Introduction

Writing in the immediate aftermath of the plane crashes into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, on September 11, 2001, Ulrich Beck proclaimed that:

‘the gulf between the world of those who profit from globalization and the world of those who feel threatened by it has been closed. Helping those who have been excluded is no longer a humanitarian task. It is in the West’s own interests: the key to its security. The West can no longer ignore the black holes of collapsed states and situations of despair’.1

Following 9/11, these fragile and failed states have been seen by western governments as islands of instability from which issue a plethora of security threats. A ‘chronic lack of state capacity, political fragmentation, collapsed public infrastructure and social isolation’ are said to lead to zones of ‘bad governance, nonexistent social services, and poverty’ which provide a ‘broader enabling environment’ leading to ‘support and sanctuary’ for terrorists ‘in vast areas that have not experienced the political and economic benefits of globalization’.2 The veracity of this link is certainly challenged, but regardless of whether or not there is actually an empirical link between terrorism, poverty/inequality and these islands of instability, it is the argument of this paper that policy makers have adopted this discursive framing to order and manage these perceived risks. However, in contrast to claims that the adopted policy framing and related practices constitute a radical rupture or paradigm shift, it is argued here, instead,
that they represent a process of incrementalist policy making in which the linkage made between human development and state stability has been further expanded.

In order to advance this argument, the paper draws upon the broader International Relations literature that identifies two competing perspectives of risk – Beck’s World Risk Society and Foucault’s governmentality of risk. The World Risk Society approach introduces a dichotomy between reflective and reflexive modernisation. The former is associated with the first phase of modernity and involves ‘improving our knowledge of cause-effect relations and control of the world’. Whereas the latter is associated with self-confrontation and an acceptance of ‘our own inability to know’. The former attempts to reduce potential vulnerabilities through improved scientific technical knowledge, while the latter involves an appreciation of the uncontrollable risks that lead to catastrophic events; prompting full recognition of the unknowability of the future effects of our current activities. Politically, it is argued, that such catastrophes prompt a shift to a ‘cosmopolitan form of statehood’ – an alliance of the state and civic movements - that will tame global capital.

In contrast, a Foucauldian approach emphasises the way in which a variety of risk rationalities and technologies are used to manage such challenges. There is thus a fundamental difference between this and the World Risk Society approach because it views risk as a way of ‘organizing reality, disciplining the future, taming chance and rationalizing individual conduct’. Rather than leading to a process of self-confrontation through which the foundations of modernity are questioned, such challenges are met by new rationalities and technologies of risk. For this approach, reflexivity refers to the ‘governmentalization of
government’ or ‘reflexive government’. Instead of witnessing a shift towards a cosmopolitan risk society, crises and catastrophes are said to produce reflexive moments through which the existing risk dispositif – the ‘discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’ – adopted by state and non-state actors to govern and manage our natural and social environments, are modified to meet the challenges that confront us, thereby sustaining the ‘authority of their authority’.

Mapping the changes in the discourses and practices adopted by western states for engaging with weak and failed states and poverty/inequality reveals a degree of reflexivity and incremental reform, but it remains limited and falls far short of Beck’s notion of a cosmopolitan society. Certainly, weak and failed states’ association with international terrorism has not induced a reversal of neoliberal policy. Within this process of incremental transformation, the politics of intervention and the securitization of development have been extended to encompass the problem of international terrorism. Indeed, the securitisation of development itself is an instance of bricolage whereby two pre-existing policy areas have become inextricably connected in response to pressing concerns over state instability, further underscoring that the inclusion of terrorism is simply the latest incremental change within a proactive set of policies intended to reduce the overall level of risk, rather than a purported paradigm shift as others claim.

This process of incremental reform and bricolage modifying the risk dispositif has involved three overlapping phases: intervention (involving the redefinition of sovereignty),
**Prevention** (involving the securitisation of development; and **extension** (involving the incorporation of terrorism within the securitisation of development). In a post Cold War world, the new policy of intervention has involved not only a shift in emphasis from Chapter VI to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but also proactive deployments in potential conflict zones. This policy of proactive intervention with regard to fragile states was not only expanded, it also conjoined development and security: the former regarded as a preventative policy to ensure the latter. This securitisation of development was further extended to terrorism under the assumptions that terrorism is linked to poverty/inequality and also that weak/fragile states provide fertile ground for terrorist movements.

Previous studies applying both World Risk Society and Foucauldian approaches to risk and security have addressed the strategic and policy impact of the new emphasis on precaution and pre-emption as a result of 9/11 and other terrorist acts. Precaution ‘implies that, from now on, along with what one can learn from science, in a context that is always relative, it will also be necessary to take into account what one might only imagine, doubt, presume, or fear’. It therefore involves ‘the deployment of imagination and its coupling with possibility of harms that cannot be tolerated....[it has] a fundamentally preventive logic. It assumes that prevention is possible’. As such, adopting this principle often requires preventative or ‘weatherman’ policies identifying potential dangers and attempting to reduce the probability of them turning into actual threats by acting in advance of the event.

This paper adds to this literature by arguing that the shift towards a precautionary approach with respect to the risks perceived to emanate from failed states and associated
with poverty/inequality has placed especial emphasis on preventative policies. Although analysis of pre-emptive policies emphasise that action is taken under conditions of uncertainty, it is our contention that this does not necessarily distinguish such policies from preventative ones. Rather, we should distinguish the two temporally. Pre-emption focuses on imminent crises, attempting to identify the emergence of an event and nipping things in the bud.19 Whereas preventative policies are viewed as having a longer time horizon ‘confronting factors that are likely to contribute to the development of a threat before it has had the chance to become imminent’.20

In order to develop these points, the remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, it critically compares the competing Beckian and Foucauldian accounts of risk, establishing the basis of the argument that risk has been deployed as a means of ordering and managing the challenges associated with weak and failing states and poverty/inequality. Second, it maps the incremental expansion and reform of the risk dispositif according to three overlapping phases which we have termed intervention, prevention and extension. Finally, it concludes that although these phases are reflexive moments, whereby policy is reformed incrementally and by processes of bricolage, this constitutes a strengthening of the prevailing rationalities and technologies of risk, rather than a radical rupture in the discourse and practices of risk associated with an emerging World Risk Society and cosmopolitan form of statehood.
Unbounded Risks, Reflexivity and Prevention

In his works, Beck distinguishes between a first phase of modernity in which ‘calculating risks is part of the master narrative’ and a later modernity in which we ‘enter a world of uncontrollable risk’. Classic modernity involves the application of scientific-technical knowledge to industrial society, not only endeavouring to calculate the risks associated with such actions but also employing an infinite iterative knowledge loop – continually learning from problems that arise and applying that new knowledge to further improve control over the environment and society. However, late modernity is increasingly beset by risks of a much greater magnitude and scope arising from the unforeseen consequences of applying our scientific-technical knowledge to the natural and social worlds. Risks become ‘de-bounded’, ‘not limited by political borders or calculable timeframes’ and are said to be of ‘low probability but potentially cataclysmic’.

In this regard, Beck’s work contains important insights with regard to risk, globalisation and security. The high degree of interdependency that comes with globalisation means, not only that risks are de-localized and temporally stretched, but also that ‘assignment of causes and consequences is no longer possible with any degree of reliability’. For Beck too, under such conditions of radical uncertainty, the precautionary principle holds. In addition, Beck identifies the way in which states have responded to the risks of global terrorism by constructing ‘transnational cooperative networks’, and understanding that it is in the ‘West’s own interest: the key to its security’ to improve the lot of others. Beck
suggests that the enormity of these risks will inevitably generate sufficient awareness within global society to prompt such critical self-reflection on our existing practices.\textsuperscript{26} This critical reflection – or reflexivity- is said to involve self-confrontation ‘with the effects of risk society that cannot be dealt with and assimilated in the system of industrial society’ and an acceptance of ‘our own \textit{inability} to know’ the unintended consequences of our own actions.\textsuperscript{27} Reflexive modernisation thus goes beyond simply ‘improving our knowledge of cause-effect relations and control of the world’ and actually involves ‘a process of reflection by which the foundations of modernity are questioned and revised’.\textsuperscript{28} This shift, it is argued, prompts a major political movement towards what Beck calls a ‘\textit{Cosmopolitan form of statehood}’ in which an alliance of the state and civic movements is forged to confront the issues that arise from such risks.\textsuperscript{29}

Although Beck does suggest that there are other policy outcomes, he argues that the nature of the global risks confronting us is acting as a ‘compulsive force’ driving us towards cosmopolitan statehood, which is a ‘facet of world risk society’.\textsuperscript{30} This is because in a world risk society, the traditional nationally based solutions are no longer feasible because, ‘instead of solving problems, it contributes to producing and exacerbating them’.\textsuperscript{31} It is argued by Beck that the cosmopolitan solution is likely to succeed precisely because it proposes a realistic solution to today’s problems.\textsuperscript{32} At times he goes even further. For example, in the aftermath of 9/11 Beck argued that ‘The following paradoxical principle holds true: States \textbf{must} de-nationalise and \textit{trans}-nationalise themselves for the sake of their own national interest, that is, relinquish sovereignty, in order, in a globalised world, to deal with their
national problems’. Most recently, Beck has argued that we are already witnessing the emergence of ‘cosmopolitanized risk collectivities’ that may act as a stepping stone towards cosmopolitan statehood.\textsuperscript{34}

In the aftermath of 9/11, a period of political reflection did indeed follow. However, although certain economic reforms were suggested this period of introspection did not resemble Beck’s process of societal self-critique.\textsuperscript{35} Certainly, there is little evidence that such an event has produced a ‘cosmopolitan form of statehood’ – that will tame global capital, or push societies ‘to make border-transcending new beginnings’ towards a more cosmopolitan world.\textsuperscript{36} Similarly, although there has been a shift away from the minimum state towards an emphasis on state capacity, the other fundamental principles of neo-liberalism remain intact, namely, free markets, free trade and the free flow of capital.\textsuperscript{37}

Instead, when confronted by cataclysmic events, this paper argues that policy follows a far more pragmatic path such that reflexivity takes the form of ‘governmentalization of government’ or ‘reflexive government’ whereby ‘the mechanisms of government themselves are subject to problematization, scrutiny and reformation’.\textsuperscript{38} A Foucauldian approach therefore emphasises the way in which a variety of risk rationalities and technologies are used to order and manage such challenges. Rather than a radical shift towards cosmopolitan statehood, the risk \textit{dispositif} has, as one of its main objects, the reduction of risk to the circulation of global ‘goods’ - peoples, commodities, and money essential for the functioning of the capitalist system - and the reduction in risk of the circulation of global ‘bads’ - forced migration, trafficking, money laundering and so forth.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, when appearing before the US
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2004, to report on the United States security environment, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby framed his submission in the very terms of the risks inhering within an enmeshed circulation globalised ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ noting that: ‘[g]lobalization remains an overwhelming force that presents security challenges. Terrorists, proliferators of illicit weapons and military technology, narco-traffickers and alien smugglers are making increasing use of the world’s financial, communication and transportation systems’.  

This period of reflection led to a reassessment of security priorities within western policy circles, exemplified by the claim in the United States Security Strategy, 2002, that ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones’. The empirical relationship between these islands of instability and transnational terrorism is contested. Broadly speaking, three positions are discernible. First, there are those studies finding evidence of a strong linear relationship, whereby the greater the intensity of state failure the more likely it is that the state will be the origin and target of transnational terrorism. Second, and contra this failed state thesis, others have argued that fragile states are preferred over failed states because they offer a more stable environment and an infrastructure that can be taken advantage of. Jettisoning these arguments framed, as they are, in terms of ‘more’ or ‘less’ state failure, yet a third position claims that the ‘relationship is more complex than a simple linear causal process’. Such complexity, it is argued, indicates the need for more careful study in order to understand how certain ‘categories of weak and failing states’ are ‘associated with particular threats’ and how ‘additional variables … catalyse
an enabling environment into a genuine terrorist sanctuary’.45 Yet, despite this disputed link, fragile, weak and failed states’ association with international instability, transnational terrorism and criminality continues to remain the ‘conventional wisdom’.46 Accordingly, references to the dangers posed by weak and failed states are now ‘thoroughly mainstreamed’ within western states strategic documents.47

A recent US National Security Strategy explicitly notes how ‘failing states’ continue to pose a ‘threat’ to the United States as they ‘breed conflict and endanger regional and global security’.48 Its National Strategy for Counterterrorism commits the US to ‘eliminate the safehavens’ relied upon by ‘Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates’ – ‘the physical sanctuary of ungoverned or poorly governed territories, where the absence of state control permits terrorists to travel, train and engage in plotting’.49 Similarly, the UK National Security Strategy 2010 notes that, ‘[f]ragile, failing and failed states around the world provide the environment for terrorists to operate as they look to exploit ungoverned or ill-governed space’ providing a ‘training ground’ for individuals with ambitions to commit attacks in the UK.50

The European Union’s Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, affirms that ‘[s]tate failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy’ (European Union, 2008, p. 1) and its Draft Internal Security Strategy notes that, ‘[s]pecial attention will have to be paid to “weak and failed states” so that they do not become hubs of organised crime or terrorism’.51

A similar link is made between Global Terrorism and poverty/inequality. Just as the link between global terrorism and fragile/failed states is disputed, so too is the link between
terrorism and poverty/inequality. Various statistical studies investigating the terrorist life cycle and the root causes of participation in terrorism have failed to establish whether poverty and inequality create an environment that makes participation in terrorist acts more likely.\(^5\) James Piazza argues that there is ‘no empirical evidence to support the crux of the “rooted in-poverty thesis … that poor economic development, measured as low levels of per capita income, literacy, life expectancy, more equal distribution of wealth, growth of GDP, stable prices, employment opportunities, and food security, is related to increased levels of terrorism’\(^5\). Moreover, other studies have found that democratic higher income countries actually have a higher incidence of terrorism and still others that, for countries with ‘similar levels of civil liberties, poor countries do not generate more terrorism than rich countries’\(^5\).

Despite the disputed link between poverty/inequality and global terrorism, the rooted in poverty thesis has been widely adopted, nevertheless - in a similar fashion to the failed state thesis - as a point of ‘consensus’ or ‘core assumption among national and policy makers since the events of September 11’\(^5\). Indeed, in his Kennedy Memorial Lecture, the former Prime Minister of the UK, Gordon Brown deployed simultaneously both the failed state and rooted in poverty theses claiming that: ‘now the worst threats come from states that are too weak’; that linked ‘to failed and failing states is the spread of international terrorism’, and; that the pool of disenfranchised serve as a ready recruiting ground for such groups so ‘that our enemy, as George Marshall put it in a great speech in Boston sixty years ago, will never be just one country but “hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos”’\(^5\).
The response to the risks perceived to be posed by fragile states and of terrorism has been driven less by the abstract principles of human rights and global justice and more by bricolage and incrementalism – combining existing policies and/or extending them to other issues. Rather than challenge neo-liberalism, the solution to such global risks has been to focus on state capacity and the basic welfare of the population to ensure its continuation. Instead of representing a shift away from what Beck calls ‘methodological nationalism’, the policy has entailed cooperation between international and national actors to ‘coproduce “sovereignty strategies”’ designed to restore the failing state to a condition whereby it can discharge effectively its sovereign responsibilities. At the same time, efforts have been directed towards development in order to improve the basic welfare of the population to further ensure stability. This securitization has involved the ‘reinvention of development as a form of conflict prevention’. 

The Evolution of Risk Governance: Intervention, Prevention and Extension

This policy process has been constituted by three overlapping phases, or reflexive moments, since the end of the Cold War: intervention; prevention; and extension. The first phase began in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Freed from the constrictions of the bipolar world, the United Nations’ peacekeeping role shifted towards a more proactive stance, embracing peace-making, peace-enforcement and peace-building. There was also
recognition for longer term policies directed towards human development to prevent fragile states from collapsing altogether. The main strategy for preventing these disruptions to global circulation has been to induce state stability through enhancing human development (the securitization of development). As Duffield argues, the development-security nexus simultaneously has as its object not only the eradication of frictions for formal circulation, but also the containment of informal circulation such as unmanaged migration. The perturbations of neo-liberal economic policies are seen as one of the factors in the shift from weak, to fragile states and their possible collapse. Despite the fact that such links have not been firmly established, precaution indicated that such a policy be followed. The resulting securitization of development views human development as part of the solution to civil conflict, inducing state stability and eradicating the problem of these un governed spaces. After 9/11, a third phase became apparent in which the securitization of development was extended to encompass terrorism. The precautionary principle was again in evidence during this phase. Fragile states were now viewed as possible safe havens from which terrorists could operate and poverty was regarded as one of many possible causes of terrorism.

*Intervention: Redefining Sovereignty*

Partly as a result of the increasing rise of islands of instability, the Dag Hammarskjöld framework of peace-keeping, previously limiting the role of UN blue helmets to a very
narrowly defined set of tasks, was radically reformed. The Cold War had restricted the UN’s role to a mode of peace-keeping that relied upon the consent of the parties to the conflict and limited the use of armed force to one of self-defence. But from 1992 onwards, there was a shift away from this ‘creative interpretation of Chapter VI’ (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) to a much more interventionist stance using economic sanctions and military force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN was now willing to engage in deployments that were no longer conditional upon the consent of all parties, but could be sanctioned if ‘any party which feels threatened by aggression or by spill-over from nearby conflicts’ requested such action. Such intervention thus involves both early deployments and confidence building measures in an attempt to avoid hostilities breaking out into conflict. Consequently, the limited notion of peace-keeping has been joined by a host of more expansive ‘peace-operations’; including ‘peace-making’ (mediated conflict resolution) and ‘peace-enforcement’ (conflict resolution through economic sanctions/military intervention). As important for our purposes has been the introduction of post-conflict operations under the rubric of ‘peace-building’. This not only involves ‘mopping up’ operations such as mine clearance, but also institution building and the improvement of a state’s infrastructure in order to reduce the possibility of conflict from recurring. The more proactive stance of peace-making, enforcement and building represent the triad of cornerstones of the new ‘integrated missions’ reflecting ‘a new international will to support the imposed or externally brokered peace deals that became more common from the mid-1990s’.
In addition, the continual monitoring of events within countries with a focus on early warning and diplomacy has become increasingly important. Overall, it can be said, therefore, that the UN has shifted its emphasis to proactive political, social and economic initiatives aimed at nipping any problems in the bud by addressing the deeper long term difficulties besetting these countries. As the First Report on the Prevention of Conflict stated in 2001, the emphasis should be on the ‘deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional, political and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of conflicts’; requiring solutions that encompass: ‘political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental, institutional and other measures taken by the international community, in cooperation with national and regional actors’. 69

Soon after (2005), the UN created a commission dedicated to the problem of fragile states and coordination of reconstruction efforts in the eventuality that such states collapse. The aim is to bring the various bodies of the UN to bear ‘on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development’. 70 Significantly, the resolution calls upon the UN to work closely with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and to ‘consult with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, including women’s organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities’. 71

Further to this, the World Bank and UN signed a Partnership Framework Agreement in October 2008, with the primary objective of enhancing ‘country resilience to crises, by
answering immediate needs and ensuring livelihoods of vulnerable populations, supporting sustainable peace-building and strengthening the capacity of national and local institutions for effective prevention, response and recovery leading to long term development’. 72 Although the usual inter-institutional rivalry has not been absent, cooperation has occurred in Sierra Leone and Liberia. More recently, the World Bank pledged $1 billion in development aid in order to support the UN’s peace-building efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The combination of ‘troops and dollars’ is now seen to be key to establishing stability in fragile states (The Economist, June 1, 2013). Such initiatives seek to reduce the risk of state collapse and the instability that arises from such breakdowns and thus enhance not only the security of the state itself, but also ‘wider regional and global security’ by preventing the global ‘bads’ that would issue from such collapses.73

Where sovereign independence with regard to territorial inviolability once held sway, selective intervention has become the norm.74 In order to contain the problems associated with these islands of instability, discourse and practice have shifted towards improving these states’ capabilities to monitor and control illegal activities within their own borders. Moreover, in situations which may lead to intra-state or intra-regional conflict, various international agencies attempt to reduce the possibility by stepping in both to provide economic assistance and diplomatic solutions but also the military wherewithal to thwart further disintegration. This security governance of intervention goes beyond simply engaging in a state on a temporary basis. It is recognised that complex emergencies involving intra-state conflict, infrastructural collapse, the resulting social dislocation and inability of the
state to provide basic necessities, also require security complexes – ‘linking state and non-state actors, public and private organizations, military and civilian organisations’ – to restore order.75

By promoting a shift from ‘governance by government to governance with government’ the principles of good governance are promoted within these security complexes without transgressing the IFIs founding principles.76 In addition, they seek to improve the legal superstructure and its implementation within governance states.77 The World Bank thus expanded its role to include ‘facilitating the communication of laws more effectively, ensuring the consistency of laws, updating legal systems, and training the judiciary’ and at the same time improving the execution of policy by ‘improving training and bureaucratic procedures, reforming the civil service...improving bureaucratic coordination and establishing a distinction between public office and private person’.78

Although these practices blur considerably the distinction between the internal and external realms constitutive of modern sovereignty, the very purpose of such intervention, paradoxically, is for the various international and national actors to work cooperatively and collaboratively in order to ‘coproduce ‘sovereignty strategies’ designed to restore the failing state to a condition whereby it can discharge effectively its sovereign responsibilities.79 The emphasis in both discourse and practice on shared responsibility and co-production of sovereign involves the failing state consenting to participate in a corrective programme to ‘close the sovereignty gap’.80 and thereby produce the legitimate forms of responsible sovereign subjectivity associated with sovereign statehood in the early twenty first century.81
In other words, these sovereignty practices are a technology of risk employed to reduce uncertainty and manage risk by ‘rendering states visible and predictable actors of a normalized international arena, that exercise ‘their’ sovereignty in a responsibly and disciplined manner’. In and of itself, the stabilisation of failed states through the discourses and practices of selective intervention are viewed as being insufficient, however. As Duffield notes, for policy-makers, ‘[t]he pacification of post-interventionary society remains incomplete and contingent … whether there has been a decline in civil war or not, the risk of instability is real and immanent’. The desire to prevent these immanent risks from emerging and the difficulties associated with doing so gives rise to ‘new challenges and opportunities to govern’ so that the risk dispositif connecting security, failed states and development continues to expand. The second of the overlapping phases of incremental expansion explored in this paper, below, is the securitization of development, whereby the stabilisation of fragile and failed states and the prevention of risks emerging is explicitly linked to human development.

Prevention: Securitizing Development

As a result of the ‘perturbations of neoliberal imposition’, there was a recognition that if the IFIs policies were to have any success in the least developed countries, then the problems of state breakdown, whether it be civil wars, resource wars, conflicts over ownership rights or the emaciating effect of informal economic networks, needed to be
These states thus became seen as islands of instability from which regional conflict, piracy, criminal and terrorist activities, ripple out into to the international system generating further chaos and instability. As Mary Kaldor puts it, ‘although most of these wars are localised, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal and external…. or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain’. As such, the World Bank viewed the problem as a ‘crisis of capability. An urgent priority is to rebuild state effectiveness through an overhaul of public institutions, reassertion of the rule of law, and credible check on abuse of power’. For example, a recent World Development Report emphasises the importance of transforming institutions within these countries in order to ensure citizen security, justice and jobs. The report recognises that state underfunding can have negative security implications not only through a reduction in capability, but also the possible involvement in informal economic networks – ensuring that ‘the security and justice sectors are funded adequately and transparently is critical to stem the diversion of illegal revenues from natural resources or trafficking to the security forces’. Yet, while acknowledging that government programs may provide an initial ‘bridge’, the private sector is still viewed as the principal source of employment creation and the report emphasises the importance of producing a ‘business-friendly environment generating economic revival and setting the stage for broader reform’. From the perspective of the IFIs, the challenge is dealt with in terms of how to ensure a highly predatorial form of capitalism whilst still maintaining a satisfactory degree of stability within a country’s borders that will ensure the sustainability of the transformation underway. In other words, the lack of what
Michael Mann labels infrastructural power – ‘the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm’ – has led to the embedding of various external actors within these states providing various capabilities which the state would otherwise struggle to supply.\textsuperscript{92}

The wider aim of this strategy is ‘to draw developing countries into regimes of global governance, which while they might have only uncertain developmental benefits, reflect the desire on the part of Western states to attempt to govern transnational flows and processes’.\textsuperscript{93} This emphasis on transnational flows and circulation is not simply concerned with the ‘unblocking of log-jams, but more generically also with’...‘the problem of differentiating good circulation from bad circulation’.\textsuperscript{94} In order to achieve this, there has been a new emphasis on biopolitics, the ‘problems presented to governmental practice by the characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population’, at the global level under the rubric of human development. The aim of which is to strengthen ‘government in terms of the management of populations by systematically assaying their needs, composition, properties and dynamics in order to promote their welfare’.\textsuperscript{95}

The ‘lesson learnt’ is ‘not that neoliberal economic policy is damaging or contradictory, but that greater attention needs to be paid to the state as an “embedding agent” and the stability of the sovereign frontier’.\textsuperscript{96} As a result, the threats arising from the ‘ungoverned space’ of fragile states have led to the securitization of development.\textsuperscript{97} This securitization has involved the ‘reinvention of development as a form of conflict prevention’ which has, in turn, led to the ‘radicalization of developmental politics. Indeed, it denotes a new commitment to
those strategies and forms of intervention that are geared to the direct attempt to transform whole societies, including the beliefs and attitudes of their members’. The new consensus can be understood as strengthening and extending the scope of permissible intervention in recipient countries. For not only is economic intervention justified on the basis of market imperfections but also the success of such interventions is attached to non-economic factors. In other words, the new consensus rationalises intervention by the donor agencies across as wide a remit as possible’.

The second phase of structural adjustment therefore entailed the embedding of capitalism, involving a shift from promoting a ‘reduction in the scope of state action’ to an emphasis upon the ‘nature of state action’. The IFIs became key agents in a broader ‘global regime of crisis management’ that emerged largely in response to the African crisis, such that they now concern themselves with ‘institutional capacity building; civil service (or more broadly public service) reform; the introduction of new forms of information technology, finance management and human resource management; technical assistance and the facilitation of public participation in policy monitoring, evaluation and development’. The degree of support in the 1990s reached new heights. For example, in Uganda, ‘NGOs contributed 64 per cent of the running costs of the health service’ and for Tanzania aid constituted 30 per cent of GDP’. But, most significant is the qualitative change of governance whereby an array of external actors have become embedded within the very sinews of these states through the funding and influencing of ‘corporate plans within
ministries, departments and agencies – based on logical frameworks which set out specific policies, executing agencies, timeframes and funding requirements’.

By engaging through continual negotiations and enmeshing themselves within various ministries, donors have attempted to transform key personnel from simple power conveyors to active participants and purveyors of neo-liberalism. This has directed the construction not just of sovereign statehood but also of a particular model of liberal democratic government and state capacity ‘based on the principles of multi-party democracy, respect for human rights, and “good governance”, together with a view of the state as the essential manager of a regulated market economy, with responsibility notably for the legal order, the currency, and infrastructure, and for the provision of basic social services’. In order to bring this about, we now have integrated governance structures that are not only providing or, helping to provide, the functions traditionally thought to be the preserve of the sovereign state; these actors are guiding government policy through ‘a substantial and ongoing relationship’ so that state government and developmental governance have become inextricably entwined.

Historical inquiry testifies that insecurity, poverty and development have been habitually connected. This notwithstanding, the crucial point here is not simply that ‘development has long functioned as a liberal technology of security’, but rather to point to how the recent ‘rediscovery’ of the risks arising from poverty and inequality have prompted these specific and incremental adjustments – or reflexive moments - in policy discourse and practice, rather than a radical disjuncture, along the lines envisaged by Beck’s World Risk
Society thesis. The final phase of incremental adjustment and bricolage to be explored is how the securitisation of development has been extended to incorporate terrorism.  

*Extension: Development Governance and Terrorism*

The events of 9/11 prompted further development reforms by the highly industrialised countries which extended the trend towards the securitization of development. A year after the event Tony Blair stated, at the Labour Party Conference, ‘we need coalitions not just to deal with evil by force if necessary, but coalitions for peace, coalitions to tackle poverty, ignorance and disease. A coalition to fight terrorism and a coalition to give Africa hope. A coalition to re-build the nation of Afghanistan as strong as the coalition to defeat the Taliban’. In this respect, the West acknowledged that, should they fail, ‘to build an economic and social system that satisfies enough of the needs of enough of the world’s people, then the terrorists will continue to recruit new allies as our old friends fall away or turn into enemies or cold, impassive neutrals’. In other words, the linkage between fragile and failed states, civil wars and global ‘bads’ was extended to include the new war on terror.

The link between poverty and terrorism is even more contested than that between failed/fragile states and terrorism. For example, the OECD has long acknowledged the disputed link, noting that: ‘most poor countries do not experience terrorism, supply nor support terrorists’. Similarly, in its Report on Terrorism and Development, RAND emphasise that ‘the link between terrorism and development ... is by no means self-evident
... [and] a direct causal link between a lack of development and terrorism has yet to be proven empirically'. Yet, despite openly acknowledging this disputed link, the OECD argues that ‘it is nevertheless important to bring together efforts to fight poverty and terrorism’. Whilst RAND conclude that ‘[t]hese qualifications aside, there is a noteworthy potential for development policies to reduce the threat of terrorism’.  

Elaborating its Development Co-operation Lens On Terrorism Prevention, the OECD explicitly notes how its strategy to combat terrorism extends its earlier strategic thinking on development and conflict prevention, more generally. From this perspective, terrorism is conceived of as a specific ‘form of violent conflict and conflict prevention is an integral part of the quest to reduce poverty’.  

When stressing policies of prevention, precaution and knowledge are pivotal concepts because it is necessary to act at the earliest opportunity to avoid disastrous events occurring, but in so doing requires acting without ‘evidence to support our hunches’. Thus, concludes Michael Williams, ‘policy-makers operating within a risk–defined system will increasingly resort to precautionary polices to manage insecurity.  

Such precaution had already prompted a revision in the management of debt repayments, even prior to contemporary concerns about global terrorism, thus reinforcing the way in which policy has developed by incrementalism and bricolage. As early as 1996, reforms had been implemented following the announcement of debt relief via the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC). At the time, 41 states that owed $221 billion were promised debt reduction, although the sustainability of debt was set at a level (250% debt to
exports ratio) that would still have left these countries saddled with heavy burdens. The initiative also required the heavily indebted country concerned make a commitment from the outset to ‘“sound economic policies” – the IFIs’ usual euphemism for SAPs’.\textsuperscript{118}

Therefore, following the failure of the HIPC (only 3 countries had become eligible after two years), the enhanced HIPC initiative was announced as part of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework. This time, the debt sustainability was set at 150% instead of 250% debt to export ratio. Additionally, some countries immediately cancelled bilateral debt (UK, Sweden, Norway and Australia). By 2002, $24 billion debt was cancelled for 26 countries.

Furthermore, just as the UK was reeling from the July 7\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks, the G8 Gleneagles Summit concluded with the announcement of a total debt relief that could amount to a total of $55 billion.\textsuperscript{119} Moreover, there was a commitment to increase aid by $50 billion over the next five years with $25 billion promised specifically for Africa.\textsuperscript{120} At the time, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stressed how the ‘clear signal on Africa, not just of intent but of detailed propositions for help, stands in stark contrast to the politics of terror that we saw exhibited yesterday’.\textsuperscript{121} However, although this debt cancellation alongside promised increases in aid was significant (although many countries have failed to deliver on their stated targets), this does not get away from the fact that the overall aim of ensuring the continuation of neo-liberalism remains the underlying rationale.\textsuperscript{122}

This new form of loan conditionality chimes with the general evolution of developing states into governance states.\textsuperscript{123} The IMF and World Bank are one of an array of non-state
actors that advise, fund and monitor states’ activities. Developing states are given greater autonomy in establishing their economic development. However, their choices remain narrowly confined to those that conform to the ‘scientific/technical’ economic policies prescribed by the ‘Knowledge Bank’. The knowledge of the ‘Knowledge Bank’ thus continues to reflect and be limited by the imperatives of capitalism and securing free markets. In this regard, the less confrontational approach adopted by developing states may simply reflect the fact that ‘pro-reform elites have internalized international policy requirements and objectives’.

Once again, these incremental policy shifts do not constitute a radical rupture in the knowledge practices adopted by policy-makers in their endeavor to manage contemporary insecurities. Instead, extending the securitization of development to incorporate terrorism is simply another phase in an ongoing process of bricolage whereby the prevailing governance discourse and practices linking fragile/failing states, poverty/inequality, and terrorism are mobilized and modified by western policy makers to order and manage the perceived risks of terrorism whilst reinforcing the authority of sovereignty and liberal (democratic) capitalism.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the responses to the events of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks that followed, although significant, do not constitute a Beckian reflexive watershed.
Beck has argued that such shocks can serve as ‘an unprecedented resource for consensus and legitimation, nationally and internationally’, that such events can be ‘averted by political action’ and could lead to ‘the fundamental principles of modernity, including the free market principle and the nation-state order itself’ becoming ‘subject to the change, the existence of alternatives, and contingency’. Such shocks are said to induce us ‘to make border-transcending new beginnings’ towards a more cosmopolitan world. However, a fully developed reflexive modernity depends ultimately upon decision-makers jettisoning tried and tested knowledge practices in their endeavours to manage contemporary insecurities. Knowledge is the pivotal concept because in an emerging risk society the modes of insecurity arising from our actions are unanticipated, unforeseen, unknown. The unenviable challenge for contemporary decision-makers is the unavoidable need to make decisions under these conditions of ‘radical uncertainty’. Illustrating the nature of the quandary for decision-makers within a precautionary environment, Tony Blair has asked, ‘would you prefer us to act, even if it turns out to be wrong? Or not to act and hope it’s OK? And suppose we don’t act and the intelligence turns out to be right, how forgiving will people be?’ As Michael Williams neatly puts it, ‘[i]t is in making the decision to act on risk that the risk becomes risky’. In other words, there has been a palpable shift in policy-making, wherein the policy of prudence which ‘recommended what “precautions” to take under conditions of knowledge’ has been replaced by the precautionary principle which ‘demands that we act under scientific and causal uncertainty’. Nevertheless, however palpable, this shift has been incremental rather than paradigmatic.
Beck is under no illusions about the deleterious consequences of global liberal market economics, ‘imposed on indebted countries by the West’. However, it can be concluded from the foregoing analysis that Beck is too optimistic about the possibility that backlashes against the West are prompting the collapse of global free market ideology. The implementation of neo-liberal reform may have been harmful for many states in the South, but it continues nevertheless, undermining Beck’s claim that such catastrophes lead to challenges to expert knowledge and to the rise of a cosmopolitan form of statehood that will tame global capital. Indeed, interpreted from the perspective of World Risk Society, western security-development policies continue to be guided by ‘a non-reflexive rationality’, associated with the first phase of modernity, because they fail to recognise that the economic problems that they view as a partial cause of these global threats, arise from the fundamental economic structure of modern society itself.

Rather than witnessing a radical reconfiguration of the global economy, the reforms represent a further extension of the risk dispositif that has resulted in a strengthening of previous risk rationalities. The post 9/11 landscape has witnessed the expansion of the precautionary principle and the linking of security and development to encompass terrorism. Yet, the IFIs have continued to implement the rationality of liberal (democratic) capitalism. The politicised nature of the project has certainly been re-energised, but rather than lead to radical reform, it has instead prompted specific incremental reform comprising direct intervention by the West to secure these islands of instability from immediate chaos, the re-
securing of territorial borders and limited development reform to prevent the emergence of further instability.

Western governments’ responses to the recent crises in Libya and rise of Islamic State (IS) have continued to adhere to the established tenets of incremental reform in risk governance. In keeping with their societies’ commitment to risk aversion and an overriding concern to avoid losses of blood and treasure of the kind incurred in Afghanistan and Iraq, western governments have ruled out, categorically, committing ground troops in any of these theatres and opted, instead, for more limited intervention at a distance, comprising no fly zones, aerial bombing campaigns, and drone attacks. In making their cases for intervention western leaders have acknowledged the difficulties in making decisions under conditions of uncertainty and the need to learn from past mistakes. However, when setting out his position for tacking the rise of IS before the United National General Assembly in 2014 UK Prime Minister David Cameron warned that ‘we must not be so frozen with fear that we don’t do anything at all’ and allow ‘past mistakes to become an excuse for indifference or inaction. However, determining what these lessons are is uncertain. President Obama was at pains to stress the need to take early precautionary action in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe in Benghazi and, following the victory of Libyan rebel forces, celebrate the humanitarian success of the operation. However, following Libya’s rapid collapse into chaos Alan J. Kuperman has noted how for Obama the lesson to be learned is ‘the need to come in full force’, whereas Kuperman’s own reading is that the US should have not intervened. The point to be drawn for our purposes here is that western states appear to
have learned very little and, even faced with entrenched crises in Libya, Iraq, and Syria exceeding most commentators worst case scenarios, the reflex remains to resort to tried and tested methods. Consequently, the future for Beck’s ideas gaining policy traction among western governments is not bright; rather the future would seem to be further incrementalism and bricolage.
Notes

2 Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization”, 38; Duffield, “Liberal Interventionism”
6 Beck, World Risk Society, 131.

A variety of related terms such as ‘risk’, ‘threat’, ‘hazard’, and ‘uncertainty’ are employed by those authors employing a Risk Society approach, although their precise conceptual distinction is not always absolutely clear. Defining his own usage of the term, Ulrich Beck states that risk is ‘a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself’. Beck, Risk society, 21 (emphasis in original). The precise meaning attributed to risk here along with its distinction from the related concepts of hazard and insecurity is quickly lost, however, when, on the same page, Beck also notes that the ‘risks and hazards of today thus differ in an essential way from the superficially similar ones in the Middle Ages through the global nature of their threat’. Beck, Risk Society, 21 (emphasis added). This conflation of terms is also repeated by those IR scholars adopting Beck’s ideas. Christopher Coker, for example, refers to both ‘de-bounded’ ‘threats’ and ‘unbounded’ ‘risks’ within adjoining paragraphs with reference to apparently the same phenomena. Coker, War, 74. For Mark Pythian, this ‘linguistic uncertainty’ occurs in part because when ‘writing about “risk” Beck is often actually describing what might be better termed “uncertainty”’. Pythian, “Policing Uncertainty”, 192. Nevertheless, in her review of this literature Karen Lund Petersen suggests that ‘a distinction between threat and risk is the baseline for understanding this approach; threats being quantifiable, specific and about intention and means-end rationality, while risk is about the unforeseen and not related to a specific incident’. Petersen, “Risk analysis”, 703.
8 Beck, World at Risk, 66.
9 Werner, “Responding to the Undesired State” quoted in Aradau and Van Munster, “Governing Terrorism Through Risk”, 95. Scholars adopting a governmentality approach also attempt to distinguish between threat and risk. For Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero and Van Munster, ‘whereas the concept of threat brings us in to the domain of the production, management and destruction of dangers, the concept of risk mobilizes and focuses on different practices that arise from the construction, interpretation and management of contingency Aradau et al., “Security, Technologies of Risk”, 148. However, they too proceed to blur any absolute distinction, noting that ‘there are also important continuities’ in that threat management ‘is also about the management of a contingent future’. Ibid., 148, note 1.
10 Rasmussen, “Sounds Like a Riddle”.
11 Dean, “Risk, calculable and incalculable”, 151.
14 Mazarr, “The Rise and Fall”; Coker, War, 134.
15 Aradau, and Van Munster, “Taming the future”, 29, 39 and 49; Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity, 73-4; Rasmussen, “Sounds Like a Riddle”, 388; Mythen and Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk”, 221; Ericson, “The State of Preemption”, 57; Amoore and De Goede, Risk and the War, 99;
16 Ewald “Crafty Genius”, 64.
17 O’Malley, “Uncertain Governance”, 186.
18 Ibid., 187-9; Rasmussen, Risk Society at War, 101.
19 Cooper, “Pre-empting Emergence”, 120.
20 Freedman, “Prevention Not Preemption”, 106.
21 Beck, “Terrorist Threat”, 39. It should be noted at the outset that Beck accords risk an ontological status whereas the Foucauldian approach treats risk as a way of ordering reality; risk is viewed as a construction, a ‘way in which we govern and are governed’. Amoore, and De Goede, Risk and the War, 9.
23 Beck, World at Risk, 52.
24 Ibid., 53.
26 Beck, World Risk Society, 81.
29 Beck, World at Risk, 66.
31 Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe, 254.
32 Ibid., 21.
33 Beck, “Towards a Realistic Utopia”, 3 (emphasis in bold added by authors).
35 Beck, World Risk Society, 80. As Shahar Hameiri has pointed out, although Beck initially emphasised risks arising from our scientific-technical knowledge and practices, since 9/11 he has included terrorism in his category of unbounded risks. Hameiri, “State Transformation”.
37 Crouch, Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism.
38 Dean, “Risk, calculable and incalculable”, 151.
39 DFID, FCO and MOD, Building Stability, 8.
40 Jacoby, National Security Threats, 12.
42 Piazza, “Incubators of Terror”; Howard, “Failed States”.
44 Plummer, “Connections to Terrorist Activity”, 416; Patrick, “Global Threats”, 32.
46 Patrick, “Failed States”, 644.
47 Boás and Jennings, “Failed States and State Failure”, 477.
50 HM Government, A Strong Britain, 28.


Piazza, “Rooted in Poverty?”, 170.


Brown, *Kennedy Memorial Lecture*.


Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States*, 166.

Duffield, *Global Governance*, 121.


Duffield, *Global Governance*, 121.

Bretherton, “Security after the Cold War”, 137.

Ibid., 138.


Ibid., 5.


Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, 45.


Williams and Young, “Governance, the World Bank”, 87.

Ghani, and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States*, 166.

Ibid.

Aalberts and Werner, “Mobilising uncertainty”, 2197.

Ibid., 2220.


World Bank, Ibid., 149.

World Bank, Ibid., 157.

95 Dillon and Reid, “Global Liberal Governance”, 49.
97 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 170.
98 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, 121.
100 Harrison, The World Bank and Africa, 18.
101 Harrison, Ibid., 4 and 18.
102 Harrison, Ibid., 87.
103 Harrison, Ibid., 89.
107 Blair, At Our Best When At Our Boldest.
108 Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War, 165-6
110 OECD-DAC, A Development Co-operation Lens, 15.
111 Cragin and Chalk, Terrorism and Development, 2-3.
112 OECD-DAC, A Development Co-operation Lens, 15.
113 Cragin and Chalk, Terrorism and Development, xiv.
114 OECD-DAC, A Development Co-operation Lens, 10.
115 OECD-DAC, Ibid., 11.
117 Williams, “(In)Security Studies”, 76.
118 Cheru, “The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative”, 73.
119 Blair, Prime Minister Blair’s Statement on the G8 Gleneagles Summit.
120 Blair, Chair’s Summary, July 8, 2005.
121 Blair, British Prime Minister Tony Blair Reflects.
122 As Oxfam reported recently, ‘[i]n spite of the bold promises made in 2005, because of the failure of some countries to meet their commitments, as the 2010 deadline passed for the G8 to increase aid by US$50 billion, only US$30 billion had been delivered in total. While the increase of US$11 billion in aid to Africa, was still way under half of the $25 billion increase promised’. Oxfam, Make Poverty History.
124 Pender, “Structural Adjustment”.
125 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 168.
127 Ibid., 7.
128 Frequent references are made to Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘unknown unknowns’ in order to convey this condition of uncertainty. For example see Rasmussen, “It Sounds Like a Riddle”, 67; Daase and Kessler, “Knowns and Unknownns”, 412.

Blair, Blair’s Terror Speech in Full

Williams, “(In)Security Studies”, 63.

Aradau, and Van Munster, “Taming the Future”, 29. However, it should be pointed out that these writers tend to differ from Beck in that they view the representation of risks as constituting a way of governing, a way of seeing the world, with certain consequences, without asserting that this is how the world really is.

Beck, World Risk Society, 6.

Beck, Ibid., 7.


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Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle”, 66-67

Ibid, 77.
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