequent upon the decision to guarantee “a fair standard of living for the agricultural population, particularly by the increasing of the individual earnings of persons engaged in

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agriculture”. The exact level of such a guarantee would become the source of conflict between France and the Federal Republic of Germany during the late 1950s and the whole of the 1960s. Negotiations centred on the target price for soft wheat, the key agricultural price to which most other agricultural prices related, which was finally agreed in December 1964. This was the core of the CAP.

Carine Germond explains how the CAP was, at first, a Franco-German agreement which was then transformed into common policy. In line with previous published research which the reader will find referred to in the footnotes of her contribution, Germond shows how the determining force in the formative phase of the CAP was the French government and its ability to impose temporary agreements on its German counterpart, which were then automatically turned into conquered ground from which to launch new demands for further concessions. The Federal Government resisted the originally-proposed price levels because they were below the high domestic prices then applying in Germany but it changed its position at the end of 1964. Germond explains convincingly the circumstances leading to the change of the German attitude. It is clear that had it been left to the German government no common agricultural policy would have been devised but, at the same time, without the German economic support, the Community’s agricultural policy would not have been cast in line with previous French practices and policy aspirations. At each French assault, the German government firstly resisted, secondly conceded, and finally ended up realising that what they had given in was translated into French as a completely different concession from the one the Federal government had initially thought it was granting. The origins of the CAP are, in fact, rooted in a mixture of blackmailing, bullying, and confusion.

The CAP started as a simple price support policy for cereal, then extended the system of guaranteed prices to dairy products, beef, veal and sugar, and its intervention mechanisms – not all via price support – ended up encompassing the entire agricultural production of the member States by 1970. In this respect, it is interesting to notice that policy makers limited their decisive protective (socially inclusive) action to agricultural producers, but almost completely forgot the farm workers, those who received their income directly from landowners. This is yet another legacy of the reconstruction times when only producers were well organised. Rainer Fattmann shows, in his introductory research included in this volume, how the agricultural workers progressively formed their own unions in order to pass on their particular goals to policy makers at the Community level. The Europeanization of interest groups as trans-national lobbies was thus not limited to producers, but extended to land workers’ unions. Soon, inevitably, agricultural producers and farm workers clashed over the constituent element of the CAP. Although in Italy a certain confusion prevailed for some time, producers and workers were talking a different language. While producers opposed any rationalisation of the CAP in terms of edging agricultural production towards higher productivity levels, farm workers realised that, as was then the case with other workers in industry and services, for their wages to rise they had to linked to increasing productivity.

3. Article 39 (b) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.
Foreign threats have always served the purpose of further consolidating the CAP according to a certain set of interests. This has always been the case with multilateral trade negotiations under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since the Kennedy Round of 1964-67. British EEC membership embodied the danger of interiorising this external pressure, as a Trojan Horse. For this reason, the first enlargement of the European Community was not conceivable until the French government (whether headed by General Charles de Gaulle or Monsieur Georges Pompidou) was completely satisfied with the actual shaping of the Community’s policies and institutional design. A fully operational CAP, for instance, which had come into force in July 1967, was not sufficient to open negotiations with the United Kingdom and other applicants standing in the waiting line. The missing link was a Franco-German agreement for financing the Community (and thus the CAP) on a permanent basis. The French government’s failure to satisfactorily secure the “system of own resources” led to recurrent Community crises, in January 1963, from June 1965 to January 1966, and in November 1967. Only with the definition of the final terms of the Community’s “own resources” in April 1970, which were immediately turned into law (acquis communautaire) of mandatory enforcement, could official negotiations leading to the first enlargement of the European Community be initiated, in June 1970.

The CAP was to be paid for out of the common Community budget. This simply means that the financing for market-intervention devices was guaranteed by the Community budget and thus no longer subject to any ad hoc inter-State bargaining. If the CAP was to be paid for out of the common budget and the EEC budget was made of customs duties collected on imports from third countries at the external borders and agricultural duties on imports from non-Community countries of produce subject to common organisation of the market, the Community’s agricultural protectionism was to be financed, essentially, by main importers of cheap extra-Community food, that is, the United Kingdom which, once it became an EEC member, would be forced to buy more expensive EEC-made produce in preference to cheaper produce from outside the EEC. The United Kingdom, the largest net importer of cheap food at the time, was allowed to become member of the European Community only if it agreed to share the overall costs of the CAP with the Germans, regardless of the low direct material benefits the British would derive in return. If the CAP was to be paid for out of the common budget CAP spending would take it all unless the Community devised additional common policies to be financed on the basis of the common budget. The fact that in 1970 CAP expenditure represented ninety per cent of the Community’s total budget implied simply that commercial and competition policies were relatively inexpensive and that the Six did not find the establishment of common policies in other directions attractive or feasible.

The contribution by Robin M. Allers shows the limits of EC membership applicants’ ability to challenge the Community’s *aquis communautaire*, the "sacred cow" referred to in the title. Allers addresses two different but intrinsically interconnected matters. Firstly, membership applications are very complex multi-level processes, which exceed the bounds of technical dossiers and go deep into political, social and cultural perceptions. Secondly, precisely because membership applications are so complex, the Community’s member States impose upon themselves relatively strict limits and negotiation margins. Notwithstanding this, to my knowledge, no other government having negotiated with the European Community for accession has ever been treated as favourably as the Norwegian. After reading Allers’ contribution, readers will certainly ask themselves what else the Community could have granted to the Norwegian government in order to assure a favourable outcome at the September 1972 referendum. I am afraid that the answer to this question might not lie in the final terms of the accession agreement but in both a deeply-rooted popular *méfiance* towards continental Europe which perhaps has to be explained from a cultural-history perspective, and a widely held idea, even today, that the “Norwegian way of life” can only lose out if entangled in regulatory schemes in which there is no direct Norwegian control over fundamental issues (such as rural and dispersed areas, fisheries, natural resources, welfare levels, and environmental standards). In 1972, the crucial question at stake and under debate was, in my view, how effectively a small population like that of Norway (almost four million at the time) believed that their vital interests could be secured.

The reasons for the continuous tolerance for CAP (mal)practices beyond the 1960s are hard to explain. Obviously, pressure from the producers’ corner continued to exist because they continued to be incapable of sustaining their then levels of income by means of their own productive activity. The system of politically-determined guaranteed prices was designed to shield even the least efficient of the Community’s producers. Despite the fact that farmers were no longer crucial from an electoral point of view, they constituted the ministers’ own personal constituencies. Thus, national ministers of agriculture continued to defend their own constituency at the cost of the rest of their country’s population. In addition, from a broader, national cabinet perspective, agricultural prices as set by the corresponding sectoral ministerial council continued to be the best mechanism to capture part of the State funds that had originally been transferred to the Community. For most governments, the simplest way to present the benefits of Community membership to their electorate was by referring to cash flows entering the country from the Community coffer. The CAP offered the main single budget item from which all governments benefited, without exception. The truth was, however, that for most of these same countries, the total costs incurred by their national consumers and taxpayers surpassed the total benefits received by their food producers. Consumers were not yet sufficiently organised and some degree of patriotic consumption persisted everywhere. The deep (although distant) rural roots

of the Western European industrial societies, the increasing romanticising of life in the countryside by populations heavily hit by urbanisation, environmental deterioration, increasing daily stress, and unemployment during the 1970s and 1980s, must, no doubt, have played a role in explaining the high level of tolerance that, in general, Western European populations were willing to offer to agrarian protectionism.

What responsibility should be attributed to the Commission in designing, building and consolidating a market-intervention system which was irrational from a strictly economic point of view? Previous historical research has shown that consideration of the way institutions operate and their legal (or ruling) frameworks improves our understanding of the Community’s historical evolution. In this case, there is little doubt that the Commission played a fundamental role in setting up the CAP. Consequently, when facing the reform process, many could be tempted to think that the importance of the CAP for the Commission remained constant and unchallenged. It should have guaranteed the Commission, at least in appearance, executive power and huge amounts of funds to be administered from its Brussels headquarters. Furthermore, significantly in a long-term perspective, the CAP would have provided the Commission with an effective discourse, particularly at troubled times, in favour of popular allegiance towards the Community: common policies would serve to improve standards of living. Under these circumstances, any serious questioning of the CAP as it existed would have meant a questioning of the Community and the Commission’s very raison d’être. I wonder whether after the contribution by Katja Seidel in this volume the previous argumentation should be regarded as simplistic and no longer taken into any serious consideration.

The Mansholt Plan of 1968, named after the then Commissioner of Agriculture, Sicco L. Mansholt, was the first of the Commission’s numerous attempts to reform the CAP. A very interesting feature in Seidel’s contribution is the vocabulary and terminology used in the late 1960s around the preparation, drafting and public and private defences of the Commission’s “Memorandum on the reform of agriculture in the European Economic Community” of 21 December 1968. We find the need to rationalise production and reduce overall costs, to cut down prices, to proceed to a radical transformation of agricultural structures, to accommodate production to changes in markets and demand, to produce high quality produce as general incomes rose, to establish modern agricultural enterprises of minimum size and pursue large co-operative arrangements, to set aside arable land, transforming it partly into woodland and partly into recreational areas in which to expand rural tourism as an alternative source of income, to define a rural development policy and use direct aid to farmers to fund education, retraining, and early retirement schemes. Much was indeed needed to put an end to the cynicism involved – in the words of the then Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Raymond Barre, as referred to by Seidel – in funding rich farmers while dumping surpluses on third-world markets. The terms used by pro-reformers in the 1960s do not differ much from those being used in present day de-

bates, which reflects the lack of radical change in CAP matters, despite twenty years of reform.

The Mansholt Plan of 1968 was rejected by short-sighted governments exactly as was the case with the Mansholt Plan of 1950.7 Had the latter been successful, this second plan would have not been necessary. Had the former been successful, the policy nightmare the Community was about to experience would have not entered the story books of European integration. Extreme difficulties started with the “monetary compensatory amounts” or specific “green rates” necessary to offset the effects on domestic prices (and producers’ earnings) of exchange-rate variability among EC currencies after August 1969, well before the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system. They continued with the mounting financing problems in times of recession because of overpriced surpluses, which led to the initiation of tortuous, exasperating and frustrating path towards a never-completed reform of the CAP which caused innumerable conflicts over budgetary contributions. The most significant early episode of the latter phenomenon was a whole decade of British-Community confrontation before the 1984 agreement on the “rebate” or British cheque. No reform was possible because, as the reader is already aware, agricultural protectionism, as forged by the Six, was defended against internal threats as effectively as it was against external ones.

Reformers had hardly been welcomed by the CAP’s main beneficiaries, i.e., agricultural producers and their supportive governments. Notwithstanding this resistance, since 1992 the CAP has embarked on a process of reform. It is true that since the mid-1980s, there was some experimentation with ad hoc supply controls to discourage production such as maximum production quotas or payments in exchange for setting aside arable land. The various attempts at reform tried to reduce supply without lowering the farming income but they generally failed because of the continuous combined effect of technological progress and high guaranteed prices. For this reason, in 1992, when the Community was no longer able to resist initiating some kind of a reform path with visible results, it had to focus on the price mechanism component of the CAP. The MacSharry Reform of May 1992 (the implementation of which took place during the 1993/94-1995/96 harvest years), named after the then Commissioner for Agriculture, Ray MacSharry, not only tried to move support prices towards lower world levels and compensate farmers with direct aid but also to break the link between subsidisation and production. “Decoupled” payments meant that subsidies were to be paid independently from production; the granting of subsidies was to be made conditional on respect for environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards. Sectoral resistance turned the transition towards a deficiency-payment system, as the preferred instrument of policy intervention in agriculture, into a long and expensive journey.

The announced shift to direct payments, price cuts, and drops in storage of food and dumping of food on world markets was countered by other hidden forms of support, with the net result that the “producer support estimate” (PSE) for the EU15 increased from 1995 to 2003 to a level slightly below 40% of total farm receipts, double U.S. levels, rather than decreasing. Admittedly, OECD data on PSE showed that many countries – Japan, Korea, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland – misbehaved even more than the European Union. The singularity of the latter’s misbehaviour is first the size of the sector and thus the world-wide effect of its decisions and secondly, its worldwide ambitions. The 1992 project that held a united Europe to be a powerful contributor to improving the world economy and its regulatory mechanisms proved to be a pipe dream. The prospect of the Eastern Enlargement, which raised the number of farms from seven to thirty million and farmland from 130 to 170 million hectares, finally forced a deeper reform upon the EU. It was in 2003 that the EU definitively changed its manner of supporting the farming sector, with the progressive abandonment of subsidies to production (market regulation devices) in favour of direct aid (income support). It was not only that the intervention changed but also that in part it was re-nationalised, since decoupled payments were to be implemented differently by each member State. It has only been recently, since 2005, that the majority of subsidies have been in the form of decoupled payments.

What were the principal drivers for such a U-turn change in the CAP? There seems to have been a combination of domestic as well as external pressures, the relative significance of which is the subject of much dispute, even among the contributors to this special volume. Contemporary observation of the public features of CAP reform is not sufficient to enable historians to evaluate this process properly. The remaining contributors to this volume, political scientists and economists, come to the historian’s assistance in this task. They all focus on providing a better understanding of the process of change and continuity which characterised CAP reform, like any other substantive public-policy reform. Political scientists have long discussed the nature of the changes under the CAP’s slow but progressive transformation. In essence, the core of the dispute is whether change is induced because the ideological foundations – underlying ideas – had essentially evolved, or whether change has resulted from a cumulative process of incremental adaptation to an evolving environment. The fundamental question here is not the speed of the transformation but where the CAP is heading. Putting it in very simplistic terms, the question would be: Should a reformed CAP be a different policy to address future new challenges, or will the CAP simply continue a process of slow adaptation to a hostile environment until it ultimately...


becomes extinct, like the dinosaurs during the Cretaceous period? Chris Elton emphasizes the ideational side of the reform, Adrian Kay and Robert Ackrill the “incremental hypothesis” and finally, Mark Spoerer the material, “the sober results of the cost side”.

Elton defines a shift of the paradigm defining the CAP beginning with the appointment in 1985 of a new Commission under Jacques Delors and being largely completed with the 1992 reform. A paradigm is defined as the combination of a set of goals carried out by a set of instruments, establishing a logic connection between ends and means. In an exercise which will be much appreciated by cultural historians, Elton examines how ideas progressively materialised in a new policy discourse which served to delegitimize certain old policy instruments and goals, in order to enhance others or launch new ones with the final objective of securing the CAP’s key original values. In Elton’s article ideas, rather than material interests, are the drivers of policymaking. I must confess to the reader that despite my not sharing what the author defines as the key economic, social and cultural values of the original design of the CAP, I do share his main conclusions. Firstly, from 1985 to 1992 the CAP had to be adapted to the paramount objective of securing the Single Market and the European Union. The exact degree of adaptation actually accomplished is a question still subject to some dispute. Secondly, there was a general recognition that expanding agricultural production alone to support comparative incomes and maintain traditional rural life was successfully contested and progressively replaced by the acknowledgement “that rural norms could only be upheld within a multidimensional policy framework”. “In practice”, concludes Elton,

“the paradigm shift became evident in the changing role of farmers, the restructuring of farm income support and the greater recognition of the cultural and environmental value of the countryside and rural areas”.

The farmers’ multifunctional role, as providers of some of the new public goods – affecting the environment, the landscape, animal welfare, and assistance to less developed countries – that modern societies appreciate and are willing to pay for, became the key feature of CAP’s new paradigm.

Kay and Ackrill do not find evidence of any paradigmatic episodes of change in the long process of CAP reform. In fact they are much more interested in searching for a more multi-dimensional account of CAP reforms. According to them, policy changes do not require the previous modification of any paradigm. Change happens as a cumulative process of small transformations. Single fine-tuning events might not threaten any of the fundamentals of the original policy but when placed together with many others and after their collective cumulative effect they may well lead to a significant transformation of the actual policy. The complexity of the CAP – a policy with contradicting policy goals encompassing many different commodities and using a variety of policy instruments – imposes on Kay and Ackrill a complex analytical tool. In analysing CAP reforms, they analyse policy responses with reference to various elements and policy levels: goals, objectives, settings, instrument logic, mechanisms or instruments, and instrument calibration. Following this multi-level me-
thology the authors are able to explain how change and continuity occur simultaneously: while the goal of supporting farming incomes still holds (the element of continuity) it has required first an adaptation of the original instruments transferring resources to producers and subsequently new ones (the elements of change). They also placed the responsibility for change on budget and international-trade constraints. Other concerns, such as those concerning animal welfare and quality and safety in food supply or environmental concerns, Kay and Ackrill argue, seem not to be decisive. In these authors’ view, the CAP in 2010, due to the process of incremental endogenous adjustments that they are able to present in their article, “bears little resemblance indeed to that of the 1970s”.

The provisional conclusions reached by Spoerer are also simple but telling:

“From an economic point of view, the piecemeal reforms of the 1980s seem to have had more impact on the protective effects of the CAP than the MacSharry reform”.

As a matter of fact, after 1992 guaranteed prices were lowered but the volume of direct payments to producers was kept at historically recorded income levels. The net result was that the cost of protection was transferred from consumers to taxpayers. Spoerer clearly sits with the “incremental change” thesis, if limited to the period previous to 1992, and does not see any “material” impact of Elton’s “paradigm change” during the 1990s. In doing so, he provides additional support to the claims of non-governmental organisations, OECD, and most third parties at on-going negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that the European Union did not drive down the level of protection and support to its agricultural producers as announced by the 1992 reform package.10

Spoeer does not present his as the only way of measuring the overall impact of the CAP. Notwithstanding this, I can assure the reader that any future evaluation of the CAP will require taking Spoeer’s methods and information into serious account. All the diplomatic duels that historians are willing to cleverly reconstruct, on the basis of tons of documents hidden in numerous archives and written in different languages, and which ended up in price agreements, generated a bill much higher than the exclusive Community-budget cost, which has been borne by consumers and taxpayers within the common market, as well as by agricultural producers world-wide. The long-term implications of specific agreements should no longer stand outside historians’ analyses. The CAP can no longer be approached in isolation from its long-term and worldwide implications.

Most contributions to the present volume coincide in referring to how pro-marketers’ proposals in agriculture have always met with opposition. The initial establishment of the CAP and the subsequent attempts at its reform pushed the Community almost to the brink of collapse on several occasions. In order to escape obvious

10. Since 1999 Oxfam, which is the leading non-governmental organisation critical of the forms of agricultural protection as carried out in the EU and the United States, has produced a number of reports denouncing the way rich countries’ agricultural subsidies damage livelihoods in the developing world. See a complete list at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/index.html.
difficulties, the EC governments disregarded all the opportunities that they had for face-saving reform. The Kennedy Round (1964-67) was the first one before the CAP became fully operational; the Mansholt Plan of December 1968 the second, once the first properly CAP-policy induced structural-surpluses problem surfaced; and, finally, enlargement negotiations (1970-72) once the exchange-rate fluctuations in the autumn of 1969 had anticipated the high costs involved in the setting of common prices in different currencies whose relative prices were no longer stably fixed. Subsequently, the episodes of the British rebate from 1974 to 1984; the obvious excesses in the dairy sector which led to the first production quotas to be imposed in 1984 and the introduction of a certain degree of financial co-responsibility for output surpluses; the single market programme which came into force in July 1987 and implied the first overall revision of the 1957 foundational Community agreements; the unpleasant episodes of “mad cows” and “sick chickens” of the late 1980s; the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht in February 1992 which meant a proper re-foundation of the European Community; the MacSharry Reform of May 1992 which could have implied the re-foundation of the CAP; the GATT Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations (1986-94); the constant pressure towards reform exercised by the European Commission since 1968 and the permanent disputes among EC member States over the common budget since the system of “own resources” was established in early 1970; or the first WTO multilateral trade negotiations, the Doha Round, since November 2001, at the time when the divergence of the economies of Europe and of the European Union with respect to the most dynamic Western and Eastern world economies was increasing most rapidly, have provided the “moments of truth” for policy makers to proceed to the complete redefinition of a common policy that has, simply, never delivered.\(^{11}\)

Today’s CAP claims to be a “new CAP”. According to the Commission,

“[T]he aim [of the new CAP] is for farmers to produce what the market wants, become more competitive and give better value for consumers and taxpayers, while at the same time benefiting from stable incomes”.\(^{12}\)

Despite the fact that consumers and taxpayers have been put at the forefront of the new policy’s objectives, no change can yet be perceived. The forthcoming budgetary negotiations among the 27 member States of the EU may continue to lower the overall share in the EU budget of total expenditure on agriculture (market related expenditure and direct aids, as well as rural development, environment, and fisheries). Notwithstanding this, I am afraid that EU taxpayers will not see their burden alleviated as national and regional budgets are taking increasing care of supplementary measures of support in favour of food producers. In addition, as of today, the CAP is completely

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powerless to impose any price discipline given the decreasing relevance of production costs in final consumer prices. Under the on-going reform prices for consumers of agricultural and food products have actually increased while farmers complain loudly about the constant erosion of the prices they receive at production level. In Barcelona, for instance, prices vary up to 609% from food producers to final consumption. Apparently the only beneficiaries of the reform so far seem to be the intermediaries along the value chain: the food-processing industry, distribution channels, supermarket chains, and retailers, but definitely not the consumer.

Let me conclude this introduction by underlining that the contributions to the present volume illustrate the benefits but also the limits of inter- and multi-disciplinary approaches. Frequently an inter-disciplinary study consists of a series of research pieces, each one of them perfectly mono-disciplinary, set next to one another. This time, at least, mono-disciplinary studies are in dialogue with each other and take each other’s main arguments into account. The final drafts submitted, peer-reviewed and approved for publication were written by taking into consideration the rest of the contributions to this volume. In this sense they all differ greatly from their first drafts. As my co-editors explain in their preface, two different workshops took place to guarantee inter-disciplinary discussions, in Paris and Maastricht in May 2009 and April 2010 respectively. Notwithstanding this cross-disciplinary dialogue, the truth is that some historian might find analytical, methodological and terminological complexities in some of the contributions to the present volume. For this reason, it is clear that without the JEIH Editorial Board’s firm commitment towards the promotion of inter-disciplinary approaches some of these articles would have not been published in a journal addressed mainly to historians.

It is exceptional to find a scholar who is equally competent as a historian, economist and political-scientist, all at once. I have known only one: Alan Steele Milward, who sadly left us recently, on the 28th of September 2010. May these words serve as public recognition of the uniqueness of his scholarly talent and this volume, the 32nd of the series, as the JEIH Editorial Board members’ collective homage to one of its founding members.

13. Prices registered during the week of 11 to 17 October 2010 for first category beef; see Gobierno de España, Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio, Secretaría de Estado de Comercio Exterior; for prices at origin see Precios origen destino en alimentación (http://www.comercio.mtyc.es/comercio/bienvenida/NovedadesLicitaciones/Precios+Origen+Destino/pagPreciosOrigenDestino-AlimentacionCambio.htm) and for price oscillations among cities in Spain and at retail level within the same city see data from the Observatorio de Precios (http://www.observatorioprecios.es/ObservaPrecios/Inicio.htm?in=0). Both data bases accessed on 31 October 2010.
Agriculture is one of the economic sectors where the process of European integration has been carried furthest. Mentioned in very broad terms in the Rome Treaty of 1957 establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was gradually set up during the 1960s. In January 1962, the Common Market countries agreed that the CAP would be organized around the core principles of market unity, Community preference and financial solidarity. In the first half of the 1960s, common prices for each product were adopted and common market organisations created. The common agricultural market became fully implemented in the summer of 1967.

The creation of a common agricultural policy posed specific problems for France and Germany. As one of the principal producers and exporters of agricultural products, France was the state which had most to gain from the formation of a common agricultural market. In the early 1960s, agriculture remained a key economic sector. About 20 percent of the active population worked in that sector and agriculture represented around 10 percent of France’s gross domestic product. Hence, when Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, agricultural integration became “a \textit{sine qua non} condition of France’s participation to the EEC”.

Thanks to the CAP, de Gaulle hoped to adapt France’s industrial and agricultural sectors to the new conditions of trade and competition in the Common Market, to solve overproduction and social problems in agriculture, and finally to maintain France’s economic parity with Germany – a prerequisite to safeguard its senior position in the Franco-German tandem. For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), a major agricultural importer, the CAP threatened to disrupt the German traditional commercial links with third countries, where the FRG bought agricultural commodities and traded manufactured goods. Thus, the German dilemma was to continue buying agricultural commodities to its traditional clients while guaranteeing a certain preference to its EEC partners in its own market. The CAP also represented a challenge for the highly subsidized and relatively inefficient German agriculture. In addition, although farmers encompassed...
only 10 percent of the German active population in the 1960s, they were well organized and represented a non-negligible electoral support for the Christian Unions.5

Focusing upon France and Germany in an analysis of a Community policy makes more sense in state-centric than in supranational explanations of European integration,6 which represent the two main strands in the historiography of European agricultural integration. Whereas historical studies on the CAP have traditionally adopted a state-centric approach in line with the then predominant realist paradigm of European integration history,7 recent studies on the CAP have stressed the supranational (and transnational) dimensions of the policy.8 While acknowledging the new insights brought by these works, this paper argues that examining the issue through a Franco-German lens can lead to a greater understanding of constitutive bargains and history making decisions in certain key policy areas such as agriculture. Yet, historical studies on the role of France and Germany in agricultural integration are either older9 or focus primarily on the 1950s.10 Some of the most recent historical studies have touched upon Franco-German relations but only provide a partial picture of bilateral interactions.11 This article intends to address this gap in the literature by providing a detailed account of Franco-German relations and their influence on the setting-up of the CAP based on French and German archives.

This article analyses to what extent the two countries’ disagreements on the economic (and institutional) developments of the EEC were responsible for the repeated crisis that broke out on agricultural matters during the first half of the 1960s, and assesses the effects of Franco-German institutionalized bilateralism on European in-

The first section examines Franco-German negotiations in the run-up to the two crucial agricultural marathons of December 1963 and December 1964. The second section investigates the role of France and Germany in the outbreak and the resolution of the empty chair crisis of 1965-1966.

The Agricultural Marathons of December 1963 and 1964

When Ludwig Erhard succeeded to Konrad Adenauer as German Chancellor in October 1963, he inherited the agricultural problem. In January 1962, the Six had laid the foundation for the organization and financing of the CAP through the establishment of a mechanism of price support and the creation of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGFF), and set precise deadlines for the gradual completion of the policy. Yet, the discussions on the British membership application to the EEC and the breakdown of the negotiations following Charles de Gaulle’s press conference on 14 January 1963 had delayed the adoption of various market regulations. The synchronization plan presented by the German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder in April 1963 allowed the Six to resume work in the Community and set out the timely conclusion of agricultural negotiations before the end of the year.

The new Federal government was all but supportive of the CAP, however. Erhard, the former and long-time Minister for Economics, was a vocal opponent of the CAP, whose protectionism and artificial support of non-viable agricultural farms he criticized. Moreover, two other key members of the first Erhard Cabinet, Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder and Agricultural Minister Werner Schwarz, were also outright critics of the Community’s flagship policy.

The coming to power of Erhard coincided with the publication of new proposals by the European Agriculture Commissioner Sicco Mansholt for the harmonization of cereal prices “in einem Zuge” and the establishment of common cereal prices at an intermediate level between the French and the German prices – i.e. between the lowest and the highest price in the EEC – on 4 November 1963. The French and German reactions to the Commission’s proposals stressed their differing interests.

The French considered that the Commission’s proposals were “un élément de consolidation et d’accélération de l’intégration dans le domaine agricole”. Yet, the terms of the harmonization of prices were problematic. Paris feared that a price

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14. The SGCI anticipated that the Mansholt proposition could raise price levels in France, lead to an excessive use of compensatory subsidies and to a destabilization of the financial regulation. AD/MAE, DECE, vol.1150, Note a/s политике agricole commune/propositions “Mansholt” relatives aux prix des céréales, Paris, 12.11.1963.
level that would be set too high would have inflationary effects in France and would jeopardize the stabilization plan adopted months earlier.\footnote{A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle. La France redevient la France, vol.II, Fayard, Paris, 1997, p. 249.} The reception of the Mansholt plan was more critical in Germany. Despite considerable income compensations for the member states (Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) that were to lower their prices as a consequence of the common price, the proposals were problematic because they would accelerate the completion of the common agricultural market without guaranteeing parallel progress in other areas. Bonn wanted to synchronize integration in the agricultural and industrial sectors, however. Since the German agreement to a common price was, according to the director of the political service at the German Foreign Ministry, “der letzte Trumpf, den wir in der EWG noch ausspielen können, wir sollten unsere Zustimmung gegen Zusicherung in anderen Bereiche der Integration abkaufen lassen”.\footnote{PAAA, B 2, Bd.128, Jansen betr. Vorschläge der Kommission zur Getreidepreisannäherung, Bonn, 04.11.1963.} In addition, these assurances should be significant enough to compensate the important domestic difficulties that an increase of the German cereal price would create.\footnote{PAAA, B 130, Bd.2102, Aufzeichnung betr. Vorschläge der EWG-Kommission zur Angleichung der Getreidepreise/hier: Frage einer Kompensation für deutsche Zugeständnisse, Bonn, 07.11.1963.} The Auswärtiges Amt also rightly expected that the DBV would reject the Mansholt proposals. Hence, Erhard affirmed in his governmental declaration that he would be “eine faire Sachwalter der Interessen der deutschen Landwirtschaft”,\footnote{K. HOHMANN, G. SCHRÖDER (Hrsg.) Ludwig Erhard. Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten, Reden und Schriften, Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1988, p.844.} and defend the German cereal price level because he did not want to jeopardize the farming vote. At the same time, the German Chancellor suggested to Paris that he was not completely hostile to a compromise. Accordingly, the French objective was
d’inspirer confiance au nouveau chancelier quant à notre volonté de faire aboutir la négociation tarifaire [within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)], dès l’instant où une solution équitable et équilibrée fondée sur une réciprocité réelle des sacrifices consentis de part et d’autre aura été dégagée dans le domaine industriel et agricole”.\footnote{AD/MAE, PD-OW, vol.2, Note a/s des négociations au GATT/Position allemande, 16.11.1963.} The French strategy vis-à-vis the Erhard administration thus consisted of two main elements. First, Paris intended to make progress in the new round of GATT negotiations conditional on progress in the CAP.\footnote{For an extensive account of the interplay between the Kennedy Round and the CAP, see L. COPPOLARO, Trade and Politics Across the Atlantic: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States of America in the GATT Negotiations of the Kennedy Round (1962-1967), European University Institute, Florence (unpublished Phd), 2006; N.P. LUDLOW, The Emergence of a Commercial Heavy-Weight: the Kennedy Round Negotiations and the European Community of the 1960s, in: Diplomacy and statecraft, 2(2007), pp.351-368.} The negotiations were scheduled to open in May 1964 and Bonn was particularly interested in their successful outcome. Second, the French government did not want to give the Germans an excuse to reject the
outstanding market regulations on rice, beef and dairy products to be adopted in December 1963.\footnote{AD/MAE, DECE, vol.1150, Note a/s négociabilité des politiques agricoles, n°271/Ce, 15.10.1963.}

During Erhard’s first visit to Paris as Chancellor on 22-23 November 1963, agricultural issues stood at the top of the agenda. Pressed by the French to take a stand on the impending agricultural negotiations in Brussels, Erhard guaranteed that Germany would not pursue “une tactique de retardement”.\footnote{H. OSTERHELD, *Außenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard. Ein dokumentarischer Bericht*, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1992, p.42.} Yet, on 9 December the German delegation rejected the adoption of the regulation on rice and Schwarz even suggested that an agreement on dairy products was unlikely to happen since it would suppress subsidies for the German farmers. To Paris, this meant that Germany would not fulfil its agricultural commitments.

As a result, the French diplomacy put pressures on the Federal authorities. The French Ambassador in Bonn, Roland de Margerie, informed Erhard that Paris would delay the Kennedy Round of GATT talks until Germany fulfilled its obligations in the agricultural sector.\footnote{AN, SAGI/161, Entretien élargi entre Georges Pompidou et le chancelier Erhard le 21.11.1963, 30 novembre 1963.} Yet, Erhard’s hands were tied as he had promised the leader of the DBV, Edmund Rehwinkel, that he would not agree to any lowering of the income of farmers. Erhard’s change of heart had two main motives. First, the Chancellor understood that the harmonization of cereal prices was necessary for the establishment of a common agricultural market, but he could not ignore the electoral consequences that a lowering of the German farmers’ income would have for his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which was dependent on the farmers’ vote for the 1965 elections. As a result, the Federal government hoped to delay a decision on the cereal price for as long as possible. The second reason related to Erhard’s lack of political leadership and his difficulties in reconciling the divergent positions of the Ministries of Agriculture and Economics, both of which had close links with influential professional organizations — the DBV for the Ministry of Agriculture\footnote{See P. ACKERMANN, *Der deutsche Bauernverband im politischen Kräftepiel der Bundesrepublik. Die Einflussnahme des DBV auf die Entscheidung über den europäischen Getreidepreis*, J.C. Mohr, Tübingen, 1970, pp.77-79; E. FREISBERG, *Die grüne Hürde Europas. Deutsche Agrarpolitik und EWG*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln/Opladen, 1965, pp.45-47.} and the Bund der deutschen Industrie (BDI) for the Ministry of Economics. Finally, there also existed divergent viewpoints inside the Auswärtiges Amt: Schröder rejected any compromise with France whereas State Secretary Rolf Lahr advocated in favour of negotiations with Paris in hopes of obtaining French concessions in the industrial sector and the Kennedy Round.\footnote{H. KRONE, *Tagebücher*, Bd.2.: 1961-1966, Droste, Düsseldorf, 2003, pp.252, 255.}

Margerie soon realized that his warnings were not taken seriously. As a result, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville called on the German Ambas-
sador, Manfred Klaiber, to whom he made clear that “un report voire un échec des présentes négociations agricoles de Bruxelles aurait les plus graves conséquences pour le Marché commun”. The threat that France would block or even leave the Community was not explicitly stated but it was an implicit warning. Either hypothesis was in fact closely examined by Olivier Wormser, head of the economic and financial service at the Quai d’Orsay. Wormser suggested three possible options in the event that Germany would not fulfil its commitments in December: first, France could distance itself from the Community, either by leaving its seat empty – Wormser appears here as a spiritual father of the empty chair policy –; second, France could refuse to pay its national contribution to the Community’s budget, or third, block all decisions related to the GATT negotiations. The latter was especially problematic for Bonn as the EEC was in the process of defining a common position. In any event, Wormser’s note was characteristic of the growing exasperation of Paris towards Bonn and its increasing fear regarding the outcome of the Brussels negotiations.

A few days before the opening of the agricultural negotiations, the French diplomats delivered a series of warnings. De Gaulle encouraged Alain Peyrefitte, the government’s spokesperson, to announce that the French Cabinet could meet before Christmas if “un événement impose d’en faire un, en particulier l’impossibilité d’aboutir à Bruxelles”. Wormser informed Commission President Walter Hallstein that France would distance itself from the Common Market if the outstanding regulations were not approved by the end of the year. The Auswärtiges Amt also registered alarming rumours, orchestrated by the Elysée, according to which France had an alternative policy should negotiations fail. On 21 December 1963, Margerie met Erhard again while de Gaulle received the German ambassador. Both made clear that the non-adoption of the agricultural regulations by the end of 1963 would severely alter Franco-German relations and cast doubt over France’s participation in the Common Market. De Gaulle reckoned that Erhard

“ne veut peut-être pas commencer sa carrière de chancelier comme celui qui aura cassé à la fois le Marché commun et le traité franco-allemand”.

His political gamble succeeded. Erhard eventually agreed on 23 December to the three outstanding regulations because he was afraid that the French President carry out his threats and was anxious to preserve Germany’s political credibility.

France and Germany were both satisfied with the December agreement, which relied on a bilateral compromise. By consenting to the regulations on beef, rice and

milk – thus the creation of markets organisations for these products –, Bonn no longer stood in the way of the further organization of the common agricultural market. At the same time, Paris had also given satisfaction to Germany by agreeing on the first elements of a common position of the EEC at the GATT negotiations. Yet, the previous bilateral tensions had left scars. Erhard, with his constant hesitations and u-turns, was no longer a credible partner. The French government was increasingly annoyed with “la persistante mauvaise volonté des Allemands” and “un désir inavoué de retarder tout progrès agricole jusqu’à la fin de la négociation [du GATT]”. Moreover, the December agreement, which Raymond Aron labelled “une victoire de l’idée européenne”, was only possible because the Six had postponed the most difficult decision on the harmonization of cereal prices to the first half of 1964.

The definition of common cereal prices was of central importance to the completion of the CAP. Not only did it determine the level of many other agricultural commodities, but France, which produced about half of the EEC’s cereals, had a particular interest in this issue. It also raised a specific Franco-German quandary as the price set by the Mansholt plan of November 1963 meant an increase of the French cereal price of about 9 percent and a lowering of the German one of 11 to 15 percent with substantial economic and political consequences in both countries. As a result, Paris and Bonn agreed to postpone the application of Mansholt’s proposals on the harmonization of the cereal price, although for different reasons.

The German government was still reluctant to adopt a common price, which would significantly cut German farm incomes, a politically highly sensitive issue for both the federal authorities and the DBV. Consequently, the Erhard administration played for time. Postponing a decision on a common price until the end of the second transition period – that is after 1966 – presented the additional advantage that the decisions would no longer be taken by unanimity but by qualified majority in the Council of Ministers. The Federal government could then argue that it had defended the interests of German farmers but was forced to accept the majority’s viewpoint. This strategy was economically less attractive – a common price adopted by qualified majority would be lower than one adopted by unanimity – but it was politically advantageous since the German government could get over the 1965 elections without alienating the farmers’ votes.

Paris was also interested in a postponement of the Mansholt proposal. The price level suggested by Mansholt was deemed too high and threatened to jeopardize the effectiveness of the stabilization plan. Paris also expected that a high price level would

encourage overproduction in the EEC with problematic consequences for the Community budget.\textsuperscript{38} Moreover, an adjournment was considered a tactical trump, since “une décision rapide […] nous priverait vis-à-vis des Allemands d’un moyen de pression utile pour freiner leur appétit de compromis dans la partie industrielle de la négociation au GATT”.\textsuperscript{39}

Conversely, a postponement presented two major drawbacks: first, common prices were an essential prerequisite for the completion of the CAP and, second, General de Gaulle wanted the realization of the policy to be achieved before the replacement of unanimity votes by qualified majority voting, which could give CAP-critic EC partners the possibility to revise the policy.

The following months reinforced Bonn’s opposition to the Mansholt plan. On 19 March, during a debate on agricultural issues, Erhard, pressured by the DBV, was forced to reiterate his commitment to defend the German cereal price level for 1965 and 1966.\textsuperscript{40} The resolution adopted at the end of the debate, which rejected the fixing of a common cereal price before 1970 and linked it with a series of prerequisites, meant that Schwarz would continue his obstruction policy in Brussels.

Neither the French nor the Germans were keen on seeing the Mansholt plan adopted as it had been presented in November 1963. The Six thus asked the Commission to submit a revised version. In May, de Gaulle declared to a surprised Lahr that he understood Germany’s difficulties regarding the common cereal price and repeated that “la France n’est pas pressée”.\textsuperscript{41} The postponement of the GATT negotiations accounted for France’s sudden benevolence. The delay made a decision on the cereal price less urgent as France could still use these negotiations to pressure Bonn on the CAP.

Given the objections raised by the Mansholt plan, the Six had asked the Commission to revise its proposals. These revised proposals were presented on 12 May 1964. The entry into effect of common cereal prices was postponed to two years but the price range was not significantly altered. However, the Six still could not agree and decided to postpone a decision until 15 December 1964. The Federal government had won a six-month reprieve but it was increasingly isolated in the Community. In fact, the revisions made by the Commission alleviated some of the French reservations. For the French Agriculture Ministry, it had become advantageous to “modérer nos réserves à l’égard du plan Mansholt, sinon même à le soutenir plus nettement que

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\textsuperscript{39} Archives nationales [AN], 5AG1/54, note a/s de l’audience des dirigeants agricoles et des problèmes actuels de l’agriculture française (no date).


\textsuperscript{41} AD/MAE, PD-OW, vol.3, Note a/s conversations Wormser-Lahr, 27.05.1964; AAPD, 1964 II, p.1161.
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The Franco-German Tandem and the Making of the CAP, 1963-1966

42. AD/MAE, DECE, vol.1151, Note a/s du plan Mansholt (no date).
43. PAAA, B 20, Bd.890, Aufzeichnung betr. St.S.-Besprechung am 23.06. 1964. Bilaterale Getreidepreisverhandlungen Deutschland-Frankreich, Bonn, 22.06.1964.
47. A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle ..., II, op.cit., pp.268-269.
charged Konrad Adenauer with negotiating a Franco-German compromise during his visit to Paris in early November 1964 that made Bonn’s agreement to a common cereal price conditional on the enforcement of the price on 1 July 1967 and on hefty compensations for the German farmers’ loss of income. Yet, Paris wanted more than promises as it had come to distrust Bonn.

A month before the beginning of the agricultural negotiations, Erhard decided to bypass Schwarz and started negotiating with Rehwinkel the conditions of the DBV’s agreement to a common cereal price. On 24 November, the Federal Cabinet accepted the Mansholt plan under certain conditions such as the adjournment of the coming into effect of cereal prices by July 1967 and substantial financial compensations, and made it conditional on a package deal including the internal development of the Community (customs union and political union) and external relations (Kennedy Round). Yet, the French rejected such a “solution globale”. They could not accept that the German government, which they thought was largely responsible for the deadlock, could raise conditions. Hence, the Erhard-Rehwinkel arrangement did not solve any of the Franco-German disagreements.

As a result, the French and German delegations clashed in Brussels when negotiations opened on 14 December. Mansholt was charged with the task of drawing a “take-it-or-leave-it” package deal that, however, did not change the price fixed for cereals. In the early morning of 15 December, after a long “nuit du blé”, the Six finally agreed on a common cereal price, set at 425 DM/t and effective on 1 July 1967. Despite stark critics from the DBV, the agreement was confirmed by the Federal Cabinet the following day. This “grand succès” was only possible because Erhard intended it to be a decisive element for the continuation of European integration and for the improvement of relations between Paris and Bonn. Despite the high level of the common cereal price and the foreseeable financial implications of the compensations allocated to Germany, satisfaction predominated on both sides of the Rhine. If, according to Couve de Murville, the significance of the agreement was “économiquement discutable”, its importance was essentially political. But de Gaulle was already targeting his next objective:

51. AD/MAE, PD-OW vol. 3, Note a/s entretien Wormser-Lahr du 27.11 et 27.11.1964.
58. M. COUVE DE MURVILLE, op.cit., p.325.
“il y a des règlements à faire sur différent produits et surtout le règlement financier; tant qu’il n’est pas adopté, rien de définitif n’est obtenu”. 59

**The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965**

With the decisions of December 1963 and 1964, common market organizations for the most important commodities were established. There remained, however, the question of the financing of the CAP. In January 1962, the Six had decided that national contributions would fund the CAP budget until 1 July 1966. From January 1970 on, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) would be funded by the Community’s own resources. The Six had asked the Commission to draw up proposals for the financing of the CAP from July 1966 to January 1970. Furthermore, the expiration date of the CAP’s financing regulation coincided with a change in the voting system in the Council of Ministers where qualified majority voting would replace unanimity.

Hallstein presented the Commission’s proposals on 23 March 1965 in Strasbourg. They triggered one of the most serious crises of the Community as the future financing of the CAP was linked with an important increase of the Commission’s and of the European Parliament’s competencies. 60 In fact, the Commission proposed to replace the national contributions of the member states by own resources of the Community that would be funded from the export duties and import levies. Accordingly, the budgetary powers of the European Parliament would have to be increased in order to control these new resources. For the financing of the CAP, the Commission suggested a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, through to 30 June 1967, the CAP would continue to be financed by national contributions according to an allocation key that would be identical for France and Germany. The second stage would start on 1 July 1967 with the coming into effect of the common agricultural market.

The French reaction to the Commission’s proposals was largely negative. President de Gaulle could not accept the strengthening of supranational institutions such as the Commission, “cet aréopage technocratique, apatride and irresponsable”, 61 to the detriment of intergovernmental bodies such as the Council of Ministers. De Gaulle rejected the Commission’s proposal on two grounds. First, the proposals had been

presented to the European Parliament without prior consultation of the member states. Second, and most importantly, he opposed the strengthening of supranationality through the increase of the competencies of the European Parliament and the Commission. De Gaulle’s reservations towards the Commission were not new, but tensions between the two former allies had increased since the beginning of 1965.62 For the Commission, 1965 seemed favourable to launch an ambitious initiative given the French presidential elections at the end of the year, and de Gaulle’s interest to complete the CAP. Hallstein thus believed he could force the French President to accept sovereignty transfers to the European institutions in exchange of the completion of the CAP.63 In Bonn, the Federal authorities faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they supported the Commission’s proposals to strengthen the European Parliament, which they had repeatedly promoted. On the other hand, Bonn was not ready to agree to a five-year financial regulation and lose all means to pressure France on the Kennedy Round. The resolution adopted by the Bundestag on 30 June 1965 mirrored this ambivalent attitude.64

Despite different viewpoints on the content of the Commission’s proposals, Paris and Bonn shared some criticisms. For instance, both capitals disagreed with the allocation to the Community of both levies and duties which would exceed by far what the Community needed to finance the CAP. Moreover, they disagreed with the subsequent strengthening of the competencies of the Commission, which would de facto administer the Community. Paris thus remained relatively confident in the outcome of the June negotiations on the financial regulation, not least because de Gaulle was once again linking his participation in a summit meeting in Venice to discuss the proposals presented by Erhard in the autumn of 1964 on the deepening of political cooperation to the adoption of the financial regulation. He expected Erhard would once again submit to his conditions. Surprisingly, even the substitution of unanimity by qualified majority voting did not seem to worry Oliver Wormser.65

But de Gaulle underestimated the increasing frustration of the Federal government. The agricultural marathons of 1963 and 1964 had been a “politisches Trauma” that hardened positions in Bonn. Erhard was no longer willing to give in to Gaullist blackmailing and rejected de Gaulle’s “reciprocal prerequisites”, namely the

French promise of supporting the re-launch of political talks between the Six in exchange for a German agreement on the CAP. The German Chancellor did not understand that these prerequisites were not simply a means of pressure but represented in de Gaulle’s mind essential conditions for the political and economic unity of Europe. This rejects Moravcsik’s argument according to which commercial and not political interests were a paramount motivation for French policy in Europe. Erhard thought that his repeated compliance with the French agricultural demands had given him the right to expect “un appui aux désirs allemands, particulièrement dans le domaine de la coopération politique”. As a result, Erhard was no longer willing to make unilateral concessions to Paris. The French leader thus misjudged the Federal Chancellor’s determination to wait

“mit unserer Zustimmung zu der in erster Linie im französischen Interesse liegenden Agrarpolitik […], bis wir die französische Zustimmung der Zollunion […] erreicht haben”.

The hardening of the German position also coincided with the re-degradation of bilateral relations after the summit meeting of Rambouillet of January 1965 as a result of de Gaulle’s cancellation of his participation in the Venice summit.

On 24 May 1965, a double meeting took place in Bonn between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the officials in charge of Economic Affairs to discuss the Commission’s proposal. Despite a good atmosphere, the French and German positions remained divergent. Hence, the summit meeting of 11-12 June was the last possibility to forge a bilateral compromise on the financial regulation of the CAP and the questions raised by the Commission’s proposals.

At the end of the first day of the Franco-German summit, both the French and the German delegations were optimistic. Indeed, a compromise seemed possible on the budgetary powers of the European Parliament. Although the application period of the financial regulation, the coverage of expenditures and the allocation of costs in the Community remained problematic, Paris and Bonn were willing to find an arrangement. Nevertheless, in the closing session on 12 June, Chancellor Erhard read a statement written by Lahr, which called into question the rapprochement of positions achieved before. In particular, the document stressed that the financial regulation to be adopted at the end of June would be valid one year instead of five years, whereas this was a prerequisite for Paris. The French and German experts convened...

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67. A. MORAVCSIK, op.cit.
69. PAAA, B 150, Bd.52, Aufzeichnung betr. Darstellung und Analyse der derzeitigen französischen Außenpolitik und Vorschläge für unser Verhalten, 11.05.1965.
70. AN, 5AG1/162, Entretien des ministres des affaires étrangères à Bonn, 11.06.1965; AAPD, 1965 II, pp.1012-1016; AD/MAE, DECE, vol.1111, AN, 5AG1/162, Conversation entre MM. le Premier ministre, le ministre des Finances et le secrétaire d’État à l’économie de la République fédérale, 12.06.1965; AAPD, 1965 II, Dok.245, pp.1026-1027.
71. AN, 5AG1/162, Séance plénière du 11.06.1965, PAAA, B 20, Bd.1320, Aufzeichnung des BMF betr. französischer Vorschlag vorgebracht bei den deutschen-französischen Besprechungen am 11./12.06.1965, 14.06.1965.
for a working lunch but could not reach an agreement. By refusing to negotiate a five-year regulation, German diplomats hoped to persuade Paris to continue the discussions after 30 June while French diplomats insisted that a five-year regulation should be adopted no later than 30 June. On the plane back to France, the French President did not hide his frustration at the German refusal.72

The failure of the Franco-German discussions accounted for the change of strategy of the French delegation at the Council of Minister of 13-15 June 1965. Couve de Murville made a proposal combining firmness on the principles (the adoption of the financial regulation by June 30) but flexibility on certain negotiable points (for instance the gradual allocation of levies and duties to the Community budget, and the allocation key). With these proposals, Paris made a gesture towards those partners, including Germany, who were afraid of paying the bigger share to the Community budget. A Franco-German rapprochement was reached on two main points. The Germans accepted to shelve the question of the strengthening of the European Parliament, and they also seemingly agreed to a five-year financial regulation.73 The visit of Lahr confirmed the bilateral rapprochement.74 Back in Bonn, Lahr stated that “eine erfreuliche Übereinstimmung in wesentlichen Punkten”75 had been reached. Wormser even believed “on avait décidé à Bonn de s’aligner sur les positions françaises telles qu’elles ont été définies à Bruxelles le 15 juin”.76 Yet, this last-minute Franco-German compromise did not prevent the outbreak of the empty chair crisis.

Based on the Wormser-Lahr agreement, the French required the adoption of a five-year financial regulation during the Council of Minister of 29-30 June 1965. Negotiations were hard-fought but not necessarily condemned to failure. However, Schröder’s unexpected change of mind on the competencies of the European Parliament, along with the dilatory attitude of the Italians and the Dutch, forced Couve de Murville, who held the rotating Presidency of the Council, to interrupt the talks. The following day, Alain Peyrefitte announced that France would draw “les conséquences économiques, politiques et juridiques de la situation”.77 On July 6, the French permanent representative was called back to Paris. France’s seat in Brussels was empty. The lack of genuine Franco-German cooperation and the failure of the Elysée Treaty were thus one of the causes of the crisis.

Manfred Klaiber, German Ambassador to Paris, recommended

“alles zu unterlassen, was den Konflikt zwischen Frankreich und den übrigen Fünf zu einem deutsch-französischen Konflikt potenzieren könnte”.78

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72. A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle ..., II, op.cit., p.287.
73. AD/MAE, PD-OW, vol.3, Note a/s des affaires européennes (no date).
77. AD/MAE, PD-OW, vol.36, TGD a/s rupture des négociations de Bruxelles sur le financement de la PAC, 05.07.1965; PAAA, B 150, Bd.36, Klaiber to the AA betr. französische Ministerratssitzung, 01.07.1965.
78. PAAA, B 150, Bd. 56, Klaiber to the AA betr. Brüsseler Krise, 02.07.1965.
Given the pressure from French farmers for the completion of the CAP and the presidential elections at the end of 1965, he expected that France would soon be back in Brussels. Despite his warnings, hard-liners like Schröder and Lahr prevailed in Bonn. They believed that the crisis was not the result of a Franco-German disagreement and that a solution had to be negotiated on a Community not a bilateral level. Hence, they refused to use the consultation framework of the Elysée treaty.

In Paris, French diplomats were very critical of Germany’s attitude during the Council of Ministers meeting. Paris felt that Bonn had not only betrayed what had been agreed bilaterally, but had tried to “exploiter la situation pour faire accepter un certain nombre de demandes reconventionnelles”. The German attitude during the negotiations had increased Paris’ mistrust towards Bonn. Therefore, the argument of Bonn’s “treachery” was not just rhetorical or simply designed to legitimate the French boycott, but it also stressed the profound damages left by the constant degradation of bilateral relations since 1964 and by prior bilateral conflicts over agriculture. Moreover, previous German manoeuvres to delay the completion of the CAP had convinced de Gaulle that the transition from unanimity to qualified majority voting would jeopardize the completion of the CAP as it would give CAP sceptical partners, including Germany, an opportunity to revise it. Margerie evoked “la crise psychologique provoquée par l’attitude dilatoire de la République fédérale vis-à-vis du Marché commun”. This also explains France’s insistence on the adoption of a financial regulation valid for five years, from 1966 to 1970, and not until 1967 as proposed by the Commission, since in 1967 a new regulation would have to be adopted by qualified majority votes. Moreover, the proposals of the Commission gave Paris a unique opportunity to get rid of “toute cette mafia de supranationalistes”, to “liquider” majority voting and to return to an organized cooperation among the Six that would “coiffer Bruxelles”, as de Gaulle bluntly exposed in his press conference on 9 September. Hence, the empty chair crisis was also a political gamble designed to broker a compromise

“qui prenne en compte le plus largement possible les intérêts agricoles français et les conceptions politiques du général de Gaulle”.

None of de Gaulle’s objectives were acceptable to the Germans, however. Even though Bonn did not rule out adjustments to the functions and role of the Commission – as long as its independence was not altered – it refused any formal revision of the Rome Treaty. Nevertheless there existed some room for negotiation since de Gaulle’s objective was “une formule resituant le droit de veto pour une question essentielle” rather than a formal revision of the treaties. Accordingly, “le gouvernement

79. AN, 5AG1/48, Projet de TG pour Bonn, 06.07.1965.
83. C. de GAULLE, Discours et Messages, op.cit., p.378.
84. PAAA, B 150, Bd. 56, Klaiber to the AA betr. Krise der EWG, 14.07.1965.
85. A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle ..., II, op.cit., p.299.
fédéral ne se refuserait pas pour sa part à un accord interprétatif sur l’application de la règle de la majorité”,
that could be elaborated on a bilateral basis. Paris’ and Bonn’s interests were thus similar. But, Erhard, who had just been re-elected and was forming his new Cabinet, did not want to rush things and left the German delegation without instructions.

During the summer, the consultation framework of the Elysée treaty was not used because Bonn did not want to enter into bilateral talks with Paris and risk to undermine the cohesion of the Five in their opposition to de Gaulle. It was essential for Erhard and the Auswärtiges Amt “dem General als Gemeinschaft gegenüberzutreten”
Playing the card of the Community solidarity was important for the Federal government because it did not want to be looking for a “Sonderarrangement” with France. Avoiding bilateral talks presented the additional advantage that Bonn would not be forced to make unilateral concessions to Paris as in 1963 and 1964. In September 1965, General de Gaulle denounced the “cordiale virtualité” that the treaty had become.

Franco-German consultations finally resumed in the autumn. A meeting between Couve de Murville and Schröder in mid-October did not reach any conclusions. The Auswärtiges Amt did not want “se laisser entraîner dans une procédure de pourparlers bilatéraux” that might sideline the other Community partners. Yet, with the looming French presidential election, Couve de Murville was in favour of a rapid solution to the crisis. In fact, the runoff from the first ballot on 5 December mirrored the growing unpopularity of the empty chair policy among the French electorate. For de Gaulle, it had also become necessary to show that France did not intend to “torpiller” the Common Market. The day after de Gaulle’s re-election, a Council of Ministers confirmed France’s participation in a meeting of the six Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg on 17-18 January 1966. The French had not abandoned any of their demands, but they were ready to negotiate the conditions of their return to Brussels. The end of the empty chair policy, furthermore, appeared essential given the French president’s project of withdrawing France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Quai d’Orsay was well aware that this would open another front with the EEC partners and that Paris could not deal with two crises at the same time. Therefore, de

89. C. de GAULLE, Discours et Messages, op.cit., p.385.
Gaulle hoped he could forge a compromise with Bonn on France’s return to Brussels to which the other partners would rally.\textsuperscript{92}

On 17 January during the first meeting of the Six in Luxembourg, Couve de Murville presented France’s conditions for her return to Brussels. The French Minister spoke in favour of a political arrangement, without a revision of the treaties, and explained that voting rules should make sure that a Member State would not be outvoted. But Schröder refused any formula by which the Six would renounce the use of majority voting. Moreover, the so-called Decalogue, which detailed the suggestions for improving the behaviour of the Commission, and the schedule presented by the French delegation also met with strong reservations from the Five. The French were particularly irritated by the systematic opposition of Schröder to their proposals during the two-day Luxembourg meeting. The conflict between France and the Five had taken a bilateral character. The FRG was not willing to compromise because it feared that the postponement of negotiations to a second conference would enable Paris to trick its partners, i.e. to let multilateral negotiations fail in order to seek a bilateral compromise during the Franco-German summit meeting that was to take place shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{93} German worries were not completely unfounded since de Gaulle had made some overtures to German Ambassador Klaiber after the first Luxembourg conference.\textsuperscript{94}

On 28-29 January 1966, the Six met again in Luxembourg in order to redefine relations between the Council and the Commission and to find a solution to the question of majority voting. If an agreement was rapidly made on the first issue, negotiations threatened to stumble over the majority voting issue. Schröder then suggested a solution that was similar to what he had already proposed to Couve de Murville in November. According to this formula, the Six would try to reach a consensus when vital interests of a member state would be at stake. Schröder also added that it would apply to all market regulations that should have been adopted by unanimity before 31 December 1965. Indeed, Bonn wanted to avoid being outvoted on sensitive issues such as agriculture and wished to retain its vote as a means of pressure against Paris.\textsuperscript{95} As Wormser summed up, a compromise was possible but it rested on an ambiguity.\textsuperscript{96} The so-called “Luxembourg Compromise”\textsuperscript{97} was eventually a compromise between the French and the German proposals. It limited the practical use of majority voting but it did not rule it out completely. On a Franco-German level, the second Luxembourg conference ended on a positive note that eased tensions. The

\textsuperscript{93} PAAA, B 150, Bd.67, Lahr betr. Krise der EG/FS von der Botschaft Brüssel, 13.01.1966.
\textsuperscript{94} PAAA, B 150, Bd.67, Klaiber to the AA betr. Gespräch mit de Gaulle, Paris, 2.01.1965. See also A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle ..., III, op.cit., p.182.
\textsuperscript{96} AD/MAE, DECE, vol.1113, Note a/s entretien avec Lahr, 29.01.1966.
\textsuperscript{97} For an historical assessment of the Luxembourg compromise, see J.-M. PALEYRET, H. WALLE LACE, P. WINAND (eds.), op.cit.
debates were devoid of the acrimony that had characterized the first conference. The Germans did not present themselves as a spokesman for the Five and adopted a more conciliatory attitude that facilitated contacts between the French and German delegations and mutual concessions.

With the Luxembourg Compromise, the Community could return to work. However, Franco-German disagreements had all but disappeared. France still required the swift adoption of the financial regulation before any other outstanding decisions. Yet, according to Schröder, the realization of the Common agricultural market was only acceptable if parallel progress was achieved in the customs union and the Kennedy Round. Bonn thus intended to

“lier le règlement financier, l’avancement des négociations multilatérales du GATT, l’adoption de décisions au moins de principe sur les prix communs, l’achèvement du marché commun agricole, et l’entrée en vigueur simultanée de la libre circulation des produits agricoles et industriels”.

After several bilateral talks in the course of March and April 1966,99 Paris and Bonn sketched a compromise that took into account the four elements of the German package deal and balanced mutual concessions. This compromise, which was drafted in the middle of the NATO crisis, dispelled remaining French doubts about “la volonté des Allemands de faire le Marché commun”.100 Couve de Murville was even surprised that France’s withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance’s military organization did not affect, to a greater extent, the agricultural negotiations.101

On 11 May 1966, the Six agreed on a financial regulation for the period 1965-1970 and set the date and conditions in which agricultural and industrial products could be traded freely in the Community. This agreement was largely based on the Franco-German compromise. In July, a second accord set the final market regulations and completed the agricultural structure of the Community.

Conclusion

The making of the CAP was characterized by a series of Franco-German and Community crises, which outlined the power relations within the Franco-German tandem, and the role of Franco-German institutionalized bilateralism in the European Community.

98. AD/MAE, EU 1961-1970, s/s RFA, Seydoux to MAE a/s négociations communautaires, 23.03.1966; PAAA, B 2, Bd.130, Lahr betr. Agrarfinanzierung, (no date).
100. AD/MAE, DECE, vol.1114, Note a/s du Conseil des 4 et 5 avril 1966 (no date).
Franco-German agricultural conflicts in the first half of the 1960s exemplify how the De Gaulle-Erhard relationship worked. Two main factors account for the successful conclusion of the agricultural marathons of December 1963 and 1964: the successful arbitration of Franco-German disagreements within the institutional framework of the Elysée Treaty that provided a forum, in which Paris and Bonn learned to negotiate and reach compromises, on the one hand, and the successful bullying tactics used by Paris on the other hand. Facing French pressures in December 1963 and an ultimatum in December 1964, Erhard submitted to Paris’ bullying tactics and twice agreed to do the necessary financial and political concessions because he did not want to strain relations with Paris to the point of rupture and to isolate Germany.102 Franco-German consultation failed in 1965 because mistrust and a hard-line policy jammed the bilateral negotiation mechanisms. Erhard’s attempts to delay negotiations, his constant hesitations between conciliation and confrontation discredited him quickly in the eyes of de Gaulle. The Federal authorities had also become suspicious of the French intentions. They believed Paris wanted to delay or bring to failure the Kennedy Round, and resented the use of the GATT negotiations as a means of pressure to force them into agreeing to regulations that were unfavourable to the German agriculture. The Gaullist strategy of “shock and awe” also strengthened the proponents of a firm attitude towards Paris and encouraged Bonn to defend its own economic and political interests more firmly even at the expense of a bilateral crisis. Hence, the empty chair crisis was a “Vertrauenskrise”103 of the Franco-German couple; but it was also part of a German attempt to re-equilibrate power relations between Paris and Bonn much earlier than usually acknowledged in the literature.

Furthermore, this article sheds light on how both countries were able to shape Community bargains in the agricultural area and hence, more generally, on the role of “special” relationships in European integration. Both countries played a preponderant role in the making of the CAP. The numerous crises that broke out on agricultural matters were not entirely bilateral but had each a strong Franco-German dimension. Accordingly, the Community accords that were struck in the first half of the 1960s all relied to a variable extent on Franco-German compromises. This thus seems to confirm the engine role of both countries that can act either as a motor of European integration when both countries come to an agreement as in December 1963 and 1964, or slow it down, when they cannot find a middle ground as in 1965. Moreover, despite divergent viewpoints on the CAP, France and Germany contributed to shaping the original policy path protective of the farmers’ interests. By pushing for the creation of the first Community common policy, an apparent paradox given de Gaulle’s opposition to any strengthening of supranationality, France was influential in Europeanizing the existing patterns of national protectionism and creating a type of ‘welfare policy’ for rich European farmers.104 In addition, the high price levels agreed in 1963 and 1964 were necessary to prevent any substantial loss of income.

103. AAPD, 1965 II, Dok.201, p.805.
104. On the welfare paradigm, see A.C.L. KNUDSEN, Farmers on Welfare …, op.cit.
for German farmers, but resulted in the emergence of surpluses in various sectors, such as milk and cereals. Overproduction created an increasing burden for the EC and national budgets and, in the following decade, threatened to develop into a budgetary crisis. From the late 1960s, the Commission repeatedly tried to reform the policy and correct its increasingly obvious flaws. Finally, the Franco-German confrontations that characterized the first half of the 1960s did not end with the realization of the common agricultural market in 1967. They remained and still are a recurrent feature of almost every agricultural negotiation.

105. On the reform attempts by the Commission, see the contributions of Katja Seidel, Adrian Kay/Robert Ackrill and Christopher Elton in this issue.
Die europäische Gewerkschaftsbewegung und die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik (1958-1972): Annäherung an einen neuen Forschungsgegenstand

Rainer FATTMANN

Voraussetzungen:
Die Gewerkschaften und das Projekt der europäischen Integration

Schon die Anfänge der Europäischen Bewegung waren durch die aktive Mitarbeit zahlreicher Führungspersönlichkeiten der Freien wie auch der Christlichen Gewerkschaften der sechs Staaten gekennzeichnet, die später die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS) und dann die Europäische Wirtschafts- sowie die Europäische Atomgemeinschaft bilden sollten.1 Viele ihrer Repräsentanten hatten bereits das European Recovery Program und im Zusammenhang damit die Vision einer wirtschaftlichen und politischen Einigung Europas in aller Regel uneingeschränkt, ja nicht selten mit Begeisterung begrüßt. Ein zunehmend integriertes Europa erschien ihnen nicht nur als Garant für einen dauerhaften Frieden in Europa und damit als notwendige Antwort auf die Verheerungen der beiden Weltkriege; die Einigung Europas galt darüber hinaus – jedenfalls in den Augen zentraler Führungspersönlichkeiten sowohl der sozialistisch-sozialdemokratisch geprägten, „freien“ Gewerkschaftsbewegung wie auch ihres christlich orientierten Pendants – als wichtige, wenn nicht unabdingbare Voraussetzung für den wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau Europas und das wirtschaftliche und soziale Wohlergehen der Arbeitschaft der europäischen Staaten.2

Als 1955 Jean Monnet sein „Aktionskomitee für die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ aus der Taufe hob, zählten zu den 35 Gründungsmitgliedern des Komitees daher keineswegs zufällig nicht weniger als 14 Gewerkschaftsvertreter, die in ihren Heimatorganisationen ausschließlich hohe und höchste Posten bekleideten. Auch die Finanzierung dieses über jahrzehntelang überaus einflussreichen proeuropäischen

‚think tanks’ wurde im Übrigen in erheblichem Maße von den Gewerkschaften, nicht zuletzt vom Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) geleistet.³

Vor diesem Hintergrund hatten die Spitzenfunktionäre der Christlichen wie diejenigen der Freien Gewerkschaften bereits den von Robert Schuman lancierten Plan einer supranationalen Montanunion nahezu einhellig begrüßt. Begünstigend für die gewerkschaftlichen Forderungen und ihre anhaltende Unterstützung dieses Projektes wirkte sich aus, dass in einer Zeit, in der der Ausgang des politischen und ökonomischen Konkurrenkampfes zwischen Ost und West noch keineswegs entschieden war, seitens der westeuropäischen Regierungen, egal welcher Couleur, zunächst eine grundsätzlich hohe Bereitschaft bestand, die Arbeiterschaft und ihre (nichtkommunistischen) Repräsentanten in die Politik der europäischen Integration möglichst weitgehend einzubinden.⁴


Gewerkschaftliche Interessenvertretung innerhalb der EWG


8. Im eigentlichen Sinne war das EGS das administrative Organ der „Freien Gewerkschaften innerhalb der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (IBFG)“; allerdings hat es sich eingebürgert, auch diese Gewerkschaftsföderation selbst als EGS zu bezeichnen (engl.: ETUS; franz.: SSE).
die Europäische Organisation des Internationalen Bundes der Christlichen-Gewerk-
chaften (OE-CISL).  

Dabei ist die in weiten Teilen der Literatur vorherrschende Einschätzung des EGS, also des Zusammenschlusses der sechs IBFG-Gewerkschaftsdachverbände, als schwach und wenig handlungsfähig, außerordentlich problematisch, ja, als unzutref-
fend anzusehen. Trotz des bis zur Umwandlung des EGS in den Europäischen Bund
der Freien Gewerkschaften (EBFG) im Jahr 1967 praktizierten Einstimmigkeitsprin-
zips scheint das EGS zu allen wichtigen politischen Fragen, wohl in erster Linie auf
Grund der gewerkschaftsübergreifenden proeuropäischen Grundorientierung, zu de-
zidierten und klaren Stellungnahmen gefunden zu haben. Dabei hatten sowohl die
christlich wie auch die sozialistisch orientierten Gewerkschaften der sechs Mitglieds-
staaten in allen relevanten europapolitischen Fragen bereits in den 1950er Jahren an
einem Strang gezogen. Seit den frühen 1960er Jahren stimmten die Generalsekretäre
des EGS und der OE-CISC – Harm G. Butter und Jan Kulakowski – die europapoliti-
schen Forderungen und Initiativen ihrer Organisationen immer enger aufeinander
ab, so dass die nichtkommunistischen Gewerkschaftsföderationen gegenüber den
europäischen Institutionen mit einer Stimme zu sprechen in der Lage waren. Von der
in weiten Teilen der Literatur beschworenen vermeintlichen „ideologische Zerris-
senheit“ der europäischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung in den späten 1950er und
1960er Jahren – sieht man von den kommunistischen Organisationen einmal ab –
kan somit hinsichtlich ihrer Europapolitik keine Rede sein. 

10. Organisation européenne de la CISC. Kern der Gruppe waren die christlichen Gewerkschaften Bel-
giens (CIC), der Niederlande (NKV und CNV) und die französische Confédération française des

11. Zum Forschungsstand (in Deutschland) vgl. S. REMEKE, Gewerkschaften als Motoren der europä-
ischen Integration: Der DGB und das soziale Europa von den Römischen Verträgen bis zu den
Pariser Gipfelkonferenzen (1957-1974), in: Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen,
2009, S.63-86. 

12. Das betraf übergeordnete europapolitische Probleme wie die Frage der Erweiterung der Gemein-
schaften, die ablehnende Haltung gegenüber der Obstruktionspolitik de Gaulles 1965/66, die For-
derung nach erweiterten Rechten der europäischen Institutionen, insbesondere des Wirtschafts- und
Sozialausschusses (WSA) und des Europäischen Parlamentes, dessen Direktwahl immer wieder
gefordert wurde, aber auch konkrete gewerkschaftspolitische Forderungen, wie diejenige nach einer
gemeinschaftlichen europäischen Sozialpolitik und einer Angleichung der sozialen Standards im
Europa der Sechs „nach oben“. 

13. Dieses gerade in der deutschsprachigen Gewerkschaftsgeschichtsschreibung seit Jahrzehnten wie-
derholte (Fehl-)Urteil findet sich zuletzt noch in der Übersichtsarbeit über die Bestände der
europäischen Gewerkschaftsverbände, die im Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung in Bonn verwahrt werden; vgl. W. BUSCHAK, Der Europäische Gewerkschaftsbund und
die Europäischen Gewerkschaftsverbände, in: Europäische Gewerkschaftsorganisationen. Bestän-
de Im Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie und in der Bibliothek der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2. erw.

PASTURE, Trade unions as a transnational movement in the European space 1955-1965. Falling
short of ambitions?, in: W. KAISER , P. STARIE (Hrsg.), Transnational European Union, Rout-
Die Herausbildung der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik und die Gründung der „Europäischen Föderation der Agrargewerkschaften“


¹⁶ Vertreten waren: Centrale Générale, Belgien, Gewerkschaft Gartenbau, Land- und Forstwirtschaft (GGLF), Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Fédération Nationale Force Ouvrière de l’Agriculture et Secteurs Connexes (Frankreich); Federazione Italiana Colonii Mezzadri e Coltivatori Diretti (FEDERCOLTIVATR - CISL), Federazione Italiana Salariati Braccianti Agricoli e Maestranze Specializzate (FISBA), Unione Italiana Mezzadri e Coltivatori Diretti (UMEC), Unione Italiana Salariati Braccianti Agricoli (UISBA), alle vier: Italien; sowie der Agrarische en Voedingsbedrijfsbond (AVB), Niederlande (in Luxemburg existierte keine Agrargewerkschaft).


Das Verhältnis der EFA zu den europäischen Institutionen


Insgesamt entsprach die Arbeit der Kommission in den ersten Jahren nach Gründung der EWG nicht nur den Vorstellungen der Gewerkschaften, sondern selbst denjenigen der sozialistischen bzw. sozialdemokratischen Parteien nicht nur in den Grundlinien, sondern häufig bis in die Details. Insbesondere ihr im Oktober 1962 vorgelegtes Aktionsprogramm für die zweite Stufe der wirtschaftlichen Integration in der sogenannten Übergangszeit (bis zur Herausbildung eines gemeinsamen Marktes), fand die ungeteilte Zustimmung sowohl der christlichen wie auch der freien Gewerkschaften und selbst der den letzteren eng verbundenen sozialistischen und sozialdemokratischen Parteien.23

Vor diesem Hintergrund unterstützten die nichtkommunistischen Gewerkschaften der Sechs die Kommission bis in die 1970er Jahre (und im Grundsatz sicherlich auch darüber hinaus) in allen Punkten von politischer Bedeutung und stärkten ihr auch in der Öffentlichkeit den Rücken.24 Auch die Agrargewerkschaften stellten sich stets hinter sie, beispielsweise im Jahr 1965 durch einen Aufruf an die französische Regierung, ihre Politik des „leeren Stuhles“ zu beenden und zur Mitarbeit innerhalb der europäischen Institutionen zurückzukehren.25


brachten Markttordnungen für die verschiedenen landwirtschaftlichen Produkte be-
riet.28

Obwohl dem Europäischen Parlament (EP) wie auch dem Wirtschafts- und So-
zialausschuss (WSA) zumindest in den ersten beiden Jahrzehnten des europäischen
Integrationsprozesses seitens der wissenschaftlichen Literatur nicht viel mehr als eine
mehr oder minder dekorative Funktion im institutionellen Gefüge der Gemeinschaft
zugebilligt werden, erwies sich die Zusammenarbeit der EFA mit beiden Gemein-
schaftsorganen als von nicht zu unterschätzender Bedeutung. Namentlich die Hall-
stein-Kommission hatte den Stellungnahmen des WSA und insbesondere des Europä-
ischen Parlaments stets einen hohen Stellenwert eingeräumt. Das lag zunächst daran,
dass die Kommission die Versammlung als die legitime Repräsentation der Bevöl-
erung der Sechs erachtete und sich immer wieder für eine Erweiterung der Rechte
des Parlaments stark gemacht hatte; eine Missachtung ihrer Vorschläge hätte diese
Politik fraglos diskreditiert.

Bereits unmittelbar nach Gründung der EWG war es den Agrargewerkschaften
dabei auch mit Hilfe ihrer verbundenen Abgeordneten innerhalb des EP gelungen,
die Kommission zu einer umfassenden Untersuchung über die soziale und wirt-
schaftliche Lage in den sechs Ländern der Gemeinschaft zu veranlassen.29 Insgesamt
verstanden es die Agrargewerkschaften, ihre Kanäle in das Europäische Parlament
zu nutzen, um die für ihre Arbeit unverzichtbaren Informationen über die verschie-
denen Aspekte der europäischen Agrarpolitik zu erlangen. Dabei verfügten sie mit
Hendrikus (Henk) Vredeling innerhalb des Europäischen Parlaments seit Gründung
der EWG über einen zentralen Ansprechpartner, der bereits auf der ersten Zusam-
menkunft der europäischen Agrargewerkschaften das Grundsatzreferat über die Sit-
tuation der Landwirtschaft innerhalb der EWG gehalten hatte und der mit der Auf-
rechterhaltung der Kontakte in die Parlamentarische Versammlung betraut worden
war. Vredeling, der als ehemaliger Gewerkschaftssekretär der niederländischen
Landarbeitergewerkschaften über profunde Fachkenntnisse in allen Aspekten der
Agrarpolitik verfügte, entwickelte sich in kürzester Zeit zum führenden Agrarexper-
ten des Europäischen Parlaments.30 Als Berichterstatter des landwirtschaftlichen

28. Vgl. I. STÖCKL, Gewerkschaftsausschüsse in der EG. Die Entwicklung der transnationalen Or-
ganisation und Strategie der europäischen Fachgewerkschaften und ihre Möglichkeiten zur ge-
werkschaftlichen Interessenvermittlung im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Engel-Verlag,
29. Vgl. Kommission der EWG (Hrsg.), Überblick über die Lage der landwirtschaftlichen Arbeitneh-
mer, Brüssel, 1960.
30. Vredeling, am 24.11.1924 im holländischen Amersfoort geboren, hatte seine berufliche Laufbahn
Anfang der 1950er Jahre als Gewerkschaftssekretär der niederländischen Agrargewerkschaft
(ANAP) begonnen und war 1956 für die PvdA in die Zweite Kammer der Generalstaaten gewählt
bis 1977 bekleidete er in seinem Heimatland das Amt des Verteidigungsministers, von 1977
bis 1981 war er unter Roy Jenkins Vizepräsident der Kommission und zuständig für den Bereich
Arbeit und Soziales. Vredeling zählte wie neben ihm wohl nur Alfred Mozer zu den wirklich füh-
renden Akteuren und bestens vernetzten Akteuren der europapolitischen Akteure des sozialistischen
Parteienspektrums und sollte wie dieser in den 1970er Jahren bei der Herausbildung europäischer

„La prise de position au sujet des principales questions de la politique agricole, élaborée par notre groupe de travail avec quelques membres du Comité économique et social, parmi lesquels se trouvaient également des représentants des syndicats chrétiens, mérite d'être particulièrement souligné“. 

**Die Beratenden Ausschüsse und der soziale Dialog in der Landwirtschaft**


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der Konsumenteninteressen; selbst in den Agrarausschüssen waren daher die Interessen der Landarbeiter in die Interessenpolitik der Arbeitnehmer in ihrer Gesamtheit (als Konsumenten) eingebunden und ausbalanciert. Dies unterschied die Agrarge- werkschaften sowohl auf nationaler wie auf europäischer Ebene deutlich von den Bauernverbänden, die die partikularen Interessen der Landwirte weitgehend ohne Rücksichtnahme auf die Belange anderer gesellschaftlicher Gruppen vertreten konnten.


34. Mansholt beschrieb die politischen Auseinandersetzungen um die Marktordnungen, allerdings ohne die Rolle der beratenden Ausschüsse zu erwähnen, mit einigem Sarkasmus: „Die große politische Linie geht bei diesen Sitzungen zwar verloren, aber es handelt sich dabei immerhin um handfeste materielle Interessen. Vorschläge für Eier-Handelsklassen oder Mindestgewichte für Hühner, für Kartoffelgrößen oder Birnenqualitäten – so was kann man nicht auf die leichte Schulter nehmen. Hinter all solchen Einzelheiten steht jeweils eine ganze Bevölkerungsgruppe“. In: S. MANSHOLT, Die Krise. Europa und die Grenzen des Wachstums, Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1974, S.64.


Die Reform der GAP und die EFA


Allerdings verlangte die EFA – auch hier wiederum im Einklang mit der Kommission und insbesondere mit Sicco Mansholt als dem spiritus rector der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (und dann ihrer Reform) – schon früh eine Abkehr von einer


Attacking the Sacred Cow.
The Norwegian Challenge to the EC’s Acquis Communautaire in the Enlargement Negotiations of 1970-72

Robin M. ALLERS

On 30 June 1970 the European Communities (EC) opened membership negotiations with Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway in Luxembourg.¹ This act formally ended a decade of crises most of them caused by French president Charles de Gaulle’s blockade of EC-enlargement.² Building on the agreement reached at their summit meeting in The Hague in December 1969, the Six were able to meet the candidates with a common negotiating position that emphasised unity. As the acting Council president and the president of the Commission explained in their opening speeches, the EC would insist on the acceptance of the acquis communautaire in its entirety. Furthermore, the candidates would have to agree on the Community’s political goals and the further development of communitarian policies was not to be delayed because of the enlargement process. Derogations from the acquis would not be allowed, only transitional arrangements which had to be the same for all parties.³

Speaking after his colleagues from the other candidate countries, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Svenn Stray managed to shake up the audience. As could have been expected from the application text and the White Paper, his government insisted on a special scheme for Norway’s agriculture which de facto amounted to a permanent exemption of his country from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Similar to his fellow applicants, Stray further demanded that Norway’s voice should be heard in deliberations on a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Like his Danish colleague he asked that already existing agreements with Nordic non-members should be maintained. Contrary to the previous speakers, however, Stray did not mention the Community’s political goals that had recently been revitalised at The Hague.⁴ Instead he

¹. This article is based on research done for my PhD thesis published as R.M. ALLERS, Besondere Beziehungen – Deutschland, Norwegen und Europa in der Ära Brandt (1966-1974), Dietz-Verlag, Bonn, 2009. I am grateful for comments and suggestions from participants at the workshops on the history of the CAP in Paris (5/2009) and Maastricht (4/2010), and from participants at the 2010 conference of the Oslo International Contemporary History Network.
spoke of the Rome Treaties as a suitable basis for cooperation in Europe and he merely acknowledged that the present situation seemed favourable to build bridges between the two Western European market formations, i.e. the EC and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).\(^5\)

The Norwegian declaration provoked reactions ranging from astonishment to annoyance. The claim to exempt Norway from the CAP clearly represented an attack on the Communitarian principles. However, it was not so much the claim for exceptions but the obvious lack of political commitment that provoked the Six.\(^6\) A Dutch diplomat was quoted stating that had a similar declaration come from the British, the Community would have not opened the negotiations in the first place.\(^7\) Few stayed as relaxed as Belgian diplomat Count Étienne Davignon who rightly observed that the declaration was mainly directed to a domestic audience.\(^8\)

Later the same day, it was the Norwegians’ turn to be shocked and annoyed. Despite intense lobbying from all four applicants, the Six decided to establish a Common Fisheries Policy disregarding the fact that enlargement with three of the world’s largest fishing nations would change the Community’s standing and identity in this sector completely. To representatives from Norway’s influential fisheries sector, the planned CFP meant an unwelcome development and changed their relatively positive view of EC membership to outright hostility. To all those who were sceptical of EC-membership because they feared the loss of national sovereignty, the decision to implement the policy seemed proof that small states would have a limited influence in Community affairs.\(^9\)

Together, the Norwegian statement and the following Council decision on the establishment of a CFP made for a worst possible start and placed Norway right next to Britain as the most difficult case in the upcoming negotiations. Indeed, Norway’s intricate problems in the primary sector would also dominate the negotiations’ final phase, even jeopardizing the successful termination of the entire enlargement process. Some of the Norwegian claims, among them the maintenance of direct subsidies for some dairy products or the permanent exclusion of foreign vessels from coastal waters challenged Community principles that were regarded as “sacred cows” among the


\(^6\) Erklärungen ..., op.cit., S.D371–374.

\(^7\) Eröffnung der EWG-Beitrittsverhandlungen, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 01.07.1970.

\(^8\) Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) 44.36/6.84-34, UD, Presseavdelingen, Kommentarer i utenlandsk presse til det norske åpningsinnlegg til 30.06.70.

\(^9\) UD 44.36/6.84-34, Brussels to UD, 07.07.1970, EEC. Åpningen av utvidelsesforhandlingene. Samtale i det belgiske utenriksministerium.

For a survey of reactions see H. ALLEN, Norway and Europe in the 1970s, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1979. Based mainly on official documents and journalistic contributions, Allen’s work remains one of the most comprehensive accounts of the 1970-72 negotiations.
Six. In the end, both sides were able to reach a compromise allowing Norway to sign the accession agreement on 22 January 1972 alongside the other applicants. Still, the agreement proved to be unacceptable to a majority of the Norwegian electorate. Following one of the most divisive campaigns in Norwegian history, the treaty of accession was rejected in a popular referendum on 25 September 1972. Why? Was the negative outcome of Norway’s bid for membership predetermined, due to principled negotiation positions on both sides? Or did the negotiations leave room for a compromise that would have satisfied Norwegian farmers and fishermen and with them the general public? Every compromise, of course, would have had to take the Community principles into account.

The first round of enlargement has been at the centre of interest for integration historians for more than a decade now. Despite the fact that government and Community archives now allow for in depth study of internal and multilateral deliberations and processes, few studies have so far addressed the 1970–72 round in detail. Studies addressing the Norwegian case have mainly dealt with the question of national motives: Why did Norway stay apart from the first steps of integration in the 1950s, why did it follow the UK and Denmark in the 1960s and why did it become the only applicant not to ratify the accession treaty in 1972? Explanations have been sought in economic, geopolitical and domestic factors. Insisting that economic factors can best explain Norwegian choices to apply and to say no, Hans Otto Frøland suggests that the application under the Rome Treaties’ article 237 TEEC was merely instrumental, i.e. a way to find out how far the Community was ready to go. When met with opposition based on Communitarian principles, a “national will” to achieve full membership was missing. Frøland’s contribution highlights two important aspects that are necessary to understand Norway’s attitude towards European integration: firstly, the government’s struggle to find a balance between the export and shipping sector’s interest in open markets and the need to protect the primary sector’s special position; secondly the tactical moves resulting from this dilemma, often leading to a certain ambivalence in the government’s communication. When suggesting that the constraints of Norway’s political economy and a lack of political will doomed every attempt for membership to failure, however, Frøland seems to downplay another aspect: that a large part of the political, administrative and industrial elite went actively in for full membership and – also for political reasons – fought for entry both in the negotiations and in the referendum campaign. Moreover, through their numerous encounters with politicians and officials from the Six, Norwegian negotiators were susceptible to obtain a better understanding of EC cooperation, in some cases leading

to a more positive view of the advantages offered by membership. To be sure, every Norwegian government had to negotiate for the maintenance of as much sovereignty in key areas as possible. Some politicians, however, adopted the point of view that in the end every solution had to be in line with Community principles and that political goodwill was needed to achieve a result embracing Norway’s concerns. A detailed analysis of the negotiating process, contrasting attitudes and proposals on both sides is necessary to assess the impact of individual and collective initiatives pushing for a successful accession.

Very little research has been done so far on the EC’s attitude towards the smaller applicant countries. Recent studies have suggested that some countries, most often led by Germany, “were willing to compromise on the *acquis* to ease conditions for British accession”. This was also the case concerning Norway. On the other side, countries like France and the Netherlands, sometimes supported by the Commission, rejected any move likely to undermine the *acquis*. When worried about their national interests, however, as in the case of the CFP, these countries were able to show a great deal of flexibility.

Looking at the development of negotiating positions on both sides and following the dynamics of the negotiations themselves, this article explores to what extent the Community was willing to consider a permanent exemption for the Norwegian primary sector (agriculture and fisheries), and how far the Norwegian government was able to move away from its maximum position demanding permanent exemptions from the CAP and the CFP. The first section revisits the negotiation positions and addresses the question of motives, i.e. why Norway applied for membership despite having problems agreeing on basic Community principles and why the community agreed to open negotiations despite being fully aware of Oslo’s reluctant attitude towards political integration. The second section analyses the negotiations of 1970-72, asking to what extent both sides were willing to compromise. Was the Norwegian side ready to accept Community principles and how much support was gained from those voices among the Six who advocated for a softening of the communitarian principles? Summing up the results of the negotiations and taking into account the negative outcome of the ratification process, the concluding section raises the counterfactual question whether a different outcome would have been possible.


14. On Germany’s special role as Norway’s ally among the Six, see R.M. ALLERS, *Besondere Beziehungen …*, op.cit.

1. Motives and principles

The Norwegian challenge

Most studies on Norway’s case agree that the country opted for an application under article 237 TEEC forced by external pressures, i.e. Great Britain’s and Denmark’s decision to join. It is equally agreed that economic considerations dominated even though political and strategic motives also played a part. In any case, however, membership was only conceivable if derogations from existing Community policies were granted. Already when applying for EC membership in 1962, Norwegian politicians and officials stressed the geographically exposed, and thus special, character of their country’s agriculture. One third of the country was situated North of the polar circle and the growing seasons were on average shorter than in continental Europe. Due to a landscape dominated by fjords and mountains – also further South – the average size of a Norwegian farm was five hectares compared to 11 hectares in the member states. All this made Norwegian agriculture comparatively unproductive and called for substantial support from the government. Maintaining this support through subsidies and protectionist measures was regarded as crucial because settlement throughout the entire country was regarded as necessary, both for reasons of nation building and for reasons of security, referring to the frontier with the Soviet Union. The latter arguments also called for the protection of the equally dispersed fishing industries, relying mainly on smaller vessels and operating in the coastal waters rich in fish. In 1961 Norway had unilaterally extended its fishing limits to 12 nautical miles and had defended this decision ever since. In this sector, however, Norway had developed into an exporting power of significance and the well organized marketing organizations had to balance their reluctance to allow competition with their interest in access to European and World markets. Nevertheless, both farmers and fishermen were equally sceptical about giving up the shelter provided by the government and to accept the necessary adaptation and liberalisation as a consequence of EC membership.

The insistence on special conditions for the primary sector was even more important as scepticism towards membership was also linked to political reservations about the integration process. Norway had been absent at the creation of the supranational institutions. Pointing to its young age as an independent nation state and to the recently achieved liberation from German occupation in World War II, Norway refrained from any limitation of its sovereignty and proved to be particularly allergic to the term “union”. In addition, being a country with a distinctive social democratic

18. The most thorough and comprehensive analysis of Norway’s political economy and its reluctance to join the Common Market is H.O. FROLAND, Choosing the Periphery ..., op.cit.
profile, Norway regarded the emerging Communities as a Western European fortress, ruled by conservative governments with a capitalistic agenda.

In 1962 external pressure resulting from the British and Danish applications was the single most important reason to consider an application. Economic considerations – the prospect of seeing at least one of its main trading partners and at least one Nordic neighbour move over behind the Community’s tariff walls – were decisive for Norway’s decision to seek a form of association. Although some politicians and bureaucrats had become interested in the political ideas underlying the European project, the Norwegian government was quite happy with the EFTA solution and would have preferred a less committing affiliation. Little was known by then about the CAP and its possible impact on Norwegian agriculture – not to speak of the non-existent fisheries policy. But scepticism was growing among representatives from the primary sector as to Norway’s ability to shape the EEC’s policies in these domains. Moreover, less than 20 years after the end of World War II the idea of joining a supranational community in which Germany and France were the dominating powers had little appeal. Facing growing opposition in the electorate and among party rank and file, the governing Social Democrats were relieved rather than shocked when de Gaulle brought the process to an end.¹⁹

Norway’s 1967 application was again first and foremost provoked by the renewed British initiative followed immediately by Denmark and Ireland. This time, however, it was a government composed of both sceptics and advocates that forwarded an application.²⁰ Those who had voted against an application in 1962 now agreed to renew it, although with great difficulties. The sceptics from the centre party – among them Prime Minister Per Borten – the Christian Party and the Liberals finally gave in to pressure from their conservative coalition partners and worked out an application for full membership. The alternative preferred by the sceptics since 1962, an association agreement under article 238 TEEC, was rejected by the conservatives and even judged undemocratic by legal experts. The latter emphasised that such an agreement would not allow the associated country to exert its influence on Community decision making while forcing it to adopt most of the EC’s policies. As the labour friendly daily *Arbeiderbladet* pointed out, Britain had rejected an association agreement exactly for this reason.²¹ In addition, several EC countries regarded an association

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¹⁹. H.O. FRØLAND, Advancing Ambiguity ..., op.cit.; K.E. ERIKSEN, H. PHARO, op.cit.
agreement as inadequate for an industrialised country. After lengthy internal debates, the government decided to send an application under Art. 237 TEEC without mentioning alternative solutions. However, the sceptics insisted that the official government White Paper preparing the negotiations refrain from declaring membership as the only option. Moreover, the claim for special rules had to be given a central part. According to Frøland, the government went actively in for testing to what extent the Community would be ready to meet Norway’s demands. Some government members had become convinced that the Community might be willing to offer a de facto exemption from the CAP under the concept of regional policy. There were, however, few indications that the Six would have accepted such a deal. Already in 1967, a solid consensus existed in Brussels that every exception had to be negotiated in conformity with the principles laid down in the Treaties of Rome. According to Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani it was unimaginable – even with a good portion of goodwill – to see the Community agree to measures that were likely to destroy the edifice that the Community had so carefully constructed over years. Even supporters of Norwegian entry, like Willy Brandt, insisted that every solution had to be found within the framework of the Rome Treaty and proposed to look for a deal under the Community’s regional policy. This proposal did not entirely meet Norwegian claims, however. To secure settlements along the long coastline, in the many mountainous areas and in the far North, Oslo was asking for a permanent exemption from CAP and the CFP for the entire country.

When de Gaulle vetoed enlargement for the second time in December 1967, the question whether Norway’s claims would stand any chance in negotiations with the Six was postponed for the second time. Although this outcome was greeted with relief by the sceptics, the government joined Britain, Denmark, and Ireland in maintaining its application. The following two years showed that there was no viable alternative to membership. As long as Denmark and Britain prioritized membership, neither plans for revitalizing EFTA nor plans for the creation of a Nordic customs union

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25. UD 44.36/6.84-26, Rome to UD, 03.05.1967, Samtale mellom Willoch og utenriksminister Fanfani 26.04.1967. See also UD 44.36/6.84-25, Brussels to UD, 17.10.1966, Willoch’s besøk i Brüssel.


27. Norwegian diplomats emphasized the need to make their German counterparts understand that it was equally difficult to maintain effective fishing and agriculture in the North as in the fjords and valleys further South of the country. UD 44.36/6.84-29, Notat, UD, 1. Handelspol. Kontor, 12.10.1967, Møte i den norsk tyske blandede kommisjon 16.-17.10.67; EEC og utvidelsesspørsmålet.
(NORDEK) had any future. Different schemes for accession or free trade agreements gained no support as long as they did not include a roadmap to membership.28

This situation remained unchanged when the Community finally decided to open negotiations with the applicants, following General de Gaulle’s retreat from power in April 1969. As mentioned above, the same demands as in 1962 and in 1967 were key elements of Foreign Minister Stray’s opening address on 30 June 1970. To his credit, the declaration he read on behalf of his government was not what Stray would have chosen to say in private. In a government split on the EC membership issue, his party, the conservatives (Høyre) were the only one unambiguously in favour. Stray himself was even known to be one of the few who supported entry for political reasons and in the run-up to the negotiations he had already clashed several times with the Prime Minister over questions of strategy. Supported by experts from the ministry of Foreign Affairs and by members of the Parliament’s foreign affairs committee he maintained that in order to obtain goodwill, Norway had to show its willingness to fully participate in the European project.29 This meant both the acceptance of the Community’s political goals and a conciliatory line with regard to special solutions for the primary sector. To insist on demands that would go explicitly against community principles would only harden positions. At the same time Stray knew that neither the political class nor the electorate would accept EC membership without obtaining major concessions if not a permanent exemption from the CAP. When meeting the Six for the first bilateral round of negotiations on 22 September 1970, Stray thus accepted the basic principles of the Community’s position, but he reiterated the demand for a permanent exemption from the CAP together with the claim to participate in the formulation the CFP. As he explained to his EC colleagues, if no satisfying solution would be found, it was not sure whether a majority for entry could be secured in the population.30

Both sectors were closely linked but in the negotiations they were treated in separate chapters and indeed posed quite different problems: Contrary to the agrarian sector where Norway was irrelevant on an international basis, its fisheries sector was one of the largest in the world and contributed significantly to the country’s export. Whereas the CAP had been part of Norwegian discussions on EC membership since 1962, neither in 1962 nor in 1967 the Community had agreed on a CFP. And finally, in the fisheries sector Norway was not alone in challenging the Community.

All four applicants had demanded participation in shaping the emerging common policy in this sector. Oslo’s main argument here was that enlarging the Community by three of the world’s leading exporters of fish would change the character of the CFP anyway. Distinguishing itself from the other candidates, Norway also claimed

29. See for example the debates in the Norwegian parliament’s committee for foreign affairs (Stortingets Utvidede Utenriks- og konstitusjonskomité, SUUKK) on the 27.08 and 08.10.1970.
that its system of distribution and price management was more adequate than the one proposed by the Community. Most importantly, Norway demanded a special permanent regime for its entire coastline. The 12-mile exclusive zone that Norway had established in 1964 was to be preserved and further expansion not to be excluded. Consequently, Norway’s negotiators were demoralised when the Community agreed on two directives aimed at establishing the CFP the very day the negotiations were opened. Although the timing was nearly provocative, the decision itself did not come unexpected. Diplomats had reported since 1966 that a CFP was in the making and that Norway probably would have to adapt to it. Since The Hague summit in 1969 Norwegian politicians and diplomats, together with their even more active Danish and British colleagues, had in vain tried to influence the Community. On 30 June the CFP was on its way and had become part of the EC’s negotiation position.

At least the applicants were now aware of what the new policy would look like and could start to conceive a strategy to revise it. In Norway working groups consisting of government experts and representatives from the primary sector discussed four alternatives: The first alternative was to maintain the Norwegian policy with exclusive fishing rights reserved for Norwegian citizens inside the 12-mile zone. This was the preferred solution for both the government and the primary sector, but was regarded by officials as having little chance of acceptance by the EC. The second alternative was the so-called establishment or settlement strategy, proposing fishing rights in the exclusive zone to all those who would settle formally in the coastal region. Two other alternatives were discussed but rejected as unacceptable to Norway: a division of the exclusive zone into two 6-mile zones, the outer-one being accessible to vessels from countries with traditional fishing rights, and, finally, a division of the coastline, granting special rights (i.e. maintenance of the 12-mile zone) only to Northern Norway because of harsh conditions. This last alternative corresponded to the “regional” solution informally proposed by Community representatives for both the agricultural and the fisheries sector. In the Norwegian view, however, the entire country had to be regarded as a special area. A division of the coastline would not make sense, it was argued, because fishermen from the South followed the fish to the North according to the season.

Discussions on the negotiation position uncovered considerable disagreement inside the government and among members of parliament as to how to phrase the Norwegian concerns. Most pro-European members of the cabinet, assisted by diplomats

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31. UD 44.36/6.84-25, Notat, Handelsdep., Avd. for utenrikshandel, 19.11.1966, Økonomiske problemer ved en norsk tilslutning til EEC.
32. UD 44.36/6.84-31, Paris to UD, 11.12.1969, Handelsminister Willochs samtale med utenriksminister Schumann 10/12.
33. SUUKK, Session on 27.08.1970.
34. UD 44.36/6.84-41, Notat, Brüssel, 16.17.1971, Utvidelsen av EF. Fiskerigrensen og jordbruket i Norge– Sverige og EF. See also UD 44.36/6.84-36, Notat, UD, Forhandlingsdelegasjon 21.11.1970, Frankrikes syn på de norske medlemskapsforhandlinger. In earlier negotiations a division had been discussed in government and parliamentary consultations, but was never proposed officially. See K.E. ERIKSEN, H. PHARO, op.cit., p.367.
from embassies in Brussels and Paris, argued that a conciliatory line would be more productive. To insist on demands that would go explicitly against Community principles would only harden positions.\textsuperscript{35} Despite these disagreements on strategy, there was a broad agreement as to the necessity of obtaining derogations.

\textit{The Community’s response}

The Norwegian demand for exemption from the CAP was perceived as a challenge to core Community principles. Introducing a study by Hans Otto Frøland on Norway’s claims for special rights, Fernando Guirao suggested in 2001 that further research was needed to clarify why the Community opened negotiations with this country at all.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, in the course of the negotiations it was suggested several times that Norway should rather look for an agreement similar to the one Sweden and the other remaining EFTA-members were after. At the same time, however, NATO-member Norway was always regarded as a natural candidate for membership. Willy Brandt in particular maintained that Norway and the other Scandinavian countries should take part in the European project because of their democratic traditions.\textsuperscript{37} French politicians such as Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann also expressed their interest in seeing Norway becoming a member.\textsuperscript{38} Norwegian negotiators did their best to convey the image of Norway being a European country. Meeting Community representatives, both Brussels based diplomats and members of government repeatedly insisted on the fact that Norway was applying for membership. This became particularly evident after a minority government formed by the labour party took over in March 1971. A statement to the negotiations conference and a new white book were both regarded as pro-European in tone and substance.\textsuperscript{39} Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli soon gained a reputation for being the Scandinavian statesman with the

\textsuperscript{36} F. GUIRAO, Peripheral countries and the Integration of Europe, in: Journal of European Integration History, 1(2001), p.7; cf. H.O. FROLAND, Choosing the Periphery ..., op.cit.
\textsuperscript{38} Schumann told his Norwegian colleague in December 1970 that France wanted to help for two reasons: Out of a deep sympathy for having experienced the same situation in 1940 and because both countries shared a similar view on most questions in international affairs, especially regarding détente: UD 44.36/6.84-37, Paris to UD, 11.12.1970, Utenriksministerens samtaler med utenriksminister Schumann, 10.12.70.
\textsuperscript{39} UD 44.36/6.84-39, Notat, UD, Forhandlingsdel., 02.04.1971, Referat fra ministermøtet EF-Norge 30.03.1971; UD 44.36/6.84-39, Brussels to UD, 01.04.1971, Norge-EF. Siste Ministerrådsmøte; UD 44.36/6.84-39, Brussels to UD, 02.04.1971, Norge-EF. Erklæringen av 30.05.1971.
strongest European attitude. But even at the times of the coalition government, whose Prime Minister Borten was accused of playing a double game, negotiating for membership while publicly expressing a negative attitude towards the EC, the Ministers of Trade and Foreign Affairs would present the membership option as official policy. If the Norwegian application was merely instrumental, this was not the impression given to the EC.

How then did the Six deal with the ambivalence characterising the Norwegian position and how did they react to the challenge it represented to the Community. Part of the package deal at the basis of the Rome Treaties, the CAP was at the core of the acquis. When Norwegian politicians and diplomats first launched the idea of permanent exceptions in 1962, the Community reacted with reservations. However, the Norwegian case never made it further than through exploratory talks before de Gaulle brought the enlargement process to an end. Five years later, when Norway again presented its plan of joining with reservations, the EC was split between France and the so-called friendly five. German support for enlargement was then much more political, linked to the so called Ostpolitik. Concerning Norway’s request for special rights, however, Community representatives were even more explicit in their rejection. The EC had just gone through the empty chair crisis that was partly provoked by a row over the CAP. Despite its bad reputation as a setback to further integration, the Luxembourg compromise of 1966 had certainly strengthened the CAP. As a result, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries supported enlargement but did not dare to provoke France over agriculture. Following de Gaulle’s second “no” in December 1967, some countries considered, but later dismissed a plan to use France’s dependence on the CAP as a “weapon” in order to force a breakthrough in the enlargement question. Politicians and officials alike were prudent enough to

41. UD 44.36/6.84-25, Notat, (Bonn), 22.02.1967, Willochs samtale med Brandt. Only when Foreign Minister Stray claimed in November 1970 that, contrary to 1962, Norway was now in favour of integration out of political reasons, the Prime Minister intervened. For a recent, archive based study of his, see H. BERNTSEN, Stauberaren. Per Borten, Aschehoug, Oslo 2007, pp.349 f.
45. R.M. ALLERS, Besondere Beziehungen ..., op.cit., pp.251 f.
use this weapon at best indirectly or passively.46 The fear of destabilizing a carefully constructed compromise also dominated the situation on the eve of the EC summit at The Hague in December 1969. A finalization of the CAP’s financial system was due until the end of the year. But instead of using France’s agreement finally to go ahead with enlargement for a revision of the CAP, the German government again refrained from all kind of pressure and judged it more important to secure French President Georges Pompidou’s consent to go ahead with enlargement.47 This gentlemen’s agreement buried the Mansholt plan that represented everything unpopular with European integration in Norway. But it also made the Six close ranks on the existing CAP rules.48 Thus, when Norway presented its negotiation position to the Community in June 1970, the Six stood more firmly than ever behind the CAP. The defence of the acquis had now become a central part of the negotiation position. Exceptions would be granted only for a transitional period which had to be the same for every country and every sector. The unifying approach was reinforced by the decision to let the Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) conduct the negotiations instead of letting every country negotiate on its own behalf. The Commission was assigned the role of a mediator.49

There was some understanding among the Six about Norway’s main argument for an exemption, i.e. the relatively insignificant size of its agriculture. At the same time it was met with a powerful counter argument: the fear of setting a precedent. This point concerned both the existing Community and the potential new members. To accord one country permanent exemptions would not only undermine the basic principles of solidarity, but such a step, it was argued, would also encourage both current member states and applicants to ask for similar derivations thus undermining the CAP and further complicating the enlargement process. Norway’s other argument, emphasising that special conditions asked for special rules, was rebutted as well. EC representatives instead pointed to the possibility of granting special conditions for certain regions, e.g. Northern Norway under the rules of regional policy. The moun-


48. On the Mansholt plan see Katja Seidel’s contribution to this special issue.

tainous regions of France and Germany and Southern Italy were mentioned as examples for regions receiving special support.\textsuperscript{50}

Against this background, unlucky as it was, the timing of the CFP-initiative was far from being unintended. As enlargement Commissioner Jean-François Deniau explained to Norwegian diplomats, the CFP was the final piece in the construction that was the CAP.\textsuperscript{51} From the logic underpinning its French inspired strategy, the Community had to face the applicants with an established policy also in this sector. In fact, given the applicants’ strength in the domain of fisheries, the Community seemed to gain a considerable advantage from a common approach. Furthermore, national interests of certain Community members also had an impact. According to the report by British chief negotiator Sir Con O’Neill, the decision to agree on a directive establishing a CFP at the 30 June session resulted from internal pressure on the French Minister who teamed up with his Dutch colleague Pierre Lardinois and was supported by the Commission.\textsuperscript{52} As mentioned above, Norwegian politicians and diplomats, together with their even more active Danish and British colleagues, had tried to influence the making of the CFP. Visiting Norway at the end of May, German Minister of Economic Affairs Karl Schiller had been asked by government representatives to intervene in Norway’s favour. Schiller indeed called his colleague, Minister of Agriculture Josef Ertl who represented Germany at the Council meeting on 30 June.\textsuperscript{53} Yet, Ertl’s remark that Norway’s interests as a fishing nation should be taken into consideration was met with opposition from a number of countries that had an interest in strengthening the Community position on agriculture and fisheries as well as from the Commission. The Dutch delegation feared

„bei allem Verständnis für die deutsche Haltung große Schwierigkeiten, wenn man die Wünsche der Beitrittskandidaten schon jetzt berücksichtige. Die Gemeinschaft könne jetzt keinen „standstill“ anwenden, sondern müsse ihre Vorstellungen präzisieren. Das schließe nicht aus, daß später mit den Beitrittskandidaten hierüber gesprochen werde.“ \textsuperscript{54}

The episode is a good example of the Community method at work. It also shows that German support for the applicants had a tendency to vanish once the unity among the Six and friendship with France in particular was in danger. As Guido Thiemyer has pointed out, “Germany had to accept the French position as a precondition for enlargement and deepening the Community”.\textsuperscript{55}

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\textsuperscript{50} 44.36/6.84-29, Referat, 1. Handelspol. kontor, 19.10.1967, Døftingene med Mansholt; UD 44.36/6.84-25, Brussels to UD, 17.10.1966, Willochs samtale med Robert Marjolin; UD 44.36/6.84-25, Brussels to UD, 18.10.66, Willoch’s besøk i Brussel.
\textsuperscript{51} UD 44.36/6.84-36, Bonn to UD, 27.10.70, EEC-utvidelsesforhandlingene.
\textsuperscript{53} PA AA, B 60, Bd.774, Oslo to AA, 30.06.1970, Besuch Schillers in Oslo; PA AA, B1, Bd.342, Schiller an Brandt, 11.07.1970.
\textsuperscript{55} G. THIEMEYER, op.cit. p.219.
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When the Norwegian demands were negotiated for the first time on 22 September, the French Foreign Minister refused an initiative by the German presidency (supported by Dutch State Secretary Henri Johan de Koster), to consider the applicant’s right to participate in shaping the CFP. According to Ambassador Jean-Marc Boegner, “M. Schumann a fait valoir qu’il convenait d’écarter toute formule susceptible d’entrainer, sous une forme ou sous une autre, la participation des États candidats aux délibérations de la Communauté”. 56

The other members finally agreed on this position. In return Schumann proposed that the Community could acknowledge Norway’s special problems in the fisheries sector, particularly with regard to the maintenance of population in certain areas. While this agreement of 22 September did not give Norway the assurance for the special treatment it had asked for, it was later referred to when a special protocol was proposed as the final compromise. The Community had thereby accepted Norway as a special case. The tactical concept agreed upon at the first bilateral meeting in September 1970 was to recognise Norway’s special concerns and to postpone a solution until after the British case had been solved.

Both parties were from the outset principled in their positions but willing to find a compromise. For different reasons both inside the Norwegian government and among the Six proponents for a principled stance were challenged by others who opted for a more conciliatory line, open for compromise. In fact, as Aril Underdal has pointed out, the negotiations were primarily integrative in character, with both sides aiming for a successful conclusion. 57

2. The negotiations

When negotiations moved beyond the fact finding phase in summer 1971, the two positions were still quite far from each other. Due to internal pressure the Norwegian government’s negotiating ability was extremely limited. The centre-right government that had submitted the application had to resign in early 1971 over a disagreement on the negotiation strategy. The labour government that succeeded it was unified in its determination to continue negotiations and to meet the Community with a more positive attitude; yet it had to take the primary sector’s concerns into account as well.

A broad Anti-EEC coalition ranging from conservative agricultural interest groups to the radical left had extended its campaign against entry. Following its forced resignation from government in March 1971, the Centre Party abandoned its tactical ambivalence and positioned itself unambiguously on the “No” side. This brought the

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number of votes necessary to reject the accession treaty in parliament short of two. The fight about the votes in a consultative referendum therefore became even more important. The Labour government, however, though in favour of membership, hesitated to campaign actively for entry. Instead, the party leadership proposed to wait until after the terms of entry would be known, i.e. until after the end of negotiations, before they would recommend membership. This can be seen either as an honourable move of fairness or as a lack of leadership. The party elite, led by Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli who did not hide his personal preference for membership out of political reasons, decided to show consideration for his voters at the periphery and for the large group of euro-sceptics inside its ranks, particularly at the left wing and in the party’s youth organisation, Arbeidernes Ungdoms Fylke (AUF). The result of this strategy was twofold: it gave the no-side a huge head start and it increased the pressure on the government to obtain a negotiation result in line with public expectations.

In the meantime, the Heath-Pompidou summit of May 1971 had led to a breakthrough in the British negotiations. This enabled the Six to concentrate on the other candidates’ demands and to consider far reaching compromises without having to fear British counter moves of a dimension that would exacerbate the entire process. On the other hand, having concluded a deal with Britain, the Six had found acceptance for their position in principle and were even less willing to compromise. Moreover, the British deal still needed to be ratified and as the Financial Times remarked “there would be an outcry from Britain fishermen if the Norwegians were to be given preferential treatment”.

A significant turn in the Community’s attitude occurred in summer 1971. Community negotiators at this point realised that Norwegian fears of not being able to ratify an agreement unanimously rejected by the interest groups were real. As intended by Norwegian negotiators the question now turned political. Following the change of presidency in the EC, the Foreign Ministers of France and Italy, a number of Ministers of Agriculture, and finally Commissioner Deniau visited Norway. The Norwegians took them to the Northern coast and flew them in small planes over the mountainous landscape in order to illustrate the conditions under which farmers had to work.

This strategy certainly had an effect on German representatives. Following the visit of Ertl in July 1971, the German Ambassador to Norway saw it as a necessity that the Federal government started to work for a political solution that would meet Norway’s special demands in the agricultural sector as far as possible.

was necessary. The Norwegian maximum demands, however, still seemed difficult to achieve because Germany's partners took a much more principled stand. According to a key-official from the French Ministry of Commerce, the maintenance of deficiency payments was regarded as particularly problematic. Referring to the danger of setting precedence he said that France was "very much afraid of any kind of special solution" and therefore regarded the Norwegian claims as problematic. Foreign Minister Schumann recognized the special status of Norway's agriculture, but rejected the claim for permanent exceptions. In the end, he stated on a visit to Oslo, every country had to join the CAP. According to him, France had no particular interest in Norwegian agriculture or fisheries. The whole question was "purely a matter of principle". Of course, France did have quite interest in the fisheries sector and tried to take care of them on the sidelines. However, French main interests were indeed a matter of principle, based on the maintenance of the existing CAP rules. Any precedence that would have given Britain or existing member states the possibility of opening this chapter in the near or distant future was of potential danger to Paris.

One of the most outspoken critics of the Norwegian negotiation strategy, however, was the Dutch Minister of Agriculture Pierre Lardinois. One had to bear in mind, he told Oslo's Ambassador, that sooner or later the Community would face lobbyists seeking to exploit the precedence established by the Norwegian deal. The worst thing that could happen would be a regionalisation of the CAP. Discussing the matter with German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel in October 1971, Lardinois stated that from a Dutch point of view, neither the fishery sector nor the agricultural sector should obtain unlimited derogations, at least not formally. In the Council the Dutch delegation boycotted an agreement on a compromise forwarded by the Commission that would have recognised Norway as a special case and included prolonged transition periods as well as financial support through Community funds. Two months later, when Lardinois paid Norway a visit, he remained unimpressed by the mountainous landscape that was meant to change his view on Norwegian special rights. Presumably the weather was too good and the scenery too idyllic to drive home the argument, as Norwegian Ambassador Søren Sommerfelt bitterly recalled. Desperate, Oslo even felt the need to send State Secretary Thorvald Stoltenberg to The Hague in order to remind the Dutch of their traditional support for enlargement.

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62. PA AA, B 60, Bd.774, Aufzeichnung IIIA5, Unterlagen für BM Ertl zum Norwegen Besuch.
63. UD 44.36/6.84-40, Paris to UD, 14.07.1971, EF. Samtale med Brunet.
65. UD 44.36/8-8, Haag to UD, 29.07.1971, EF-Norge. Fiske/Landbruk.
67. UD 44.36/8-8, Den Haag to UD, 08.10.1971.
at least concerning agriculture. A German diplomat attending a bilateral meeting with Norwegian officials reported that representatives of the ministries for Agriculture and Foreign Affairs now had been much more conciliatory than earlier, while attitudes in the ministry of Fisheries remained unchanged.

With both sides displaying a certain political willingness to reach an agreement, negotiations went into their final phase after the summer break. In the agricultural sector, the new government had abandoned rather quickly the maximum position of the so-called “screening line” working for a permanent exemption from the CAP. Instead it had pursued what was known as the “compensation line”, arguing that the difference between the Norwegian price level and the Community level had to be compensated for by the authorities. Similar to the position of the centre-right coalition the Labour government insisted on the maintenance of deficiency payments and direct subsidies as measure to compensate for the expected losses of farm incomes caused by the adjustment to Community price levels. In addition, Norway wanted to keep decision authority on the necessary adjustments under national control but to let the Community pay for the compensations through its European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF). These claims were not accepted entirely. But in early November, the Community finally presented its proposal for a compromise that some observers regarded as a fair deal. Under the condition that Norway would become part of the Community, the latter agreed to allow direct subsidies for certain products such as milk under the label of transport costs in order to guarantee supply for the entire country. The remaining negotiations concerned the length of the transition period for different groups of products. Here Norway obtained longer transitions than originally planned. Reactions in Norway varied from moderately positive to fiercely negative. The matter clearly was subject to interpretation as Norwegian Minister of Agriculture Thorstein Treholt exclaimed: “Call it what you want, I call it permanent exemptions”.

By December 1971 the parties were able to finalize the agreement. Following the meeting the Norwegian delegation said it would accept the Community’s proposal for a special protocol attached to the accession treaty. By then, Trade Minister Per Kleppe judged the result as satisfactory, with the reservation that the result for the fisheries sector was still missing.

The fisheries question, by contrast, was far from being resolved. The Norwegian government managed to reach a deal on the market organisation that met its demands.
The difficult question was the coastal regime, where Norway insisted on the permanent maintenance of an exclusive zone of 12 miles. In the end, the fisheries question even had the potential to sabotage not only Norway’s agreement but also the agreements reached with the other candidates. On 12 November, Britain, Ireland and Denmark had finally accepted a Community proposal that foresaw exclusive 12-mile zones for certain coastal areas. The transitional period would last until 1982 when the Community would have to revise the question again. Britain’s chief negotiator Lord Geoffrey Rippon triumphantly called the deal a *de facto* permanent exemption and observers agreed that this was the end of CFP as it had been conceived in June 1970. Still, the Community had an interest in maintaining the impression that the *acquis* was left intact and Schumann in particular rejected the idea that permanent exemptions had been granted. But everybody was aware of the fact that Norway wanted to obtain more from the Community than the others had obtained. Despite heavy pressure from the British, they refused to join the 12 November deal. Instead, Norway was following the advice it had been given by Community representatives at the margins of the opening session on 22 September 1970: to wait for the conclusion of a special deal until the question of British membership was resolved. Norwegian experts had concluded from this advice that no agreement could be reached before the conclusion of the British negotiations and acted accordingly. Already in July Oslo had rejected a proposal by its co-applicants to join a multilateral session on the fisheries question. Britain had just reached a breakthrough in its negotiations following the summit meeting in June and had a strong interest in closing the remaining chapters as soon as possible. To Ireland and Denmark the fisheries question, although important, did not have the same significance it had for Norway. As Norway’s Ambassador to the EC reminded his British colleague Kenneth Christofas, however, the Six had regarded his country as a special case since September 1970. Now Norway felt it had gained further understanding for its special conditions whereas the other applicants had not. Therefore, a coordinated approach was not in Norway’s interest. Following the successful vote on the negotiation result in the House of Commons on 13 July 1971, the question of British entry seemed to be settled and the way for a special deal with Norway open. Indeed, the Community kept its word and judged Norwegian fisheries interests to be in a category apart. This did not mean, however, that the Six had given up their reluctance to grant permanent exclusive rights. On the

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75. UD 44.36/6.84-35, Brussels to UD, 05.10.1970, Norge EEC.
77. UD 44.36/6.84-40, Brussels to UD, 26.06.1971, Norge-Storbritannia/Fiskergrensen. See also UD 44.36/6.84-40, London to UD, 01.07.1971.
one hand, the basic principles steering the Community attitude and the position of France in particular remained unchanged. On the other hand, the negotiations with the other applicants were not finally closed. Both British and Irish negotiators threatened to reconsider their agreement should the Norwegian obtain an all too favourable deal.\(^7\) Signals from Brussels suggested that the EC would go a long way in meeting Norwegian concerns but would stop short of granting the permanent maintenance of a 12-mile zone wanted by Oslo.

In an effort to act in accordance with Community principles without abandoning the claim for a 12-mile exclusive zone, the new government had decided to throw all its weight behind the so-called settlement solution. By asking foreign vessels to register properly in Norway, the right to equal access was meant to be circumvented. This attempt was outright rejected by the Community and in the end the government had to give in and opt for the once rejected division of the coastline. Acknowledging the heavy pressure on the Norwegian government by increasingly unhappy pressure groups, however, it was agreed that the exclusive zone would de facto include almost the entire coastline stretching from the Northern Cape to Egersund only a few miles away from the Southern most point. Still the question of a transitional period versus a permanent agreement had to be resolved.

The final weeks were marked by intensive negotiations accompanied by efforts at bilateral diplomacy. The central challenge was to find solutions that did not break openly with the acquis and avoided to provoke a renegotiation of the deal reached with the other applicants.

The compromises

The agreement in the agricultural sector has been regarded as a fair compromise with give and take on both sides. The agreement mirrored the negotiations that had developed in a rather pragmatic way, with a good understanding among experts at the technical level. Not surprisingly, the agreement did not fulfil the maximum demands put forward by the interest organisations. These groups had not been entirely negative to the idea of EC membership, but their demands had been too high from the start and now they felt that the government had sacrificed their interests in order to secure an acceptable deal for the fisheries sector. The fisheries sector could not be entirely disappointed, given the concessions laid down in a special protocol. In fact, due to combined pressure from all four applicants, fisheries were the only sector of the entire enlargement negotiation where the Community had abandoned its negotiation pos-

\(^7\) PA AA, (B 20), Bd.1917, Aufzeichnung G1 III E, 13.01.1972, Fischereipolitik; hier: englische Reaktion auf die Norwegen-Formel.
The EC had agreed on a ten year transitional period and it had not excluded the possibility of revising the CFP after the end of the period. This makes the CFP a good example of the possible impact of an alliance of states with strong and well defined interests that mounts an “attack” on the _acquis_ in an area where EC interests are contradictory or less well defined.\(^{79}\) In addition to its co-applicants, Norway had obtained a _de facto_ exemption of its entire coastline.

Nevertheless, interest organisations were still not content. First of all the result was difficult to explain to the fishermen and to their supporters in the general public. The EC had not been able to issue a formal guarantee that would have assured Norway would maintain control over its extended exclusive zone beyond 1982. Political guarantees had been issued by some governments, assuring that the Community would never break its promise. This was not enough for those who feared from the outset that a small state like Norway would be run over by the big member states in every question of importance. And with the 30 June decision fresh in mind the sceptics had a powerful example to point to. The Minister for Fisheries, recruited from an interest organisation in order to secure their support, justified his resignation two days before the signature of the treaty exclusively with the lack of a legally binding guarantee.\(^{81}\) Norwegian diplomats regarded this move as a decisive blow to membership ambitions as it emphasised an enormous mistrust towards the Community itself.\(^{82}\)

Only a limited number of politicians and government officials were ready to accept the Community method.

This method had been explained rather bluntly by Pompidou in a conversation with Bratteli in early January 1972. Every member state, the French President lectured, wanted to safeguard its national interests and to obtain special rights – also France. But in a Community nothing was as important as the maintenance of principles. Depicting himself as an almost impartial observer, he said that in his view the Community had gone very far into Norway’s direction whereas Norway had barely moved. Now everybody had to sit down in a marathon meeting and at the end of the night a compromise would emerge that everybody had to accept.\(^{83}\)

This prediction proved to be true, at least to some extent. The written result of this compromise, however, the treaty of accession, was packed in such complicated phrases that it was impossible to explain its presumed advantages to a broader public. Following the signature of the treaty on 22 January, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung viewed the opposition to Norwegian membership as weakened.\(^{84}\)

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\(^{80}\) M. RASMUSSEN, _State power …_, op.cit., pp.374.


\(^{83}\) UD 44.36/6.84-45, Brussels to UD, 07.01.1972, Samtale med president Pompidou.

true. An unholy but forceful alliance of farmers, urban intellectuals, and Christian fundamentalists joined in a people’s movement against membership that had broad appeal in the population. Resistance was not limited to but absolutely strongest at the periphery, in areas dependent on agriculture and fishery. Their powerful interest organisations had both financial clout and organisational mobilizing capacity. Their resistance, partly based on fear of change, partly on utilitarian reasons, had a strong influence on their members and a great appeal to the population in general. In a population of four million almost everybody had relatives with connections to a rural Community.85

Conclusion

This article has set out to revisit the question why Norway had engaged in membership negotiations with the EC in 1970 despite its difficulties with the concept of integration and why the Community had opened negotiations with a country that not only wanted to be excluded from the CAP and the CFP but also had severe reservations against the political goals inherent in the Rome Treaties. It was argued that an analysis of the negotiations themselves was needed to judge whether positions on both sides were too principled to leave room for an acceptable compromise.

It can be argued that the negotiations themselves ended successfully. Norway had to be satisfied with its status as a special case and even though no permanent exemption was achieved, it had obtained far reaching derogations from the CAP and the CFP. The Norwegian government was able to look back on difficult negotiations where both the Six and the other candidates accepted a deal that to a large degree was the result of Norwegian stubbornness. But also the EC was able to regard the agreement as a success, because the CAP principles and thus the acquis were left more or less intact. More importantly, enlargement that had been a cause for tension throughout the 1960s was finally brought on its way and could be expected to infuse the Community with new dynamism.

However, taking the rejection of the treaty of adhesion in the popular referendum of 25 September 1972 into account, it can be equally argued that the negotiations were unsuccessful, first of all from a Norwegian perspective, but also both from a Community perspective. The referendum proved what had been suspected by many already during the negotiation’s final days, namely that negotiations had led to a compromise that was not acceptable to interest groups. But the Bratteli government had negotiated for a successful accession and refused to accept a looser accession agreement as a fall back position. It resigned immediately after the referendum, leav-

ing it to the mainly eurosceptical parties to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EC. Nor could the Six be entirely satisfied with the final outcome of the Norwegian case. There were certainly those who were not too unhappy seeing a potentially difficult partner opting out. But the general reaction was one of annoyance, disappointment and – to some degree – self-criticism. First of all there was annoyance over the fact that the Six had to revise original CFP and that even this move had not helped convince all applicants to join. Some conference diplomats even wondered whether Britain, Denmark and Ireland would have obtained such far reaching concessions, had it not been for Norway’s tough negotiating style.

More generally, the Norwegian non-ratification left a stain on the first round of enlargement. This failure was even more deplorable as Community representatives had to acknowledge that Norway’s “no” – domestic reasons apart – was also a criticism of the Community method and reflected growing dissatisfaction with the integration process. Following the Norwegian rejection of the treaty, some Community representatives expressed self-criticism, deploring the way in which the EC had behaved during the negotiations. Le Monde called the decision a “Warning to all Europeans”. Like Sicco Mansholt, however, most of them pointed to the Community’s image rather than to the details and the substance of the negotiation.

While the “classical Community Method”, i.e. the insistence on the unconditional acceptance of the acquis by new members, was regarded as complicated and sometimes ineffective, it was seen as the best way to defend both Communitarian and member state interests. Nevertheless, the widespread impression of failure, both on the Norwegian and on the Community side, leads to the question whether the outcome was predetermined and if negotiations could have turned out differently. Uwe Kitzinger who in 1973 provided one of the first detailed accounts of the first round of enlargement negotiations, has analysed them as „a self-contained system and a procedure for settling minor issues of a transitional character”. Citing conference diplomats he maintains that most of the questions on the table were of “gigantic irrelevance” and could have been agreed upon over a cup of tea and a brandy. As Norway’s case has shown, this did not mean that negotiations had to lead to a successful ratification. Indeed, as Norwegian historians have argued, in 1962, 1967 and 1970-72 it was hard to see how any agreement that complied with the acquis could have satisfied Norwegian interests. There was, however, nothing predetermined in the outcome of the negotiations. Both public and internal records show that the out-

come of negotiations as well as the result of the referendum campaign was undetermined until the end. Enlargement negotiations were already in the early 1970s a complex multilevel game, where certain norms and rules were applied and followed, but where a multitude of different factors and actors defined the outcome. 91 Officially, Norway and the Community met 27 times during the 19 month long negotiations, ten times at ministerial level and 17 times on deputy level. In addition there were countless informal consultations and meetings among experts. Depending on the subject and on the phase, the expert level was more important than the political level whereas in other phases political initiatives were decisive and able to push the process towards a compromise. Also, bilateral contacts between applicants and member states could have a decisive impact upon the negotiations. Such contacts were allowed and even encouraged as long as they did not thwart the EC’s common negotiating position. Together, these contacts had the side-effect of making the negotiations more integrative and contributed to further understanding among negotiators. This explains to some degree why it was possible to find a compromise even to Norway’s intricate problems in the primary sector.

However, although negotiators constantly took domestic factors into account and even used domestic pressure as a negotiation tool, they apparently operated too remotely from the people and in the Norwegian case the electorate had the final word on the result. Until the failure of the last marathon sessions in January 1972 and the subsequent resignation of the Norwegian Minister of Fisheries, there was still some optimism among negotiators that the government would be able to defend the result at home. Against the advice of some of his closest advisers and despite growing opposition, Bratteli signed the accession treaty and started the ratification process. During the eight months of hard campaigning the Labour party mobilised its troops and the Yes-campaign gained some ground that was lost earlier. At the same time, several incidences in Norway and in the EC made things more difficult for the proponents of entry.

At this point a counterfactual question might be introduced: 92 was it right of the Community to stay firm on its principles? What would have been the consequences of granting Norway the far reaching exemptions it had asked for? A number of factors were responsible for the “no” but the negotiations’ result and the way it had been achieved clearly were among them. Norwegians were deeply disappointed at not being able to make their voices heard in a sector where their country had to be regarded as a central player. Farmers, fishermen and all those sceptical of European integration got their view confirmed that a small state like Norway would not be in a position to defend even its most vital interests.

Could the Community have acted differently? Was not there some more room to stretch the principles a bit further, allowing the Norwegian government to “sell” the result as representing a guarantee for safeguarding national interests in the agrarian sector? Could not and should not the Community have accepted from the start that a CFP was impossible to conceive without the participation of future members whose inclusion would radically change the size and character of the regime? Would a special regime for Norway really have jeopardized the conclusion of the enlargement process and undermined the CAP?

It is certainly stimulating to take counterfactual questions as a starting point for a discussion on the adequacy of the now “classical Community method”, centred on the unconditional acceptance of the acquis. In a historical analysis, however, the wider political context in which the negotiations took place cannot be ignored. The 1970-72 process was marked, first of all, by the French fear of an all out attack on the CAP and by its partner’s politically motivated consent not to provoke a crisis over this question. In an atmosphere still under the impression of the crises of the sixties, and influenced by Germany’s preoccupation with support for its Ostpolitik, it is hard to imagine the Community embarking on a major reform project that most certainly would have endangered its internal cohesion. The unity of the Common Market was in everybody’s interest and the consent on the centrality of the acquis was the kit that held the Community together. Instead of using the applicant’s challenge to CAP and CFP as an incitement to reform an arguably ill-devised and increasingly unpopular policy, the acceptance of the acquis became the key concept of EC enlargement. To the present day, this principle has made every further enlargement a painfully long and ever more complicated process. On the one hand it protects the European Community (and today the EU) against disintegrating influences from future partners that are unable or unwilling to share the full obligations of full membership. At the same time, however, the insistence on the acquis seems to reduce the EC/EU’s ability to absorb initiatives for reform.
Taking Farmers off Welfare.  
The EEC Commission’s Memorandum “Agriculture 1980” of 1968

Katja SEIDEL

Agriculture is in crisis, again. During his visit to the Paris Salon de l’Agriculture on 6 March 2010 French President Nicolas Sarkozy acknowledged that the sector suffered from a climate of crisis and fear and that young people in particular must seriously doubt whether they had a future in farming. He condemned the path the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has taken since the early 1990s, namely to “exchange prices against subventions”. Farmers, according to him, were entrepreneurs who needed to gain their incomes from prices and not subventions. At the same time, he announced that, should the agricultural budget of the European Union (EU) be slashed further, France would insist on Community preference and price policy to compensate for the cuts, otherwise “ce n’est plus l’Europe”.¹

Nearly fifty years after setting up the CAP and eighteen years after the 1992 MacSharry reforms, agricultural policy and the economic and social situation of farmers still draw the political attention in Europe. The fact that in the year 2010 the French President advocates a strengthening of Community preference and a return to price policy that had caused the EU budget nearly to collapse in the 1980s, invites an analysis of the first attempt of reforming the CAP in 1968. Here, too, the point of departure was “a feeling of despair” that had “gripped many farmers, who see no future in their work”.² In the late 1960s, the flaws of the CAP, a “welfare policy” the European Economic Community (EEC) had established to help the agricultural sector survive the economic and social transitions post-war Europe was undergoing, were blatant.³ The situation was characterised by increasing costs of market support and price policy – the two pillars of the CAP – and the inability of many farmers in the six member states to generate a sufficient income in spite of the costly support mechanisms. At the same time the high agricultural prices started to lead to costly structural surpluses for some commodities, in particular dairy products, wheat and sugar.

². §33 of the “Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in the European Economic Community and Annexes”, COM(68)1000 final, Parts A and B, 18.12.1968; Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement No.1/69, pp.9-46. This memorandum, which was submitted by the Commission to the Council on 21 December 1968, is henceforth referred to as the Mansholt Plan (MP).
Since the mid-1960s the Commission had realised that the CAP, even though it was the first common, and in many ways the EEC’s flagship policy, needed to be altered. To remedy the situation, the Commission launched its memorandum “Agriculture 1980” in December 1968, the aims of which were no less than to transform European agriculture, modernise agricultural structures and turn farmers into entrepreneurs who could generate a satisfactory income from their work. Agricultural prices should again play the role of prices in a market economy, namely regulate supply and demand. In short, the reform proposal aimed to take European farmers off welfare.

This so-called Mansholt Plan – named after Commission vice-president Sicco Mansholt, responsible for agricultural policy – resulted in three directives on agricultural structures which the Council of Ministers adopted in April 1972. These directives were, however, only a watered-down version of the Commission’s ambitious plans and hardly appropriate to achieve the radical change in the European agricultural sector it had set out to realise. The Mansholt Plan itself, the reactions to it and its aftermath have already been discussed in the research literature on the CAP. Kiran Klaus Patel analyses in particular the position of the German government and the German farmers’ lobby, Deutscher Bauernverband. Edmund Neville-Rolfe’s account focuses on the reactions of the member states to the Memorandum. He also gives interesting insight in the long-term impact of the three directives on structural policy adopted in 1972. However neither Patel and Neville-Rolfe, nor authors such as Michael Tracy, Guido Thiemeyer and Adrian Kay analyse in detail the preparation of and the rationale behind the Mansholt Plan. Yet, the background of the reform is important as the “Agriculture 1980” memorandum was the first attempt to reform the CAP - arguably the most radical until the MacSharry reforms of 1992 – and it served as a blueprint for subsequent reform proposals.


This article sets out to place the Memorandum in the context of the rise of structural policy and the “great plans” of the late 1960s, explore the policy and decision-making process leading to the Memorandum, and discuss the different actors that were involved. It first summarises the main points of the Mansholt Plan before secondly studying the slow rise of structural policy as a potential addition to the CAP framework during the 1960s. The third section analyses the preparatory phase of the Memorandum in EEC Committees and the last section examines the controversial discussion of the reform in the Commission.

The Memorandum “Agriculture 1980”

On 21 December 1968 the Commission submitted the “Memorandum on the reform of agriculture in the European Economic Community” to the Council. It was part of a 500-page strong package that included several annexes containing statistical data, among them the first Community report on the situation of agricultural structure. The Memorandum first gave an account of the current situation of farming in the EEC, showing that in spite of growing output and productivity farmers lagged behind the non-agricultural population both in terms of income and living standard. It argued that the demand for agricultural products in the Community was not likely to grow proportionately to the increasing farmers’ output as the degree of self-sufficiency for most agricultural commodities was already high. Hence, the Memorandum concluded that there was little possibility of improving the situation of farmers by further augmenting prices and productivity, also given the growing costs of the guarantee section of the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). The main obstacle to improving the situation of farming was seen in structural imperfections such as the small average farm size in the member states and the rising average age of the farming population, leaving old farmers running small farms which barely earned them a living. The overall rationale of the reform the Memorandum proposed was to cut prices and to proceed to a radical change of agricultural structure.

Consequently, the price proposals for the marketing year 1969/70 presented in the first part of the Memorandum were cautious. A veritable reform programme was then developed in the second part, the actual “Agriculture 1980” programme. The aim of improving incomes and living conditions of farmers would necessitate a reorganisation of agriculture with potentially important consequences for traditional agricultural patterns. The Commission argued that in the long-term farms needed to become much larger to make investments pay off, to lower production costs and to be able to react to changes in markets and demand by adapting production. Farms were therefore to form “production units” (PU) or “modern agricultural enterprises” (MAE) (§90-91, MP). The former were either large individual farms or farms entering into cooperative arrangements with other farms, working on a size of 80-120 ha. The latter were farms that merged with others into large agricultural enterprises, i.e. above 120 ha. Both forms should grant their owners and labourers a sufficient income allowing them to
participate in the general rise in wealth in the Community. After five years into the programme, these PUs and MAEs would exclusively benefit from financial aids and investment grants whereas other types of farms would not be supported anymore and were eventually to disappear (§96, MP).

The surplus problem should be tackled by reducing the agricultural population which would fall by five million within ten years (§88bis, MP). To achieve this, a costly social and regional policy programme, partly financed by the EEC, should create jobs and provide the necessary incentives in the form of aid, education, retraining, early retirement, etc., for farmers to give up farming (§74-83, MP). In order to curb production and to cope with the rising productivity of the PUs and MAEs, five million hectares of arable land should be taken out of production and transformed into woodland or used for recreational purposes (§105, MP). By 1980 EAGGF guarantee costs should be limited to 750 million units of account (u.a.) per year (from ca. 2,000 million u.a. in 1968/69). Additional measures were proposed to remove obstacles to increasing farm sizes, for example in land tenure legislation, and to improve information and marketing of agricultural products. In short, the Mansholt Plan was not simply a programme for reforming agriculture but it was a political, economic and social programme for the agricultural sector and rural areas. The member states should invest heavily in their regions in a “movement of solidarity, which aims at guiding agriculture into modern ways and at giving farmers their due share in the general prosperity” (§33, MP).

The immediate reactions to the Mansholt Plan ranged from friendly through sceptical to outright hostile. Many were surprised by the frankness with which the Memorandum described the situation of farming in the Community and by the radical measures it proposed. This raises the question to what extent the ideas in the Memorandum were unique, in what context they emerged and what kind of data was available from which the Commission drew these kinds of conclusions. To understand the background of the Mansholt Plan, it is crucial to look at the development of structural policy in the Community in general and in the CAP framework in particular.

### Structural policy and the asymmetrical CAP

The treaty establishing the EEC in 1957 stipulated that one of the aims of the Community’s agricultural policy should be to improve agricultural structures to enhance the competitiveness of European agriculture (Articles 39.1(a) and 41(a)). This aim was again emphasised in the resolution of the Stresa conference of June 1958: “Structural reforms should go hand in hand with market policy; the first should

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result in a harmonization of prices, the latter should stimulate productivity”. In the following years the Commission and the member states focused on market organisations, however, and the CAP was built on price and market policies; the improvement of agricultural structures remained in the hands of the member states.

At the national level structural policy became more important throughout the 1960s. France was pioneering in this respect, their efforts on land reform culminating in the 1960 *Loi d’orientation agricole* and the 1962 *Loi complémentaire*. This legislation aimed at regrouping farmland, raising productivity in agriculture and improving marketing and production structures by establishing the *Sociétés d’aménagement foncier et d’établissement rural*, or SAFERs, for land consolidation. Other member states followed and enacted similar legislation before the mid-1960s.

Structural policy measures to improve the efficiency of farming were also advocated by leading agronomists, particularly in the context of the difficult question of the common cereal prices. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, a panel of eight experts was charged with studying the consequences of a possible lowering of the high domestic cereal prices. In the so-called *Professorengutachten* of 1962 the experts argued that German cereal farmers had to raise their level of productivity to offset the envisaged price cuts. In the long-term, they argued, movement of surplus manpower into other economic sectors was necessary to increase farm sizes and thus productivity. Although such ideas were widespread, they were also heavily contested, for example by the Deutscher Bauernverband. The net result was that productivity-enhancing ideas had little impact on the price decisions at Community level.

Generally speaking, Ulrich Kluge sees in the second half of the 1960s the peak of research and discussions among agronomists about aims for a modern agricultural sector. This period gave rise to what he calls the “grand programmes and plans” at both the national and Community levels. In 1967, for instance, the German Agricultural Minister Hermann Höcherl published an agricultural programme which re-

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sembled, in some of its elements, the “Agriculture 1980” memorandum. For example, Höcherl also emphasised the need for structural policy, the formation of producer groups and a preference for full-time farm holdings and farms with potential to increase their size. Another plan, this time more geared towards regional economic development generally, was the Schiller Plan of 1969, named after the German Economics Minister Karl Schiller.

In France, Agricultural Minister Edgar Faure commissioned a report on the situation of French agriculture in 1966. Unlike the Höcherl and Schiller Plans, this was a report from an independent commission, led by law and economics professor Georges Vedel. The resulting report, published in 1969, was a projection of the development of French agriculture until 1985. In its spirit and frankness, as well as in many of its conclusions, it was similar to the Mansholt Plan and the Professorengutachten. The Vedel report suggested analysing the farming profession with the same criteria that were applied to the general economy, namely in terms of business, problems of raising capital, management, employment, investment and markets. While the Höcherl Plan did not mention agricultural surpluses, the Vedel report thought that such surpluses were already a problem and that they would become an even greater problem if the sector did not undergo transformation. Surpluses were seen as the result of a price policy geared towards meeting the production costs of even the most unprofitable farms and of poor agricultural structures. The reduction of arable surface and of the agricultural population was, like in the Mansholt Plan, mentioned as part of the solution. Prices should again play their economic role to guide production and not to support farmers. However, unlike the Mansholt Plan, the Vedel report did not think that people leaving agriculture would considerably increase farm sizes and thus efficiency. All in all, it was very frank about the current situation and painted an alarming picture of the French agricultural sector by 1985 if nothing was done to reform it. It is not surprising that the French government, anxious not to cause new unrest among the agricultural population in the aftermath of May 1968, hesitated to publish the report and kept quiet about it.

The main difference between the Mansholt Plan and the national plans was that the latter often did not communicate clear ideas about the look of a modern agricultural sector and who should benefit from government aids to achieve modernisation. The French 1960 law, for example, was geared towards viable “family farms” without further defining them. The Höcherl Plan and later the 1970 Ertl Plan of German

18. Ibid., p.527.
Agricultural Minister Josef Ertl, attributed a lot of freedom to farmers to choose whether they wanted assistance to improve their holdings with the view of generating acceptable incomes, whether they wanted to continue as before or whether they wanted to leave agriculture altogether. Any selective approach to helping farmers, like in the Commission’s Memorandum, would have been politically explosive. Also, the individual national plans did not aim at improving the situation in the Community as a whole. Often they were geared towards improving the competitive situation of one country’s agricultural sector in the EEC common market. Farmers of countries with no national structural plans such as Italy were left behind by those in financially better off member states that were able to subsidise an often backward agricultural sector. The idea that there needed to be a Community structural policy to complement the CAP therefore suggested itself.

Although the Commission initially tried to push for structural measures, progress in structural policy at Community level was slow. In September 1958, for example, Mansholt gave a speech at Bad Tölz in which he advocated that structural reforms were necessary. Already then the transformations he envisaged for the sector were quite radical, advocating a reduction of the agricultural surface and a massive exodus of farmers – nine million people within fifteen years should leave the land. These ideas were met with a wave of protest and such plans, judged too controversial, were subsequently abandoned in the set-up phase of the CAP.

Yet, reducing the number of farmers and setting aside arable land were ideas the Commissioner for Agriculture kept at the back of his mind, communicating them from time to time. At the third regional conference of the Food and Agriculture Organisation in Rome in October 1962, for example, he argued that to avoid agricultural surpluses EEC member states should aim to reduce their agricultural population to 6-10% of the active population while implementing a careful price policy. Structural reforms, he believed, could reduce the income gap between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. It was only in January 1962 that the Council had decided on implementing a Community market and price policy for agricultural products. In late 1962, therefore, Mansholt may still have hoped that well-thought national structural programmes would lead to an efficient European farming sector which would allow for lower prices and less market support at the Community level.

In December 1963 the Council set up EAGGF; one third of its funds should have gone into the “orientation” section, from which structural measures in the member states would be financed. This threshold was never reached as the “guarantee” section of EAGGF for market support grew constantly as agricultural surpluses increased. An attempt to co-ordinate national structural measures at EEC-level was made by

setting up the Standing Committee on Agricultural Structure in December 1962.22 The Standing Committee was composed of member state representatives and chaired by a Commission representative (Article 1). Further, the Commission should submit to the European Parliament and the Council an annual report on the structure of agriculture in the EEC containing an appraisal of member states’ structural policies in relation to their contribution to the aims of the CAP (Article 2). Based on these reports, the Commission should submit proposals to the Council aimed at improving agricultural structure and coordinating further the structural policies in the member states (Article 3). Importantly, the decision authorised the Commission to request information on programmes and legislation regarding national structural policies. In 1964, the Commission decided to set up an Advisory Committee for Problems Regarding Agricultural Structure Policy composed of 36 representatives of the profession, namely farmers, farm cooperatives, banks specialising in agricultural credit, farming families, farm workers, commerce and industry as well as non-agricultural trade unions. The Commission could consult the Advisory Committee on issues relating to the Council decision of December 1962 and on all problems related to the politics of agricultural structures.23

These measures were primarily aimed at coordinating and harmonising national structural policies. The Community institutions were lacking any power or right to impose sanctions in this area. By neglecting structural policy, the EEC had ended up with an asymmetrical CAP with different centres of decision-making: the market organisations and common prices were decided at Community level and managed by the Commission whereas socio-economic measures were excluded from the CAP framework and remained in the hands of the member states.

The Mansholt Plan was clearly embedded in the academic and political debates on the modernisation of agricultural structures and regional policy in the 1960s. At the same time it was based on Mansholt’s own ideas reaching back at least to the Stresa conference.

**Collecting data and preparing the Mansholt Plan**

Both the Council decision of December 1962 and, to a lesser extent, the Commission decision of 1964, were important steps on the way towards a Community structural policy. They allowed for the collection of data and thus for more precise studies of the structure of agriculture in the Community. Structural policy was a complex area as national and regional differences made one-size-fits-all solutions impossible. The improved methods in agricultural economics and the national structural programmes

were therefore a necessary precondition for the Commission to be able to obtain data and draw conclusions that could guide their policy decisions.

Commissioner Mansholt and his Directorate-General for Agriculture (DG VI) had played a major role in setting up the CAP and managing it. During the early 1960s structural policy had however played only a marginal role. This was not least due to a rather passive Director of structural policy, Roger Groten. In the late 1960s Groten was replaced by Raymond Craps who had previously been head of the division “Improvement of the social conditions in agriculture” and then of the division “Coordination of structural policy in the member states, Community programmes for agriculture”. Craps was one of the leading figures in DG VI pushing for structural policy. Allegedly in 1964 Craps and a colleague wrote a letter to Mansholt saying that “a global policy, an agricultural policy and not a price policy” was needed.24 This view hit a nerve with Mansholt who, as seen above, nurtured similar thoughts. Craps, together with Hans-Broder Krohn, the Director of the Directorate for Agricultural Economics and Legislation, and Georges Rencki, head of division for non-governmental organisations, were to become the main drafters of the Mansholt Plan. The reform proposal reflected not least the ideas of Krohn, who had been a student of German agriculture economists Arthur Hanau and Emil Woermann, and who like them considered agriculture as primarily an economic problem, with farming enterprises forming an integral part of the economy. He thus opposed the special treatment the agricultural sector received in the CAP framework.25

Moreover, the growing surpluses and the rising costs of the EAGGF guarantee section certainly encouraged DG VI to propose a reform of agricultural structures. Further, the completion of the CAP – the common market for agricultural products opened on 1 July 1968 – invited a new move of the Commission. In October 1967, a small group of DG VI officials met in Luxembourg at the village of Gaichel to discuss the long-term implications of the market and price policies under conditions of unchanged economic growth and agricultural imports and how much land and labour needed to remain in production.26 Later Krohn, the leading figure in this meeting, explained the rationale of the group to officials of the British Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. The decision to go into agricultural structures was taken because of the accelerating surpluses and the prospect of heavy annual destruction of produce (especially wheat, fruit and dairy products) and because of the frightening prospect that the Community would not be able to meet the costs of the CAP unless something was done and quickly. As the CAP had been the first European policy, safeguarding

it as a symbol of European integration played a role as well: “A further point in the background was the crucial importance both in the economy of the Community and prestige-wise of the CAP. If it went ‘bust’, apart from the possibility of social revolution and economic hardship the whole fabric of the EEC itself could be in the balance”.27

Mansholt had started preparing the ground for the reform since early 1967. This included presenting his ideas to different audiences. In April he gave a talk to the Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee. It is telling that he addressed the economic experts before the agricultural community, given that the changes he had in mind would “peut-être […] donner un choc aux agriculteurs. Parfois ce choc est salutaire, mais parfois il peut entraîner une rébellion”.28 It was only in October of the same year that Mansholt raised the question of structural policy in the Commission. He wanted to present the problem at the Council of Agricultural Ministers in mid-October and thus needed agreement of his colleagues.29 In the Commission, Mansholt’s main argument for a Community structural policy was that of rationalising production and reducing costs. He chose this argument (and not for example that of raising farm incomes) to persuade his CAP-critical colleagues such as Hans von der Groeben. The Commission agreed that an efficient structural policy needed to be set up and gave Mansholt the mandate to pursue this accordingly.

When he presented his ideas in the Agricultural Council a couple of days later, Mansholt - again adapting to his audience - put the main emphasis on improving the social and economic situation of farmers and not on reducing costs. He argued that the main question to be solved was how to ensure that farmers obtained a standard of living comparable to that in other sectors of the economy. He then drew a link between incomes and structural policy, arguing that prices could not rise indefinitely and increasing production was not a solution either, as for many commodities the Community had already reached self-sufficiency. Instead, his solution was: “Il ne nous reste qu’à augmenter la productivité; en produisant avec moins de personnes les mêmes quantités de produits”.30 The target was to bring the agricultural population down to six per cent of the active population over a period of circa 20 years. Mansholt argued that by giving aids also to small farms, the member states would only perpetuate the problem, namely of farms where farmers had a seven-day working week on

27. National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK), Kew, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 30/317, G. W. Ford to Geofffrey Woodward, 27.01.1969. Ford was an official in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). Woodward was Assistant Secretary and since 1970 Undersecretary in MAFF.


29. European Commission Historical Archives (ECHA), Brussels, BAC 259.80 No.5, PV spécial de la 10e réunion de la Commission, 10-13.10.1967.

a low income and the farmer was “l’esclave de son entreprise”.31 The ministers, although surprised and not entirely convinced by Mansholt’s alarming picture, agreed to assist the Commission in the study of agricultural structures, particularly through the senior civil servants sitting on the Standing Committee of Agricultural Structure. These works should be “très confidentiels” however, in order not to upset the farming population.32

While the Commission advocated that price policy and market support had reached their limits, agricultural incomes had stagnated and many of the Community’s farmers lived in dire socio-economic conditions, it was vital to base these assumptions on reliable data and scientific studies. In an intensive study phase lasting from mid-1967 to summer 1968 DG VI worked closely together with national experts. For example, work on the first survey on the structure of agricultural holdings, which had been on the agenda since 1962, finally got under way. The survey was carried out by the Standing Committee on Agricultural Structures and was coordinated by DG VI, in particular by Krohn and the Directorate for Agricultural Structures under Craps.33 DG VI based the diagnosis of problems in agriculture and the remedies it proposed in the Mansholt Plan on this survey, based on a random survey of 1.2 million agricultural holdings, and on additional studies it produced itself and commissioned from the Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee.34 The survey was only published in late 1968 together with the Mansholt Plan.35

In summer 1967 Craps’ directorate prepared a paper with mandates for five working groups in the Standing Committee. The paper argued that the common market for agricultural products posed new challenges to farmers to which they needed to adapt. It was necessary to develop a “conception globale de cette politique agricole”.36 Consequently, the themes DG VI wanted the Standing Committee to study were those which they thought would characterise agriculture in the future. These were the common use of capital equipment and of services, the joint production of certain commodities, the merger of agricultural enterprises, large-scale animal farming, and the amalgamation in commercialisation and processing of agricultural products. All these themes were eventually addressed in the Mansholt Plan.

31. Ibid., p.328.
32. Ibid., p.324.
34. Since then, the Commission has published these surveys on the structure of agricultural holdings circa every three years; see Commission européenne, Structure des exploitations agricoles. Résultats historiques – Enquête de 1966/67 à 1997. Version finale: octobre 2000, Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, Luxembourg, 2000 (p.3 for the 1.2 million figure).
In early 1968 DG VI again established working groups in the Standing Committee, each of them studying a different aspect of structural policy. In April 1968 working group I tabled a hundred-page document on the situation of farms and the agricultural population in the member states.\(^{37}\) This report was an important source for the Mansholt Plan which retained many of its results. The paragraphs in brackets in the following section refer to the corresponding paragraphs in the Mansholt Plan. The report first underlined that in all member states the reduction of the agricultural population in previous years had led to more efficient farms that, due to technical progress, could function with less labour (§3, MP). However, the report concluded that this migration from the land was not sufficient to improve agricultural structures (§35, MP). The demographic analysis had shown that there were still too many small farms often worked by ageing farmers who were left behind after paid labour and then family members had left the farm (§§13 and 35, MP). Given that these small farms often did not find a successor due to better working conditions for the young in jobs outside agriculture, the report argued that this was the opportunity of enlarging existing farms. With its social measures, the Mansholt Plan aimed at stimulating, accelerating, accompanying and controlling this transformation process (e.g. §§59 and 68-83, MP). The report projected the development of the agricultural sector until 1975, concluding that the agricultural population would shrink further and estimating that 514,779 people would need jobs in different sectors and 1,596,052 would retire.\(^{38}\) These numbers were even higher than the estimated 80,000 new jobs that had to be created annually according to the Commission’s Memorandum (§88, MP).

The report then distinguished between the prospects for farms in three types of regions. The best prospects were for farms in urban or industrialised areas with good communication and transport facilities, availability of non-agricultural jobs and markets for agricultural products. The second region was rural but with a satisfactory demographic situation and normally functioning public services. Also here agriculture had potential and the creation of additional industrial jobs was possible. The third type of region was essentially rural and isolated; its demographic situation was problematic as the young were deserting it, leaving behind an ageing population. These three regions and the conclusions as to their possible development entered the Mansholt Plan as industrial, semi-agricultural and predominantly agricultural regions (§§84-86, MP). Crucial for the argument of the Commission to increase farm sizes was the conclusion of the report that farm size had a direct impact on the socio-economic situation of a farm.\(^{39}\) The report also examined the average farm sizes in the member states, ascertaining that many farms were run by full-time staff while being too small to generate a satisfactory income (§§11-12 and 36, MP). Finally, the controversial figure of five million farmers having to leave agriculture that would

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38. Ibid., p.216.

39. Ibid., p.229.
cause outrage in the farming community after the launch of the Mansholt Plan could be found in this report (§§88bis, MP). The report even concluded that this number was not high enough to allow for real improvement of farm sizes.

Simultaneously to the work in the Standing Committee, DG VI used the Advisory Committee to involve the agricultural community in the discussions and to obtain their opinion on some of the proposals for a modern agriculture. In May 1968, DG VI submitted a catalogue of questions to working groups, asking for example which were the most appropriate means to guarantee farmers the availability of land necessary for enlarging their farms while keeping the financial costs down. Another question was whether a policy facilitating the acquisition of land by farms would be welcomed and how and under what conditions the reduction of labour for improving farm structures could be achieved. Finally, DG VI asked which type of collaboration between farms would be advantageous and which types of vertical integration between farms and the agricultural and food industry could be beneficial.40

Given these studies and the amount of data that was processed to obtain the conclusions that entered the Memorandum, Adrian Kay is certainly right to emphasise that “the plan is the one significant example of the analysis of agricultural economists, prior to the MacSharry Reforms, having some input into the reform process”.41 In addition, based on these findings Mansholt and DG VI constructed a particular narrative, sharpening the arguments to create an ambience of urgency to convince first the Commission and then the Council of Ministers of the need to undertake a radical reform of the CAP. They also combined the results of the report of the Standing Committee working group with other aims. It was DG VI, for instance, that linked agricultural structure to the surplus problem. This provided them with an additional argument in favour of this costly adaptation programme both vis-à-vis the Commission and member state governments.

**Broadening the reform programme: the input of the Commission**

During the second half of 1968 DG VI drafted the reform memorandum. Mansholt presented the draft in the Commission on 16 October. It appears that after the Commission had agreed to make a move in the field of structural policy in October 1967, it had not discussed the issue again, nor had any of the other directorates-general been involved in the preparation of the draft. Mansholt’s proposals thus must have generated surprise among his colleagues in terms of both the radical nature of the measures that would transform agriculture and of the costs of the measures that would retain agriculture as the Community’s main interest for the next ten years. While the main arguments of the Memorandum survived the debate in the Commission, new aspects

40. Private Papers Georges Rencki, Tervuren, Comité consultatif pour les problèmes de la politique de structure agricole, Meeting of working group No.1, 14.05.1968.
41. A. KAY, op.cit., p.31.
were introduced by Commissioners who pursued their own agendas and who did not necessarily think that the Commission should continue to focus its attention on the CAP.

Following Mansholt’s presentation, the Commission set up a group of five Directors-General to study the Memorandum. According to a British source, these Directors-General had the task of “revamping” the Memorandum, following criticism made by Raymond Barre and other Commissioners. The Directors-General discussed a catalogue of six questions during one working weekend (23-26 October). Due to the short time span, the report was brief and introduced few new aspects. Among them was the idea to propose to the Council a reform of the European Social Fund to provide funding for education and training of children of farmers and those who wanted to leave the agricultural sector. In general, the Directors-General supported the reform which “s’impose dans l’intérêt général de l’économie”, but they predicted that the financing of the measures would pose a problem.

At the same time, members of the Commission set up a Groupe des problèmes agricoles, which was presided over by Mansholt. Commissioner von der Groeben participated actively in the group and identified three problems the reform needed to address: how to limit EAGGF expenses; problems related to farmers who had to stay in agriculture but did not have a sufficient income; and problems related to farmers who had to leave agriculture. The last problem was, according to him, a regional policy problem as new employment needed to be created in the regions. He announced that he would draft a paper on “lignes directrices d’une politique régionale appropriée”. Generally speaking, von der Groeben became very active in the preparatory phase of the Memorandum, emphasising the regional aspects of the structural policy proposals.

It was only in July 1967 that von der Groeben had taken over the newly created Directorate-General for Regional Policy (DG XVI) and it is likely that he was looking for a possibility of linking up the CAP problems with regional policy actions to get the then non-existent regional policy off to a start. The Mansholt Plan presented von der Groeben with the opportunity to raise his profile as Commissioner responsible

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42. ECHA, BAC 259.80 No. 22, PV spécial 52ème réunion de la Commission, 16.10.1968.
43. NAUK, FCO 30/318, James Mellon to Martin R. Morland, Brussels, 26.08.1969. Mellon was an agricultural expert in the FCO and member of the UK delegation to the EC between 1967 and 1972. Morland was an official in the European Integration Department of the FCO.
45. Ibid., p.10.
for regional policy. As a matter fact, it was in December 1969 that he presented his proposals for a “regionalisation” of the agricultural reform to the Council.  

Another Commissioner who took the opportunity of the reform memorandum to discuss the CAP in general was Raymond Barre, Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs. Barre analysed the draft memorandum from an economist’s perspective. The first and main problem he saw were the costs of the measures: it would be difficult to get politicians to accept that expensive measures they agreed to now would only pay off in five to ten years’ time. In particular those countries currently not benefiting from the CAP such as Germany and Italy would be very reluctant to endorse the programme if it did not go hand in hand with extending Community policies in other sectors to balance the expenditure and make those losing out in agriculture gain in other areas. For this reason Barre argued for integrating the reform into a broader programme of employment and industrial development which would of course involve his Directorate-General. He then criticised the core convictions of the Memorandum; he doubted whether reaching parity for agricultural incomes, improving the living conditions on farms, reducing agricultural expenditure and avoiding additional costs for consumers could be reached through the proposed measures. While Barre agreed that with growth rates of circa three per cent per annum the EEC economy could absorb the 3.6 million people leaving agriculture (or 1.9 million as some would retire), he argued that the exodus could become a problem for some regions.

For Barre the entire reform of agricultural structures did not make sense from an economic point of view. Regarding the creation of production units and modern agricultural enterprises, he doubted whether it made sense to subsidise the process of taking land out of production while at the same time investing heavily in the creation of more productive farms. Because of the surplus problem, an investment in modern agricultural enterprises was fundamentally “anti-economical”, had no advantage for society but only for individual farmers. It would be much easier and less costly to create profitable employment in other sectors.

Barre also called into question the “agricultural vocation” of the Community and asked whether it was not cynical to fund European farmers with a lot of money while dumping surpluses on people in the third world. Instead, he asked whether it would not be better to open the borders of the Community for products of third world coun-

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48. NAUK, FCO 30/318, Raymond Barre, Note sur certains problèmes de caractère général ayant trait à la politique agricole dans le cadre de la politique à moyen terme, Brussels, 13.11.1968.
tries. Barre was also extremely sceptical towards the idea of rationalising agriculture and thought that the results were often unsatisfactory not least because standardisation of production often had a negative effect on the taste of the products. According to him, alongside rationalisation the “family farm” should remain as it produced sought-after high end products. These high quality products could be marketed to high earners in Europe and the United States. This would keep part of the agricultural population in place, especially in areas of natural beauty where tourism was an additional income source. In his conclusion Barre wrote that the memorandum should put more emphasis on factors external to agriculture, as the problem of agricultural structures could only be tackled by looking at the larger problem of the structure of economic development in the Community.

In spite of his criticism of the CAP in general, and the reform proposal in particular, Barre played an important and constructive role. He introduced arguments on why the measures on agricultural structure would stimulate economic growth in the member states and help develop the regions. This was important to make the proposal acceptable to the member state governments other than agricultural ministers. In his paper Barre underlined that the programme of the Commission was expensive but that the absence of a programme would lead to economic and social tensions which in the long run would be even more expensive than the reform.49 Indeed, while the Commission did not fundamentally change the Memorandum after Barre’s presentation, it decided to emphasise more the benefits of the reform for the general economic development (§§43 and 88, MP). Further, in the Commission meeting of 18 December when the final discussion and vote on the Memorandum took place, Barre emphasised that through the creation of new jobs in more productive sectors than agriculture the costs of the programme would be offset in the medium-term.50 The Commission agreed that Mansholt’s presentation to the Council should be based on this argument. It was also a last-minute effort to broaden the programme and to turn it into an overall programme for regional economic development with which CAP critics such as von der Groeben and Barre could identify. On the initiative of the Directors-General and Lionello Levi-Sandri, Commissioner for Social Affairs, the reform of the European Social Fund entered the Memorandum (§79, MP) and social measures were extended to people beyond the agricultural sector, to include measures for education, training and the creation of new jobs.51 Generally, the Commission, possibly on the initiative of von der Groeben, emphasised more the diversity of the regions and therefore the different regional needs and conditions for creating jobs.

As the Memorandum was supposed to be linked to the decision on agricultural prices, Mansholt also submitted price proposals to his colleagues, proposing (slightly) lower prices for surplus commodities. It seems that the price proposals and measures to tackle surpluses were at least as controversial as the structural policy measures. Mansholt’s main critic was Fritz Hellwig, German vice-president of the Commission

49. Ibid.
50. ECHA, PV 61\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission, 2\textsuperscript{e} partie final, 18.12.1968.
51. ECHA, BAC 259.80 No.22, PV spécial 55\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission, 06.11.1968.
and responsible for Research and Technology. Hellwig came up with a number of counter-proposals to Mansholt’s price proposals which he still deemed too high, thus showing his deep uneasiness about the rising costs of the CAP. Hellwig’s main suggestions were linked to making producers contribute towards the costs of dairy surpluses and to fix a Community-wide quota for milk production. Making farmers participate in the costs did not yet find a majority in the Commission, however. When the Commission voted on the controversial points, Hellwig could not impose his views even though he was often backed by German Commissioners Wilhelm Haferkamp and von der Groeben and also the Dutch Emmanuel Sassen.52

When the Commission finally voted on the entire text, Hellwig voted against the Memorandum and von der Groeben abstained. Hellwig’s rationale was revealing for the critical stance some in the Commission had adopted vis-à-vis the CAP and the problems and costs it had already caused:

“L’agriculture continue à être traitée de manière unilatérale, comme un secteur privilégié, les erreurs du système communautaire mis antérieurement en place étant largement entérinées, puisque le problème des excédents de production ne sera pas résolu.”53

While Sassen remained critical about the Memorandum, he voted in favour to show his support for the “restructuration de l’agriculture européenne ainsi qu’au principe fondamental des modifications à apporter au système du soutien des marchés agricoles”.54

The Memorandum was adopted on 18 December after a shaky consensus had been formed in the Commission over a short period of ten weeks. Several Commission members and President Jean Rey criticised that Mansholt had left it too late to inform them and that DG VI did not inform or cooperate with other interested Directorates-General. The fragmentation of the Commission’s services was not conducive to such cooperation. As a consequence, the other Commissioners were only informed about the Memorandum in their weekly meetings, shortly before it was due to be launched. In the end, Mansholt’s core ideas prevailed but they were slightly modified by emphasising regional policy more (von der Groeben), by underlining the advantages for regional economic development that could be expected by investing in the measures proposed by the Memorandum (Barre) and by proposing a reform of the European Social Fund (Levi-Sandri). The price policy and how to limit the surpluses had been the real point of contention, showing that many Commissioners were deeply dissatisfied with how the CAP had turned out. It is problematic that two Commission members could not identify with the initiative (Hellwig and von der Groeben). Yet, on the whole the Commission, in particular President Rey, still trusted Mansholt, who had played a major role in setting up the CAP, to make the necessary improvements to his policy.

52. ECHA, PV 61ère réunion de la Commission, 2e partie final, 18.12.1968, for example pp.18-19.
53. Ibid., p.32.
54. Ibid., p.34.
Conclusion

The Agricultural Ministers first discussed the Mansholt Plan in the Council meeting of 16 January 1969. While the ministers’ reactions were not entirely negative, most attention was given to the price proposals, which constituted the most pressing issue. In the following months the Council barely considered the long-term perspective of agriculture, the main aim of the Mansholt Plan, but focused instead on agricultural prices and on concluding a deal on the financing of the CAP. For the member states consolidating the old CAP system had priority. In April 1970 the Commission submitted to the Council five draft directives and one draft regulation – the so-called Mini-Mansholt Plan. In the course of the Council negotiations and consultations with farmers’ groups, these proposals were reduced to three directives dealing with modernisation, early retirement and socio-economic guidance. It took until early 1972 for the Agricultural Ministers to adopt them. All controversial proposals of the Mansholt Plan such as land set-aside, minimum size for farms or direct aids for farmers had no chance of being adopted by the Council of Agricultural Ministers.

Moreover, the debate in the Council shows that structural policy continued to be seen as a national domain. The comment of Dutch Agricultural Minister Pierre Lardinois in the Council session of 16 January 1969 is telling and put the Commission in its place: “on pourrait se demander […] si on ne se trouve pas en présence d’un adolescent qui est en train de soulever une pierre trop lourde pour lui”. Not surprisingly the three directives, passed in April 1972, did not go much beyond what was available already at the national level. During the 1970s and 1980s the dilemma resulting from not agreeing on structural policy at Community level was that “national structural and social policies came to be used by member states to ‘compensate domestic agriculture in the case of “insufficient” price decisions at the Community level’”. The CAP thus remained asymmetrical and structural measures were an additional means for member states to distribute welfare to farmers.

Even though the Mansholt Plan was not implemented in all its aspects, it was part of and triggered an intensive debate in the member states and at Community level about modern agriculture and improvement of agricultural structures. The Commission’s projection of future developments and the attempt to manage the changes on a large scale were characteristic of the late 1960s and the early 1970s’ belief in modernisation through planning. Mansholt’s plan epitomised more than any other policy proposal of this era the progressive development of Western European societies from agrarian to (post) industrial societies. In fact, Mansholt wanted to speed up this process of deagrarianisation and depenasantisation which “also implies the decline of the political power and the cultural hegemony of the landed elites as well as of the pre-

56. Ibid., p.123.
57. See e.g. E. NEVILLE-ROLFE, op.cit., pp.88-89.
58. A. KAY, op.cit., p.36.
valence of agrarian mentalities and values, the change of the patterns of production, living and settlement”.  

The Mansholt Plan had been the result of intensive studies of agricultural experts, economists, and agronomists both in the Commission and in expert committees using statistics and data processing and punchcards. The Memorandum was thus part of the increasing use of science in policy-making in that period. For the late 1960s it is thus only partly justified to speak of a “dialogue of the deaf” between agricultural economists and CAP policy-makers on the subject of CAP reform which Kay diagnosed for the period up until the 1980s.  

Nevertheless, the manner in which the Mansholt Plan was drafted – in DG VI and expert committees – seems to indicate the future path of the CAP which made a reform increasingly difficult as the policy was managed in committees of national and Community experts and was thus removed from the broader political questions. This and the fragmented administration in the Commission were not conducive to CAP reform during the 1970s. It was precisely through discussions in the Commission since October 1968 that the Mansholt Plan was connected to broader economic questions and regional policy.  

Although the European farming sector has experienced profound changes since the launch of the Mansholt Plan, the plan is an important document that introduced the notions of competitiveness and efficiency into the debate on the future of European agriculture. Even if it is impossible to prove a direct influence, some of the ideas contained in the Mansholt Plan were again addressed in the late 1980s and in the preparatory phase of the MacSharry reforms. It is likely that Eve Fouilleux’s explanation of a profound transformation of the “rapports de forces entre les acteurs en jeu et l’évolution de leurs objectifs politiques globaux depuis les années 60” and Chris Elton’s argument of a paradigm change can account for the final acceptance of ideas similar to those put forward in the Mansholt Plan.

60. Ibid., p.29.  
61. A.C.L. KNUDSEN, op.cit., p.284, also emphasises the continuity.  
Inwieweit lässt sich die Entwicklung des EU-Systems in den letzten Jahren im Spannungsfeld zwischen Differenzierung und Fusion beschreiben und erklären? Die verschiedenen Beiträge wenden diese beiden Konzepte auf die Entwicklungen in der polity-, politics- und policy-Dimension der Integrationsentwicklung an.

Wirtschaftskrise, Klimawandel, Terrorismus, Migration und soziale Ungleichheiten erfordern europäische Lösungen. In diesem Buch wird aufgezeigt, woran die europäische Integration krankt und eine Vision für eine stärkere und demokratischere EU entwickelt.

Der Band untersucht die Entwicklung der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik (ENP) im Aushandlungsprozess zwischen Akteuren Brüsseler Institutionen und mitgliedstaatlichen Koalitionen. Dadurch ist ein neues außenpolitisches Instrument der EU entstanden, mit welchem sie die Erweiterung und deren Erfolge zu ergänzen versucht.

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Paradigm Change within the CAP 1985-92:
The European Commission's Construction of an Alternative Policy Narrative in the Late 1980s

Chris ELTON

Unlike other parts of the Treaty of Rome, the formal goals of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) set out in Article 39 have not been changed or modified. Yet, Isabelle Garzon suggests that “the founders of the CAP in 1958 […] would [today] not recognise this policy, its objectives and its instruments”. Consequently, there has been considerable academic debate about the nature of policy change, how such change has been brought about and what factors have determined the outcome and direction of change. While Adrian Kay and Robert Ackrill (in this volume) explore the processes of change in the principal programme of price and market support, this article examines change in the CAP as a composite whole and argues that the underlying rationale of the CAP was reviewed and amended during the 1985-1992 period.

Among political scientists, there has been an increasing turn towards the role of ideas as causal factors in explaining policy change. This turn owes much to the seminal work of Peter Hall who introduced the concept of a ‘policy paradigm’ to capture the very framework of ideas and standards which underpin policy makers’ specification of their goals and their selection of policy instruments. Further, policy paradigms encapsulate those ideas which enable policy makers to interpret policy issues, including cognitive ideas about how the world works and normative beliefs about what is legitimate and appropriate in the context of the culture and politics of the state. To explain how ideas came to influence the development of the CAP, it is necessary, as John L. Campbell proposes, to identify the causal mechanisms linking ideas to the outcomes of policy making, including the role of actors, the institutional context in which actors influence policy making and the processes by which policy discourse translates policy ideas into practice. Marc Blyth argues that crises, by generating uncertainty about the adequacy of current ideas for resolving problems, create the opportunity for political contestation and the promotion of new ideas. His sequential model of institutional change emphasises how ideas help to interpret the

3. While the use of the term ‘paradigm’ reflects Kuhn’s work on scientific paradigms, a policy paradigm cannot be equated with the scientific revolutions identified by Kuhn.
crises, provide a critique of the current paradigm and a ‘blue-print’ for an alternative paradigm.\(^6\)

Hall emphasises that a paradigm shift or “wholesale changes in policy occur relatively rarely” and would be evidenced by “radical changes in the overarching terms of the policy discourse”, a change in “its account of how the world facing policy makers operates” and be “preceded by significant shifts in the locus of authority over policy”.\(^7\) Such onerous conditions for a paradigm shift inevitably mean that policy change generally proceeds through incremental change along a path which is determined by the initial design of the policy. For example, Kay has highlighted how the initial specification of the political goals and policy instruments and the way they were embodied in the legislative structure of the CAP has constrained its subsequent development.\(^8\) Moreover, Carsten Daugbjerg suggests that the CAP became ‘locked-in’ to a stable path by the close network of policy makers and farm lobbyists who had a common interest in maintaining the policy rules and structures.\(^9\)

Over the past decade, there has been considerable debate among scholars on whether the reforms of 1988 and 1992 initiated a paradigm shift in the CAP. On the one side, it has been argued that there has been a change in the policy’s core ideas, expressed as a shift from a ‘state-assisted’ policy model to one in which the farmer plays a more multifunctional role, being both a food producer and a conserver of rural landscapes.\(^10\) On the other side, Grace Skogstad and Daugbjerg argue that reform of the CAP in the period to 1988 and even in 1992 was modest as the ‘state-assisted’ paradigm was not questioned.\(^11\) Daugbjerg suggests “the reform [in 1992] can hardly be called radical because it did not question the use of considerable subsidies in agriculture, but rather altered the way in which subsidies were paid to farmers”.\(^12\) Skogstad further argues that the introduction of rural structural support instruments and “a new objective of environmental sustainability” as part of the 1988 reforms “are best regarded as continuity within the state assistance model”. It would appear that for Skogstad a change in the CAP policy paradigm would mean

“a jettisoning of the state assistance model […] indicated by deregulation of agricultural markets, the termination or substantial restraint of government expenditures for agriculture, and a discourse antithetical to government intervention”.\(^13\)

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More recently, some scholars have begun to focus on the process as well as the outcome of CAP change. Garzon, for example, argues that a paradigm shift has occurred through a succession of reform episodes (in 1992, 1999 and 2003) during which “cumulative change did modify the overall policy objectives through feedback loops [through which] the strength of apparently minor changes […] put pressure on policy mechanisms and produced further change”.14 Supporting that perspective, Wyn Grant suggests that “changes in policy instruments have reoriented the policy without any change in formal Treaty goals”.15

This previous work has not systematically explored the causal mechanisms or processes linking the review of the ideas underpinning the CAP to the policy outcomes and, as with Skogstad’s analysis, has applied somewhat arbitrary criteria for evaluating change. This article provides an analysis of the process of ideational development which occurred during the 1985-1992 period and which, it is argued, reshaped the policy goals, the design of new policy instruments and the delegitimization of others. It begins with an analysis of the ideas which framed the original formulation of the CAP, as a baseline against which to evaluate subsequent change. Then, it explores the development of an alternative policy discourse during Jacques Delors’s Presidency of the Commission. Finally, it assesses whether the changes introduced during the 1985-1992 period should be regarded as a paradigm shift in the CAP.

The Common Agricultural Policy Paradigm

The ideas which underpinned the development of the CAP have their origin in the 19th century when many West European states sought to protect their farming sectors by erecting trade barriers against competition from the expanding production in the United States. Further state assistance in the form of market organisation and price support was provided especially from the 1920s in response to deepening crises in agricultural markets and in an attempt to shelter domestic markets. Such state support after the war was more clearly codified in national legislation designed to nurture the recovering agricultural sector and to address “the farm income gap” by placing on a statutory basis support for income-parity with other occupational groups.16 The six future member states of the EEC shared common issues, as the Spaak report of April 1956 recounted

“there is no doubt that special problems prevail resulting from the social structure of agriculture based fundamentally on family farming, the essential necessity of stability of supplies, the instability of markets that are influenced by external conditions and the inelas-

ticity of the demand for certain products. It is this particular nature of agriculture that explains the existence in many countries of extensive intervention in this area”.17

As Ann-Christina Knudsen concludes

“the taking off point for the ‘Europeanization’ of agricultural politics was, on the one hand, the broad political acceptance and legitimacy of these ideas of agricultural exceptionalism and welfare and, on the other, the ideas and political will to create the European Community”.18

Many scholars have sought to encapsulate the original CAP paradigm in a variety of labels – “a developmental or state assisted paradigm”; “state assistance paradigm”; a “dependent agriculture paradigm” – but without fully specifying those underlying ideas which framed the policy objectives and instruments.19 In order to understand how this paradigm became subject to challenge and replacement, it is necessary to examine more fully the multi-dimensional framework of ideas comprising the original CAP paradigm.

1. Agricultural exceptionalism

The Spaak report captures the very essence of agricultural exceptionalism as a guiding principle for state intervention in agriculture. The concept embodies a set of cognitive and normative ideas which justifies the special treatment of agriculture as an economic sector, protected from the full force of market conditions. Agriculture was regarded as exceptional because, firstly, farming is a hazardous enterprise, subject to unique and uncontrollable factors resulting from the vagaries of the weather and markets, and secondly, it contributes to essential national goals of securing food supply. As agricultural markets are less efficient and attract greater risk, “the price mechanism is a sub-optimal means of achieving an efficient and productive sector”.20 State intervention has therefore sought to control markets and support prices to provide farmers with adequate and stable incomes, while providing incentives for investment to increase productivity and efficiency.

The Spaak report provided the context for the drafting of the EEC Treaty and its analysis of agricultural exceptionalism underpinned the goal of creating “a common market for agricultural products […] accompanied by a common agricultural policy” (Article 38.4). The objectives of the CAP, set out in Article 39, reflected firstly, the experiences of national governments and their rationales for intervention and secondly, the state of the sector in the immediate post-war period. It was readily ack-

17. Quoted in ibid., p.60.
18. Ibid., p.120.
nowledged that security of food supplies could only be delivered by addressing the problems of low farm incomes and lack of competitiveness. The prevailing image was of a sector which lagged behind the rest of the economy, especially in its failure to modernise its structures. Therefore, the CAP incorporates an objective “to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress” (Article 39.1a).

National governments in Western Europe both pre- and post-war adopted correspondingly ‘exceptional’ governance arrangements based upon specialised political institutions, in which closed agricultural policy communities of agricultural departments and the main farmers’ associations dominated. Consequently, agricultural politics in the EEC embodied ‘exceptional’ multi-level governance arrangements coordinated by the Agriculture Council, but in which member states supported by their farming associations adopted an inter-governmentalist framework of decision-making.

2. Social welfare

An inevitable consequence of agricultural exceptionalism and the politicisation of agricultural markets was the virtual elimination of the relationship between prices and incomes, with the result that the significance of farm incomes as a political issue increased with the level of price and market support. In the aftermath of the war, governments in Western Europe reinterpreted the farm income problem by recognising as a political priority the need to address the disparity in incomes between farmers and other comparable occupations. Post-war agricultural policy paradigms among most West European states were thus broadened to embrace social welfare and redistributive aims.

Knudsen links the emergence of welfarist agricultural policies to the post-war development of welfare states in Western Europe and the common objective of providing income security. Consequently, she concludes that “when designing the CAP, policy-makers prioritized the welfare path […] by integrating key elements from the welfare models of member states”.21 The acceptance of agricultural exceptionalism as a guiding principle of the CAP equally ensured the incorporation of the income-parity objective in the CAP, and hence Article 39.1b sets out “to ensure a fair standard of living for those employed in the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture”. Elmar Rieger stresses that the CAP’s political rather than economic rationale means that “the CAP was not designed to increase food production, but used production-based support to increase the incomes of farmers”, with the result that the CAP should be viewed “as an integral part of the European welfare state and its ‘moral’ economy”.22

3. Images of rural life

The third dimension of the CAP paradigm relates to socio-cultural narratives of rural life. Images of rural life as some idealised construct of a traditional, anti-modern way of life, of family values and closely-knit rural communities were widely invoked by politicians to justify farm legislation, especially measures to support farm incomes and to maintain the family farm as a key rural institution. The countryside and rural life were seen to carry a vital symbolism in the narratives of nationhood, as French historian, Fernand Braudel, concluded in 1995: farming should not be seen as an economic activity but as “a way of life and a form of civilisation”.23

Such images of rural life were an essential component of the discourses which steered the development of the CAP. The final resolution of the very first meeting of agriculture ministers with the European Commission at Stresa in 1958 gave recognition to the central role of the family farm in the future of European agriculture:

“given the importance of family structures in European agriculture and the unanimous agreement to safeguard this family character, it follows that all means should be taken in order to strengthen the economic and competitive capacity of the family enterprise”.24

Community legislation supporting the CAP is replete with references to the family farm and to agricultural and rural communities as symbols of the intention to protect a traditional rural way of life. When these socio-cultural images were threatened by the proposals of Agricultural Commissioner, Sicco Mansholt, in both 1959 and 1968 to improve the economic competitiveness of the family farm, such was the hostility and violent opposition that they were rapidly withdrawn (see Katja Seidel in this volume). Knudsen argues that such rural images are “romanticised […] and have never been authentic representations of the socio-economic conditions of farm life”.25 Nonetheless, they became established as an integral dimension of the CAP paradigm which strongly influenced the policy discourse, the choice of policy instruments and the response to crises.

The CAP paradigm therefore embodied values and beliefs inherited from the agricultural policies of the original six member states. Through negotiation, they were adopted as the core set of Community ideas which would underpin the design of the CAP institutions and policy instruments. The commitment to the family farm and rural communities resonated with the longstanding normative values of the member states and therefore provided legitimacy to the belief that farming activity is integral to the well being of the countryside. Cognitively, the Community supported the view that agriculture could not be left to the vagaries of the market and that support for farm incomes was therefore the most effective means of delivering both the security

of food supply and socio-cultural wellbeing of rural areas. The CAP cannot therefore be regarded simply as an economic policy for a single sector, but rather as a rural policy delivered through agricultural development measures.

As “the major political priority for the CAP related to the farm-income problem […] the political objective of providing income guarantees for the farm sector made the CAP resemble social welfare legislation”.26 The principal policy instruments were therefore designed to deliver this political objective, essentially through market intervention by creating a common market for agricultural products, a common pricing mechanism and erecting common trade barriers and tariffs. The CAP was financed through the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), two-thirds of which were originally intended to guarantee prices, and the remaining third to support structural measures.

Rieger concludes that “the common interest in protecting the rural sectors from the competitive forces of a capitalist market economy proved strong enough to build a centralised institutional apparatus”.27 Yet, the outcome was not the creation of a supranational institution which controlled and managed the CAP. The power to set the target prices was retained by the national governments working in concert in the Agriculture Council. The European Commission’s role is seen by John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg as “the crucial player in the day-to-day management of the CAP” as, for the most part, its proposals, often drawn up in consultation with the Europe-wide farming group, the Committee of Professional Agriculture Organisations (COPA), were fully accepted.28

Moreover, both national and Europe-wide farm groups played important roles in shaping the decisions, which lead to accusations of “intimate, even incestuous, relationships between national agriculture ministries and farmers’ groups”.29 This complex and disaggregated decision-making process effectively constrained the policy by ‘locking-in’ the mechanisms which supported its implementation, thus securing its path-dependency. With the European Parliament having a very limited role in the CAP, there tended to be a lack of scrutiny and public justification for decisions. There was an “illusion that all problems can be resolved on the basis of technological considerations, assuming the policy goals are settled”.30 Within this paradigm, the institutions of the CAP became focused on the detailed framework of mechanisms and policy instruments for its implementation such that tabling alternative policy goals became virtually impossible.

27. E. RIEGER, op.cit., p.188.
29. Ibid., p.139.
Developing an alternative policy discourse

The implementation of the CAP within this paradigm inevitably generated unintended consequences, which threatened to overwhelm the policy and the Community’s budget. Periodic crises had lead to the introduction of new policy instruments, only adding to its complexity. Price support encouraged the rapid expansion of farm output and increasingly from the late 1970s and 1980s the production of significant surpluses. The costs of the CAP thus rose with the Guarantee Fund required to support greater levels of intervention together with the associated costs of storing surpluses and expanding export subsidies. “Price support drove up production, which drove up surpluses, which drove up the budget costs”.31 Between 1974 and 1979 the cost of the CAP rose by 23%, and by 1984 it accounted for 69.8% of the Community’s entire budget.32

Moreover, despite the high and increasing levels of support for farmers and growing levels of production, there was clear evidence that farm incomes were declining especially on family farms. Real incomes between 1984 and 1986 fell by 26.8% on small farms and by 14.5% on large farms. However, in the following three years (1986-1989) whereas incomes grew by 22.3% on large farms, they continued to fall on small farms by 8.9%.33 Larger farm businesses had, through the amalgamation of holdings, expanded, become more profitable, and had thus offset the decline in farm prices through cost-efficiencies. Further consequences of the rapid expansion of production included firstly, deterioration in environmental conditions in the countryside, following the much higher usage of pesticides, fertilisers, animal hormones and the removal of field boundaries. Secondly, the increase in exports and the dumping of surplus produce had a depressing effect on world markets, such that “the reaction of other exporters became more strident and co-ordinated”.34 Before 1980, the impact of the CAP was visible only to farmers and producers, in terms of its effects on prices and incomes. However, the CAP’s visibility rose with the growing surpluses, to which the media drew attention in somewhat emotive terms, e.g. butter mountains and wine lakes, and with increasing criticism from environmentalists both of which served to undermine the public’s support for farming.

The growing budget crisis was debated at the 1984 European Council Summit at Fontainebleau, where three key budgetary measures were agreed. The first was simply to increase the size of the budget by increasing the VAT ‘call-up’ rate from 1% to 1.4%, thereby underpinning a further expansion of the price support system. The second was to resolve a long running dispute over the scale of net contributions paid by the UK, which feared that under the influence of an expanding CAP budget its contribution would grow only larger. The third measure was to introduce guidelines

for ‘budgetary discipline’, among which was a requirement that the growth of the CAP would not exceed the growth rate of the EC’s own resources. Reconciling the often widely differing negotiating positions may thus have taken exhaustive diplomatic skills but the outcome was an ever more tortuous regulatory framework to enable the Community to meet its objectives within the prevailing policy paradigm.

Kay, Garzon and Kenneth Armstrong and Simon Bulmer all conclude that the initial policy framework, including the established range of policy mechanisms and instruments, constrained its subsequent evolution, helping to maintain its existing development path. Thus, Armstrong and Bulmer conclude that

“an interpretation of the CAP’s character would be that those engaged in agricultural policy making were able to isolate themselves from broader issues of public policy – including the financial aspects – and thus exploit supranational policy-making to enhance their own power resources”.

The outcome of the 1984 reforms was in many ways a rejection of the Commission’s proposals to secure a longer term and more stable budgetary framework for agriculture. George Ross concludes that

“nothing worked particularly well in or for the Commission in the early 1980s. […] Because there was no overarching and focused Commission strategy, the administrative services, perhaps the Commission’s most important internal resources, were demoralised. The European Council at Athens in 1983 was a nadir”.

However, both the resolution of the British rebate problem and the appointment of a new set of Commissioners in 1985 provided the catalyst for what Ross describes as “something extraordinary […] the willingness of member states to contemplate European solutions to their problems”. It is argued that it was this radically changed political environment which provided a favourable context for the construction of an alternative CAP discourse. The new Commission was lead by its President Delors, a former Finance Minister in the French government of François Mitterrand. During Delors’ first year in office “the Commission had moved from being a prisoner of governments determined to limit its autonomy to the position of entrepreneur”. This shift in its political credibility freed the Commission to re-interpret the anomalies of the CAP and to propose new ideas and solutions to what had become an intractable problem. The 1984 European Summit was also significant for committing the Community to the completion of the internal market. Wayne Moyer and Tim Josling argue, “Delors had made the Single European Market (SEM) something of a personal crusade and could not easily see his goal frustrated by agricultural stalemate”. The Commission under Delors thus introduced a vital link between the CAP and the wider ambitions of the Community. Armstrong and Bulmer argue that the programme to

36. Ibid., p.55.
38. Ibid., pp.26 and 33.
complete the SEM “provided a platform for a major revival of European integration”.40

In order to develop a new strategy for CAP reform, an ‘inner circle’ of Commissioners was established consisting of Delors as Commission President, together with the Agricultural and Budget Commissioners. Other Directorates-General were excluded so that “agreement among the inner circle would both speed the Commission process and minimize the need to make expensive ‘side-payments’ to win the support of other Commissioners”.41 It has also been suggested that this was an attempt to weaken the powerful policy community – of COPA and the agricultural ministries – which had monopolised the previous reform debates.42

The growing budgetary crisis, the accumulating anomalies and unintended consequences created uncertainty about the capacity of the CAP to meet the Treaty objectives and to continue to support social and cultural stability in the countryside. Given the urgency of the situation, the new Commission lost no time in launching a general debate on the perspectives for the CAP in January 1985, only a few days after taking office. The Commission then published its own analysis of the crisis, including a range of potential options, in a ‘Green Paper’ in July 1985 which, in a bid to solicit views beyond the closed agricultural policy community, was aimed at Community institutions and other parties.43 The policy discourse which it generated focused on the contribution of farming “beyond its economic function [and to its] increasingly important role in regional development, contributing to the maintenance of the socio-economic fabric or to the safeguard of the environment and the countryside”.44

This policy discourse was shaped not only by the Commission’s own analysis of the crisis, but also by a changing policy environment in which developments in both Community policy and in the external environment structured the range of options for reform. In his foreword to the Newsflash on the Green Paper, the Agricultural Commissioner, Frans Andriesson, stated that

“soon after the new Commission took office in January 1985, it decided to create the framework for dialogue [… ] in order to define the future prospects for European agriculture. The agricultural population […] need a better view of the medium and long term prospects for themselves and for the next generation”.45

The Commission’s diagnosis was that the CAP had initially allowed an ordered exodus of rural population as the modernisation of agriculture released labour which was

41. W. MOYER, T. JOSLING, op.cit., p.87.
absorbed by expanding urban economies. It feared that the prevailing economic downturn in Europe with high levels of unemployment and a continued outflow of labour from agriculture “has created conditions in which an acceleration of the rural exodus would be intolerable”.

The Green Paper therefore sought to construct new ideas about the future of rural Europe which would reassure farmers and, crucially the wider rural population. It states unequivocally:

“The need to maintain the social tissue in the rural regions, to conserve the natural environment, and to safeguard the landscape created by two millennia of farming, are reasons which determine the choice of society in favour of a ‘Green Europe’ which at the same time protects employment possibilities for those in agriculture and serves the long-term interest of all Europe’s citizens”.

The aim of the discourse was to broaden the debate beyond the technical aspects which had so absorbed the Council of Agriculture Ministers and to locate the CAP within a wider policy context. The discourse was still however framed by the core ideas of the CAP – agricultural exceptionalism, social welfare and the images of rural life – but it sought to reinterpret them in a Community rather than agricultural context to ensure a closer integration with the other Community policies.

The Commission’s diagnosis of the crisis emphasised that the imbalance of supply and demand for some agricultural products was resulting in a “waste of resources which is difficult to justify, particularly in the present economic situation and at a time when the Community should be concentrating its efforts on a strategy for the future”. The cause of the problem was considered to be the open-ended guarantees which “have isolated farmers from market forces”. In a reflection on previous attempts to deal with the problem, the Commission recalled the difficulties which the 1968 Mansholt Plan had encountered and concluded that “it is not easy to remedy the situation without at the same time creating income problems which are socially and therefore politically unacceptable” for those marginal farmers whose function is “essential for preserving social balance and […] for the preservation of the environment”.

Moreover, the Commission rejected as wholly incompatible with European values any shift to a more market liberal paradigm by stating that “an agriculture based on the model of the USA, with vast spaces of land and few farmers is neither possible nor desirable in European conditions, in which the basic concept remains the family farm”.

The Green Paper reflected that the overwhelming emphasis on the price support instrument had resulted in a significant diminution of the funds available for structural measures such that the “imbalance between price support and other measures was not what the original designers of the CAP intended”. As matter of fact, the Guidance

46. Green Paper, op.cit., p.II.
47. Green Europe Newsflash, 33, p.II.
49. Green Paper, op.cit., p.II.
50. Ibid., p.V.
section of the CAP had become seriously under-funded throughout the 1980s, with its share of the CAP budget, originally expected to be about a third, declining further from 4.3% in 1983 to 3.5% in 1987. The Green Paper concluded that the CAP now had only one principal instrument for delivering diverse objectives and that the limits of the price support approach had been reached. The Commission therefore identified as a major priority “deal[ing] more effectively and systematically with the income problems of small family farms”, specifically by increasing the role of structural measures.51

The Commission argued that in the prevailing economic climate of reduced growth and fewer alternative employment opportunities relying on urban areas to absorb surplus labour from agriculture was no longer realistic. Therefore, improving the performance of the rural economy to provide income sources alternative to or supplementing farm incomes was put forward as a substitute for continued reliance on price support measures. Structural measures to support directly the incomes of those farmers in upland and mountain areas where the climate, soils and terrain militate against productive agriculture – the less favoured areas - had already been introduced in 1975.52 Further, the introduction of the Integrated Development Programmes53 in 1981 provided a template for the Commission’s proposal for integrated programmes of regional development characterised as “well coordinated multi-sectoral approaches [in which] it is not so much a question of agriculture, but rather of developing the regional economy as a whole”.54

The CAP reform discourse was also linked to other developments in Community policy. Firstly, reform proposals were framed in the wider policy context of economic and social cohesion, set out in the Single European Act (SEA). Delors expressed the essence of this policy idea in this way:

“it is self-evident that a large market without internal frontiers could not be completed or operate properly unless the Community had instruments enabling it to avoid imbalances interfering with competitiveness and inhibiting the growth of the Community as a whole”.55

Rural development and support for farm incomes therefore became integral to the cohesion policy. Secondly, the SEA also set out for the first time the goals and principles of EC environmental policy which had particular significance for the CAP and the agricultural sector though the inclusion of objectives for: preserving, protecting and improving the environment; protecting human health; prudent and rational utilization of natural resources.

51. Green Europe Newsflash, 34, op.cit., p.5.
The discourse on CAP reform was heavily influenced by an intervention from the Environment Directorate which sought to ensure the Green Paper, firstly, took “account of environmental policy, both as regards the control of harmful practices and the promotion of practices friendly to the environment”; and secondly, recognised the positive contribution which farming makes to safeguarding the environment by promoting “a common framework for encouraging the conservation of the rural environment and the protection of specific sites”.56 The potential of such agri-environment instruments as an alternative source of income for farmers was also highlighted by the Commission.

The re-invigoration of the momentum towards European integration created by the SEM/SEA package provided a significant challenge to the path dependent CAP institutions. As Mark Blyth57 emphasises, “in order to replace the existing institutions, agents must delegitimate such institutions by contesting the ideas that underlie them”. The ‘inner circle’ of Commissioners was concerned to promote the values of fiscal soundness, especially as the EC was technically heading towards insolvency. Not surprisingly, the Commission in its 1987 review of the CAP questioned its effectiveness as “an active incomes policy, founded on relatively high farm prices [and as] the key instrument with which to safeguard the economic and social fabric of rural areas”.58 This tactic confronted the very rationale which member states had traditionally used to justify continuing increases in price support, especially for the family farms.

The Commission’s proposals consisted of two elements:

1. increased expenditure through the Structural Funds to support the modernisation and restructuring of farms, and to support the rural economy as part of a regional development strategy;
2. a system of budget stabilisers in all commodity sectors which would be automatically triggered when production reached pre-set ceilings.

In this way, the SEM/SEA package, especially through the reform of Structural Policy and the associated increase in its resources, opened up the potential of integrating the CAP’s farm incomes policy with regional and rural development policy.59 This was a policy opportunity which throughout the 1980s had been denied by the increasing diversion of Community resources to underpin the CAP’s price support instruments. It is argued that the Commission was seeking through this “interlocking of sectors [and] close connection between […] economic and structural policy” to position its proposals in a broader strategic context in which the role of rural society and its contribution to European integration and cohesion became the focus of a new rural policy agenda.60

58. European Commission, Review of action taken to control the agricultural markets and outlook for the Common Agricultural Policy, COM(87)410, 03.08.1987.
60. Ibid., p.77.
To secure its ideas and proposals, the Commission sought to shift some of the power and responsibility for the implementation of the CAP budgetary mechanisms from the Agriculture Council to the Commission itself. By effectively separating the decisions on the Guarantee funding (concerned with price and market support) from the Guidance funding (supporting structural measures) the Commission sought to limit opportunities for the diversion of structural funds to market and price support instruments, and more significantly, to dilute the power of the Agriculture Council. As Liesbet Hooghe argues the Commission “through its monopoly of initiative on the institutional design” of the reform of Regional and Structural policy was able to promote a supranational regional policy (incorporating the rural component). However, the Commission had no such monopoly in the implementation of the CAP Guarantee funds as its institutions were essentially intergovernmental.

The institutionalisation of the Commission’s new ideas was to a significant extent “a compromise between different interests”. Key decisions on the Commission’s proposals were taken at the 1988 European summit in Brussels: while the proposals for addressing the problems of farm and rural incomes through the cohesion policy were accepted, including a 30% increase in the level of the Structural Funds, member states retained separate mechanisms for delivering price and market support to farmers, with the Agriculture Council continuing to act as the forum for intergovernmental decision making.

A new CAP paradigm?

The narrative of the Commission’s attempt to construct an alternative CAP discourse would lead to a conclusion that over the 1985-1988 period significant steps were taken towards a restructuring of the policy’s goals and instruments. This section explores whether the outcome of this review process can be regarded as having heralded a shift in the policy paradigm. According to Hall, the process of paradigm change would be initiated “by events that proved anomalous within the terms of the prevailing paradigm [… ] give rise to policy failures that discredited the old paradigm and lead to a wide ranging search for alternatives”. The unintended consequences of the CAP which became evident in the 1980s provide clear evidence of such anomalies and policy failures, while by positioning the CAP within the wider context of the Community’s vision and future priorities the review was able to generate a range of alternative solutions to these policy problems.

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63. A detailed account of the measures agreed at the Brussels summit is provided by W. MOYER, T. JOSLING, op.cit.
64. P. HALL, op.cit., p.291.
As Blyth emphasises, in a context of policy anomalies “ideas allow agents to reduce uncertainty by interpreting the nature of the crisis”. It may be argued that the main purposes of the Green Paper were to explain why the budget was coming under such severe pressure and why the CAP was no longer serving the interests of farmers and rural areas. It also presented ideas which could potentially redefine the goals towards which actors should strive, provide a way of conceptualising the ends of political activity, and which could “contest and replace existing institutions”.

Change to the CAP had by the 1980s become almost wholly focused on the Agriculture Council’s technical management of commodity price levels. Under the increasing budgetary pressures, the Council attempted to introduce significant reforms to existing policy instruments to restrict the growth of surpluses, but largely without success. However, as Pierre Lascomes and Patrick Le Galès conclude “instrumentation is really a political issue, as the choice of instrument […] will partly structure the process and its results”. The Agriculture Council’s attempts at reform were constrained within the prevailing policy paradigm.

The Delors policy review adopted an approach very different from the technical appraisals conducted by the Agriculture Council. The Commission focused on the CAP as a composite policy, and from a strategic perspective sought to examine its role and contribution to the future of the Community. The review therefore considered the implications for the CAP of developments in related policy areas, in particular the Single Market, the expansion of the Community through the accession of Spain and Portugal, the emergence of regional and cohesion policy and the growing significance of environmental objectives. Hence, in terms of Hall’s criteria for paradigm shift, it may be argued that the Commission’s macro perspective radically changed ‘the overarching terms of the policy discourse’, and through the establishment of a multi-disciplinary approach, ‘the locus of authority over policy’ shifted from the Agriculture Council to the Council of Ministers.

One of the first tasks for the Commission’s review was to examine the potential implications for European agriculture of the growing trend towards monetarism. In rejecting any move to market liberalism, agricultural exceptionalism, social welfare and rural images were upheld as the principal ideas which would continue to frame the goals of the CAP. Moreover, the rejection of the notion of fully exposing agriculture to market forces reinforced the symbolism of the CAP as a major force for European integration and hence continued commitment to these values and beliefs. However, as Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram emphasise, in the policy design (or re-design) process, policy goals need to relate to the current perception of policy pro-

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65. M. BLYTH, op.cit., p.35.
66. M. BLYTH, op.cit., p.29.
67. A. KAY, R. ACKRILL (in this volume) provide details of the range of reforms introduced by the Agriculture Council.
blems which, for the CAP, had radically changed since its original formulation. The review process by reappraising the policy problems and reinterpreting the cognitive framework and normative values and beliefs allowed a reassessment of the policy goals.

The original problems of food security and farm modernisation, equalising farming incomes with other occupations and conserving rural cultural heritage had given way in the 1980s to problems of surplus production, social instability and rural environmental degradation. This reassessment lead to a re-interpretation of the normative values and beliefs. Firstly, agricultural exceptionalism could no longer be justified in terms of protecting an un-modernised farming sector, but was now essential to the political stability of the countryside and to prevent any retreat towards a re-nationalisation of agricultural policy. Secondly, falling farm incomes ensured that social welfarist values were reinforced in order to address the growing social instability and the exodus from the countryside. Thirdly, the failure to protect the traditional images of the countryside together with growing environmental concerns pointed to the increasing incompatibility of the CAP’s productivist imperative and the Community’s environmental objectives. The value of conserving rural cultural heritage therefore became enmeshed with emerging environmental values to engender a belief that farmers had a lead responsibility in conserving rural landscapes and biodiversity and in reducing the environmental impact of agriculture.

Therefore, the policy discourse updated perceptions of the policy problems and introduced a revised normative framework within which the policy goals could be reformulated. While the original goals/objectives of the CAP, as set out in Article 39 of the Treaty, remained unchanged, they had never been formally prioritised or in some cases specified in a way that could be readily operationalised. As a result, the policy ends could not be regarded as static and unchanging. The new perspective on policy problems ensured that the objective of improving farm productivity and increasing production was relegated in significance, while supporting farm incomes and conserving the rural environment assumed greater importance. As a result, policymakers came to view the rural world from a radically different perspective, such that the new ideas provided a very different “account of how the world facing policymakers operates”. The cognitive underpinnings of policy shifted from supporting increased production as a means of facilitating modernisation, raising incomes to comparable levels and retaining the traditional images of the countryside to curbing the level of farm output in order to bring production more in line with demand, identifying additional sources of income for farmers and recognising the synergy between the agricultural practice and environmental well-being.

The Commission’s ideas could therefore be regarded as a basis for a paradigm shift in the CAP, and hence for resolving the crisis and renewing the commitment

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71. P. HALL, op.cit., p.279.
among member states to a common agricultural policy. However, the Brussels summit in February 1988 was only partially successful in institutionalising the revised normative and cognitive frameworks. While the introduction of new structural measures to support disadvantaged agricultural regions was agreed unanimously, much greater difficulty was encountered in agreeing a new rationale or ‘instrument logic’ for directly supporting farmers’ incomes. The new menu of optional policy instruments reflected a failure by member states to agree on a common approach. At the same time, the powers and responsibilities of the Agriculture Council remained unaffected by the decisions of the summit, ensuring that price and market support remained the main instrument for providing income support.

Despite agreement on a five year budgetary framework, the CAP budget (and the level of subsidy) continued to rise after 1988 as production levels increased, resulting in continued surpluses, for example of 500,000 tonnes of butter and 15m tonnes of cereals in 1991. Attempts to stabilise CAP expenditure were rapidly undermined by the Agriculture Council, as member states, especially France and Ireland, sought to protect their shares of the CAP budget and showed little willingness to exchange the certainties of the present rules for the uncertainty of budget reform. The strength of feeling among farmers, especially in France, was evident in frequent demonstrations. Therefore, in an increasingly uncertain economic climate, some member states were unwilling to antagonise an often crucial component of their electorates.

For Delors and the Commission, reducing the share of the Community budget allocated to the CAP was a prerequisite for expanding the range of Community competences and for his “strategy’s sequential unfolding from market to state building”, as the Delors I package was to be succeeded by Delors II, after 1992. Greater urgency for reform was provided by the Uruguay Round of the GATT which had begun in 1986, but which had stalled at the end of 1990 over the question of agriculture. Eve Fouilleux argues that the Community’s inability to reach agreement lay with firstly, the problems which inter-governmental decision-making presented for reaching compromises in international affairs, and secondly, the lack of analytical and forward-looking capacities in DG VI.

Delors had recognised the lack of strategic expertise in DG VI during the preparation of the 1988 reforms and had recruited a number of specialists from French governmental organisations. During the year following the 1988 reforms, Delors and Jean-Luc Demarty (Cabinet Advisor on agriculture) initiated work on further reform of the CAP with “the first full brainstorming in June 1990”. For Demarty, there were two key issues which needed to be addressed in any future reform; firstly, he argued that the dispute which had led to the collapse of the GATT talks could not be resolved within the “the existing CAP’s essential provisions” and secondly, he pointed out that because the CAP subsidises farmers in proportion to their output, 20 %
of farmers produced 80% of farm output and received 80% of the support.75 The conclusion was that “the old CAP had reached a point of no return”.76

The Commission’s reform proposals therefore sought to address the trade-distorting effect of the price and market support mechanisms and to ‘modulate’ the scale of farm support in inverse ratio with the size of farms. Its proposal for a system of ‘deficiency payments’ would provide income support as direct public subsidies and allow farm output to be traded at real market prices, hence reducing the trade distorting effects of the current system. In the autumn of 1990, the Commission began the process of persuading member states and crucially farmers of the need for further reform. As a Commission official concluded “in December 1990, it was a rather strange situation. [At the GATT talks] the Commission was defending for the European Community a policy which she had decided to dismantle”.77 The discourse employed by Delors and Demarty was firmly embedded in the analysis set out in the 1985 Green Paper and appealed to “two discussions […] on rural life and the future of European agriculture”. Delors went on to warn of the dangers of continuing with the present CAP, arguing that the “struggle against scarcity now has to be ended, since its policies had come to threaten the very existence of Europe’s countryside” and he concluded “the future of the CAP is inseparable from the ‘collective good’ dimension of the rural world”. He was equally aware of the need to respect the history of the CAP and its three principles and argued “the equilibrium of the basic triangle had to be maintained, but not as it is. Community preference cannot be permanently ensured at the level it is now”. Finally, there was a scarcely veiled threat in his conclusion that “the continuation of existing policies even for five more years will lead to results you will regret”.78

According to Delors, the Community now had to recognise international interdependence and therefore that “solidarity and rural development were key dimensions of the CAP”.79 Hence, consistent with Blyth’s model of institutional change, the updated discourse thus allowed the Commission to define the terms of the reform debate, by re-defining the very problems the Community was facing and by proposing alternative solutions.80 Specifically, by evoking rural values, the Commission was not simply responding to environmental concerns, but reflecting a more fundamental belief that “the renaissance of the rural world is an issue of civilisation [as rurality is] a basic dimension of the European model of society”.81

76. G. ROSS, op.cit., p.111.
77. Quoted in E. FOUILLEUX, op.cit., p.242.
79. Ibid.
80. M. BLYTH, op.cit., p.38.
The ideas expressed within such a discourse are, as Blyth maintains, available to be used as weapons “with which agents contest and replace existing institutions”. The threat of a worse outcome for farmers and the perceived risk to European civilisation, together with recognition of “some danger of member states opposed to reform beginning to ‘renationalise’ agricultural policies” were all weapons aimed at delegitimising the existing institutions and the ideas that underlie them. These same weapons became the blueprint for reform. Thus, policy solutions were constructed to address the trade distortions and resolve the GATT talks, to resolve the continual budget overruns, to provide more security for farmers’ incomes and to restore rural Europe by enabling farmers to adopt “dual roles, as producers and agents for rural development”.

The new CAP institutions were agreed in May 1992, in time to provide a revised basis for negotiation on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The reform significantly reduced the scope of price and market support mechanisms, especially for the most trade distorting commodities: wheat and beef. The original proposal for deficiency payments proved to be administratively too complex and was replaced by direct payments, administered by national governments. However, measures to modulate payments according to farm size proved unacceptable to the Agriculture Council, “because it weighted on one member state [the UK]”. Compulsory agri-environment measures were also agreed as part of a programme of extensification in which farmers were paid for the ‘public good’ of maintaining and conserving the rural landscape.

Conclusions

The narratives presented above provide substantial evidence supporting a conclusion that, on the basis of Hall’s criteria, there was a paradigm shift in the CAP which began with appointment in 1985 of a new Commission under Jacques Delors. It was partially implemented in the 1988 reform and largely completed in the 1992 reform. Over that period, the original framework of ideas which underpinned the selection of policy goals and the choice of instruments and which structured the interpretation of policy problems was contested and replaced. The role of key actors, under the leadership of Delors, as President of the Commission, was vital for securing the paradigm shift. In the context of the commitment of member states to securing the Single Market and European Union, the Commission was able to present reform of the CAP as an essential catalyst for their achievement. The new paradigm was shaped both by this

82. M. BLYTH, op.cit., p.39.
83. G. ROSS, op.cit., p.111.
wider political context and by the preferences and political experiences of the key decision makers, especially the Agriculture Council.

As a result, the cognitive belief that expanding agricultural production alone could support comparative incomes and maintain traditional rural life was successfully contested and replaced by a recognition that rural norms could only be upheld within a multidimensional policy framework. In practice, the paradigm shift became evident in the changing role of farmers, the restructuring of farm income support and the greater recognition of the cultural and environmental value of the countryside and rural areas. Farmers exchanged the imperative of intensive production for a more multifunctional role which Delors proclaimed was now as "producers of goods, creators of civilisation and gardeners of nature". 86 This multifunctional role became a key characterising feature, distinguishing the new paradigm from the old.

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Problems of Composition, Temporality and Change in Tracing the Common Agricultural Policy through Time

Adrian KAY and Robert ACKRILL

Investigating the reasons for change and continuity is central to any historical perspective on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, this investigation is often hampered by the problem of specifying the *explainandum*, or in social science language operationalising the dependent variable, ‘the CAP’. What are the appropriate dimensions and scales at which to track the CAP through time? Policy has been described as a meso-level, whereas others recognise that policy also encompasses micro decisions.¹ Peter Hall’s framework of three levels of policy – paradigms, instruments, calibration – was the first effort to move description of policy change beyond a single variable and it remains the mainstay for most analyses of policy development.² This enduring impact attests to the originality of Hall in moving the description of policy change to stress the cognitive and normative dimensions of a policy alongside more formal, legalistic policy instruments. As Chris Elton in this volume sets out, the application of the Hall scheme to the CAP has encouraged scholars to be sensitive to how ideas rather than calculations of material self-interest may drive policy-making; and in raising questions about the relationship between ideas and material factors in CAP policy processes by stressing that policymakers work within a framework of beliefs that specifies goals and instruments, as well as the nature of the policy problems.

There are criticisms about the degree of sensitivity in Hall’s framework to policy change; in particular, whilst the notion of a policy paradigm may provide some leverage in understanding the policy-making consequences of rare, epochal shifts such as the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in the United Kingdom as in the original Hall article, there are doubts about its ability to account for episodes of substantial policy change that are significant beyond the ‘normal’ cycle of policy-making but nonetheless fall short of paradigm change. There is a significant policy space between small change (at the instrument and programme level) and big change (at the paradigmatic level).

A recent refinement of the Hall taxonomy by Michael Howlett and Benjamin Cashore (hereafter H&C) gives six dimensions of policy change and offers the potential for a new understanding of developments in the CAP that Hall cannot account

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for. The present paper, first, discusses the H&C framework in terms of identifying patterns of CAP change across time. The significance of the analytical problem of specifying the CAP over time is manifest in the substantial variation in accounts of CAP reform over the last twenty years, from those who see strong continuity in the CAP as reform is dominated by budget and trade interests; to those – as in Elton’s paper in this volume - who see a new paradigm in the CAP in which environmental, developmental and animal welfare interests are to the fore. The main section presents a historical perspective on the reform of the CAP using the H&C framework, in which we eschew paradigm-spotting for a richer, more nuanced account of CAP reforms on different dimensions; and we avoid the a priori presumption that there are one-off paradigmatic episodes of CAP reform that fundamentally shift its trajectory.

Specifying CAP change

H&C argue that the orthodoxy in the social science study of policy change is the punctuated equilibrium pattern, where rare paradigm change punctuates long periods of incremental adjustments due to shocks induced by institutional change or new actors, ideas, beliefs which are exogenous to the policy system. They see this orthodoxy as a synthesis of earlier work on incrementalism and on policy paradigms. However, logically prior to any tracing of policy change over time is the problem of defining a policy. Of Hall’s three orders, orders one and two (the choice of policy instruments and their settings) are endogenous to the policy subsystem and incremental, but third order paradigmatic change is exogenous. Hall makes a further distinction between theoretical or ideational change in policy (third level) and concrete, action based and/or on-the-ground policy change which occurs at the first and second levels of policy change.

H&C suggest that the popularity of Hall’s framework has limited theoretical and empirical progress in policy studies. They also start with the identification of three levels of policy: the theoretical abstract level of the composite whole e.g. trade policy; the programme level e.g. tariffs; and the on-the-ground level e.g. setting the appropriate tariff rate. In a novel step, policy ends are separated from policy means for each of those levels. Thus we have six dimensions on which policy might be measured and change identified (in order of decreasing abstraction):

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Policy ends: (iii) Goals, (ii) Objectives, (i) Settings.

At the highest, most abstract level, ends iii, goals, refer to the broad types of idea that shape policy. Means iii instrument logic, meanwhile, refers to the broadest notions of preferences that policy implementation should reflect. At the intermediate Programme Level, policy objectives, ends ii, identify what the policy formally should target, whilst means ii, mechanisms, identify the particular instruments, literally, to be used to those ends. Third, there are the on-the-ground measures. Ends i, settings, refers to the specific requirements of policy; whilst means i, calibrations, specify the ways in which the instruments are to be used. Level i probably leads to the most confusion, given that the word ‘settings’ in general usage addresses what H&C call calibration, whilst Hall’s use of the term conflates H&C’s notions of settings and calibration. Another possible confusion is ends ii, objectives, given this term is also used to describe the statements in the Treaty of Rome which set out the ‘objectives’ of the CAP. In the present paper, all terms are used in the H&C sense.

The strength of the work of H&C is to point the field of policy studies beyond the strict dualism that has provoked most criticisms of Hall: that policy change is either incremental or big bang, paradigmatic, with nothing in between. What H&C offer is a more sophisticated view of the different constituent elements of policy or combinations of the constituent elements, and in doing so they reveal potential and actual patterns of policy change obscured in the Hall framework. In particular, they give an analytical edge to the intuitive insight of many CAP scholars regarding the potential for incremental but cumulative change i.e. that small adjustments in the same direction can profoundly shift policy over time in the absence of large exogenous shocks.

Despite the advance made by H&C, we are still left with the question: what is the relationship between different policy levels? There is no impeccable formal logic to the relationship. One response is to deny any relationship or connection between goals or instrument logic at the abstract level of the policy ‘whole’ (ends iii or means iii, respectively) and the actual setting of CAP instruments. Instead, each level is described and explained separately. Following this approach, within the field of policy studies different descriptions, metaphors, concepts, models and theories used in analysis belong to different levels; and the requirement for scholars is to be explicit about the dualism or trialism implicit in their analysis.

Whatever the appeal of this answer in terms of academic neatness, however, almost all CAP scholars assert a link between different levels and regard this link as at the crux of their subject. For example, Elton in this volume argues that change at the broadest level of goals and instrument logic – in his terms, and following Hall, the policy paradigm - is a necessary precondition for change in instruments and their settings. Because we construct the CAP as a dependent variable, any claim that there is a relationship between different policy levels involves constitutive rather than causal reasoning: scholars are looking at the structures and their levels that constitute policy rather than investigating the set of conditions that might cause policy and
policy change. Policy can be constituted internally in a form of reductionism; in an analogy with the natural sciences, policy has a genetic structure. This view in broad terms underpins methodological individualism in the social sciences. An entity has an internal structure which accounts for its properties. On a strict reductionist view, the policy whole is nothing but its internal constitutive elements. In addition, entities can be constituted externally as a holistic entity by reference to external structures in which they are embedded. On this view, policy is constituted as a whole with reference to entities such as government departments, legislatures, think tanks and so on. This external constitution is characteristic of the literature on the comparative political economy of public policy, where change is explained, for example, in terms of the differential effects of societal institutions, variations in national ‘styles’ of capitalism or the uneven consequences of globalisation for different welfare state types.

What are the consequences of these two types of constitutive reasoning for the analysis of the CAP? Once scholars accept that the CAP is to some degree externally constituted they commit themselves to some form of structuralism where the structure of the whole in some way governs its constitutive elements. This is the case because without structures at the level of the whole, the properties of the whole (any regularities and so on) would not exist: they would be nothing but the constituent elements i.e. you would have reduced the CAP to its constituents.

In practice, we think the literature should develop the general acknowledgment that the CAP is a social construction and draw the implication that its analysis needs to be synthetic; that is, it must be simultaneously holistic and reductionist. The field must leave open, but central, the thorny level of explaining relationships between levels in the CAP. Unlike holism that stays at the top and reductionism that sticks to the bottom, synthetic analysis of the CAP takes a round trip from the top to the bottom and back. It encompasses two or more perspectives, looking at the CAP whole on its own level and looking at it on the levels of its constituents. To connect the different levels, it employs two kinds of explanations: macroexplanations and microexplanations.

Macroexplanations develop scientific concepts and theories for composite variables without mentioning their constituents. They delineate properties for the policy whole, represent them on dimensions, and find the causal regularities and mechanisms among them. Macroexplanations constitute the primary explanatory level of systems thinking, and they enjoy a high degree of autonomy. In these terms, it makes sense to say that ‘agricultural policy is changing because’ or ‘the CAP has tended in this direction because’ and so on. This is the level at which many debates about the role of ideas in the CAP over time take place. For example, it has been argued that despite shifts in the ideational underpinnings of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules on international agricultural trade, the CAP remains governed by a state-assisted policy paradigm, in which agriculture remains an exceptional sector of the economy which for reasons of history, politics and culture is not the subject of standard market
governance. However, for a full understanding of the systems including their composition, such macroexplanations are necessary but not sufficient. For this we also need microexplanations that connect the properties delineated in macroexplanations to the properties of the constituents: microexplanation depends on macroexplanation, which first sets out what needs microexplanation.

Microexplanations introduce their own concepts, theories and assumptions that are not found at the top level. Such extra theorising ensures the irreducibility of the whole into its parts. Microexplanations explain system properties without explaining them away, as reductionism does. They not only find the micromechanisms underlying macroscopic properties, but also explain, for example, how structures of abstract ideas at the policy system level of the CAP constrain the behaviours of individual constituents in making detailed, day-to-day CAP policy. They look at the whole causal structure spanning the system and constituents from all angles – upward causation, downward causation – to get a comprehensive grasp of the complexity of composition. In short, the appropriate approach to the composition problem is not to reduce the policy description framework but expand it to accommodate more perspectives, more postulates, and more theoretical tools to filter out irrelevant microscopic details and define novel emergent macroscopic properties. A multiplicity of approaches and models is a characteristic of all social sciences that wrestle with complex phenomena and should be welcomed and encouraged in the study of public policy.

A composition problem arises for the CAP using the H&C framework: it is more complex than implied by the notion of a single holistic entity. There are different types and degrees of change and thus, at the micro level, change and stability may coexist. If we adopt the analytical strategy of describing the CAP at the micro or fine-grained level in terms of constituent elements – as a complex matrix of multiple policy instruments rather than as a single, composite variable – then different explanatory strategies can be adopted.

A first alternative line of argument to the macro/holistic approach is to view policy change as continual, but generally incremental and gradual. Focusing on specific elements rather than the policy system as a whole, we may observe changes in terms of instruments, but this has more frequently involved re-setting existing policy instruments than introducing new ones. It is generally ineffective in terms of ameliorating longer term, structural pressures for reform and much remains in place through reform episodes from previous policy regimes. Recent writings in the historical institutional school have heralded a return to an older tradition of incrementalism in policy processes, represented most clearly by the works of Charles E. Lindblom over many decades. Institutions are adapted to new circumstances through a process of

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incremental adjustment rather than through periods of drastic and rapid change, achieved by means such as layering, conversion and drift: “The picture of institutional evolution that emerges from these analyses is one in which it is not so useful to draw a sharp line between cases of institutional stability versus change”.8

Once policy change is acknowledged as more nuanced for analytical purposes than this duality, we return to the problem of composition. The central thrust of both Hall and H&C is that policy must be understood at different levels. By combining microexplanations with macroexplanations, in the context of the multiple policy dimensions offered by H&C, we may observe a policy simultaneously exhibiting elements of both continuity and change. As we set out in the next section, change with the CAP comes when policy reproduction mechanisms are upset or disrupted, usually brought about through either the budget (endogenous shock) or trade (exogenous shock), although environmental concerns and food safety pressures have also had some, albeit limited, effect in disrupting the reproduction of CAP mechanisms. As a result, the question of what it is about policy that is path dependent does not admit a single, conclusive answer; rather it remains an open and empirical matter, to be explored in the context of particular policies, each with their own specific composition and structure.

This fine-grained analysis refines what can be meant by reform. The macro perspective can identify a critical juncture faced by a (complex) policy, which can lead to individual institutions being changed, removed or introduced (‘layered-in’).9 The CAP consists of multiple institutions, commodities and countries, so ‘CAP reform’ may involve amendments to only some of its individual institutions. A common view on types of change contrasts incremental policy changes and “the policy feedback literature rooted in historical institutionalism, [the latter viewing] change not as an incremental process but as a rather dramatic one”.10 The fine-grained approach adopted in this paper allows for a perspective on change contra Carsten Daugbjerg, that accommodates and explains the incremental accumulation of pressure for change, the upsetting of institutional reproduction and gradual adaptation of policies and institutions.

By framing the CAP as a nexus of inter-related institutions distinguishable using the policy dimensions of H&C, the present analysis ultimately can deepen our understanding of the nature of the CAP reform over time, showing how stasis and change can co-exist in the CAP, combining microexplanations and macroexplanations and thus distinguishing individual institutions from the overall institutional matrix. As a final thought in this section, it should be noted that this analytical approach does not close off additional scholarly contributions. Thus one may extend a familiar saying

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8. K. THELEN, Time and temporality ..., op.cit., p.106.
9. Synonyms can include ‘policy framework’, ‘institutional matrix’ or ‘nexus of institutions’.
by noting that if macroexplanations address the wood or forest, and microexplanations examine the trees, there is still much to be added by exploring specific areas of undergrowth, through detailed archival analysis of the sort undertaken by several contributors to the Special Edition.

**Tracking the CAP Through Time**

Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome identified five objectives for the CAP. The details of policy – especially how to achieve the objective of ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community – were then established over the following decade. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyse this in detail, but some aspects need highlighting.\(^{11}\) When the CAP was established, a wide range of instruments were adopted across commodity regimes, but the principal policy adopted was price support.\(^{12}\) Several factors help explain this. First, several countries employed price support previously. An analysis of this continuity is beyond the scope of the present paper but Carine Germond, in this issue, explores in-depth for France and Germany the difficult transition from national to common policies. Second, there was widespread political opposition to direct payments, seen as a social handout. Third, direct payments would have had a much larger impact on the emergent EU budget whilst the prevailing farm structure, with millions of small farms, would have raised administration costs substantially.\(^{13}\)

The choice of price support created a particular dynamic for CAP spending. By linking (‘coupling’) production and support levels, it stimulated production and thus drove up CAP spending. This increase at the aggregate level of total CAP spending was driven by spending on commodities for which production exceeded EU consumption: that is, commodities that were in surplus. This was because the principal expenditures under price support were linked to the maintenance of high prices and thus the removal of surpluses from the internal market that could undermine them: the cost of intervention storage and refunds or subsidies on exports to third countries.

Initially, the EU budget represented a positive sum game – as total spending on the CAP rose, every country and producers therein could receive more CAP transfers: the member states, individually and collectively, had no budgetary incentive to reform the CAP. Reform events imply that, eventually, the policy reached a critical juncture. Initially the principal reason was budgetary – but defined at the level of the total EU budget, upon which the member states, through the Treaty of Rome, had imposed a

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13. Katja Seidel, in this volume, explores further the largely unsuccessful Community attempts to improve the economic efficiency of the structure of farming in the early years of the CAP.
Balanced Budget Rule (BBR). Spending could not exceed a certain level, defined in terms of total revenues that could be collected in that year. This represented a domain constraint on decision-making, affecting “the permissible outcomes of solutions that may be allowed under any agreed-on procedures”. It can also be thought of as a static constraint, a ceiling on spending that is fixed annually and can be changed only in accordance with pre-determined procedures.

Introduced into the Treaty of Rome in 1970 is a distinction between Compulsory Expenditure (CE) and Non-Compulsory Expenditure (NCE), a procedural constraint affecting the rules for collective decisions. The key feature of this distinction for current purposes is that NCE levels are determined directly whereas, with CE, once the expenditure-generating policy instruments are in place, spending levels cannot then be controlled directly, but only through changes to those policy instruments (‘policy reform’). Price support created an ongoing production incentive which generated growing surpluses and thus ever-higher CAP spending. CE, a dynamic procedural constraint was, ultimately, to conflict with a static domain constraint, the BBR.

This offers one of the principal macroscopic explanations of CAP reform: regardless of the level of spending on individual commodities – and of the response in terms of which commodities are involved in a reform of CAP instruments – of concern is the level of spending at the macro ‘CAP’ level. What our synthetic analysis below does, however, is analyse also the response to such a macro pressure at the microscopic level of individual components of the dependent variable. By the late 1980s, budget pressures had not gone away entirely but were now joined and, to a considerable extent, overtaken as a point of focus by concerns over the extent to which agricultural policy instruments distorted trade – again, a key macroscopic pressure, but which yielded reform responses at the microscopic policy level. From this time also, as analysed by Elton in this volume, concerns were growing about the wider policy impacts of agricultural support policies: on the environment, the safety of food, plant and animal welfare, and so on, factors also addressed in the analysis below.

What will be clear from the following discussion is that the very phrase ‘CAP reform’ is ambiguous: the CAP covers many different commodities and utilises many different types of policy instruments to achieve different policy goals. To aid this discussion, in analysing CAP reforms we shall identify macro-level reform pressures on ‘the CAP’, and analyse the policy responses with reference to the six elements of the H&C framework introduced earlier: ends iii (goals), ends ii (objectives), ends i (settings), means iii (instrument logic), means ii (mechanisms or instruments), and means i (instrument calibration). Level iii in each case is the most theoretical abstract level of the composite whole; level i on-the-ground.
CAP Reform – Changing Policy Means or Ends?

For many years, not only did price support dominate CAP policy instruments, but there was an annual process of fixing support prices for the coming year. This process represented an annual means i re-calibration of key policy instruments, but not in a way that constituted policy reform. Early attempts at reform, therefore, involved not only means i recalibration of support price levels but also, as a minimum, means ii changes whereby instruments were introduced that affected prices in a different way. Moreover, reforms prior to 1984 and the breaching of the BBR were still being negotiated in an environment of a positive-sum budget game. There was a trade-off between price cuts to try to limit the production incentives which were driving spending upwards, but which would also undermine the principal policy goal (ends iii) of supporting farmers’ incomes. In practice the former lost out and the means i changes that were agreed were minimal in extent. The first two CAP reform episodes considered here, the dairy co-responsibility levy (CRL) introduced in 1977 and Guarantee Thresholds agreed in 1982, both conform to this characterisation of new means ii instruments introduced to effect means i price changes in some pre-determined way.¹⁶

The principle underpinning the co-responsibility levy was that producers should share the financial burden of dealing with the surpluses they were producing. The resulting levy on producers, set as a small (no more than 3 %) share of support prices, represented an implicit but de facto downwards re-calibration of support prices. Subsequently, however, it was shown that there was an offsetting increase in support prices agreed in the annual rounds of price-fixing, despite the small impact overall of the CRL (EU prices were routinely 40-60 % above world price levels).¹⁷ Producers were thus unaffected by the net means i changes – but consumers were worse off because the rise in prices increased still further the production incentives to producers in the sector, dairy, that was already the most expensive for the EU budget. Note that the CRL introduced into the cereals sector in 1986 shared all key features with the dairy CRL other than it was not preceded by agreement of a ‘normal’ price rise. Even so, the magnitude of re-calibration (means i) remained modest.

Whilst the dairy sector had been in surplus since the 1960s, in the late 1970s it was joined by other key sectors, notably beef and cereals (that were also, not coincidentally, underpinned by price support). High world commodity prices at the turn of the decade reduced the unit export refunds payable on the rising volume of subsidised exports sufficient to see a brief dip in CAP spending; but very soon rising spending in several sectors combined to threaten the BBR, as higher CAP outlays drove up total EU spending. The first multi-commodity reform attempt, agreed in 1982 before the BBR was breached, introduced another new means ii policy instrument, Guarantee Thresholds. Not for the only time was a CAP reform misleadingly named. Guarantee Thresholds worked by triggering negotiations on price cuts should

¹⁶. See R.W. ACKRILL, op.cit., p.63, for more discussion of various CAP reforms.
a certain production level be exceeded. That said, even production above the Threshold received full support, whilst the price cut was introduced only after a ‘normal’ price rise had been agreed through the annual price-fixing. As with the dairy CRL before it, therefore, the net re-calibration of policy instruments was minimal and, in some cases, support prices still rose.

Although the 1977 and 1982 reforms saw a change at the level of means ii, their design and implementation were consistent with the extant means iii of price support; nor were any policy ends altered. Does this mean, therefore, that for a CAP reform to change means iii and/or policy ends, a macroscopic pressure is needed? The first time this is seen is in 1984, when production quotas were imposed on dairy farmers. Quotas operated via instruments layered-in as a means ii change that were, in their basic design, very similar to Guarantee Thresholds. The key difference was that with dairy quotas, if production exceeded a specified level the penalty would be a ‘superlevy’ that, depending on the exact instruments a member state could adopt, would be either 75% or 100% of the support price. This imposed a limit on the level of production eligible for support, the first time CAP support for any commodity ceased to be ‘open-ended’. As such, this was the first reform when a policy end was changed: specifically a policy setting (ends i).

Why, though, was this reform of the dairy sector, which drew on very similar means ii instruments, implemented in a way so fundamentally different to the 1982 reform? Moreover, since the dairy sector had been in surplus since the 1960s and was by far the most expensive element of the EU budget as a result, why was it reformed only in 1984? The answer lies with the situation of the EU budget overall: it was in 1984 that the BBR was breached. This macro pressure affected the CAP directly, because it was CAP spending that pushed total EU spending up to and through the revenue ceiling. The (microscopic) focus in the reform on the dairy sector is explained by the fact that by the early-mid 1980s, it took one-third of total CAP spending and one-quarter of the entire EU budget. As a result the macro-level problems caused by CAP spending were, at this stage, both caused by and could be addressed through reform of instruments in this single sector.

The macroscopic perspective also enables other changes to the institutions of the EU budget to be identified that, because agricultural and budgetary institutions occupy common space, affected the CAP. In response to the budget crisis, a new budgetary objective of Budgetary Discipline sought to contain EU spending. Part of this, the Agricultural Guideline, addressed aggregate CAP spending. The Guideline set a limit on the rate of increase of EU budget revenues, so that CAP spending should cease to grow as a share of total EU spending. This therefore represented a new ends

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19. Strictly speaking the BBR was breached in 1983. Problems were put off until 1984, however, by carrying over the unfunded portion of EU spending to 1984.
ii objective for the CAP. The problem was that it was not accompanied by any new instruments (means ii) to enforce it.

1984 saw the dairy sector reformed, with changes to policy ends addressing the perpetual growth in spending. A lack of change in the policy ends of other commodities, however, meant that spending on, in particular, cereals and beef, continued to grow, driving overall CAP spending upwards (between 1980 and 1990 nominal CAP spending roughly doubled, during which time the share going to the dairy regime roughly halved, to about 20%). A decision in 1986 to increase the budget revenues available, via the VAT-based own resource, meant that when a package of reform measures to both the CAP (‘stabilisers’) and budget was negotiated in 1988, the (macroscopic) budget pressure on the CAP was no longer binding.

The multi-commodity ‘stabiliser’ CAP reform was, at the level of policy means, similar to the Guarantee Thresholds of 1982, with a cut in support prices of up to 3% triggered by production exceeding a certain level – the ‘Maximum Guaranteed Quantity’. That said – and reflecting the difference between the 1986 cereals CRL and the 1977 dairy described earlier – the stabiliser reform did not start with a ‘normal’ price rise (a parallel which, of itself, reflects a shift in means iii). Moreover, the price cut would not be negotiated but would be automatic if production exceeded a certain level; also a change in means iii, as the new instrument logic this represented reflected changed regulatory preferences. On the other hand, just as the notion of a Guarantee Threshold was a misnomer, so too was ‘Maximum Guarantee Quantity’: as with the earlier case, all production was supported in full. As a result of this, ends i remained unchanged. Furthermore, even though the automatic price cut and the CRL were additive, resulting in a price cut of up to 4.5%, the net effect was still marginal in relation to the prevailing world-EU price gap (the changes at means i level, the recalibration of support price levels, remained modest).

It is worth noting that the original Stabilisers proposal had a trigger based directly on spending, rather than indirectly via production, but this proved unacceptable politically. Even though, since 1984, the EU budget represented a zero-sum game, spending could still rise in absolute terms. The implicit ceiling on spending embedded in this proposal would have represented a change to policy ends i, that the member states were not ready to make. That said, as part of Commission President Jacques Delors’ vision for a restructuring of EU spending, changes were made to the wider institutions of the EU budget. Of direct relevance for the CAP, the Agricultural Guideline was strengthened in that the growth rate of CAP spending should be contained to 74% of the growth rate of available resources, but again this overlapping budgetary end was not matched by new effective policy means of delivery.


The 1992 CAP Reform

The combination of reformed budgetary institutions, but CAP changes that introduced new ends without matching means would, by 1992, see ‘macro’ budget pressures once again affecting the CAP as the BBR was once again threatened. By 1992, however, a second macro factor (this time exogenous to the EU) was putting pressure on the CAP – the trade talks in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round.22 The foregoing discussion raises a crucial question – what microscopic reforms could put the CAP as a whole on a new trajectory, ensuring consistency between CAP and budget institutions and between the CAP and trade concerns? Several authors argue the 1992 reform reflects principally either budget or trade factors.23 The present paper, however, argues it was a confluence of the two – although, as in 1984, the resulting reform focused only on some commodities. In identifying these reform pressures, other factors are not denied. Growing concerns over food safety, animal welfare and the environment all helped shape policy, but the demands of budgetary and trade factors defined the limits of feasible policy responses. The factors identified by Elton in this volume as emerging in the CAP in the late 1980s were, we would therefore argue, not as influential in 1992 as on subsequent reforms – as explored below.

The combination of budget and trade pressures is significant because whilst the EU could leave ends iii goals largely unchanged, the GATT talks challenged policy ends ii, objectives. Specifically, on domestic support aggregate budgetary transfers could be maintained if they were channelled through mechanisms that distorted trade less, a change to means iii. In effect, ends iii were left unchanged, through an acceptance by the EU of an ends ii change. This was combined with returning budget pressures that once again challenged policy ends i. The GATT talks, by creating a shift in EU regulatory preferences towards more de-coupled support also, therefore, resulted in a change in means ii, as new instruments consistent with this means iii change were introduced. A key point to note from this is that whilst H&C identify six separate policy elements, this is a useful heuristic but those elements are by no means mutually exclusive and, in some cases, could be seen as joint elements in practical terms.

The GATT talks also confronted other elements of the CAP, in particular price support as the most trade distorting of policies. As noted above, spending could be maintained in aggregate, so long as it was channelled through less trade-distorting instruments. As a result, the instruments of price support remained, but means i recalibration of a sufficient degree was undertaken to ensure spending on trade distorting policy instruments fell by enough to permit a multilateral agreement on domestic agricultural support. The new instruments introduced were sufficiently de-

coupled to ensure they were agreeable to other members of the GATT. Their calibration meant, moreover, that financial transfers made through them to EU farmers obtained political support within the EU. Whilst the extent of re-calibration of individual instruments was considerable, the net effect across all instruments for a particular commodity regime was much more modest.24

The means i changes to price support instruments, moreover, were sufficient to ensure that the resulting reduction in export subsidisation ensured agreement on that element of the GATT talks. The third part of the agriculture talks in the GATT, over market access, in essence, required imports to rise. This, in principle, represented one of the few challenges to ends iii, as it questioned the principle of Community Preference, a foundational feature of the CAP that established trade barriers protecting relatively inefficient EC producers from lower cost imports. That said, by reducing external barriers (the threshold price) by less than internal support prices, Community Preference was not only retained but, by this definition, increased (although the analysis of Mark Spoerer, in this volume, finds that by a range of other measures the protection the CAP afforded producers was starting to decline by the late 1980s). As a result, this ends iii Goal of the CAP may have been challenged, but ultimately was left intact.

It is worth noting that the 1992 reform focused primarily on the cereals complex (cereals, oilseeds and livestock, especially beef), commodities supported by the most trade distorting policy instruments, those of price support; and which were the most expensive, the direct link between price support and budget outlays having been discussed earlier.25 It is also worth reiterating the macroscopic nature of the budget and trade pressures. Thus the extent of the means ii and means i changes to the commodities of the cereals complex meant agreement could be reached in the GATT talks with much more modest changes to other commodities such as sugar and dairy.

Two further features of the direct payments saw changes to the budgetary aspects of ends i, policy settings. The value of each unit payment was fixed; and the total number of payments that could be made (per hectare for arable, per animal for beef) were limited. Thus the total possible cost of these payments had an in-built ceiling. Although the introduction of the payments saw a one-off jump in budget costs for the commodities concerned, once phased-in the trajectory of CAP spending was much flatter. This provided a long-term solution to the budget concerns surrounding the CAP. Moreover, these features of the direct payments can also be seen as a radical

25. Beyond the cereals complex, price support was still used to support dairy and sugar production. In the former case, quotas limited production and thus exportable surpluses and budget costs. With sugar, production was limited by quotas, whilst a levy on producers covered the budget costs of the domestic policy regime. The latter regime was reformed in 2005/06, with support prices and quota levels cut significantly: R. ACKRILL, A. KAY, Multiple streams in EU policy-making: the case of the 2005 sugar reform, in: Journal of European Public Policy, forthcoming.
change in means iii, instrument logic. The CE/NCE distinction still existed, but the in-built spending limit controlled CE endogenously.

Thus whilst the 1992 reform did not succeed in changing ends iii, policy goals, the combination of endogenous and exogenous macro pressures (respectively, budget and trade concerns), yielded changes to ends ii and i; and all three levels of policy means. That said, with the unit value of the new direct payments determined with direct reference to the extent of the re-calibration of support prices, those who benefited most under price support continued to benefit most under the new post-1992 payments. On this point, therefore, we would challenge the conclusion of one recent contribution to the literature on CAP reform and CAP policy instruments, where it is claimed that “the policy instrument [of price support] lost legitimacy because it was simply not efficacious”. The direct payments introduced in 1992 actually cemented the unequal distribution of financial transfers to farmers, the reform being motivated by concerns unrelated to the efficacy of price support as a means of providing income support to farmers. Indeed, to this day the issue of farm incomes has never adequately been addressed.

**Reforms since 1992**

The negotiations that resulted in the 1999 reform began with the publication, in 1997, of the ‘Agenda 2000’ programme. This included the Financial Perspective for 2000-2006 and reforms to the regional and agricultural policies, preparing the EU for what would become the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Again, budget and trade concerns were present. The principal budget concern was being able to afford the CAP in an enlarged EU, respecting the budget limit negotiated separately within Agenda 2000. This task was made harder by the 15 member states agreeing to keep total EU spending unchanged post-enlargement as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP), even as the size of the possible enlargement rose from six countries to ten during the accession negotiations. Trade pressures arose as a result of the imminent resumption of trade liberalisation talks in agriculture, under what would become the WTO Doha Round. These would challenge not only the remaining price support but also any support that was not fully de-coupled – including the direct payments agreed in 1992.

The 1999 CAP reform reached by the European Council at the end of March 1999, addressed two distinct elements. The first continued the changes begun in 1992, with further cuts in support prices and (partly) offsetting increases in direct payments. In this element of the reform, therefore, no new instruments were introduced but existing

instruments were recalibrated (means i). At the aggregate level of total CAP spending, however, this represented a further shift in CAP spending from coupled to de-coupled support instruments, from price support to direct payments. This reinforced the ends ii and means iii changes introduced in 1992.

The original reform agreement, reached by the Council of Agriculture Ministers in mid-March, saw a deeper price cut and larger compensating rise in direct payments. When the European Council met two weeks later, however, they altered the extent of the means i recalibrations, by reducing both the depth of the price and the rise in direct payments, in order to reduce the overall cost of the reform to the EU Budget and ensure it respected the overall budget limit determined by the European Council a month earlier.\(^\text{28}\) In this case, therefore, the macro budget pressure, working through the ends ii policy of Budgetary Discipline, acted to limit the means i recalibration of CAP support instruments. This can also be seen as an ends i change, as means i changes were made to respect a new desired level of budget spending at the macro level of the CAP.

The second element of the CAP reform brought together several existing and new non-income support measures under the heading “rural development”, also known as Pillar II of the CAP (Pillar I being income support). These measures covered a wide range of policy issues, including agri-environmental concerns and elements directed at the wider rural economy rather than the agricultural sector per se. As such, this reform represented a change to ends iii, not by changing what was there already but by layering-in new goals for the CAP. This also manifested itself through the introduction of specific new ends ii objectives and means ii instruments, notably with several rural development instruments being more fully decoupled than the Pillar I payments at the time. Furthermore, elements of rural development, plus ‘cross-compliance’ conditions for the receipt of direct payments, brought environmental concerns more directly and explicitly into the CAP. The introduction of the rural development policy measures also brought about a means iii change to instrument logic: for the first time CAP measures were not 100% funded from the EU budget but were co-funded by the member states. A further means ii change was brought about through ‘modulation’, whereby member states could choose to take some of the money allocated to direct payments and recycle it into additional rural development funding – an option that would manifest itself through further instrument re-calibrations.

Thus the first part of the 1999 reform developed the higher level (ends ii and means iii) changes of 1992, but itself only involved means i changes. Indeed, it is a paradox of the 1999 reform that the macro budget pressure limited the extent of the instrument recalibration. The second part of the CAP reform package, however, saw much more profound changes, even seeing new ends iii goals layered into the policy mix. The 1999 reform also reveals a weakness with the H&C classification. The changes made in the second part of the CAP reform changed even ends iii, yet most money continued to be channelled to farmers, through Pillar I instruments largely unchanged from 1992.

\(^{28}\) See R.W. ACKRILL, op.cit., pp.116-127 for a detailed analysis of this sequence of events.
other than through some re-calibration. Thus questions remain over how or even if the different elements of the H&C framework can be valued and ranked in assessing the extent of a reform overall.

It is with this in mind that we turn to the next multi-commodity reform of the CAP. The 1999 agreement required a ‘mid-term’ policy review in 2002. With WTO talks focusing attention on the remaining trade distortion within the CAP, Commissioner Franz Fischler assembled a reform package, agreed in 2003, that addressed at least some trade concerns. Most CAP institutions were left unaltered, but two changes of note were made. First the reform introduced a cross-commodity Single Farm Payment (SFP) to replace existing direct payments, primarily those within the cereals complex. Payments would be based on past transfers with no specific requirements concerning current production. The intention was to de-couple payments sufficiently to assure protection from future cuts in coupled support agreed through the WTO talks, although the final agreement did permit member states to retain some post-1992 payments. This element of the 2003 reform is thus unique in CAP history, as it involved a change to means ii that was not accompanied by a means i re-calibration (although the changes to modulation, discussed below, did re-calibrate support instruments). This feature of the 2003 reform does not, of itself, represent an ends i change, but is strong confirmation of the ends i change made in 1999 (which was, in turn, a reinforcement of the ends i change made in 1992). The remaining institutions of price support were left untouched, although the subsequent sugar reform of February 2006 included a 36 % price cut.

The 2003 reform also enhanced the environmental institutions of the policy. Eligibility for the SFP requires compliance with several environmental conditions, whilst modulation of SFP monies into rural development is now compulsory and the ceiling on transfers raised – a combination of adapting means ii and a change in means i. Whilst the institutions associated with post-1992 direct payments were not removed from the CAP matrix, most budget transfers would now be channelled through the new institutions of the SFP. This layering-in of new support instruments means, however, four sets of income-support institutions exist alongside each other (price support, post-1992 direct payments, post-2003 Single Farm Payments; and Rural Development), with each in turn receiving greater shares of CAP spending as they are introduced to supersede more problematic institutions. The shift to fully decoupled direct payments is a further change in ends ii. Decoupling also changes means iii because of a change, indeed a reversal, in instrument logic: instead of making transfers to farmers based on what they produce, a transfer is now made in the form of the SFP, with farmers free to choose what they will do.

The latest reform – the Health Check – continues to nudge the CAP in a certain direction, reinforcing earlier reforms. Many of the key elements, though (for example

29. See also A. SWINBANK, C. DAUGBJERG, The 2003 CAP Reform ..., op.cit.
30. The figure is five if Single Area Payments are counted separately. These are a variation on SFPs required initially for the new member states, who had not been in receipt of the previous direct payments which provided the base level of transfers to determine SFPs.
the removal of the set aside obligation and introduction of other measures to preserve wildlife benefits; a simplification of the environmental cross-compliance rules for receipt of direct payments; a tightening of the exemption rules for incorporating post-1992 payments into the SFP; increases in modulation rates) are, in essence, minor changes to elements of policy already present – mainly means i changes with limited means ii changes. Even one of the more significant changes at the commodity level – the abolition of dairy quotas and an increase in the SFP - represents a means ii change as one particular Mechanism is eliminated, with a means i re-calibration of an existing Mechanism, the SFP.

**Conclusion**

Historical perspectives on policy require an understanding of reasons for continuity and change in that policy over time. Moreover where a policy, such as the CAP, is a complex mix of multiple institutions and instruments, explanation may be required for how and why continuity and change can be observed as occurring simultaneously. To this end, the present paper treats the CAP not as a single holistic entity but as a complex policy consisting of multiple inter-connected institutions: these are the units of analysis in CAP reform. Furthermore, it draws upon recent theoretical developments by Howlett and Cashore, which extend the earlier work of Hall on disaggregating ‘policy’ into different levels of analysis, distinguishing between policy ends and means. Whilst the (unchanging) goal of supporting farming incomes has remained untouched, we have shown in the paper reforms of two basic types. The first is instrument adaptation, where the prevailing instruments transferring resources to farmers are adjusted in response to pressures; and instrument innovation, where new means of supporting farm incomes are introduced or layered-in.

Second, the sources of the critical junctures leading to reform events, the triggers, were identified clearly as being budget-related, trade related, or both jointly. Early CAP reforms were budget-oriented, created by a long-term incompatibility between the obligations of a balanced budget rule, imposed on the EU budget as a whole, and the rising CAP spending created by a combination of the foundational price support instruments and the ‘compulsory’ nature of CAP spending. More recently, pressure has come to bear on the CAP through international trade talks, jointly with budget pressures until ‘CAP reform’ embedded endogenous constraints on Compulsory Expenditures. Although other factors shaping individual reforms are also identified, notably growing environmental concern within the EU, we do not find them decisive in inducing reform.

With the CAP involving the transfer of financial resources to the farm sector, critical junctures have been induced by the budgetary scale of transfers, where the fiscal consequences of the status quo were so great that the CAP had to be put onto a new financial trajectory. New institutions were layered-in that maintained support,
as required by the Treaty of Rome, but which also stabilised spending, as required by the balanced budget rule (and also by the desire to develop spending in new policy areas whilst containing overall EU spending).

Trade-related reforms, on the other hand, were not concerned with budget spending *per se* but, rather, the extent to which support was channelled through trade-distorting instruments. Such reforms have not removed existing instruments from the CAP, but they have re-directed most financial resources towards new, more de-coupled, instruments layered-in to address such concerns. Reforms motivated by, notably, environmental concerns have helped determine the detailed policy response to the demands of trade talks. Moreover, the progressive layering-in of new budget-related instruments into CAP and EU budget institutional space has succeeded in controlling CAP spending. As a result, trade pressures are now the most likely source of future critical junctures. Trade-distorting institutions, albeit conduits of reduced financial resources to farmers, have yet to be removed from CAP institutional space.

Table 1 summarises the findings discussed at length in this paper. This reveals some important features about CAP reforms. Changes to higher-level means (instrument logic) or to policy ends have only occurred when one or more reform pressure was binding. The only change to policy goals (ends) has not involved removing existing elements, but layering-in new environmental concerns (an aspect of the CAP discussed in depth by Elton in this volume). After 1992, a number of the policy ends were reinforced in subsequent reforms but there appears to be a tailing-off in the extent to which policy ends have continued to be altered or added. Indeed, by 2009 and the Health Check the picture of changes to means i and ii has taken the nature of CAP reform back to the reform episodes of the 1970s and early 1980s. Herein lies one of the most important insights offered by H&C: significant policy change can be brought about by incremental endogenous adjustments, without the need for exogenous shocks (à la Hall); for the CAP in 2010 bears very little resemblance indeed to that of the 1970s.
Table 1: a summary of reform means, ends, and concerns

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Notes:
B, T and E refer to, respectively, the presence of binding budget, trade and environmental reform pressures;
PI and PII reflect the two elements of the 1999 reform that addressed, respectively, Pillar I and Pillar II (see main text).
The underlined ticks indicate that these policy ends were not introduced in 1999, but were developed further in 1999, following their introduction in 1992.

Zeitnah zum Inkrafttreten der Grundrechtecharta erscheint eine aktuelle Neuauflage des Standardkommentars. Das Werk
- erläutert die Präambel und sämtliche Artikel anhand ihrer Entstehungsgeschichte
- interpretiert die Bestimmungen der Charta für die Anwendung in der Rechtspraxis
- behandelt auch die prozessuale Durchsetzung der europäischen Grundrechte.


Mark SPOERER

The history of European integration is usually told as a success story. Countries that used to fight against each other for centuries decided to cooperate politically as well as economically and established supranational institutions. More than half a century after its foundation, the European Union forms an umbrella under which its member states pursue common interests or compete peacefully for resources and markets. At least for the core of the states that joined the European Union before the turn of the century, the very idea that neighbouring states take up arms to resolve conflicts is hardly conceivable. By all political standards this is indeed a tremendous success.

This historical achievement, however, did not come without cost. As numerous states have to coordinate their decision-making, costly institutions emerged to manage the European Union. The notorious ‘bureaucrats in Brussels’, though, cost the European taxpayer not more than 0.06 per cent of the combined gross national income (GNI) of the EU member states. Even if some bureaucratic excesses may call for rationalization, the EU's political coordination costs are quantitatively negligible.

For an assessment of the true costs of the European Union it is not sufficient to consider administration costs alone. A more interesting issue is whether the policies pursued by the EU caused costs that feasible alternatives would not have had. In this respect the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) comes immediately to mind. In the first three decades of the EU it was the CAP that received by far most public attention, to an extent that the CAP seemed at times to be nearly congruent with EU politics. This was mirrored by the EU budget, the expenditure side of which was (and still is) dominated by the CAP, with its share peaking at 90 per cent in 1970.

Yet the CAP cost European consumers and taxpayers much more than what was visible in the EU budgets. European farmers enjoyed high protection levels against cheaper imports and even received subsidies to export their production surpluses. This may be interpreted as a huge redistribution program from the non-agricultural sectors to agriculture. In total, however, the costs borne by taxpayers and consumers were larger than the farmers’ benefits because high prices crowded out consumer demand and the subsidized expansion of European agriculture bound labour and cap-

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1. Throughout this article the term 'European Union' will be used for its predecessors as well: EEC - European Economic Community and EC - European Community. I would like to thank the German Historical Institute Paris and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for generous funding of this research project and Carine Germond, Fernando Guirao, Markus Hofreither, Cathérine Moreddu, Katja Seidel and Stefan Tangemann for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper and Michael Buchner and Valentin Kreilinger for very able research assistance.


3. EAGGF Guarantee Section plus related structural funds, calculated from ibid., p.78.
ital resources that might have been used more productively in other parts of the economy. Hence the CAP was not just a zero-sum game.

The purpose of this paper is to present first results of a larger exercise aimed at estimating the full costs of the CAP, thus supplementing historians' EU success stories with the sober results of the cost side. Within the EU taxpayers and consumers incurred these costs while farmers benefited. Outside the EU the CAP was criticized for its protectionist effects. In this paper, we are particularly interested in the degree of agricultural protection caused by the CAP and its development over the last half century. This will allow us to assess the validity of two arguments that are often repeated. First, that the EU's Common Agricultural Policy just continued national agricultural policies, and second, that the MacSharry reform of 1992 led to a substantial reduction of agricultural protection in the EU.4

The empirical backbone of this undertaking are two databases measuring agricultural protection set up by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank, respectively. While the World Bank database has not yet been exploited for historical research, that of the OECD has only very recently been used by economic history research, in a pioneering article by Giovanni Federico.5 From a conceptual point of view the OECD database is ideal for the purposes pursued here. Its drawback, however, is that it starts only with the year 1979 and underwent a fundamental conceptual change for the years since 1986. The World Bank database builds on the OECD data and goes, for some countries at least, back to 1956. The economic concepts underlying these databases are compatible so that the two databases combined cover the main member states of the EU.

A cautionary remark needs to be made. The findings presented here are in themselves not sufficient for a normative assessment of the CAP. Apart from the political benefits of the CAP – paying for an inefficient supranational policy is certainly more sensible than to wage war against each other – and its non-agricultural economic benefits – to achieve France's consent for the Common Market some form of agricultural policy coordination was considered a *conditio sine qua non* in the early 1960s – it is now widely accepted that certain agricultural activities produce positive external effects for which farmers should be rewarded. In particular, the preservation of a historically emerged landscape is a public good for which modern societies are willing to pay. This argument is not necessarily ahistorical. What is described here in sober notions of welfare economics may have been felt by politicians and taxpayers of the 1960s as well, even though it was expressed in terms like 'tradition', 'heritage', etc. In this respect this paper is far from pretending to deliver complete data for a


normative assessment of the CAP – not addressing the benefits for the farmer and the society, it is just confined to the cost side.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section we will briefly review the development of the CAP from its beginnings to the MacSharry reform of 1992, which is usually seen as a turning point in the history of the CAP. Section two discusses the OECD and World Bank databases and how they are combined for deriving the results which are presented in section three. Section four concludes.

1. Chronology: A Short Economic History of the CAP Up to the MacSharry Reform

After World War II the United States wished to establish a new order in which European states cooperated and adhered to the principles of free trade. The process that led to the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in March 1957 was not exactly what the United States had wished for, but the benefits of a politically united and capitalist Western Europe outweighed the costs of a customs union, which was but a second-best solution for the White House because of the trade-diverting effects. Making the customs union work was a painstaking process for the EEC member states that bound much diplomatic resources in the late 1950s and 1960s. In particular, France, keen to improve the trade balance by exporting agricultural surpluses to her neighbours, made clear that some form of a common European agricultural policy was a necessary prerequisite for a European customs union, a project favoured by Germany and its export-oriented manufacturing sector. Indeed, given the weight of agriculture in the EU6-economies in the 1950s (on average 11 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1955-59), the perspective of large intra-EEC agricultural trade flows and the quite different national regimes of agricultural support, a harmonization of agricultural policies was inevitable.6

In post-war Europe two agricultural subsidization regimes were in practice which relied either on direct payments (direct income support) or on market protection to raise the domestic price level artificially high (indirect income support). As Great Britain had exposed its agriculture to the competitive forces of the world market since the abolition of the corn laws in the 1840s, its agricultural sector was very small (1955-59: 4 per cent of GDP). Consumers profited from low food prices close to the world market level and the few remaining British farmers received tax-financed direct payments.7

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In the other European countries, and especially in the countries that were to form the EEC in 1957, the situation was different. Domestic farmers had been protected by tariff barriers since the last quarter of the 19th century when the grain invasion from more efficient overseas producers had set in. Moreover, since the inter-war period many states had introduced quantity restrictions for imports. These protective measures slowed down structural change and so the farm sectors were characterized by numerous and often very small farms, many of which would not survive in competitive markets. A customs union, even if it protected EU farmers as a whole from outward competition, would imply that comparably efficient agricultural producers like those in France or the Netherlands would expand at the cost of the less efficient ones in Italy or Germany. Direct income support as practiced in Great Britain would have been very costly, difficult to implement on a supranational scale (especially in Italy with its many small farms) and would have faced opposition because it would have openly demonstrated that farmers could no longer earn their living on their own but rather were on welfare.

The solution finally chosen in January 1962 followed the traditional pattern of continental European agricultural policy support. The CAP foresaw a system of politically determined minimum prices which shielded less efficient producers from price competition of more efficient producers either from countries inside the customs union or outside. The produce of the latter was made dearer by import levies which varied according to the difference of the guaranteed minimum price and the world price. Intra-EEC competition in the agricultural sector was dampened by a system of border levies ('transitional compensatory amounts') which were to be phased out once the level of EEC-wide common prices was specified.

Using price policy to conduct income policy was the original sin of the CAP. When the Council of Ministers chose this option in early 1962 there could be no doubt on the consequences. Already in 1958 the so-called Haberler Report, an expertise for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by a commission led by the Harvard economist Gottfried Haberler, had clearly analyzed the consequences of such a policy. If a producer knows that all his output will sell at a guaranteed minimum price, he will expand production until his marginal costs equal the guarantee

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price. The European Commission was also well aware of this simple economic logic.

Given the principal decision for common minimum prices, the decisive question was of course their level. Countries with less efficient producers like Italy and in particular Germany argued for high prices whereas France feared their inflationary consequences for the consumers (and voters). After a long negotiation process in which Germany assumed the role of a veto player, the EU6 states opted for a quite high price level in December 1964. This enabled many German farms to survive and brought French farmers decent profits. The bill was paid by taxpayers and consumers who were not in the position to form powerful lobby groups able to influence the negotiations in the way the producer lobbies did.

Already before the introduction of common prices on July 1, 1967, European farmers proved that they understood the economic logic laid out in the Haberler Report. Once the first EEC-wide market regulations became effective in July 1962, agricultural production in the EU6 states grew strongly, leading to excess supplies which were either stored, destroyed or dumped on the world market. Butter mountains, milk and wine lakes, etc. symbolized the flawed policies of the CAP already in the mid-1960s.

As early as 1969 the EEC had to give up the idea of a common price, one of the fundamental pillars of the original policy. Following a revaluation of the German mark and a devaluation of the French franc, the European Commission introduced the 'monetary compensatory amount' (MCA). As the devaluation made French farmers more competitive, they had to pay MCAs when they exported to other EEC member countries. In contrast, German farmers exporting to other member countries received MCAs so as to not have their competitive position deteriorated. As a consequence, considerable national price differences re-emerged in the supposedly 'common market', so that the introduction of the MCAs has often been interpreted as a renationalization of agricultural price policies. Later a 'switch-over' mechanism was introduced which relieved the farmers in the devaluing country while leaving the

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farmers in other countries eligible for MCAs. This contributed to further price increases.\textsuperscript{17}

It did not necessarily require the expertise of economists to realize the perverse incentives of the price guarantee system. Yet once on its path, reforming the CAP proved to be extremely difficult.\textsuperscript{18} An important factor for reform was not so much economic insight but rather the need to avert budget crises. In fact, the CAP proved to be so expensive and the ensuing political deadlocks so intricate that at times the whole European project was called into question. The internal push for reform was intensified by external pressure on the EU. Its protection of European agricultural markets was a constant stumbling block in international trade rounds within the GATT and WTO framework (Kennedy, Tokyo, Uruguay, Doha rounds) and undermined the credibility of the EU.\textsuperscript{19}

The European Commission drafted numerous reform proposals, but as the system of guaranteed prices was successfully defended by its beneficiaries the underlying problem was not approached.\textsuperscript{20} Instead of tackling it from the price side those proposals that were put into practice introduced quantity limits (the milk quota 1984, 'producer co-responsibility', etc.). Only the reform package of 1992, named after the then commissioner for agriculture, Ray MacSharry, decoupled income policy from price policy in the cereal sector. Prices were reduced and farmers were compensated by direct payments, a quite similar system to the policy regime operative in Great Britain prior to adhesion to the European Community in 1973.\textsuperscript{21}

\section*{2. Methodology: Assessing the Protective Effects of the CAP}

In the postwar trade rounds the agricultural protectionism of the EU, as well as that of other exporters of agricultural goods like the United States, proved to be a constant hurdle. Not only was it difficult to reconcile conflicting interests, but the data situation

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} M.F. HOFREITHER, \textit{Origins and development of the Common Agricultural Policy}, in: M. GEHLER, op.cit., pp.333-348.
\end{itemize}
was unsatisfactory. Hence the OECD Ministerial Council decided in 1982 to monitor
the agricultural sector closer than before. The OECD Secretariat chose the concept
of the 'producer subsidy equivalent' (PSE), predecessors of which had been developed
by trade economists in the 1960s to measure the economic effects of current practices
of agricultural protection and support. The notion of the PSE had been developed by
Tim Josling in the early 1970s who refined the concept and used it in his work for
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).\(^{22}\) In 1999 the concept of the PSE
underwent several conceptual changes and was renamed 'producer support estimate',
apparently to remove normative connotations. Further minor changes were added in
2007.\(^{23}\)

As the share of agriculture in developed countries' GDP continues to shrink, agri-
cultural protection and support has become less of a problem. For the less developed
countries (LDCs), however, it remains high on the agenda of economic reform. So,
for similar reasons as the OECD 25 years before, the World Bank built up a large
database to measure agricultural protection in LDCs. Fortunately, from this paper's
point of view, this database includes most developed countries as well, in fact it builds
directly on the data collected by the OECD. In contrast to the OECD, which treats
the EU as a single political unit, the World Bank data relate to individual EU member
countries and stretch back to 1956. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of
both databases.

**Table 1: OECD and World Bank Agricultural Protection Databases\(^{24}\)**

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<td>CSE, PSE, TSE, NAC</td>
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Notes: BE, GR, LU – Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg; CSE/PSE/TSE – consumer/producer/total support estimate (* consumer/producer subsidy equivalent); NAC – nominal assistance coefficient; NRA – nominal rate of assistance.


A crucial variable in the OECD framework and the most important component of the producer support estimate (PSE) is market price support (MPS), which is defined as

“the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture by creating a gap between domestic market prices and border prices of specific agricultural commodities”.

Basically, the MPS for a commodity is determined by adding together transfers to producers from consumers and taxpayers, which empirically corresponds to the quantity of domestic production multiplied by the difference between domestic market price and world price. In other words, MPS measures indirect support via price policies, i.e. protection.

The PSE is a broader measurement concept and also includes direct subsidies, i.e. support. It is defined as

“the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm gate level, arising from policies that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income”.

The PSE for a country c is calculated by adding together MPS_i for all commodities i and adding the aggregate Budgetary and Other Transfers to producers from policies (BOT).

Like the MPS, the PSE is a figure expressed in currency units. For international comparisons the OECD recommends non-dimensional measures like the Percentage PSE (%PSE) and the Producer Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC). In order to calculate %PSE, PSE is related to the value of Gross Farm Receipts (GFR), which is the sum of the Value of Production (VP) at domestic prices and BOT. Note that market protection and support policies may inflate VP by lifting domestic prices over world prices and/or may result in paying direct subsidies (BOT). In the absence of any subsidies or protectionist policies, BOT = 0 and PSE = 0, and so GFR = VP = domestic production valued at world prices (or, in this case equivalent, at domestic prices) and %PSE = 0.

\[
\%PSE_c = \frac{PSE_c}{VP_c + BOT_c} * 100 = \frac{PSE_c}{GFR_c} * 100
\]

25. OECD (2008), p.57. Prices at "farm gate level" or "border prices" correspond to domestic prices and world prices, respectively. The economic concepts behind acronyms like PSE, NAC or NRA are derived from welfare and trade economics. In this paper, we will not go into the details. Basically, the OECD and the World Bank undertake a classical partial-analytical exercise. For a deeper analysis, see ibid.

26. Ibid., p.107, emphasis added by author.
The producer NAC is just a transformation of %PSE. It is determined by dividing the value of gross farm receipts by the value of production at world prices, which is the value of production at domestic prices less market price support:

\[
NAC_c = \frac{GFR_c}{VP_c - MPS_c} = 1 + \frac{\%PSE_c}{100 - \%PSE_c}
\]

The Agricultural Distortions Project of the World Bank bases its measures on the same conceptual framework as the OECD. For its database the World Bank has chosen the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA), which is NAC minus unity. In the absence of any assistance (subsidies or price-distorting policies) PSE is zero, NAC equals unity and NRA equals zero. As we find NAC slightly more intuitive than NRA, we will rely on this measure for international and intertemporal comparisons of agricultural protection and support.

Before moving into the following section, the reader should note that the PSE and NAC values so-far discussed underestimate the true figures of protection and support for at least two reasons. First, not all direct support measures on national and subnational levels are included, in particular prior to 1986, and second, the 'welfare loss triangles' (consumer demand crowded out and inefficient resource allocation) are not accounted for. However, both effects are probably not large, and their exclusion certainly does not change the overall picture. Note also that the economic costs we are about to discuss are different from the welfare costs in a typical welfare economic exercise. The main difference is that a large part of the economic costs are transfers to the farmers. While an analysis of the welfare costs might be interpreted as a net concept, our focus on the economic costs is a gross concept.

3. Results: Agricultural Protection and Support in the European Union

We are now able to calculate the economic costs of the CAP and compare them to the fiscal costs. The fiscal costs are published in the EU budget and include expenditure for price guarantees (EAGGF Guarantee Section) and expenditure for structural measures (EAGGF Guidance Section). They are borne by the taxpayers and are plotted as dotted line in figure 1 (in million of euro, left-hand scale).

The economic costs are measured by the PSE concept using the OECD/World Bank data. In addition to the fiscal costs borne by the taxpayers, they also include those borne by the consumers who pay politically influenced prices for food directly or indirectly (if processed) subject to CAP regulation rather than (usually lower) world prices. As the World Bank’s agricultural protection database does not include Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece we estimated the PSE for the EU6, EU9 and EU10

27. Ibid., p.171.
by adding up PSE for all other member countries and add a fictitious PSE for Belgium and Luxembourg (90 per cent of the Dutch PSE) and for Greece (14 per cent of the Italian PSE). From 1986 onwards, we rely directly on the OECD's PSE data for the EU as a whole. The original PSE data are in US dollar. As our focus here is on the burden borne by taxpayers and consumers of the EU, the interpretation should not be blurred by the fluctuations of the US dollar. Hence we chose the European unit of account, Ecu and Euro as 'currency' (which, in the strict sense, it is only since 1999) for the comparison and converted the PSE data accordingly. The economic costs are plotted as bold line (in million of euro, left-hand scale). The time axis stops in 2003, just before the enlargement to 25 member states which became effective on January 1, 2004.

Figure 1 (see next page) clearly shows that the fiscal costs published by the EU are but a small fraction of total economic costs as measured in the OECD/World Bank framework. The dashed line is the ratio of the fiscal costs to the economic costs (right-hand scale). From 1970, three years after the CAP had come into full effect, until the mid-1980s this ratio amounted to between 15 and 20 per cent on average, with a slightly rising trend. Since the mid-1980s it has risen quickly to about 45 per cent indicating that the EU’s agricultural support policies became on aggregate much more transparent than before (the fiscal costs borne by the taxpayers are visible in the EU budget, the additional costs of the consumers are not).

28. The results are very similar if we assume that the combined PSE of Belgium and Luxembourg is equal to that of the weighted average of the other EU member states.

29. We proceed as follows (variables taken from the World Bank database are in lower case letters):
\[
\text{NAC} = \text{nra totd} + 1, \text{VP} = \text{vop tot} * \text{NAC} \quad \text{(in order to correct for the difference between domestic and world market prices)} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{BOT} = \text{nps}. \quad \text{In order to check whether this interpretation of the World Bank database corresponds to equation (2) we compared the PSE figures calculated by this method from the World Bank database with the OECD's figures for Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the US for 1986 to 2007. The correlation coefficient is 0.986.}
\]

30. In December 1952 the European Community for Steel and Coal created a parity unity of account (UA) for their budget, which was taken over by the European Communities. Initially the UA equaled one US$. When the Bretton Woods system broke down in 1971 and currencies floated, the EC pegged the UA to the gold value that the US$ had had between 1934 and 1971. The UA was replaced by the Ecu in March 1979, which in turn gave way to the Euro in January 1999. The exchange rate between the UA and the US$ was 1 until August 1971. The rates since 1971 are taken from Eurostat, table ert_bil_eur_a (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ert_bil_eur_a&lang=en).
Both the budget and the PSE series displayed in figure 1 are in nominal terms and are thus inflated by the hefty price increases of the 1970s. Although public debates relate to nominal terms, it is more interesting in the long perspective taken here to account for the effects of inflation (figure 2). The method of deflating the fiscal cost and economic cost series is not obvious. As the CAP undoubtedly contributed to the increase of agricultural producer prices, this series is not an adequate deflator. From this reasoning it would be optimal to use an adjusted consumer price index net of agricultural prices. Such an index, however, is not available for the whole period under discussion. Hence for deflating the series we used the common consumer price index provided by the OECD.


32. The OECD calculates a consumer price index net of food and energy prices. This index, however, is only for a few EU countries available for the whole period under consideration, see the tables in http://lysander.sourceoecd.org/.

33. We used the OECD's data for the annual change of the consumer price indices for the EU countries, constructed indices for the EU6, EU9, EU10, EU12 and EU15 and chained them. The harmonized CPI index is not available for the whole period under consideration. The country weights are taken from the EuroStat website (variable prc_hicp_cow) and are corrected for territorial changes (Germany 1990).
Figure 2: Fiscal and Economic Costs of the CAP in prices of 2000, 1956-2003

Notes: same as in figure 1. Data deflated with a EUx index constructed from OECD consumer price indices for the member countries, see footnote 33.

The MacSharry reform came into effect only in the harvest year 1993/94 and was completed by 1996. Both from figures 1 (in nominal terms) and 2 (in real terms) it becomes clear that the reform had at best a dampening effect on the fiscal costs. Yet this is not too surprising given its construction (see below). More interesting are the economic costs. In nominal terms they stagnate since the mid-1980s whereas they fall quite considerably in real terms in spite of two accession rounds and although agricultural prices did not fall on average. From an economic point of view, the piecemeal reforms of the 1980s seem to have had more impact on the protective effects of the CAP than the MacSharry reform.

We now take a closer look at the effects of starting the CAP and acceding to the EU. As outlined in section 2, the producer NAC is determined by dividing the (actual) value of gross farm receipts by the (hypothetical) value of production at world prices. If agriculture is neither protected nor supported, there is no difference between domestic prices and world prices so that MPS = 0, there are no subsidies BOT, hence

34. Sources: same as in figure 1.
37. See the wheat prices in figures 3 to 5 below and prices stored in the FAO’s price archive, http://faostat.fao.org.
VP = GFR, the numerator will equal the denominator, and NAC equals unity. If agriculture receives direct support or indirect support (protection) the value of gross farm receipts is inflated by subsidies paid out directly (BOT > 0) or by artificially high prices (MPS > 0), and NAC will rise above unity. A NAC of 1.5, for example, means that direct and indirect support equal half of the total value of production measured at world prices. If it is below unity, agriculture finances other sectors of the economy, for example if agricultural exports are taxed as was often the case in Mediterranean countries before they joined the European Union.

Figures 3 to 5 show the NAC for four of the original six EEC member states and the countries that acceded in 1973 and 1986 respectively. In respect to the 1992 Mac-Sharry reform which was implemented between 1993 and 1996 the data show that the impact on overall levels of protection and support was negligible. The point of the reform was to decouple income policy from price policy. In order to get political consent, the volume of direct support was determined by historical income levels.38 Hence the share of agricultural support financed by the consumers decreased while that of taxpayers increased, so that the transparency of the policy increased as well. As figures 3 to 5 show this worked apparently quite smoothly, but with very little effect on trade distortions as measured by the NAC. Interestingly, like figures 1 and 2 discussed above, figures 3 and 4 also suggest that the incremental reforms of the second half of the 1980s were more successful in driving the level of protection and support down than the 1992 reform.39

38. See also G. FEDERICO, op.cit., pp.265-266, and R.W. ACKRILL et al., op.cit.
39. See also C. ELTON, Paradigm Change within the CAP 1985-88: The European Commission’s Construction of an Alternative Policy Narrative in the Late 1980s, in this volume.
Figure 3: Agricultural protection and support in four of the original six EEC states, 1956-2007

Note: Data for Belgium and Luxembourg are not available.

Figure 4: Agricultural protection and support in the states that acceded to the EEC in 1973, 1956-2007


41. Ibid.
Trying to answer the question whether the EU’s CAP was simply a continuation of national agricultural protection and support on a European level leads to astonishingly clear results. Figure 3 suggests that pre-CAP assistance levels fluctuated between 1.1 in Italy and 1.6 in Germany (see appendix for details). In July 1962 the markets for cereals, pig-meat, poultry and eggs became subject to the new market regulations, which consisted of target prices for domestic producers, equalization border levies on intra-EEC trade, variable import levies on exports from third countries and compensatory payments for exports at low prices. This raised the price level in the EEC and made imports less attractive, so that during the second half of 1962 imports of regulated products from countries outside the EEC fell “drastically”, as the United Nations noted.\(^{43}\) Indeed, in all four states the level of assistance increased enormously to between 1.5 in Italy and more than 2 in Germany and the Netherlands.\(^{44}\) The un-spectacular development of US wheat prices (as a proxy for world prices) between the mid-1950s and 1972 confirms that there were no drastic price changes that might have affected the NAC (this is also confirmed by the stable NAC values in other European countries around 1962 in figures 4 and 5). Note that wheat prices are converted to UA/Ecu/Euro to control for fluctuations of the US dollar.

The sharp decrease of the NAC in the years between 1973 and 1975 is a reflection of the world food crisis which led to a price spike on the international cereals markets. As world prices approached and even surpassed the high European guarantee prices,

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42. Ibid.
44. See also T.E. JOSLING, op.cit., pp.128-129.
MPS decreases, and so the denominator of the NAC (VP – MPS) increases, indicating a decline of protection, which proved to be temporary, however. In these years the CAP worked the other way round and penalized European farmers who wished to export their produce, so that prices in the EEC remained comparably stable. As inflation rates were high in these years, this policy was interpreted as a success of the CAP.45

The high wheat prices during the world food crisis and a five year transition period obscure the full impact of joining the EEC and its CAP for the agricultural sectors of Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain (figure 4). But already in 1975 the NAC was much higher than in the years preceding the accession, and for Denmark and Ireland were even higher than in any year since 1956. For the agricultural sectors of Portugal and Spain the accession was a welcome gift as well (figure 5). In both countries pre-CAP protection levels were very low or even negative (Spain's NAC < 1), then jumped immediately after accession in 1986 and remained on levels far higher than before. The 1986 spike, however, is partly due to a fall in world prices in that year. In the course of a seven to ten year transition period, the Iberian agricultural sectors were allowed to adapt slowly to the common tariff system and the CAP.46

4. Conclusion and Outlook

Given the evidence presented in the previous section, there should remain no doubt that the economic effect of the CAP was more than simply a Europeanization of traditional national policies. One may insist that, in a very wide sense, the set of policy instruments did not change much. But the economic outcome of the policy chosen, i.e. the level of agricultural protection and support, was markedly shifted upwards. This was by no means inevitable. The fact alone that in 1993 the CAP introduced the system of direct payments that Britain had been required to abandon when it joined the EEC in 1973 demonstrates that there had been an alternative to the path actually chosen.47

The path chosen was extremely expensive. For all states analyzed here, the four of the original EU6 as well as the new members joining in 1973 and 1986, the CAP

47. In Germany, the British model was discussed in the business press and in the public since at least 1958, see F. WALTERMANN, Verbraucher zahlen die EWG-Zeche, in: Der Volkswirt, 27.07.1962, pp.1574-1577. The Commission discussed this alternative in 1963, see Commission de la Communauté Économique Européenne, Mesures en vue de l'établissement d'un niveau commun des prix des céréales, VI/COM(63)430 final (20.11.1963).
was an effective shield against world markets. Assistance levels usually jumped by 0.5 points, that is up to half of the total value of production measured at world prices. Under the CAP, the level of EU agricultural protection and support continued to increase until the mid-1980s, disrupted only by the world food crisis of 1973-75. Since the late 1980s protection levels have declined. As cereal prices fluctuated around a constant trend between 1975 and 2005 this decline was probably the result of incremental changes before the MacSharry reform of 1992, a hypothesis which needs further elaboration.

It is certainly true, as Ann-Christina L. Knudsen has forcefully argued, that the CAP must be interpreted as a welfare policy for the farming population. But this should not be interpreted as an inevitable feature of the emergence of the European welfare state. The NAC data for other European countries that also developed the welfare state and were not at the time member states of the EU do not necessarily follow such a trend, as table 2 shows. In the mid-1980s, only Norway and Switzerland, countries whose agricultural sectors would certainly qualify as “less-favoured areas” in the CAP nomenclature, had higher assistance levels than the EU on average. Moreover, apart from Norway only Japan expanded its assistance to agriculture between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s on a similar scale to the EU. The assistance levels of the agricultural sectors in Portugal, Spain, Sweden and even Switzerland grew pronouncedly less than in the EU, while those of Austria and Finland even decreased.

Table 2: Nominal Assistance Coefficient for European Countries and Japan, 1956-58 to 1983-85

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49. Source: See appendix.
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Notes: EU6 value-added-weighted average of NAC for France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands; EU9 the aforementioned plus, since 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the UK.

If the CAP was a welfare policy, it was an extraordinary expensive one, and its stunning resistance to reform suggests that the welfare argument brought forward by the contemporaries seems to have been more a useful rhetoric to mobilize urban agrarian romanticism for agro-industrialist interests than the full story, another hypothesis that needs further elaboration in future research.
### Appendix: Nominal Assistance Coefficient for European Countries, 1956 to 2003

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<th>NL</th>
<th>DK</th>
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Notes: EU6 value-added-weighted average of NAC for France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands; EU9 the aforementioned plus, since 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the UK.


Zu messen ist dieses „Büchlein“, wie es der Autor im Vorwort bescheiden bezeichnet, am eigenen Anspruch ein Reader für ein breiteres Lesepublikum zu sein.

In brevi: Gehler legt ein Werk vor, das durchaus geeignet ist, eine breitere Leserschaft für das Thema Europa zu interessieren, das innerhalb der Fachgrenzen aber nicht für große Aufmerksamkeit sorgen wird, was vom Autor auch nicht intendiert wurde. Angesichts der Fülle des Materials wiegen kleinere Unannehmlichkeiten der Textgliederung nicht schwer, vielmehr ist dem Buch die anvisierte breite Leserschaft zu wünschen.

Johannes Pollak
Webster Vienna Private University
International Relations Department


„Warum und in welchen Momenten ist Ihnen Geschichtsbewusstsein von Nutzen gewesen“? – diese Frage von Fritz Stern an Helmut Schmidt eröffnet den neulich im


Eben die persönliche Note und die Vielfalt der Themen – von der Außenpolitik Deutschlands und der USA, dem Verhältnis zwischen der Bundesrepublik und seinen westlichen und östlichen Nachbarn, über die Innen- und Außenpolitik von Israel, den Antisemitismus und das Geschichtsbewusstsein bis hin zur Geschichte der europäischen Integration – sind sicherlich die größten Stärken des Bandes „Unser Jahrhundert“.

Kornelia Kończal

Center for Historical Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences


So ist ein Arbeitsbuch entstanden, das für die universitäre Praxis sehr hilfreich ist, da man die zentralen Texte der Integrationstheoretiker vorliegen hat. Das Buch hat jedoch eine klare Schwachstelle. Die Texte sind zwar so abgedruckt, dass man die Seitenzahlen des Originals erkennen kann. Jedoch haben die Herausgeber die Fußnoten der Originale weggelassen. Das ist natürlich für eine Beschäftigung mit Integrationstheorien aus historischer Perspektive fatal. Denn wenn man nachvollziehen will, wie die Autoren ihre Argumentation stützen oder wenn man überprüfen möchte, welche Werke die Autoren rezipiert haben, ist man auf die Fußnoten angewiesen. Es bleibt daher doch notwendig, das Original zu konsultieren.

Somit bleibt abschließend festzuhalten, dass der Ansatz des Buches zwar durchaus sinnvoll ist, denn die Texte sind treffsicher ausgewählt, und die Fragen und Kommentare erleichtern den Zugang zu den Theorien. Der Verzicht auf die Fußnoten der Originale ist jedoch kaum zu verschmerzen. Diese sollten bei einer eventuellen Neuauflage auf jeden Fall aufgenommen werden.

Henning Türk
Universität Duisburg-Essen


Das vorliegende Handbuch gliedert sich in acht Abschnitte. Nach der Einleitung (I) der Herausgeber, die die deutsche Außenpolitik in historischer und systematischer Perspektive beleuchten, geht es um Konzepte (II), Rahmenbedingungen (III), Institutionen und innerstaatliche Akteure (IV), Staaten und Religionen (V), Politikfelder (VI), Internationale Organisationen (VII) und Außenpolitikforschung (VIII).


Sehr breiten, fast schon viel zu großen Raum nehmen hingegen „Institutionen und innerstaatliche Akteure“ ein: Beiträge betreffen das Grundgesetz (Rüdiger Wolfrum), den Bundesrepräsentanten (Michael Jochum), den Bundestag (Wolfgang Ismayr), die Bundesländer und den Bundesrat (Thomas Fischer), das Bundeskanzleramt (Karl-Rudolf Korte), die Bundesministerien (Christoph Weller), den Auswärtigen Dienst (Reinhard Bettzuge), die Bundeswehr (Johannes Varwick), Nachrichtendienste
(Hans-Georg Wieck), Parteien (Torsten Oppelland), politische Stiftungen (Sebastian Bartsch), Wirtschaftsverbände (Werner Bührer), Gewerkschaften (Wolfgang Schroeder), Kirchen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen (Gero Erdmann), öffentliche Meinung (Hans Rattinger), Medien (Ulrich Sarcinelli und Marcus Menzel) sowie die Politikberatung (Martin Thunert).

Unter „Staaten und Regionen“ finden sich erwartungsgemäß an erster Stelle die USA (Stephen F. Szabo) und die jeweiligen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (Andreas Falke), gefolgt von Frankreich (Uliike Guérot), Großbritannien (William Paterson/James Sloam), Polen (Basil Kerski), „Mittel- und Osteuropa“ (Michael Dauerstädt), Russland (Angela Stent), den GUS-Staaten (Ellen Bos), „Ex-Jugoslawien“ (Marie-Janine Calic), Türkei (Heinz Kramer), dem Nahen und Mittleren Osten (Udo Steinbach), Israel (Michael Wolffsohn/Thomas Brechenmacher), Maghreb (Tobias Schumacher), Afrika südlich der Sahara (Siegmard Schmidt), Lateinamerika (Manfred Mols), Südostasien (Jürgen Rüland), Indien (Christian Wagner), der VR China (Sebastian Heilmann) und Japan (Nadine R. Leonhardt/Hanns W. Maull). Es fällt an der Reihe die Prioritätensetzung auf, vor allem aber dass kleinere und mittlere Staaten so gut wie keine Berücksichtigung fanden. Nordeuropa, d.h. die skandinavische Staatenwelt, scheint auf der Landkarte dieses Handbuchs nicht auf. Es ist eine an den Großmächten und -räumen orientierte Außenpolitik-Darstellung, in der auch kleinere Nachbarstaaten wie Belgien, die Niederlande, Österreich oder die Schweiz kaum einen Platz finden.

Unter „Politikfelder“ tauchen Sicherheits- (Gunther Hellmann), Außenwirtschafts- (Reinhard Rode), Finanz- (Peter Nunnenkamp), Energie- und Rohstoffpolitik (Erwin Häckel), Rüstungsexport (Michael Brzoska), internationale/r Kriminalität und Terrorismus (Jutta Bakonyi/Cord Jakobeit), Entwicklungs- (Franz Nuscheler), Einwanderungs- und Flüchtlings- (Dietrich Thränhardt), Menschenrechts- (Wolfgang S. Heinz), Umwelt- (Tanja Brühl) und Kulturpolitik (Horst Harnischfeger) auf.

Unter „Internationale Organisationen“ wird das Verhältnis zur UNO (Manfred Knapp), EU (Josef Janning), NATO (Johannes Varwick), OSZE (Ralf Roloff), WTO (Bernhard Stahl) sowie zu den G7/G8-Gipfeln (Bernhard May) thematisiert. Unter „Außenpolitikforschung“ findet sich ein einzigar Beitrag zu Ansätzen und Methoden der Außenpolitikanalyse von Dirk Peters. Eine Einordnung der deutschen Außenpolitik in die größere Theoriedebatte der internationalen Beziehungen wäre wünschenswert gewesen. Exponenten wie Hans Morgenthau oder Kenneth Waltz tauchen nur an wenigen Stellen im Gesamtwerk auf.

Dieses Handbuch legte den Schwerpunkt auf die deutsche Außenpolitik seit der deutschen Einigung. Wenngleich das „Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik“, 1975 herausgegeben von Hans-Peter Schwarz, immer noch als Referenzwerk gelten kann, wird im hier zu besprechenden Nachschlagwerk die Entwicklung von Mitte der 1970er Jahre bis Anfang der 1990er Jahre nur gestreift, was sehr bedauerlich ist, weil sich damit auch die Debatte um Diskontinuitäten und Kontinuitäten bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik besser hätte führen lassen können. Es fällt einerseits die starke Innenperspektivierung auf, andererseits fehlen unter „Akteure“ eigene Beiträge zu den
Außenministern Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Klaus Kinkel, Joschka Fischer oder Frank-Walter Steinmeier, die keine eigene Würdigung finden.


Michael Gehler
Stiftung Universität Hildesheim


In der Einleitung des Bandes wird vor der eigentlichen „Spurensuche“ bereits ein beeindruckendes Panorama zu Debatten, Begriffen und Methoden-Streitigkeiten bei der Untersuchung vieler Europathemen geboten. Von dem bekannten Spannungsfeld zwischen Funktionalisten und Föderalisten bis zum kritischen Blick auf den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess und die EU-Grenzschutzagentur FRONTEX werden zahlreiche Themen im begriffsgeschichtlichen Kontext der Diskurse über „Europa“ und die „Bürger“ gestreift. Das Nebeneinanderlaufen dieser beiden Stränge muss
nach Ansicht des Autors in ein Zusammendenken gewandelt werden, um „Europa nachhaltig zu stabilisieren“ (S.122).


Das „Europa der Bürger“ gerät über die anspruchsvolle Länge nicht zu einem Lückenbüßer, wie das Schicksal des Themas in einigen Berichten und EU-Dokumenten leider erscheint. Zwar ist im Hinblick auf die Quellen einschränkend anzumerken, dass es sich überwiegend um Material aus deutschen Archiven handelt, wel-
ches hier gehoben wurde. Trotzdem macht diese erste spannende Begriffsgeschichte eines „Bürgereuropas“ Hoffnung auf weitere Forschungen.

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Sonderforschungsbereich 640, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin


Christian Salm
University of Portsmouth


For a long time, European supranational institutions have been neglected by historical studies, with the exception of certain pioneering works,\(^1\) as they were seen either as irrelevant in a process dominated by nation-states, or as mere tools in the hands of the federalist heroes like Jean Monnet. This lack of research and analysis has now been put right with the publication of more balanced studies based on in-depth archival research,\(^2\) and, in particular, with the publication of the important collective volume on the History of the Commission (1958-1972) published in 2007.\(^3\)

Katja Seidel’s Ph.D. thesis, which was defended at the University of Portsmouth and published in this book, focuses on a crucial case-study: the first two supranational


\(^{2}\) For example, Mauve Carbonell’s Ph.D. thesis is a collective biography of the members of the ECSC High Authority (excluding Jean Monnet): M. CARBONELL, *Des hommes à l’origine de l’Europe : biographies des membres de la Haute Autorité de la CECA*, Presses de l’Université de Provence, Aix-en-Provence, 2008. Yves Conrad also wrote several articles on the EEC civil servants. Morten Rasmussen has worked on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the *Service Juridique*, the judicial service which was common to the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom. Antoine Vauche has also worked on the ECI.

institutions during their foundational periods, i.e. Monnet’s presidency of the ECSC High Authority (1952-55) and Walter Hallstein’s presidency of the EEC Commission (1958-67). Her aim is to study the members of these commissions as well as their high-ranking officials from sociological, cultural, and institutional points of view. She examines not only these people's backgrounds, ideas, and working methods, but also how the supranational institutions were organized at their very beginning.

The first strength of this book is its methodological approach. Even if biographical data is always difficult to gather, especially for non-public figures, Katja Seidel has managed to collect substantial evidence through archival records scattered throughout seven European countries and by conducting no fewer than 39 interviews. So as not to fall into the trap of engaging in tedious descriptive narratives and summaries, the author relies on a solid analytical framework, which is based mainly on the concept of Europeanization, i.e. the emergence of new rules and norms at the European level, and on the process of socialization, which examines how these values spread. The focus on the early period of the supranational executive bodies is justified by the convincing historical institutionalist argument of the long-term path dependencies created by these formative years. The theoretical background remains light and easily accessible. It does not lead to a teleological interpretation. Above all, it is useful to reach original historical conclusions in terms of individuals, institutions, and administrative culture.

From the individual point of view, Seidel’s book sheds new light both on well-known and more anonymous figures. With regard to the former, the sharp contrast between the approaches of Monnet and Hallstein is emphasized. Hallstein appears as being more pragmatic and moderate than he is usually portrayed. In terms of institutional organization, the first president of the EEC Commission developed a strong and clear vision, which was methodically executed. In contrast, the book leaves a chaotic impression of Monnet’s presidency, in particular of his “arbitrary working methods” (p.17). This is based in particular on the examination of his decision-making process and on the fact that High Authority meetings were often unannounced and unorganized.

Beyond these usual suspects, the book also deals with a wide range of high-ranking officials, from the Commissioners and members of the High Authority to top A-level officials. The wide-ranging diversity of this sample is offset by the author's use of relevant individual biographies and taxonomy. Two groups are identified within the High Authority. The first is composed of “members of the century generation [born between 1900 and 1912], mainly coal and steel veterans”. A second group consists of younger officials, who were more multinational, and whose vision of Europe was both idealistic and realistic – sometimes more economic (Pierre Uri) and sometimes more political (Max Kohnstamm).

Three pairs of opposites are identified within the European Commission. The first contrasts ‘experts’ and ‘politicians'. Among the Director-Generals, for example, Pieter Verloren van Themaat belonged to the first category, and was not always aware of all the political consequences of his decisions, in contrast with officials such as Ernst...
Albrecht or Karl Heinz Narjes. The second pair is based on the classic distinction between 'novices' and 'veterans'. The final pair contrasts the 'realist idealist' and the 'pragmatist'. The first were Euro-enthusiasts such as Émile Noël or Georges Rencki, whereas the second group was composed of individuals who considered their time at the Commission as only one professional experience among others. This was the case, for example, of Jean-François Deniau and François-Xavier Ortoli, who later became Gaullist ministers in French governments.

On the subject of institutional organization, the book makes a clear assessment of the longstanding debate on the difficulty of setting-up an efficient supranational institution. Monnet wanted to build a light and flexible organization modeled on that of the Tennessee Valley Authority or the French Planning Agency. He emphasized team work and wanted to avoid compartmentalization, whereas Hallstein relied on the classic division into Director-Generalships, with each one being presided over by a commissioner. The working groups of commissioners, which were established in 1958, ceased to exist as early as 1960. In order to encourage intra-DG communication, the chef de cabinets (the chief of the commissioner's personal staff) and the executive secretariat (headed by Noël) were strengthened. The Commission relied on collegial administration, but Hallstein, despite claims to the contrary by some historians, frequently used the voting procedure within the college. The problems of national balance, of compartmentalization, and of the difficulty of working in a multinational context led to numerous reports on administrative reform, with the first being published as early as 1959. Another problem concerned the links between national and European administrative bodies. Here again, Hallstein remained pragmatic and did not support the idea of total separation. Former national civil servants were useful as they were aware of the opinions and requirements of member-states.

Lastly, concerning administrative methods and systems, Katja Seidel stresses several factors which explain the emergence of a genuine esprit de corps among the first European officials. The experience of World War II is a common explanation as to why there was so much support for the European concept. Secondly, these European officials were offered rewarding careers. Most of them started working at the Commission during the early years of its existence and stayed until the 1980s. Thirdly, the Commission was dominated by an 'expert culture', which was useful in overcoming national prejudices caused by cultural and linguistic divides. Participatory working methods were also widespread. Lastly, role models such as Hallstein and Sicco Mansholt served to promote the creation of a collective identity.

These features are analyzed more systematically in two case studies, the DG IV (Competition) and the DG VI (Agriculture). In the DG IV, the most important officials were united by a strong ordoliberal background. They wanted a Europe which was tightly regulated by competition policy. Other officials were quick to come to terms with this model. Another original feature was the willingness of Hans von der Groeben to rely on the advice of academics such as Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker. In this he was following the German practice, but he remained isolated in the Commission. In this respect, Regulation 17/62 gave the DG IV wide-reaching powers to act
independently from the Council, thereby bringing an additional benefit, that of a strong sense of autonomy, to the DG IV. The DG VI officials also shared the feeling of being special as they were motivated by Mansholt’s exceptional skills and working methods. Mansholt particularly favoured round-table discussions during which lower-ranking officials could freely discuss issues and put forward new ideas. In addition, the DG VI officials were united by pre-EEC interaction with each other, as most of them had already met in the numerous European negotiations on agriculture which had been held in the 1950s. Both of these case studies are useful as they complement the public policy perspective by adding a cultural dimension.

In conclusion, this book’s main flaw is that it is too short as the reader is left wanting to know more about the people portrayed in it. For example, as the study brings a great deal of new information on important personalities such as the commissioners Robert Marjolin and Jean Rey, short supplementary biographies would have been helpful. Of course, many of the topics covered could, in an ideal world, have benefited from more in-depth discussion. Such topics include the administrative reforms and their consequences, particularly with respect to the merger of 1965, which is mentioned, or the administrative culture of other important DGs.

This book is therefore a welcome invitation to increase research on European supranational institutions by taking into account their sociological and cultural aspects in order to demonstrate both their complexity and their originality.

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In acht Kapiteln durchmisst Haller die aktuelle Krisenlandschaft der europäischen Integration. Genauer in den Blick nimmt er die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und bürokratischen Eliten. Das Spektrum der Themen reicht von der Rolle der charismatischen Gründerväter über den „europäischen Korporatismus“, die „Resozialisierung


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Si l’on savait déjà les petits États sensibles à l’idée européenne, l’ouvrage de Geneviève Duchenne renouvelle notre connaissance du cas de la Belgique, en fournissant une étude fort complète de l’europhéisme belge entre les deux guerres. Cet épais volume de plus de 700 pages, issu d’une thèse de doctorat, dresse un tableau très détaillé de l’activisme pro-européen des années 1920 et 1930, en croisant des sources multiples et abondantes – papiers privés, documents diplomatiques, archives institutionnelles, presse quotidienne, revues politiques et littéraires, mémoires et souvenirs,
etc. Au fil des pages, l’ouvrage fait ainsi apparaître d’importants aspects que l’historiographie avait jusqu’à présent un peu trop sous-estimés, et d’abord le poids des spécificités nationales dans le combat européen. Geneviève Duchenne note ainsi «un certain décalage entre le militantisme européen tel qu’il se présente en France […] et la réalité belge». Les militants s’insèrent, en effet, d’abord dans des cadres nationaux et la Belgique représente un cas bien particulier, en raison de sa situation géographique au cœur de l’Europe, coincée entre deux voisins, France et Allemagne, dont les relations restent tendues: le pays cherche de ce fait à jouer un rôle de trait d’union entre les deux anciennes ennemies dans le but de pacifier le continent européen. L’idée d’une unification européenne commençant sur le terrain économique fait également l’objet d’un consensus au sein des milieux européistes belges, ce petit État étant très tourné vers l’exportation. Toutefois l’européisme belge vise aussi l’émancipation des deux «entités» qui composent la Belgique, la Flandre et la Wallonie. Nationalisme et européisme ne sont pas antithétiques.

Le particularisme belge observé par Geneviève Duchenne s’affirme également par la faible pénétration dans le royaume des mouvements phares de l’européisme. L’exemple du comité belge de Paneuropa, longuement étudié est édifiant. Le fondateur de ce mouvement d’origine viennoise, le comte Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, bénéficie en Belgique du concours d’un stomatologue flamand méconnu, Irénée Van der Ghinst, qui sera «la véritable cheville ouvrière de l’européisme en Belgique» et l’unique participant belge au 1er congrès paneuropéen de 1926 à Vienne. Mais l’analyse de la réalité du mouvement paneuropéen démontre que son action en Belgique est largement paralysée par son excessive centralisation: Coudenhove ne tient pas compte des aspirations de la section belge qui souhaiterait mettre en avant un axe économique plus fédérateur que le volet politique, ce qui explique notamment l’échec du projet de congrès paneuropéen qui devait se tenir à Bruxelles en octobre 1927. À l’été 1927, la Belgique ne compte pas plus de 200 adhérents et «le mouvement ne décollera jamais». Pour autant, l’auteur estime que Paneuropa a été l’élément stimulant du débat éuropéen dans le pays et qu’il a généré un premier militantisme organisé en faveur des États-Unis d’Europe. C’est précisément là que s’effectue le lien avec la décennie suivante, les animateurs des groupements européistes nés au début des années 1930 ayant tous gravité dans les sphères paneuropéennes.

de rénovation de la société et d’un rêve d’unification européenne. Mais ces «nouvelles relèves» belges, selon l’expression forgée par Olivier Dard, se séparent entre un pôle «progressiste» qui met l’accent sur le versant économique de la réforme et un pôle plus «réactionnaire» qui «critique la technique et la modernité et recherche, avant tout, un nouvel humanisme fondé sur le primat du spirituel». Au sein de ces milieux émerge la figure de l’influent publiciste catholique Raymond de Becker et, sous l’impulsion du couple très mondain formé par Lucienne et Edouard Didier, la section bruxelloise de l’Union Jeune Europe leur offre une importante tribune.

Geneviève Duchenne met également en valeur l’activité de deux autres associations qui n’avaient jusqu’alors fait l’objet d’aucune étude historique, le Bloc d’action européenne né en décembre 1931 à Bruxelles, une organisation qui ambitionnait de rassembler tous ceux qui partageaient l’idéal de construire l’Europe; ainsi que l’Institut d’économie européenne, fondé à Bruxelles en mai 1932, par Van der Ghinst, secondé par Francis Delaisi, un groupement qui entendait se consacrer à l’étude des problèmes économiques européens et des plans de réorganisation économique de l’Europe (plan Delaisi, rapport van Zeeland, etc.).

Il ne faut toutefois pas s’exagémer l’importance du courant européen belge dont l’auteur confirme un caractère bien marqué pour tout le reste du continent, à savoir qu’il est l’apanage d’une élite: dans le cas belge, cette dernière est souvent bruxelloise, composée d’avocats, médecins, ingénieurs, commerçants, publicistes, économistes, imprimeurs, etc. Mais l’europeisme belge n’est pas fermé et recherche des synergies hors des frontières belges: il possède des relais dans d’autres pays d’Europe et parvient à se hisser au cœur des réseaux européistes transnationaux.

Si les «dérives idéologiques subies par l’idée d’Europe unie» durant la période sombre de la seconde guerre mondiale, à l’image des époux Didier, s’avèrent particulièrement préjudiciables à la cause européiste, il ne s’agit pas néanmoins d’un cas général, Van Ghinst rentrait par exemple dans la clandestinité, ce qui vaudra à son mouvement de survivre au conflit avant de fusionner avec la Ligue européenne de coopération économique de Paul van Zeeland. Concluant sur les continuités de l’europeisme de l’entre-deux-guerres, l’auteur indique à juste titre que ces années furent le «creuset d’une réflexion qui, loin d’être utopique, avait déjà bien cerné les principales difficultés de la construction européenne».

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Die Niederlande haben insbesondere in der ersten, experimentellen Phase der Europäischen Integration zwischen 1945 und 1973 eine oft unterschätzte Rolle gespielt. In
der Wahrnehmung der Öffentlichkeit stand die Regierung in Den Haag oft im Schatten der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen. Und dennoch, das ist die These des Buches des Groninger Historikers Anjo Harryvan, war der Einfluss der Niederlande auf den Integrationsprozess von hoher Bedeutung. Die Niederlande waren, gerade in dieser Phase, mehr als das Zünglein an der Waage zwischen Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Das Buch ist in weiten Teilen eine Zusammenstellung von Aufsätzen, die schon an anderen Orten erschienen sind, und hier zu einer Synthese zusammengefasst und teilweise ergänzt wurden.

Die Studie beginnt mit einer theoretisch-politikwissenschaftlichen Untersuchung zur Bedeutung von kleineren Staaten in der internationalen Politik. Dies ist ein bislang recht stiefmütterlich behandelter Teil der Theorie internationaler Beziehungen und die Ergebnisse dienen Harryvan auch vor allem dazu, seine These zu entwickeln, dass das politische System der EG/EU wegen der durch das Gemeinschaftsrecht vorgegebenen Verfahren insbesondere kleineren Staaten einen Handlungsspielraum zugeht, der sie in einem anarchischen System nicht hätten.


Ab 1958 veränderte sich die niederländische Europapolitik unter dem Einfluss der gaullistischen Herausforderung. Hauptziel wurde nun die Verteidigung des Status quo. Die Fouchet-Pläne wurden vehement bekämpft, weil sie eine Abkehr von der für die Niederlande als essentiell angesehenen supranationalen Gemeinschaftsmethode angesehen wurden. Gleiches gilt für die „Krise des Leeren Stuhls“. Hier weist Harryvan die These von Piers N. Ludlow zurück, dass die Krise vor allem aus der Opposition der „fünf“ gegen die französische Regierung entstand: „The crisis originated in French resistance to the Commission´s package proposal“ (S.191). Die Konsequenz aus dieser Krise für die niederländische Regierung war die vehemente Un-


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Philip BAJON, *La Crise constitutionnelle des Communautés européennes 1965-6. Origines, développement, conséquences* – Université Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV); Universität Duisburg-Essen (cotutelle)
supervisors: Eric Bussière, Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV); Wilfried Loth, Universität Duisburg-Essen
jury: Sylvain Schirmann, Institut d’études politiques de Strasbourg; Franz Knipping, Bergische Universität Wuppertal
date of the exam: 25.06.2010
contact: Philip.Bajon@eui.eu

Cette thèse porte sur la crise constitutionnelle européenne des années 1965-1966, appelée couramment « crise de la chaise vide », et s’appuie sur des recherches approfondies dans un grand nombre d’archives communautaires, françaises, allemandes, belges et suisses. À partir de l’hypothèse que les foyers de décision étaient bien Bruxelles, Paris et Bonn, l’auteur montre comment un désaccord sur le financement de la politique agricole commune est utilisé par le chef de l’État français, le général Charles de Gaulle, pour obtenir une révision des traités et supprimer des pratiques supranationales.

En particulier, l’auteur présente les acteurs, montre l’autonomie des différentes logiques et s’interroge sur le rôle des personnalités, l’adaptation continue des traités, les politiques du possible et d’autres aspects essentiels de la construction européenne. Walter Hallstein apparaît moins comme l’idéologue fédéraliste qui a provoqué la crise, mais comme un président qui cherche à stabiliser une structure supranationale encore débutante. À Paris, l’auteur découvre un schisme entre les hauts fonctionnaires, prêts à faire des compromis, et le général de Gaulle, assisté par son ministre des Affaires étrangères Maurice Couve de Murville. Le général et Couve trouvaient leur maître en Gerhard Schröder, ministre des Affaires étrangères
allemand, qui menace de mettre la France «hors du Traité». Le résultat fut le fameux Compromis de Luxembourg, le «désaccord sur la non-application» du vote majoritaire. Si le poids des principaux protagonistes est bien mis en valeur, ce travail s’écarte cependant d’une histoire diplomatique traditionnelle, dans la mesure où l’auteur cherche à comprendre l’impact des facteurs économiques, le poids des représentations et à «contextualiser» son approche, dans le cadre des grandes discussions internationales de l’époque. Ensuite, l’auteur évoque la question controversée de savoir qui sort renforcé de cette crise. Même si les institutions communautaires semblent à première vue les victimes, c’est davantage d’un retour des États que d’une victoire de de Gaulle qu’il faut parler. Enfin, après avoir traité les résultats immédiats de la crise, la thèse s’achève avec une analyse de «la culture du veto» dans les institutions communautaires jusqu’à l’Acte unique de 1986, en s’interrogeant sur son enracinement, sur l’importance de la recherche du consensus, et plus largement, sur la légitimité européenne.

Emmanuel MOURLON-DRUOL, The Emergence of a European Bloc? A trans-and supranational history of European monetary cooperation, from the failure of the Werner Plan to the creation of the European Monetary System, 1974-1979 - European University Institute, EUI, Florence

corrector: Harold James (Princeton)
jury: N. Piers Ludlow (LSE), Kiran Klaus Patel (EUI), Éric Bussière (Paris IV – Sorbonne)
date of the exam: 21.06.2010
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The creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) represents one of the landmarks of post-war European economic and political history, and constitutes a fascinating case-study of the formation of an incipient trans- and supranational polity, namely the European Economic Community (EEC).

This thesis is the first detailed archive-based study of European monetary cooperation from the mid- to the late 1970s. It is based on an extensive multi-archival and multinational research, including archives of the French, British and German governments, as well as of EEC institutions (Commission, Council of Ministers, Monetary Committee, Committee of Central Bank Governors). It analyses the complex interaction between the numerous actors involved in the process (Finance ministers, heads of government, central bankers, economic advisors, academic economists) at various levels (domestic, EEC, international), and explains why and how the attention shifts from one level to another.

In order to explain the reasons, modes and the extent to which Western European governments were willing to further their monetary cooperation through the EEC, it is essential to go beyond a strictly intergovernmental approach based on ‘material interests’. Instead, this thesis delves into a more sophisticated and refined understanding of the process, looking at different modes of governance (transnational, international, supranational), as well as the interplay between different policy areas.
During the 1960s and early 1970s the question of Britain’s entry to the European Communities was one of the most dominating and controversial issues in the country’s political debate. A so far neglected aspect of the history of Britain’s relationship with European integration is how the British parties communicated the “European issue” to the electorate at times when public opinion mattered most, i.e. during general elections and what role the issue played in the internal electoral strategy planning of the parties.

This thesis aims to answer these questions by an extensive analysis of the entire spectrum of party campaign media (from the official election manifestos down to election addresses of the local candidates) used at the five general elections between 1959 and February 1974 and by examining the internal debate of Labour, Conservatives and Liberals on election strategy through sources from party archives as well as personal papers of the protagonists.

Apart from the fact that the European issue did not feature prominently in most of the campaigns, findings suggest that both major parties shared a common, stable European discourse despite the attempt to stress their differences on the matter and changes in their official position towards EEC entry. For different reasons, Europe certainly looked an “awkward issue” to election strategists of both Labour and the Conservative Party leading to its marginalization in the campaigns. But this did not mean that they dropped the hope of making it their “election winner” or the fear of their opponents using it to that end. Instead, the “Europe question” remained electorally charged during the whole period. Thus, electoral considerations were highly present in the parties’ general internal discussion about EEC membership and acted
as an important constraint for their European policy making from the moment the Macmillan government decided to opt for entry to the Six.


**promoteur:** Michel Dumoulin, UCL

**jury:** Éric Bussière, Paris IV-Sorbonne; N. Piers Ludlow, London School of Economics and Political Science; Michel Dorban, UCL; Paul Servais, UCL

**date de la défense:** 04.05.2010

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Cette thèse analyse la genèse d’une politique industrielle communautaire dans les secteurs de l’informatique et des télécommunications, depuis ses premiers balbutiements au milieu des années 1960 jusqu’en 1984, en se focalisant sur le rôle de la Commission européenne. Dans les années 1980, les nouvelles politiques dans ces secteurs figurent au premier rang des innovations qui redynamisent la Communauté européenne. En 1984, l’*European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technologies* (ESPRIT) est lancé: il s’agit du premier grand programme de recherche communautaire en dehors du secteur nucléaire. La libéralisation des télécommunications, à partir de 1987, ouvre la voie à celle des autres services publics. La dissertation retrace les origines de ces actions communautaires, tout en les plaçant dans le cadre plus large de la politique industrielle, qui couvre également le commerce extérieur, la propriété industrielle, les marchés publics, les normes techniques, la protection des données, les questions sociales, etc. L’étude s’appuie non seulement sur des documents officiels, la presse et des interviews, mais aussi, au premier chef, sur les documents internes de la Commission et du Conseil européens, de l’Agence spatiale européenne, de l’OCDE et de l’entreprise CII-HB.

Cette dissertation montre que la politique industrielle poursuivie par la Commission implique la réalisation d’un grand marché européen, protégé de l’extérieur par des mesures préférentielles, et un soutien public pour l’industrie, notamment dans les secteurs de pointe. Si le projet de la Commission reste globalement identique tout au long de la période, ses propositions concrètes sont adaptées en fonction de la perception de leur efficacité, de la réceptivité des États membres et des évolutions techniques. La dissertation aboutit également à des conclusions sur les moyens mis en œuvre par la Commission pour tenter de faire accepter ses propositions. Premièrement, la Commission se construit très progressivement des bases juridiques, de l’expérience, de l’expertise et de la crédibilité. Deuxièmement, il n’y a pas d’« intégration légale » automatique. Dans certains cas, l’action de la Commission se trouve facilitée par les bases juridiques du traité, mais il s’avère aussi possible de créer une nouvelle action communautaire sans qu’il existe une base juridique directe. Inversement, la Commission hésite parfois à faire usage de ses compétences en vertu du traité pour imposer une mesure aux États
membres, parce qu’elle espère les amener à coopérer également dans des domaines non couverts par le traité, et qu’une action unilatérale ne contribuerait pas à créer le bon climat. Troisièmement, le pouvoir de conviction de la Commission dépend de sa propre cohésion. Pendant toute la période étudiée, il règne à la Commission un large consensus sur le projet de politique industrielle à poursuivre. À la fin des années 1970, le commissaire Étienne Davignon renforce encore cette cohésion en institutionnalisant la coopération entre les différents commissaires et services de la Commission. Enfin, Davignon innove aussi pour la création d’un consensus avec les autres acteurs-clé: il implique non seulement l’industrie, mais également les administrations des États membres en amont des propositions formelles. Cette capacité à créer des coalitions de soutien apparaît in fine comme l’une des principales forces de la Commission européenne.
Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration e.V.

### International Anti-Corruption Regimes in Europe
**Between Corruption, Integration, and Culture**
Herausgegeben von Dr. Sebastian Wolf und Dr. Diana Schmidt-Pfister
2010, Band 70, 217 S., brosch., 49,– €
ISBN 978-3-8329-5846-6

In dieser aktuellen und interdisziplinären Analyse der internationalen Antikorruptionsregime werden mit Schwerpunkt Europa ausgewählte staatenübergreifende Bemühungen der letzten Jahre zur Eindämmung der Korruption einer kritischen Bestandsaufnahme unterzogen.

### Die EU-Reflexionsgruppe »Horizont 2020 – 2030«
**Herausforderungen und Reformoptionen für das Mehrebenensystem**
Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Gabriele Abels, Annegret Eppler, M.A. und Prof. Dr. Michèle Knodt
2010, Band 69, 238 S., brosch., 49,– €
ISBN 978-3-8329-5717-9

Der Band dokumentiert die Anregungen und Reformoptionen des Mehrebenenregierens in der zukünftigen EU und wirft ein kritisches Licht auf die Möglichkeiten von Reflexionsgruppen.

### Kommunale Aufgaben im Europäischen Binnenmarkt
**Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Oscar Gabriel, Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Peter-Christian Müller-Graff und Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Christian O. Steger**
2010, Band 68, 177 S., brosch., 39,– €
ISBN 978-3-8329-5692-9

Kommunale Aufgaben im europäischen Binnenmarkt bewegen sich in einem Spannungsfeld zwischen ihren daseinsvorsorgenden Ziel-elementen und dem unionsrechtlichen Rahmen einer wettbewerbsverfassten Marktwirtschaft.

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Towards a European Society? Convergence and Divergence in 20th Century Europe
Synthesis of the Summer School organized by RICHIE, the German Historical Institute Paris and the University Sorbonne-Paris IV

The Summer School “Towards a European Society? Convergence and Divergence in 20th Century Europe (Politics, Economy, Society and Culture)” was organised by the German Historical Institute Paris, RICHIE and the University Sorbonne-Paris IV, and took place from 4th to 10th July 2010 in Moulin d’Andé, France.1 Open to PhD and advanced Master students in history or related social sciences, the Summer School discussed structural change, convergence and divergence in 20th century Europe. The participants, who were requested to explore the possible benefits of applying social science concepts and European integration theories to historical research, perceived Europeanization as a gradual political, economic, cultural and social process of convergence, leading towards an increasingly similar development of European societies. It was stated that Europeanization can be interpreted as a result of individual conceptions of “Europe” or as a result of external incentives and pressures on the different European countries and societies to cooperate. However, the participants made clear that gradual processes of convergence within Europe, internal conceptions of Europe and external pressures on Europe should not be seen as separate but rather as mutually dependent phenomena. Most of the papers therefore dealt with a relatively broad definition of Europeanization, explicitly going beyond the institutional integration and including top-down as well as bottom-up processes. In contrast to more restrictive definitions of Europeanization provided by political scientists, who focus mainly on the emergence of European institutions and their growing influence on domestic politics, European integration was less referred to as a cause than as a result of Europeanization – which, admittedly, could henceforth be the starting point for a huge variety of successive evolutions.

It was precisely this broad definition of Europeanization which led many participants to put into perspective and to question the importance of 1945 as a historical turning point and as a prelude to European cooperation. They argued that Europeanization had never been a uniform nor linear process starting with post-war European cooperation, but a long-term evolution with various points of departure, breaks, standstills and different dynamics instead. In this respect, the modernisation and globalisation processes of the 19th century, as for instance in the field of communication and transport, certainly paved the way for the subsequent convergence and rapprochement of European societies. The cooperation of medical institutions from various European countries in order to fight epidemics can serve as one example among many for these early forms of Europeanization. However, the first concepts

1. Organizers were Matthieu Osmont (RICHIE), Émilie Robin-Hivert (RICHIE), Katja Seidel (GHI Paris), Mark Spoerer (GHI Paris) and Christian Wenkel (GHI Paris/RICHIE). Scientific advisers were Éric Bussière (Université Paris IV) and Reiner Marcowitz (Université de Metz).
for a political integration of Europe that were based on economic interdependences and cooperation, for instance by Aristide Briand, were not developed before the interwar period. Even though the Second World War represented a considerable setback for those who advocated a democratic and peaceful cooperation between European countries, the 1930s and early 1940s should not simply be understood as a time of complete standstill with regard to Europeanization. Instead of referring to the relatively well known postwar planning of resistance movements, several participants pointed to the often neglected but considerable impact of national-socialist occupation policies and economic collaboration under totalitarian auspices on postwar conceptions. On the other hand, there seemed to be no doubt that the memory of destruction and genocide had served as a decisive catalyst for European integration after 1945, which was undeniably conceived and perceived as a solution and as the only alternative to what had happened before. While pointing out the structural continuities and underlying forces of Europeanization, the participants hence emphasised the far-reaching consequences of the Second World War with respect to political and intellectual history.

Even though the notion of space was only rarely referred to in an explicit manner, it played a prominent role in many of the papers. Most of the participants understood Europeanization as a process transgressing traditional barriers and limitations. They stressed a general tendency to move away from national categories, accelerated by an increase of transnational phenomena and challenges such as environmental pollution, epidemics or labour migration. It was underlined that these forms of Europeanization had always reached beyond the member states of the institutional integration process. From the participants' point of view, countries such as for example Austria, Sweden or Spain were subject to multilayered forms of Europeanization long before their entry into the European Union. In many cases, convergence and integration amongst European countries and societies were catalysed by encounters with the non-European world, as in the cases of the international campaigns against the sleeping sickness in African colonies or the European reactions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other contributions dealt with competing historical ideas and concepts of Europe, their impact on civil society, and the formation of European memory spaces. The question of space was however not only discussed at the macro-level, but also with regard to the micro-level processes such as the entwinement of German, Belgian and Dutch civil societies in the borderland during and after World War I or the growing economic integration between Rotterdam and its German hinterland since the 1960s. The difficult balancing act of post-communist Eastern European societies between Europeanization and re-nationalisation was repeatedly mentioned and still requires systematic analysis.

While in some cases it still seems justified to distinguish between public and private actors of Europeanization, most of the participants avoided such distinctions. Whereas the influence of political actors such as the European institutions themselves, national governments and diplomats remains crucial, certain other groups like retirement and labour migrants or migrating industrialists can clearly be identified as private actors. The participants detected a growing range of actors who rather occupy
the sphere in between the public-private paradigm. With European integration pro-
gressing not only at an institutional level, but also in the social, economic and cultural
sphere, more and more actors can be described as „in-betweens“. This conclusion
seems particularly striking with regard to the mass media, to transnational social
movements, civil society organisations or environmental associations, to elite and
expert circles, academics or lobbyists. At the same time, the participants advocated
a shift in focus away from those actors being either explicitly in favour of or explicitly
opposed to European integration. They suggested focusing as well on actors who are
not directly involved in shaping the process of Europeanization in spite of being
subject to it. They pointed to those who – depending on their respective interests –
might occasionally act in favour of, but sometimes also against Europeanization. And
they paid special attention to actors who – like conservative elites and right-wing
movements co-operating on a European level for the preservation of national interests
– are promoting a sort of “Europeanization against intention”.

The majority of the participants opted for a comprehensive interpretation of Eu-
ropeanization as an important category of historical analysis and as a long-term pro-
cess running often together with or in parallel to, but sometimes also in the opposite
direction of other evolutions shaping the European countries during the 20th century,
such as globalisation, modernisation, liberalisation, democratisation or westernisa-
tion. Far from describing Europeanization as a linear and teleological development,
they focused especially on the discontinuities and the phases of apparent stagnation
repeatedly affecting the rapprochement and the integration of European states,
economies and societies. It was underlined that periods of conflict, confrontation or
open violence such as World War II or – in a less devastating way – the “standstill”
of European integration during the 1970s and early 1980s had often prepared and
decisively preconditioned subsequent pushes for Europeanization and integration. In
line with these findings, the participants identified different types of external and
internal pressures accelerating and catalyzing Europeanization – among them in par-
icular the two World Wars and their aftermaths, the Cold War constellation and its
break-up in 1989/90, the economic challenges of an increasingly globalised world
trade, migration, environmental pollution and cross-border terrorism.

To sum up, the Summer School offered a good occasion to contemplate and dis-
cuss the complexity of Europeanization from an interdisciplinary angle. The coop-
eration between the German Historical Institute in Paris, the International Research
Network of Young Historians of European Integration (RICHIE) and the University
Paris IV-Sorbonne provided a constructive working atmosphere, and a stimulating
and comprehensive overview of current research on the path “Towards a European
Society”. More studies focusing on Europeanization in Eastern, Central and South-
east Europe would complete this multifaceted approach. Particularly inspiring were

2. Papers of the summer school will be published in 2011 by Peter Lang in a volume entitled Pour une
lecture historique de l’européanisation au XXe siècle / Europeanisation in the 20th century: the
historical lens.
approaches envisaging Europeanization as a process comprising not only elites and political institutions, but European societies and cultural practices.

Johannes Grossmann, Universität des Saarlandes
Jacqueline Niesser, Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder
Tobias Schneider, HU Berlin


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Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Carine GERMOND


The making of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the first half of the 1960s was characterized by a series of Franco-German conflicts that regularly resulted in Community crises. Based on research conducted in France and in Germany, this article explores to what extent the two countries’ disagreements on the developments of the European Economic Community were responsible for the repeated crises that broke out on agricultural matters. Focusing on three key agricultural negotiations, it sheds light on the shifting power relations within the Franco-German tandem and on how both countries were able to shape Community bargains in the agricultural area.

La pomme de discorde agricole: le couple France-Allemagne et la mise en œuvre de la politique agricole commune, 1963-1966

La mise en œuvre de la politique agricole commune (PAC) durant la première moitié des années 1960 a été jalonnée de nombreux conflits franco-allemands débouchant régulièrement sur des crises communautaires. Fondé sur des recherches dans les archives françaises et allemandes, cet article explore dans quelle mesure les désaccords entre les deux pays sur l'évolution de la Communauté économique européenne ont été à l'origine des crises répétées éclatant sur les sujets agricoles. En analysant trois principales négociations agricoles, cette contribution montre l'évolution des rapports de pouvoir au sein du couple franco-allemand et la façon dont les deux pays ont été en mesure d’influencer les négociations communautaires dans le domaine agricole.


Die Entstehung der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) in der ersten Hälfte der 1960er Jahre wurde durch eine Reihe deutsch-französische Konflikte gekennzeichnet, die oft zu Gemeinschaftskrisen führten. Gestützt auf Archivmaterial aus Frankreich und Deutschland, erforscht dieser Artikel die Frage in welchem Umfang die Meinungsverschiedenheiten beider Länder über die Entwicklung der EWG für die wiederholten agrarpolitischen Krisen verantwortlich waren. Durch die Analyse von drei der wichtigsten Agrarverhandlungs runden zeigt dieser Beitrag die Entwicklung der Machtverhältnisse innerhalb des deutsch-französischen Tandems auf und verdeutlicht, wie die beiden Staaten jeweils gemeinschaftliche Verhandlungen im Agrarbereich beeinflussen konnten.
Rainer FATTMANN
The European Trade Unions movement and the Common Agricultural Policy
(1958-1972): a First Venture in a new Research Field

The Free and Christian trade unions of the six founding members of the EEC had been one of the motors of European Integration from its beginnings. The Hallstein Commission entertained close relations to the European Federations of free and Christian trade unions, which had been created immediately after the founding of the EEC. In the field of agriculture Sicco Mansholt installed systematically contacts to the European landworkers federations. The plans of Sicco Mansholt's „Memorandum for a reform of the European agriculture“ corresponded exactly to the ideas, which the 'European Federation of Trade Unions for Agriculture' had developed in the preceding years.

Le mouvement des syndicats européens et la Politique Agricole Commune (1958-1972):
une première approche d’un champs de recherche nouveau

Les syndicats libres et chrétiens des six pays fondateurs de la Communautés Économique Européenne représentaient dès le début un des moteurs du processus d'intégration. La commission Hallstein soignait des contacts étroits avec les associations des syndicats libres et chrétiens nés dans la foulée de la création de la CEE. Dans le secteur agraire, Sicco Mansholt, établissait très vite en sa qualité de commissaire responsable des contacts systématiques avec les syndicats agraires européens fraîchement tenus sur les fonts baptismaux. Ses plans de restructuration de fond en comble du secteur présentaient dans le „Mémorandum pour la réforme de l'agriculture de la CEE” correspondaient en effet exactement aux conceptions que la 'Fédération Européenne des Syndicats Agraires' avait élaborées au cours des années précédentes.

Die europäische Gewerkschaftsbewegung und die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik
(1958-1972): erste Annäherung an einen neuen Forschungsgegenstand

Robin M. ALLERS
Attacking the sacred cow
The Norwegian challenge to the EC’s *acquis communautaire* in the enlargement negotiations of 1970-72

In the first round of EC enlargement, Norway’s claims for permanent exemptions from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) challenged the EC’s negotiating position based on acceptance of the *acquis communautaire*. The article revisits positions and attitudes on both sides. Why did Norway apply for membership despite having problems agreeing on basic Community principles and why did the Six agree to open negotiations despite being fully aware of Oslo’s reluctant attitude towards political integration? Analysing the negotiations on agriculture and fisheries in detail, the article explores to what extent both sides were willing to compromise. Given the negative outcome of the referendum on membership, the article concludes by discussing the importance of the negotiation result and the possibility of a different outcome.

Quand la Norvège défiait la vache sacrée de l’«*acquis communautaire*» (1970-1972)

Au moment du premier élargissement de la Communauté européenne, la revendication des Norvégiens en vue d'obtenir des exemptions permanentes de la Politique Agricole Commune (PAC) et de la Politique de Pêche Commune (PPC) défiait ouvertement les pléniopotentiaires de la CE soucieux de défendre l'acceptation de l'«*acquis communautaire*» comme base de négociation. La contribution passe en revue les positions et les attitudes des deux camps. Il soulève la question de savoir pourquoi la Norvège, en dépit de ses réticences à entériner les principes et les règles élémentaires du Marché commun, posait sa candidature d'adhésion, tout comme de l'autre côté, il cherche à élucider les causes qui incitèrent les Six d'ouvrir le débat avec Oslo qu'iils connaissaient pertinemment l'attitude rebutante des Norvégiens à l'égard de l'intégration politique. En analysant de près les pourparlers relatifs à la PAC et à la PPC, l'article cherche à évaluer jusqu'à quel degré les deux parties étaient prêtes à faire des concessions. Il met ensuite les résultats de la négociation en relation avec le score négatif du référendum norvégien, et, pour conclure, évoque la possibilité d'une issue différente du dossier de l'adhésion.

Angriff auf eine heilige Kuh
Norwegen und das *acquis communautaire* im Rahmen der EG-Erweiterungsverhandlungen (1970-1972)

In der ersten EG-Erweiterungsronde forderte Norwegen mit seinem Anspruch auf eine permanente Ausnahme von der Gemeinsamen Landwirtschafts- und Fischereipolitik die auf der Annahme des *acquis communautaire* basierende Verhandlungsposition der Sechs heraus. Der Beitrag untersucht und vergleicht die Verhandlungspositionen beider Seiten. Warum stellte Norwegen einen Antrag auf Vollmitgliedschaft obwohl Regierung, Interessengruppen und Bevölkerung Schwierigkeiten hat-

Katja SEIDEL

The so-called Mansholt Plan of 1968 was the first of many attempts to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It was a radical proposal to transform European agriculture and to modernise agricultural structures. As such, the reception of the Mansholt Plan, the reactions of member states and farmers’ lobbies and the aftermath of the Memorandum have been discussed in the literature. This article sets out to place the Mansholt Plan in the wider context of the rise of structural policy in the EEC in the 1960s. It analyses the preparation of the Memorandum, explores the policy and decision-making process leading to it, and discusses the different actors that were involved in the process. The article thus sheds new light on a crucial episode in the history of the CAP.

Libérez les agriculteurs des aides sociales. Le mémorandum «Agriculture 1980» de 1968 de la Commission européenne


Chris ELTON
Paradigm Change within the CAP 1985-92: The European Commission’s Construction of an Alternative Policy Narrative in the Late 1980s

Policy change in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been the subject of much academic debate, especially among political scientists. The nature of change in the CAP is widely contested, with some scholars arguing that its underlying ideas or policy paradigm have been fundamentally transformed over time. It has been argued by others that change has resulted from a cumulative process of incremental adaptation to the changing policy environment. This article argues that previous work has not systematically explored how the CAP paradigm came to be transformed, including specifically the role of actors and policy institutions. It therefore examines how a new policy discourse was constructed over the 1985-92 period and how the new paradigm shaped a re-prioritisation of policy goals, the design of new policy instruments and the delegitimisation of others, while securing the key economic, social and cultural values which had underpinned the original design of the CAP.

Le changement de paradigmes dans la PAC entre 1985 et 1992
La commission européenne et la construction d’un récit politique alternatif

L’évolution et les mutations de la Politique Agricole Commune (PAC) sont un thème beaucoup discuté, surtout parmi les politologues. La nature du changement politique demeure en effet très controversée. Certains chercheurs estiment que les idées fondamentales, voire les paradigmes politiques auraient été fondamentalement modifiés; d’autres contestent cette conception que le changement profond pourrait résulter cumulativement d’une addition d’adaptations au contexte politique changeant. L’auteur de la contribution prétend que les changements de paradigmes de la CAP n’ont jusqu’à présent pas suffisamment été étudiés sous l’angle de vue du rôle des
acteurs de la politique agricole commune et des institutions politiques compétentes en la matière. Il examine par conséquent comment, au cours des années 1985 à 1992, s'est formé un nouveau discours politique, comment les priorités politiques ont été modifiées par le paradigme nouveau et comment celui-ci contribua à créer de nouveaux instruments tout en «dé-légitimant» d'autres tandis que les valeurs économiques, sociales et culturelles décisives, qui avaient déjà caractérisé la PAC initiale, demeurèrent intactes.

Paradigmenwechsel in der GAP 1985-1992
Die Europäische Kommission und die Entfaltung einer alternativen Politikdarstellung


Adrian KAY and Robert ACKRILL
Problems of composition, temporality and change in tracing the Common Agricultural Policy through time

Investigating reasons for change and continuity is central to any historical perspective on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, the achievement of this explanatory ambition is often hampered by problems in operationalising the dependent variable, ‘the CAP’. This paper draws on recent theoretical developments which distinguish between policy means and policy ends, identifying three levels for each with varying degrees of abstraction. We are thus able to move away from the strict dualism that policy change is either incremental or paradigmatic. Through careful decomposition of key CAP reform events from 1977, a greater depth of understanding of the nature of gradual policy change is revealed. In particular significant policy change has been achieved through cumulative incremental endogenous adjustments to lower-level policy means (instruments and their calibration), while policy ends have changed less frequently and (high-level) policy goals have endured largely unaltered.
Problèmes de composition, de temporalité et du changement dans la représentation de la Politique Agraire Commune

L'examen des causes qui conditionnent le changement et la continuité est d'une importance capitale pour exposer la perspective historique de la Politique Agraire Commune (PAC). Souvent une présentation explicative des faits s'avère toutefois très difficile parce qu'elle dépend de la mise en œuvre d'une variable, la «PAC». Fondée sur les connaissances théoriques les plus récentes qui distinguent entre les moyens politiques et les objectifs politiques, avec chaque fois trois niveaux d'abstraction différents, la présente analyse nous autorise à nous séparer du dualisme strict d'après lequel le changement politique s'opérerait soit par étapes soit en fonction de paradigmes. Grâce à une décomposition en profondeur des principaux résultats des réformes entamées depuis 1977 on peut dès lors aussi aboutir à une meilleure compréhension de la quintessence du changement politique par étapes. Il apparaît de fait que les importantes mutations sont provoquées par des changements cumulatifs, successifs et endogènes des moyens politiques du type lower-level (instruments et leur calibrage), tandis que les objectifs politiques sont plus rarement changés et que les buts politiques de très haute importance n'ont pratiquement pas été touchés.

Probleme der Komposition, der Temporalität und des Wandels in der Darstellung der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik


Mark SPOERER

Since its inception, the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been discussed controversially. Based on data compiled by the OECD and the World Bank which have so far not been used for historical research, we show that the pro-
tectionist effects of the CAP between the 1960s and the 1980s were larger than those of its national predecessors. Moreover, there is evidence that already the piecemeal reforms of the 1980s reduced the level of protection and support in the EU, that is prior to the MacSharry reform of 1992.

La «forteresse Europe» dans la longue durée: le protectionnisme agricole de la Communauté européen, 1957-2003

Dès son début, la Politique agricole commune (PAC) de l’Union européenne a été un sujet très controversé. En nous référant à des données statistiques de l’OCDE et de la Banque mondiale qui n’ont pas encore été utilisées dans la recherche historique, nous montrons que les effets protectionnistes de la PAC étaient plus étendus que ceux provoqués par les politiques nationales qui la précédaient. En outre, certains éléments laissent à penser que les réformes fragmentaires des années 1980 réduisaient déjà le niveau de la protection et de soutien dans l’UE bien avant la réforme MacSharry de 1992.


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