**FORM UPR16**

**Research Ethics Review Checklist**

Please complete and return the form to Research Section, Quality Management Division, Academic Registry, University House, with your thesis, prior to examination.

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<tr>
<th>Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information</th>
<th>Student ID: 300508</th>
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<td>1/9/2008</td>
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<td><strong>Study Mode and Route:</strong></td>
<td>Part-time X, Full-time, MPhil, PhD, Integrated Doctorate (NewRoute), Prof Doc (PD)</td>
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<td><strong>Title of Thesis:</strong></td>
<td>Performance Culture meets Police Culture: the relationship between political ideologies, police reform and police culture.</td>
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<td><strong>Thesis Word Count:</strong></td>
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<p>| a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and within a reasonable time frame? | YES |</p>
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**Date:**
PERFORMANCE CULTURE MEETS POLICE CULTURE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, POLICE REFORM AND POLICE CULTURE

Graham John Hadley

The thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Criminal Justice of the University of Portsmouth.

October 2014
Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award.

Graham Hadley

Word Count: 49 595
PERFORMANCE CULTURE MEETS POLICE CULTURE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, POLICE REFORM AND POLICE CULTURE
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>BME</td>
<td>Black, Minority and Ethnic</td>
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<td>BPA</td>
<td>Black Police Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>BV</td>
<td>Best Value</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Constable</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Compulsory Competitive Tendering</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAR</td>
<td>Crime Evaluation Data and Recording</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Comprehensive Spending Review</td>
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<td>DETR</td>
<td>Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions</td>
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<td>ERM</td>
<td>Exchange Rate Mechanism</td>
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<td>FMI</td>
<td>Financial Management Initiative</td>
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<td>GP</td>
<td>General Practitioner</td>
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<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
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<td>HO</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Inspector</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key Performance Indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPIA</td>
<td>National Police Improvement Agency</td>
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<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Police Constable</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
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<td>PCSO</td>
<td>Police Community Support Officer</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
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<td>SM</td>
<td>Strategic Manager</td>
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<td>SMT</td>
<td>Senior Management Team</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>TVP</td>
<td>Thames Valley Police</td>
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<td>TVPA</td>
<td>Thames Valley Police Authority</td>
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<td>VFM</td>
<td>Value for Money</td>
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores successive police reform agendas over the period 1979 – 2012 in terms of the relationship between political ideology, police reform and police occupational culture. The thesis addresses the interplay between ideologically driven police reform and the reception of reform agendas within the central mindset of policing. It examines the significance of political and economic drivers in police reform agendas and literature on police occupational culture, with emphasis upon change and reform and the response within the police. As a means of exploring the relationship between reform and police culture the thesis gathers data through empirical research based upon documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. Research upon street and management cops (Reuss-Ianni 1983) and the analytical model of cultural knowledge and change outlined by Chan (1997), was used to analyse and present the research findings. The main conclusions concern how ideology in police reform agendas was received by police occupational culture. Utilising the theoretical frameworks of Reuss-Ianni and Chan, the thesis argues that the ideology in police reform agendas is received and assessed through cultural knowledge. This places into context documented features of police occupational culture such as the sense of mission, conservatism, resistance to change and the street – management divide. As a result, this thesis contributes to the understanding of police occupational culture through the prism of reform and the implications for practice, outlining how ideologically driven police reform agendas are received and interpreted through police occupational culture.
INTRODUCTION

Police reform was high on the agenda for the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition government; public finances were under considerable pressure due to economic circumstances and law and order was a key political objective. The means by which the public sector and the police service were managed was, as a result, subject to much scrutiny. The police service, with its wide range of responsibilities, was undergoing significant reform, in order to manage budgetary constraints whilst continuing to deliver over a range of objectives. The impact of reforms, proposed reforms, and the basis upon which they were formulated has consistently been of interest organisationally and politically. The means by which improvement was sought, and the specific reforms proposed to public services, form an approach by government to institutional change which carries profound implications.

The ideology behind reform agendas was also significant from the perspective of how members of the police service perceived reform. The harnessing of resources, particularly those on the front line, to new ways of working has been recognised as essential to make progress. The appraisal of the direction of reform agendas, and the underlying ideology, may be a significant factor in change. The manner in which reform is appraised is of critical importance in understanding the relationship between the ideology that drives agendas, the changes that are proposed, and the reception of such by the workforce. The impact of ideology, reform and role of occupational culture is therefore crucial to understanding how change has impacted. The variation in how members of an organisation responded to reform agendas is also an important part of the context, such as the extent to which different roles influenced responses to reform.

A series of reform agendas, the Coalition being the latest phase, have displayed continuity in terms of aspects of their respective approaches. The thesis outlines how these reform agendas have formed a consistent ideologically driven direction and how police occupational culture has related to change, proposed change, and the implications organisationally. The period the research encompasses includes reform agendas of the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major, New Labour governments of Blair and Brown, and Coalition of Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. These police
reform agendas relate to each other through the underlying rationale that has shaped the police service.

The Conservative governments of Thatcher provided the basis for successive reforms following a radical departure from previous governments. The police service as a result underwent significant changes which introduced marketised approaches to increasing output whilst reducing expenditure. A preference for private sector management techniques, short term contracts, performance related pay and intrusive performance monitoring systems were advanced. Without the Thatcher governments reforms the basis for successive change would not have been set in place. The new and radical momentum differentiated the Thatcher governments from its predecessors and set the climate for future reform. The regulatory framework established by Thatcher was harnessed to drive performance by the Major government, with committed attempts at modernisation importing private sector practices with performance measurement, central inspection, competition and contracting out services. Major also added to the framework for future reform agendas through the Citizen’s Charter, placing consumerism and responsiveness at the centre of police reform.

The New Labour police reform agenda centred upon intensive auditing, target-setting, monitoring and inspection, intensifying the managerialism from preceding agendas. The objective was to improve the allocation, management and control of resources by defining critical scrutiny of outputs and value for money. The consumerist reforms of the Major era continued with the introduction of neighbourhood policing and workforce modernisation (further civilianisation) in order to do so. As well as ideological continuity within the New Labour approach to public service provision, a clear development and intensification of the VFM of the Thatcher and Major governments, and consumerism of the Major era, drove reform.

The Coalition police reform agenda had an emphasis upon productivity building upon previous reforms intensifying further the scrutiny upon spending to outcomes, with an emphasis upon front line policing. Amid poor economic performance, the Coalition governments Value for Money reforms expanded on an austerity narrative linking value, defined as local responsiveness and public availability, to accountability. Police Commissioners, reporting to the public on performance, were introduced to
improve VFM and local responsiveness. The Big Society aspect of the Coalition police reform agenda emphasised voluntary work and local engagement. With a critique of New Labour centralisation and performance there was nevertheless a continuing focus upon VFM, managerialism and reforms that have featured for all the government agendas since 1979.

The aim of this research is to establish the nature of the relationship between political ideologies, police reform and police occupational culture with a view to explain the interplay between the formation of police reform, reception and interpretation of reform agendas via police occupational culture. The research seeks to answer the following questions:

- To what extent has police reform been influenced and shaped by ideological influences?
- What is the role of police culture in resisting and interpreting reform agendas?
- What are the cultural implications in instigating change?
- To what extent does the existing literature acknowledge the influence of political ideology in police reform?

The research has the following objectives:

1. To examine police reform 1979 – 2012 in the context of ideological drivers assessing the significance of political ideologies, party political ideology and party politics upon change in the police service;
2. To explore police occupational culture, examining existing literature and research, to assess the reception of reform agendas at front line and management level, operation of police culture and implications for instigating change;
3. To analyse the empirical research and existing research and literatures to identify themes and areas of significance in police reform agendas;
4. To contribute to existing knowledge on police occupational culture and change / reform, drawing implications for practice.
Exploring the relationship between political ideologies, party politics and police reform agendas allowed for distinctions to be drawn between the motivating factors in political reform programmes. The time-span the research focused upon encompassed the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, New Labour governments and Coalition of Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. The period 1979 – 2012 was chosen as it marks what has been described as a shift from the social-democratic consensus following the Second World War (Gamble 1994) to the inception of alternative ideological approaches to public sector management. Examining police reform established the organisational impact of reform during this period, its direction, issues and themes, the continuity, or otherwise, in governmental approaches and reasons why. The literature on police culture and existing research assisted assessment of the cultural response to reform at both operational and strategic levels. Key studies such as the ‘management – street cop relationship’ (Reuss-Ianni 1983) and theories of change (Chan 1997) were used for analysis. Each chapter is now summarised to provide an overview of the thesis.

Chapter one examines police reform. It starts by considering ideology from its origins as a ‘science of ideas’ through its development as a political concept. Political ideology is then considered, and how significant public reforms under ideology driven by marketisation, managerialism and the New Public Management (NPM) have affected the police service. The chapter considers the successive governments that formed the period of the research. Approaches to police reform and progress, or otherwise, are outlined. The Thatcher governments are considered first, and the supposedly belated application to the police service of New Right reform, setting what is argued to be a platform for successive governments through concerns for efficiency (VFM) and core roles of the police. The Major government follows, with a continuation of many of the previous government reforms and resisted Sheehy proposals for change, and introduction of key consumerist reforms which impacted upon the police in the Citizen’s Charter. The New Labour governments of Blair and Brown follow and discussion of the continuity within the Third Way approach to police reform. This includes the centralisation debates, Best Value as a progression upon VFM and research from that era. Finally, the Coalition government is considered in terms of their approach and divergence from previous reform agendas such as the introduction of Police and
Crime Commissioners and return of VFM. The Big Society implications for policing and reversal of some New Labour reforms are also considered.

Chapter two examines police culture. Three broad periods identified in the development of the literature are used to structure the discussion. The working rules, those concerning inside and outside the organisation, and codes held to form aspects of police culture are explored. ‘Canteen culture’ is introduced in relation to the debate concerning attitude and behaviour and the broader context of cultural influence, as well as racism and how research into race, culture and the organisational response has contributed to an understanding of police culture. Typologies of police and public are explored as cultural explanations of how officers see themselves, colleagues and the public. The focus within the literature from similarities within police culture to differences is then explored. The street – management divide as a sub-culture in policing is explored, the emphasis upon variation and sub-cultures being a key cultural debate to this research, with the research of Reuss-Ianni (1983) forming the main theoretical basis. The theoretical framework of Chan (1997) is introduced and considered as a key concept concerning change in police organisations.

The methodology is outlined in chapter three. The qualitative techniques employed are considered with a supporting rationale. The issues regarding insider research and ethics are addressed, such as the role of the researcher-practitioner, including discussion of some of the cultural issues that merit consideration. Documentary analysis is explained, as are the documents and analytical methods used. The semi-structured interview framework administered with two sets of respondents is introduced. The research process and methods of analysis is outlined, consisting of documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in reform, to establish the background context to reform, proposals, issues and perceptions of organisational response. Further semi-structured interviews with front line respondents then explore their perceptions of reform agendas, developing themes around aspects of reform, officer responses and cultural features. Front line here refers to uniform officers on reactive (response) or neighbourhood policing teams who are directly engaged in operational public-facing policing, including their supervisors and managers (Sergeants and Inspectors).
Chapter four presents the research findings and analysis. The analysis is presented through reference to existing documented facets of police occupational culture: the sense of mission, conservatism and resistance, and the relationship between management and front line cops. In each of these sections the relationship and role of ideology in reform is explained. The theoretical frameworks of Reuss-Ianni and Chan are used to argue that a fuller context of change and occupational culture takes account of the role and reception of ideology in reform agendas. The categories of cultural knowledge described by Chan (1997) are referenced throughout in order to show how ideology has been a factor in cultural assessments of change and reform agendas. This updated context of police reform and occupational culture adds to existing theory and advances knowledge of how management and street cops interact, how and why performance management and reform are resisted and what factors generate the supposed conservatism in police culture. Chapter four concludes by bringing the themes together to highlight the significance for change and reform and summarise how utilising the theories of Chan and Reuss-Ianni has assisted the analysis. This is also presented in tabular format showing reforms, cultural knowledge, ideological influence and how it added to existing theory.

The concluding chapter reviews the aims and objectives and, in doing so, provides an overview of the thesis. The relationship between ideology, police reform and police occupational culture and how the research has modified and updated understanding in this area is outlined. The use and extension of existing theory is considered and how the separate literatures combine to inform the analysis and conclusions. The implications for practice are then considered, focusing particularly on instigating successful change, training and issues for particular reforms in light of the findings. The final section consists of concluding comments.
CHAPTER 1
POLICE REFORM

INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers police reform 1979 – 2012. It does so by documenting the successive governmental approaches to the police service, the direction of changes and rationale for them. The underlying ideological influences that are argued to have driven the direction of reforms are introduced. The continuity and consistency in governmental approaches to reform are considered, discussing the Thatcher era, focusing upon VFM and civilianisation, and the Major government, with sections on consumerism / the Citizen’s Charter, modernisation and Sheehy. New Labour governments follow, discussing centralisation, performance and Best Value. The Coalition discussion features sections on the Big Society, VFM and continuity and change. The ideological influences, that this thesis argues has significantly shaped the direction of police reform, police reform agendas, and impacted upon police occupational culture, are introduced. We start with a brief consideration of ideology and its expression in political ideology, which the remainder of the chapter will outline in terms of how it has influenced police reform.

1.1 IDEOLOGY

This section will discuss ideology in order to place into context the approach of governments to police reform. It commences with definitions and approaches to ideology. These concern the multiple drivers that influence party politics and political ideology in order to examine the relationship with police reform. To expand upon successive governmental approaches, the following sections consider police reform agendas in relation to the varying ideological influences. We turn now to consider the literature on political ideology and public sector management.
Any discussion of ideology should acknowledge that it is a contested concept (Heywood 2007 p.4; Vincent 2010 p.17). Ideologies have been defined as sets of ideas which justify organised social action by government (Seliger 1976), as well as individual political perspectives and often as a pejorative term colloquially. Debates in the literature concern how specific a definition of ideology should be (see Hinch and Munger 1994). General definitions can be too inclusive whilst more specific definitions, which can identify more precise political drivers, can generate contradictions. More specific definitions do have the benefit of highlighting competing tensions within ideologies, a feature of modern political thought systems. An example of such is the following from Hinch and Munger (1994 p.11):

“...ideology is an internally consistent set of propositions that makes both prescriptive and proscriptive demands on human behaviour . . . having implications for what is ethically good . . . and how society’s resources should be distributed and where power appropriately resides”.

The history of ideology as a science is beyond the scope of this discussion, other than to note its association with political doctrine and social change (Heywood 2007 pp.5 - 6; Vincent 2010 pp.2 - 3). Political parties expressed ideologies to guide emerging industrialised societies. Framed primarily around economic considerations, these consisted broadly of liberalism, socialism and conservatism (McClellan 1995; Heywood 2007 p.16). The convergence of political aims displayed in many industrialised countries (Lipset 1969) and relative economic prosperity diminishing social economic and political differences, added weight to the argument that ideology lacked explanatory power as a concept (Vincent 2010 p.10). The multiple ideological influences within political parties, together with the challenge of discerning what is ideologically motivated or otherwise, supported this view.

The literature on political ideology is large and approaches vary from those who focus upon the history of political ideology (Heywood 2007; Vincent 2010) to those that consider party political ideologies (such as Marquand 1988; Gamble 1994; Freeden 1999; Macleavy 2007). Both note the complexity of identifying between what Seliger (1976) refers to as the fundamental level of abstract philosophical ideas and operative level of securing power. Together with the complexity of hybrid and multiple
ideological influences within parties and political movements, identifying theoretical coherence can be challenging (Freeden 1999). Economic, social and populist drivers in securing power between and within parties mean that ideologies function from the abstract to policy making, discourse, activism and ordinary language (Vincent 2010 p.292). The decline of the left – right divide in politics furthermore reduces associations with former ideological commitments. The period the research focuses upon is considered now.

This research commences considering governments from 1979, which marks a significant change in managing the economy and state (Heywood 2007 p.8; Vincent 2010 p.66). Following the Second World War the state assumed responsibility for running the economy (Keynesian economics) and providing the public with universal social and citizenship rights (Beveridge 1942). A supposed collectivist consensus prospered during economic growth, although the true extent of this is disputed (see Marquand 1988 p.319; Butler 1993; Kavanagh 1997 p.6). This consensus was tested by economic circumstances and critiques of existing arrangements for public service delivery (Atkinson and Savage 1994 p.4). The critiques and ideological approaches that emerged, the ‘New Right’, is introduced next.

The New Right featured most prominently in the UK Thatcher governments 1979 - 1990 (Pollitt 1990 p.130; Farnham and Horton 1996 p.160), and US Reagan administrations 1981 – 1989 (Niskanen 1988 pp.4 – 6; Heywood 2007 p.8). Reflecting the discussion above concerning ideological concepts, its composition is subject to differing interpretations (Vincent 2010 p.66). It is generally held to consist of free-market economics, classical liberal economics and traditional conservative social authoritarianism, also referred to as neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism respectively (Heywood 2007; Vincent 2010). It should be noted that the influence of the latter is contested and some scholars discount it from the New Right (Nozick 1974; see Vincent 2010 pp.66 – 67). We will consider the free-market neo-liberal component first.

Free market and classical economics emphasised the efficiency of markets over state intervention (Smith 1776), arguing that solutions to economic and social problems lie in the market and not political control. They do so through emphasising competition and consumerism (Heywood 2007 p.53). The New Right provided a
critique of big government and interventionist statism, based upon the perceived failure of economic demand management (Hayek 1944; Mises 2005), high taxation (Friedman 1962; Nozick 1974; Harvey 2005) and wages unrelated to productivity (Vincent 2010 p.30). Ideologically this provided a platform for successive governments from Conservative to New Labour to reform (Jenkins 2007). The practical supremacy of market principles became a central driver in policy making (Heywood 2007 pp.52 – 53; Vincent 2010 p.30).

The Thatcher governments shifted the policy debate and redefined the ideological centre ground in politics beyond Thatcher’s premiership alone (Gamble 1994 p.224; Jenkins 2007 p.148). The endorsement of elements of Thatcherist / New Right ideology by opposing parties, as will be discussed, demonstrated the influence and significance of this period of government, change from the post-war consensus and direction of public service reform (see Gamble 1994 p.68; Jenkins 2007 p.153; Vinen 2009 p.276). In order to focus upon public sector reform to the police service, this chapter will go on to discuss how ideology has been expressed operatively in governmental approaches to public sector management. A brief overview of ideological and structural critiques establishes the context.

The traditional and bureaucratic hierarchical organisation that typified public services (and the police service) was held to define technical and procedural processes clearly and regulate activity between planning and doing (see Weber 1947 p.339). Such models were increasingly critiqued for being inefficient and bureaucratic in a pejorative sense (see Niskanen 1968 pp.293 – 305; 1971 p.32; Pollitt 1990 p.177; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000 p.16). Many of the sources of such critiques held much common ground with the ideology of the New Right. They can be broadly categorised under ‘public choice / marketisation’ and ‘managerialism’. Public choice / marketisation argued for greater use of markets, de-centralisation and competition through contracts and quasi-markets (sometimes referred to as pseudo-markets) (Gamble 1994 p.60; Lane 2000 pp.214 – 215; Pollitt 2002 p.276; Ellison 2011 p.56). Quasi-markets applied free-market principles to public service delivery, arguing for splitting those who purchase services and those who provide them, using contracts extensively and focusing on inputs to outputs (Broadbent and Laughlin 2002 p.100). Such ‘marketisation’ features in numerous schools of thought, including the New Right (Vincent 2010 p.93), although
the extent to which it has influenced actual reform is debated (Broadbent and Laughlin 2002 pp.104 – 105).

Managerialism (sometimes referred to as neo-Taylorism) advocates private sector techniques such as performance regimes, incentive reward systems, flexibility and entrepreneurialism (Pollitt 1990 p.177). It is wider than the ‘right to manage’ and reducing the power of unions, and asserts the need to modernise and overcome bureaucratic limitations, often through creating the climate and structure to inject market disciplines (Pollitt 2002 p.276). It has been defined as “attempts to re-structure internal administrative and organisational cultures . . . by both importing private sector management techniques and artificially creating competitive market mechanisms” (Atkinson and Cope 1994 p.44). This acknowledges the importance for reformers and government of management climate and culture to achieve organisational change. It is also the means by which marketisation can be used to re-focus institutions like the police service on financial inputs, outputs, outcomes and roles and reforms such as performance related pay and reward systems. This is a theme that will be examined in detail throughout the research and is a consistent area of police reform.

The literature on public sector management contains two important debates which are of significance to this research. The first is the importance of context in considering the application of reform to public sector institutions (see Flynn 2002 pp. 57 - 76), and the second is the extent of the supposed emergent new consensus on public sector management from successive governments (see Flynn 1997 p.41; Jenkins 2007). These are pivotal to this research and will be developed later. To conclude consideration of the impact of ideology and public sector management, one further area of relevant literature is introduced, consisting of the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). As the practical implementation of free market principles and private sector management techniques, the NPM literature recognised that broad agenda setting ideas were redesigning institutions (Aucoin 1990; Hood 1991; Hood and Jackson 1991; Barzelay 2002 p.19). Entrepreneurial management, performance regimes, emphasis on outputs, de-centralisation, competition and the superiority of private-sector management techniques were listed as key tenets (see Hood 1991 pp.3 – 19; Hood and Jackson 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992 pp.325 – 328).
Key debates in the NPM literature concern firstly the many tensions and contradictions that NPM reform programmes can have when marketisation is applied to public services (Dawson and Dargie 2002 pp.35 – 36). The second concerns the documented disparity in its application comparatively across countries as well as within and between sectors (Dunleavy and Hood 1994 pp.9 – 16; Ferlie, Pettigrew, Ashbourne and Fitzgerald 1996), and the need to account for the role of governance in public management (Cochrane 2000 pp.131 – 132; Osborne and McLaughlin 2002 p.10). The third key area concerns institutional context, and the recognition within the literature that NPM is a theme with distinct variations; “it varies within sectors, across sectors and it varies according to the outcome of specific management-professional relations” (Dent, Chandler and Barry 2004 p.1).

This section has introduced some of the key concepts and literatures that are of relevance to this research. The rest of this chapter will now discuss the institutional impact of police reform agendas.

1.2 POLICE REFORM AGENDAS

This section considers the successive governments 1979 – 2012. Approaches to police reform and progress or otherwise is outlined. The Thatcher governments are considered first and the supposedly belated application to the police service of New Right reform. The government of Major follows, with its emphasis upon a continuation of many of the previous government reforms, and introduction of key consumerist reforms which have impacted upon the police. The New Labour governments of Blair and Brown follow, with discussion of the continuity within the Third Way approach to public service change and police reform. Finally, the Coalition government is considered in terms of approach and divergence from previous reform agendas. The Big Society and reversal of some New Labour reforms are considered.

The reception of reform agendas, resistance to change and impact upon new reforms is considered where relevant. Police occupational cultural aspects of this are introduced in the next chapter in greater detail. This chapter aims to outline the links
between ideology, political ideology and public sector management in the context of changes and attempted changes to the police service. This assists the research by establishing the institutional context that the NPM literature cites as being important to understand how reforms are received, and how the initial ideology and rationale for instigating them is assessed and interpreted occupationally. Appendix A charts the reforms, for ease of reference showing chronologically the significant reforms, government that initiated them and link to ideology. We start with the Thatcher governments introducing the main ideological directions and the VFM and civilianisation that commenced during her tenure, setting a platform for further reform.

1.2.1 THATCHER

From her ascendency to the leadership of the Conservative Party in 1975 until her departure in 1990, and after eleven years as prime-minister, Margaret Thatcher shifted the policy debate and redefined the ideological centre ground in UK politics (Gamble 1994 p.224; Jenkins 2007 p.148). A key concern was to improve the efficiency of the economy (Conservative Party 1983; Horton 1996 p.160), through New Right prescriptions for free-market economics. This consisted of privatising state monopolies, controlling the money supply, reducing state welfare, cutting taxation and freeing individuals from state regulation (Heywood 2007 p.76). The state was to be ‘rolled back’ with big government / interventionist statism heavily critiqued (Pollitt 1990 p.130; Farnham and Horton 1996 p.16). Whilst disillusionment with the previous Keynesian orthodoxy commenced prior to Thatcher’s premiership and with the Labour administrations of Wilson and Callaghan (see Krieger 1996 p.51), the radical change to monetarism from government intervention nevertheless marked “a new revolution in politics led by Thatcher” (Jenkins 2007 pp.87 – 88). This was due in no small part to the extent of, and reliance upon, New Right ideology in economic management and welfare distribution. Heywood (2007 p.52) summarises Thatcherism as a New Right inspired ideological project, conjoining laissez-faire economics with a conservative social philosophy. It is important to distinguish between ideology, party political ideology and policy implementation as Gamble (1994) notes, which also assists understanding of how
Thatcher’s departure in 1990 reinforced rather than undermined Thatcherism by “separating the ‘-ism’ from the lady herself” (Jenkins 2007 p.4).

During the 1980s the Thatcher governments cut public spending and reduced the tax burden to historically low levels, with government power seen as limiting individual freedom through creeping collectivism (Thatcher 1979). Social authoritarianism (‘family values’), conjoined with state authoritarianism (‘prison works’ for example), stemmed from the neo-Conservative influence within the New Right (Heywood 2007 p.252). Individual prosperity and freedom to achieve was held to be the ultimate goal of society which would establish a healthy society, improve quality of life and deliver better public services (Thatcher 1985; 1987). Thatcher’s conservative governments articulated a prominent role for law and order, protecting the vulnerable and tackling crime and disorder (Thatcher 1978; 1982; 1988). Reform in the Thatcher governments focused upon productivity, cost-efficiency and rolling back the state, mostly within health, education and local government. The police service, unlike other public sector institutions, enjoyed a privileged status (Loader and Mulcahy 2003 p.29; Savage 2007 p.169) with change being belated and restrained compared to other public sector institutions (Raine and Wilson 1997 p.80).

Thatcher pledged to support and strengthen policing as part of the Conservatives law and order agenda (Savage 2007 p.167). Government commitment to police reform and criminal justice policy found accord with police unions; “the 1979 Conservative manifesto marked an intellectual and emotional convergence with the (Police) Federation that would last until the early 1990s” (Brain 2010 p.57). The implementation of the Edmund-Davies pay review with generous terms was a significant factor in this (Reiner 2000 p.72). Police Federation support for the Conservative Party pre-election in 1979 has been cited as a factor in this relationship (Jenkins 2007 p.181). The need for a strong service to police the Miner’s strike (Sullivan 1998 p.306; Savage 2007 pp.170 – 171) and quell disorders which marred the early part of the first Thatcher government continued this approach. The mutual alliance of police and government was however stretched as Thatcher’s tenure continued, with the political climate cooling on a perceived lack of return on investment as recorded crime rose (Jenkins 2007 pp.181 – 183). Increasing fiscal pressure, rising police expenditure and diminished public confidence in policing influenced reform to address
efficiency and effectiveness (Savage 2007 p.23). New Right solutions from wider public sector reform were introduced and influenced police reform and proposals for change, setting in motion reforms that have influenced the service significantly.

**VFM AND CIVILIANISATION**

Value for Money (VFM) is a constant theme in public sector and police management. It intensified in the mid 1980s, will be argued to have continued through the New Labour governments, and features again heavily in the Coalition reform agenda. The focus of this discussion is how it was implemented and the ideological factors in instigating change to the police, which commenced with Thatcher’s reforms to the public sector. New Right prescriptions to improve public sector efficiency focused upon eliminating waste and driving efficiency. In summary, the New Right and NPM principles consisted of an emphasis upon management by objectives, performance management and devolved management (Horton 1996; Savage 2007 p.86). The Rayner Scrutinies applied these and developed them, evolving into the Financial Management Initiative (FMI). They mark the start of the application of NPM to the police service with its reliance upon marketisation, a trend that will be argued to have continued and intensified. Continuing application and development through reform agendas of VFM has seen it become an institutional norm, influencing successive strategic delivery plans and performance plans.

VFM became entrenched in the management of the police service through Home Office Circular 114/83 and its “private sector techniques and philosophies” (Brain 2010 p.85). It has been attributed with the emergence of a new private sector language and terminology within the service and one that was supposed to engage with the experience of junior officers (Brain 2010 p.86). Inspection through the Audit Commission and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) provided a regime which enforced the principles behind 114/83, based as they were upon NPM. Managerialism and its use in driving the VFM agenda was provided continuing impetus by the rise of inspection and audit regimes through the 1980s into the early 1990s (Savage 2007 p.95). The ethos behind the FMI was endorsed, promoted and its implementation scrutinised by the Audit Commission and HMIC. These regulatory
bodies assessed good management practice and developed a centralised influence. HMIC itself was consolidated by the inclusion of younger former Chief Constables and civilian Inspectors (Reiner 2000 p.191). The Audit Commission similarly developed its influence to secure VFM, (from its role bestowed by 114/83), in ensuring existing resources were being used efficiently. Their influence grew incrementally impacting seriously in the 1990s via authoritative studies such as ‘Helping with Enquiries’ (1993) and ‘Streetwise, Effective Police Patrol’ (1996), developing increasingly rigorous control of police resources (Metcalf 2004 p.75).

Both the Audit Commission and HMIC provided responses to debate in the early 1980s concerning the validity of rational management and policing by objectives. These are instructive as they demonstrate some of the internal organisational responses to the reform agenda. The call for enhanced rational management had its supporters within the service (Butler 1985), as did scepticism over its applicability to an organisation with a diverse demand-led and highly discretionary role (Waddington 1986). Police management itself has periodically held little confidence from government in terms of expertise, structure and ability, to the extent that introducing military officers to senior ranks and / or the private sector has been actively considered with direct-entry to senior levels (Savage and Leishman 1996 p.243). This narrative emerged again more forcefully with Coalition police reform. The steady introduction of managerialism, concerns about the quality of police management and ability of police staff organisations (particularly ACPO) to satisfy government regarding the pace and intensity of change, was an ongoing tension. The extent and influence of central control, which rose incrementally through and beyond the Thatcher governments, commenced through such agencies and reforms (Jenkins 2007 p.183).

The ideological influences and reforms of the Thatcher governments have one further aspect of continuing relevance for police reform that will be developed later. The third Thatcher government, commencing in 1987, contested re-election as in 1979 with a heavy emphasis upon law and order. Following on from the approach of Home Office circular 114/83, Home Office circulars 105 and 106 (both issued in 1988) encouraged the use of civilians to release officers for operational duties. Establishment increases would only be approved if both Secretary of State and Chief Inspector of Constabulary at HMIC were satisfied that existing resources were being used efficiently (Brain 2010
Such reforms had the effect of increasing civilian staff numbers and increasing the roles they undertook, linked to VFM. Significantly, with civilianisation, the direction and foundation of further reform was set to be developed by successive governments.

In relation to the police service, the noted belated initial impact of reform was marked by significant changes, such as Home Office Circulars 114/83, 105 and 106, all of which introduced NPM solutions and marketised approaches to increasing output whilst reducing expenditure. A preference for private sector management techniques, short term contracts, performance related pay and intrusive performance monitoring systems were advanced by HMIC and the Audit Commission with increasing intensity. The necessity of policing the Miners strike, public disorders, football violence and the law-and-order agenda saw the police in the early to mid-1980s “escape the full rigours of NPM” (Brain 2010 pp.158). With rising crime, increases in general spending without return and loss of public confidence, the supposed solutions to generate efficiency and effectiveness were to catch up with the service. Without the Thatcher governments reforms the basis to do so would not have been set in place. It is important to note the new and radical momentum differentiating the Thatcher governments from almost all of its predecessors (Gamble 1994 p.227). The use and reliance on NPM and marketisation was to become more intense still under Thatcher’s successor, John Major.

1.2.2 MAJOR

This section briefly outlines the similarities with the previous Thatcher governments and extent to which Major built upon the ideological approach of Thatcherism, before discussing consumerism and the Citizen’s Charter. A following section on modernisation and Sheehy discusses attempts at radical reform, the resistance and outcome, with a focus on the continuity of approach to public sector and police reform and intensification / development of previous reforms.

The Major era continued the rise of power at the centre, privatisation, deregulation and the ascendancy of the contract through compulsory competitive
tendering (CCT). His tenure in the majority of policy areas maintained the Thatcherite approach that had gone before and formed relative continuity, avoiding potentially divisive ideological issues and debates (Baker 1993 p.431; Kavanagh 1997 p.202). The continuation of Thatcherite principles provided the necessary time and space for both the electorate to see it as the norm, and the Labour Party to significantly reform in a Thatcherite direction. The real programme attributed to Major has been described as “Thatcherism with a human face” (Jenkins 2007 p.164), the permanent establishment of Thatcherism following the perceived decline of socialism. Examination of substance and direct analysis of ideology leads to a common consensus that the Major government continued with Thatcherism (Gilmour and Garnett 1997, Kavanagh 1997, Lynch 1999). A catalogue of Thatcherite projects continued unabated: privatisation, tax cuts and reducing trade unions legal immunities - “Thatcherism without Thatcher” (Dorey 1999 p.226). Ideological commitment to the supremacy of the private sector continued as practices from the latter were imported to improve the public sector (Major 1997).

Both Thatcher and Major remained consistent with the New Right view of the superiority of markets, minimal state intervention, encouraging choice, competition, and entrepreneurism. The basic role of government in providing health, education and social security was acknowledged as well as in protecting and safeguarding citizens and the economy (Conservative Party 1992; Major 1992), organising a fair and stable economy (Major 1992) and protecting the vulnerable (Major 1997). Concepts of freedom and opportunity re-emerged in Major’s dialogue concerning the ‘classless society’, a nation at ease with itself where artificial barriers to choice and achievement are removed (Major 1992). The New Right concept of individualism was common to both, with the individual and family being the unit upon which society was built, people bearing responsibility for their own lives as opposed to the state (Major 1993a). This traditional conventional social order formed a substantial part of the ‘back to basics’ campaign (Major 1993b; Major 1994; Gilmour and Garnett 1997).

In the early 1990s reforms applied to the police exhibited more ambitious intent. This was driven by increasing fiscal pressure and police consumption of public expenditure, a continued rise in recorded crime and incidents that diminished public confidence (Savage and Leishman 1996 p.243). Critiques intensified, based upon perceived bureaucracy and a role culture combining solidarity, isolation and discretion.
obstructing change (McLaughlin and Muncie 2000 p.171). The police service was identified as demonstrating “all the characteristics of a badly designed system, one ripe for fundamental reform” (Davies 1992 p.30). The Police faced similar criticisms following amalgamations in the 1970s, with larger forces seen as remote from local needs (Loveday 2005a p.340). The Major government, with New Right inspired reform of public sector institutions, had a well established set of principles to improve the service by extending previous government reforms.

**CONSUMERISM AND THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER**

A key development and continuation from the Thatcher governments was the consumerist focus that Major introduced. This was a key political aim finding expression incrementally through the Thatcher governments and notably in the Major administration (and on into New Labour with neighbourhood policing). Major’s flagship consumerist policy was the Citizen’s Charter, designed to redress concerns he reportedly held that bureaucrats and public services were out of touch and run more for their own convenience than value for money (Seldon 1997 p.188). Major had articulated a philosophical commitment to public service responsiveness, the perils of bureaucracy and faceless institutions, in a speech to the Adam Smith Institute (Major 1989). This emphasised the importance of value for money and need to represent the public against bureaucracy. Commencing as ‘contractorisation’ the initial concept of what would become the Citizen’s Charter was linked to the Thatcherite policy of enabling councils (Seldon 1997 p.188). As the system of quality control for public service outcomes was developed, the term ‘contractorisation’ became unpopular and ‘Citizen’s Charter’ was chosen (Seldon 1997 p.189). Worked out laboriously, the Citizen’s Charter was worked and re-worked upon by leading conservative ministers prior to its launch (Seldon 1997 p.404).

The Citizen’s Charter formed a centrepiece of government strategy, reflecting a change in governance and style adopted by the Major administration (Atkinson and Cope 1994 p.47). Contingent with a personal concern of Major’s, regarding an individual’s level of choice and control (Major 1993a), the Charter sought to enhance these and empower citizens. Consumers of state services would be given, as far as possible, the equivalent consumer power and choice they would have if operating in a
free market. Described as ‘governing by contract’ (Pirie 1991 p.7), the supposed superior private sector contractual conditions would allow consumers to understand the service they are entitled to as a result of the investment of tax-payers money, and have a clear right of redress if those services were not provided at the level ‘contractually’ agreed. This was to have a significant impact on the police service.

The Citizen’s Charter preferred the market as the normative mechanism for generating entrepreneurial activity in the provision of public services. As well as cultural reform, the ideological basis for the Charter consisted of deliverers being held to account through performance targets, faced with competition, independent inspection and rigorous complaints procedures for consumers. Producers and providers were to be divided from consumers with a new relationship between client and provider (Kavanagh 1997 pp.205 – 206). The running of public services was increasingly being conceptualised through a private sector lens, with concerns to introduce greater responsiveness for consumers. The Citizen’s Charter played a key role in enacting within policy some of the principal tenets of the NPM (outlined later), role of government and creation of a quasi-market for choice in the provision of public services (Seldon 1987 pp.187 – 195). The Citizen’s Charter was hailed as a transformation of an otherwise unresponsive bureaucracy (Pollitt 2002 p.288).

The emphasis within the Charter upon choice and redress was designed to encourage providers to improve the services they were responsible for, so that outcomes generated by the public sector were “every bit as good as those offered by the private sector” (Major 1993a p.2). In a clear assertion of the superiority of market principles and private sector practices, the commitment where achievable to privatisation was extended further than under Thatcher. Citizenship became “part of a wider strategy for fundamentally reassessing the state, its forms, functions and relationships with the private sector” (Akinson and Cope 1994 p.49). Designed to facilitate the Citizen’s Charter, greater financial and managerial accountability was the desired outcome. The Charter increased the responsiveness of public service provision and commitment to re-inventing government through questioning the role the latter takes in public sector management (Atkinson and Cope 1994 pp.51 - 52).
The impact upon the police service consisted of an intensification of performance management from two regulatory sources established during the Thatcher era; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Commission. This resulted in forces having increased targets to achieve, especially as existing ACPO quality of service targets remained and were cross referenced to the requirements of the Citizen’s Charter. Whilst not the intention of the Charter, the resulting bureaucracy associated with its implementation became a focus for criticism (Brain 2010 p.188). It did however engender the importance of responsiveness and open government. The impact of the Charter upon the police has been argued to be a major driver for the introduction of micro-scrutiny and oversight, which would continue until 2008 when a new strategic direction was supposedly taken away from that extent of reliance on targets (Brain 2010 p.189). The Charter introduced further reform to the public sector and police service, making the prospect of further organisational change likely. Key Charters covered all major public services defining standards, meaning that through consumerist reform the direction and pace of change could be harnessed by successive administrations following Major.

The Charter extended these principles during Major’s government, importing private sector practices with performance measurement, central inspection, competition, consumer choice and information on standards, competitive tendering and contracting out (Conservative Party 1992; Major 1995). In consideration of these free market principles, the Citizen’s Charter, sometimes claimed as a departure from otherwise consistent Thatcherite ideology, was consistent at its core. Service delivery was to move closer to the client, backed up centrally with set standards of quality and efficiency at a uniform level throughout the public sector. This required quantifiable output if the Charter was to work. The justification for moving power to the centre was as Thatcher’s before him, to reduce formal regulation as growing competition was felt (Jenkins 2007 p.168). The police service had consumerist ideology as a concern, which would continue on and into New Labour governments, as successive reforms emphasised elements of customer satisfaction. The impact occupationally of this will be considered later in the thesis. The next section considers one of, if not the most, contentious reforms attempts of the Major government: modernisation in the Sheehy Inquiry.
MODERNISATION AND SHEEHY

The Major government reform agenda for the police was not limited to the Citizen’s Charter. A highly significant set of reforms for the police service, displaying a clear affinity with NPM and marketisation, were proposed in the Sheehy Inquiry (1993). Market forces / marketisation, the ‘right to manage’ (managerialism) and elements of reducing bureaucracy proposed flexibility in pay scales, performance related pay and fixed term appointments for all ranks. In terms of both marketisation and managerialism, Sheehy was a precursor to more contemporary reform proposals, emphasising the need for greater flexibility, performance related pay and a streamlining of the rank structure. In addition to Sheehy, the Posen Inquiry (Home Office 1995) was established to discuss the tasks that could be relinquished from the police and delivered by other means that would be more cost-effective, with proposals for the Home Secretary to set priorities and objectives whilst Police Authorities became more business-like. Governance was targeted for reform to increase responsiveness in line with consumerist reforms elsewhere and the increased use of privatisation, contracts and outsourcing.

These reforms encountered resistance from the outset concerning underlying ideology. Debate concerning the suitability of the application of market-values and competition to a “public sector good” followed (Brain 2010 p.223). Concerns centred upon potential divisive effects on recruitment, retention and morale, and the various staff representative associations united in criticising the proposed reforms recommended. A well-co-ordinated campaign led by staff associations successfully stopped reform (Savage 2007 pp.146 – 148). For the time being the full expression of desired reform was postponed, although the direction and mechanisms for change remained consistent with further marketisation and managerialism. This was entirely consistent with the continuation under Major of the themes that commenced more incrementally under the tenure of Thatcher. The development of the Posen review was less acrimonious: from an initial position of scepticism staff associations (particularly ACPO) became an active part of shaping the recommendations which ultimately concurred with views within the service (Savage 2007 p.155).
The Major era as outlined intensified and attempted significant reform of the police service built upon the foundation provided by the Thatcher years. The ideological basis was the same, with powerful economic drivers adding to the need for change and for VFM and performance. As we consider the New Labour governments next, with their approach to police reform, the continuity and further intensification of change in the same direction will be considered.

1.2.3 NEW LABOUR

This section considers the ideological approach of New Labour, and public sector reforms which, in relation to the police service, further intensified and built upon the changes instigated by Thatcher and Major. A section on centralisation and performance discusses the attempts to improve efficiency and effectiveness and critiques of the centralisation that accompanied reform. The following section considers Best Value as New Labour’s VFM reform, introducing research into the effects on the service and impact.

The election of New Labour in 1997 saw the greatest electoral change in votes and seats in the UK in the twentieth century, accompanied by arguably a minimal shift in the approach of government (see Jenkins 2007). Numerous themes of continuity with a Thatcherite agenda in the Labour Party’s 1997 manifesto were apparent. Economic liberalism, flexible markets and social conservatism led the 1997 election to be summarised as more about continuity than change (Kavanagh 1997 p.236). The realisation within New Labour was that a party of the left must lose its association with the unions, special interest groups and “forge populism of the centre” (Selden 2001 p.123). A substantial body of academic research has focused upon policy and practice (for example Kitson and Wilkinson 2007; Sawyer 2007; Wilkinson 2007) as well as more ideologically based examinations (MacLeavy 2007; Page 2007). Academic analysis has taken a sceptical view concerning New Labour in government and the existence of any coherent ideology (see Leggett 2004; Vincent 2010 p.93), although arguments for ideological consistency counter this view (see Freeden 1999; Fairclough 2000; Powell 2000; Lister 2001). The ideological objectives of New Labour were
formally expressed as economic prosperity and fairness for all (Blair 1999, 2003; Labour Party 2005).

New Labour formulated a supposed new political configuration, situated between the New Right / neo-liberalism and social-democracy, a middle path labelled the ‘Third Way’ (Giddens 1998 pp.74-75; Leadbetter 1999 p.240-244; Clarke, Gewirtz and McLaughlin 2000 p.11). The conjunction of market with enabling state sought to combine traditionally opposing perspectives into one cohesive discourse (McAnulla 2006 p.138). Economic efficiency and social justice positioned together what were traditionally competing concepts, allowing the claim that the Third Way had “transcended old ideological debates”, generating a fresh electoral basis and policy initiative for the left (Heppell 2011 p.17). The Labour Party’s ideological identity was linked to a statist view of social equality (Buckler and Dolowitz 2009 p.13), with welfare spending via progressive taxation (Hickson 2011 p.125), and Keynesian demand management sustaining economic expansion (Bevir 2000).

New Labour applied dual objectives of opportunity for all and economic prosperity simultaneously to their approach to public service provision (Labour Party 2005). Commitment to investment in modern public services was the infrastructure to support growth. Investment was to be matched by reform through minimum standards, inspection and audit regimes, devolution of power to front line delivery, with flexibility and responsiveness to the consumer giving greater choice (Blair 2002). Market systems were therefore encouraged in the public sector provision of goods and services (Blair 2007). Much of this was based upon New Right tenets and private / public management crossover with performance targets, management from the centre and an ‘enabling state’ (Labour Party 2005; Blair 2007). A renewed reforming discourse, determined to be tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime, was to be achieved by intensifying the NPM influences working un-evenly through the criminal justice system, perceived to lack organisational continuity. The techniques to achieve this centred upon intensive auditing, target-setting, monitoring and inspection, intensifying managerialism (McLaughlin and Muncie 2000 pp.174-175). The evolving FMI sought to improve the allocation, management and control of resources by defining critical scrutiny of outputs and value for money (Minogue 1998 p.27).
CENTRALISATION AND PERFORMANCE

The effect on the police organisation included various extents of de-layering and devolution of line-management responsibility, increasing bureaucracy and reducing front line supervision (Butterfield, Edwards and Woodall 2005 p.332). A burgeoning regime of performance management focused accountability and activity through Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and strategic objectives; ‘steering’ the police became increasingly centralised, whilst ‘rowing’ became increasingly decentralised (Cope, Leishman and Starie 1997 p.454). Performance appraisal systems tried to influence front line activity with limited success and buy-in from front line resources (Metcalfe 2004). The police were increasingly adapting to a rising workload, allied with the status of a new breed of managers well immersed in NPM rhetoric (Savage and Leishman 1996 p.250), making successful reform more likely and unified resistance less so. The perceived need to inject market disciplines witnessed an expanding performance management regime directed centrally, seeking to standardise tasks and render professional activities more visible. This heightened the scrutiny on those areas of police activity that fell under the auspice of performance indicators, often based in crime-management (Savage 2007 p.214). The continuing influence of the Home Office, HMIC, Audit Commission and the Police Standards Unit revealed the significance attached to performance. Modernisation continued the focus upon performance across the range of policing services: who delivered them, how and at what cost. Central government driving this process of change was seen as essential to deliver modern public services and the police were no exception (Blair 2002).

Numerous critiques developed in relation to performance management, centralisation and the impact on policing. The ability of specific management tools to ‘colonise’ organisational activity through the application of the values of the measurement system imposed was the focus of historic criticism (Laughlin 1991 pp.37-42). The presentation of set performance information as factual representations of policing activity to the detriment of other duties has likewise been criticised (Reiner 2000 pp.91-93), potentially hampering the flexibility on which policing responses depend “especially where central priorities diminish addressing local concerns” (Reiner 1994 p.156). Critiques further cited an over-emphasis on crime-management, neglecting the institution enhancing task of “constituting new security governance in the
community” (Hope 2005 p.381) and possibly “disempowering” localised decision making and responsiveness (Savage 2007 p.191). In summary, critiques over-emphasised quantifiable crime-management, a lack of intellectual investment in activities less susceptible to measurement and over-focus on ‘hard’ aspects of performance (McLaughlin 2008 p.274; Carlisle and Loveday 2007 p.24); “hitting the target and missing the point” (Bevan and Head 2006 p.521).

Crime-management, which since the mid-1990s had demonstrated success in reducing recorded crime, did not have the same impact on public perception and confidence. Instead an apparent decline in police legitimacy was reported. Despite falling crime rates the fear of crime rose (Fielding and Innes 2006 pp.127-145). An acknowledged reassurance gap hence required addressing to reduce levels of insecurity. The instigation of neighbourhood policing was designed to address this gap (Hope 2005 p.379; Loveday 2005a p.345). The principal reform, which under New Labour continued the precedent established through consumerist reform of the Major governments, consisted of the Neighbourhood policing model. This established local relationships by community engagement and civil renewal through teams of visible, accessible and familiar uniformed staff (Home Office 2005). A key political driver to further civilianisation has been the need to make neighbourhood policing a success, and progress has been made to that end by the introduction of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs).

The key driver for workforce modernisation was restoring a uniformed presence to the streets, towards the political imperative to reduce the fear of crime. This aspect of workforce modernisation conforms to NPM ideals of greater flexibility and a more deployable professional workforce. Civilianisation is recognised as potentially capable of quenching increasing demand for reassurance policing and wider modernisation (Loveday 2006 p.107). NPM and its emphasis upon the importance of consumer confidence has been a driver for change in public sector management. In the context of the police service, the extra pressing element has been rising fear of crime and disorder. As well as sector wide reforms aimed at consumerism and emanating from central government, the political significance of perceptions of crime rates influences reform programmes. The basis of civilianisation (from Home Office circulars 105 and 106, through Posen, CCT / outsourcing) provided a basis from which further workforce
modernisation could be initiated, building upon the previous governments of Thatcher and Major.

During the New Labour era (and since) the police service has been accused pejoratively of being “the last great unreformed and unionised institution” (Parris 2005 p.21), viewed by some as the last major unreformed sector (see Savage 2007 p.190). Modernisation is a consistent feature of police reform and one in which, through successive governments, continuity in approaches to policing structures and practices is apparent. Some of the more ambitious proposals were aired during the New Labour era in ‘Modernising the Police Service’ (HMIC 2004), which addressed the internal structure, management and role / status of police staff. It recommended substantial modernisation with multiple-entry at all levels and, most radically of all, proposed the ability for staff to move between warranted (where police powers are required) and non-warranted posts. Argued by some to allow police managers “to effectively manage for the first time” (Loveday 2005b p.279), it caused concern about the potential erosion of the office of Constable, most vociferously from the Police Federation. The direction of reform was as with Thatcher and Major, but the pace and intensity extended further.

Changes to police organisational structures have sought to flatten hierarchies and devolve responsibilities downwards, as per the NPM (Butterfield, Edwards and Woodall 2005 pp.336-341). Reforms to the structure of policing, and proposed reforms, demonstrate again the importance of context and the distinct impact of reform upon the police service. In the wider public sector research into the impact of such NPM principles has demonstrated the ability of professional groups to enhance their role and status (Bolton 2004 pp.331). In the police service, however, the addition of a new strategic slant, through devolution of responsibilities to the role of Sergeants and Inspectors, did not. According to previous research, the influence of performance management reforms resulted in increased bureaucratic activities, auditing and monitoring (Butterfield, Edwards and Woodall 2005 pp.336-341). Police supervisors and managers had not been enabled to become practitioner-managers and withdrew from an operational-supervisory role, failing to lead and enhance further reform. This research coincides with the New Labour centralisation and documents some of the occupational impact and unintended consequences of change, which will be considered later. We now consider New Labour reforms in Best Value.
**BEST VALUE**

This period of VFM reform is instructive, as it coincides with research focusing upon police reform and, to an extent, showcases the NPM influences and some resulting organisational impact. The Best Value regime of New Labour extended and followed on from the preceding Conservative government’s x3 E’s (economy, efficiency and effectiveness). The Best-Value (BV) regime of New Labour is notable in its extension of Major’s Conservative government’s CCT. It sought VFM through a statutory basis consisting of a general duty for police authorities to secure continuous improvement in the way in which services are provided. Services are considered from a framework of the 4 C’s, listed below with the associated NPM emphasis (Local Government Act 1999 p.3):

- Challenging the purpose of a service (practising tight cost control);
- Comparing performance with other providers (targets, standards, and continuous quality improvement);
- Consulting the community (being closer to customers);
- Competition (being performance driven).

BV established a quasi-market in respect of reliance upon league tables, benchmarking and performance indicators (Leigh, Mundy and Tuffin 1999 p.v). The aim was to manage markets in order to promote a “mixed economy of provision” (DETR 1998 p.20). Consequences of BV can be split into strategic and operational issues. At the strategic level the lack of a comprehensive efficiency measure for the wide police remit in promoting safety, reducing crime and disorder and the fear of crime linking inputs to outcomes was identified as an issue (Drake and Simper 2001; 2005 pp.465-481). BV was intended to focus beyond efficiency alone in addressing service quality and consumers expectations, for example corporate health indicators and the experiences of staff from ethnic minorities (DETR 2000 p.12). In reality, efficiency in the ability to detect crime dominated performance assessment. The conjunction of BV with crime-control generated consistent critiques of its interpretation of efficiency and effectiveness (Martin 2003 p.170), argued by critics to be out of step with local crime and disorder partnerships and inter-agency working (Mulraney 2000 p.10; HMIC 2003 p.29). The inability to achieve performance indicators was hailed as indicative of a
failing service by both media and politicians alike (Travis 2001 p.1; McLaughlin, Muncie and Hughes 2001 p.311-312). When forced to prioritise resources Chief Constables were more likely to focus them upon performance within national league tables (Martin 2003 p.169; Caines 2000 p.5).

Sergeants’ roles substantially altered, with an increase in auditing and monitoring measurable outputs, and greater accountability for results through performance indicators. Sergeants’ reduced contact with the public, engaging in community consultation and problem solving, offered less support for local policing (Loveday 2000 p.24). Front line activities were less supervised (Butterfield, Edwards, and Woodall 2005). Harnessing individual performance towards targets produced poor compliance and participation rates and provoked scepticism from officers, perceiving it to have achieved little influence (Metcalf 2004 pp.82-85). This was consistent with research from a previous reform era; attempts to focus activity and discretion through performance management failed to significantly mould values and ideas about the objectives of policing, leaving space for officers to assert their own preferences (Holdaway 1994 p.68). The impact of such reforms will be discussed later in terms of resistance, occupational culture and unintended consequences. The BV regime is a good example of the process of attempting to secure VFM and one that this summary has necessarily focused upon the critiques of.

The ideological renewal of the New Labour project managed initially to marginalise the critiques from the left (Beech 2008 p.1; Hepell 2011 p.18), whilst wrestling from the Conservative Party the mantle of economic competence (Lee 2011 p.189). However, the economic crash of 2008 – 2009 exposed as illusory supposed gains achieved by Third Way government economies for over-reliance on the financial sectors cheap credit. The notion that global markets had been reconciled with ethically informed policies was seriously questioned (Jordon 2010 p.1). In public policy “one of the most striking tendencies . . . was the expansion of markets and market orientated reasoning into spheres of life traditionally governed by non-market norms” (Sandel 2010 p.1). The premiership of Gordon Brown proved consistent to what went before as opposed to any return to old labour socialism, it was if anything “the same as pre-election period Thatcherism” (Jenkins 2007 p.255). The consensus was that the party moved to the centre ground, endorsing elements of Thatcher – Major’s policy
approaches, described as a ‘concordat’ with middle England (Toynbee and Walker 2001 p.153; Jenkins 2007). The framing of this as a move away from former traditional social-democratic politics has been described as conforming to a neo-liberal approach (Heffernan 2001 p.170; Heppell 2011 p.22).

The impact upon the police service saw significant reforms with a growing performance management regime backed centrally. The introduction of neighbourhood policing and civilianisation in order to do so, and a Best Value / VFM agenda intensified the NPM influences. As well as the ideological continuity within the New Labour approach to public service provision, a clear development and intensification of the VFM of the Thatcher and Major governments, and consumerism of the Major era, drove reform. The centralisation and crime management critiques and debates likewise intensified, providing space for the Coalition to develop their police reform agenda once in office, based in part upon criticisms of the Labour governments.

1.2.4 COALITION

This section examines the formation of the Coalition government, the Coalition agreement and approach to public sector management and police reform. Key issues of deficit reduction and the role of the ‘Big Society’ are considered and its ideology and development explored. Much of the Coalition approach and police reform agenda is based upon their policy statements, with less research being available compared to Thatcher, Major and New Labour governments. The Big Society is considered in terms of volunteers, the Special Constabulary and Commissioners, followed by a section on VFM and how the budget deficit has seen a resurgence of focus in this area. The final section discusses continuity and change between Labour and Coalition governments, which is considered later in the research in terms of police occupational cultural responses.

A re-orientation of the Liberal Democrat Party (Clegg 2008; Marshall and Laws 2004) and ‘liberal-conservative’ politics of David Cameron (Cameron 2007) facilitated the Coalition agreement by reducing the distance between the parties. Cameron’s liberal
conservatism has been summarised as containing a neo-liberal economic philosophy supporting free markets, competition, dominant private sector, low levels of income tax and de-socialised state (Beech 2008). A greater role for the free market was acknowledged by the Liberal Democrats whilst Cameron repositioned the Conservatives in the centre ground of British politics (Jenkins 2007 p.252; Bale 2010 p.285). Cameron also claimed pre-election “there is barely a cigarette paper between us and the Lib-Dem Party” on a range of issues (Cameron 2009 p.9). The ‘Orange Book’ Liberal Democrat perspective signalled numerous areas of convergence with economic liberalism and a coherent effort to reclaim economic and political liberalism regarding market mechanisms, consumerism and private sector dominance (Laws 2004 p.42; Cable 2004 p.161; Randall 2007). The prospect of Coalition with Labour had also been diminished by the Labour hierarchy underestimation of the ‘generational shift’ in the Liberal Democrats (Kavanagh and Cowley 2010 p.210).

Contentious policies required negotiation, which altered the policy positions that parties had adhered to pre-election (Kavanagh and Cowley 2010 p.225). Concessions to the Conservatives on the depth and pace of cuts to the deficit appeared acceptable to allow potential reform of the voting system. The Coalition programme was introduced by Cameron and Clegg as reflecting convictions to radically reform government, a stronger society and smaller state (HM Government 2010a p.8). The overall aim was deficit reduction, with any measures presenting a cost to public finances being dependent upon decisions made in the comprehensive spending review (CSR), (HM Government 2010b p.35). The influence of the Orange Book liberals in harnessing their party towards a Coalition resulted in a relatively unified ideological basis of localism, anti-statism, markets and voluntary activity (Hickson 2011 p.252). Deficit reduction was identified as the key Coalition priority.

Structural weakness and indebtedness was argued to be magnified by tax-and-spend policies, constricting the private sector and damaging the overall economy (HM Treasury 2010 p.13). The decision by the Coalition to focus upon the deficit has propelled ideology to the forefront of mainstream attention, with the announcement of the CSR revealing the biggest raft of cuts since the Second World War (Emmerson 2010 p.2; Beech 2011 p.267). Aided to reduce the national deficit by slashing public expenditure annually by 14.4% and over five years 46.4% (Crawford 2010), it also
reduced the responsibilities of the state. As Cameron expressed it “the central task I have set myself and this party is to be as radical in social reform as Margaret Thatcher was in economic reform” (Cameron 2008 p.9). The end of big government would be supplemented by the role of the ‘Big Society’ (Cameron 2009; Cameron 2010b p.8; HM Government 2010a). This would have a significant impact on police reform as well as the budgetary issues facing the Coalition.

**BIG SOCIETY**

The origins of the Big Society concept pre-date the 2010 election. Pragmatically the ‘Big Society’ idea introduced social responsibility back into the Conservative Party agenda, balancing previous perceptions of the Tories as ‘the nasty party’, fuelled partly upon Thatcher’s infamous assertion that “there is no such thing as society” (Thatcher 1987 p.1). The Big Society consisted of three areas of activity: public sector reform (state action); community empowerment (societal action) and philanthropic action (individual action). These three components are underpinned by the ‘New Localism’, transparency of information and social investment. It counteracted the critique that state machinery has placed bureaucratic limits on society, reversing the hierarchical model that dictated that government policy should be cascaded down to the operational level. This would, it is argued, allow for flexibility and adaptation to local needs. The ideological origins of the Big Society extended back over a decade and are clearly discernible through the publications of leading conservative thinkers and groups. They can be broadly divided into communitarian (Willett 1995; 1997; 2008 p.17) and ‘one-nation’ influences (Duncan-Smith, Streeter and Willetts 2000; Hilton and Gibbins 2002; Clark 2003; 2008). Practically the agency and political philosophy of Oliver Letwin played a pivotal role in defining the Conservatives policy approach to Coalition negotiations, including in it the Big Society (Letwin 1999 pp.151 – 156; Kavanagh and Cowley 2010 p.227).

The Big Society contrasted ideologically with the New Labour approach particularly in relation to public service reform (Prabhakar 2010 p.34), argued to have been too top-down and top heavy (Jenkins 2007 p.281), inhibiting local responsibility,
innovation and civic action (Cameron 2010a, 2010c p.2). The supposed huge growth of the state and its apparent accompanying ideology of centralisation, managerialism and intervention required correction to that ideology which provided a convenient, if not wholly accurate, foundation to launch the Big Society (Norman 2010 p.25). The devolution of power was “long present in political debate, but tentatively and in opposition rather than government” (Jenkins 2007 p.309). The danger for the Big Society, as with any new political initiative, was being dismissed as electoral expediency. It has been described as “communitarian thinking in disguise”, as opposed to having any philosophical depth and coherence (Norman 2010 p.182). It is supposedly pragmatic and non-ideological, exhibiting “instinct and judgment” rather than a ‘one size fits all’ application of political doctrine (Norman 2010 p.193). The difficulty in labelling it left or right demonstrated its flexibility and innovation, where fixed ideologies can be restrictive. In this respect the Big Society is a fact of the new conservatism which sought to unify disparate threads within the centre-right.

The Big Society will feature later in the research and has been associated with police reform in terms of both the use of volunteers (including the Special Constabulary), the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners and continuing engagement through neighbourhood policing. The use of volunteers and Specials represents VFM and also involves the community in policing activity. Neighbourhood policing will continue to engage local communities and partner agencies in resolving crime and disorder issues. The new Police and Crime Commissioners will interpret and apply value “reporting to the public on performance, monitoring use of resources and purchasing goods and services, and use of collaboration in regional services” (Home Office 2010 pp.13 -14). They will replace Police Authorities, which were argued to have become “remote and invisible, without the capability and the mandate to insist on the priorities of local people” (Home Office 2010 p.2). As will be examined later, the Big Society forms a significant area of this research as its reception and inclusion in the Coalition police reform agenda impacts upon police occupational culture.

We turn now to how VFM will secure performance despite the economic circumstances.
The economic circumstances and deficit reduction meant that the Coalition approach to public sector management is defined by an intense scrutiny on VFM. The approach to the police service was outlined in Policing the Twenty-First Century (Home Office 2010). The critiques of previous performance management and big government were listed as centralising policing and increasing bureaucracy, withdrawing from local concerns and issues and reducing professional autonomy (Home Office 2010 pp.2 – 6). The impact of this was argued to be the reduction of local responsiveness through inhibiting the local context in favour of centrally determined performance frameworks. Such criticisms were reflected in the literature on public sector management and NPM with the systematising of tasks and definition of outputs having a significant and (in this context) negative impact on policing (Laughlin 1991 pp.37-42; Reiner 2000 pp.91-93; Carlisle and Loveday 2007 p.24; Bevan and Head 2006 p.521). This has been argued to negate other reforms (McLaughlin 2008 p.274; Parkinson and Marsh 2000 pp.25-26).

Emphasis upon efficiency and VFM has found a renewed vigour in light of the prevailing economic circumstances, although it has been a constant concern for governments. The inputs to the public sector and resulting outputs in performance are key indicators impacting upon government reputation and potentially electability. Concern over public sector expenditure and effectiveness has focused debate and generated critical examination proportionate to a public sector deficit that has only been matched once before in wartime. The prediction of two whole parliaments of fiscal austerity (Lambert 2009 p.2) added to the impetus for the Coalition. In addition to increased financial pressure, continued expectations demand balancing budgets whilst sustaining delivery; the historical precedent from the last recession was a decade of cutbacks but this does not diminish expectations regarding service.

Successive managerialist reforms have continued the themes of VFM with an emphasis on cash savings increasing as economic circumstances worsened. The white paper ‘Protecting the public: supporting the police to succeed’ identified savings of 100 million by 2010 / 2011, with further VFM savings from 4/2011 equating to 545 million by 2014 (Home Office 2009). Business processes that have the capability to increase efficiency and effectiveness were encouraged, VFM results are to be published in local
policing plans and form the basis for performance management. Police ‘report cards’ and VFM profiles perform the function of a diagnostic tool with 40 separate data sets, indicators for net revenue expenditure per head (NPIA 2010). This push for productivity was aimed at sustainable improvements in the development and deployment of the police workforce across its wide mission. Focusing on productivity was linked to improving confidence by enhancing visibility of resources, especially as the latter accounts for over eighty percent of policing budgets (NPIA 2010; Home Office 2008).

Value for Money from the Coalition government built upon previous reforms by intensifying further the scrutiny upon spending to outcomes as opposed to inputs and officer / staff numbers, with an emphasis upon front line policing. Police Commissioners, reporting to the public on performance, monitoring use of resources and purchasing goods and services and use of collaboration in regional services, will drive VFM (Home Office 2010 pp.13 -14) whilst HMIC will inspect through VFM profiles and comparative information on costs and outcomes (Home Office 2010 p.17). Value included an increased emphasis on what officers and staff are doing, not numbers alone (p.23), and in common with CCT and BV how the private sector can deliver VFM through outsourcing back office services and other functions (p.28). Amid poor economic performance, the Coalitions governments Value for Money reforms continued and expanded on an austerity narrative linking value, defined as local responsiveness and public availability, to defined outcomes and emphasising the need to render more accountable the outcome.

Current policing structures and practices are often seen as outdated. Such arguments often focus upon the structure of the forces which has remained unchanged since 1974, determined more by history than local need (Lambert 2009 p.3). This is argued to inhibit more efficient funding arrangements, especially where an apparent consensus points to structural changes being the only way to achieve the appropriate level of cost savings (Gilbertson 2009 p.21). Working practices have likewise been identified as a barrier to necessary reform: a workforce model for police officers that has remained largely the same for one hundred and eighty years (Fahy 2009 p.23); a hierarchical structure where line managers have an average of half the reports they would in the private sector and public perception of overtime and gold-plated pensions
(Lambert 2009 p.6). The agenda has been set for radical reform in areas attempted previously without success. The extent to which pay and conditions and assessment of the wider reform agenda is influenced by police occupational culture will be considered later.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

In relation to performance the Coalition government defined a distinct approach from the previous Labour government by reversing the Policing Pledge (Home Office 2008), a set of commitments for the police service nationally to be judged by incorporating public confidence. This was deemed spendthrift and also part of an identified issue with supposed central government inhabiting a gap where local accountability should be determined. The Coalition Home Secretary’s statement that the main role of the police was to cut crime, and the potential to define performance, signals a potential departure that will be explored further in the research. Commitment to neighbourhood policing was acknowledged by the Coalition government as going some way towards engaging with local communities, and continues to feature in Coalition plans for police reform (along with the Big Society), being a source of continuity in the reform agenda for officers (see Home Office 2010).

One clear division between New Labour and Coalition policy was the approach to force restructuring and amalgamation, which will be considered later in the research in terms of occupational views. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 2005 report ‘Closing the Gap’ (HMIC 2005) assessed the structure of 43 police forces in England and Wales and recommended amalgamation into 12-15 ‘strategic forces’. Stating that the current structure was no longer fit for purpose, forces with less than four thousand officers were argued to be ineffective in providing protective services (serious crime, terrorism, public order and critical incident management). Driven by high profile failures to protect the public (such as Soham and the resulting Bichard Inquiry, 2004), recommendations to focus upon national risk-management and issues transcending local policing have impacted significantly on reform proposals (Loveday 2005b p.280). Whilst the political will to restructure along the lines of Closing the Gap may have abated (Savage 2007 p.164), the drivers have not diminished any. Nationalisation of
policing through agencies and policy frameworks seeks to move accountability to a centre-strategic level with enhanced regulatory governance (Home Office 2007), impacting upon and generating tension between nationalisation and localisation. In terms of Coalition reform this has led to work to balance the new localism with central guidance and doctrine.

In terms of policing structure however, a clear line has been drawn between the approach of the Labour administration and that of the Coalition. Whilst the motivations and rationale for that may be in part political, financial or linked to reforms designed to increase local democratic accountability, the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners will make further progress here problematic. Collaboration and voluntary mergers, where financial savings can be identified, instead pragmatically replace visions of larger strategic forces. The extent to which this could be said to be ideological reform in terms of the Big Society and Commissioners replacing previous commitment to strategic forces is covered later as is the views of officers and influence of police occupational culture.

The Coalition represented a new political configuration which as outlined demonstrates consistency in terms of its ideological approach. The Coalition approach to public sector management and police reform can be summarised as an intense VFM agenda. This is linked to the perceived superiority of private sector techniques driven by economic circumstances and budgetary / deficit reduction plans. The Big Society agenda sought to empower localism, increase the use of voluntary support and, through Commissioners, gain better representation of local issues, as well as provide scrutiny and oversight of VFM in forces. Whilst force amalgamations and the policing pledge had been discontinued, the commitment and direction of Policing in the Twenty First Century to modernisation is clear.
1.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has outlined ideology as a concept, some of the key debates in the field, political ideology and the influence that the New Right and NPM has had. The period of the research 1979 – 2012 has been outlined with the approaches of the Thatcher, Major, New Labour and Coalition governments, arguing that there has been continuity on governmental approaches in terms of utilising ideological prescriptions for improving efficiency and effectiveness.

The impact upon the police service, thought initially belated due to the other drivers present in the early Thatcher years requiring a strong service, has seen an increasingly intense application of reforming narratives and proposals which have incrementally sought to remodel the service. The direction of this has been at times accelerated in proposals, although change to the service has been slower institutionally. Radical changes have been made in terms of Commissioners, civilianisation and oversight and scrutiny, and the service has modernised to an extent in numerous areas. The Coalition agenda stated a clear intent to continue to modernise, with a clear leaning towards private sector techniques and philosophies (Home Office 2010).

Appendix A for ease of reference chronologically lists the reforms considered and links them to the government reform agendas and ideological basis. Whilst a necessarily superficial and selective account of police reform, the direction and influence of successive administrations is signposted. The next chapter discusses police occupational culture, and will cover resistance and unionism in greater detail.
CHAPTER 2
POLICE CULTURE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses upon police occupational culture, introducing the main themes, debates and features of what is argued to comprise police culture. It adopts a broadly chronological approach considering how the police culture literature has developed and the key debates. Discussion of the early literature considers the development of police occupational culture as a concept worthy of research. The increasing diversity and variation identified within concepts of police occupational culture (or cultures / sub-cultures) is then considered. Later period debates and directions discuss the validity of earlier research, highlighting key debates and linking them to this research. The final section discusses reform and police culture and is split into three subsections, introducing key research which will be developed and used throughout the thesis.

2.1 POLICE CULTURE RESEARCH

The literature on police culture is expansive and this section does not provide a summary of all areas. Occupational culture has significance, as resistance to change can cause unintended consequences and frustrate reform, with cop culture a significant factor (Reiner 2010 p.115). Police culture has been described as the biggest obstacle to change (Crank 1998 p.6), reflecting the potential for the behaviour of those closest to the public to impact on reform agendas. Police culture research is therefore a key factor in assessing the relationship between ideology, reform and change, and attempts to change occupational culture. The approach taken to discussing the literature on police culture commences with definitions, early attempts to document the context of police institutions, working rules and typologies. This develops into key debates in the literature. We start by noting the approach to defining police culture in early ‘classic’ research.
2.1.1 EARLY CLASSIC RESEARCH

Varied definitions of police occupational culture have been suggested, dependent upon the research and theoretical perspectives involved in studying the phenomenon. Complexities in organisational cultures are exacerbated through the elusiveness of the police role and perception of law enforcement (see Westley 1970 pp.3 - 7), as well as socio-economic factors (Reiner 2010 p.138). Police occupational culture has been described as a sharing of beliefs and consensus of values in the context of an organisation, operating at a number of differing levels. These are “not synonymous with a particular groups culture but as manifestations of it”, representing the variables through which we try and identify such culture (Cockroft 2013 p.5). This reinforces the need to distinguish between culture at a conceptual level and the resulting behaviours and actions influenced through it, as culture operates at varying levels and differentiating between them is crucial. There are the physical expressions of culture and the “deeply embedded, unconscious, basic assumptions” that represent cultures abstracted form (Schein 2004 p.25). Schein’s definition of organisational culture is often referenced in the police culture literature (see Cockroft 2013 p.5). It is argued to be particularly valid to policing (Chan 1997 p.68). Culture is:

A pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration – that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel... (Schein 1985 p.9).

Loftus (2009 pp. 3 – 20) discusses the orthodox conceptions of police culture and how they are considered as almost “classic clichés” (p.8), in the context of new ways of thinking about the concept, which will be considered later. Crank (1998 p.23) utilises a “construction metaphor” to build an understanding of culture through themes, emphasising institutional factors that lead to a shared cultural experience. These operate through the expectations of the principal “audiences” of the police and occupational organisation of police units (pp. 27 – 38). We discuss now the initial identification of a supposed police cultural identity. This focuses upon the debates that arose within the
literature concerning police culture, which have sought to understand the operation and existence of such assumptions and beliefs.

Three broad periods have been noted in describing the development of the concept of police culture (see Westmarland 2008). Early / classic research focused on the sociological dimensions of police work, discretion, factors distinct to the cognitive and behavioural responses of officers, and impact of different environments on methods and styles of policing (such as Skolnick 1966; Westley 1970; Cain 1973). The importance of police culture became apparent through early observational studies, which sought to interpret how the police saw their role and how this may impact upon the way they work (for example Banton 1964; Rubinstein 1973; Van Maanen 1973, 1974). Seen as a key element in explaining behaviour, early research addressed culture as a probable key determinant in the application of discretion in direct contact with the public, particularly in the role of uniformed officers at street level (Wilson 1968).

Key themes were identified as a result. Public encounters were found to be with those aspects of society that are policed as opposed to those the police protect, leading to the perception of a heightened sense of hostility (Westley 1970). A hostile public, secrecy and isolation thereby generate solidarity which influences the occupational culture (Westley 1970 pp.92 - 108), although this argument has been critiqued for insufficiently accounting for police-public relations that are not hostile (Holdaway 1989 p.70). The secrecy that, for Westley, was generated through public hostility was furthermore in Rubinstein’s research equally prevalent between cops; in order to protect their own work, avoid conflict, issues and being implicated in illegal activities (Rubinstein 1973). Practical jokes and banter was argued to be used in order to relieve tension caused through secrecy, often based upon ethnicity, race, and sexualised behaviour.

Some commentators argue that the police occupational culture creates the working rules officers abide by, thereby maintaining the interaction style and methods of the dominant group (Wootten and Brown 2000 p.6; Tajel and Turner 2001). This further reinforces and preserves culture through operating as a “protective armour” (Reiner 2000 p.92), a defence against external adversaries (Goldsmith 1990 p.313), which develops further a sense of solidarity often increased through a perceived lack of
managerial, court and political support (Chan 2007 p.147). The prevailing culture is held to persist through its “elective affinity . . . its psychological fit, with the demands of rank and file cop condition” (Reiner 2000 p.87). Broad cultural adaptations exist to allow officers to cope with unknown situations and danger (Crank 1998 pp.91 – 94). These are often expressed in the context of use of force and danger, with potential implications for these processes in how officers would appraise change and reform agendas. This will be examined in later sections.

Underlying tensions of the police role are symbolised with danger, conflict and antagonism with out-groups producing solidarity (Van Maanen 1973). The organisational culture and requirements of officers are “loosely coupled”, so that officers’ activities can become severed from organisational goals, engendering strength in the face of reform and cultural backlashes to change (Crank 1998 pp.8-9). Real police work “is out there” (Manning 1978 p.77), with individualism competing with mass bureaucracy (Crank 1998 p.233). These are recognised themes that have an impact on reform agendas, as occupational culture resists change.

The examination of cognitive and behavioural similarities in officers formed the focus of much early research. Skolnick’s examination of the police working personality (Skolnick 1966), argues for socialised traits displayed by officers that go on to comprise the occupational culture. This notion of a working personality, whilst accepting that not all officers conform exactly to such a model, highlights distinct cognitive processes that occur in policing and form a powerful and significant part of the occupational experience. These, Skolnick argues, consist of danger and authority with the constant pressure to be efficient, which contributes to social isolation and solidarity as a result (Skolnick 1966 pp. 42 - 44). The importance of efficiency, framed by Skolnick in terms of making arrests and maintaining order, is a theme developed in later research (see Reiner 2010 p.119). The pressure to get results and how the working personality and occupational culture interprets such issues and impacts on officers will be considered later.

The ability of culture to guide officers in directions not formally proscribed, to work around policy and legal frameworks, has profound implications for policing. Research identified from an early stage how the law grants discretion in addition to
officers extending beyond such legal powers to achieve the outcome they desire (Skolnick 1966 p.90). The discretion granted by law itself (or ‘delegated’ in Skolnick’s terms 1966 p.90) involves huge implications for those impacted by it, prior to considering officers extending beyond policy and procedures. This is coupled with the fact that the hierarchical police organisation situates discretion operationally with the lowest ranks (Wilson 1968 p.7; Fielding 1988 p.120). This factor has been significant in making the occupational culture of interest to earlier researchers, exploring a range of civil-libertarian concerns such as malpractice and crime-control (see Reiner 2010 p.116).

Research demonstrates that the “way things are done” forms a powerful cultural influence on new recruits (Schein 1996 p.20), with almost rule-like expectations of officers (Goldsmith 1990), argued to require individuals to conform to and join strong cultures (Fielding 1988 p.2). The “blue curtain” secrecies associated with police culture is argued to be a product of such that resists influence to change (Crank 1998 p.56). Fielding (1988) suggests that the combination of formal and informal cultural processes commence from recruit training, where individuals experience and construct their own conception of the realities of policing. Culture is conceptualised as a resource available to individuals, with an active role in engaging with it or otherwise, with some groups having a reduced access to it (Fielding 1988 p.54). Further research argues that the occupational culture and role are not necessarily linked, with groups such as female and ethnic minority officers succeeding in one area not necessarily dictating success or inclusion in the other (Heidensohn 1992 p.84). The influence of the pressures that form the police occupational culture are such that female and ethnic minority officers and staff may not be able to impact on the prevailing culture and have full access to it as other officers can. This is an area of occupational culture that has attracted much attention and even has its own colloquial title of ‘canteen culture’.

Canteen culture has been defined as the expression of prejudice and discrimination within the organisation, one that has been linked to a cult of masculinity that drives behaviour (Smith and Gray 1983 p.372). The canteen culture is argued to place a high value upon conflict, competition, misogynistic and patriarchal attitudes and exclusionary approaches to out-groups with fierce loyalty to in-groups. These are more likely to be exhibited by young male officers and the extent to which such attitudes are
shared is argued to vary as individuals progress within the organisation (see Fielding 1994 pp.47 - 52). Canteen culture is probably most associated with racist and sexist behaviour and stereotyping, and the process by which some members of the police service are not accepted into the occupational culture fully. Ethnic minority and female officers are expected to tolerate discriminatory behaviour if they are to be accepted into the occupational culture themselves, risking isolation if they do not (Holdaway and Barron 1997 p.139). Whilst research in terms of race and culture is discussed later, one of the key debates of relevance is the distinction, or otherwise, between attitude and behaviour.

One approach argues that culture is not sufficiently analysed as discourse alone, and hence police culture is a crucial indicator of police activity (Holdaway and Barron 1997 pp.75 – 77; Reiner 2010 p.115). Police culture has also been argued to fail to account for a greater dichotomy between attitude and behaviour (Waddington 1999a), and capture the distinction between occupational culture and everyday cultural influences. Waddington argues for the potential for an oral and occupational culture to account for canteen culture, inferring a three way relationship between culture, behaviour and language. This, together with other possible explanations for canteen culture (such as tension release or ‘banter’), suggests that the link between canteen culture and cop culture / action may be a much more “complex and context driven relationship” (Bowling and Foster 2002 p.1010).

Questioning the importance of occupational culture in racial prejudice and discrimination has itself been critiqued for failing to sufficiently account for the need to understand how officers “construct and present their interpretations . . . and act on that foundation” (Holdaway and O’Neill 2006a p.497; O’Neill 2005 p.197). To understand the resilience of ingrained characteristics it is useful to examine the broader context that shapes the culture (Loftus 2010 p.16), including accounting for the role of internal conflict (Reuss-Ianni 1983 pp.121 - 126), presentational strategies adopted by senior management and discourses of police leadership (Adlam 2002). The implications for reform of these cited factors and features of police culture and organisations are profound. As will be expanded upon in this research, the reception and articulation of reform agendas is influenced significantly by these organisational divisions and relationships, and how they respond to reform agendas.
Typologies assist understanding of these cultural behaviours. These aim to clarify observed behaviour, develop hypotheses to explain them and predict how other occurrences might appear (Cockroft 2013 p.7). Westley (1970 p.76) discusses the process by which police typologies of the public are communicated and perpetuated in order to give meaning and control to the world. He outlines how shared stories and experiences abstract intolerance, and that this abstraction of the supposed public the police deal with becomes the lens through which reality is interpreted. The level of abstraction increases as more and more stories add to the supposed weight of evidence concerning the public, in turn fuelling solidarity and understanding between officers, informing those less experienced. Reiner (2010 pp.133 - 134) notes that the majority of earlier research into typologies of police constables (at which level the majority of research is focused in this area) produces four similar categories of ‘peace-keepers’, ‘law-enforcers’, ‘alienated cynics’ and ‘managerial professionals’ (Reiner 2010 p.133). Peace keepers emphasise the preservation and maintenance of social order through the service aspects of policing, preferring discretion over blanket application of the law. Law-enforcers emphasise crime-fighting over the service aspects, preferring catching criminals as real policing. Alienated cynics comprise those disillusioned with policing and coasting, whilst managerial-professionals are aiming to progress and exhibit the language and approach of those further up the hierarchy. In the case of senior managers this includes accommodating managerialist and businesslike pressures (see Reiner 2010 p.134; Savage 2007 pp.88 - 91). The police culture literature also identifies some weaknesses with such typologies and sub-cultural approaches, where they arguably fail to capture some of the diversity and occupational experiences of officers.

One such area consists of female officers who, research indicates, often make significant adaptations to their identity and professional life to conform and fit in as both an officer and woman (Martin 1979). O’Neill (2005 p.195) argues that it is more productive to see the occupational culture as being different for women and ethnic minorities. This emphasises the importance of not viewing occupational culture as monolithic for officers, and acknowledging the varied experience of officers within the organisation and also not assuming full and equal access to the occupational cultural experience for all. This allows for theories of occupational culture that can explain the divergence in approach of officers through accepting the diversity present whilst, as this research intends to do, highlighting the cultural pressures present in assessing and
discussing change and reform. Heidensohn (1992 p.118) argues for several themes that aid understanding of the occupational experience of female officers. Bearing similarities to themes offered elsewhere, the focus and context is different. For example, the sense of mission referred to elsewhere (Reiner 2010 pp.119 - 121) was found to emphasise to a greater extent gaining acceptance and fulfilling careers in previously male dominated roles and ranks where female officers are under-represented. In this latter sense the sense of mission varies from the wider culture.

Just as typologies are a useful way of attempting to understand how police officers make sense of their world, they are also instructive in terms of how officers conceptualise the public they police. This approach has been argued to be more instructive than the analysis of working rules, in that typologies are better able to explain how behaviour changes with the flexibility required in policing, an area in which rules are weaker (Holdaway 1989 p.69). Provided the danger of stereotyping police activity is avoided through over-applying typologies, it is argued to bear more validity than other approaches (Fielding 1989; Holdaway 1989). Commencing at a general level, the police are argued to view the public as threatening, misguided and potentially violent and dangerous (Westley 1970 p.145; Manning 1997 p.203). In relation to the criminal fraternity, a division between villains and good villains conceptualises the former as less co-operative and the latter more so, admitting and clearing-up their crimes (Manning 1997 p.203). The recognition within the literature is that the police cultural view of sections of society extends beyond these relatively simplistic categories, with potential implications for police-public interaction. Smith and Gray (1983 p.350) identified the term “rubbish” to denote police-public interactions that will not result in valued outcomes (e.g. no arrest or sanction). Loftus (2009 pp.165 - 168) identifies and extends such sentiment to a wider “underclass” of white working class that the police perceive as “rubbish”. They are seen to be “police property” (see Reiner 2010 p.124), seen by the normal majority as left to the police to manage. Numerous further conceptual categories are suggested which fall beyond the scope of this discussion.

We now move on to discuss the increasing recognition of cultural variation in the literature.
2.1.2 MIDDLE PERIOD AND VARIATION

The middle period in literature on police culture (see Westmarland 2008) has been summarised as the move from emphasising core similarities to an analytical concept acknowledging variation. The impact of managerialism began to be noted and key distinctions such as the gap between management and street cops considered (Reuss-Ianni 1983). These are key features attributed to organisational and occupational culture which will be developed further in this thesis. The impact of managerialism to the police service is of interest from the perspective of how the police culture literature has noted and considered such influences. The middle period literature on police culture increasingly identified multiple ways of defining and considering the concept of culture. The identification of a sense of mission, action, cynicism and pessimism (Reiner 1978) is argued to provide a framework which builds and expands upon the potential for the police occupational culture to reflect the distribution of power within society and take more account of political and sociological influences.

The sense of mission relates to the vocational nature of policing as supposedly common to those in the service, the sense of a higher purpose occupationally and in preserving the moral fabric of society (Reiner 2010 p.120). How the policing mission is defined and shared culturally is of significance to how reform agendas may be appraised and received, and resisted, as will be developed later. An orientation to action reflects the active policing of foot and car chases, use of physical force, and ‘nicking’ criminals. This is often valued above other styles of policing and methods of resolving conflict. The cynicism and pessimism Reiner argues for bares similarities to reasons offered in earlier research, a learned helplessness to resolve societal issues and belief that the police are barely able to prevent a complete breakdown in law and order (Holdaway 1989 p.65). Cynicism forms a recurrent theme as an identified cultural sentiment common amongst police organisations (Crank 1998 p.272). The occupational culture forms a prism through which officers conceptions of their role, beliefs and assumptions are influenced by a sense of mission, action, cynicism, pessimism and finally pragmatism. Upon Reiner’s analysis (2010 p.121) these inform and contribute to each other despite appearing contradictory. Occupational culture is argued to form a lens through which policing activity is interpreted and understood (Manning 1979). The
Pragmatism constitutes the desire to reach the desired result with a minimum of trouble and bureaucracy, with high value placed upon pragmatic solutions to policing issues (Reiner 2010 pp.131 - 132).

A further distinction which emerged is between that of organisational and occupational cultures (sometimes referred to as subcultures), which often occurs in the police culture literature (for example Barton 2003). The difference centres upon the recognition that not all members of an organisation display and conform to a single culture (Paoline 2003). This has implications for how reform is assessed, how subcultures may interact and what this means for successful change. In this research the perceived differences between public and private sector organisations, and the supposed efficiency and effectiveness of each (Cockroft and Beattie 2009), is one factor that has arguably led to an occupational cultural impact (see Parker and Bradley 2000). The subcultures debate is often introduced with reference to Reiner’s recognition that police occupational culture is not monolithic (Reiner 2010 p.116). In terms of particular cultures in policing, such as management and street cops, the varying approaches to reform and change will be developed further.

One aspect of the broader context concerns the police role and mandate with its heavily symbolic nature (see Manning 1997). Dramaturgic devices such as symbolism and metaphor are used to manage the gap between expectations of the police to control crime and what they can realistically achieve. Public expectations demand the police control crime, a conception driven by popular media, the police themselves and recent government policy, despite historical and sociological evidence to the contrary (Reiner 2010 p.109 - 111). The gap between what the police can do and what they say they can do is bridged through presenting the service as the authority on controlling crime and disorder. Numerous implications follow organisationally such as the pressure to define and deliver performance in recorded crime. Whilst the dramaturgical impact upon subcultures within the police may be significant, the true extent to which symbolism is an indicator of police power is contested. Not all groups in society would see the police as equally symbolic, least so some of the police property aforementioned, who equally may find that the operational impact of police activity extends far beyond the symbolic (Holdaway 1983 pp.90 - 93).
The crime-fighting and service orientated aspects of the police role, reflected in typologies, occupy the majority of police activity. However, the value placed upon crime-fighting has often been argued to be significantly greater than that of peace-keeping and service orientated roles. The core role of the police in fighting crime is often assumed as an uncontested basis for debate from both civil liberties and law enforcement perspectives (Reiner 2010 p.141). Whilst the public tend to conceive of the police as helpers, the police themselves are more likely to define their effectiveness through their ability to fight crime (see Fielding 1988 p.125). The value of ‘real’ police work, which emphasises action and use of force, is argued to be reinforced through cultural codes that define and structure experiences. The official police hierarchy is subverted, with formal rank relegated in value below that of the front line officer performing real police work (O’Neill 2005 p.180). Similarly, real police are those that perform the core policing role, with management seen as distant and social service orientated roles seen as detracting from the influence of real police officers and real policing (see O’Neill 2005 pp.180 – 181). This theme will be considered later in relation to aspects of reform.

2.1.3 LATE PERIOD DEBATES AND DIRECTIONS

The late period of research (see Westmarland 2008) has been summarised as focusing upon the weaknesses of police culture as a linear and deterministic concept (see Chan 1997). A notable change of emphasis to a progressive and more complex social understanding of police culture distinguishes this period. This has been described as the process of the “appreciable universality breaking down further into aspects of occupational outlook” (Nickels and Verma 2007 p.205). The argument has also been made that police culture research has placed too much emphasis upon heavyweight elements of police work such as use of force, coercion, danger and corruption, all of which may be “too unwieldy to mete out the subtlety of police culture” (Crank 1998 p.14). The need for alternative theoretical frameworks to understand police occupational culture and the possibility of change as well as resistance was highlighted. Theories of police culture should “account for the existence of multiple cultures, recognise the
interpretative and creative aspects of culture, situate cultural practice in the political context of policing and provide a theory of change” (Chan 1997 p.67).

Earlier research was critiqued for failing to sufficiently account for the political dimensions and influences which can perpetuate in policing (Reiner 2010 p.117). Critiques argue there is a failure to acknowledge fully the social and situational pressures that can shape police practice (see Mastrofski 2004). Other more recent research, however, argues that the classic accounts of police culture still hold some relevance in describing the occupational identity, as the basic formative policing pressures have not changed (Loftus 2010 p.2). The underlying world view of officers is asserted to display continuity with older patterns, and continue to exert considerable influence over day to day police work (Loftus 2010 p.3). Officers share “a set of assumptions, beliefs and practices which transcend contrasting terrains” which are “substantially similar to the cultural traits identified almost half a century ago by earlier police research” (Loftus 2010 p.15). This questions the extent to which significant change to the police occupational characteristics, as observed by earlier scholars, has occurred (Loftus 2009 p.187).

The debate concerning occupational culture and racism has likewise progressed to consider the importance of the institutional memory of racism, and how racial categorisations central to culture may lead to routine discriminatory policing (Holdaway and O’Neill 2006b pp.346 – 369). The role of managerialism in impacting upon reform and culture, a theme that will be developed further later, appears in research into the new articulation of race that occurred through the emergence of Black Police Associations (BPAs) (see Holdaway and O’Neill 2004 p.854). Similarly to the supposed distinction between rank and file and senior officers, the latter were found to have “deployed a rather different schema, of relevance to managerial performance, to policy outcomes, the instrumental role of race policies” (Holdaway and O’Neill 2007b p.412). They did so in dealing with the influence of covert racism in a way found to differ from conceptions of BPA officials, highlighting the importance of context in assessing cultural influence within groups within the service. Whilst race has become an agenda for senior officers, the role of occupational culture in defeating race relations training (O’Neill and Holdaway 2007 p.485) and the reliance on lower ranked supervisors (mostly Inspectors and Sergeants) to relate them to practice on the streets and in the
station is significant (Holdaway and O’Neill 2007a p.92). In relation to the wider debates in the literature, research of BPAs suggests it is more accurate to conceptualise police occupational culture as being “attuned” by the social and cultural perspectives of these groups (O’Neill 2005 p.196).

The extent to which culture drives behaviour is linked to the debate concerning differences between cultures within policing. Reiner (2010) draws upon the pervasive elements of classical research into police culture whilst allowing for diversity in and between settings, an approach supported by other research (Loftus 2009). From a similar perspective further research supports the argument that sufficient room exists for individuals to resist or accommodate the prevailing culture, which varies according to the institutional and departmental context, potentially down to the individual shift or team officers work within. Officers have “an interpretative and active role . . . in their understanding of the organisation and its environment” (Chan 1997 p.112). This suggests that culture is nuanced and comprised of agents that have a role in defining it as well as being shaped by it. This allows for the possibility that cultural variations are a product of the response of those that comprise the relevant groups, with a degree of shaping of the group culture achieved through the interpretation of the prevailing context by the group themselves.

Officers are argued to interpret, act and interact in “networks or relations structured by processes and institutions – shifts, neighbourhoods, police areas . . . in subcultures within broader cultures, associated with specific structural positions” (Reiner 2010 p.116). This has led to the argument that it may be more accurate to discuss a rank and file police ideology rather than a police culture (McLaughlin 2007 pp.56 – 57). This is a view which is, to a degree, consistent with the majority of earlier definitions of police culture, documenting elements of incorporating adjustment to external pressures and tensions (Reiner 2000 p.87). The way in which external pressures and tensions are identified and conceptualised may be a more embedded and powerful process, with implications for reform and possibility of change, a view not supported by those who argue the occupational culture is more a resource than ideology (Fielding 1988 p.204). This debate is significant for the way in which officers structure their understanding of the organisation and environment and modify it themselves (see Chan 1997), and how they see their social world and role in it (Reiner 2000 p.85). It supports
research identifying the significance of values and attitudes in generating beliefs and assumptions (Wilson, Ashton and Sharp 2001 p.133). This is consistent with recent research on police culture asserting the “embeddedness of police culture in the deep structure of policing” (Loftus 2010 p.137).

The true extent of external influences upon the police occupational culture has been argued to be worthy of consideration to ensure its supposed features and characteristics are not over-exaggerated (Holdaway 1989 p.71). Key debates around canteen culture, sexism and racism, and the extent to which occupational culture generates such behaviour, would be influenced by such. The role of occupational culture in an organisation like the police has been argued to be significant in terms of how it enables officers to construct the world they then operate in, a process that extends beyond reacting to the environment to creating it. Research in police culture therefore needs to take account of the extent to which it has the potential to shape perceptions of reform (in the context of this research), as well as react to reform proposals. Key debates of significance to this research are outlined next, the street – management divide, conservatism and role of occupational culture in reform.

2.2 REFORM AND POLICE CULTURE

Some of the characteristics of police culture identified and considered above, particularly the reported dichotomy between management and street level activity, would suggest that police reform processes could be one area which generates the contested aspects of cultural response (Wilson, Ashton and Sharp 2001 p.133). Changes to current practices, especially those that are aimed at significantly altering the status and operation at street level, challenge the prevailing police culture. A consistent theme in police reform is the recognition that failing to account for cultural impact upon reform programmes yields profound limitations to bring about real and enduring change (Crank 1998 p.5; Barton 2003). This section will discuss features of police culture relevant to the research in terms of conservatism, resistance and the street-management distinction.
2.2.1 CONSERVATISM, NPM AND CHANGE

Conservatism is a theme documented in police culture (Manning 1997 p.20; Skolnick 1994; Crank 1998). Research highlights how police recruits have a tendency towards being politically, morally and socially conservative, with officers generally showing reluctance to change and a preference for the existing ways of doing things (Bowling and Foster 2002 p.1012). Recruits attracted to the police as a hierarchical, rule-bound organisation are more likely to be a success if they share a conservative viewpoint (Reiner 2010 p.126). Political orientations likewise suggest officers tend to be conservative both politically and morally (Reiner 2010 p.126), although this is based upon American officers (Skolnick 1966 p.61) acknowledging little evidence concerning British police (Reiner 2010 p.127). The recent history of police deployments in the UK to control the activities of “the Left” and organised labour has been cited as a reason for police conservatism (Reiner 2010 p.126). Despite a supposed affinity between upholders of the law and conservative politics and morality, sentiment shifted during the early and mid-1990s as the Conservative government applied its market-orientated approach to public services (Reiner 2010 pp.127 – 128). Police have also reportedly demonstrated neutrality during such Labour issues (Skidelsky 1975; Cockroft 2013 p.77), suggesting that whether or not the police demographic is conservative politically may not be significant operationally. This would find agreement with earlier research (such as Westley 1970), which argues that the occupational culture is formed principally by the pressures of the job, regardless of the conservatism present in rank and file.

The concept of police culture has been used to explain resistance to reform and modernisation, via the perception that change is a threat which undermines operational autonomy and “real policing” (McLaughlin 2007 p.56; Reiner 2010 p.131). Reform is conceptualised and assessed in relation to it being an opportunity, or otherwise, for the patrolman to perform real police work (Van Maanen 1973). In line with these findings, the dominant culture or subculture will supposedly react to preserve the existing culture in the face of potential reforms perceived to be alien (Tajel and Turner 2001; Collins 2004). As much police reform is top-down, the rank and file are acutely aware of the “new policing realities” and the fact working practices will be subject to change to meet these requirements (Loftus 2010 p.3). Culturally, the role of unionism has been argued
to form the expression of reactions to NPM in reform and a symbolic resistance (O’Malley and Hutchinson 2007 p.164; Marks 2007; Cockroft 2013 p.86). This research will expand upon the extent to which conservatism is an explanatory factor in resistance and introduce other drivers (such as NPM and managerialist ideology) which influence the occupational cultural response. We now discuss existing research which considers the impact of NPM upon the police service and the extent to which cultural factors have been identified as significant.

In terms of management and supervision, research confirms that it is Sergeants who have the greatest influence upon the operating of those on the front line (Rubinstein 1973; Butterfield 2001 pp.329 – 341), although other research suggests the extent of such influence is questionable (Allen and Maxfield 1983 p.82; Crank 1998 pp.32 – 33). Research into top-down reforms consisted of the introduction of performance appraisal and vertical reporting to a police service. The research concluded a resulting failure to influence activity and behaviour at a street level (Metcalfe 2004 pp.71 - 91). The conclusion of Metcalfe’s research suggests that other influences, such as police culture and a negative cultural response to such innovations shaped the reaction of those participating. Butterfield, Edwards and Woodall (2005) researched the impact of NPM reforms and the impact on the police service. The devolution of responsibilities to the role of Sergeants and Inspectors emphasised performance management and flattening of hierarchies. The influence of performance management reforms and structural changes resulted however in increased bureaucratic activities, auditing and monitoring (Butterfield, Edwards and Woodall 2005 pp.336 - 341). Police supervisors and managers were not enabled to become practitioner-managers and withdrew from an operational-supervisory role, failing to lead and enhance further reform. Unintended consequences caused practical issues and, as with Metcalfe, negative and cultural elements to this response emerged.

The relationship between managerialist reform and cultural responses to them suggests officers may be especially resistant to change in a NPM direction, as the “elite narratives” of reform clash with local police cultures (Bevir and Krupicka 2007 pp.153 – 171). The investigation of the attitude of officers towards new initiatives, particularly those drawing inspiration from the private sector, have been argued to reveal a new form of stratification within the police hierarchy (Cockcroft and Beattie 2009 pp.526 –
540). On such analysis, performance culture sits uneasily with police culture and appears at odds with it (Cockcroft and Beattie 2009 p.536). From a reform perspective a central issue is how significantly altering the structure, values and role of the police can engage front line officers and staff who shape policing as they interact with the public (Fielding 1988 p.205). Despite talk of aligning police managerial systems more closely with private sector employment relations practices, policing has supposedly not yet fully harnessed the collective insight, knowledge and commitment of front line officers to be able to take advantage of such reforms (Sklansky and Marks 2008 p.6).

Recent research, which documents the impact of occupational culture, draws upon both classic conceptions and also the potential for change, sub-cultural variety and individual agency (Loftus 2009). Other contexts, such as policing football, have been proven to “shed new light” on the older conceptions of police culture and also “unite some contrasting theories” (O’Neill 2005 p.194). O’Neill’s research highlights the importance of looking beyond police institutions formal structures and boundaries, to explore the universal and “residual ties through the underlying police community”, explaining how officers define their context in relation to “a common pool of attitudes, perceptions, symbolism and history” (O’Neill 2005 p.197).

Police occupational culture is often cited as the biggest obstacle for reform, leading to the assertion that it has been approached in a “one-sided, stereotypical and negative way” (Loyens 2009 p.482). This reflects the aforementioned debate concerning the use of the concept as something negative and inhibiting. Sklansky (2007 p.19) warns of the danger of seeing police culture as a major impediment to reform through asserting its supposed monolithic nature, to the detriment of acknowledging new emerging challenges in policing. This includes the impact of managerialism and ideology, areas arguably overlooked as the majority of research has examined street culture (Sklansky 2007 pp.38 - 40), making the occupational analysis of responses to reform potentially “superficial and reductionistic” (Manning 2007 p.50). Recent research summarises the impact of NPM upon cultural change as unclear, with evidence of “numerous tensions at a practical level when implementing such changes in public sector organisations” (Cockroft 2013 p.97). The importance of occupational culture in reform lies in understanding the fuller context.
It is acknowledged that public sector organisations may be directed not by market forces but political ideologies that push social and economic agendas (Cockroft 2013 p.14). Such political control has led to an “obfuscation” of clear objectives and performance management technologies (Cockroft 2013 p.15). One such view is that the emergence of managerialism, founded upon NPM, has seen reforms applied to the public sector implemented with insufficient knowledge of organisational cultures (Sinclair 1991). The result has been a lack of assimilation between NPM and organisational cultures which directly affects the possibility of success (Parker and Bradley 2000). Whilst some analysis suggests that NPM has led to a more efficient public sector (Domberger and Hall 1996), other research notes increased stress and job dissatisfaction as a negative factor (Bogg and Cooper 1995). Performance management has been argued to conflict with core concepts of police dominant culture: “Symbolic aspects of police work have become more complicated by the interplay between traditional police cultures and cultural changes associated with the import of NPM method and ideologies” (Cockroft 2013 p.142).

Approaches of research, as considered, vary regarding the universality of police culture and capacity of individuals and groups to resist change. One approach, conforming to an arguably ‘monolithic’ view, argues that police culture has “a clearly discernible set of beliefs and assumptions which determines how police will behave” (Wilson, Ashton and Sharp 2001 p.133). Such arguments contrast with research which highlights the potential divergence from a set pattern of beliefs and behaviour; that officers are far more than passive in the process (Chan 1997 pp.69 – 70), and that culture has a positive ability to function (Chan 1996 p.111). The idea that cultural change is fixed without variance and that police have “ideological or cognitive blinders that force them to look at the world from a particular point of view” is contested (Crank 1998 p.5). Early research demonstrated how some factors, such as local politics and administrative orientations, can steer occupational values and actions (Wilson 1968). The remainder of this section will look at research theories and concepts that aim to explain processes of change and how variety within occupational culture is significant.

As summarised earlier, the variation in police culture and subcultures reveals some of the diversity apparent in police organisations. The relationship between groups within the police service becomes of significance in assessing the likely response to
reform, a factor in police culture which has been the focus of numerous research. The next section considers the divide between management and street cops. Leadership is held to play a critical role in meaningful reform (Sherman 1980; Skolnick and Bayley 1986), with successful change requiring the support of the policing hierarchy, otherwise limiting the possibility of transformation at a cultural level (Foster 1989; Chan 1997, 2003; Skolnick and Bailey 1986). Existing research into cultural differences and management / front line officers is now considered.

2.2.2 STREET AND MANAGEMENT COPS

The police culture literature notes variety regarding reform and change, between what has been termed ‘street cops’ and ‘management cops’ (see Reuss-Ianni 1983; Manning 1997). Rank is identified as a key boundary in police culture which may contain multiple cultures (Crank 1998 p.24). The prominent research upon the street-management gap which will be considered further is by Reuss-Ianni (1983). Although American based and pre-dating managerialist reforms, Reuss-Ianni’s central contention is that the organisation of policing is best understood and described in terms of interactions between two distinct cultures (street and management cops). At the time of the research, this expanded upon what is often described more recently in the literature as the recognition that police culture is not monolithic. It also introduced consideration of the social and political forces that Reuss-Ianni argues weaken the occupational culture (1983 p.2). Despite pre-dating the recognition of NPM, the public administration principles employed at the time of her research is identified as significant in terms of change and cultural response. The effects of the two cultures clashing were documented as “alienation... incongruent value systems... and displacement of quasi-familial relationships” (1983 p.4). This has clear implications for this research in terms of reform.

The increasing scrutiny of social and financial accountability saw management cop culture as an “impersonal ideology” different from disaffection in other areas of the public sector. The street cop culture determined day to day practices whilst management ranks were seen as distant administrators (Reuss-Ianni 1983 pp. 2 - 7). The issue of
interaction between the two was not considered by reformers, as the police was seen as analogous to any other hierarchical bureaucratic agency, with little consideration of how the organisation facilitated day to day contacts. Understanding the policing environment and the structure and processes on which it is based are argued to allow for specific recommendations on improving organisational relations and meaningful change (Reuss-Ianni 1983 pp.124 – 126). The structure suggested will be outlined and developed in this research to update and provide a UK context, and expand the acknowledged lesser focus upon management cops in the original research (Reuss-Ianni 1983 p.3).

A differing perspective on working rules is offered by Reuss-Ianni. Rather than rules, a cultural code defines interaction with colleagues and superior officers, a process of rule making and rule breaking, the components of which provide indicators of the social organisation (Reuss-Ianni 1983 p.12). These processes “mould and channel behaviour . . . in the form of behavioural expectations and conventions which sets the limits” and consist of socialisation (learning the ropes), authority-power (command structures), peer-group (all peer groups and their influence) and the cross-group structure (supervisors, managers, other areas, departments and headquarters) (Reuss-Ianni 1983 pp.7 – 13). The cultural code in these areas is comprised of maxims which have the capability to guide police action, but are used depending upon the context. Hence the ability of culture to vary is explained through the institutional context, a theme that will be returned to later.

The strategic context includes greater political factors and influences, media and community relations concerns. Front line officers require controlling to deliver the appropriate objectives, the significance of the high levels of discretion not being lost on management. Front line officers however value morale, discretion, solidarity and interpret management as potentially acting against these due to their wider interests. The two sub-cultures do not share a common context for interpretation or action:

There is the quality of a game in the present relationship between street cop culture and management cop culture. The headquarters managers can mandate Management by Objectives or any planning model but they cannot make street cop / workers treat the new program seriously or honestly. The street cops, on the other hand, can and do fight back with the traditional weapons of alienated employees – foot
dragging, sabotage and stealing company time . . . whilst most of them know they cannot possibly win the game, they still want to win some small victory on the way down. (Reuss-Ianni 1983 pp.119 – 120).

The two cultures are held to oppose each other through the management’s administrative processes vs street cops operational pragmatism. The process of change is therefore beset by a structure of mutual opposition and competition for supremacy. The result argued to occur is the “continuous disintegration in communication, morale and effectiveness” (Reuss-Ianni 1983 p.118). Change impacts directly upon the structure of socialisation, authority-power, peer-group and cross-group interaction. One of the cultural features of change was ‘war stories’ vs rational management (“gut vs stats”) and often irreconcilable status of both (Reuss-Ianni 1983 p.18). One of the case studies, the introduction of management by objectives, demonstrated the two perspectives of street and management grounded in the situation of the people describing it. As the attitudes, values and ways of doing things had not changed, new systems and ways of working were assessed as likely to continue to generate negative coping mechanisms (Reuss-Ianni 1983 pp.121 – 123). We now consider wider research that focuses upon this divide.

The comparative distinction between management and street cops is significant to police reform processes as change is historically imposed ‘top-down’, often emphasising the importance of leadership (Barton 2003). Police culture may as identified by Reuss-Ianni be a special case in terms of the importance of understanding the institutional dynamics at play in change. Not only are higher levels of discretion held by lower ranks, but a cultural perception that ‘management’ cops have a diminished authority to influence front line activity and legitimately comment upon it exists. As the police is a vertical reporting hierarchy, with reform often instigated from ACPO / Home Office level downwards, this has significant implications. Studies from other jurisdictions describe “a habitat of cops against bosses” (Crank 1998 p.122) where military organisational style and discretion at the front line “collide”, generating bureaucracy (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993 p.120). Adversarial relationships with management are reported (Wilson 1968; Reuss-Ianni 1983 p.16), where “no one cares until something goes wrong” (Manning 1978 p.79). This also constitutes a significant
source of stress (Crank and Caldero 1991 p.347). Senior officers are supposedly
denigrated through “having forgotten what it’s like” (Mastrofski 2004 p.104).

The supposed difference between management and street cops has been used in
the argument that police strategic thinking and reform proposals are in fact more a
question of discourse. Manning (2007 p.53) notes how situated rhetoric progresses
through the ranks (in community and quality of service categories for example). Adlam
(2002) argues for a gap between the dramaturgical world of senior officers and that of
operational reality. Punch (2009 p.125) poses the question as to what actually happens
behind institutional rhetoric “espousing change and optimistically claiming beneficial
effects”. Reform is viewed as coming from an out-group by rank and file (Miller 2007
p.232; Shiner 2010 p.951). A climate of opinion towards politicians suggests they are
seen to be “remote and unrealistic ivory-tower idealists, corrupt self-seekers, secret
subversives” (Reiner 1978 p.86; 2010 p.125). This requires balancing however with the
argument that police culture research has been applied as a tool for criticism rather than
analysis (Waddington 1999a, 1999b), and that in terms of street-management relations a
focus on the “expressed ideology” of front line officers has promoted “the false idea that
top command [strategic managers] are semi-competent idealists, who have lost touch
with the reality of policing” (Manning 2007 p.51).

Having examined the research and theories relating to the supposed divide
between street and management cops, and implications for reform, we move on to
Chan’s (1997) research into culture and change. The next section introduces her critique
of previous accounts of police culture and alternative framework.

2.2.3 CHAN AND CHANGE

The research into change and police occupational culture by Chan (1996; 1997)
is central to this thesis. This section discusses in greater detail the issues and findings as
elements of the analysis are employed later. The approach Chan adopts to police culture
research is outlined, followed by the analysis put forward to address deficits in
theorising about change and cultural influence. Wider research and issues are then
introduced, with parallels drawn between those and this study, incorporating where relevant the previous discussion of Reuss-Ianni and street / management cops. We start with an overview of the reasons for Chan’s research, which establishes some of the institutional context that will be argued makes her findings particularly relevant.

Chan’s study of institutional reform focuses upon racism in an Australian police force, and the role of police culture in deviance and resistance to change (Chan 1997). A new framework for understanding the structural conditions of police work, police cultural knowledge and police practice is proposed, which is argued to better account for aspects of the organisation that tolerates and even encourages racist attitudes and behaviours. This is argued to explain systemic malpractice and resistance to change with greater utility than previous theories. The background to Chan’s research bears some similarities with the contemporary reform agenda. The need for change and drivers to do so in both cases are politically urgent, and knowledge about change and awareness of the “contingencies and vagaries” of reform are critical (Chan 1997 p.1). Chan argues an emphasis upon the political drivers should be afforded greater acknowledgment in the process of change and in the cultural awareness of officers. We now consider the criticisms of previous police culture theorising which Chan sought to address.

Problems in the police culture literature which Chan highlighted consisted of the inability to account for differences and variation, and acknowledgment of the active role played by officers in the “reproduction or transformation of culture” (Chan 1997 p.12). The scope and possibility of cultural change was insufficiently addressed and the police occupational culture not placed in a full context accounting for political and social influences. To summarise, previous theories were critiqued as being overly deterministic and unidirectional. Several assumptions are implicit to most discussions concerning police culture: “that there is a close relationship between the demands of police work and the existence of the culture; that the culture is relatively stable and uniform over time and space; and that the culture has a negative influence on police practice” (Chan 1997 p.44 - 47). Despite being supposedly not monolithic, police culture was often described as if it is (Chan 1997 p.65), it being a “faulty notion” to conceptualise culture as uniform and separate from the formal structures of policing (Chan 1997 p.63).
In order to address these issues, Chan proposes a new framework, which draws in part upon the social theory of Bourdieu. In summary, society is composed of relatively autonomous ‘fields’, social spaces of conflict and competition where “participants struggle to establish control over specific power and authority, and, in the course of the struggle, modify the structure of the field itself” (Chan 1997 p.71). In the context of this research the field could be described as the historical relations between government and the police service through reform agendas, changes to policy and practice (legal, structural and occupational) and influence of ideology in setting the agenda for change. The account of these social, political and ideological factors is joined with cultural knowledge to avoid critiques of occupational culture as simple, linear and deterministic:

...the concept of police culture as currently theorised in the literature suffers from many problems . . . the new framework explains police cultural practice in terms of the interaction between the social political context of police work (the field) and the institutional perceptions, values, strategies and schemas (the habitus). The advantage of this framework is its ability to account for the existence of multiple cultures and its capacity to theorise about cultural change. (Chan 1997 p.92).

The ‘habitus’ (Chan 1997) consists of the stories, narratives, categories, schemas and scripts that form cultural knowledge. Chan proposes four dimensions of cultural knowledge which form the habitus (Chan 1997 pp.76 – 80), drawn from organisational theories of culture (see Schein 1985) and group cultural cognitions (see Sackmann 1991). These consist of Axiomatic, Dictionary, Directory and Recipe knowledge, the basic assumptions and beliefs that are held to form the “collective construction of social reality” (Sackmann 1991 p.21). These will be considered in turn and will be returned to later in the thesis. Each category will be introduced and placed into context for this research.

Axiomatic knowledge represents the fundamental assumptions about ‘why things are done the way they are’ and comprise the basic rationale of policing. Representing the rationale of the organisation, determined by ACPO and government, and influenced by the direction of reform and its underlying ideological influences, axiomatic knowledge is not necessarily shared with lower ranking members (Chan 1997
The debates surrounding the role and mandate of the police, ‘real’ policing, the ‘thin blue line’ and public demand, complicate this area of cultural knowledge.

Dictionary knowledge provides definitions and labels of things and events within an organisation, so complex and ambiguous scenarios can be summarised and dealt with (Chan 1997 p.77). The previous discussion concerning typologies of the public, stereotyping and racism would be examples of cultural dictionary knowledge. In relation to change, categorising reform agendas consists of drawing parallels between governments, identifying the drivers behind them and responding to reform by identifying a category to use. As a complex area of policing, and one with most reforms yet to happen, this area will be argued in this research to be particularly culturally powerful and influenced by recognition of the ideology behind change.

Directory knowledge contains descriptions about how things should be done in and by the organisation, and is associated by Chan (1997 p.78) with operational policing being carried out routinely. Previous discussion of the maxims, codes and ‘rules of thumb’ in the police culture literature reflect the importance of how officers apply discretion, the law, and how they circumvent formal regulations. In the context of assessing reform agendas, directory knowledge is the cultural response to change shared by groups within the service. It asserts how change should be managed, the consequences of reform proposals, usually operationally and from an organisational perspective.

Recipe knowledge prescribes what should or should not be done in specific situations and is the normative dimension of cultural knowledge, providing recommendations and strategies for coping with police work (Chan 1997 p.79). This would, by way of example, include from the previous discussion of police culture the solidarity and the function of ‘war-stories’ in communicating recipe knowledge. In relation to reform this aspect of cultural knowledge can be seen in resistance to change, and the communication of the implications of reform and how officers should respond to it. The resistance discussed to aspects of reform and the unintended consequences cited by multiple commentators reflects in part what will be argued to be the sharing of recipe knowledge. The emphasis upon ‘real’ policing and the role of the sworn uniformed officer represents an area for which reform faces a stern challenge.
Resistance and unintended consequences will be argued later to represent the sharing of recipe knowledge to mobilise solidarity and influence / prevent change.

Chan notes how the link between police cultural knowledge and the structure of policing has been recognised in the literature, but that the link is often assumed but not clearly established (Chan 1997 p.73). An overly simplistic linear model emerges as a result between structural conditions (the field), cultural knowledge (the habitus) and police practice. The centrality of officers as active participants are denied as is the notion that structural change alone brings about successful reform. Changes in the field may alter structures and have no discernible impact on the habitus. Likewise, changes to the habitus may not be permanent or long lived if unsupported by changes in the field which support its continuance (Chan 1997 pp.92 – 93).

This section has considered reform and police culture, seeking to consider research and themes and concepts from chapter one. The conservatism apparent in the police culture literature, NPM and issues with change were considered as well as the street-management divide and implications for reform. The work of Chan (1997) has been considered and her analysis presented linking it to the context of this research.
2.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has introduced the police culture literature, the main themes and concepts. Whilst some references in the literature for police culture and public management to NPM and to potential clashes with workforces exist, seldom has research directly addressed or documented the impact. The studies of Metcalfe (2004) and Butterfield, Edwards and Woodall (2005) do so in a policing context, although the scope in terms of management and street cops is not expanded upon. Both the work of Reuss-Ianni (1983) and Chan (1997) notes that their respective methodological focus is placed more upon street cops and culture, although both provide a clear and comprehensive overview of management cops. Reuss-Ianni’s framework of the structure of policing will be applied in this research, noting any variations in findings as a result of the focus upon ideology and occupational culture. The framework Chan suggests (1997) will likewise be employed in this research to aid analysis and present the research findings. This approach is intended to conform to recent analysis of police culture research:

...current scholarship overstates the degree of and potential for change in police culture, and accordingly overlooks the continuities and inertia in police dispositions and practice . . . by failing to recognise the stubborn patterns in police culture we neglect to appreciate its resilience and tenacity . . . policing scholarship is right to identify the changes taking place within policing contexts, it nevertheless exaggerates them. (Loftus 2009 pp.198 – 199).

The next chapter will introduce the methodology.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the methodology and associated considerations, outlining how the research will gather data. The method applied to interpret the data is outlined as well as the specific order in which the research was conducted. The extent and use of documentary analysis is discussed, the documents chosen, reasons why and approach to analysis prior to introducing the use of semi-structured interviews with two groups of officers. The choice of qualitative methods will be explained and how the interviews were structured and focused. This raises numerous issues and concerns which will be considered in a section on insider research and ethics. The research process is then introduced, the techniques employed and how analysis from the various techniques employed achieved the aim and objectives.

3.1 RESEARCH PROCESS

This section outlines the selection of techniques. The research process is depicted in tabular form below linking the formal objectives to the methods that will research them. It also lists the sample relevant to those methods that will gather evidence towards that area of research.
Table 1: Objectives and Methods / Sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>METHODS / SOURCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Examine police reform 1979 – 2012 in the context of ideological drivers, assessing the significance of political ideologies, party political ideology and party politics upon change in the police service</td>
<td>Literature Review (Politics, Ideology, Public Sector Management, NPM, Police occupational culture); Documentary Analysis; Semi-structured interviews (Strategic respondents / front line respondents).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Explore police occupational culture, examining existing literature and research, to assess the reception of reform agendas at front line and management level, operation of police culture and implications for instigating change</td>
<td>Police occupational culture literature; Documentary analysis; Semi-structured Interviews (Strategic respondents / front line respondents).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Analyse the empirical research and existing research and literatures to identify themes and areas of significance in police reform agendas</td>
<td>Police reform / Police Culture literature; Documentary Analysis; Semi-structured interviews (Strategic respondents / front line respondents).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Contribute to existing knowledge on police occupational culture and change / reform, drawing implications for practice</td>
<td>Methods for objectives 1 to 3 above.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The structure of the research was designed to reflect the overall exploratory and initially inductive emphasis, during which the objectives to explore party political ideologies as they impact upon public policing are covered through a literature review, and documentary analysis. To explore the relationship with police occupational culture semi-structured interviews with two groups of officers were utilised. Key stakeholders to the process of strategic change were invited to participate in individual semi-structured interviews, (utilising a structure initially informed by literature review and documentary analysis). A second group of front line officers were then interviewed again using semi-structured interviews.

The research commenced with a literature review and an overview of the relevant literature in the topic areas of the research (Holloway 1997 p.99). This incorporated existing research and studies focusing on ideology, political ideology, public sector management, police reform and police culture.
Initial research explored the official strategic response to the change of government and reform agenda for the police service concerned, the method by which this generated data is as follows:

(i) Literature review;
(ii) Documentary analysis;
(iii) Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in strategic change.

This approach has previously been used to good effect researching within a police service (see Holdaway 1983). Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders generated detailed data towards the objectives. The structure was informed by the exploratory analysis and was developed as the research progressed, using semi-structure to guide the interview stages in conjunction with the developing research and in light of the earlier analysis. Details of semi-structured interviews are listed in Appendix C. The combination of methods was designed to provide an intensive analysis, setting the context for the wider research. We now discuss strengths and weaknesses of the research process elected, prior to moving onto the various techniques that will be utilised.

Qualitative designs such as those utilised have been criticised as operating from a “naive orientation which bypasses the complex philosophical issues in favour of a what-works approach” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003 p.10). They lack the strength of multiple / mixed methods which lie in generating different levels of data to inform a problem, as interdependent techniques have the potential to provide a more comprehensive picture. Whilst having obvious benefits in terms of generating “thick” description and rich detail, the selected qualitative approaches have inherent weaknesses which are well documented (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003 p.9) and will be developed further later in this chapter, in the section covering semi-structured interviews.

Qualitative methods can have the advantage of generating rich detail of people operating “on their own turf” (Kirk and Miller 1986 p.12). Knowledge of the organisational setting adds an interpretative context and framework for the researcher, without which the wider context may be misunderstood (McCall and Bobko 1990 p.515). Whilst this is an advantage of qualitative methods, and may explain why such
methods predominate in management research, the disadvantages are limited information about causation between variables and often limited longitudinal focus. For an exploratory design, such as the one utilised for this research, the paradigm is pragmatic, interpretive and participatory orientated (Cresswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann and Hanson 2003 p.232). The lack of a clear single defining epistemological tradition means, however, a need to ensure clarity in the exposition of the methodology so that the results inferred can clearly be demonstrated to have developed from the data.

We now turn to consider the process in turn, starting with documentary analysis. In describing the techniques selected and analysis, the issues above are referenced and addressed.

3.1.1 DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS

Prior to talking about the specific documents selected and analysed, the technique and approach of documentary analysis is considered. The documents are then introduced (attached as appendices). We start with the selection of documentary analysis as a technique.

Ritchie (2003) defines documentary analysis as “the study of existing documents, either to understand the substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings which may be revealed by the style and coverage” (Ritchie 2003 p.35). As a technique, documentary analysis is noted for being of practical value where written communications are central to the enquiry. Another advantage consists of being able to research beyond direct observation or questioning (Ritchie 2003 p.35). The language and key words of participants is overt and in official documentation has been prepared for public viewing (Cresswell 2003 p.187). As a qualitative technique, documentary analysis is a wide ranging term, and one that relies for its validity in any research process through justification for the documents selected. Scott (1990 p.6) references four criteria for assessing the quality of documents; authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. As this research selected official public documents for
analysis, it is the latter categories of representativeness and particularly meaning that requires further consideration.

Silverman (2005 p.160) notes how a qualitative approach to documents often relies upon analysing a small number of texts, in order to understand the prevalent categories and how they relate to concrete activity. This is a constructionist orientation, concerned with how the document depicts and shapes reality for the organisation, rather than an assessment of objective truth. The danger in seeing official documents as “transparent representations of organisational routines, decision-making or professional diagnosis”, is that they construct particular kinds of representations within their own conventions (Atkinson and Coffey 2004 p.58). Hence whilst authenticity and meaning could be seen as less of an issue with official documents, caution has to be exercised in terms of the meaning inferred and the method of analysis will be expanded upon below. Documents with an official or quasi-official capacity are noted as often presenting a unique aspect to representativeness (see Bryman 2008 p.521), especially in an examination of culture. It cannot be inferred that documents reveal anything necessarily about any underlying social reality, but rather have something to reveal about what goes on within that organisation (Bryman 2008 p.525). This is similar to Silverman’s point regarding modelling the processes behind the content of documents as opposed to truth or falsity in isolation.

Atkinson and Coffey (2004) argue that documentary material has its own distinctive ontological status, a separate reality from being written for a prospective audience and in representing the person or organisation that produced it. Concurring with some previous views, documents cannot transparently represent an underlying organisational reality; “we cannot learn through written records alone how an organisation actually operates day by day” (Atkinson and Coffey 2004 p.58). One of the key general points regarding documentary analysis is the need for other methods in order to draw upon the wider issues. In this research, documentary analysis is employed to support the initial task of establishing the institutional context around the strategies and formal directions the service articulates. Further qualitative techniques provide exploration of wider issues and consideration of how official documents are perceived and used. This directly assists understanding of the potential impact of occupational culture.
The police service featured in the research used a set of documents to outline its values, mission statements, priorities and objectives during the research phase. These consist of:

1. Delivery Plan 2010 – 2011 (Thames Valley Police 2010);

These provide the overarching direction and for each strand of policing activity outlined how the organisation will work towards the respective objectives. They were influential documents at a strategic and tactical level and are all attached at Appendix B. It is worth emphasising that these plans were seen as the foundation upon which policing activity is based. They were, as such, extremely influential documents which are consulted upon, published publicly (including updates on performance towards them) and used to hold Chief Officer Teams and Local Police Areas to account. Given the comments concerning representativeness and meaning (Scott 1990 p.6), the remainder of this section will introduce how the documents will be analysed and consider how this will assist the research objectives.

Analysis of the documents will conform to what Bryman (2008 pp.529 – 531) defines as qualitative content analysis. This consists of a “searching out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed... extracted themes being illustrated...” (Bryman 2008 p.529). Bryman further notes that the method of extracting themes is often not specified in detail (2008 p.529). Applying Scott’s criteria for assessing the quality of documents will assist in showing the value of focusing upon the plans and the method by which themes present themselves, which is relatively straightforward. As official and public documents, authenticity and credibility is not in issue. They were widely consulted both internally and externally to the organisation, prior to being published. The latter two categories are where the value in the context of this research is of interest. In terms of representativeness the document sets out what the priorities were, how they will be worked towards and the values of the organisation and its members. A link is documented with national priorities and consideration of budgetary and police reform factors. Police occupational culture and its reception of the plans is therefore of interest and, whilst documentary analysis is limited and can say little about this response.
on its own, it can set the scene and establish the context of what themes emerge officially. These can then inform the semi-structured interviews with strategic managers and front line officers. The perspective of interest is how these plans were assessed by those participating in the research, what it means to them and how it has influenced them professionally.

The documents concerned are reproduced at Appendix B. The resulting themes and analysis is summarised at the start of Appendix B and is discussed at research process below. The use of semi-structured interviews is outlined next.

### 3.1.2 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

The semi-structured interviews support the aim of the research by concentrating on the relationship between policy, implementation and operational delivery with police reform and culture. The interviews were intended to maximise the gathering of opinions of participants on these aspects. In relation to the research objectives, interviews with those involved and operating at a strategic level were designed to explore more the relationship between party political ideology, party politics and police reform. The aim of the research means that, as well as exploring opinions, the emphasis upon the relationship that ideology, politics, police culture and reform has upon the tangible differences in the respondents working lives was considered. Interviews addressed this wide objective through the aforementioned focus upon multiple organisational levels of activity, a semi-structured approach to exploring the factors that shape reform, the link between the operational as well as policy enactment and the ability of qualitative techniques to allow participants to provide rich data on any aspect of these relationships. The selection of participants through rank and role was designed to support the research aim and objectives through capturing the various relationships between policy change, implementation and front line activity.

Attempts to define qualitative research have found fairly wide consensus that it comprises naturalistic, interpretive approaches, focusing upon the natural settings in which people can make sense of phenomenon by bringing meaning to them (Denzin and
Lincoln 2000 p.3; Bryman 1988 p.8; Ritchie 2003 p.32). Due to the requirement to research a wide range of experiences, a method that facilitated participants to produce rich data and provide perspectives on past and future was preferable; essentially to be focused but able to guide the study (Holloway 1997 p.94). As generated methods involve reconstruction, re-processing and re-telling of attitudes, beliefs and behaviours they give an understanding of the meaning that people attach to phenomenon being studied (Cresswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann and Hanson 2003 p.186). The consensus within the literature discussed indicated that the qualitative in-depth interview represented the favoured strategy for collecting rich data on individual experiences and in valuable contexts (Holloway 1997 p.94; Ritchie 2003 p.37). Participants could take perspectives on the past / future, can lead discussion, experience un-diluted focus in-depth and allow exploration of complex processes.

Semi-structured interviews were chosen because the research aims would be best served by the resulting generated data. Following preclusion of other methods, the attraction of semi-structured interviews lay in the undiluted focus on the individual, detailed investigation of participant’s personal experiences and context, with capacity for clarification and more detailed understanding (Ritchie 2003 p.37; Holloway 1997 p.94). Interviews were chosen as they allow probing, in depth information, interpretative validity, exploration and confirmation. The weaknesses of interviews was identified as the time taken to complete them, potential reactive and investigator effects as discussed, low perceived anonymity and time consuming data analysis (Kemper, Stringfield and Teddlie 2003 p.308). Having discussed the strategy and type of qualitative method to be used, we move on to outline the design that will enable the data to be collected and analysed.

Purposive selection criteria / sampling ensured that participants represented the key criterion of operating at a strategic level in terms of setting the direction for the resources of the service. The two principal aims of purposive sampling are to ensure “key constituencies relevant to the subject matter” is generated and to include diversity in the sample (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam 2003 p.79). The key stakeholders concerned were identified by role and area of influence. The use of topic areas and follow up probes proved to work well in facilitating interviews, providing flexible direction through a broad agenda of themes constituting a mechanism for steering discussion.
This group was of particular concern in terms of mitigating any career-limiting concerns they may have through the criticism of policy or reform, which ultimately was not an issue, although two senior officers declined the opportunity to participate from the outset.

Resisting the temptation to “move from raw data to analytic concepts” was an objective from commencing the research, in order to structure evidence within which the building-blocks of analysis can be seen (Miles and Huberman 1994 p.224). Data needed to be retained in context and the process documented so that interpretation into higher levels of abstraction was valid and not forced (Strauss 1987 p.55). Part of the advantage for commencing in phase one with key stakeholders in the reform process, such as those involved in strategic change, is that the progression of policy to front line activity developed through the interviews. The foundation had been set, in terms of the expectations and reported ideological influences, to then determine the true extent to which such influence impacted upon the lower ranks.

The strategic managers’ sample consisted of key stakeholders, representative of those operating at a strategic and policy making level within the police service concerned. This was designed to provide a background context to political changes and their impact upon the broader organisation. The front line sample was designed to identify officers of the rank of Constable to Inspector. This was achieved through populating lists of front line resources onto a database, identified only through shoulder numbers and on a secure database not capable of viewing by any other person bar the researcher. Front line here is defined as those who are public facing on police areas and, in the case of Inspector rank, those who line manage or have responsibility for operational deployment. This list specified force identification number only and nothing more (i.e. no attributes such as sex, skills, length of service) and the database contained three lists for officers based upon rank (the lists being populated through shoulder numbers being taken from rank including acting and temporary ranks). Permission was granted for such sampling and use of the list for the purposes of selecting individuals from them to participate / opt-in. These individuals were selected based upon random probability, meaning a specified non-zero probability of being selected for each member of the relevant sub-group population and a statistically equal chance of being selected.
The following was agreed in advance with participants: confidentiality will be maintained and anything they would not wish to be made public will not be disclosed, neither will rank in circumstances (such as senior officers) where to do so would reveal identities. Only the researcher has access to the material and contributors’ identities are not revealed. Potential participants are asked for permission and to ‘opt-in’, stating clearly the right for refusal at any point and that the research is not funded or conducted by the organisation. A short letter of introduction outlining all these points was used to ensure a standard approach (Holloway 1997 pp. 57 – 59). The various ethical issues were also checked and approved by the relevant ethics committee supervising the research. Each and every participant will be clearly informed that the research is not official (from a police perspective), with no compulsion to take part, and of the independent nature of the researcher and research outcomes.

Sampling strategy must be ethical in terms of informed consent, potential costs and benefits and absolute assurances about the maintenance of any promised confidentiality (Kemper, Stringfield and Teddlie 2003 p.276). In terms of methodology, ethical concerns are considered throughout all stages from an individualistic perspective as outlined above (i.e. anonymity, confidentiality), and also an autonomy perspective, where maintaining the voluntary and full participation of subjects is essential to the generation of valid conclusions.

Front line officers presented different ethical issues to strategic managers, the danger being that they may view interviews as sponsored by the organisation, or be suspicious of the intentions of the researcher (i.e. career minded project, working for the Chief). Hierarchical effects with the rank and status of the researcher, or perception / knowledge of service record / history may also have been significant. Familiarity of researcher and researched may mask potential data through the use of terminology, phrases, organisational slogans and current issues (playing to the audience). Respondents may have felt pressure to say what they think the researcher wants to hear and that may have a cultural factor in it. This again, as considered, required reflexivity and critical distance in analysis, to ensure that if this is a factor it is identified and afforded the significance it deserves.
For ease of reference, and to comply with the ethical parameters in terms of identity and anonymity of participants, the following is a breakdown of ranks and classification of the organisational level individuals are taken to operate at:

**Table 2: Interview Participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANKS</th>
<th>ROLE</th>
<th>NUMBERS AND BREAKDOWN BY SEX / BME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constable, Sergeant and Inspector</td>
<td>Front line operational patrol / Neighbourhood teams.</td>
<td>26 (12 female, 4 BME)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Inspector to ACPO ranks</td>
<td>Strategic managers involved in reform.</td>
<td>12 (1 female, none BME)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interview respondents overall reflected the proportion of female to male officers, with twelve of the total of twenty-six being female. Viewed in categories by rank, female officers had less proportionate representation the higher the rank. Only one of the strategic managers (a Superintendent) was female, whilst two of the four Inspectors, three of the five Sergeants and half of the twelve Constables were female. This reflects the proportions of female to male officers for those categories in the wider force. From an ethnicity perspective four respondents (two Inspectors, a Sergeant and two Constables) classified themselves as not white British (consisting of two Asian, one middle-eastern and one Polish). The sample was generated at random, so this proportion would be expected in line with the services black, minority and ethnic officer (BME) numbers at the time of the research.

The respondents were drawn from the groups excluding specialist functions such as Roads Policing (traffic), investigative departments such as CID, Tactical Support (firearms, public order, dogs). The rationale for this was the focus upon front line contact with the public. The volume of previous academic research also focuses largely on the uniformed patrol officer. At the time of the research in the service concerned all officers started on front line shifts. For the investment of time and potential comparative value with existing research, front line officers formed the majority of respondents. The
remainder, strategic managers, were a group selected through their role as implementers of reform and strategy.

Where quotes and précis from interviews are used the participant is introduced as either front line followed by rank, or by strategic manager as appropriate. A subject number was allocated to each respondent and is recorded, preceded by rank (C = Constable, S = Sergeant, I = Inspector, or SM = Strategic Manager).

The methodological approach consists of two parts. Part one set the context of strategic change and policy approach utilising an inductive approach. It applied analysis of the strategic response of the police service to change of government and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in strategic change and policy formulation. Analysis of this phase was aimed at identifying central themes to take forward. Part two linked the findings of part one with operational delivery. These utilised semi-structured interviews exploring themes identified from analysis of stage one and were designed to identify the impact of themes upon operational delivery. Appendix C lists the tables of semi-structured interview themes and topics which were utilised.

The semi-structure for part one was informed through the literature review, consideration of public sector and police reform and documentary analysis of the plans relevant to the service which the senior managers would be working to. To take one example, a theme of Value for Money (VFM), featured in the discussion of politics and the economic climate, had a recent and consistent manifestation in police reform nationally, and likewise was reflected in the force delivery plan. This included a range of tactical reforms which strategic managers would work towards, monitor and implement. As a topic in semi-structured interviews, it included occupational cultural probing as to the understanding of front line officers and expectations from a strategic management perspective, as well as in part two when interviewing front line officers. The significance, interpretation and reception of such themes together informed appreciation of how culture operates. Appendix C contains the interview semi-structured topics and themes.

Data, and analysis of it, is noted to shape the theories that are developed and concepts that are introduced to explain police culture. There is the tendency for research
on police culture to apparently seldom interrogate “the link between theory and methodology” (Marks and Singh 2007 p.356). Part two utilised direct engagement with individual police officers, with part one having established the context of some prevailing organisational and societal power relations. This formed the deductive elements going forward to semi-structured interviews with front line officers, who then have opportunity to add rich detail to the “elite” reform agendas (Bevir and Kupka 2007 p.153) and explain the potential cultural impact that emerges.

The associated difficulties with researching an abstract concept such as culture merits further consideration. The distinction between etic and emic research, where the former commences with categories of analysis informed by literature review and the latter utilises an inside perspective to focus on categories of importance to those studied, is significant. Whilst an absolute distinction between these approaches is impossible to distinguish fully (Cockroft 2013 p.9), the research process is designed to conform to as ‘emic’ a process as possible regarding the cultural aspects. This allows the subjective consideration of potential cultural influences from respondents and interpretation of knowledge generated, in accordance with the view that subjectivity is restricted to an extent by collective influences that form to construct social reality (Stablein 1996). For a much more in-depth consideration of objectivity and subjectivity in researching culture see Cockroft 2013 (pp.8 – 15).

The research was designed to gather contextually specific knowledge concerning ideology, police reform and culture. Sometimes referred to as ‘thick description’, textured information can treat culture as more of a metaphor than as a variable that can be applied (Cockroft 2013). In discerning any potential relationship between reform and culture the aim of the research was designed to determine “an appreciation of contextually specific knowledge rather than an understanding that emerges from the process of abstraction and generalisation across cases” (Martin 2002 p.43). The focus and breadth of the research was therefore nomothetic, in that it focused upon variations within specific cultural manifestations between police occupational groups in relation to reform processes and ideological influences. This was designed to avoid “cognitive burn in” that can occur with etic perspectives and presented the opportunity to uncover equally suitable or new conceptual categories (Cockroft 2013 p.110).
One of the key features of research into occupational culture is the attitude / behaviour distinction. Some scholars argue that attitude has a demonstrable causal relationship with behaviour and, as a result, police culture is a significant indicator of police activity (Holdaway and Barron 1997 pp.75 – 77; Bowling and Phillips 2002; Reiner 2010 p.115). Others urge caution in not accounting for everyday cultural influences (see Waddington 1999a), or over attributing the link between language and behaviour and overlying attributing culture as a critical tool (Waddington 1999b; Manning 2007 p.51). Whichever view is adopted in terms of methodology, documentary analysis of the type proposed and interviews are unable to measure behaviour, which would require additional further methods to be fully incorporated in the research. That said, the semi-structure to the interviews and comparison with existing research allows for the potential dichotomy between language and behaviour to be explored from the perspective of the subject, which has cultural value in itself. The research contains a historical aspect and therefore only focuses upon the Coalition agenda as one where this distinction may be relevant. Previous resistance to reform and other research, including observational, does form part of the analysis.

As an insider to the organisation I had the capacity to assess attitudes / behaviour, and a well-informed perspective to interpret what was revealed in the interviews. The primary focus was, however, upon the impact of ideology, reform and operation of occupational culture and the narratives from the interviews concerning these factors. Where these involved behaviours they are seen in the context of the wider narratives and, whilst not directly observed, my insider perspective affords a degree of judgement in assessing validity or otherwise. Much previous research which includes observational elements does not benefit from an insider perspective (acknowledging the potential drawbacks considered elsewhere in greater detail), for example, Loftus (2010), Metcalfe (2005) and Chan (1997).

This research, unlike much that precedes it, specifically gathered data from across ranks and in terms of the street-management distinction. Previous precedent for this has been considered in terms of change as established themes of attitude impact on successful reform. Reuss-Ianni (1983 pp.121 – 123) outlined how attitudes can generate negative coping mechanisms and resistance to change. The investigation of officers’ attitudes towards new initiatives, particularly those drawing inspiration from the private
sector, have been argued to reveal a new form of stratification within the police hierarchy (Cockcroft and Beattie 2009 pp.526 – 540). We turn now to the analysis which also addresses the issues outlined here.

Avoiding moving from raw data to concepts, searching for a structure appropriate to the research, is designed to build analysis and ‘move up the abstraction ladder’ (Miles and Huberman 1994 p.324). The ‘analytic hierarchy’ was selected (Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor 2003 pp.219-263) due to its ability to provide structure and identify themes through cross-sectional analysis based on interpretations of meaning:
TABLE 3: ANALYTIC HIERARCHY (Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor 2003 p.212):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEEKING WIDER APPLICATION</td>
<td>Application and comparison with existing theory in discussion and conclusions / reflections sections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPING EXPLANATIONS</td>
<td>Addressing how and why themes exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETECTING PATTERNS</td>
<td>Analysis by association and identification of clustering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTABLISHING TYPOLOGIES</td>
<td>Refining and distilling more abstract concepts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENTIFYING ELEMENTS AND DIMENSIONS, REFINING CATEGORIES, CLASSIFYING DATA</td>
<td>Descriptive account refined as dimensions are clarified and explanations developed and as the hierarchy is progressed movement both up and down is required to ensure accuracy. Raw data is returned to check typologies and explanations of patterns resulting in a refining of categories and reclassification of data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARISING OR SYNTHESISING DATA</td>
<td>Assigned data to themes summarised in those categories to portray meaning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORTING DATA BY THEME OR CONCEPT</td>
<td>Separate data into chunks via application of themes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABELLING OR TAGGING DATA BY CONCEPT OR THEME</td>
<td>Apply themes and concepts to data through colour coding (Tesch 1990 pp.142-145) on each interview conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENTIFYING INITIAL THEMES OR CONCEPTS</td>
<td>Familiarity with data; identification of themes and concepts that reflect underlying meaning, listing topics separately and returning to data (Rossman and Rallis 1998 p.171). Facilitated by Structured analysis criteria: repetition, transitions, similarity, causal linguistic connectors (because / since etc) and theory related material (Ryan and Bernard 2003 pp.85-109).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAW DATA</td>
<td>Interview transcripts hand written from semi-structured interviews.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regarding identifying initial themes and concepts, the inclusion of criteria outlined by Ryan and Bernard (2003 pp.85-109) was used. These consisted of:

- Repetition: topics occurring multiple times;
- Transitions: topics shifting within the transcripts;
- Similarity: focusing on the diversity, or lack of, in explanations of topics;
- Linguistic Connectors: words operating as causal connectors (i.e. because / since);
- Theory-related material: use of concepts for themes / topics.

The next section discusses in greater detail the cultural and insider researcher issues. Whilst aspects of these have been introduced in considering the methods used they merit further discussion, especially around the potential cultural implications.
3.2 INSIDER RESEARCH AND ETHICS

This section discusses my role as researcher practitioner, encompassing issues of neutrality, objectivity and research process. These issues are relevant as the researcher was a serving police officer during the research and as such was arguably subject to cultural influences, as well as operating in an environment subject to the various implications (positive and negative) of police reform. The position of the researcher within the organisation therefore requires careful consideration. Consideration of the researcher-practitioner role is followed by a more general discussion concerning ethics. We consider now my role as researcher and reflections upon how my status as a practitioner would impact upon the research process.

3.2.1 THE RESEARCHER

My status as the researcher is a significant factor, particularly in light of the potential cultural factors in play. This section discusses how those issues were mitigated. As this is not considered to present an issue in relation to documentary analysis, discussion commences with the qualitative semi-structured interviews, considering my status as researcher and a member of the organisation. This relates to the strategic managers group, all of whom are more senior officers, and also front line officers, the majority of which are junior in rank. To consider these groups it is useful to summarise my role and rank at the time of conducting the interviews, after outlining the key factors I considered in relation to how my position in the field could potentially impact the research process.

Being a serving officer necessitated the use of reflection to consider how I would manage the research process in terms of my experiences as an officer of the ranks interviewed. This included my own views of reform and opinions on change. As the stages of the research progressed I reflected on my approach to each interview / literature review to ensure I was satisfied that the ongoing interpretation and theorising was objective. In relation to interviews this was a factor that required consideration
throughout the questioning and in relation to note-taking, and not as a stand-alone reflection (at the end or prior). This was essential due to the semi-structured design of the interviews leaving discretion in directing and following up questions. It was particularly important to plan how to interview in circumstances where I would disagree with the views expressed or where the respondent appeared to be influenced by my status within the organisation. The crucial element of the reflections upon my approach to the research was to manage my reactions to whatever responses where fielded by those partaking.

For the duration of the research process I was a Sergeant in the service researched. I worked in a specialist department away from front line policing which provided training and tactical support for operational activities. My role included command and leadership training, which meant I had regular exposure nationally and internationally to senior officers, including delivery of training to foreign senior officers at the Police College, Bramshill. As a result I considered myself capable of looking beyond rank (or more accurately to ensure unnecessary barriers are not impacting on the research). In relation to junior officers, the majority of front line respondents being Constables, as a Sergeant I would still be considered an operational officer, and the opt-in to the research explained that it was not commissioned by the service. This was designed in part to ensure accuracy and honesty from participants.

Another relevant factor which is seen as currency within the police service is length of service. At the time of the research I had completed ten years and as such would not be considered particularly experienced. However, the strategic managers group all had more service than this (usually substantially more). The front line officers (bar a minority) reflected the usual demographic of shifts which is officers within four years service, suggesting that both groups would not be unduly influenced by either rank or service. My roles within the police service were likely to assist communication with both groups, being familiar to working with senior officers in a group and one-to-one basis, and being perceived through rank and role as still being a front line (operational) officer. Although a specialist on a department tasked with operational training (such as public order, officer safety and command), this was a role perceived as uniform and respected. Whilst I had completed six years in uniform on shift prior to
joining tactical support, the interviews were started afresh without preconceptions on my part of the daily life and influences of front line officers.

The following section references the potential cultural influences that may impact and the findings of previous research in this area.

### 3.2.2 RESEARCHING CULTURE

Manifold issues arise from the practitioner-researcher role in the process, especially where the methodology employs qualitative techniques such as interviews and where interpretation features in the analysis and generation of theory. Prior experience has a crucial bearing on how research is conducted (Silverman 2005 p.71), and this is especially so for the practitioner-researcher operating in a familiar setting, where the danger of misunderstanding is especially great (Hammersley 1990 p.8). Researchers own biographies and knowledge can influence methodology, generally being “inextricably implicated in data generation”; a frequently cited aspect of this occurs in interviewer bias where the researcher can be hugely influential (Holloway 1997 p.96). The issues can be summarised as ensuring neutrality in drawing conclusions, objectivity, managing preconceptions (Holloway 1997 p.2; Ritchie and Lewis 2003 pp.19-23), maximising transparency (Silverman 2005 p.295) and demonstrating what informed the conclusions (Seale 1999 p.158).

Insider claims have been argued to be potentially constrained by the social and historical conditions that have shaped the relevant organisations normative roles and conceptions of reality (Shaw and Faulkner 2006 pp.47-51). The effect of cultural pressures, combined with reform and wider societal change, can lead to a ‘colonisation’ of insider knowledge and as an insider the researcher could be influenced in numerous ways through such a process. Practitioner researchers require acute awareness in conducting research where strong reactions may be exhibited against anything perceived to be knowledge tainted by police perspective / culture; they need to account for the “politics of perspective” (Winter, Griffiths and Green 2000 p.30). The context of the practitioner is crucial and should be consciously defined so as to be open to criticism.
(Pereira 1999; Fryer 2004), which will be signposted where relevant throughout the research. Inaccuracies are more likely if practitioners become emotionally involved in the process. Similar issues may occur with senior officers from the perspective of status as key stakeholders or drivers in certain areas to be researched. Issues of research failing to generate data in areas where a corporate line is taken by participants similarly have to be considered. This is part of the context that has to be established, and the ‘opt-in’, confidentiality and analytical process will, as far as possible, inhibit negative impact from such concerns.

The potential impact of police culture within the research process needs to be accounted for in respect of methodology, to ensure the viability of the analysis and conclusions. Literature on police culture notes the tendency for lay and insider depictions of the police “to tend to the opposite extreme” (Crank 1998 p.2), with behavioural research limited as “cops know when to show off, be quiet and cover their butts” (Manning and Redlinger 1970 cited in Crank 1998 p.3). Themes in police culture research would also suggest caution for a practitioner-researcher, particularly the street-management divide, and central boundaries held to constitute police cultural awareness such as the divisions, departments and status of participants in terms of currency such as length of service and special skills. If local police cultures are embedded in departmental organisation then the researcher, as part of that structure, needs to be aware of the operation of cultural themes such as the “power of myths” in articulating values (Crank 1998 p.130) and the function of “war stories” (Kappeler, Sluderand and Alpert 1994 p.246). The research process is designed to take account of cultural influences and as such mitigate any ‘un-conscious’ cultural impact.

Sufficient reflection is required to comprehend the potential for police culture to limit the capacity of respondents. This applies equally to the researcher in terms of identifying the pre-dispositional biases in behaviour and separate external influences (see Crank 1998 p.171). A further feature of police culture that may be significant is solidarity, either expressed as the researcher being part of the in-group or alternatively perceived as an outsider, either through the fact research is being conducted (potentially invoking suspicion as to motives) or due to rank dynamics. The reported management discourses that supposedly fail to match reality (Adlam 2002) may likewise present a potential cultural challenge in interviewing senior officers, where the dynamics of the
process may be influenced by the perception of the respondent towards the researcher (in terms of rank or service for example).

Whilst noting areas of caution, there are well documented positives noted from previous research which has focused on the police. The literature on police culture often reflects the “honesty of cops in interviews and openness” (Baker 1985 p.5; Fletcher 1990 p.iv). The rich detail of ethnographic research is also noted as providing the majority of material and potential for rich detail from the literature (Van Maanen 1978 p.310; Reiner and Newburn 2007; Westmarland 2008). Critics however argue that there is a danger research can be sterile, through lacking a three-dimensional understanding of police experience (Young 2004 p.14; Manning 2007 p.59; Cockroft 2013 p.110). This research focuses on qualitative techniques and a sampling strategy that promotes rich detail to avoid such a critique. The status of the researcher is likewise critical in not only the research phase but also the analysis ensuring that there is no “interpretative over reach” (Waddington 1999a p.91), or indeed the opposite, where my knowledge, experience or assessment of police cultural facets dictates how data is analysed. There has to be sufficient reflection and probity to allow any police cultural influences to be identified through the research, and not the researcher, without explicit reference to the research process.

3.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has introduced the methodology by which the aims and objectives of the research were explored. The considerable ethical issues and practitioner-researcher factors to be taken into account have been considered. The research process was then considered in detail outlining the various methods, with detailed discussion of the use of documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. The approach to sampling and groups researched was outlined.

Having described the methodology we move next to consider the results of the analysis and overall findings.
CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the findings of the research by discussing occupational cultural themes. The focus is the context of police reform and the relationship ideology and public sector management has with police occupational culture. The aim is to consider these cultural themes in relation to existing theory and highlight areas where this research covers new territory. The final section discusses the themes together in considering how current theory is progressed. We start by examining the cultural themes identified through the research.

4.1 CULTURAL THEMES

This section presents the themes which emerged from the data gathering process. The cultural themes consist of the sense of ‘mission’, conservatism change and resistance and finally the street – management divide / sub-cultures. These are all substantive areas of the police culture research which have been covered earlier. They feature here in terms of both relevance and applicability to previous research / literature, and through commentary upon new aspects. The framework and theory of both Chan (1997) and Reuss-Ianni (1983) is signposted within the themes to develop the relationship of cultural knowledge with reform and ideology. This sets the scene for the remainder of the chapter, which addresses directly the implications for particular concepts and theories in police occupational culture ahead of the conclusion. We start with the first theme of Mission.
4.1.1 MISSION

The sense of ‘mission’ in police occupational culture was reviewed in chapter two. How the policing mission is defined culturally is of significance to how reform agendas are appraised. The concept of police culture has been used to explain resistance to reform and modernisation, through the perception that change is a threat which undermines operational autonomy and “real policing” (McLaughlin 2007 p.56; Reiner 2010 p.131). Reform is assessed in relation to it being an opportunity for the patrolman to perform real police work (Van Maanen 1973). VFM is considered first as a major influence that has significantly impacted upon the service. It will be argued that the assessment of VFM was heavily informed by a cultural response which exhibits elements identified by previous research (mission), showing how ideology and reform related to occupational culture.

The notion of consistency in the VFM approach was evident through the research from the large majority, as one strategic manager commented:

“...there has always rightly been a concern to get the most out of public spending, for as long as I have been in the service there has been a policy in place to maximise efficiency, from the first Home Office circular (114/83) through Best Value and now with Value for Money. The two factors that influence the intensity of these are performance and the value that we are trying to generate, and the economic conditions of the time”. (SM 2).

Awareness of continuity in terms of VFM and acknowledgment of the need to show that money should not be wasted was notable. This awareness of continuity was expressed as beyond particular governments, more as a feature of policing, and one that failed to define and understand policing activity. Such a cultural response was articulated across the ranks by the large majority of respondents and conformed to what Chan (1997 p.76) terms axiomatic knowledge. This concerns the fundamental assumptions about what the organisation does (mission and mandate) interpreting the impact of reform. It featured not just for strategic managers, but reflected persistent and repeated use of terms like VFM and BV in successive performance appraisals, force
plans, communications and corporate policies and procedures. The recognition of VFM as a driver for reform was based however upon a deeper ideological assessment of the basis for change, as one Sergeant expressed it:

“...no-one would dispute the need to not waste money, the thing is we know that what is behind VFM is just the same old cuts, and actually will not save much at all, will leave the front line short and un-supported. It has always been this way and always will be...”. (S10).

The shared elements of the Sergeant’s objections with the large majority of front line respondents focused upon the recognition that VFM was a cover for cuts. The expressed rationale for that extended beyond the colloquial ‘mainstream’ view, extending to a desire to impose an ideological agenda upon the police service. This can be categorised as dictionary knowledge (Chan 1997 p.68), in which complex and ambiguous situations are labelled and defined in terms of organisational impact. Similarities from other research concerned adversarial reactions to NPM terminology and this was evident (Cockroft 2013 p.97). The nature of operational policing was somehow seen as irreconcilable with financial concerns, as expressed by one Inspector:

“I would say it’s a pervasive viewpoint across the service that we get beaten up over VFM but that we have very little influence in achieving it. It frustrates people as no-one purposely wastes money, and behind reform there is looming lots of dangerous ideas about how to supposedly save money, little if any of which reaches us who are better placed to decide how to save money. People are just too cynical and streetwise to think any different”. (I35).

The status and character of the police service was one that was emphasised as being not suited to ‘private sector’ / business reform:

“...whoever is in government seems to assume that we should be more like businesses but in reality we just cannot do that, so a lot of changes end up being lots of spin and rhetoric whilst we have to fix it on the ground to keep things going”. (S19).
“...no business I know has to manage what we do, twenty-four seven, across such a range of critical activities. Each government comes along and claims it has the panacea to policing bureaucracy and waste, invariably related to entrepreneurial private sector stuff that we’ve either tried already or know just would not work”. (I13).

The large majority of respondents subscribed to the view that policing was special and vocational and, as such, should not be subject business-like reforms. The context of policing was one seen to be misunderstood by reformers. Organisationally, the majority of front line practitioners took the view that VFM was rhetoric, as the role already was perceived by them as under-funded and under-supported, and that the functions were ones that were not open to change (or should not be). It was notable that not a single respondent at any level interpreted VFM as perhaps empowering or enhancing the role of front line policing. Where mission and VFM was considered directory knowledge (Chan 1997 p.78) informed officers how operational work should be carried out, ‘operationalised’ VFM and its implications (hence ‘fixing things on the ground’ and private sector ‘stuff’ not working).

Political drivers were commented upon in the timing and instigation of VFM, along with the intention to inject private sector reform. This view was best summarised by a strategic manager and is representative of the large majority of respondents at that level, asserting issues with treating the police service and its wide mandate and mission like the private sector:

“...we need to save money for obvious reasons, but there is always a choice within reason as to how this is achieved, and this government, like many before it, has clearly indicated that this route is the same as predecessors, private sector management in a more businesslike public service . . . sounds good, but maybe does not fit as well as it should” (SM2).

“...undoubtedly the cash savings are front-loaded for electoral purposes to identify the savings and as far as possible get them out of the way prior to the next election campaign”. (SM2).
“...it is preferable to make savings upon the assumption that the service has not been prudent enough and this marks a new start for the Coalition, when in fact as we all know this is more of the same with a few political tweaks to personalise it and add distance from the outgoing government”. (SM1).

This acknowledged some of the political drivers the respondents believed were behind VFM. As well as political factors, the majority of strategic managers discerned an ideological basis:

“I would say that you cannot see a reform package in isolation and when you look at the whole VFM agenda there is still the powerful influence of private sector practices and policy makers think the service does not do enough of this”. (SM7).

“...it is a different way of operating which is desirable not because it saves money, supposedly, but because it’s superior in their eyes. We can definitely learn from business but there is ultimately a dividing line and boundary as we are a public service operating in a different way on society”. (SM2).

Responses were articulated by strategic managers more as ‘challenges’ of reform and, whilst responses differed and reflected opinion, discernible factors at play consisted of the unsuitability of private sector techniques applied to policing and the consistency of government approach. The complexity and subtlety in axiomatic cultural knowledge could be seen, including political and ideological drivers in reform. The deploying of cultural knowledge did show strategic managers utilising a greater exploration of axiomatic knowledge then front line officers. The latter perceived savings being of minor impact, and not significant operationally:

“...the only difference, apart from all the talk about money, is getting authority from the duty Inspector for overtime incurred . . . and handing over jobs that might have been seen through on overtime previously” (C28).

“...civilian staff have bore the brunt of savings and where they were supporting shifts and officers there may be an increase in bureaucracy, but apart from that I am yet to notice any real difference” (S16).
Continuity from the majority showed that, bar a few relatively minor procedural changes in overtime monitoring and authorisation, front line officers were not reporting perceived change. A clear response from the front line was apparent, which framed itself in terms of the challenge to them and the nature and status of the role (or perceived mission) of the service:

“...the challenge for us as you term it is doing more with less, we get the job done whatever it is and if that means overtime we get it, if we do not someone else has to do it so something else drops off the table, either way front line officers respond and deal with whatever and that will not change. What will have to give is the army of staff who do not support what we do and maybe the management could be streamlined?” (S18).

“...they cannot let cuts affect shift, the government would be slammed, we are the last line of defence if we could not function the impact would be nuclear”. (C24).

The large majority of front line officers felt that the policing they did was the last line of impact for VFM which was a powerful and pervasive form of directory knowledge (what the organisation should do). All and any other aspects of the service were fair game for cuts, seemingly the more so the less they had to do with the work of sworn officers on reactive shifts. The uniform police role was something that reform and politics had no place in trying to change, a fierce independence as to officers’ status, role and ability to operate:

“I do not see much of a gap between any of the parties on police reform, they all have a similar approach preferring the private sector which they think we should be more like. We’ll see if the Coalition are actually less intrusive than Labour, and actually move away from central influence”. (SM25).

“...colleagues are bored of basically being slagged-off the same way by the same people in different parties who do not understand what we do, who throw money away in some areas and then starve others of resources. It is just a game to them and their business approach and reforms are irrelevant to what we do”. (S10).
The sense of mission documented in the police culture literature was a significant resource used in assessing reform. In terms of VFM and its heritage in reform agendas, political and ideological drivers were discussed and are common currency for strategic managers and front line officers. A further key area of reform considered previously consisted of performance management, which engaged with cultural perceptions of mission.

No consensus between strategic managers and front line officers was evident regarding performance. Criticism of performance management and how it had been defined and developed was based upon the perceived unique role of the uniformed officer and lack of suitability of performance management regimes. Strategic managers showed an understanding of front line perspectives, to an extent endorsing and acknowledging the cultural response to performance and seeking to work within them.

Performance was a term that front line respondents focused upon, linking it (for the large majority) with crime management in terms of statistics. In the words of a front line Constable, performance is:

“...how we are judged by figures like how many people we stop, how many detections we get and how our CEDAR [computerised crime management database of investigations]is up to date or not...”. (C21).

From front line respondents, only one person identified performance as wider than crime management expressed as detection and reduction rates for recorded crime, although notably still highlighted which area drives activity:

“...everything we do is performance, and almost everything we do is measured, from the British Crime survey, to crime stats, to neighbourhood engagement, and there is the quality side of things as well as the raw stats that drive activity”. (S15).

Performance tapped directly into a set of responses that was repeated from the large majority of front line respondents. They consisted first of the notion that crime management and performance regimes failed to acknowledge their wider role, and secondly that culturally such systems and attempts to control and focus activity were at
best given lip service and at worst openly mocked. Performance as a topic was subject to categorisation through dictionary knowledge (Chan 1997 p.77). It was about the latest priority, crime type and incidents of concern, usually quantifiable activity. One Constable articulated how dictionary knowledge is shared:

“...it is like only a third of what you do is looked at, and looked at in isolation without any thought for everything else we get shafted with on a daily basis. Everybody sympathises with everyone else and shares war stories and takes the p**s. It’s not even seen as a necessary evil, next month it will be some other crime we are supposedly focusing upon, and we will be chased up over something else”. (C33).

The large majority of front line respondents at Constable, Sergeant and Inspector levels described a shared perception that performance could never fully engage officers due to an ingrained conflict with the police mandate and role. This was conceptualised as extending much further than crime management alone and was often seen as cyclical and inevitable. The sense of mission and action prevalent in police occupational culture sat uneasily when engaged by performance management terminology and techniques. Elements of the critiques were raised in greater detail by a small majority, in terms of the focus on crime-management, neglecting other policing tasks and failing to appreciate the manifold demands made of shift officers. A link to axiomatic knowledge in these critiques questioned the rationale of performance management and impact on the wider police mission, as this Constable explains:

“...the current priorities are drilled in every briefing, posters everywhere, sometimes training on them, and the taskings concentrate on dealing with the relevant people, although on shift there isn’t much time in-between responding to incidents to do anything towards them”. (C38).

It was only at a strategic level that respondents acknowledged the importance of performance with a broader perspective on the effects of reform, such as stated by one strategic manager, and representative of the majority of strategic managers interviewed:

“...performance is critical. Policing activity is directed daily on (local police areas) and monitored centrally, alongside the neighbourhood teams and their priorities. We’ve seen
numerous developments in crime patterns and recently too had the policing pledge and confidence targets in addition . . . recorded crime and the British Crime Survey will always be significant and has influenced central government so a rise in crime or significant crime types that capture media attention will be interesting in terms of how the new (Coalition) government responds”. (SM2).

A minority expressed concerns that Commissioners, elected on a local mandate and accountable to local communities, would be performance focused and that, given the nature of manifestos and mechanics of being elected, this would involve a more intense focus. Aspects of this that drew comment were in response to the withdrawal of the policing pledge and the assertion that the main role of the police is to cut crime:

“...overlooking the vagueness of cutting crime (is that prevention as well?) the removal of the confidence target is meaningless where forces keep it anyway or when a Commissioner is elected as the two things they will be judged on is crime rates and confidence . . . so I do not see anything changing bar the government avoiding criticism for rising crime as cuts and the economy bite by saying you elected them, don’t vote for them next time...”. (SM5).

Performance was strongly associated with centralisation and the contrast between New Labour and the Coalition was introduced by the majority of strategic respondents. At a strategic level acknowledgment that governmental approaches had differed, and that some crime performance issues were managed at less than arms length, were expressed. The reasons for and prospects of a significant alteration in approach were assessed as follows:

“I can see there being the same level of central intervention and influence through, in a strange way, the introduction of Commissioners meaning that to keep a grip on issues will require strong central guidance. We are already codifying numerous areas where the new system will have to sign up to and if the stakes were high enough the capacity is there to do the same with performance”. (SM2).

Awareness of the changing priorities of successive governments in terms of how performance was managed was apparent. Numerous respondents also made connections
within and across reform agendas, for example the neighbourhood policing reforms were connected to the need to counter the impact of a predominantly crime-management agenda. This latter, more consistent NPM approach was something that was regarded as being continued under Coalition reform plans. Strategic managers used directory knowledge as a significant resource in order to rationalise change.

A generally high level of cynicism was expressed about discretion and, from front line respondents, a disassociation from management teams and force policies / targets. Positive performance was re-constituted in crime-fighting terms and was never framed in respect of delivery plan objectives. Awareness of priorities existed, but were inevitably relegated as secondary to dealing with whatever was the task in hand. The influence of directory cultural knowledge (what the organisation should do) and recipe knowledge (what officers should practically do) was strong. In a sense some of the NPM prescriptions for performance management (empowerment and discretion) were absent, and what remained was a tendency for well documented aspects of police culture, such as mission, to dominate.

When asked which one factor regarding performance was most difficult, front line respondents in varying ways expressed the view that they ‘do it all’. With acknowledgment from strategic level respondents, a notion that the police reform agenda had arrived at a point where no aspect of performance could be dropped prevailed. Confidence, crime management (detection rates and overall crime) and VFM all had to be delivered, as commented upon by one strategic manager:

“...whatever budgets do the clock cannot be turned back on the range of partnership, crime, community and social issues the police have a stake in, which means that performance management needs to be better than ever and there will be more intense scrutiny on what results we get”. (SM2).

A dismissive reaction to the notion that the main role of the police was to cut crime emerged. Responses varied from those that cited partnership and New Labour reforms in community safety to those who hoped that the Coalition genuinely wanted to see the police withdraw from the tasks cited as deflecting them from crime-management (such as missing persons / mental health / reassurance):
“I have calculated that over sixty percent of my team’s time is taken up with non-police work, I mean not crime fighting, doing social service roles and public safety. This is not acknowledged or often measured, and isn’t prioritised or intrusively tasked like generating performance in recorded crimes. My teams are clued up to this and it makes them very cynical and hard to sell new priorities to...”. (I26).

One area that did see accord was over the references to roles and powers and the modernisation reform agenda, its consistency, nature and the resulting response. The sense of mission was referred to in terms of how the Police Federation represented rank and file, where reform should be limited to and relations between government and the service:

“I think the Federation have got the focus wrong in that whilst pay and conditions may be highly significant for members it is the tradition and status of officers that would bring the public more onside. That has been done to an extent with cuts to policing publicity but not enough. It surprises me as there is a clear will to push the managerialist agenda through to unprecedented levels”. (SM8).

“...if they start messing with the role of sworn officers, that is the dividing line for me, they’ve gone too far”. (S10).

“...there is always strong views on change, there has been and there always will be, but this feels like a greater gap between reformers and police than ever before. The rationale and the way in which police reform has been done now stands in opposition to what a lot of the people doing the policing see themselves doing and in a way being . . . and that is having a big influence on them and their views on what the Coalition are doing”. (SM5).

The role of unionism has been argued to form the expression culturally of reactions to NPM in reform and symbolic resistance (O’Malley and Hutchinson 2007 p.164; Marks 2007; Cockroft 2013 p.86). In this research the assessment of change and cultural factors at play were sufficiently strong to permeate deeper than unionism and saw officers express views based upon mission about how they were being represented (and the police mandate and role). The role of the Police Federation was itself subject to
axiomatic and directory knowledge (its approach to reform and what it should be doing).

Many concerns levelled against the new Commissioners and Big Society reforms (including use of volunteers / Special Constabulary) were likewise founded upon axiomatic cultural knowledge concerning how the police use objectives. These resulted from the assimilation and interpretation of the reforms into policing and engaged many complex areas such as governance, accountability and operational independence. This was identified by the large majority of respondents and is summarised by one strategic manager:

“...the idea behind local accountability is the elected commissioner brings with them a local mandate, and then the supposedly operationally independent Chief decides how to achieve it, according to the Commissioners expectations, which presents many issues. Biggest is whether any Chief could (or would) actually disagree with a commissioners plans, on the grounds of operationally or otherwise”. (SM4).

The consumerist and partnership work which had been pursued through previous reforms (reassurance and neighbourhood policing) was seen as a more favourable method of encouraging localism. This was expressed by a large majority of strategic managers and a small majority of front line respondents and is summarised below:

“I understand Big Society to be about partnerships locally, which is what neighbourhood policing does, I see the commissioners as something that due to their political nature could take policing away from work in this area”. (I13).

Concerns and issues raised were a response to the underlying attributed rationale for the relevant reform, often through comparison with the sense of mission held by the respondent. By way of example, and mirroring the large majority of respondents, one Constable provided the following explanation of how reform was considered, which described how dictionary knowledge categorises reform:

“...everyone looks at new ideas from where they work in the organisation, and emphasises the impact on them, which is usually negative, against the things that we
hold as important. With Commissioners it is political influence, with volunteers it is resilience, with neighbourhood policing it was style and priorities”. (C34).

A key distinction drawn from the large majority was that of idea and implementation, as summarised by this Inspector, showing how axiomatic knowledge and appreciation of ideological grounds for reform impacted on wider categories of cultural knowledge:

“...the idea itself is good and makes sense on some levels, it’s just when you think practically that problems with it start to emerge. I can see real clashes if Commissioners start to say or do things that are seen to clash with existing areas of policing, and if they do I see rank and file kicking back and there being real internal conflict. They’ll have even less respect than Chief Constables in the eyes of front line cops”. (I35).

Reform was assessed by respondents in relation to its motivating and perceived underlying ideology (axiomatic knowledge). The reasons for change were examined and criticised (or occasionally supported) pragmatically on the basis of argument and issues with that perceived ideology, communicated through directory and recipe knowledge. This was not change resistance alone but a reaction to reform based upon existing conceptions of the police role. Front line policing was the last line of defence with special status, value was solely operational, with performance measuring only a third of activity. Modernisation made ranks too strategic and remote, volunteers were not as good as regulars and Commissioners were too political. From front line respondents a strong sense of mission was apparent with the potential, acknowledged by strategic managers, for aspects of police culture that endorse the crime-fighter to become reform-fighter. Hence the strong rejection of private sector terminology and supposed superiority. The perception that VFM meant private sector management techniques generated responses based upon the special status of the police and mission.

The true extent of positivity concerning reform extended only as far as respondents articulating how they sought to protect and advance more traditional conceptions of the police role. In this sense, front line officers were not change-agents and asserted helplessness in the face of reform. Strategic managers similarly acknowledged cultural issues and frustration at the difficulties of instigating successful
change. This was, to an extent, the institutionalisation of a tension documented in the literature on NPM. The tenets to empower and enable professionals were at odds with the more classical management necessity to centralise, control and focus performance using auditable means. The tendency then for quality to suffer led to additional reform to address consumer expectations. This was a recognised and criticised component of police reform in the interviews. This represents a doubly powerful cultural response to neo-liberal ideology: it was resented for the initial reform and also blamed for further reform attributed to its introduction. The NPM literature notes the importance of socio-institutional context and professional managerial relations in barriers to change (Flynn 2002; Dent, Chandler and Barry 2004), as does the police culture literature in establishing the broader context of influences upon reform (Loftus 2010 p.16; Bowling and Foster 2002 p.1010).

In conclusion, the deconstruction of ‘mission’ into the many and varied tasks the police undertake, and the performance management elements, extended beyond the possibly too simple typologies that, for example, categorise officers as peace-keepers, crime-fighters, or managerial professionals (whilst these have utility, in the context of assessing reform they lack acknowledgment of some of the more complex drivers in occupational culture). The failure to address the role of the police, the emphasis upon quantifiable crime control and apparent cyclical nature of using resources to focus on crime types were motivating factors in responses. Culturally the legacy of previous reform was often referenced, showing how the sense of mission, including its compatibility or otherwise with the ideological basis for reform, influenced officers’ assessment of change. At an axiomatic level of cultural knowledge, awareness of ideology in reforms informed how change was classified and received (dictionary knowledge), how the organisation and groups within it should respond (directory knowledge) with examples of how individuals should respond (recipe knowledge). This will be developed further when the themes are considered together. We turn now to consider conservatism and resistance.
4.1.2 CONSERVATISM, CHANGE AND RESISTANCE

Conservatism and resistance features significantly in the police culture literature and was found to play a role in the assessment of reform. As with the preceding section, the fuller context includes the impact of reform agendas, ideology and how this is interpreted, shared and communicated. This research will expand upon the extent to which conservatism is an explanatory factor in resistance and introduce other drivers (such as ideology).

Chan notes how the link between police cultural knowledge and the structure of policing is often assumed but not clearly established (Chan 1997 p.73). An overly simplistic linear model emerges as a result between structural conditions (the field), cultural knowledge (the habitus) and police practice. The centrality of officers as active participants was denied, as well as the notion that structural change alone brings about successful reform. Changes in the field may alter structures and have no discernible impact on the habitus. Likewise, changes to the habitus may not be permanent or long lived if unsupported by changes in the field which support its continuance (Chan 1997 pp.92 – 93). Culture has been described as a ‘tool-kit’ which can be used to produce a sense of order (Chan 1997 p.69). A “collection of stories and aphorisms instruct officers how to see the world and act in it”, a way of “seeing and being” through the narratives in the stories (Chan 1997 p.70). One officer offered an instructive explanation of how such processes may become established:

“...it starts by the common ‘war story’ about how you never get rewarded for preventing crime which is really hard to do anyway, and forces do not bother much in reality with prevention. It develops through the clichés about if we had enough resources we would stamp it all out, and the management stop us doing real policing, being pro-active and getting into the criminals, and all that. It gets reinforced with officers dealing with bureaucracy, whinging as they do it to colleagues in the station, publicly berating the Home Office, Chief, Management, Sergeants, lawyers, Human Rights, the law . . . and before you know it you have a negative cycle passed on to new generations of officers, explaining why they will not be out there stopping crime and
why they will have to listen to their Sergeants and Inspectors at briefings banging on about the latest re-branded crime focused initiative”. (S36).

Those responsible for directing and leading performance (in addition to Sergeants), were equally aware of the challenge and potential for culture to shape responses to corporate steers, as one Inspector put it:

“...if I used the word performance that would be the end of the briefing . . . I find other ways to get the message across which works, because as odd as it sounds they all want to do the things that the plans and priorities focus on but not because they feature in those plans. It is a kind-of ‘not in my name’ thing, a sort of resentment, once I remember some of my team whinging about the latest burglary drive and then hours later, when one of them had nicked an outstanding (wanted) burglar, celebrating with ‘tea and medals’...”. (I17).

The sentiment from the large majority of front line officers that they have been disempowered and were reactive to incidents that are then dealt with procedurally with little room for discretion, was lamented upon by one Sergeant:

“...thinking back a long time we had massive discretion, and although this did have drawbacks from ‘cuffing’ (not dealing with incidents appropriately) because we are not and cannot be directly supervised out and about to any real extent, meaning loads of polices and SOPs came in (standard operating procedures). Things changed early last decade with crime recording and detections drives but now there is some discretion back in certain circumstances and other disposals other than arrest, it gets officers thinking about the specifics of what they are dealing with and makes them exercise judgment, although these are limited”. (S15).

The responses conformed to directory knowledge (what the force should be doing) and recipe knowledge (in terms of disempowerment) in its examples. The approach to performance of senior officers was also assessed from a cynical position for a small minority of front line officers, notably more so from supervisors (Sergeants).
“...we’ve had a range of bosses who have taken different approaches to performance, some tried to ram it home and others were more understanding. The most negative period was when the detections drive had us all being micro-managed beyond belief just to get some senior officers their bonuses, second to the current changes to pensions and pay that was the most damaging thing done to morale. Good officers were demotivated and policing turned into remote supervision through computer screens chasing already busy officers”. (S18).

A sense of disempowerment from front line officers and also potentially some ‘change fatigue’ was referred to by strategic managers. The majority of front line respondents resented performance management as they referred to its capacity to neglect the wider role, create bureaucracy and, in a fashion, try and define policing activity (dictionary knowledge). Distaste for being directed to deal with certain offences in certain ways because they were the current focus was expressed (directory knowledge). It seemed as if the status of the latest priority disingenuously suggested other tasks they performed were not valued. Despite strategic managers’ knowledge and attempts to breach this cultural response, they appeared to seldom be successful.

The interviews were an opportunity to explore directly what respondents thought of resistance. We start with some themes from the interviews in terms of how the majority of front line and strategic managers viewed resistance to reform:

“I’m not sure that anyone actually resists reform as such, we don’t get a choice, it is something done to us. Does not stop the moaning and complaining though”. (C34).

“I would describe it as like learned helplessness, expressed through bitterness, spread like an infection through the ranks via rumour and war stories. If this comes in, it will mean this for us, and so on. The more powerless we are, the more the shared negativity. That’s what’s bad for morale, as much as any change itself”. (C12).

“...culture defeats strategy is quite a common saying and senior officers are acutely aware of it, solutions are not quite so common though!”. (SM7).
Culture and resistance was no purely unconscious process, potential reasons for this being supplied by a small minority of respondents for reasons well summarised by one Inspector:

“...when you start talking about culture, you have the hangover from ‘canteen culture’ and racism and all the negativity that most officers disassociate themselves from. Then you have performance culture which is unpopular. It’s just full of pitfalls as a concept”. (I30).

An example of a recipe knowledge ‘war story’ asserted the following (mentioned by three respondents):

“...they closed the canteens because of culture that is how seriously management take it”. (S10).

Officers conceptualised culture through dictionary knowledge as a negative and pejorative label that failed to acknowledge the concerns they held with reform. Strategic managers likewise acknowledged the issues culture supposedly presented in enacting change, although the overwhelming majority of the latter took a far more positive approach about the contribution front line officers can make.

One factor in resistance to change was often cited as being the overall support for reform agendas:

“...it has been clear from the outset that ACPO are in favour of a lot of the changes or at best are staying silent on the issue (of pay and conditions)”. (C31).

“...the reform agenda is an opportunity to improve what we do and in the economic climate that includes discussing pay and conditions . . . to make the savings required and keep delivering a service to the public, and in the budgets identified for the next four years, there is a shortfall which reform of pay will cover”. (SM2).

The implications for practice will be outlined in greater depth in the concluding chapter. Resistance to reform was at its most potent when the change in question
engaged the sense of mission, and was interpreted to instigate new practices to front line activity. Conservatism needs to be seen in light of these, as a response to change, asserting existing aspects of police occupational culture, and doing so in response to proposed reform agendas. Adopting Chan’s framework of cultural knowledge suggested that the way axiomatic knowledge relates to ideology in reform has a strong influence upon how the other categories of cultural knowledge (dictionary, directory and recipe) function. The Big Society elements of Coalition reform demonstrate this further.

The responses to discussion of reforms that constitute the Big Society showed an awareness of the multiple factors that were perceived to drive reform (political as well as ideological) and consequences at an axiomatic level. They demonstrated that reform programmes that do not appear to display continuity were considered from a conservative standpoint and assessed pragmatically as to implications for change through dictionary and directory knowledge. This assessment was not resistance to change alone but, in part, is the result of the appreciation of the changing ‘field’ and ideological opportunism in reform:

“...use of Specials was previously unpopular and contested, even opposed openly by some local commanders, but now the opportunities are obvious. It’s not just cost either in terms of visibility for very little financial inputs, but it fits nicely with the government approach”. (SM27).

A clear ideological line was discernible through the Big Society to use of Specials, with the large majority of respondents connecting the terminology to the practical reform, as will be expanded upon below (and possibly due to political debate at the time of the research concerning the Big Society and cuts clearly identifying the concept as ideological). A small minority of respondents went further to articulate the change in policy approach, linking this to reform directly, as with this strategic manager when asked why the concept was ideological and what that actually meant:

“...the link was made straight away from Big Society to volunteers in rhetorical terms and the rest was very easy policy wise as the networks were there already, the reason why the use of Specials had declined though was because it would be limiting to build
capacity around that part of the workforce, especially where the proportion of their use increased”. (SM2).

“...it is ideological because it’s committed to local networks supposing they are superior to central government, and it delivers VFM and gets local communities involved in policing”. (SM2).

The nature of the relationship and contact officers had with specials / volunteers was a factor for the large majority of front line respondents, and was ‘operationalised’ through dictionary, directory and recipe knowledge. As commented upon by one Sergeant:

“...useful for joining officers otherwise on their own and for patrolling certain functions, although no way near as operationally useful as another regular officer would be, most of what I need to cover they are not suitable for dealing with alone”. (S10).

Front line officers displayed no animosity towards volunteers, but referred in the majority to a preference to working with other regular officers, as expressed by one Constable:

“...nothing against people giving up their own time but to me they do not add anything to me on shift . . . if I am crewed (working) with a special it just means I pick up all the work, end up supervising effectively, and I’d rather work with another officer personally”. (C22).

“...if this was such a good idea then why was not it done before? Why does it take some government spin to get senior managers to do something useful? Or is it just that policing now simply follows what politicians want instead of standing up for itself like any professional group should and having some independent thought?”. (S10).

“...as a service we’ve under-utilised specials for years often with resistance (to them) from senior officers yet now there is a u-turn because it fits some piece of government ideology, it is good in my opinion but also regrettable that the direction of reform is not
led by the police more, as the danger is government will think we are not up to the job”.
(I26).

The connection had been made by the large majority between use of volunteers
and the Big Society, with common ground about concerns. Regardless of opinions on
use of Specials, the supposed failure to utilise them effectively prior to the Big Society
reforms and VFM formed a pejorative critique of the police role in reform, an opinion
formed through axiomatic knowledge. The ideological tensions posed an interesting
avenue for exploration, as they showed a clear relationship between respondents and the
perceived underpinning reasons behind reforms. A key distinction drawn from the large
majority of respondents was that of idea and implementation, as summarised by this
Inspector with reference to the introduction of Commissioners:

“...the idea itself is good and makes sense on some levels, it is just when you think
practically that problems with it start to emerge.” (I35).

The documented conservatism in police culture likewise was accurate but, in
relation to change, benefited from consideration of wider ideological drivers and
cultural knowledge. Ideology and its perception drew upon a wider and more embedded
reaction than conservatism alone. One of the implications of this, as to an extent
referred to elsewhere (for example Barton 2003), was the strength of occupational
culture to resist change. As this research shows, a significant part of this was the ability
of the street-management distinction to be deployed to diminish senior officers /
reformers authority, and perception that senior officers buy into the ideology. With such
a weight of cultural resources seemingly at odds with aspects of reform, resistance to
change could be likened to a noble-cause.

The process by which officers compared appraisals of change was wide ranging
but focused on similar themes. Remaining with the instigation of Commissioners, the
‘inside view’ consisted of the following, shared amongst officers (as described by one
Inspector, demonstrating the progression from axiomatic knowledge through to
dictionary and directory knowledge):
“...you get change, like Commissioners, and no-one really knows what will happen, so someone says something half-sensible about it, the more cynical the better, and it goes around like wildfire. With Commissioners it is how long the Chief will last before she’s sacked, and how they will shield the government from blame when the cuts hit home”. (I30).

This view was explored when more inexperienced Constables were asked how they formed opinions on change:

“...if I know nothing about something, I pick up on what others say, repeat it and see what response I get, or check it out online, if I don’t automatically have an opinion either way. I want to know what it means for me as an officer and my job so the people around me are best placed to help that, not the bosses or corporate stuff”. (C38).

“...we talk about reform through imagining what would happen if, say, there were no PCSOs, if SMTs (Senior Management Teams) were direct entries, if the next Commissioner was Jordan or Clarkson for example, and sharing stories builds up an idea of what the future will be like”. (C28).

These processes highlight how cultural knowledge is formed and shared and, to an extent, identify aspects of the supposed divide between street and management cops.

The large majority identified the supposed advantage of Commissioners from a government perspective, as commented upon by this Sergeant:

“...seems like a case of show the last lot (government) in a bad light, make big changes that probably will not be reversed, reduce spending and blame commissioners and chiefs when the public want everything prioritised or crime waves happen, as well as anti-social behaviour etc sorted”. (S19).

Potential force mergers showed the same process of assessment:

“...it became real for people when they had to consider wearing a different crest, being paid by a different police authority, and all the potential scare mongering that ensues
about promotion, transferring, and so came the horror stories and doom-mongering that accompanies most change so people got more worked up than perhaps they should”. (S23).

This is something that respondents reported to be shared and developed, tested even through discussion and scenario type thinking which the majority of front line respondents indulged in:

“...a lot of the shift goes onto policing blogs and there is loads of topical stuff on there about the job that is funny but true”. (C21).

Direct entry demonstrated the deeper cultural influences in assessing reform. This placed conservatism and resistance into context. A strategic manager summarised the options being considered for inclusion in reform focusing on direct entry and powers for roles from her perspective, one shared by the majority of strategic managers:

“...it has been a consistent theme in my service that is back with more support, direct entry into police ranks as well as placements for police managers in the private sector. I would think within a decade the management structures will be unrecognisable in policing, even to the extent of powers for roles, direct entry being the first step”. (SM4).

The large majority also recognised the inevitable tensions created by this aspect of reform:

“...there is a constant challenge to any public service to be more business-like and this hasn’t really to date stood against a lot of the policing traditions in terms of ranks and roles, it has always been at the periphery”. (SM7).

A consistent theme from all levels on this topic was that of operational competence in the case of direct entry, summarised by this strategic manager and reflected throughout the ranks, extending axiomatic summaries of the rationale for direct entry to dictionary and directory knowledge about what the organisation does already:
“...we already do direct entry, we have business managers, IT managers, from ACPO level down to front line support through PCSOs, the idea that managers from the private sector such as M and S [Marks and Spencer] or Tesco are going to manage operational policing is frightening . . . the prospect of people with little or no experience commanding firearms, public order, threats to life or any high risk policing activity is just daft.” (SM8).

Front line respondents, for the large majority, expressed reservations about direct entry in operational terms, as expressed emphatically by this Constable and with obvious implications for reform with such recipe cultural knowledge being widespread:

“...they will not have any respect or credibility as they have not done what we do and never will... no-one will have any confidence in them”. (C34).

The pervasive view that management in a police context was the domain of those who had walked the streets and operated on the front line, with leadership being an issue for direct entry, emerged. This was an area from the research that displayed the greatest continuity across any street-management divide, where the common bond remains police powers and status as a sworn Constable.

The practical implications that respondents perceived to occur as a result of the reform agenda, and the response within the service, asserted the ‘learned helplessness’ aforementioned for the large majority:

“...I would say ninety-nine percent of my colleagues feel the same way, there is not much we can do about it [reform], so whilst attitudes are constantly expressed through chat and banter, I’m not sure it makes any difference to getting the job done. Very few reforms will actually change what uniform response does”. (S16).

The research reinforced the importance of looking beyond the police institutions formal structures and boundaries, to explore the universal and “residual ties through the underlying police community”, explaining how officers define their context in relation to “a common pool of attitudes, perceptions, symbolism and history” (O’Neill 2005 p.197). It was the process used by officers to apply common attitudes and perceptions in
relation to reform agendas which reveals much about change, resistance and occupational culture.

Police occupational culture provided a set of assumptions and resources to officers in mediating change. These clashed with reform agendas’ reliance upon NPM and ideological approaches to the police service. They were shared and communicated between officers and groups, being readily available online and through sources not previously available to officers. VFM, performance, Commissioners / volunteers / Specials, direct entry and force mergers were all areas where resistance was apparent. A particularly adversarial relationship between NPM and specific ideological approaches to managing and reforming the police service existed. These changes to the ‘field’ of policing resulted in officers actively researching the changes, and testing current assessments of their role and the service.

We turn next to discuss to what extent this differs between groups within the organisation.

4.1.3 SUB-CULTURES: STREET AND MANAGEMENT COPS

This section discusses aspects of the research findings which add to existing theory on sub-cultures within policing. The impact of managerialism and reform would be expected to have a significant impact on management and street cops, resistance to change and conceptions of reform. The debate upon the extent to which different groups within the police service hold “a clearly discernible set of beliefs and assumptions” (Wilson, Ashton and Sharp 2001 p.133) is examined. The potential divergence from a set pattern of beliefs and behaviour; that officers are active in the process (Chan 1997 pp.69 – 70), and that culture has a positive ability to function (Chan 1996 p.111), will be considered. This builds upon previous research and extends further analysis of perceptions of reform agendas in order to “mete out the subtlety of police culture” (Crank 1998 p.14) and acknowledge fully the situational pressures that shape police practice (see Mastrofski 2004).
The full context of the relationship between street and management cops and the role of occupational culture in reform required acknowledgment of the influence of ideology. Using VFM as an example, the following contrasts comments from a strategic manager and two Constables:

“I think we do productivity well and have a positive culture of change, and there is a genuine buy-in and people understand the need to make savings and identify where they can be made”. (SM3).

“VFM is a term and nothing more, none of us do anything differently, it’s irrelevant to real policing”. (C28).

“We are led by demand from the public not the bosses”. (C14).

The divide or dissonance in approach to reform was based not upon rank alone but on assessment of change, mission and the wider context. Expressed in terms of cultural knowledge, front line officers relied on categorisations of strategic managers (dictionary knowledge), strong directory knowledge concerning the impact upon their role and recipe knowledge concerning a lack of impact on their activity. From an axiomatic perspective, officers for the large majority tended to accommodate for this in how they operated. Performance management demonstrated this approach (as this Sergeant summarised):

“I would not say this openly but none of my team could tell you any part of the delivery plan or local priorities with any accuracy . . . except maybe the latest poster on the toilet wall. This is due to figures and numbers turning them off straight away, as with the old detections drive and percentages etc, the belief that they are slaves to the radio, and the linking of performance with senior management and therefore a lack of appreciation of the realities of the job”. (S32).

A small majority of Sergeants likewise identified with the failure to ‘buy-in’, with reforms seen as emanating from the bosses and not therefore in tune with reality. This dictionary cultural knowledge formed a partial divide with strategic managers, and the resulting directory and recipe knowledge and guidance given to teams was therefore
unsupportive. The preceding sections outlined how the existing literature, in terms of NPM and police culture, made reference to such tensions in a more general context. The relationship between managerialist reform and cultural responses to them suggests officers may be especially resistant to change in a NPM direction, as the “elite narratives” of reform clash with local police cultures (Bevir and Krupicka 2007 pp.153 – 171). A range of references existed in the literature which point in a similar direction to this thesis, but without the full context of how reform and culture interacts (Cockcroft and Beattie 2009 pp.526 – 540). This will be considered further in the next section and concluding chapter.

Strategic managers articulated an approach towards reform which acknowledged the challenges they faced from an axiomatic knowledge perspective:

“...as a monopoly provider there is no way of using competition and in the past the service has probably been too relaxed about value for money and performance because we could be, now we are in austere times, the challenge is to change and adapt . . . we could learn from the private sector in terms of asking ourselves if we really are pushing ourselves enough to deliver’. (SM2).

Directory knowledge was also identified as a critical aspect of the management cops role:

“...at a strategic level we have an awareness of the direction of reform and the factors behind it, it is up to us to interpret it and make it fit in both directions”. (SM9).

This was also reflected by the large majority of front line respondents when assessing strategic management involvement in reform, as this Constable alluded to in more cynical terms, using dictionary knowledge to label managers and reinforce the sense of mission from directory knowledge:

“...HQ is the ideas factory and senior officers and the government are clueless as to the reality of policing”. (C11).
Strategic managers displayed an awareness of front line views upon performance management and used this to inform attempts to support change. This demonstrated that the street-management distinction is more subtle, capable of conforming to the more positive aspects of police culture which seek to accommodate and support change despite challenges. The difficulty of getting the balance right where performance is concerned was expressed by this strategic manager, representative of a small majority of them:

“We have priorities within the wide range of activities we undertake but always seem to struggle to focus on them and sell them the right way. There was such a negative reaction to the detections drive, yet how many officers joined to catch criminals and prosecute offenders, so why when it becomes corporate does performance become resented?” (SM1).

Strategic managers displayed and articulated an awareness of the cultural issues front line practitioners reported. The potential negative effects of dictionary, directory and recipe knowledge were well rehearsed. The majority saw culture and its negative implications in this area as the main issue for them in performance management:

“...officer’s can easily resent performance management, it has to be done right or you lose them, like a lot of things in policing it’s an area where as individuals you would never have an issue getting a buy-in or agreement but put it in a group or shift or station dynamic and suddenly culture gets in the way and is enormously powerful. The saying ‘culture defeats strategy’ is true and no more so than in crime management”. (SM1).

The research established a wider context for the challenges strategic managers face and the frustrations expressed by the front line supported by some previous studies. Top-down reforms to a police service noted a failure to influence activity and behaviour at a street level through rejection of the underlying rationale for those reforms (Metcalfe 2004 pp.71 – 91; Butterfield, Edwards and Woodall 2005 pp.336 - 341). Police supervisors and managers withdrew from an operational-supervisory role, failing to lead and enhance further reform. Unintended consequences caused practical issues, with a negative and cultural element to this response. The issues raised could again be described as a fundamental disagreement with aspects of reform at an axiomatic level, a
reaction to the ideology of change and perceived to be behind change, which in turn is expressed through all levels of cultural knowledge.

As articulated by a strategic manager, and representative of the views of a small majority of all those interviewed, tensions were present within the roles of ranks:

“I can see the argument for flattening the rank structure but see it from a different perspective. Police ranks have all become upwards looking and very strategic, gone are the days when Inspectors ran shifts and actively patrolled, Sgts are desk bound, and on neighbourhoods it is PCSOs that do the patrolling . . . we’ve managed to introduce a whole new rank in everything but name, without losing any existing ranks”. (SM1).

In accordance with previous research a picture of an organisational structure was described that was no leaner and flatter than previous eras. Previous research showed that NPM reform had the effect of increasing workloads (Butterfield Edwards and Woodall 2005) which was supported by this Sergeant, seemingly unaware that the large majority of his colleagues also shared this view:

“...my time has increasingly been spent on office based things my Inspector used to do years ago . . . most people do not realise as they have not got enough service, things have really shifted for Sergeants and the front line is further away than ever”. (S23).

A consensus over the impact of reform upon officers from strategic managers and the front line was also found in certain areas. Accounting for the role of occupational culture in assessing ideology in reform introduced a further variable to any sub-cultural analysis. As will be outlined later, this supported the argument that Chan (1997) outlines in terms of not seeing police culture as linear and deterministic. Aspects of the reform agenda supported this view and showed the operation of culture beyond simple rank distinctions, such as direct entry. This was an area from the research that displayed the greatest continuity across any street-management divide, where the common bond remains police powers and status as a sworn Constable regardless of rank. The devolution of power and responsibility had failed to empower lower ranks because of the cultural knowledge and appraisal of successive reform agendas.
The level of consensus in some areas of reform provided a contrast with previous research, which is much more pejorative in the account of the divide between management and street cops. Studies from other jurisdictions describe “a habitat of cops against bosses” (Crank 1998 p.122), where the front line and management “collide” generating bureaucracy and elaborate rulebooks (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993 p.120). Adversarial relationships with management were reported (Wilson 1968; Reuss-Ianni 1983 p.16) where “no one cares until something goes wrong” (Manning 1978 p.79). This constituted a significant source of stress (Crank and Caldero 1991 p.347), arguably more so than the features of the unknown and danger which police culture is possibly more adept at managing than internal conflict. Senior officers are supposedly denigrated through “having forgotten what it’s like” and “punitive bureaucracy” (Mastrofski 2004 p.104).

When considering reform and change, fuller account should be taken of the extent to which management cops consider cultural impact and how all groups assess reform ideologically. Where discord was articulated between front line and strategic managers, it was driven as much by cultural responses of mission, conservatism and reaction to ideology in reform than rank distinctions alone. Where front line officers presented negative views of management, this was based upon dictionary cultural knowledge categorising them as instigating or presiding over reform that was axiomatically opposed. Directory knowledge prescriptions for what the service should do and recipe knowledge examples (of resistance or opposition to reform) followed on from axiomatic tensions. The variables of specific reforms and its ideology must form part of the context in assessing street – management cops interaction.

Reuss-Ianni’s central contention was that the organisation of policing is best understood and described in terms of interactions between these two supposedly distinct cultures (street and management cops). Despite pre-dating the recognition of NPM, the public administration and scientific management principles employed at the time of her research were identified as significant in terms of change. The effects of the two cultures clashing were documented as “alienation... incongruent value systems... and displacement of quasi-familial relationships” (1983 p.4). The increasing scrutiny of social and financial accountability saw management cop culture as an “impersonal
ideology”, which was argued to be different from disaffection in other areas of the public sector (Reuss-Ianni 1983 pp. 2 - 7).

As opposed to separate cultures, the updated context (acknowledging the differing jurisdictions and time elapsed) suggested far more subtlety in police culture and interaction between these groups, and provided some of the significant drivers such as ideology which impact on that relationship. This research also focused to a greater extent upon management cops than the original research, which was acknowledged (as with Chan’s research 1997) to focus more on front line activity (Reuss-Ianni 1983 p.3). The ‘strategic slant’ and devolution of responsibility in performance also emphasised lower ranks to a greater extent (and formed a concern for them as documented). The potential for axiomatic cultural knowledge to operate directly on front line resources and react to ideology in reform was increased as a result.

The supposed difference between management and street cops has been used to argue that police strategic thinking and reform is more a question of discourse, with a gap between the dramaturgical world of senior officers and that of operational reality (Adlam 2002 p.32; Manning 2007 p.53; Punch 2009 p.125). According to this account policing services “may bear little relationship to the language of leadership whilst core police culture . . . remains relatively immune to the delicately contrived discourses of its leadership” (Adlam 2002 p.32). This requires balancing however with the argument that police culture research has been applied as a tool for criticism rather than analysis (Waddington 1999a, 1999b) and that in terms of street-management relations a focus on the “expressed ideology” of front line officers has promoted “the false idea that top command [strategic managers] are semi-competent idealists, who have lost touch with the reality of policing” (Manning 2007 p.51). When the ‘expressed ideology’ of front line cops, management and reform was considered together, a more accurate picture emerges of the relationships and how cultural knowledge is influential.

Bearing similarities to Metcalfe’s research into performance appraisal, a failure to buy into such terminology was apparent, interpreted by Metcalfe as a rejection of neo-liberal reform (2004). Should a management discourse exist, then it is to an extent rejected, as expressed from a minority of front line respondents such as this Constable:
“...there is management speak, with its phrases and own terminology and you see aspiring officers use it to learn how to get on and sound like their superiors, it’s fairly meaningless to real policing though”. (C31).

The prevalence of such terminology gives it a status which is now more easily shared between ranks as the service, as well as senior officers, becomes “immersed in the rhetoric if not the reality of NPM” (Savage and Leishman 1996 p.250). As revealed through the documentary analysis, such terminology is in colloquial usage through its inclusion in performance appraisals and force plans. The intensity and impact of reform was an area which had implications as described by this strategic manager:

“...there are always strong views on change, there has been and there always will be, but this feels like a greater gap between reformers and police than ever before. The rationale and the way in which police reform has been done now stands in opposition to what a lot of the people doing the policing see themselves doing and in a way being . . . and that is having a big influence on them and their views on what the Coalition are doing”. (SM5).

The views upon reform agendas and response were interpreted to have created more of a challenge for strategic managers in terms of the Coalition approach, reflecting the reaction to the ideology behind change. This is not the same however as front line officers dismissing management as semi-competent idealists.

Reuss-Ianni found that management and street cops do not share a common context for interpretation or action in her research (1983 pp.119 – 120). The observation that the process of change is beset by mutual opposition and competition was not supported by this research (reflecting an updated context). Many aspects of the street – management divide in the literature were present, although in other research the acknowledgment of ideology and its appraisal in reform operating across sub-cultures was lacking. Reuss-Ianni’s analysis afforded more power to supposed sub-cultures that “mould and channel behaviour . . . in the form of behavioural expectations and conventions which sets the limits” (1983 p.7). It is arguably more useful to see what groups hold in common and where variation emerges in interpretation, than see them as distinct. The differing contexts for interpretation and action are better conceptualised as
directory knowledge prescribing organisational outcomes. Management and front line cops still, however, shared a great deal of axiomatic cultural knowledge and understanding.

The various structures held to influence policing culturally (Reuss-Ianni 1093 pp.7 – 13) all feature in this research and highlight how reform and change was assessed and the ideological factors at play. The ‘socialisation’ and ‘peer group’ processes Reuss-Ianni argues for includes communicating and sharing assessments of reform and change (often outside the direct experience of those discussing them as considered in previous sections). Change through police reform agendas, ideology and political factors were significant drivers in this area, which similarly conform to changes in the ‘field’ to adopt Chan’s terminology (1997). The second structure, authority – power (command structure), has been considered in this section (the remaining category of culture, the ‘cross - group’ structure which features other departments and headquarters, has not featured heavily in this research).

In summary, strategic managers referred to political drivers for change more readily than front line officers, having a greater appreciation of political and ideological factors from an axiomatic knowledge perspective. They demonstrated a keen awareness of the tensions that emerged in reform agendas between reform and front line activity, seeing themselves as having a responsibility to interpret reform both strategically and operationally, linking the reality of policing everyday to overarching reform agendas. In this respect directory knowledge did reflect a different context to front line officers. Ideological tensions were articulated between aspects of reform and, as with Adlam (2002), the use of management discourse (or rhetoric). However, strategic managers were aware of the gap between them and the front line. Greater awareness of political drivers, ideological tensions between rank and file and particularly the ideological impact upon performance were apparent. They articulated in the large majority (and with a high degree of accuracy) cultural perceptions of reform and their role as senior officers in it from a front line perspective. A picture emerged of strategic managers acutely aware of the power and influence of culture, and the significance of reform and its perception within the service. This represented an updating of the ‘authority-power’ structure described by Reuss-Ianni (1983 p.9). The cultural impact of ideology in reform
competed in the documented areas with authority systems and networks (such as strategic managers) in decision making and control.

Strategic managers displayed an ability and desire to manage rank divisions internally. This showed a broader context of reducing conflict than previously identified. The danger in adopting a sub-cultural approach is of missing the full context, interaction and shared element of cultural factors. Whilst presentational differences do emerge between ranks, research which can penetrate the discourse and rhetoric of rank and file has the potential to find how common themes are interpreted and the level of awareness involved. This is of importance in examining reform agendas, the prospects of change and the inhibiting factors that may impact upon it. We turn now to consider change, culture and existing theory across the themes.

4.2 CHANGE, CULTURE AND EXISTING THEORY

The previous section outlined the research findings in relation to identified themes of mission, conservatism, resistance and sub-cultures (focusing on the street – management divide). Aspects of reform agendas of significance were outlined and implications for theory. This section combines these themes to consider the theoretical framework for change outlined by Chan (1996; 1997) and the implications of this research.

The research into change and police occupational culture by Chan (1996; 1997) is central to this thesis. The background to Chan’s research bears some similarities with the contemporary reform agenda. The need for change and drivers to do so in both cases were politically urgent, and knowledge about change and awareness of the “contingencies and vagaries” of reform were critical (Chan 1997 p.1). Chan’s study proposed a new framework for understanding the structural conditions of police work, police cultural knowledge and police practice. Previous theories of police culture were critiqued for failing to capture the full context and influence of the relationship between police organisations, practice and cultural knowledge. The emphasis upon the political drivers (in the case of this research ideological) that Chan argued should be afforded
greater acknowledgment in the process of change and in the cultural awareness of officers was evident. We now consider the criticisms of previous police culture theorising, which Chan sought to address and which this research is of relevance to.

Chan highlighted the inability to account for differences and variation in theory, and acknowledgment of the active role played by officers in the “reproduction or transformation of culture” (Chan 1997 p.12). The scope and possibility of cultural change was argued to be insufficiently addressed and the police occupational culture not placed in a full context that took account of political and social influences. The acknowledgment of the role of ideology and reception of reform agendas provides a fuller context, describing how the occupational culture reacted to change. The ideology in police reform and agendas represented part of the formal structure of policing which Chan argues should not be conceptualised as “uniform and separate” from culture (Chan 1997 p.63). The extent to which strategic managers and front line officers operated within differing structures in terms of managerialism, NPM and change nevertheless involved a high degree of understanding of each others ‘mission’ and how it was impacted upon by ideology in reform. Having regard for occupational cultural themes such as mission, conservatism and resistance placed into context the relationship between the demands of police-work, existence of culture and negative implications as a result. As Chan argues (1997 p.44 – 47), such assumptions should not be implicit to discussion of police culture and, as in this research, should be evidenced.

Chan’s framework for explaining police occupational culture conceptualised society as composed of relatively autonomous ‘fields’, social spaces of conflict and competition where “participants struggle to establish control over specific power and authority, and, in the course of the struggle, modify the structure of the field itself” (Chan 1997 p.71). In this research a key component of the field consisted of the historical relations between government and the police service through reform agendas, changes to policy and practice (legal, structural and occupational) and influence of ideology in reform. These social, political and ideological factors were joined with cultural knowledge to avoid critiques of occupational culture as simple, linear and deterministic (Chan 1997 p.92). The documented ideological, political and organisational reforms (the ‘field’) interacted with institutional perceptions, values and schemas (the ‘habitus’). What this research develops is how the ideological aspects of
the field relate to and impact upon the habitus: the mission, conservatism, resistance and street – management divide. The preceding sections featured the stories, narratives, categories, schemas and scripts that formed cultural knowledge in the context of reform.

Chan proposed four dimensions of cultural knowledge which form the habitus (Chan 1997 pp.76 – 80) consisting of Axiomatic, Dictionary, Directory and Recipe knowledge (focused in her research upon street-level practitioners). Axiomatic knowledge represents the fundamental assumptions about “why things are done the way they are” (Chan 1997 p.76). Although Chan notes that axiomatic knowledge is not necessarily shared with lower-ranking members (Chan 1997 p.69), in relation to reform agendas a given rationale for proposed changes was usually given (whether accepted or not). Axiomatic knowledge, for strategic managers and front line officers was, in relation to reform agendas, informed by an appreciation and interpretation of ideology in reform. The fundamental assumptions about why things were done the way they were in the police service formed the basis for the future of the organisation. Axiomatic knowledge was revised in light of reform agendas and in turn culturally related to the continuity in change. These mission-led cultural responses formed a response to axiomatic knowledge, with conservative responses and resistance forming part of that reaction. The strategic managers discussed this area of cultural knowledge more, referred in greater depth to political drivers in reform, as would be expected given their roles. Front line officers demonstrated an acute awareness and development of axiomatic knowledge. Changes of policy relating to volunteers and the Special Constabulary (and to a lesser extent Commissioners) were linked to the Big Society. VFM, private-sector and business like reforms clashed with cultural conceptions of what the police should do.

Strategic managers demonstrated awareness that front line officers did not necessarily share similar conceptions of axiomatic knowledge. This was particularly evident regarding performance management. As outlined, the sense of mission and resistance, together with the street – management divide, meant front line officers allegiance was focused upon the role above the organisation. The sense of mission and response to ideology in reform was built upon axiomatic knowledge, and was placed into context through acknowledging the role ideology, and cultural reaction to it, takes. Resistance did not manifest itself as solely due to the divide between street and
management cops, but because of the perceived allegiance between axiomatic knowledge and elements of reform agendas. For example, strategic managers being out of touch was linked to differing interpretations of the policing mission. Conservative responses to change, such as use of volunteers and direct entry for example, were not merely against change for the sake of it but were based upon axiomatic knowledge, including the ideology behind the reform.

Dictionary knowledge provided definitions and labels of things and events within an organisation, so complex and ambiguous scenarios can be summarised and dealt with (Chan 1997 p.77). In relation to change, categorising reform agendas consists of drawing parallels between governments and identifying the drivers behind them, and responding to reform by identifying a category to use. As a complex area of policing, and one with most reforms yet to happen, this was particularly culturally powerful and influenced by recognition of the ideology behind change. The continuity in reforms such as VFM and the link between modernisation and Coalition proposals was an example of how complex agendas were linked together. The war-story regarding the closure of canteens was another example of labelling the organisational response to negative implications of culture, in a way that inconvenienced officers and as a supposed knee-jerk reaction. In relation to reform, the method by which complex and often ambiguous proposals for change were assessed was significantly influenced by the perception of ideology. The rejection of ‘private sector terminology’ and phrases documented earlier was an example of how rapidly such assessments can be linked and made. Regarding performance management, the ease with which shifts and officers could be lost through reference to performance in briefings, highlights how powerful dictionary knowledge can be, and how NPM / ideology can sit uneasily with police occupational culture.

Directory knowledge contained descriptions about how things should be done in and by the organisation, and was associated by Chan (1997 p.78) with operational policing being carried out routinely. In the context of assessing reform agendas, directory knowledge was the cultural response to change shared by groups within the service. It asserted how change should be managed, in what direction, and the consequences of reform proposals, usually operationally, and from an organisational perspective. The issues with direct entry, and the comments on strategies adopted by the
various staff associations to counter the reform agenda, were examples of the expression of directory knowledge. The sense of mission and front line focus that emerged was a clear indication of directory knowledge reacting to reform proposals. Such reactions were most intense where the ideological basis for change was perceived to be antagonistic to existing aspects of directory knowledge. An example would be the Home Secretary’s comments upon the role of the police being to cut crime alone, and the changes through Police Commissioners and concerns about politicisation.

Recipe knowledge prescribed what should or should not be done in specific situations, and was the normative dimension of cultural knowledge, providing strategies for coping with police work (Chan 1997 p.79). This would, by way of example, include from the previous discussion of police culture the solidarity and the function of ‘war-stories’ in communicating recipe knowledge. In relation to reform, this aspect of cultural knowledge was seen in resistance to change, the communication of the implications of reform and how officers responded to it. The emphasis upon ‘real’ policing and the role of the sworn uniformed officer represented an area for which reform faced a stern challenge. Resistance and unintended consequences represented the sharing of recipe knowledge to mobilise solidarity and influence / prevent change / preserve the status quo.

The discussion around how officers shared and communicated / assessed reform conforms to recipe knowledge, which reacted to reform and the drivers behind it. This includes political and ideological drivers and cultural reactions, such as to reinforce the sense of mission or reference resistance (for example, direct entry candidates will get no respect and have no credibility). Of note for this category of cultural knowledge was the nature of reform often being based around the future, and so not being as subject to experiential learning as other aspects of police-work. The resources used to inform officers about reform was hence wide ranging and included social media and internet as well as peer groups organisationally. The reliance upon cultural resources, including the reaction to ideology in reform, was therefore significant in informing recipe knowledge.

The link between police cultural knowledge and the structure of policing had been recognised in the literature but was often assumed and not clearly established
(Chan 1997 p.73). The causal factors had not been identified and placed in context as fully as they could be. An overly simplistic linear model emerged as a result between structural conditions (the field), cultural knowledge (the habitus) and police practice. This research has examined police reform agendas and cultural response to establish the role of ideology in the structural conditions of policing, and the resulting impact on police cultural knowledge (the habitus). Whilst the potential discord between NPM and police culture is referred to elsewhere, the connections had not been made explicit and the full context explored. The police reform agendas, with their underlying ideology, changed the field, proposing and creating new structures. The resulting impact upon the habitus was the response to those changes and ideology, based upon cultural knowledge. Emphasising the ideological aspects of the field demonstrated powerful influence and the strength of the occupational cultural response. Changes in the field of reform had a discernible cultural impact in the sense of mission, conservatism and resistance documented. To understand the full context of police reform and assess the potential for change ideology and its reception must be considered.

4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has introduced the research findings and considered them in light of existing research and theory. The street – management cops distinction (Reuss-Ianni 1983) and theories of change (Chan 1997) have been considered and added to in terms of the role of ideology in reform agendas and police occupational culture. Diagram 1 shows in simple diagrammatic form how the police reform agendas (field) were considered through the theoretical elements applied, resulting in the updated cultural themes that will be expanded upon further in the conclusion.

The diagram is set out with the aspect of reform / significant feature of the policing ‘field’ from the research findings on the left. These consist of VFM, Commissioners (PCCs), volunteers / specials, direct entry and performance management. These are changes to the field through police reform agendas (the structures within which policing takes place). Moving across the table, the next column, entitled ‘theoretical elements applied’, documents aspects of the significant cultural
knowledge (habitus) in that area from Chan’s (1997) analysis; axiomatic (rationale, role and mandate), dictionary (how phenomenon is categorised and understood), directory (what should be done by the organisation) and recipe (examples, war-stories and mythology of note).

**Diagram 1: Summary of Research Findings**

**THE FIELD OF POLICE REFORM**

Changes to the Field of policing through successive reform agendas e.g. VFM / PCCs/ Big Society (volunteers / specials) / direct entry / performance management.

**THEORETICAL ELEMENTS APPLIED**

The theoretical framework of Chan (1997):
- Axiomatic knowledge;
- Dictionary knowledge;
- Recipe knowledge;
- Directory knowledge.

**UPDATED POLICE CULTURAL THEMES**

- Culture and resistance
- Street / Management divide
- Conservatism
- Mission

Applying the theoretical elements revealed a new context on established police occupational cultural themes as well as their interplay with reforms in the field of policing. VFM as considered in chapter one had consistently evolved through reform agendas and is a key NPM principle for public sector management. As considered, the terminology used has differed and the emphasis within reform agendas, with the
Coalition heavily emphasising VFM in light of the economic circumstances. Cultural knowledge consisted of an axiomatic understanding of this continuity and the reasons why, mitigated by directory knowledge which argued that the value should be seen as protecting front line uniform activity. The examples and ‘war-stories’ of recipe knowledge reinforced this message and confirmed that (as was the case) no cuts to front line policing would happen. This adds to existing theory by demonstrating how cultural knowledge has a significant relationship with the ideology within reform agendas. It updates the context of police reform.

Considering Commissioners, volunteers and Specials together as Big Society reforms produced instructive responses from cultural knowledge. From the axiomatic perspective the VFM aspects of voluntary work were apparent, with pragmatic directory knowledge issues with Commissioners over politicisation and volunteer’s resilience and availability. From a recipe knowledge perspective the reform agenda with PCCs was seen as political interference operationally and created potential issues with Chief Officers. The most instructive aspect was the perceived switch from under-investing in the Special Constabulary for decades to placing it at the mainstream of reform. Despite the pragmatic directory and recipe knowledge issues with this, ideology was cited as dictating policy. Similarly, direct entry (a recurring consideration in reform agendas), produced both dictionary knowledge categories concerning government conceptions of the quality of police leadership, directory knowledge concerning the value of experience and why the proposal will be less than effective in reality. The rejection of any parallels with operating more like the private sector and being more ‘business-like’ was strong.

Performance management, as considered in chapter one, had a long heritage in reform agendas. A clash at an axiomatic level of cultural knowledge with the values of measurement systems imposed, and the wider role and mandate / mission of the police emerged from the research. Wider police activities suffered as a result of the impact of measuring recorded crime and, through directory knowledge, provided cultural examples. Denials of the validity of private-sector terminology, with recipe cultural knowledge notable from managers dealing with performance without losing staff, informed conceptions of change. The implications for theory consisted of acknowledging the assessment of ideology in reform and how cultural knowledge reacted to it in this area. The street–management divide also needs to be re-evaluated in
light of the findings. Management cops operated within cultural knowledge and with an awareness of it. This updates existing studies which frame the relationship as much more adversarial.

The concept of culture and resistance from an ideological perspective was often associated with unionism, resistance to change and conservatism. Culture was seen as a negative concept, with some notable recipe knowledge war stories such as canteen closures. When presented from a dictionary knowledge perspective a disempowered ‘slaves to the radio’ conception of activity emerged as opposed to resistance. Management acknowledged the difficulties of engaging them in reform, particularly performance, despite the power of cultural knowledge expressed through the sense of mission and action documented elsewhere. The implications for practice will be considered in detail in the concluding chapter. The new aspects for existing theory were the fuller context of conservatism and negativity in police culture, the role of ideology in cultural knowledge resisting change, and the re-assessment of likelihood of successful change as a result.

The street – management divide featured in the literature, which has been considered in preceding sections to some extent. Managers articulated having a cultural role in understanding how cultural knowledge impacted upon reform and change and making it work. Front line officers displayed a range of directory, dictionary and recipe knowledge concerning relationships between them, policing roles and how they are managed. This adds to current theory by showing the extent to which the occupational culture defined and influenced interaction, the measures to which managers go and account for culture and ideology in reform and how the divide is not as wide as previously thought. Meting out the subtleties of police culture and reform produced a more accurate picture of organisational life and therefore the possibility of change.

The concluding chapter will unite the consideration of ideology, reform and culture and consider implications for practice.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

The successive reform agendas that have been examined have developed with similar ideological foundations. This has resulted in themes of continuity and to an extent shaped the relationship with police occupational culture, and how police reform agendas have been received and assessed. The Coalition reform agenda engaged managerialist and NPM / private sector approaches in order to address the extremely challenging economic circumstances that accompanied their tenure. VFM, productivity, civilianisation, performance and reduced budgets presented challenges. New reforms with the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners and the Big Society (volunteers and Specials) formed significant aspects of change. Police occupational culture interpreted the consistent and supposedly new reforms alike and related to the ideological foundations. This has implications for theory and practice which will be outlined through revisiting the aims and providing an overview of the thesis. The chapter then continues on to consider contribution to current theory, discussing the implications for the literature on public sector management and police occupational culture. Discussion of implications for practice then follows, which centres upon police occupational culture, reform agendas, change and the role of managers and front line officers. The final section, entitled concluding comments, draws together the thesis to comment upon implications for current theory and practice. We turn now to discuss the overall aim and objectives of the research.

5.1 AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW

This research aimed to establish the relationship between political ideologies, police reform and police occupational culture with a view to explain the interplay between the formation of police reform, reception and interpretation of reform agendas via police occupational culture. In relation to exploring the relationship between ideology and political ideologies, party political ideology and party politics, it has been
argued that consistent ideological influences in the NPM, marketisation and managerialism have driven police reform agendas. This consistency has been examined in relation to police reform agendas 1979 – 2012 in the context of ideological drivers for change. The exploration of impact upon police occupational culture examined existing literature, with reference to reform processes, the reception of reform agendas, resistance to and processes of change, resulting in numerous key findings. The key findings concern the historic attempts to change the service and previous research, which often focused upon negative cultural conceptions and features inherent to resisting reform. These are argued to fail to capture the full context of reform agendas from a cultural perspective and therefore expand on the debate concerning the possibility of cultural change. The majority of the key conclusions were generated from comparing and contrasting the existing research and literature with the findings of this research, to provide a fuller context of how cultural knowledge interprets and assesses reform agendas.

One of the objectives was to examine police reform 1979 – 2012 in the context of ideological drivers, assessing the significance of political ideologies, party political ideology and party politics upon change in the police service. Political ideology (acknowledging the varied factors that can influence and complicate the identification of such) had been consistently applied by successive governments to respective approaches to managing the police service. This approach has been argued to be ideologically driven with the increased use and application of NPM, marketisation (pseudo-markets) and managerialism. The ideological basis for this was linked to critiques of public sector institutions and the remedy was a complex application of market-based principles, from front line operations to governance.

Previous research into the impact of NPM upon the police service was considered involving de-layering, devolution of responsibility and increased time spent on outputs. The prevalence and increase of performance indicators were considered and the extent of centralisation in managing performance from the Home Office and government, allied with the rise of inspection bodies such as HMIC and the Audit Commission. Resulting critiques concerned with a supposed lack of flexibility locally and empowerment of front line resources were outlined and the extent to which the Coalition critiques of previous police reform (based upon localism and autonomy)
accord with those. Significant reforms in terms of community / neighbourhood policing were considered from a consumerism perspective, the reassurance gap, civil renewal and how such reforms had changed the police service.

The consistency of successive government approaches to VFM, from the Rayner scrutinies through the FMI, Home Office influence and circulars, CCT and BV, was outlined. The impact of BV reforms was considered from a strategic and operational perspective. Strategically, issues with measuring police performance and efficiency continued to be a problem for reformers. Operationally, front line supervisors struggled to cope with new auditing responsibilities, partnership work reportedly suffered, with a lack of ‘buy-in’ from front line officers. The continued productivity drive necessitated by economic circumstances and the approach of Coalition government to the public sector explored the ‘value’ component of VFM and how it was interpreted across reform agendas. The emphasis within the Coalition reform programme was placed upon localism and private sector solutions to efficiency and effectiveness, showing continuity with previous approaches.

Themes emerged in the police context referred to in the wider NPM literature. The first is that it is best to see NPM as a theme with distinct variations; “it varies within sectors, across sectors and it varies according to the outcome of specific management-professional relations” (Dent, Chandler and Barry 2004 p.1). The second is that the impact of NPM does not apply equally to institutional contexts, as management climate, culture, socio-technical systems and institutional capacity for change shape the impact of reforms (Flynn 2002 p.74). Capacity to change and particularly the scope for reconfiguring managerial-professional relations featured in research on the success of reforms and the tactics of professionals in subduing them (Dent, Chandler and Barry 2004 p.4). This supported the resulting analysis of the role of police culture in assessing reform and the ideology behind change, as well as managerial – professional relations in the street-management distinction referred to in the literature on police culture.

Whilst the Coalition marked some departures in terms of their expanded critique of ‘Big Government’, localism and reversal of some reforms (the policing pledge and force restructures for example), the overall approach remained consistent and, if
anything, sought to intensify the application of familiar themes. The ‘right to manage’ and associated managerialist tenets to empower the command and control of resources was hotly contested, with police unions concerned over proposed changes to regulations and working practices whilst reformers sought more flexible deployment. This was a consistent debate in police reform, reflecting the continuity of government approach and arguably the perceived failure to bring about satisfactory change by reformers. VFM likewise had a long heritage often in differing guises, and from the Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Thatcher governments had developed through CCT of the Major era, BV of New Labour, and VFM of Coalition. The BV reforms were examined as they were accompanied by academic research which directly and indirectly touched upon a police cultural response, as well as documenting the impact of NPM organisationally. This research shows the relationship in greater detail.

In terms of assessing the impact of ideology on police reform, the Big Society Coalition agenda posed some interesting discussion points. At first sight it appeared to mark a departure from previous government, and was contested as an ideologically inspired reform being critiqued as a cover for cuts. As outlined, the Big Society did have an ideological grounding and had been formulated over time, as opposed to appearing suddenly. Its basis in communitarian and one-nation thinking was not inherently neo-liberal, and so its reception in the police reform agenda was noteworthy. The impact of localism, Commissioners and use of the Special Constabulary in police reform demonstrated how change is assessed and how shifting ideology was perceived and communicated. The consistent ideological approach from successive governments to public sector management had significantly shaped police reform. As a result, the service had incremental exposure, and high profile bouts of resistance to varying degrees, to these proposed changes. This has allowed the time and space for a cultural response to be developed and shared which recognises, compares and assesses change, including its ideological foundations.

The objective focusing on police occupational culture examined existing literature and research, to assess the reception of reform agendas at front line and management level, operation of police culture and implications for instigating change. Police culture was considered in chapter two, commencing with attempts to define it, the orthodox conceptions and cognitive and behavioural similarities reportedly
displayed by officers. Three broad periods identified in the development of the literature were used to structure the discussion, and the working rules, those concerning inside and outside the organisation, maxims and codes held to form aspects of police culture were explored. The significance of these for reformers consisted of civil libertarian concerns with the factors that can justify police officers to step outside formal regulation and legal prescriptions. One aspect of this, canteen culture, was then considered in relation to the debate concerning attitude and behaviour and the broader context of cultural influence, as well as racism and how research into race, culture and the organisational response had contributed to an understanding of police culture. Typologies of police and public were then explored as cultural explanations of how officers see themselves, colleagues and the public.

The change of focus within the literature from similarities within police culture to differences was then explored. The concept of sub-cultures was outlined, and the progression from a deterministic conception of culture that denies the possibility of change. The symbolic aspects of policing were considered as to how they impact within police culture as well as the dramaturgical aspects of theories that introduced the street–management divide as sub-cultures in policing. The emphasis upon variation and sub-cultures was discussed further as a key cultural debate of relevance to this research. The difference between street and management cops was outlined and the resistance to reform from the lower ranks. The importance placed upon ‘real’ police work, amount of discretion and influence (or otherwise) of first-line supervisors (usually Sergeants) and negative cultural reactions was explored. The prevalence of top-down reform and a failure to engage front line ranks was highlighted as a recurring theme. Those key areas and debates are summarised below, as they are relevant to assessing the reception of reform agendas, resistance to and processes of change. Sections on reform and culture then expanded discussion on the supposed conservatism and resistance to change in the police service and theories of change, principally that of Chan (1997).

This research has demonstrated the ability of police culture to comprehend and understand shifting reform programmes, as well as manage internally rank divisions (over performance management for example). This shows a broader context of reducing conflict between management and front line officers than previously identified (such as Reuss-Ianni 1983) and a greater degree of malleability than discourse alone in
differentiating the approach of management and street cops (as in Adlam 2002). As the research demonstrated, strategic managers were often viewed as having diminished authority and operational credibility, which accords with other research concerning an apparent divide (Reiner 2000; Reuss-Ianni 1983; Manning 1997). Street and management cops however, on the basis of this research, may march to a different beat but did so whilst singing from the same song-sheet. The cultural resources available to them were interpreted across their contexts, and were deployed to interpret change, the organisations and their place within it.

Whilst many aspects of reform were yet to be realised, the sharing of negative implications did impact upon the respondents and assessments of operational outcomes. Not only was language itself a form of behaviour, it was a way of sustaining core beliefs challenged by reform agendas and countering ideology deemed unsuitable. The resulting effect upon morale and a lack of ‘buy-in’ alone would be expected to impact upon effectiveness. Whilst front line officers did not acknowledge the supposedly high amounts of discretion and ability to frustrate reform, this articulated disempowerment itself had a similar impact. Senior officers referred to the inability to engage operational officers, particularly regarding performance. In relation to reform, occupational culture could be considered especially powerful where it pre-emptively deployed long established ‘givens’ against change yet to happen. A further key area of police culture, conservatism, is of relevance to this.

The conservatism displayed was relatively consistent with that described in accounts of police culture in a way that reacted strongly and adversely to change. This was a reaction to the perceived ideology behind such reforms, which qualified the extent of prevalent conservatism by expanding upon the reasons for such a response. It demonstrated “the new policing realities” and the fact that change is required, this is acknowledged in other research (Loftus 2010 p.3). This was attributed by some respondents as due of the popularity of policing blogs and online resources that shared and analysed potential reform, allowing an entire new generation of officers to be immersed in the culture. This awareness of changing drivers behind reform and reaction to change is a subtle process institutionally. The findings from this research suggested that this is due to the police cultural response to ideology that is (and is perceived) to
drive such reform and therefore clash with existing conceptions of policing and police cultural identity, particularly from the sense of mission.

This research found that police culture did take account of political (and ideological) drivers in reform, and that many of the previously identified features described were active in that interpretative process. This included the street-management divide, the conservatism and sense of mission. This supported other recent research which affirms the remaining validity of such “classic” accounts of police culture (Loftus 2009 p.187, 2010 p.2). Existing conceptions of change regarding reform agendas, reception and impact upon occupational culture, are argued to fail to capture fully the context. This reflected the observation that research may insufficiently account for the political dimensions and influences which can perpetuate in policing (Reiner 2010 p.117; Muir 1977; Shearing 1981), and acknowledged fully the social and situational pressures that can shape police practice (Mastrofski 2004).

Whilst the negative impact of occupational culture in terms of the ability to resist and subvert change has been well documented (Barton 2003), less research discusses how cultural change is possible and for the positive. Chan (1997) outlined how external and internal factors can combine to generate positive change. This research found less value on the interpretation of the role of officers and sub-cultures and more on the strength and influence of occupational culture throughout, in interpreting not only changes in reform but continuity in reform agendas, particularly ideological aspects. The role of culture in assessing reform agendas was a powerful process and, whilst not relying on any ‘monolithic’ cultural rules, drew upon established and valid cues documented throughout the police culture literature.

The objective to contribute to existing knowledge on police occupational culture and change / reform, drawing implications for practice, is considered in detail in the next section. This will outline how the research contributes to existing literature, mainly in the field of police occupational culture but also with reference to public sector management and NPM. In relation to the latter, the importance of context is paramount and, should a comparative view or wider research involve the police service, police occupational culture provided the basis for this fuller context. In summary, the research has added to the police occupational culture literature on the street – management
distinction and consideration of change processes and how cultural knowledge influenced the possibility of successful change. The resulting implications for practitioners, particularly those involved in instigating change and reform, to the police service is expanded upon in the next section.

5.2 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS: CONTEXT AND PRACTICE

The literature on NPM emphasised the socio-institutional factors that can influence how public sector wide reforms are instigated. They point to the importance of context in researching reform, change and likely outcomes. The literature on police occupational culture likewise contains debates upon the extent to which variety unites or contrasts theories. What both literatures lack is a fuller appreciation of the context of police reform and police occupational culture, and how the two interact. This section outlines how this research addressed such a gap. The focus in public administration and public sector management had been more often aimed at sector wide levels, and not particular institutions. Where parts of the public sector are researched and referred to, this is more often local government, education and health and not the police service. The ideological basis for and impact upon the police service is not an area subject to a great deal of scrutiny in that context.

The literature on police occupational culture is expansive addressing reform, change, issues between those on the front line and management. It does so with comparative research as well (allowing comparisons across jurisdictions to be made). Whilst the literature does in places refer to tensions and issues between reform and occupational culture (Cockroft 2013 for example), insufficient detail explains how and why tensions between street and management cops, distrust of elite narratives of reform and resistance occurs. To express this in Chan’s terminology, the field of police reform and the ideology behind change has not been sufficiently accounted for as an explanatory factor in occupational cultural response. A fuller context allows for the correct consideration of interaction between ranks, management, front line activity and issues. The relationship between cultural knowledge and change could be better
theorised with a fuller appreciation of the relationship between reform, ideology and cultural response.

This research argues that a consistent approach from numerous governments in police reform agendas broadly follows the prescriptions of the NPM being ideologically driven. As a result the police service has experienced a range of reforms to model it upon private sector organisations. The increasing application and use of market mechanisms through pseudo / quasi-markets, performance management and competition followed. The role of police occupational culture in reform and change has been considered and the theories of Reuss-Ianni (1983) and Chan (1997) employed to analyse the relationship between reform and culture. The tendency for occupational culture to resist change and negative traits has been considered, as well as the existing research (such as Metcalfe 2004; Butterfield, Edwards and Woodall 2005). This research found that it is more accurate to conceptualise cultural knowledge as shared between street and management cops. When ideology in reform is considered at an axiomatic knowledge level, the differences between the groups are minor. The resulting directory and recipe knowledge (what the organisation should be doing and examples of how officers act) does differ, but the fuller context is to be found in allowing for the influence of ideology in reform. The following table summarises implications for practice in terms of these findings.
Table 4: Summary of Implications for Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>GAP</th>
<th>PRACTICAL VALUE</th>
<th>RESULT / OUTCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONTEXT</td>
<td>Academic literature acknowledges the importance of context which is not previously made out in relation to ideology, change and police reform.</td>
<td>Establishing contextual factors adds to knowledge and informs reform strategy and implementation.</td>
<td>Better understanding the reception of reform agendas and role of ideology will aid further research and comprehension of issues in change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STREET – MANAGEMENT INTERACTION</td>
<td>Relationship between street and management cops not fully understood.</td>
<td>Aid understanding and communication.</td>
<td>Accuracy of interpreting tension, conflict and informing reform attempts / understanding impact of this relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGE AND DISEMPOWERMENT</td>
<td>Influence of culture and power / disempowerment not fully articulated.</td>
<td>Aid understanding how culture can be engaged positively and disempowerment mitigated.</td>
<td>Updates the extent and detail of existing concepts of conservatism and resistance and implications for instigating / managing change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The importance of context has practical value in aiding comprehend how change and officers interact. Ideology in reform agendas has a significant role to play. The interaction between ranks is better understood and communication issues expanded upon. Comprehending the relationship for reformers and their approach to change is aided. How and why disempowerment and resistance impacts through reform agendas, the role of ideology and culture, and the extent to which conservatism and resistance likewise assists managing change. Discussion now expands on these areas referencing Chan (1997) and how her theory and its application in this research has developed a better understanding of context and practice.
Chan’s (1997) theory on changing police culture acknowledged the important role of axiomatic knowledge in influencing responses to reform. It also provided a framework for conceptualising police culture which can better account for the role of officers as more than passive actors. In a similar fashion to elements of the literature on public management and the NPM this allowed for the importance of context. The consideration of police reform and its relationship with police occupational culture should allow for the impact of ideology within reform, and its reception through government agendas. There is a fuller context in the role of ideology in change, shaping reform agendas and the response to them, which has not been fully reflected in the respective literatures. This has over emphasised the influence of conservatism and resistance to change without acknowledging the reasons why, labelling police culture often as negative and failing to mete out the implications for practice as a result.

Applying Chan’s framework of cultural knowledge (Chan 1997 pp.76 – 80) to research police reform has added to previous theorising regarding the street – management divide. It has identified the influence and reception of ideology in reform agendas and how they are received. Existing features of police occupational culture are better understood (the sense of mission, conservatism, resistance and street and management cops). The axiomatic cultural knowledge concerning the police identity and role included and incorporated reactions to ideology in reform. This is particularly notable in terms of NPM and private – sector change. This level of cultural knowledge was relatively homogenous between street and management cops. Dictionary knowledge categorised aspects of reform, whilst directory knowledge provided alternative conceptions of organisational direction and was more employed by front line officers reacting to proposed change. Recipe knowledge formed the practical and pragmatic on the ground responses to reform. The axiomatic emphasis upon the rationale for change, motivations and desired outcomes (the ideology of reform agendas) had not been recognised to its full extent within cultural knowledge.

Successive police reform agendas have followed a similar approach to change and direction. The ideology that drives and supports such reforms had a significant relationship with police occupational culture. Cultural knowledge at an axiomatic level interpreted change and assesses its compatibility with the existing occupational culture and ways of working. This informed how officers appraise change through the sharing
and communicating of what reform meant, why it was proposed, how it should be classified, considered and what individuals should do in response to it. This placed police occupational traits, such as the sense of mission, conservatism and resistance to change, in perspective as well as the interactions between management and front line officers, explaining more accurately how reform agendas are received and assessed.

Such an approach allowed for a greater appreciation of the habitus and cultural dispositions and therefore the possibility of change. It also reinforced those aspects of culture which are particularly resistant to change. The relationship between reformers, change-agents and groups within the police service could be better understood. The importance of police leadership, so often rightly emphasised by scholars as crucial to meaningful change, can be better articulated and understood in light of understanding how change was assessed and how ideology related to occupational culture. The relationship itself between street and management cops could better be understood where the common ground they share is defined. An updated appreciation of so called sub-cultures can generate a more pragmatic approach for managers.

For those implementing reform agendas strategically the research findings assist by providing a fuller account of change and its assessment by arguably the most significant groups in the workforce: those who manage front line operational activity and those who conduct it. Reform agendas have featured a relatively consistent set of ideas applied to the public sector and police service to bring about certain consequences (usually based around value for money / efficiency, performance and accountability). This process had been continuing and increasing in intensity in many areas since 1979 until 2012. What also marked the character of the various reform programs is the degree of agenda-resistance displayed by groups within the service and how this was mitigated. For the first time in recent history, and in contrast with pay and conditions under the Thatcher governments, the police service faced a future which has been framed in more pejorative terms by government. The resulting impact on morale and relations would be expected to be challenging in isolation. The research highlighted some key areas where focus should be placed to avoid frustrating performance.

The Coalition reform agenda was (and perhaps more importantly was perceived to be) imposed. Less meaningful consultation, and a much more combative stance in terms of the change needed, was often interpreted as politically motivated. When
compared to the Labour era there was less of a sense of a joined-up approach. This tapped dangerously into the sense of disempowerment which front line officers reported and which cultural knowledge readily recognised and engaged with. Longer standing issues (and not party political issues) with performance, NPM, the sense of mission and interpreting the role on the ground collided with the perceived rationale and direction of reform. These may have been intensified by any failure to address concerns with a reform agenda that combined with cultural knowledge to create a ‘watershed’ feeling. Recipe knowledge showed examples of the cyclical nature of police reform, changing priorities, politicisation, distrust of politicians and supposed failure of police leadership. The danger is that cultural knowledge and its reaction to reform agendas may turn crime-fighters into reform-fighters. Strategic managers recognised this to varying extents with the recognition that these processes were not as simple as morale or negativity. However, the scale and magnitude of change left almost all areas of policing untouched and provided ample opportunity to develop directory, dictionary and recipe knowledge in response.

Changing the field does not necessitate changes to cultural knowledge (Chan 1997). This research suggests that culture was all the more powerful when viewed from the perspective of reform. However, it also demonstrates how officers’ sense of mission conservatism and resistance were not in a sense ‘unionised’. The thin blue line was not drawn around pay and conditions, but powers, status of the sworn Constable, with considerable disquiet at Police Federation tactics in representing issues with the Coalition agenda. The potential for greater engagement to tackle disempowerment and to engage more directly with the cultural knowledge responding to reform agendas was there. This applies to staff associations as much as those at the forefront of strategic change.

The street – management divide has been considered at length. The updated context allows for better briefing for managers (and confirmation) of how cultural knowledge impacted upon groups of officers. This would also be of practical value for direct entrants at a management level, who will not have experience of such cultural resources (from subordinates, peers, senior management and the public). The potential barriers that cultural knowledge reacting to ideology in reform agendas can cause is not the same as resistance for the sake of it (as some previous research implies). The ability of such aspects of occupational culture to function positively should be teased out as
best practice and celebrated, where cultural knowledge sustains good service. Change programs should be cognisant of, and address, the likely ‘barriers’ and ideological issues that can arise colloquially. As referred to in the research findings, management speak, private sector terminology and business practices, together with dictionary and recipe knowledge otherwise formed a source of disempowerment. As Chan argues (1997), training and structural changes to the field will not necessarily alter the habitus. Neither will insufficient consideration of the impact of cultural knowledge and ideology in assessing and mediating reform agendas. By way of one example, imagine the impact on a front line workforce that is told and communicates that the canteens were shut because of police culture. The implications for any training or initiative that seeks to engage or discuss culture that does not address such aspects of cultural knowledge may be short lived. The same could be said for management cops who do not understand how these processes operate. The discussion around how managers motivate and manage teams showed, to an extent, a natural tendency to acknowledge the impact of cultural knowledge whilst achieving organisational goals. This should be organisationally embedded and planned for by management teams at all levels. The wider implications in managing the more negative aspects of culture documented would be sufficient benefit in themselves, in addition to introducing reform agendas.
5.3 CONCLUDING COMMENTS

For many respondents in this research, the conception of police reform was that of having reached a watershed of concerted change. From a more historical perspective the continuity and framework put in place by Thatcher had progressed through successive administrations. The role of police culture in mediating change was one that would not diminish, with a continuing challenge of performance and VFM and an ongoing program of change which is set to engage with established features of police occupational culture. Factors that were most likely to further intensify police reform included further changes of government, the proposed and ongoing changes to the way the service operates and is governed (in terms of staff associations, ACPO, HMIC) and the impact of reforms examined in this thesis. The electoral cycle for Commissioners, potential increase of direct entry and interpretation of performance are set to continue to see tensions within the service. Economic conditions were unlikely to improve either in terms of budgets and resources available to the police.

It is important for academics and practitioners alike to see police occupational culture, reform and change in as full a context as possible. Understanding how proposed reform is received, and the cultural knowledge that interprets reform agendas, can assist the police service in enacting successful change. Strategic managers and those designing reform would have an explicit awareness of how mission, resistance and the street – management divide itself can endanger or support change (which in some areas of policing was happening already and is part of the strategic managers role as they see it). As with Chan (1997) the process of change was, on the basis of this research, one in which officers were active and as such opportunities exist, such as in training for example, for better understanding and appreciation of cultural knowledge to facilitate positive change.

The area of this research which merits final consideration is the application of the context of change and cultural knowledge. Some of the previously negative conceptions of occupational culture, such as conservatism, resistance and unionism are qualified by the strong sense of mission. This has the potential to function positively, and is not de facto resistant to change. As some aspects of the literature refer to, a role for leadership exists which participants in this research recognised and used. The ability
for police occupational culture to support reform agendas is an area which has yet to be tapped into and engaged.
REFERENCES


Cameron, D. (2010c April 9th). Labour are now the reactionaries, we are the radicals – as this promise shows. *The Guardian*, 9th April 2010.


http://reassurancepolicing.co.uk


APPENDIX A: POLICE REFORM

This table is a brief and by no means exhaustive chronological summary of the major reform attempts and changes through successive governments 1979 – 2012. It is compiled from a public sector management / NPM focus and therefore does not include other potentially relevant reforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event / Publication</th>
<th>Ideological links</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Rayner Scrutinies</td>
<td>Introduced marketisation through management by objectives, performance management and devolved management to public sector. Evolved into the Financial Management Initiative spanning numerous governments from Thatcher to Major.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Home Office Circular 114/83</td>
<td>Private sector techniques and philosophies for better efficiency. Scrutiny on inputs and outputs. Set the foundation in the Thatcher governments for continuing modernisation to the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>The Audit Commission</td>
<td>Inspection body to assess management practice and develop a centralised influence on force management to secure VFM, (from its role bestowed by 114/83), in ensuring existing resources were being used efficiently, effectively and economically. Key driver in reform in Major and New Labour eras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
<td>To assess and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces, increasingly assessing the success of reform agendas and organisational impact. Key driver in reform in Major and New Labour eras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Home Office Circulars 105 and 106</td>
<td>Encouraged the use of civilians to release officers for operational duties. Set the foundation in the Thatcher governments for workforce modernisation that would continue, up to and including the Coalition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Compulsory Competitive Tendering</td>
<td>Introduced requirement to tender for services for contracts and award to the most competitive bid. Extensively used by Major government until replaced by Best Value of New Labour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>The Citizen’s Charter</td>
<td>Emphasised the importance of value for money and need to represent the public against bureaucracy by setting Charter standards. Major government centrepiece setting foundation for consumerist reforms in police service. Consumerism continued in various forms by New Labour and Coalition (e.g. Neighbourhood / Reassurance policing).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>The Sheehy Inquiry</td>
<td>Emphasised the need for greater flexibility in deployment, performance related pay and reward systems and a streamlining of the rank structure. Major government attempt at wholesale reform encountering significant resistance from within the police service. Elements of Sheehy since enacted or proposed by Coalition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Report/Reform</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The Posen Review</td>
<td>Reviewed tasks that could be relinquished from the police and delivered by other means that would be more cost-effective, with proposals for the Home Secretary to set priorities and objectives whilst Police Authorities became more business-like. Centralisation that would continue with New Labour governments and further workforce modernisation since Major.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Best Value</td>
<td>VFM through a statutory basis consisting of a general duty for police authorities to secure continuous improvement in the way in which services are provided, building upon CCT and intensifying competition between police services. New Labour intensification of CCT and Major government reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Police Standards Unit</td>
<td>Regulatory body monitoring performance and increasing control over resources with extensive powers to intervene. New Labour era reform to drive standards and improvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Closing the Gap</td>
<td>Report into force mergers and restructuring of police services where they were considered too small to manage specialist services. Commissioned by New Labour and dropped by Coalition as too costly and as part of localism agenda.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS

This appendix consists of the following documents:

1. Delivery Plan 2010 – 2011 (Thames Valley Police 2010);

The following overall themes were identified:

1. Value for Money (VFM) / Productivity: There was frequent reference to VFM and productivity. Getting more from resources was a consistent theme and tactics to maximise visibility and streamline services.

2. Big Society: The use of volunteers and the Special Constabulary received much greater emphasis and was explicitly linked to community engagement.

3. Performance: There was a consistent reliance upon measurable indicators of police activity throughout the ‘performance domains’ and areas of activity for the year(s) ahead.

4. Front line: There was an emphasis upon the importance of maintaining the front line, supporting front line activity and having officers visible to the public. This was directly related to VFM and productivity.

The following table depicts the full analysis of the delivery plan from which the above summary is taken:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTRAL THEME</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT</th>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Challenge / challenging</td>
<td>Financial / budgetary...</td>
<td>No reduction in availability and visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintaining frontline...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reducing Bureaucracy...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Providing VFM...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Freeing’ shift patterns...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborating / collaboration</td>
<td>Improved efficiency...</td>
<td>Savings and improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Better resilience...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost-effectiveness...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opportunity...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuts / fiscal constraint /</td>
<td>Wider public sector...</td>
<td>Ultimate effect on levels of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funding cuts</td>
<td>De-layering...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Streamlining...</td>
<td>‘Imposed’...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain frontline...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No patrol reduction...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maximise productivity...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk-assess...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural change...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- No reduction in availability and visibility of policing...
- Officers less hindered...
- Fundamental restructure to meet challenge...
- Savings and improvements
- Minimising impact...
- Ultimate effect on levels of service available...
- Severe pressure in coming years...
- Rationalised structure...
- Unprecedented period of financial contraction...
- Outsourcing back-office functions...
- Redundancies
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VFM</th>
<th>Innovation...</th>
<th>Reduced waste / inefficiency...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leaner...</td>
<td>Less risk-averse...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Productivity...</td>
<td>Compliance &amp; targets to professionally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture of continuous improvement...</td>
<td>Self-confident &amp; customer focused culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unprecedented scale of savings...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase future availability...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Policing</td>
<td>Match CDRP boundaries...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficiency / effectiveness...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VFM Profiles...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>Specials...</td>
<td>Reduced size...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Valuable...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficient...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity</td>
<td>Skills and attitudes of staff...</td>
<td>Relationships improving...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced sickness...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train, brief, deploy...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remainder of Appendix B consists of the documents researched.
# Delivery Plan 2010-11

## To strengthen neighbourhood policing to respond to local need and increase public confidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Improve local arrangements for community consultation in line with the Policing Pledge and deliver enhanced engagement and problem solving in conjunction with partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Implement a method of identifying those at risk from chronic anti-social behaviour problems in terms of victims, offenders and locations, ensuring that police and partners deliver appropriate interventions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Improve the communication between neighbourhood policing teams and our local communities: making best use of community messaging, new technology and newsletters, aligning with partners wherever possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Increase members of the Special Constabulary to 450.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Take measures to improve confidence and satisfaction levels reported by all our communities, closing the gap where differences are apparent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Control Strategy Priorities:*

Tackle anti-social behaviour by focussing on problem families and locations and supporting reable victims.*
## Delivery Plan 2010-11

### To develop our partnerships to reduce crime and disorder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Work with partners to implement effective local integrated offender management that will reduce re-offending amongst an extended group of offenders.</td>
<td>ACC LP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Ensure our engagement with young people in schools supports our work to tackle anti-social behaviour, street crime, knife crime and gangs, is in line with good practice nationally and locally, and that officers and staff engaged in such activity are appropriately trained and resourced.</td>
<td>ACC LP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Target enforcement activity and preventative measures to reduce the level of serious violence, particularly that associated with gangs and the criminal use of knives.</td>
<td>ACC LP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Increase prosecutions against drivers who use their vehicles in an anti-social manner in our neighbourhoods, through the effective use of legislation including seizure powers.</td>
<td>ACC O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Ensure greater use of awareness training and online education schemes for drivers and other road users (e.g. pedestrians and cyclists) to reduce the number of those killed and seriously injured on our roads.</td>
<td>ACC O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Tackle violent crime offences by improving their investigation, increasing the detection rate and the use of prosecutions.</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Reduce offences and increase detection rates in burglary dwelling, robbery and autocrime by targeting prolific offenders and crime hotspots.</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CJ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Strategy Priorities:**

Tackle violent crime and crimes involving the use of knives and improve our investigation of serious acquisitive crime.
To improve the service provided to victims, witnesses and the public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Enhance the quality of service in relation to victims, witnesses and callers coming into contact with Thames Valley Police by streamlining our processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Maximise the current mechanisms for receiving information from the public and identify additional effective communication routes using the internet, email and text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Improve compliance with the requirement to keep victims informed about progress of their investigation in line with the Policing Pledge by negotiating/agreeing updates with victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Roll out the national modernising charging project. This will involve the police taking responsibility for more charging decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>In partnership with Health and other agencies establish a Sexual Assault Referral Centre for the Thames Valley to provide a service for the victims of Serious Sexual Assaults.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Ensure the Force is able to deliver the standards required of the police for mental health and supporting people with learning difficulties as set out in the Bradley Report and forthcoming national guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Work with partners to reduce repeat victimisation in those domestic abuse cases managed by the Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Identify and reduce the number of repeat domestic abuse offenders who move from victim to victim through targeted enforcement and preventative activity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Strategy Priorities:
Tackle domestic violence and improve our investigation of serious sexual assaults and hate crime.
Delivery Plan 2010-11

To protect communities from the threat of terrorism and organised crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct results analysis for major and serious organised crime in order to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase intelligence gained through communities and to increase the effectiveness of using such intelligence for tackling serious and organised crime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare and implement management plans for all identified Organised Crime Groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage with other regional and national agencies and partners to support our preventative and enforcement activity against serious and organised crime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop partnerships with the business community to support our preventative and enforcement activity against serious and organised crime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>ACC O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare and protect against terrorist attack in partnership with our Local Resilience Forum partners.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct a counter-terrorism exercise to test the Force and partner agency response to terrorist incidents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Strategy Priorities:
Continue to disrupt organised crime groups, tackle those engaged in drug supply and violence, and reduce the threat of terrorism.
Delivery Plan 2010-11

To use information and intelligence to be more effective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Implement the Guardian Came System across the Force and introduce effective business change in order to facilitate maximum operational benefit</td>
<td>DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Further improve Information Management tools and processes to enable efficient access to key data, information and organisational knowledge.</td>
<td>DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Meet the specified requirements in order to connect to the Police National Database and introduce effective business processes so as to maximise the additional intelligence opportunities</td>
<td>DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Implement a future-proof cost-effective ICT infrastructure that provides staff secure access to key systems and applications in any location so as to improve our customer service.</td>
<td>DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 Introduce Identity Access technology controls and compliance with the ACPO Information Assurance Maturity Model to enhance Force Information systems' security.</td>
<td>DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 Introduce further Information Assurance controls across the organisation to facilitate effective information sharing with partners and to minimise risk around data transfer.</td>
<td>DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7 Implement recommendations from the force review of intelligence that will improve and streamline our processes.</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CJ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Delivery Plan 2010-11

To develop our people to give the best service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Promote leadership and embed professional values in our people.</td>
<td>DoR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Implement actions developed in response to the staff survey.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Take positive action in the recruitment, development, promotion and retention of under-represented groups in TVP. Specifically to:</td>
<td>DoR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Achieve an annual recruitment target of 10% Black &amp; Minority Ethnic (BME) officers, police staff and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Achieve the Police Authority’s locally agreed targets for overall representation of female and BME police officers, police staff and PCSOs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Reduce under-representation in departments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Monitor career progression of female and BME officers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Strengthen the quality of individual performance management by marketing the PDR matrix and guidance.</td>
<td>DoR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Delivery Plan 2010-11

7

To improve the use of our resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Implement the agreed actions of the productivity plan.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Identify and implement collaborative opportunities that will improve service delivery and/or deliver savings.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Ensure that appropriate gaps in the Protective Services Improvement Plan are closed.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 Ensure that identified benefits are realised and risks managed through the Change Management process across the organisation.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 Improve the management and analysis of performance data through effective use of systems and processes.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6 Progress asset management opportunities and priorities.</td>
<td>DoR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7 Identify the Force’s environmental impact and develop actions to achieve future improvements.</td>
<td>DoR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8 Through ICI collaboration with Hampshire constabulary and working with Forces in the SE region ensure compliance with the NPAA Information Systems Improvement Strategy.</td>
<td>DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.9 Develop a strategy to bridge the funding gap identified from 2011 to 2014 and publish details in the Value for Money Statement.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.10 Use the Productivity Framework to drive sustainable improvement in quality of service and efficiency.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Delivery Plan 2010-11

Delivery Plan Targets

To strengthen Neighbourhood Policing to respond to local need and increase public confidence:
- Increase the percentage of people who agree that the police and local councils are dealing with anti-social behaviour and crime issues that matter in their area to 88%.
- Increase the number of Special Constables to 450.
- Increase the satisfaction level with the overall service provided to 86%.

To develop our partnerships to reduce crime and disorder:
- Increase the detection rate for Violence against the Person with Injury (including domestic abuse) to 35%.
- Reduce the level of Serious Acquisitive Crime (domestic burglary, theft of a vehicle, theft from a vehicle and robbery) by 2%.
- Increase the detection rate for Serious Acquisitive Crime to 12%.
- Achieve a 25% detection rate for Serious Sexual Offences.

To improve the services provided to victims, witnesses and the public:
- Reduce the level of repeat victimisation, compared to 2009/10, for victims of domestic abuse assessed by the police as 'High Risk' and managed by Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences.
- 90% of 999 calls to be answered within national target of 10 seconds.
- 90% of Non-emergency calls received within the PECs to be answered within the national target of 40 seconds.

To protect communities from the threat of terrorism and organised crime:
- Disrupt 20 High Risk Organised Crime Groups.
- Increase the number of confiscation orders by 10%.

To develop our people to give the best service:
- Achieve an annual recruitment target of 10% BME officers, police staff and PCSOs.
Delivery Plan 2010-11

Diagnostic Indicators

To strengthen Neighbourhood Policing to respond to local need and increase public confidence

- The disparity in the white and BME satisfaction levels with the overall service provided by the police.

To develop our partnerships to reduce crime and disorder

- The level of Most Serious Violent Crime compared to Most Similar Force Group
- The detection rate for Most Serious Violent Crime compared to Most Similar Force Group
- The detection rate for Assault Less Serious Injury compared to Most Similar Force Group
- The detection rate for Burglary in a Dwelling compared to the Most Similar Force Group
- The detection rate for Theft from Vehicle compared to Most Similar Force Group
- The detection rate for Theft of Vehicle compared to Most Similar Force Group
- The detection rate for Robbery compared to Most Similar Force Group
- The detection rate for hate crime.

Key to Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CC</th>
<th>Chief Constable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCC</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC IP</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable, Local Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC C&amp;CJ</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable, Crime &amp; Criminal Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC O</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable, Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoR</td>
<td>Director of Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIST</td>
<td>Director of Information, Science &amp; Technology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategy for policing
Thames Valley 2011-14
incorporating the Delivery Plan 2011-2012
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-14

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STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-14

Foreword
by the Chair of Thames Valley Police Authority

I am pleased to introduce the three year strategic plan 2011/12 – 2013/14. This plan outlines the objectives and strategic direction which has been set for the Force over the coming years.

We are facing serious financial challenges in the coming years and this three year strategy sets out our approach to maintaining the frontline services which are most important to the people of Thames Valley, while delivering the necessary financial savings to respond to the Government’s comprehensive spending review.

In creating this document the Authority and the Force have consulted extensively with a broad range of members of the public in Thames Valley to gain a greater understanding of what they felt the police should focus on for the future.

A clear priority identified in this consultation was to increase the visible presence of the police. It is for that reason that we plan to maximize the number of officers and PCSOs available for operational duties through new shift patterns, a reduction in bureaucracy and an increase the use of mobile data solutions to reduce the time officers spend in stations.

The objectives and plan set out within this plan will be challenging, however the Authority and Force will continue to work hard alongside our partners to make Thames Valley a safe place to live and work.

Khan Juna
Chairman, Thames Valley Police Authority
**Strategic Plan 2011-14**

**Foreword**
by the Chief Constable

This strategy sets the direction for Thames Valley Police and was developed after extensive consultation within Thames Valley.

We have taken note of the Government’s report *Policing in the 21st Century* and have sought to balance the national requirement with local concerns.

This strategy sets out six strategic objectives which will focus our efforts over the next three years and will build on the substantial reductions in crime over the last three years.

We will focus on cutting crimes that are of greatest concern and will ensure that local communities including rural and business communities lie at the heart of all we do. We are changing the structure of local policing to provide a more responsive local service and to enable the Force to maintain and improve visible policing in a challenging financial climate. We will work with a wide range of local partners to reduce crime and will increase the number of Special Constables to 700 by March 2012.

We will also continue to fight domestic terrorism and will reduce threats to the 2012 Olympic Games by effective planning and preparation with other forces and partners.

We will improve our communication with the public and will provide timely and relevant information as well as harnessing new techniques for reaching a wide range of groups in our communities. We will continue to develop the leadership skills of all our staff to improve performance across all areas of our work.

This ambitious plan has been developed against significant reductions in our budget, but through our Productivity Strategy we have ensured that there will be no cuts in the number of officers on patrol or in Neighbourhood Policing Teams.

The aim of Thames Valley Police is to work in partnership to make our community safer – this strategy is our plan to achieve that aim.

Sara Thornton
Chief Constable
Strategic Plan 2011-14

Our Aim and Values

We, in Thames Valley Police, have a very clear aim:

‘Working in partnership to make our community safer’

We believe that providing a high quality of service to the public is not simply about what we do, it’s equally about the way we do it.

Our values are shared by all members of our organisation and are the foundations that underpin the delivery of our aim and objectives.

Our Values

To foster the trust and confidence of our community, we will:

- Treat everyone fairly and with respect
- Act with courage and integrity
- Take pride in delivery a high quality service and keeping our promises
- Engage, listen and respond
- Learn from experience and always seek to improve

Introduction

Thames Valley Police is the largest non-metropolitan force in England and Wales, covering the counties of Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Buckinghamshire and serving a population of 2.1 million from diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. The population in the Thames Valley is predicted to rise significantly over the next decade and Milton Keynes, Slough and Aylesbury have been identified as key areas for growth. We also play host to over six million visitors annually, who come to sample our festivals, history and sporting events.

These numbers will increase significantly when the Olympics come to England in 2012 as some sporting events will take place in Thames Valley.

The Force is divided into 15 Local Police Areas (LPAs). The LPAs are responsible for providing local policing priorities and are supported by a number of Force-wide specialist teams such as Roads Policing and Firearms. As of March 2011 there were 4293 police officers (full-time equivalent), 2580 police staff including 500 police community support officers (PCSOs) and 516 special constables, assisted by 598 volunteers.

In addition to meeting the everyday demands and challenges of policing, we recognise the importance of setting out our aim and objectives which will govern the future direction of Thames Valley Police. Our Strategy for Thames Valley Police 2011-2014 therefore explains what we are seeking to achieve over the next three years and outlines how we intend to deliver on both the national and local policing priorities.

In addition to meeting the every day demands and challenges of policing, we recognise the importance of setting out our aim and objectives which will govern the future direction of Thames Valley Police. Our Strategy for Policing Thames Valley 2008-2011 therefore explains what we are seeking to achieve over the next three years and outlines how we intend to deliver on both national and local policing priorities.

Developing the Strategy

Understanding the national and local priorities is key to developing a strategy that will effectively provide the direction for Thames Valley Police. We have therefore engaged with you, the public, and our partners to gain a better understanding of the issues that affect the community the most and have taken into account the national priorities which apply to all police forces around the country.
 Strategic Plan 2011-14

Our Aim and Values

Thames Valley Policing Priorities

Put simply, the priority of the Thames Valley Police Authority and Thames Valley Police is to ensure that the public gets the best value for money to do this we aim:

- To cut crime
- To catch criminals
- To cut costs

Our strategic objectives are closely aligned with the Home Secretary’s priorities and will focus on how we will be working with our partners and the community in order to make our neighbourhoods safer, cut crime and deliver a high quality of service to all of the community.

Between June and July 2010 we consulted the public in surveys with representation from over 100 adults in each of the Local Police Areas, including older age groups; Black and Minority Ethnic population and those with long-term disabilities. Additionally 1,255 adults completed an online survey, 1,753 adults completed paper surveys and 497 face to face interviews were conducted across each of the LPAs.

There are consistencies in the priorities highlighted across the consultations, although the methodologies vary. These priorities echo what we were told last year, that the public thinks TVP’s priorities should be answering emergency calls; tackling violent crime and solving crime.

A great deal has been done to modernise and strengthen our Force over the last three years, but we know that we must continue to develop our people, our resources and our relationships with the community in order to enable us to deal with the challenges of 21st century policing. Our rolling three year strategy therefore provides the overall direction for our Force and is supported by key goals and milestones which will be reviewed and refreshed annually. This process ensures that we, as a service, can anticipate and respond to changing local and national priorities, whilst still working towards our long term aim.

This Strategy for Policing Thames Valley 2011-2014 reflects the needs of the community in Thames Valley and sets out what we, as Thames Valley Police, will seek to achieve over the next three years and how we are going to achieve it.
Part 1:
Strategy for policing the Thames Valley 2011-14

Policing is not just about responding to serious crime and large-scale incidents, it is equally about understanding and dealing with the issues that affect our communities on a daily basis. The last three years have brought many new challenges and achievements, from investigating terrorist activities and coordinating emergency response to flooding, through to the successful rollout of Pride and Confidence Policing.

We understand that effective engagement with the community and our partners is key to making our community safer. To help us achieve our aim, we have identified six strategic objectives. They provide a framework enabling every member of our organisation to focus on the issues of greatest importance.

Details of how we will work towards achieving our strategic objectives during 2011-2012 are contained within our Delivery Plan, which can be found on pages ...
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 2011–14

1 To cut crimes that are of most concern to the community

Cutting crime is at the heart of what we are committed to in policing the Thames Valley. This involves crime prevention or reduction activity as well as response to incidents (including crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour) and investigation. This overlaps with our other priorities in improving public safety and providing reassurance to our communities.

Our Neighbourhood Teams are vital in preventing crime, catching criminals and managing offenders. These teams consist of police officers, special constables, police community support officers and volunteers. They are committed to spending the maximum amount of their time on visible patrol and being part of the community.

Investigating crime is a core part of our business. Major crime investigation is more complex than ever before. There has been an increase in policing resources over the years, but increased capability is required to meet the growing demands and complexities of major crime investigations.

We are committed to investigating priority crime in the nighttime economy. Developing on from the good practices identified by Project Morse, we will ensure that our officers are deployed at appropriate times and locations to help reduce the effect of alcohol-related crimes in our city centres.

We will also be implementing a streamlined way in which we provide a number of services to the public, starting initially with the custody process, but with the potential to expand the initiative to other areas. We will challenge existing processes to ensure the ones we do have do not hinder the officers in the front-line and provide the best value for money to the public, freeing officers from bureaucracy to be back on the streets as soon as possible.

We have developed the offender management scheme in the Force and will develop smarter processes with the voluntary sector.
Strategic Objectives 2011–14

2 To increase the visible presence of the Police

Thames Valley Police is committed to increasing the amount of time our officers are available and visible to the public. We will reduce the reasons for officers being inside police stations so that they can be where you want them more of the time – on the streets.

A key element of our strategy is to make Thames Valley Police more visible and locally accountable to all of our communities. This means police officers, community support officers and other police staff, using modern techniques and updated powers, to provide a responsive, visible, reassuring presence, preventing crime where possible and deliver a professional investigation when it is reported.

We will target key locations and times to ensure the police are there when they are needed and can be most effective.

We will work to increase and make best use of Special Constables and other volunteers to enhance the value of our service to our communities.

We are putting in place the Local Policing Model, a major restructure, with reducing crime, responding to local demands for policing and investigating crime as the overall priorities for our delivery of policing services at a local level across the force. This will also include a force-wide shift pattern review to put our officers in place at the right times to meet calls for service.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 2011-14

3 To protect our communities from the most serious harm

We recognise that many people contact the police when they, their families, friends or colleagues are at their most vulnerable or upset. It is our duty, working closely with partners, to protect people and reduce the risk to them coming to harm. A high priority will be the protection of children and young people and other vulnerable people.

Effectively identifying threats to people and communities will enable us to respond in the right way and in the right timescales, reducing the risks of harm. We will create effective plans to minimise the harm suffered by individuals or communities and to assist in identifying emerging trends and threats to the public. We will also seek to reduce re-offending through education, engagement and where necessary, enforcement through positive offender management and intervention and by collaborative and co-ordinated partnership working.

We aim to maintain and improve the confidence of communities in Thames Valley Police by delivering services that meet local needs, but there is little benefit in doing so if we fail to consider the threats posed by serious and organised crime and terrorism and act to reduce the threats as well as respond to them. We will collaborate through the South East Counter-Terrorist Unit with other agencies such as the UK Border Agency to tackle serious and organised crime. In line with the national counter-terrorism strategy and together with the local community we will tackle terrorism and extremism in its various forms.
Strategic Objectives 2011–14

To improve communication with the public in order to build trust and confidence with our communities

Communication is an essential tool in helping individuals and organisations undertake their business more effectively and efficiently. In Thames Valley Police we believe that effective communications must be at the heart of our service to help us listen to and to engage properly with our communities.

We are committed to having relevant information available in the public domain which is in the right format to keep you aware of local issues, tells you how we are performing and how you can get more involved in helping us to cut crime in your neighbourhoods.

We will enable officers to communicate more effectively with you, using existing and new techniques to meet the needs of all communities and age groups. This will help ensure that we continue to listen to concerns, engage with our communities, and respond in the way that best meets your expectations.
5 To tackle bureaucracy and develop the professional skills of all staff

Given the challenges the police service is facing nationally around funding reductions and ensuring we deliver a cost-effective service for the public, we need to ensure that our managers at all levels in the force are properly equipped to deliver on our priorities, do the right things, and ensure that our officers and staff get it right first time. This means becoming less risk averse as an organisation, removing heavily prescriptive processes and unnecessary bureaucracy and giving our staff the confidence to take personal accountability for managing situations in the right way.

We will continue to develop a culture of innovation and implement change inside the organisation to improve how we do things to deliver a leaner, effective service for the public. We value the ethos of coaching in Thames Valley Police and we will continue to support, coach and lead our staff to use their skills effectively throughout the organisation.
Strategic Objectives 2011–14

6 To reduce costs and protect the frontline

We need to ensure that we make the best use of the funding provided to us to deliver the most cost effective service to the communities of the Thames Valley.

We will be robust in driving out unnecessary paperwork and bureaucracy that prevents or limits our officers and staff from delivering the best service and from being in the right place at the right time. Approximately 80% of our funding is spent on staff salaries, so getting the most from our people is essential. This means making sure that everybody working for us, whatever their role, works to their full capacity every day. This is about how they are led and managed day to day, making sure that priorities and performance expectations are very clearly set. We also need to make sure our staff are properly trained and developed to give the best service possible.

We will increase the opportunities to work with individual volunteers and voluntary organisations. There are a great many people living and working in our communities who have knowledge and skills which they may well be willing to give to help us to cut crime and make those communities safer.
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-14

Part 2:
Key Activities 2011-2014

In addition to the six Strategic Objectives, there are a number of other priorities that underpin all of the work we are doing to achieve our strategic objectives and are key to taking Thames Valley Police forward over the next three years.

A Modern and Diverse Workforce
Community Engagement
Protecting Vulnerable People
Reducing Road Casualties
Public Order

A Modern and Diverse Workforce

The principles of the Human Rights Act underpin everything that we do and are instrumental in ensuring that you have trust and confidence in us to do our job fairly and properly.

TVP has developed and adopted a Single Equality Strategy, incorporating previously separate strategies within the single document. This is evolving further to reflect the additional requirements of the Equality Act 2010.

Equality and fairness of recruitment of officers and police staff, and our support networks for staff across a range of diversity groups reinforces the organisations commitment to fairness for all, Our efforts to become an employer of choice are evidenced by our achievement of 35th in the Stonewall top 100 employers’ Workplace Equality Index.

A Diversity Impact Assessment has been conducted through which the Equality Strategy has been assessed for its relevance to each strand of diversity. Full details of our Single Equality Schemes can be found on our website at www.thamesvalley.police.uk
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011–14

Part 2:
Key Activities 2011-2014

Community Engagement

Our vision of a Police Service for the Thames Valley values and respects the diverse community we serve. Community engagement plays a key role in strengthening our links with and between diverse groups, and to adapt our services in recognition of varying needs.

Everyday we interact with all sectors of our community on a wide range of issues; from reassurance and high visibility patrols, dealing with anti-social behaviour and crime, to responding to serious incidents.

Protecting vulnerable people

We work with a variety of partner agencies to protect a range of vulnerable adults and children. Our activity in this critical area of business is supported and overseen by a Protecting Vulnerable People Unit, which ensures the highest standards are maintained and partnerships flourish.

Hate crime is another area of victimisation where we work closely with partners to build confidence and encourage reporting. The Thames Valley Equality Scheme sets out our commitment to provide an equitable service for all sections of the community and to respond as a priority when people are targeted because of their difference.

Child protection teams work closely with local authorises and other partners to ensure the highest quality of service is provided across the whole of Thames Valley. To develop partnership activity and prevent abuse and harm against children, we play an active part in the local safeguarding boards covering the Force.
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-14

Part 2:
Key Activities 2011-2014

Reducing road casualties

Through local consultation, road safety and policing of the roads is consistently identified as a priority for communities. We are addressing these neighbourhood issues in partnership with local people through a number of joint schemes.

The Authority and the Force are fully engaged with key partners, through which our approach to speed enforcement is set and camera enforcement managed. With the partnership we will balance enforcement with education to reduce road casualties.

Our Roads Policing Unit work to make roads safer for people to use by; reducing the risk of injury and damage, dealing positively with those who break the law and tackling anti-social driving. We will continue to target the 'high-risk' people most likely to be responsible for crashes.

Public Order

Public order policing and public safety events are managed by competent commanders with significant experience in this area of policing. They are trained, assessed and accredited in line with the national Advanced/Initial Public Order Commanders regime.

This ensures that we are appropriately prepared to respond to this type of incident. Working with Forces in the southeast we will improve our ability to work across force boundaries and increase our collaboration regionally and nationally. We aim to explore regional exercising, training and operational deployment as collaborative approaches develop. We will continue to work on the recommendations made from the HMIC Adapting to Protest review, following on from the policing of the G20 conference in 2010. This will ensure that human rights, positive engagement with protestors and public communication are at the heart of planning and decision making for operational practice in the policing of protests.
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-14

Part 3:
Delivering our Strategy

To drive the Force forward over the next three years, we need to ensure that we have an organisational framework in place that supports and delivers our strategic objectives. Our framework will provide:

- Strong governance
- Effective performance machinery
- Robust financial management
- A professional workforce

These strands will enable us to realise continuous improvement in our service delivery and meet the demands of 21st century policing.

Operational policing decisions are the responsibility of the Chief Constable; however, the Thames Valley Police Authority monitors the performance of the Force throughout the year and holds the Chief Constable to account for delivery of the plan and the achievement of agreed targets.

Each of our fifteen Local Police Areas is led by an LPA Commander. They are responsible for performance and service delivery at a local level.

Governance

Thames Valley Police Authority is an independent body made up of local people who help to oversee the work of your local police force. Its primary responsibility is to secure and maintain an efficient and effective police service in Thames Valley by providing appropriate levels of resources. The Police Authority does not, however, have a role in the management of operational policing, which falls strictly within the remit of the Chief Constable. Thames Valley Police is managed and led by the Chief Constable and her senior management team. This team consists of the Deputy Chief Constable, three Assistant Chief Constables, a Director of Resources and a Director of Information, Science & Technology. Each member of the management team is allocated a portfolio, within which they have specific areas of responsibility see page 27 Their role is to monitor performance and ensure the delivery of the policing plan.
Strategic Plan 2011–14

Part 3: Delivering our Strategy

Managing Performance in Thames Valley Police

The Deputy Chief Constable is responsible for ensuring that processes are in place to instil ownership of performance improvement at every level within the Force. Members of the Police Authority also regularly monitor and review performance and hold the Chief Constable and the Deputy Chief Constable to account.

At a national level force performance is monitored by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC). The Government's stated intention is to reduce centrally driven policing targets allowing forces to develop local priorities to cut crime and antisocial behaviour according to the needs of local communities. However, HMIC will continue to monitor force performance in relation to more serious crime. We will be measured against the local performance priorities and have in place a rigorous Force performance accountability regime which enables us to continuously monitor our performance and to address issues as soon as they arise.

Our Force performance review process ensures the full range of service delivery is monitored and reviewed with particular emphasis given to each of the strategic objectives. The performance framework is used by chief officers to examine the performance of LPAs and provides an opportunity to identify where additional support can be provided to help LPAs deliver against their performance priorities.

The Force produces daily management information for use by operational staff and monthly performance monitoring reports at Force and LPA level showing current performance in relation to the national performance indicators. Updates on the progress made against targets set out in this plan are provided to the Police Authority on a quarterly basis and at regular Performance Monitoring Group meetings.

Financial Overview – 4 Year Medium Term Financial Plan 2011/12 to 2014/15

As with all public services, funding cuts have been imposed from central government, and consequently the need to maximise the productivity of our resources, to improve and focus on service delivery, is of paramount importance. To achieve our strategy for the policing of Thames Valley over the next three years and to protect visible policing, we are implementing our productivity plan including a forcewide restructure programme. These changes are imperative to make sure that we can deliver the appropriate and required services to those communities that we serve with the limited resources available.
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-14

Part 3:
Delivering our Strategy

Resources Available to Police Thames Valley

In line with the Government’s comprehensive spending review (CSR) the financial plans of the force have been developed to cover the four year period 2011/12 – 2014/15.

Our expenditure for the period 2011/12 to 2014/15 is constrained by the level of central government financing, and the income raised through council tax precept. The levels of central government financing are to be reduced by approximately 11.75%, in cash terms, over the next 4 years, together with council tax precept increases being frozen for a least one year, and potentially for the following three years. These funding reductions have put significant pressure on the management of the available resources, and will mean that Thames Valley will need to find budget savings in the region of £53m over the period.

The revenue and capital resources available to police Thames Valley over the four year period are estimated to be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross Revenue Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>427,457</td>
<td>412,108</td>
<td>410,370</td>
<td>414,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government Specific</td>
<td>-23,993</td>
<td>-23,825</td>
<td>-14,477</td>
<td>-14,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Income</td>
<td>-17,503</td>
<td>-18,936</td>
<td>-20,550</td>
<td>-21,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td>-2,815</td>
<td>-2,011</td>
<td>-0,766</td>
<td>0,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Revenue Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>383,146</td>
<td>367,336</td>
<td>374,577</td>
<td>379,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funded By:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government Grant Income</td>
<td>-247,552</td>
<td>-230,960</td>
<td>-238,969</td>
<td>-235,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-383,146</td>
<td>-367,336</td>
<td>-376,333</td>
<td>-373,404</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual Shortfall /(Surplus)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1,756</td>
<td>7,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Expenditure</td>
<td>10,030</td>
<td>11,169</td>
<td>10,819</td>
<td>6,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financed By:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Grant</td>
<td>2,007</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>3,425</td>
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<td>Borrowing</td>
<td>2,915</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,210</td>
<td>2,110</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital Receipts</td>
<td>4,478</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>1,738</td>
<td>0,823</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserves &amp; Revenue Contributions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,334</td>
<td>5,171</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9,400</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,169</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,819</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,358</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategic Plan 2011-14

Part 3: Delivering our Strategy

Medium Term Financial Plans

The medium term financial plan (MTFP) makes provision for estimated inflationary and contractual commitments, changes in legislation and government funding, as well as providing funding to maintain our infrastructure. In the current restrictive financial environment, financial growth is not an option but new demands must be achieved by re-prioritising resources and improving efficiency and effectiveness.

2011-12 Budgets

The breakdown of the 2011/12 budget illustrates that 77.93% of our budget is spent directly on police officers and police staff pay and allowances:

- Gross revenue expenditure:
  - £223.69m Police Officers
  - £109.41m Police Staff
  - £94.35m Other running costs

- Capital expenditure:
  - £4.918m Property
  - £2.093m ICT
  - £2.870m Vehicles
  - £0.150m Equipment

The staffing numbers supported by the 2011/12 budget are illustrated below:

- 4,179 Police Officers
- 2,723 Police Staff
- 530 PCSOs
PART 3: Delivering our Strategy

Value for Money Statement

The Authority and Force has a long history of delivering value for money through its Productivity Strategy. The Productivity Strategy is a programme of work designed to improve value for money and ensure our processes are as efficient and effective as possible.

This on-going continuous improvement strategy facilitates the balancing of annual budgets and the reinvestment of resources into frontline policing. The following principles underpin the Productivity Strategy:

- Protecting frontline services
- Protecting our ability to manage risk
- Maintaining our capability in protective services and back office functions through collaboration
- Maintain and improve performance in key areas
- Reduce “discretionary spending”
- Streamline business processes and eliminating unnecessary bureaucracy and waste
- All change risk assessed

In developing a strategy for the next three years, the Force can draw on the experience of the last four years of successes in making savings through the Productivity Plan. The overall Force aim remains the same, to make our communities safer, but this needs to be delivered within the constraints of the current financial pressures which demand that we make changes to the way in which the Force operates and is structured. The Productivity strategy has embedded an ethos of efficiency and effectiveness within the force which has facilitated the identification of the unprecedented scale of savings required over the next four years as a result of the government cuts.

The current medium term financial plan includes £47m of savings identified through the Productivity Plan against a potential funding shortfall over the next four years of £33m.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shortfalls being met by the productivity plan £m</th>
<th>Potential shortfalls to still be found £m</th>
<th>Total shortfall £m</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>15.582</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>19.417</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>8.184</td>
<td>-1.756</td>
<td>6.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>3.924</td>
<td>7.599</td>
<td>11.523</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.107</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.843</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.950</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011–14

Part 3:
Delivering our Strategy

The on-going work of the Productivity plan will continue to identify and deliver savings to ensure the force continually improves its use of resources and delivers a balanced budget; where possible savings will be achieved with the minimum impact on staffing numbers.

The PRODUCTIVITY STRATEGY will focus on five main areas of activities:

1. Structural Review – Local Policing Model
The Force is carrying out a review of how policing services are best delivered at a local level. The review will remove the current five Basic Command Units (BCUs), and deliver local services (patrol, investigation and neighbourhood policing), directly from the 15 Local Police Areas (LPAs).

Other force operational and business support services will be delivered through a revised shared service delivery structure to enable economies of scale and pooling of resources where appropriate, which will deliver significant savings to the force.

The implementation of the new Local Policing Model will save the force £4.7m in 2011/12 and a total of £16.1m over the next four years.

2. Streamlined Processes
The successful implementation of the review into crime and incident management will continue to deliver substantial efficiency savings in 2011/12. This significant review has streamlined the overall process and maximised the use of technology. The new process improves the "Customer Journey" by focusing on the needs of the public.

We will instigate a similar review of processes that offer opportunities for improved service and efficiency gains, for example the criminal justice process both for the police and with criminal justice partners.

Continually challenging policies and producers identifies where efficiencies can be achieved. The introduction of a new force overtime policy is estimated to produce savings of £2.6m over the next four years.

The Force continues to focus on and reduce any local self-created bureaucracy. As an objective, the Force will seek to identify any unnecessary bureaucratic processes and where possible use its discretion to eliminate any inefficiency and waste. Use of the "Waste Line" helps to achieve this, by providing all staff the means to identify and report bureaucratic burdens.

We continue to monitor and be involved in the national Reducing Bureaucracy Programme Board, which has been set up reporting into Nick Herbert, the Policing Minister. This board aims to follow on from Ian Berry’s work and contribute towards achieving the Government’s aim of reducing unnecessary bureaucracy in the Police service. TVPs representative on the board is involved in the six key areas that are being reviewed with the overall headings of Criminal Justice, Management of Information, Legal Powers, Management of Risk, Partnership & Engagement and Internal Systems.
Strategic Plan 2011–14

Part 3: Delivering our Strategy

3. Collaboration
We continue to work with forces from the South East region to identify and develop collaborative opportunities. Work is currently underway to deliver improved cost-effective integrated protective services and to widen the remit to collaborate on a number of other areas outside of protective services. Alongside this regional work the Force will continue to scope all business areas with a view to promoting and extending the principles of collaboration wherever possible.

In addition the Force is working with Hampshire Constabulary to identify Bi-lateral collaboration opportunities. Currently we are working with Hampshire Constabulary implementing specific options to collaborate in the areas of ICT, Operations and Information Management. Over the next four years these Bi-lateral collaborations will deliver £7.7m of savings.

4. Value for Money
The Scrutiny Panel approach was established in 2007 to critically review a number of centrally held budgets and contracts and has been responsible for identifying several million pounds of efficiency savings so far. In its work the Panel has adopted similar operating principles to those applied within the ZBB Reviews, aligning spending to the Force Strategy, prioritising future spending according to need and wherever possible identifying potential savings and efficiencies. The Value for Money Panel will continue to use benchmarking data, such as the value for money profiles, regional analysis and industry knowledge to identify and review budget lines and functional areas where savings may be achievable. Examples where savings have been identified include; fleet reviews; SSP payments, police staff pay and conditions.

5. Zero Based Budget Approach (ZBB)
ZBB continues to be part of a critical process of thorough reviews looking at Operational Command Units and departments. The aims of the reviews are to ensure a fair and appropriate distribution of resources, to ensure that resources match demand in the future and to identify and secure any possible savings or efficiencies. The results and proposals of the review are then presented to a panel chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable and consisting of other Chief Officers. The panel recommendations go forward to the Chief Constable’s Management Team and finally to the Police Authority for approval or further review. Current examples of savings from the ZBB process include: Property Services; Corporate Communications; Crime Support; CRED and Strategic Development.

For each of these strands, the skills and attitude of our staff will be crucial to achieving a more effective and efficient workforce. Effective resource management is aimed at maximising the time that staff are available to deliver front-line services and making sure that the time is used to best effect. This will be achieved by training our managers and supervisors to be better leaders providing more effective briefing and deployment, reduced sickness levels and better use of Specials and volunteers.
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-14

Part 3:
 Delivering our Strategy

The scope of the Productivity Strategy is intentionally wide-ranging in its approach. The next few years will be challenging for the Force and it is imperative that the organisation undertakes ambitious programmes of work, to ensure that the service is as productive and efficient as possible, whilst maintaining or improving service delivery and increasing public confidence. It is an unfortunate, but inevitable consequence of the work being undertaken by this programme, that the size and structure of the workforce of Thames Valley Police will be reduced and redistributed; the scale of the efficiencies required mean that this is unavoidable. It will require commitment and cultural change from across the organisation at all levels, but will result in a leaner, more effective Force for the future.

The savings targets currently set out in the productivity strategy, by these strands are:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Streamlined Processes</td>
<td>1.950</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>4.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>2.932</td>
<td>3.607</td>
<td>1.926</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>9.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Value For Money</td>
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<td>4.918</td>
<td>1.390</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>9.520</td>
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<td>3.901</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>8.041</td>
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</table>

15,581  19,417  8,185  3,924  47,107

The impact on our staff numbers is expected to be:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Review</td>
<td>32.21</td>
<td>105.17</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>142.08</td>
<td>50.51</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>166.72</td>
<td>277.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streamlined Processes</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>69.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>61.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>65.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value For Money</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>26.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>27.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>132.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Based Budgeting</td>
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<td>45.40</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>42.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>89.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>114.21</strong></td>
<td><strong>155.57</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>320.58</strong></td>
<td><strong>57.51</strong></td>
<td><strong>60.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>255.72</strong></td>
<td><strong>564.15</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-14

Part 3:
Delivering our Strategy

These proposals ensure that resources are targeted towards priority business areas. There will be no reduction in local visible policing and those areas that support key objectives and the management of risk receive the greatest protection. Within the Productivity Plan every cost reduction has been risk assessed to understand what impact it will have on service delivery. Those areas that represent high risks or are more complex to implement are timetabled for years 3 & 4 of the plan, this ensures that opportunities to mitigate those risks or identify other savings are maximised.

Risk Management
Managing risk in all aspects of policing is critical to ensuring that the service we deliver to you is of a high quality. Risk management is about identifying the risks to effective policing, evaluating those risks and deciding on the best course of action to address them. We therefore have a risk management strategy which is the framework for identifying and evaluating these risks.

At the highest level, we are, as a Force, exposed to a number of risks that may threaten our assets, and divert resources away from policing. Not only do we focus on the risks posed to the organisation as a whole, we also manage risk locally on a day-to-day basis. Our processes allow us to identify risks at an early stage and to take action to minimise the potential for harm to the public, our staff and our organisation.

Protective Services
We take our duty to protect you and your community from organised criminals, extremists and predatory offenders very seriously and are continually working to improve the way we deal with more serious crime.

There are eight areas of policing, collectively known as “Protective Services”, which deal with the most serious crime and these are as follows:

- Major Crime (homicide)
- Serious, Organised and Cross Border Crime
- Counter Terrorism and Extremism
- Civil Contingencies
- Critical Incidents
- Public Order
- Strategic Roads Policing
- Protecting Vulnerable People.

We have reviewed our capability in each of these areas and have produced action plans using the ACPO Threshold Standards and HMIC recommendations.

Following this review process, we are confident that we are capable and ready to deal with serious crime and major incidents. However, we are not complacent and our plans will ensure that we meet and maintain the required standard, closing high need areas identified during the Force’s strategic assessment process.

The Assistant Chief Constable’s responsible for Crime & Counter Terrorism and Operations are responsible for driving improvements in line with the revised NPIA Minimum Standards for Protective Services, so that we meet the national standards required by the Home Office by 2011. The Force will also work with the NPIA to identify and close regional and national gaps.
Strategic Plan 2011-14

Part 3: Delivering our Strategy

Collaborative Working
We have outlined in Section 3 of our Productivity Strategy (page 23) how we are committed to exploring innovative ways of improving the service we provide to the public of the Thames Valley. We believe that collaboration with other Police Forces and potentially other organisations may provide a more resilient service as well as potential savings and therefore better value for money.

Work that demonstrates this has already taken place at a regional level between Thames Valley Police, Surrey, Sussex and Hampshire; in April 2010 regional Witness Protection, and Covert and Technical Support Units were implemented; in September 2010 the South East Serious and Organised Crime Directorate was established, comprising the Regional Asset Recovery Team (RART), the Regional Intelligence Unit (RIU) and the Serious Crime Investigation Team (SCIT).

Through the Chiltern Transport Consortium we already share the management and costs of our extensive vehicle fleets with Bedfordshire Police, Hertfordshire Constabulary and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, achieving significant economies as a result.

In a similar way, the Chiltern Air Support Unit provides operational support to Thames Valley Police, Bedfordshire Police and Hertfordshire Constabulary through a tripartite funding arrangement between the three forces. The Unit currently has two helicopters that cover the five counties of the three forces.

So, through our latest approach, Bilateral Collaboration Programme with Hampshire Constabulary, in such areas as Information and Communication Technology, Police Operations and Information Management we continue to show our commitment to work with others to provide a more efficient and effective police service for our respective communities.

Procurement
Thames Valley Police has systems and procedures in place which achieve value for money and embrace economy, efficiency and effectiveness when purchasing essential goods and services. Through collaborative working, we are taking advantage of shared funding opportunities in order to improve our services and to save money. This policy conforms to the highest ethical standards and ensures that we are open-minded and fair, encouraging competition from all sectors of the community. We will seek to use goods and services which minimise the impact on the environment.

Environmental Management Policy
We are committed to ensuring that all officers and employees of Thames Valley Police try to minimise the impact of our operations and activities on the environment. All new buildings and major refurbishments of existing buildings are now designed taking into account energy efficiency and whole-life costs. All of our Force sites are liable to inspection by the Environment Agency and local environmental health officers for matters relating to environmental protection legislation.
STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-14

Part 3: Delivering our Strategy
Chief Officers' Responsibilities

Thames Valley Police Organisational Chart

Chief Constable Sara Thornton

- Helen Bell, Assistant Chief Constable
  - Chief Constable's Office

- John Campbell, Assistant Chief Constable
  - Community and Crime

- Amanda Cooper, Director of Information, Science and Technology
  - Information and Communication Technology

- Francis Halgood, Deputy Chief Constable
  - Corporate Services

- Steve Rowell, Deputy Chief Constable
  - Professional Services

- Tim Teasdale, Director of Partnerships
  - Neighbourhood Policing and Partnerships

- Finance
  - Legal Services
  - Professional Services

- Human Resources
  - Strategic Development
  - Local Policing

- Police Change
  - Professional Services

- Leadership and Development
  - Strategic Development

- Operational Development
  - Professional Services

- Strategic Development
  - Professional Services
Delivery Plan
2011–12
Our aims and values

Our Aim
Working in partnership to make our community safer

Our Values
To foster the trust and confidence of our community, we will:

- Treat everyone fairly and with respect
- Act with courage and integrity
- Take pride in delivering a high quality service and keeping our promises
- Engage, listen, and respond
- Learn from experience and always seek to improve.
**DELIVERY PLAN 2011-12**

1 **To cut crimes that are of most concern to the community**

The main role of the police is to cut crime through crime prevention, reduction activity with partners and effective investigation and enforcement. We will focus on those crimes that have been highlighted as being of most concern across Thames Valley, but ensure that proportionate investigations are undertaken for all offences. We will improve our investigative skills and ensure that our processes are effective and efficient through Project Morse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Cut the level of violence against the person by 12% and the level</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of overall serious acquisitive crime (domestic burglary, robbery and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vehicle crime) by 5%.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Continue to improve the investigation and prosecution of offences</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as part of Project Morse and increase the detection rates for violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with injury to 42% and the overall detection rate for serious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acquisitive crime (domestic burglary, robbery and vehicle crime) to 15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Streamline the custody process and reduce the abstraction from</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visible policing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Work with rural and business communities, with our partners, to</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improve crime prevention.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Reduce violence and serious sexual assaults associated with the</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>night time economy and make best use of new legislation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 To focus on the needs of those most at risk from anti-social</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behaviour and provide an individual care plan for support and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investigation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 Implement the new crime system.</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Delivery Plan 2011–12

### 2 To Increase the visible presence of the police

*We are committed to increasing the availability and visibility of our staff in communities and will reduce the things that keep them away from the frontline. We will change the style and structure of our local policing model so that it supports that commitment. At a time when the size of the organisation will reduce, we will increase the number and make best use of our volunteers, particularly Special Constables.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>ACC NHP&amp;P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Protect our communities from the most serious harm

We will work closely with partners to protect the public from harm. High priorities are the protection of children, young people and other vulnerable people, particularly those suffering domestic abuse. We will also focus on the threat posed by terrorism and serious organised crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Establish referral desks for all public protection cases in order to identify those who present the greatest threat and those who are the most vulnerable.</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Focus on organised criminals who prey on communities where people feel more isolated.</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Strengthen our response to extreme terrorist threats and domestic extremism.</td>
<td>ACC C&amp;CT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Reduce local and national threats to the Olympics through effective preparation and planning with other Forces and partners.</td>
<td>ACC Ops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Successfully implement the TVP / Hants Operations collaboration.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Implement organisational learning arising from key counter terrorist and local resilience exercises.</td>
<td>ACC Ops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Delivery Plan 2011–12

4 Improve communication with the public in order to build trust and confidence with our communities

We are committed to delivering a transparent service and will have relevant information available in the public domain so that communities are aware of what is happening, how they can ask for services and what people can do to get involved in helping to cut crime. We will improve the ways that the public can have their say and ensure that all sections are able to communicate with us.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Focus our community communications providing timely and relevant local information whilst effectively managing resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Equip staff to help them deliver cohesive and consistent information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Widen the use of technology channels to promote productive two-way communication and information sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Listen and respond to the needs of isolated communities by providing local, face to face engagement opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Develop a force wide press bureau.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 To tackle bureaucracy and develop the professional skills of all staff

It is important that we reduce all unnecessary bureaucracies so that our staff have the freedom and support to deliver the best possible service. Bureaucracy can also create a risk adverse culture, we want to create an environment where staff are confident and able to make decisions at the appropriate level and in the right way. The leadership skills of all our staff will be key to this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Embed the principles of Serving with Pride and Confidence, encouraging our staff to have the confidence to exercise their discretion and reduce levels of bureaucracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Develop the leadership skills of all our staff, particularly around the management of resources, individual and team performance and attendance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Remove unnecessary bureaucracy from key processes, for example crime and incident recording.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Streamline processes so that we deliver an effective first time response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Ensure that the implementation of the corporate change programme is managed effectively, taking the opportunities to streamline our structures and processes and introduce more productive ways of working.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Continue to progress the Force's Carbon Management Programme monitor &amp; manage our environmental impact: working towards a 30% reduction in carbon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 To reduce costs and protect the frontline

The financial situation for policing means that forces will face reduced budgets over the next four years. We need to make sure that all of our resources are used both effectively and efficiently. We must be robust in driving out all possible savings from non staff budgets and ensure that our staff are delivering the right service at the right time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Chief Officer lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.a. Match the number and availability of resources to demand levels and risk categorisation.</td>
<td>ACC Ops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.b. Provide resource management training including practical use of the force ‘ready reckoner’ to ensure staff are aware of the cost and value of services.</td>
<td>DOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.c. Benchmark all non staff costs to ensure these provide value for money, including premises, transport and supplies and services.</td>
<td>DOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.d. Further exploit our use of technology to reduce costs whilst maintaining and improving our services.</td>
<td>DIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.e. Deliver the cost reductions identified in the productivity strategy.</td>
<td>DCC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX A

Delivery Plan Targets

1. To cut crimes that are of most concern to the community
   - Reduce the level of violence against the person by 12%
   - Reduce serious acquisitive crime (domestic burglary, theft from a vehicle, theft of a vehicle and robbery) by 5%
   - Increase the detection rate for violence against the person with injury (including domestic abuse) to 42%
   - Increase the detection rate for serious acquisitive crime to 15%
   - Improve satisfaction levels for victims of domestic burglary, violence and vehicle crime above those achieved at 2010/11 year end
   - Maintain the detection rate for serious sexual offences above 25%.

2. To increase the visible presence of the police
   - Increase the number of Special Constables to 700
   - Achieve an annual recruitment target of 10% BME for Police Officers, PCSOs and Special Constables.

3. Protect our communities from the most serious harm
   - Increase the number of confiscation orders achieved by 5%.
APPENDIX A

Diagnostic Indicators

1. To cut crimes that are of most concern to the community

   - Monitor the detection rate for the individual offences of:
     - Domestic burglary
     - Robbery
     - Theft of vehicle
     - Theft from vehicle
     - Domestic Violence related violence against the person with injury detection rate compared to overall violence against the person with injury detection rate
     - Call handling performance to be monitored against the national call handling standards.

2. To increase the visible presence of the police

   The individual BME recruitment levels for Police Officers, PCSOs and Special Constables to be monitored.

3. Protect our communities from the most serious harm

   Monitor the value of confiscation orders.

Key to Abbreviations

CC Chief Constable
DCC Deputy Chief Constable
ACC NHP&P Assistant Chief Constable, Neighbourhood Policing & Partnership
ACC C&CT Assistant Chief Constable, Crime & Counter Terrorism
ACC OPS Assistant Chief Constable, Operations
DoR Director of Resources
DIST Director of Information, Science & Technology
APPENDIX B

Part 1 - Performance against strategic objectives, measures and targets

In part 1, where applicable the Red / Amber / Green (RAG) status is shown for each performance indicator. (Green: Target achieved. Amber: Below the target but performing better than last year. Red: Below the target and performing worse than last year).

Force Performance Summary for Q3 2010 – 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance indicators</th>
<th>Annual Target</th>
<th>Q4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase the number of Special constables by March 2011</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase satisfaction with the overall service provided (March 2010 to February 2011)</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>85.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increase the number of Special constables by March 2011
The number of Special Constables has increased to 534 at the end of March 2011 from 493 at the end of December 2010. The number of Special Constables has increased from 408 at the end of March 2010. Thames Valley has exceeded the target of 450.

Increase satisfaction with the overall service provided
Satisfaction with the overall service provided continues to improve. At 85.6%, the level is below the target of 86%, but is an increase of 1.3% over the level achieved at the end of March 2010.
2. To develop our partnerships to reduce crime and disorder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance indicators</th>
<th>Annual Target</th>
<th>Q3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduce the level of serious acquisitive crime</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the sanction detection rate for serious acquisitive crime</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the sanction detection rate for serious sexual offences</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the sanction detection rate for violence against the person with injury</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reduce the level of serious acquisitive crime
Serious acquisitive crime has fallen by 16.0% in 2010/11 when compared with 2009/10, exceeding the reduction target of 2%.

Increase the sanction detection rate for serious acquisitive crime
The sanction detection rate for serious acquisitive crime has increased from 8.5% in 2009/10 to 12.8% in 2010/11, exceeding the target of 12%.

Increase the sanction detection rate for serious sexual offences
The sanction detection rate for serious sexual offences has increased from 23.3% in 2009/10 to 27.3% in 2010/11, exceeding the target of 25%.

Increase the sanction detection rate for violence against the person with injury
The sanction detection rate for violence against the person with injury was 38.7% in 2010/11 compared to 29.5% in 2009/10, exceeding the target of 35%.
Appendix B

3. To improve the service provided to victims, witnesses and the public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance indicators</th>
<th>Annual Target</th>
<th>Q3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of 999 calls to be answered within the national target of 10 seconds</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-emergency calls received within the PECs to be answered within the national target of 40 seconds</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>92.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data for this measure will be subject to a full audit to ensure compliance with the definition.

% of 999 calls to be answered within the national target of 10 seconds
The number of 999 calls being answered within 10 seconds in 2010/11 was 92.3%, an increase from 92.1% in 2009/10, and exceeding the target of 90%.

Non-emergency calls received within the PECs to be answered within the national target of 40 seconds
In 2010/11 the number of non-emergency calls being answered by the PEC within 40 seconds exceeded the target of 90% with 92.7% being answered within 40 seconds. This is an improvement on the 92.0% achieved in 2009/10.

4. To protect communities from the threat of terrorism and organised crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance indicators</th>
<th>Annual Target</th>
<th>Q3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target &amp; disrupt the activities of known High Risk Organised Crime Groups</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the number of confiscation orders by 10%</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Target and disrupt the activities of known High Risk Organised Crime Groups
The number of High Risk Organised Crime Groups targeted and disrupted in 2010/11 was 23, in excess of the target of 20.

Increase the number of confiscation orders
The number of confiscation orders achieved in 2010/11 was 220. This is greater than the 178 achieved in 2009/10 and exceeds the target of 196.
### 6. To develop our people to give the best service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance indicators</th>
<th>Annual Target</th>
<th>Q3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of new police officer recruits from BME background</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of new police staff appointments from BME background</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of new police community support officer appointments from BME background</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of new police officer recruits from BME background
In 2010/11 14.0% of new police officers recruited externally were from a BME background. This exceeds the target of 10%, and is an increase from the 11.8% achieved in 2009/10.

% of new police staff appointments from BME background
In 2010/11 8.2% of new police staff appointments from external recruits were from a BME background.

This fell below the target of 10%, but is an increase from 8.1% achieved in 2009/10. There was limited external recruiting for police staff posts in the last six months of the year.

% of new police community support officer appointments from BME background
In 2010/11 7.3% of new police community support officer appointments from external recruits were from a BME background. This fell below the target of 10% and is a slight decrease from 7.5% achieved in 2009/10.
Appendix C

Local consultation and local contact

Thames Valley Police Authority (TVPA) has a legal obligation to consult widely with the public and diverse communities when formulating its strategic plans. The consultation process allows people who live and work in Thames Valley to let us know their views and concerns about the crime and community safety issues which have a direct impact on them and their local community. Effective consultation enables the public, our partners and community organisations to play an active part in shaping our key policing priorities.

The Police Authority and the Chief Constable place great emphasis on consultation and engagement with the public. In July 2010, TVPA held a comprehensive series of 10 focus group discussions.

Two focus groups were held with each of five sub-groups to gain a more in-depth understanding of policing issues of particular reference to them. The objectives for these groups were to:

- Understand awareness of recent changes in policing in our area/community;
- Understand perceptions of police effectiveness with regard to that particular sub-group, and the particular issues they face;
- To obtain detailed feedback about the stated policing priorities within the Thames Valley;
- To assess the degree to which these priorities are agreed upon, and understand the gaps;
- Gain feedback about communications from the police to difference groups and communities, in terms of content, style, channels used and usefulness.

In addition to these one-off events, we understand the importance of engaging with our communities throughout the year. We regularly undertake telephone surveys and on a less formal basis, we continually engage with our local communities through our neighbourhood policing teams and your Neighbourhood Action Groups. As a result of this consultation and engagement, we know that the emerging themes as police priorities across the Force are:

- Responding to emergency calls
- Tackling violent crime
- Detecting crime and arresting offenders
- Tackling organised crime and terrorism
- Tackling domestic and child abuse

Our Strategy and Delivery Plan reflect how we intend to work with you and our partners to address these concerns.

Quality of Service

Our Quality of Service Commitment reflects the high quality, professional and timely service that you should expect when you make contact with us. We aim to put your needs at the heart of everything we do and we are determined that everyone in Thames Valley will receive the same high quality service no matter where they live or work, or no matter what the crime or incident.

Your feedback enables us to tailor our services more effectively to meet your needs and those of the local community, so that we can do our very best to make sure you are satisfied with the service you receive.
APPENDIX C

Local consultation and local contact

Impressed by our service?
Residents often send reports of good work which we pass on to our staff and use as examples of good practice, which we then share across the Force.

If you have been impressed by the service you have received and want to let us know please write to us, telephone us or e-mail us, via our dedicated page on the Thames Valley Police website (www.thamesvalley.police.uk). We will publish examples on this site.

How to make a complaint

- Visit a police station and ask to speak to a Sergeant, Inspector or supervisor.
  If none are available at that time, ask the desk officer to make an arrangement for you to be contacted

- Contact the Professional Standards Department at:
  Professional Standards Department
  Thames Valley Police
  Headquarters
  Kidlington
  Oxford, OX5 2NX
  Email: professional.standards@thamesvalley, prnn.police.uk

- Contact the Thames Valley Police Authority
  (see page...)

- Contact the Independent Police Complaints Commission at:
  90 High Holborn, London, WC1V 6BH
  Tel: 08453 002 002 (local rate)
  Email: enquiries@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk

You can also approach other agencies to make a complaint on your behalf. Examples of these include:

- Citizens Advice Bureau
- Equality and Human Rights Commission
- A solicitor
- Other community groups.

Anonymous Information
If you wish to give information about a crime or an incident anonymously you can also contact:

Crimestoppers on 0800 555111 or visit the Crimestoppers website at www.crimestoppers-uk.org where you can also give us anonymous information on line.
(The information you send to us will be sent over a secure internet connection, which makes sure that you and your computer cannot be traced.)
Appendix D

Members of the Police Authority

Khan Juna
Chairman
Independent Member

Iain McCracken
Deputy Chairman
Elected Member
Bracknell Forest
Conservative

Ben Simpson
JP MBE
Independent Member

Jesse Grey
Elected Member
Windsor & Maidenhead
Conservative

Barrie Patman
Elected Member
Wokingham Conservative

Alison Phillips
OBE
Independent Member

David Carroll
Elected Member
Buckinghamshire
Conservative

Anthony Stansfeld
Elected Member
West Berkshire
Conservative

Zoe Patrick
Elected Member
Oxfordshire
Liberal Democrat

Martyn Griffiths
JP DL
Independent Member

Jamie Chowdhary
Elected Member
Reading Conservative

Ian Abbott OBE
Independent Member

Richard Jones
Independent Member

Louis Lee
Independent Member

Balvinder Bains
Elected Member
Slough Labour

Hazel Bell
Independent Member

Sam Crooks
Elected Member
Milton Keynes
Liberal Democrat

Kieron Mallon
Elected Member
Oxfordshire
Conservative

Beverley Thompson OBE
Independent Member
APPENDIX E

Glossary of Terms

ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR Automatic Number Plate Recognition. ANPR equipment automatically reads vehicle registrations and matches them to database information
AVLS Automatic Vehicle Location System - A system which helps to identify the location of resources and navigate them to incidents and specific places
BME Black Minority Ethnic
CCMT Chief Constable’s Management Team
CDRP Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships - An alliance of organisations required by statute to help to tackle crime and disorder within their partnership area
CRED Control Rooms and Enquiry Department
CONTEST The Government’s counter terrorism strategy is also known as CONTEST. It is divided into four principal areas; Prevent, Protect, Prepare and Pursue
FIB Force Intelligence Bureau
ICT Information, Communications and Technology
LPA Local Policing Area. Geographically based operational police unit which is coterminous with local authority boundaries
MoPI Management of Police Information. The government’s statutory code of practice for the management of police information
NHP Neighbourhood Policing
NPIA National Police Improvement Agency – National support for the police service
OCU Operational Command Unit - Specialist department which support operational policing
OCG Organised Crime Group
PCSO Police Community Support Officers
PDR Performance and Development Review
PND Police National Database
RAG Red / Amber / Green - Action or target colour status code
SERIOUS ACQUISITIVE CRIME Burglary in a dwelling, Aggravated burglary in a dwelling, Robbery of business property, Robbery of personal property, Theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle, Aggravated vehicle taking and Theft from a vehicle
SERIOUS SEXUAL OFFENCES Will include: Rape, Assaults involving penetration, Sexual assaults on minors, mentally disordered people or patients, causing or inciting a minor to engage in sexual activity
SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIMES Will include: Murder, Manslaughter, Torture, Grievous bodily harm & wounding, Endangering life offences (i.e. Explosive and Firearms offences), Death by dangerous driving offences or whilst vehicle unlawfully taken / used
If you would like this document in a different language please contact:

Tel: 01865 846645  
Email: typ3@thamesvalley,nnn,police,uk

Jeli chcielibyś otrzymać ten dokument w innym języku, prosimy o kontakt

हिंदी मार्गदर्शक बंदरगाह की नियम नागरीक के लिए नियम नागरीक के लिए

لو تود أن ترى هذه الوثيقة بلغة مختلفة ترجو الأتصال:

यदि आपके यह रेलवे अन्य भाषा में मार्गदर्शक को अनुवाद करें करें:

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चाहिए की रेलवे मार्गदर्शक की नियम नागरीक के लिए नियम नागरीक के लिए

أنت لا تود أن ترى هذه الوثيقة بلغة مختلفة ترجو الاتصال:

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APPENDIX C: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

The supporting rationale for using semi-structured interviews is discussed in the main body of the thesis and is not repeated here. The approach to the interviews is structured differently as a result of this stage being focused following the stage 1 research with strategic managers, providing increased structure as a result of the preceding research, described below in detail.

To facilitate the structure of interviews, and ensure that data between interviews was as much as possible comparable and focused upon the research strategy, a list of key and detailed questions in five topic areas were created. These were selected and developed on the basis of ensuring that views of change were broached, its impact and how this influenced officers’ activities, performance and management. They were designed to provide guidance, as the majority of interviews proceeded to cover such points and more without the need to refer to the set questions. The first table outlines the topic areas and key questions, the themes being based upon literature review and documentary analysis, and some key questions which are more general to assist guide interviews if required.
Strategic Managers: Central themes for discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTRAL THEMES</th>
<th>NPM POLICE CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUITY?</th>
<th>TENSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEW LOCALISM</td>
<td>Strategic core guides periphery; Close to consumers; Choice through elections. Devolved power.</td>
<td>‘Big Society’ departure from previous centralisation &amp; ‘Big Statism’.</td>
<td>Neighbourhood policing; Governance reform &amp; accountability for crime control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUCTURE</td>
<td>De-layering / flattened hierarchies; Economies of scale (collaboration / mergers);</td>
<td>VFM / austerity narrative.</td>
<td>Establishment numbers; Specials / volunteers. Loss of BCU’s supported by Neighbourhoods?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSUMERISM</td>
<td>Addressing fear of crime / insecurity; Reassurance; Crime-mapping / local data. Public / private / voluntary solutions.</td>
<td>Citizen’s Charter, community policing, values, quality of service.</td>
<td>Partnership reduced; Politicisation of crime control; ‘Front line’ emphasis; Public concern re: cuts. Bureaucracy; Funding mechanism?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MODERNISING
Private-sector superiority;
Last unreformed sector;
VFM driven accounting logic;
Centrally driven;
Workforce modernisation;
Inputs to outputs.

Right to Manage;
‘Unfinished business’;
x3 E’s, VFM, BV.

Refined emphasis on effectiveness;
Resistance from staff associations;
Agenda-resistance;
Outcomes?

Strategic Managers: Suggested structured questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPIC AREAS</th>
<th>KEY QUESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>What has changed as a result of political reform?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Of these, which is the most significant to your role?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functions</td>
<td>What do you do now you didn’t previously?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What do you no longer do that you did before?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What would you like to be able to do?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What inhibits you from doing so?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>What is your role?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How is your role defined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How is your activity monitored?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are others’ expectations from you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>How do you manage your time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent are you supervised?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do you manage your workload/team?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance /</td>
<td>How are your objectives set?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>How do they impact upon your role?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What changes as a result of these?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What development opportunities do you have?
To what extent are you confident in meeting the requirements of your role?

From the semi-structured interviews with strategic managers the following updated table depicts refined themes, contexts and outcomes to take forward for wider exploration with the front line officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FINANCIAL</td>
<td>Consistent theme of productivity pre-election with consistent terminology. Cash-focused savings marks departure from previous wider efficiency drives.</td>
<td>Impact for years to come. Front loaded for electoral purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>Weak APA leadership. Ill-conceived reforms with PCC’s / PCP’s. No Royal Commission.</td>
<td>Intense political scrutiny. Unbalanced tri-partite leadership. Accountability problematic. No going back.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIG SOCIETY</td>
<td>Specials increasing to bolster visibility and community engagement locally.</td>
<td>Attitudes and relationships improving between regular / special ranks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLABORATION</td>
<td>Successful collaboration projects ongoing for years.</td>
<td>Savings through police staff reductions akin to delayering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONT LINE</td>
<td>Front line far wider than public / political view accepts.</td>
<td>Level of cuts will impact upon front line support. Public perception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULTURE</td>
<td>New approach to productivity required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESISTANCE</td>
<td>Staff associations are out of step with public sentiment. ACPO perceived to have taken government side.</td>
<td>Fragmented response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALISM</td>
<td>Ideological commitment to localism and locally elected governance. Oversight and scrutiny functions.</td>
<td>Reshape neighbourhood policing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following table depicts the interview key questions and then results following phase two (semi-structured interviews with front line officers).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TOPIC AREAS</strong></th>
<th><strong>KEY QUESTIONS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change</strong></td>
<td>What has changed to your role as a result of reform? Of these, which is the most significant to your role and why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functions</strong></td>
<td>What do you do now you didn’t previously? What do you no longer do that you did before? What would you like to be able to do? What inhibits you from doing so?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role</strong></td>
<td>What is your role as you see it? Does that differ from what the force expects? How is your role defined? Who defines it? How is your activity monitored (and how successfully)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management</strong></td>
<td>What are managers expectations from you? To what extent do your supervisors support the ‘corporate view’? How do you manage your time? To what extent are you supervised? How do you manage your workload? How do you rate police leadership? How well has the Federation represented you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance / Development</strong></td>
<td>How are your objectives set? How do they impact upon your role? What changes as a result of these? What development opportunities do you have? To what extent are you confident in meeting the requirements of your role? What are the barriers to you policing?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td>What should ACPO be doing? What should the government be doing (or not)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morale</strong></td>
<td>How is morale? How has it changed and why?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FRONT LINE OFFICERS: THEMES IN CONTEXT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
<th>PHASE 2 VIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FINANCIAL</td>
<td>Consistent theme of productivity pre-election with consistent terminology. Cash-focused savings marks departure from previous wider efficiency drives.</td>
<td>Impact for years to come. Front loaded for electoral purposes.</td>
<td>Front line view of savings as small / minor impact. Overtime focused. Not impactive below Insp. Yet to bite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>Weak APA leadership. Ill-conceived reforms with PCC’s / PCP’s. No Royal Commission.</td>
<td>Intense political scrutiny. Unbalanced tripartite leadership. Accountability problematic. No going back.</td>
<td>PA’s not visible, but PPC’s too political. Operational independence essential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIG SOCIETY</td>
<td>Specials increasing to bolster visibility</td>
<td>Attitudes and relationships</td>
<td>Sound-byte. Public apathy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLABORATION</td>
<td>Successful collaboration projects ongoing for years.</td>
<td>Savings through police staff reductions akin to delayering.</td>
<td>Effective collaboration already completed. Nothing new.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONT LINE</td>
<td>Front line far wider than public / political view accepts.</td>
<td>Level of cuts will impact upon front line support. Public perception.</td>
<td>Support services will decline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULTURE</td>
<td>New approach to productivity and reform agenda required.</td>
<td>Culture of continuous improvement to be fostered.</td>
<td>Support for aspects of reform such as Big Society weak. Perception that government is targeting police unfairly. Productivity seen as ongoing norm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP</td>
<td>From compliance &amp; targets to culture of customer service.</td>
<td>Vague role mandate in cutting crime. Local / central</td>
<td>Policing day structured around targets. Local concerns secondary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reduced targets and simplified reporting. Appears simple but leaves too many issues unresolved. Previous partnership machinery ‘Labour’ initiated gone not replaced.

| RESISTANCE | Staff associations are out of step with public sentiment. ACPO perceived to have taken gov’ side. | Fragmented response. | Reduced morale & good-will. |
| LOCALISM | Ideological commitment to localism and locally elected governance. Oversight and scrutiny functions. | Reshape neighbourhood policing. | Political localism agenda needs buy in from centre. Neighbourhood key deliverer but not priority. |

The levels of abstraction that allowed valid representation of each category were reduced as far as possible. For example, VFM and budgetary considerations were synonymous with productivity, whilst volunteers and Specials / Commissioners likewise were placed under Big Society together. This resulted in the themes discussed in chapter four in the thesis.