‘From Mission Idealism to Operational Realism’:

A study of the Norwegian contribution to

International Police Reform Missions

By

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A thesis submitted to the University of Portsmouth
in partial fulfilment for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Faculty of Humanities and Social Science,
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies

August 2012
Declaration

‘Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award’

Word count: 67 891

Signed ......................................................................................................................
Maren Eline Kleiven

‘From Mission Idealism to Operational Realism’

A study of the Norwegian contribution to

International Police Reform Missions

Abstract

This qualitative study has examined the overall Norwegian contribution to international police reform missions (IPRMs) using a multiple case study design to compare three different missions where Norway has contributed relatively significantly over a period of time; the bilateral project in Serbia (JUNO); the multilateral UN Mission to Liberia (UNMIL); and finally the regional EU Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL). The case studies have subsequently been systematically compared through a narrative cross-case analysis where similarities and variations have been categorised into three stages; pre-mission, in-mission and post-mission, using analytical software for qualitative studies. Motives and goals for involvement were identified, subsequently set against the police officers actual experience in each mission, and their understanding of the overall picture in relation to their responsibilities. Substantial empirical research work was undertaken to inform the individual case study’s including 99 open-ended interviews, consisting of 36 Norwegian police officers (practitioners), 21 co-operating partners in the missions, and 42 experienced senior officials working with IPRMs throughout the world. Also, observational fieldwork and study trips to 11 countries were conducted, and a wide range of secondary data was reviewed to ensure reliability and validity throughout the thesis.

The findings suggest that there are severe impediments to achieve a successful outcome of IPRMs, but that the responsibility cannot be attributed to one organisation or country alone. The experiences of Norwegian police officers deployed to different types of IPRMs paint a picture of an international arena torn between idealism and realism, one characterised by a pragmatic approach focused on action and quantity
rather than development and quality. Because of a complete absence of overall doctrines and a system that is not sufficiently well grounded, IPRMs suffer from an absence of long-term strategies, goals, success criteria, and planning. Instead, goals are often vague and over-ambitious, demanding results that promote output rather than outcome, consequently at the risk of the individual police officer who operates in adverse operational working conditions. The findings reveals a system that currently fails to recognise the need for better and more extensive planning and preparation for the individual police officer pre-mission, that fails to acknowledge the role and professionalism of the police officers in-mission; and that fails to ensure proper debriefing and reintegration procedures for the police officer post-mission.

International relations theory was used as a basis for the macro-level of this study, but no mid-range theory was found to inform the meso- and micro-level. Herein lies the original theoretical contribution to this field – it aims to inform the development of international police science, one that can substantiate a much needed future universal doctrine on international police reform missions.
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, sincere thanks to the many interviewees who took of their valuable time and gave me their honest and reflective opinions. Without you, there would not have been any thesis. The same goes for my brilliant and tough Supervisor, Dr. Paul Norman, who has steadily guided me through these years – I am eternally grateful. Thanks also to my second Supervisor, Dr. Francis Pakes, for valuable tips. For initiating the whole process, Professor Tore Bjørgo, and for believing in me and for funding a significant part of my PhD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, best represented by Torun Dramdal. For continuously giving me fruitful advice, Dr. Mark Downes in DCAF. A special appreciation to the library and the travel desk at the Norwegian Police University College for being so prompt and professional, and to all my outstanding colleagues at the college and in the police community, especially Bjørn Barland, Ivar Fashing, Kristin Hellesø-Knutsen, Henning Høgseth, Kristin Kvigne, Trond Myklebust, Else Mette Næss, Hans Sverre Sjøvold and Geir Aas for constructive input and reassurance. A special thank you to my external examiner, Professor David Bayley, for providing a very positive examination and support and for giving me productive ideas for a book, and to my internal examiner, Professor Mike Nash, for giving me vital directions for the thesis in the major review.

To my supportive friends and family who has been there for me and kept my spirits up, but in particular my sister Kitty, who has been my touchstone and given me invaluable feedback and backing. To my husband Jostein, for being so patient, understanding and for providing invaluable technical support and illustrations. And last but most significantly, with all my love, to my exceptional children, Magnus and Hannah, who have provided endless encouragement, support and have, through lots of laughter, kept me in touch with what’s really important in life.

Thank you.
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<th>ABP</th>
<th>Afghan Border Police</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>BMDF</td>
<td>British Management Data Foundation</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>CEU</td>
<td>Council of the European Union</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>[Geneva centre for the] Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Staff organisation</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Co-operation</td>
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<td>ERU</td>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>EUPOL-A</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Police Mission [in Bosnia-Herzegovina]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>[British] Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FDD</td>
<td>Focused District Development</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Units</td>
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<td>GHD</td>
<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IDG</td>
<td>International Deployment Group</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>InterGovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IMG</td>
<td>International Management Group</td>
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<td>IPCB</td>
<td>International Police Co-operation Board</td>
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<td>IPRM</td>
<td>International Police Reform Mission</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JUNO</td>
<td>JUgoslavia-NOrge</td>
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<td>LNP</td>
<td>Liberian National Police</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NORAF</td>
<td>NORway-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NPTA</td>
<td>[the Liberian] National Police Training Academy</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUPI</td>
<td>Norsk UtenriksPolitisk Institutt [Norwegian Institute of International Affairs]</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies au Congo</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security for and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>Pearson's Peacekeeping Centre</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PRIO</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute of Oslo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>the Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td><strong>R</strong></td>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<td></td>
<td>RORG</td>
<td>Rammeavtale ORGanisasjoner [a network of Norwegian NGOs engaged in Development Education and Awareness Raising in Norway]</td>
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<td><strong>S</strong></td>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative to the Secretary-General</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Standing Police Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>T</strong></td>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>the Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TFEU</td>
<td>the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Training Needs Analysis</td>
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<td><strong>U</strong></td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNPOC</td>
<td>United Nations Police Officer Course</td>
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<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td><strong>W</strong></td>
<td>WCPC</td>
<td>Women and Children Protection Centre</td>
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<td></td>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Many theorists of international relations neglect peacemaking, leaving it to practitioners and to proponents of psychological and sociological approaches. The result is a literature with a relatively prescriptive and ad hoc case study approach that leaves a wide gap between it and mainstream concerns in international relations theory. (Gilady & Russet, 2002, p. 394).

Norway has one of the longest records of contributing internationally to peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reform projects, and its engagement has long been recognised throughout the world. An experienced actor in the field, Norway is richer in resources than its size might suggest and has for decades proven its dedication and sincerity by consistently donating considerable funds and human resources to international missions. For example, in 2008, Norway donated USD 909 million to the UN system, making it the 6th largest donor to the UN overall and the second largest based on percentage of gross national income (GNI) (Tommelstad, 2010). These contributions have resulted in international recognition and enabled Norway to show its financial independence from the Great Powers while simultaneously preserving its own security needs by securing good co-operation with them. Nor are the country’s significant contributions solely financial; Norway also donates human resources to both UN and EU missions, and the country’s deployment of Norwegian police officers for peacekeeping missions has been an important component of its contribution. In fact, the Norwegian government’s strategy, articulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasises the importance of bilateral and multilateral aid to police services and to police reform programmes that secure the development of democracy and stability worldwide (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002; Utenriksdepartementet, 2006a, 2006b). Given the global shortage of available and qualified police personnel (ICG, 2012, para. 18), Norway’s contribution of a relatively large number of highly experienced police officers to international police reform missions (IPRMs) is particularly valuable. The research context is made even more interesting by the fact that Norway is a devoted member of the UN but not a member of the EU.
This study aims to provide an original contribution to the field in the form of a cross-case analysis of the first-hand experiences of Norwegian police officers deployed to three different missions: JUNO/Serbia, UN/Liberia, and EU/Afghanistan. The missions have been different both in form and in the set of conditions it has taken place; the bilateral project in Serbia (JUNO) aimed to reform an existing, functioning police service in a peaceful, post-conflict state, the multilateral UN Mission to Liberia (UNMIL) attempts to rebuild and reform a mal-functioning and corrupt police service within a post-conflict, but tense state, and finally the regional EU Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) where a non-existing police service has been sought established in a war zone. The primary data for this study includes 99 open-ended interviews, consisting of 36 Norwegian police officers (practitioners), 21 co-operating partners in the missions, and 42 senior officials working with IPRMs throughout the world, together with extensive field work and study trips to 11 countries. A wide range of secondary data has been used to ensure reliability and validity.

The aim of this opening chapter is to set out a theoretical framework for IPRMs and provide a foundation for later conceptualisation, analysis, and discussion by contextualising Norway’s motives and policies for involvement. It thus seeks to provide an initial understanding of this complex and conflicting arena and lay out research questions that will form the basis for this original contribution to the field. The chapter concludes with an overview of the thesis that explains its organisation and summarises the content of subsequent chapters.

My own academic and professional interest in this area arose from my personal experience of conducting police courses in Eastern Europe; more specifically, in the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, and Serbia. These courses, conducted between 2002 and 2006, were part of the larger programme, A New Europe in the Making – Norway and the EU Candidate Countries, designed to prepare East European countries for entry into the European Union (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002). At that time, as a police superintendent and lecturer at the Norwegian Police University College, I was engaged in conducting police courses on problem-oriented policing and human rights and ethics. In preparing these courses for the overseas programme, however, no
allowances were made for the major differences in setting. Rather, course preparation was purely technical – gathering materials, setting up a course plan, and developing a training method; no contextual or demographic information were provided prior to course administration; and no evaluations were conducted afterwards to assess whether the training had been beneficial. Hence, although my general impression was that these courses were of value to the local police officers participating, I also felt a sense of ‘throwing knowledge around without purpose’. Had I been given sufficient contextual knowledge beforehand, the courses could have been better adapted to and more valuable for the participants. In addition, had there been a proper post-training evaluation, lessons would have been learned for future courses. These issues triggered my interest in Norway’s international engagement in IPRMs and became the basis for the early stages of this doctoral project.

Subsequently, I made several research trips to observe the IPRM community in several countries (e.g. Canada and Australia) and organisations (the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) in New York and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in Geneva – see chapter 2). I soon realised, however, that although the role of international police has evolved and expanded rapidly, developing doctrinal or strategic visions to guide these missions has not kept pace, and proper planning and operational capacity building are in short supply. Gheciu and Welsh (2009), for example, argue that policy-makers should question the motives driving their actions more meticulously, deal with the issues related to these motives, and explain their actions to their own citizens (p. 143). According to these authors’ survey of official statements from primary actors like the U.S. and EU, intervention and rebuilding is likely to be motivated by a minimum of four factors. The first appeals to the special responsibility to use force only when necessary and a broader obligation to help the vulnerable. The second involves a conviction that democracy is a global value, one that Western states have the responsibility to secure. The third stems from a belief in the duties of statesmanship, and the fourth is a wish to reinstate ‘self-determination’ (ibid, p. 123). Neack (1995), however, describes peacekeeping as ‘self-interested actions to establish, preserve or increase a state’s own position and power in the world’ (p. 188), implying that the idea of an idealistic
international community performing these services out of pure good is naive (Crawford, 2008, p. 241).

Annika Hansen (2002), in her acclaimed book, From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations, points to an imbalance between the ambitious goals in UN Security Council Resolution mandates and the actual planning, understanding, and operation of the actual missions (p. 15). The result has been too many fragmented ad hoc missions with short-term solutions rather than well-founded holistic long-term engagements. Indeed, foreign policy expert Asle Toje (2007b), emphasises the vast public funds Norway expends on development aid and the lack of interest for the effects of these contributions. According to Toje there exists a fundamental dislike against thorough evaluations which has ‘contributed to an ever-increasing gap between those expectations that are created, and the results that we actually manage to achieve’ [author’s translation](ibid, para. 6). Such is also the general reality within the field of police reform in post-conflict states: a clear lack of focus on lessons learned and a scarcity of project evaluations result in a repetitive cycle of doing the same things over and over without any development or knowledge transfer.

**International Relations Theory**

Researchers like Bures (2007) and Diehl (2008) argue that, despite attempts in the peacekeeping and peace-building research to incorporate IPRMs into specific theories, the lack of results stems from an absence of theoretical foundation to guide these missions. Bures (2007), for example, in his aptly titled ‘Wanted: A Mid-range Theory of International Peacekeeping’, maintains that international relations theories have yet to be fully integrated into the study of peacekeeping (p. 408). Yet there is logic to placing IPRMs into this field of enquiry because foreign policy analysis and external relations fall under its rubric. The fact that the deployment of Norwegian police officers is funded by the Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs intrinsically links this international police activity to foreign policy.

International relations theory first emerged as a separate academic discipline in 1919 when the Department of International Politics was set up at the University of Wales.
The premise for its establishment was that scholars could use scientific analysis to identify the causes of the world’s political problems and thereby suggest solutions. For the next 20 years, the discipline was characterised by a concern to change the world, a normative position that aspires to make the world a better place. Opponents of this stance, however, characterise it as an idealism that strives to help change the world to fit a particular picture (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2008, pp. 3-4). Such detractors prefer a realist approach that sees the world as it truly is and considers attempts to change the world or human beings for the better to be far-fetched. For realists, the main notion in world politics is that states are legally sovereign actors, meaning that they have the exclusive right to self-govern and cannot be forced to act in specific ways (an important contemporary discussion). As a result, all international corporations and organisations must act within the limits of inter-state relations. From this perspective, international politics is a ‘struggle for power between states each trying to maximize their own national interests’ (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 5), a so-called ‘balance of power’ that prevents any state from dominating another. World politics, therefore, is all about diplomacy, with negotiations and relations being the key factors for balancing national interests but military force being the ultimate instrument for implementing states’ foreign policies (ibid.).

Over recent years, a variant of realism known as neo-realism has emerged that, rather than looking at agents’ strategies and motivations (as realism does), focuses on the structure of the international political system as it affects the behaviour of all states. Put simply, their theory is based on the notion of states as unitary actors whose behaviour results from structural changes at the international system level. As a result, however, neo-realists are hard put to explain the post-Cold War shift from international system domination by two main powers towards a ‘multi-polarity’ (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 5) that has resulted in ‘new wars’ and more global interventions (Kaldor, 2006). They are unable to explain why, for example, ethnic, religious, or class-based divisions occur and why they are often the causes of civil war (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p. 41).

Another dominating paradigm within international relations is liberalism, a more processed version of idealism that offers a very different view of world politics. First,
liberalism assumes that human beings are perfectible, that ‘democracy is necessary for that perfectibility to develop, and that ideas matter’ (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 5). Liberals thus reject the realist notion that war is the natural condition of world politics and believe in progress. Rather than seeing states as the main actors on the world political stage, they tend to think that international organisations, transnational companies, and terrorist groups have a leading role on the world political stage. This latter implies that states, rather than being distinctive actors, are merely a ‘set of bureaucracies’ (ibid., p. 5). Notions of national interests are therefore non-existent because domestic decisions are the result of whatever a bureaucratic organisation has composed. Liberalism thus underscores the need for co-operation and believes it vital that the international arena be set up in a way that best facilitates co-operation. For liberals, military force is not the sole solution; they are just as concerned with economic, environmental, and technological issues. Likewise, interdependence between states is more important than sovereignty, and order within world politics derives from the interactions between many layers of governing arrangements, common laws and norms, international regimes, and institutional rules (ibid., p. 5). This is exemplified by the Geneva Conventions, the UN Security Council Resolutions, and the rulings of the International Criminal Court, all vital instruments in the peacekeeping environment.

According to Phillip Bobbitt (2008) in his *Terror and Consent*, the world is shifting from an international order led by legal institutions towards a ‘market structure and informal, consensual institutions’ (p. 503). He therefore predicts that UN peacekeeping forces will be complemented by peacekeeping alliances and private companies, and that former oppressive states will take on more humanitarian practices to ensure continuing access to markets (ibid.). Such a perspective is referred to as neo-liberalism, a viewpoint which, broadly speaking, believes that transferring part of the control over the economy from the state to the private sector will result in more efficient government and improved economic indicators for the nation. These neo-liberal movements have changed the world's economies in many ways; for example, through the elimination of trade barriers and the privatisation of previously public-owned enterprises. In fact, Jelle Janssens (2010), in his ‘Blur the Boundaries!’ claims that ‘contemporary policies towards failed and failing states are imbued with neoliberal
ideas and dogmas’ (section 5.1.2) because they assume that underdevelopment is the main reason for conflict, implying that facilitation of economic equalisation is a key factor for success. Admittedly, neo-liberalism, by focusing on domestic political institutions and bureaucracies, is better able than neo-realism to explain why civil war occurs. However, in terms of relevance to this study, it cannot explain domestic institutional change, the use of force, or alliances or conflict between rebel groups and the government (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p. 41), conditions that characterise many of the recent conflicts that have engaged the international community.

Global politics also involves companies and non-governmental organisations, as exemplified by the variety of organisations surrounding peacekeeping missions. This variety has led some scholars to advocate pluralism as the basis for analyses, within which framework Willetts (2008) categorises five groups of political actors in the global system:

- Nearly 200 governments in the global system, including 192 members of the UN;
- 77,200 transnational companies (TNCs), such as Ford, Shell, Microsoft, or Nestlé with these parent companies having just over 773,000 affiliates;
- More than 10,000 single-country non-governmental organisations [NGOs], such as Population Concern (UK) or the Sierra Club (U.S.), which have significant transnational activities;
- 246 intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), such as the UN, NATO, the European Union, or the International Coffee Organisation; and
- 7,300 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International, the Baptist World Alliance, or the International Chamber of Shipping, plus a similar number of less well-established international caucuses and networks of NGOs. (p. 332)

All these players form a part of global politics, and all governments co-operate with a variety of non-state actors. The important question is whether this non-state world is significant in its own right and whether it makes any difference to this analysis.

As a political theory, pluralism is based on the notion that all types of actors can affect political outcomes (Willetts, 2008, p. 332). Pluralism also acknowledges that states are different, but that they can assent to a framework in which certain ethical principles
should be followed (Shapcott, 2008, p. 200). Hence, as noted above, in the international arena, it is not only governments that have influence but also various agents that can be thought of as ‘transnational actors’ (Willetts, 2008, p. 332).

Biersteker (2002), however, worries about ‘the democratic accountability of these new forms of agencies’ (p. 171), pointing out that although they are only accountable to their members, they have influence over a wider set of matters. This latter is a notable concern in the current climate of international peacekeeping in which parts of the scene are dominated by large NGOs and INGOs, organisations funded by the donating countries, often out of political motives. Hence, Freeman (2007) draws the following conclusion:

> These stark realities highlight that international peace building is still very much a ‘work in progress’, and policy and planning in its functional areas is under continuous development. (p. 5).

**Norway's foreign policy**

Norway’s foreign policy, marked by 50 years of involvement in development aid co-operation is seen by many as liberalistic. In fact, one currently prominent component of development aid co-operation is the deployment of Norwegian police officers to IPRMs. One important motivation for Norway’s commitment is its own historical transition: after freeing itself from Sweden and becoming a sovereign country in 1905, it shifted during the last part of the 20th century from being a comparatively poor nation to being one of the richest countries in the world (OECD, 2008a, p. 10). It has been suggested, therefore, that the humanitarian action that is an important part of Norwegian foreign policy is ‘an intrinsic expression of Norwegian values and international solidarity’ (ibid, p. 18). This humanitarian involvement is sometimes labelled the ‘Nansen tradition’ after Norwegian adventurer Fridtjof Nansen, who, having explored some of the world’s coldest places, as the first High Commissioner of Refugees, repatriated half a million World War I prisoners of war held in the Soviet Union and rescued many Jews from deportation during the Holocaust in World War II (Heiberg, 1998). The Government of Norway has long recognised Nansen’s humanitarian achievements, and many claims that his legacy is why Norway is so actively involved in conflicts and humanitarian disasters around the world (Heiberg,
1998). In the international relations field, such involvement would be looked upon as ‘liberal idealism’ (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 278). Norway, with over a £100 million annually spent on humanitarian assistance in 2009 and 2010 £10 million of that sum dedicated to IPRMs – is one of the main donors globally to humanitarian action and peace building.

As part of this commitment, Norway has sanctioned the Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship (GHD, 2003) and has implemented these principles pragmatically. Norway’s own humanitarian policy emphasises that assistance should be both predictable and flexible, and that there is a necessity for fast action to meet ever-changing conditions (Utenriksdepartementet, 2008, p. 28). According to a 2008 peer review by the Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) of the OECD, one of the world’s largest and most reliable sources for comparative statistics and economic and social data (Sonpon, 2010), Norway’s development co-operation has given it ‘considerable credibility and influence within the international humanitarian system’ (OECD, 2008a, p. 18). Not only did Norway’s parliament use the UN as the backdrop to its Norwegian Policy on the Prevention of Humanitarian Crises, a strategic guideline to its overall conflict and disaster risk reduction initiatives (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007), but the country is a firm supporter of the UN’s peacekeeping efforts and is the largest overall budgetary contributor to the UN per capita (OECD, 2006). The view that Norwegian Foreign Policy has a liberal foundation is further supported by the fact that peace and transformation are among the most fundamental values within liberal theories of international relations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 4). Norway has also placed major emphasis on intensifying the UN’s peace-making activities through the development of new mechanisms for conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy through the expanded use of peacekeeping operations. For many years, the country has provided comparatively large contingents to the UN’s peacekeeping operations: since 1947, more than 55,000 Norwegians have served in UN units, both military and police (Blakksirud, 2000).

Nevertheless, some critics argue that Norway’s foreign policy in reality is realism, with lead researcher Helge Pharo (2005) of the ‘Norwegian Peace Tradition’ project claiming...
that Norway’s engagement in conflict areas is not only founded in a humanitarian tradition but is also used to solidify Norway’s security status by strengthening its position in the UN and NATO and towards America. In Gundersens (2004) article ‘The Homeland of Peace’ [author’s translation], Pharo states that ‘Norway’s perception of being a peace nation is a bit strange’ [author translation] (para 1.), and in Gulseth’s (2007) newspaper article headlined ‘Norway’s profile may damage peace work’ [author’s translation] Pharo claims that there is ‘floating around a perception that Norway is a little state without any ambition of being a superpower’ (para. 9). In the same article, Øyvind Østerud argues that ‘driven by Norwegian needs Norway has dived into many situations without looking at consequences and results’ [author’s translation] (Gulseth, 2007, para. 11). Other researchers and journalists have also suggested that Norway has more realism in its foreign policy than it likes to admit because of its relationship with, and dependence on, America (Katzman, 2011). In fact, Tønnesen (2003) claims that Norway’s international engagement in conflicts and humanitarian disasters is determined by political security assessments and media coverage, while Jakobsen (2006) attributes the Nordic countries’ historical enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping to their governments’ use of such missions to kill ‘several birds with one stone’ (p. 386). Undoubtedly, however, these peacekeeping efforts have resulted in international recognition and enabled Norway to show independence from the Great Powers while simultaneously securing their good co-operation: ‘The rise of the Nordic model can, in short, be explained by the fact that it generated power, pride and prestige on the cheap’ (ibid, p. 386).

However, Norway’s approach to peacekeeping and police reform is (negatively) affected by its dispersed and ambivalent foreign policy. As Stein Tønneson, former Director of Oslo’s Peace Research Institute (PRIO), stated in an interview in Klassekampen (cited by RORG, 2009):

The Stoltenberg II government white paper attempts to allow values and interests to go together and not stand in contradiction to each other. In cases where it is impossible to hide that they do not, it calls them ‘challenges’ and claims we must undertake ‘considerations’ [author translation].
According to Toje (Katzman, 2011), Norway’s foreign policy suffers from a lack of ability to prioritise, leading to a pragmatic ad hoc approach that plays on a multitude of strings to survive in the global arena. Consequently, the OECD (2008) found that the management structures and processes around Norway’s administration of development assistance are highly complex and that efficient co-ordination might be impeded by institutional hindrances (p. 46). Pharo (cited by Toje, 2007b) has argued that Norway simply does not have the administrative resources to sufficiently control the amount of funds the country donates to the multitude of projects (Norway has a portfolio of over 4000 agreements (Bolle 2011)). Disch (2011) revealed at Evalueringskonferansen 2012 [a research conference on evaluation methods] that he had not identified any long-term strategies for any of the projects in which he had been involved. Rather, during Norway’s continuous 15-year involvement in Bosnia, planning took place for only one year at a time, and hence he highlighted the threat to accountability when the politicians are driving the decisions. He further stressed ‘a sense of haste’ within the Foreign Ministry’s policies, claiming that, compared to the rest of Scandinavia, Norway has no formal policies:

What surprised me the most was the lack of long-term thinking around what they expected as results of the money spent. It was constantly short-term goals that were the basis for how the money was spent [author translation]. (Bolle 2011, para. 5).

In her Norwegian Peacebuilding Policies, a report intended to verify the effects of different international projects, Hauge (2004) highlights the need for an increased number of regular evaluations. Her opinion is supported by Andreassen’s (2011) contention that even though increased evaluation in management is important to gaining and using knowledge, the Norwegian Government focuses only on budgets – not results – with a lack of attention to long-term effects. Conversely, Deputy Director Tobias F. Svenningsen of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues that because Norway is a small country, it is important that it be flexible and able to provide rapid but politically important contributions (Bolle, 2011). The OECD (2008b) points at Norway and argues for the need ‘to turn the rhetoric into reality’, calling for a broader discussion on how to tackle challenges, one tied to clear goals and success criteria (p. 21). Several commentators concur, pointing to the problematic challenges when
Norway tries to unite its values with its interests (e.g. for example Curtis, 2009, 2010; Egeland, 2008). Based on the above observations, it does indeed seem that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has tended to vacillate between idealism and realism, and that Norway’s foreign policy lacks clear direction and guidelines.

**Conclusion**

This study will therefore investigate the relation between the Norwegian government’s objectives in allocating resources to IPRMs and the ways in which the police officers deployed at the executing level experience the mission. The theoretical insights that have supported and informed the approach to this thesis suggest the following broad research questions:

_How does Norway conduct international police reform missions?_

_What are the experiences of the police officers deployed in-mission?_

_To what extent does Norwegian police deployment contribute to Norway’s foreign policy objectives?_

The initial chapter of this thesis has provided the background for this doctoral project on international police reform missions and has introduced international relations theory as the general conceptual framework. By examining the debate on Norway’s foreign policy, it has clearly shown that Norway is governed by a multitude of aims which does not easily combine. It has also suggested that, as will be emphasised throughout the thesis, the ambivalent dualism within Norway’s foreign policy results in a fragmented approach to IPRM implementation and a lack of long-term planning and/or fruitful evaluation.

The consequent two chapters will be dedicated to give a solid insight into the research context and literature. To this end, Chapter 2 contextualises Norway’s role within IPRMs by covering the background of such missions and discussing the three main contributors within this area: the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Chapter 3 is a critical
examination of contemporary literature on the topic: it introduces the concepts surrounding IPRMs and discusses notable related issues, including conflicting terminologies, the international community’s impact, the tasks of the international police officer, and the role of the police versus the military. Chapter 4 explains and justifies the multiple case study research design and details the research methods used to gather data on IPRMs; namely, ‘open-ended’ questions administered to police officers currently or formerly deployed to one of the three missions chosen and their co-operating partners in the field, and interviews with experienced senior officials. The chapter also discusses ethical considerations, in particular those around my role as a police officer researching my own organisation.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 set out three different case study’s with a narrative presentation of the police officers’ experiences in the specific missions. Chapter 5 addresses the bilateral JUNO-project in Serbia and the training of Serbian police officers in problem-oriented policing and strategic analyses. Chapter 6 describes the UN’s peacekeeping mission to Liberia (UNMIL) and examines the various challenges facing police officers on a UN mission. Chapter 7 focuses on the European Union Police Mission – Afghanistan (EUPOL-A) and Norway’s bilateral police reform project NORAF (NORway-AFghanistan), and covers the police officers’ experiences in these missions, with a particular emphasis on the extreme environment in which they are working. Chapter 8 then explores the research objectives using a comparative analysis of the three case studies in which interviews, primary and secondary documents, and observations are triangulated to provide validity. This application of a cross-case analytic framework allows for examination, identification, and the highlighting of similarities and differences across cases that share a comparable profile within a specific, related focus area. One key analytic theme is the police officers’ experiences before, during, and after the IPRM.

Finally, Chapter 9 aligns the findings with the research questions and reflects back on the theory and primary themes from the literature review. Categorising the key findings of the detailed cross-case analysis into macro, meso, and micro levels highlights the study’s original contribution to the field. As a whole, the chapter provides
a comprehensive discussion of Norway’s contribution, set against the ambitious and complex demands of the international community and the context in which the missions operate.
Chapter 2 - Contextualising IPRMS

Because of their complexity, international police reform missions often involve a broad range of countries and organisations steered by both domestic and international regulations and agreements, and frequently by mandates from the UN Security Council. Hence, to clarify what may seem a muddled picture, this chapter first discusses three main contributors to IPRMs – the UN, the EU, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – and then contextualises Norway’s role and position in this arena.

As previously emphasised, Norway has been a committed supporter of the UN since its foundation in 1945, and the significant contribution of the UN’s first Secretary-General, Norwegian Trygve Halvdan Lie (Eide, 2010), led to a solid relationship between Norway and the UN:

Those who gave their lives in order that we may be free, those who lost their homes, those who suffered, and still suffer, from the consequences of war have given us a sacred mandate: that is to build a firm foundation for the peace of the world (Trygve Lie, 2 February 1946).

Since its inception, however, the UN, being an assembly of states whose sovereignty and autonomy have from the beginning been paramount to order, has undergone many challenges and transformations (Taylor & Curtis, 2008, p. 313). Most particularly, because these states are regarded as equals within international society and international law, their governments had sole authority within their own borders, a principle protected in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. Intervention within states were conflicting with the principles of international society, and was an exception to the rule (ibid, p. 322). This supremacy of statehood was further reinforced when the process of decolonisation placed statehood over justice, an absolute right to independence expressed in the 1960 General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. According to these mandates, statehood precedes any other test of viability, even those of economy, justice, or defensibility, as we shall see later in the chapter.
UN peacekeeping

First generation: 1945–1989

During the period of first-generation peacekeeping, the fundamental rule was consent from all involved (Karns & Mingst, 2001, p. 219), and UN troops were sent exclusively to separate combatants and stayed completely neutral (Tranca & Garon, 2008). In 1979, however, Beitz voiced one of the earliest reservations about the inviolability of national sovereignty when he argued that the situation of individuals after independence is just as important as statehood (cited in Taylor & Curtis, 2008, p. 320). A similar sentiment that a state’s right to exist should depend on its interest in the well-being of its citizens had already been expressed in 1977 by Waltzer and echoed in 1983 by Nardin (ibid.). After the end of the Cold War came a growing consensus within the UN that individual rights were just as important as states’ rights and that “threats to international peace and security did not only emanate from aggression between states” (ibid., p. 321). As a result, humanitarian interventions like emergency assistance, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, post-conflict rebuilding, and democracy development began to have more impact (Luckham, 2003, p. 12), and security became connected with development (Janssens, 2010, p. 82). Getting governments to agree to principles of individual rights over state sovereignty was thus seen as a step towards building a more lawful and peaceful world. As human security and justice became increasingly part of the peace and security agenda, the viewpoint emerged that the UN was justified in intervening when necessary (Taylor & Curtis, 2008, p. 321) but that a broad set of instruments, to be located within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), should be used to protect international humanitarian laws and standards.

Throughout the history of the UNSC, whose original 11 participating states grew to 15 in 1965 (Taylor & Curtis, 2008, p. 315), five members have remained permanent – America France, Russia, Great Britain, and China – all of whom have veto power over council decisions (ibid.). Because the number of permanent members undoubtedly influences the council’s decision-making process, it has been much debated within the UN, particularly during the last decade, and highlighted in a number of publications, including the 2004 report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, issued by the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
Nevertheless, even though this document acknowledges the existence of dissension on UN Security Council organisation, there appears to be a lack of political will to do anything about it (Porter, 2007; Tharoor 2011).

Today, although some of the largest states defend the traditional view of state sovereignty, most members (including the EU) choose to seek authorisation from the UNSC for any potential engagement, and any UN Member State can mediate any conflict or conditions referred to the Security Council or General Assembly through UN Article 34 (UN, 1945, Article 35 (1)). The UN Security Council sets out the overall agenda for any United Nations peacekeeping operation, and although the mandates vary depending on the nature of the conflict, it is the UN Security Council that sets the agenda for any UN peacekeeping operation based on ‘the broader normative debates shaping the international environment’ (UN, 2008). The UN Security Council mandates can also encompass broader operations with a focus on particular themes, like the Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. When there is a threat to ‘international peace and security’, the UN Security Council first tries to resolve the conflict peacefully through Chapter VI of the UN Charter. These are classical peacekeeping mandates where peacekeeping missions are established after the end of a conflict with the consent of the recipient state, and where weapons only can be used in self-defence (Taylor & Curtis, 2008, p. 319). According to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council can also authorise armed intervention ‘as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’ (UN, 1945, Art. 42); for example, if a failed state, through its collapse, presents a wider threat to the international community that can be defined as an international conflict (Taylor & Curtis, 2008, p. 319). Nevertheless, peace-building environments may differ in wars that are vastly internationalised (e.g. Afghanistan) versus wars that are internal (e.g. Liberia), meaning that external peace-building interventions by regional or international organisations may differ based on who is involved in the conflict and the benefits and ripple effects on the international community (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 42).
The difficulty in easing the principle of non-intervention when consent from the host country is not given, however, should not be taken too lightly. It could be argued that the 1999 action against Kosovo illustrates this danger. As a result of such actions, many countries are wary of what they perceive as the development of ‘a license to intervene in their affairs’ (Taylor & Curtis, 2008, p. 323). Darfur, for example, has been a challenge because the Sudanese government has not been willing to fully accept the presence of the UN. The consequences if the UN slackens the non-intervention principle, however, may be an increase in military intrusion by individual states without specific UN endorsement, as was the case in Iraq in 2003. Iraq also illustrates the increase in the numbers of non-UN actors involved in peace operations, including regional organisations and private contractors. This involvement has led to a worrying propensity for international humanitarian interventions to influence the nature of the conflicts or even worsen them (OHCHR, 2010).

Second generation: the 1990s

The end of the Cold War sparked a new (second) generation of UN peacekeeping, which roughly covers the period between 1989 and 1996-1999 (although there is no clear consensus on when the shift between second and third generation occurred). This era began with the UN Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia (Ioannides, 2008) where Norway deployed its first police officers to a UN mission. The post-Cold War context, characterised by a shift from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts or civil war (Karns & Mingst, 2001) – also dubbed ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2006) – challenged the UN, and second-generation peacekeeping resulted from an increased readiness to intercede to protect human security (Tranca & Garon, 2008, p. 7). Since 1990, the UNSC has continuously extended the grounds for intervention to include a threat to civilians, human suffering, state failure, refugee movements, and ethnic cleansing, which in the short time from 1989 to 1993 led to involvement in 17 simultaneous missions (ibid.). Unlike first-generation peacekeeping, second-generation peacekeeping included civilian experts and specialists as well as military, and in some missions, a greater number of soldiers were authorized to employ force for grounds other than self-defence (Afghanistankomiteen i Norge, 2011). Nevertheless, second-generation
peacekeeping has been inconsistent and difficult to define and is the least clear-cut of the three generations.

In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented the UN Security Council with *An Agenda for Peace*, an analysis meant to provide a ‘recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping’ (1992, section 1). This report, which outlined how the UN was to maintain peace and security in the new world after the Cold War, is concisely summarized by Taylor and Curtis (2008):

- *Preventive diplomacy*: involving confidence-building, fact-finding, and preventive deployment of UN authorized forces.
- *Peacemaking*: designed to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means. Peace enforcement may be authorized under Chapter VII if necessary may occur without the consent of the parties.
- *Peacekeeping*: the deployment of a UN presence in the field with the consent of all the parties (*i.e.* classical peacekeeping).
- *Post-conflict peacebuilding*: to develop social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent further violence and to consolidate peace (p. 320).

This agenda for peace (Boutros-Gahli, 1992) helped turn traditional (first-generation) peacekeeping into the more holistic and interventionist second-generation approach. In a 1995 supplement to the document, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali claimed that it ‘served to advance international consensus on the crucial importance of economic and social development as the most secure basis for lasting peace’. More second-generation peacekeeping operations fell under Chapter VII (action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression) (UN, 1945), although as Freire and Lopes (2009) point out, ‘some call it “Chapter VI½” [because] soldiers are sent but with a restrictive mandate regarding the use of force’ (p. 6). The 1990s missions to Somalia and former Yugoslavia represented ‘a second generation of enforcement’ (James, cited by Celik, 2010, p. 8), but it was not until the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo reached their peaks in 1995 and 1999, respectively, that Chapter VII was used with all its powers to restore peace by forceful means (Ferguson, 2004).
Third generation: 2000 to date

In response to the increased threats to international peace and security during the 1990s, the variety of tasks within UN peacekeeping operations have increased considerably. Since 2000, most peacekeeping operations comprise elements that correspond with third-generation objectives; namely, to stabilize and rebuild fragile states (Tranca & Garon, 2008, p. 7). The overall rationale is that intrastate conflicts are linked to deprivation and frustration, meaning that the security approach needs to be directed to the ‘individual and community level’ (Janssens, 2010, p. 82). At the same time, although each operation is different, there is a certain degree of uniformity around the tasks mandated by the UN Security Council (UN, 2008). This generation of peacekeeping, for example, has placed greater emphasis on more holistically rebuilding the country and the civilian element, including the police. Such rebuilding is carried out in co-operation with many other organisations, meaning that it is not necessarily the UN per se that carries out the tasks delineated in the UN Security Council Resolution adopted. Rather, the mandate to conduct a mission can be given to regional organisations like the EU or the African Union (AU) in the Sudan, to military alliances like NATO in Afghanistan, or to a hybrid of the two.

In 2000, an independent panel on UN peacekeeping operations produced the important Brahimi report (named for panel leader, Lakhdar Brahimi) (UN, 2000), a milestone in UN peacekeeping history (Wigdel, 2001). This significant document was motivated by the failures that the UN experienced during the 1990s in countries like Bosnia and Rwanda when the international community was unwilling to authorize a Chapter VII operation even in the face of massive genocide (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2008, p. 529). Being criticized for doing ‘too little too late’ in Rwanda and Bosnia, the interventions in Kosovo in the late 90s has in contrast been criticized for doing ‘too much too soon’ (ibid, p. 529), partly because this time NATO did not hesitate to use air support, and partly because this was an executive mission – meaning that the deployed police officers were armed and executed police duties instead of the national/local police. Put simply, the UN went from its normal modus operandi of Chapter VI operations to a Chapter VII operation (Secretary-General, 2002).
It was in this context that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked the expert panel on peace operations to evaluate the UN system’s shortcomings and make forthright and sensible suggestions for change. This panel heavily critiqued – and advocated extensive changes in – the way that UN peacekeeping and associated post-conflict peace building was conceived, planned, and executed (Durch, Holt, Earle, & Shanahan, 2003), identifying a number of shortcoming and suggesting institutional changes within the UN (UN, 2000). Some changes were in fact made, but it was the report’s tangible and operational suggestions that were more easily adopted by the UN bureaucracy than ‘those pitched at the level of doctrine or strategy or those addressed to the member states themselves’ (ibid.).

Any follow-up to peacekeeping missions is enabled by the appointment of a Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG), who monitors the progress in countries in which peacekeeping missions are underway. These experts have the challenging task of being deployed to unfamiliar terrain where they must be aware of the different explanations for why the violence erupted in the first place, why the conflict has persisted for as long as it has, and what solutions have already been tried and discussed. They also need to understand the motivations, interests, and strengths of those with whom they must work. A Special Representative to the Secretary General must thus have what one might call ‘a political map’ of the area, a daunting challenge whose achievement is questioned by Brahimi & Ahmed (2008):

This ignorance-based decision making process is the norm rather than the exception in post conflict environments and is the original sin of mediation. (p. 6).

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations

The operational responsibility to plan and set out a mission lies with the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (Høgseth, 2008), which is tasked with conducting fact-finding missions; writing follow-up reports, strategy plans, and doctrines; and handling all administrative work related to deployed personnel. To date, with UN peacekeeping operations at an all-time high, the DPKO has workloads that far exceed its capacity: an approximate 1,000 employees in New York must administer to
the needs of about 130,000 people in the field worldwide (Tan, 2010) with a budget of only around £6 billion (UN, 2009). It is important to note that the UN does not have its own resources to drive the missions, being always dependent on donor countries for finances and personnel. Hence, Tan (2010) argues that the DPKO must be strengthened if it is to meet the complex mandates and expectations of the international community. At present, the UN operates with a system that is largely ad hoc, and every operation is assembled and funded individually on a case-by-case basis (Diehl, 2008, p. 83). Moreover, rather than having specific operational procedures for each mission, the UN relies on general standard operating procedures (SOP), perhaps due partly to DPKO work overload but also to the fact that the mix of international and national cultural elements in UN missions hinders production of a standard on which all parties involved in each mission can agree.

The practice of deploying police officers to international missions began with peacekeeping operations in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960 and in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 (Hansen, 2002), and it was in Cyprus that the term ‘CIVPOL’, civilian police, was coined. However, until the 1990s, peacekeeping in conflict and post-conflict situations was a task dominated primarily by the military (McFarlane & Maley, 2001; Murray, 2007), most of whose contingents were in Africa. The tasks of the first civilian police missions were merely to observe and report, which involved activities like patrolling, advising, and reporting back to the UN Special Representative on any violation against human rights (Hansen, 2002). In the 1989 UN mission in Namibia, for example, CIVPOL was primarily a UN instrument for monitoring various local police work (Ferguson, 2004, p. 7). The first official civilian police unit was established at the DPKO in May 1993 and was tasked with planning and coordinating all matters related to policing activities in UN peacekeeping operations (Hansen, 2002, p. 21). At the UN Security Council’s 3801st meeting on 14 July 1997, the President of the Security Council recognised the importance of police personnel to the broader UN mandate:

Civilian police [perform] indispensable functions in monitoring and training national police forces. They could play a major role, through assistance to local police forces, in restoring civil order, supporting the rule of law and fostering civil reconciliation. The Council [sees] an increasingly important role for them in helping build confidence and security between parties and among local
populations, in order to prevent or contain conflicts or to build peace in their aftermath. (UN Security Council, 1997).

In the face of the Brahimi report’s criticism, the CIVPOL concept was amended to its present form, the United Nations Police (UNPOL), whose current responsibilities can consist of anything from close operational and investigative support, capacity building and training, to a full reform of the national police service or challenging tasks like change management (UN, 2000):

The UN has increasingly become occupied with quality within which they send, and conducts testing of police officers from various African countries, together with developing a course for leaders in mission to make them better at planning for the arrival of rotating international police officers. The DPKO also wishes to put higher demands on the mission leaders to get them to plan further ahead. (UN official, personal communication, September 2011)

To improve efficiency, the UN has developed the UN Standing Police Capacity (SPC) whose tasks are to establish police components in new UN peace operations and support on-going operations. The presence of a team of police officers with experience from previous missions is meant to ensure that each new mission is built on lessons learnt; to ensure, as St-Pierre (2009) puts it, ‘continuous improvement in the speed and efficiency of future UN missions’ (p. 155). However, it is not only the UN that is involved in rebuilding conflict countries and security sector reform. Other regional bodies like the AU, the EU, and the OSCE have been increasingly engaged during recent decades in ending conflicts and restoring justice ‘as part of complex, multi-faceted PSOs [Peace Support Operations], each bringing separate mandates representative of their member states’ (Ferguson, 2004, p. 7).

**European security architecture**

The OSCE, formerly the Conference for Security and Co-operation established in the 1970s to improve the co-operation and dialogue between east and west, is one of the primary organisations focused on police reform in Europe (Blakkisrud, 2000). This security organisation, which currently has 53 members and comprises all of Europe, Canada, Russia, and America (Celik, 2010, p. 64), has a primary focus on human rights and the principles of democratic states and has been heavily involved in the reform of
the eastern European countries, including their police services (Blakkisrud, 2000). Specifically, the OSCE has been actively involved in police reform in the Balkans, together with other organisations like the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which is also heavily involved in Africa, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD), which has used many resources to develop an evaluative tool for peace-building (OECD, 2008b). Fleitz, however, in his *Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s* (cited in Celik, 2010) argues that although the OSCE has been engaged in many diplomatic endeavours and humanitarian and reconstruction missions in Europe and Russia, these missions are not peacekeeping operations – the OSCE observes and reports but is unarmed (pp. 64–65).

Because Norway stands outside the EU, it has been interested in promoting other European organs of co-operation in which it has full membership, most particularly, the OSCE, to which it has actively contributed (Blakkisrud, 2000). In fact, the OSCE’s attempt to become a central arena for the formulation of new European security architecture after the Cold War appealed to Norway’s EU sceptics. However, despite broad agreement that the OSCE must play a central role in developing new patterns of co-operation, it gradually became clear that other organisations would be more important in safeguarding security on the European continent. The Norwegian authorities have therefore given priority to establishing a sensible division of tasks between the OSCE, the UN, and other regional and transatlantic organisations (Blakkisrud, 2000). It has also given its support to the OSCE’s conflict-prevention operations and the development of its crisis handling capacity, and has launched several bilateral projects in Serbia (hereafter, JUNO) under its umbrella.

**The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy**

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the main element of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), comprises EU security, defence, and military aspects. This framework has its antecedents in the European Political Co-operation (EPC), established in 1970 to enable foreign policy coordination in the EC, which in 1992 became the Common Foreign and Security Policy (ratified in 1993) (Smith, 2008, p. 39). The framework’s implementation resulted primarily from the end
of the Cold War and the Yugoslav crisis, which put European security high on the agenda (Vanhoonacker, 2005, p. 79) and made it clear that the EU needed the capacity for early warning (Smith, 2008, p. 184). It was in the Balkans, however, that the EU became engaged in ‘civilian crisis management’ and initiated its very first police missions (Ioannides, 2008, p. 1). Subsequently, the CFSP’s institutional structure was modified by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (ratified in 1999) which established two institutions: the office of the High Representative for the CFSP and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which identifies focus areas for the CFSP, produces policy papers, and gives initial warnings on crisis (Smith, 2008, pp. 41-42).

At the Helsinki European Council of 1999, further significant action was taken; namely, the introduction of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now CSDP) and the establishment within the council framework of new bodies to assist in any upcoming ESDP operations: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC), and the Military Staff Organisation (EUMS) (Smith, 2008, p. 41). The Political and Security Committee (commonly known by its descriptive French acronym COPPS) comprises the permanent ambassadors from member states, who meet frequently as a preparatory body to assist in formulating common EU external policies, coordinating CFSP working groups, and giving political advice to the council (EU Council of the European Union, 2009a; Smith, 2008, p. 42; Vanhoonacker, 2005, p. 83). The Political and Security Committee also heads the ‘political control and the strategic direction of crisis management operations’ (EU European Commission, 2008) and thus plays a vital role in CSDP operations.

The civilian part of crisis management was established in the European Council in June 1999 as a result of a discussion on ESDP evolution (Ioannides, 2008, p. 9). Then, in June 2000, the subsequent Feira European Council defined four interlinked priority areas: police co-operation, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection (EU Council of the European Union, 2009a). These instruments were later expanded in 2004 to include monitoring and strengthening of the Offices of the EU Special Representatives (ibid.). Although civilian crisis management was placed under Pillar II of the EU, in fact all three pillars (the European Communities (EC), the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home Affairs (now the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice) were involved in this area (Ioannides, 2008, p. 8). These pillars differed primarily in that the second and third pillars were founded on intergovernmental co-operations and agreements, while the stipulations in the first pillar (the EC) were under the aegis of the Court of Justice (BMDF, 2008). The Treaty of Lisbon (signed 13 December 2007) did away with the pillar system and the entire Constitutional Treaty came under Court of Justice adjudication in 2009 (Auswärtiges-Amt, 2009).

Also as a consequence of recent reforms, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has been moved into Title IV of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and is under the aegis of the Court of Justice. One notable exception is certain areas of judicial co-operation in criminal matters and police co-operation and matters of internal order and security (Article 276 TFEU), which the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly states are the sole responsibility of the Member states (Article 4(2) TEU) (BMDF, 2008).

It is important to note, however, that because deploying police officers to post-conflict zones is part of EU foreign policy, the EU has acknowledged the presence of a natural cross-over between ‘internal security and external affairs’ (Rees, 2005, p. 222). Blockmans and Wessel (2009) therefore argue that the termination of the pillar structure will strengthen external action (pp. 267-268).

Through the CSDP, the EU has outlined an approach to external security that is ambitious and comprehensive, and within the European Security Strategy (ESS), it has defined important threats and challenges to the EU. Susan Woodward, in her discussion of lessons to be learnt from the Balkans, even claims that ‘the myriad of reforms and programmes in south-eastern Europe are aimed at providing security for Western European states and citizens in defense against south-eastern Europe’ (cited in Osland 2004, p. 545). In fact, the ESS does define state failure as a threat and sees it as a catalyst for organised crime, identified as another of five major threats to the EU (EU Council of the European Union, 2003). Hence ‘restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime, is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU’ (Osland, 2004, p. 544). The ESS also references the EU’s strategic objectives, including
international co-operation, democracy building, and respect for human rights and the rule of law (Smith, Crowe, & Peterson, 2006, p. 255). Hence, although the CSDP’s military dimension is relatively modest, its civilian counterpart, the law enforcement capabilities, has provided the EU with considerable international influence in terms of ‘soft’ power instrument development (Rees, 2005, p. 222).

In contrast to most EU policies, the EU Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy allows all member states to formally propose new policies within its framework. Members interested in initiating a CSDP operation, for example, do not have to promote their case to the European Commission, meaning that member states have a considerable voice in this area (Björkdahl & Strömvik, 2008, p. 24). Even bodies other than the member states can propose missions; for instance, the EU Council Secretariat, together with external actors like the UN and international peace negotiators (ibid.). Once a CSDP mission has been proposed, several factors are considered, including the political feasibility of such an operation and whether the mission is strategically sensible for the EU, as well as other factors like capacity and resources (Björkdahl & Strömvik, 2008, pp. 26-27). If these obstacles are overcome, then the next step is to lay a foundation for the mission, which may consist of the Political and Security Committee acquiring information from a number of sources and initiating informal contacts with external parties, such as the UN, OSCE, or third countries. This stage will also usually include a fact-finding mission to determine whether the mission is viable (Björkdahl & Strömvik, 2008, p. 27). If the Political and Security Committee determines that a mission is possible, the planning phase begins. First, a crisis management concept (CMC) is developed that provides an overall political assessment, identifies the objectives of the mission, and suggests a possible course of action. Depending on the nature of the mission, the crisis management concept, including possible police activities, is then discussed in the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). Dependent on CIVCOM’s advice, the crisis management concept is negotiated in the Political and Security Committee. Should an agreement be reached there, the EU Council approves the crisis management concept (ibid.). The planning and daily management of the missions are carried out by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), peopled by police advisors from the different member states, which
is politically controlled and under strategic direction. Specifically, the CPCC’s mission is ‘to provide assistance and advice to the High Representative, the Presidency and the relevant EU Council bodies and to direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review civilian CSDP operations’ (EU Council of the European Union, 2011).

When a mission has been mandated by a UN Security Council Resolution (as in the case of Afghanistan), there are frequent discussions between the EU and the UN, leading to a formal invitation from the UNSC to take part in a mission. The ESS then recognizes the UN as the leader within the international peacekeeping efforts but encourages close consultation and co-operation with important actors like the OSCE and the AU (Solana, 2003, pp. 14-15). Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the next steps would have been the setting up of an agreement between member states to launch a mission and the formal adoption by the Council of the European Union of the EU decision as a Joint Action. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, however, ‘introduces a single legal personality for the Union that enables the EU to conclude international agreements and join international organisations. The EU is therefore able to speak and take action as a single entity’ (Finansdepartementet, 2011) and all ‘joint actions’ are now referred to as ‘decisions’ (Ni Chonghaile, 2002). This change simplifies decision making by eliminating the circuitous path to joint agreement.

Although Norway is not a member of the EU, it has strong ties with the European Economic Area (EEA) and has since 1992 been an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU), whose aim is to develop a European capability to intervene in situations in which NATO finds it unnecessary to become involved. This process of strengthening European security and its crisis-handling capabilities is one that Norway has supported. Following the WEU’s gradual integration into the EU, Norway has safeguarded its interests through close co-operation with NATO and the EU under a special co-operation agreement between EU and NATO countries that are not EU members. For constitutional and political reasons, agreements of this kind are necessary to facilitate Norwegian police participation in EU operations (Blakkisrud, 2000). A change in the macro security context at the end of 1989, however, allowed Norway to engage its police service in conflicts on a lower level not only through the
UN but also bilaterally and through the EU. Since then, it has actively sought involvement in European police missions, including EULEX in Kosovo and EUPOL–A in Afghanistan, and has guaranteed personnel and equipment to the CSDP Rapid Reaction Force and to the EU Nordic battle group (on the condition that the actions have a UN mandate) (Europa, 2010). Although the EU’s initial policy intent in Afghanistan was for police officers to be selected solely from member countries, this goal was not achievable because of a personnel shortage, leading to the practical solution that non-member states like Norway and Canada contributed to EUPOL.

The CSDP has now existed for almost a decade and has been operational for the last seven years. The first CSDP crisis management mission started up in January 2003 in Bosnia, and by December, a total of 17 civilian missions had been initiated (EU Council of the European Union, 2009b). By comparison, the UN has been involved in only about 15 such operations, although these are admittedly much larger than most ‘typical’ EU missions (Björkdahl & Strömvik, 2008, p. 9).

**Contextualising Norway’s contribution**

The value of deploying police officers to IPRMs was first formally noted in Norway in the 2004 action plan The Contribution of Developmental Aid Politics to Peace Building – Norway’s role [author translation] (Utenriksdepartementet, 2004b). This action plan emphasises that satisfactory security conditions are necessary for successful development aid co-operation and that one way forward could be to redistribute manpower from the military to the civilian police as part of Norway’s foreign policy (Utenriksdepartementet, 2004b). Most particularly, the plan focuses on securing women and children’s rights in accordance with international development goals (ibid.). A subsequent action plan, the 2006 Government Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security, laid out the international role of the Norwegian police even more specifically (Utenriksdepartementet, 2006a), stating that Norway shall be a driving force within the DPKO’s work to mobilise police resources for peace operations. In recognition of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 intent to ‘incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations’ and ‘take special measures to protect women and girls from
gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse’ (UN Security Council, 2000), the 2006 Action Plan specifically addresses the need for female Norwegian police investigators with expert knowledge on investigating sexual offences and gender-related violence in war and conflict (Utenriksdepartementet, 2006a). These goals were updated and strengthened in 2011 by a later version of the plan, *Women, Peace, and Security – Norway’s Strategy Plan 2011–2013*, which focuses on certain priority areas that are to receive special attention in the next few years (Utenriksdepartementet, 2011). The same year, an intergovernmental action plan, *In Service for Norway*, was launched to secure better protection of Norwegian personnel serving abroad. However, a list put out by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security of initiatives implemented almost a decade ago show that this plan, although aspiring to be a fresh and innovative initiative, is actually a direct replica of already existing actions (Justisdepartementet, 2011).

The leading actors in Norway’s contribution to IPRMs are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Norwegian Police Directorate, and the Norwegian embassies in the recipient countries to which the programmes are directed (OECD, 2008a, p. 23). The primary foreign policy document developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal with Norway’s involvement is the annual budget statement (white paper) from the Norwegian government to the parliament. This rough plan for how humanitarian assistance will be distributed during the year, which includes geographical, topical, and organisational priorities, is subject to continuous review (OECD, 2006). For example, in the annual budget statement for 2003–2004 (no. 1), the period during which the UN mission to Liberia (UNMIL) was established, the MFA’s proposal accentuates Norway’s long-standing and close relationship with America and emphasises that Norwegian and European security depends on America and NATO (Utenriksdepartementet, 2002). This message is reiterated in virtually every subsequent annual budget statement (Utenriksdepartementet, 2003, 2004a, 2005, 2006b, 2007, 2008, 2009). The government further stipulates in the annual budget statement 1 of 2003–2004 that it puts great emphasis on contributing to the international community’s capacity to enhance a lasting and stable peace, particularly through the UN (Utenriksdepartementet, 2003). The proposition also directs that
peacekeeping shall be an integrated part of Norway’s international aid co-operation, with particular weight on securing rapid and flexible support for peace operations in countries that are working their way out of internal violent conflicts. In practice, however, the process of deploying Norwegian police officers to IPRMs is quite complex and involves many actors. This complexity is summarised in Figure 2.1, which provides a simple schematic overview of the mechanisms involved when either the UN or the EU requests the deployment of Norwegian police officers.

Figure 2.1: Norway and IPRMs - a schematic overview

As figure 2.1 shows, when the UN Security Council initiates a mission through a Resolution, the police unit within the DPKO conducts a fact-finding mission and a needs analysis and then, on that basis, sends out requests for police advisors to member countries. Meanwhile, in Norway, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes a political decision on whether or not to become involved. If the decision is positive, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security decides how many officers will be deployed. The National Police Directorate then has the responsibility for planning the mission, as well as the operational responsibility for the Norwegian police officers being deployed (Høgseth, 2008). Norway has deployed police officers since 1989 to a broad range of IPRMs all over the world, see table 2.1:
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Table 2.1. gives a schematic overview of the types of IPRMs Norway has contributed to from July 1989 to August 1st 2012. The length of each bar in the table indicates the duration of the mission. Mission bars with no thick line towards the end of the time scale is still on-going. As displayed in the table, Norway has contributed to bilateral, regional and multilateral missions, where the focus and tasks has varied considerably depending on the nature of the IPRM. However, it is worth noting that for UN missions in particular, Norway has been asked by the DPKO to contribute particularly in the field of gender and human rights (Justisdepartementet, 1999-2000), both aspects that are present in Norway’s long-term commitment to the UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL) and Afghanistan (see table 2.1).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has set out the constitutional and macro-policy context for Norway’s involvement in IPRMs and has identified the actors involved, their motives, and who sets the agenda. The discussion also considered whether the assistance is provided primarily as a tool to further the diplomatic aims of the provider or to further the peaceful transition to democracy in the requesting state. Although these twin motivations need not be mutually exclusive, either can be counter-productive without proper and meaningful collaboration. Yet to date there has been little in-depth policy and impact analysis aimed at providing proper guidance to mediate these potentially competing tensions in establishing policy bases for these missions (Bures, 2007; Hills, 2008). Further, nor have such operations been accompanied by strategic or operational planning or a qualitative analysis of the system itself. In preparation for developing an analysis that addresses some of these issues, the next chapter reviews the literature on IPRMs, examines the various concepts and terminologies surrounding such missions, and highlights the challenges related to their execution.
Chapter 3 – Literature review

... there seems to be some form of pervasive assumption that police from developed nations will engage with counterparts from emergent nations and that, by a physical presence in the field, along with some form of training, role modelling, mentoring, and coaching, an osmotic transformation will occur among indigenous police. (Murney & McFarlane, 2009, p. 202).

As preceding chapters have shown, international relations theory offers a variety of explanations for the international community’s general imperative to engage in peacekeeping but does not fully cover the role of police. Though the Western world in many ways stumbled into IPRMs at the end of the Cold War, its involvement has progressively become an important element in the foreign policy of the industrialised world. It is therefore especially notable that so little attention has been paid to the process of achieving successful outcomes. Rather, the focus in peacekeeping has first been on the military part of the mission and then on ways to establish an interim police force. Over the last 15 years, however, IPRMs have not only moved beyond the traditional UN peacekeeping role and gained the interest of many organisations other than the UN (e.g. the EU, the OSCE, and many NGOs) but have triggered a range of bilateral aid initiatives from many Western countries. This review therefore seeks to identify the literature that best highlights the challenges surrounding IPRMs, including the various concerns raised about post-conflict police reform. The latter includes the importance of police reform within democracy-building programmes, the lack of a common definition and the diversity of terminologies, the variety of forms that IPRMs take and the different conditions in which they take place, the lack of strategies and plans, the police versus the military, goals versus feasibility, differences in standards, and the tasks and role of the deployed police officer. The key point of this literature review, then, is to generate sharp, astute questions about the issue (Yin, 2003, p. 9), to be critical, and to draw attention to the areas that are most relevant to the research project (Wallace & Wray, 2011, p. 150).

According to Bayley (2006), one of very few academics to provide research insights on IPRMs, there are four reasons for the increased interest in deploying police officers to missions: the UN Security Council’s readiness to sanction peacekeeping interventions,
the eagerness of the international community to promote democracy as the best form of government after the 1989 fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, a concern that ‘failed’ states provide shelter for transnational crime and terrorism, and recognition that a stable police service is an absolute must for the promotion and maintenance of political order (Bayley, 2006, pp. 9-10). Hence, although policies and guidelines on police reform exist, such reform is a challenging task even in democratic states and an extremely problematic endeavour in countries where conflicts and poverty prevail. In earlier work, Bayley (2001) highlights the many hindrances to reform – including ‘corruption, alienated publics, and enduring habits of repression’ (p. 5) – and questions why there is almost no shared knowledge on how to tackle these problems. In his 2006 book Changing the Guard – Developing Democratic Police Abroad, he also complains about a dearth of literature on the rebuilding of an accountable and democratic police service with a focus on serving the public (Bayley, 2006, p. 11). Above all, he finds it ironic that during the last couple of decades, when most Western states have been reassessing the structures of their own police services, there has been scarce ‘cross-fertilisation’ between lessons learned at home and the ‘imperatives of foreign assistance’ (ibid, p. 12). He emphasises particularly that the international community need to study the course of police reform in order to facilitate the movement towards democracy (ibid., p. 13).

According to Ferguson (2004), ‘post-conflict police reform theory is divided into several schools of thought, not all of which gel together’ (2004, p. 7). Likewise, Hills (2008), after reviewing the literature, concludes that although the NGO Human Rights Watch produces normative reports of police practices and that journals like Conflict, Security & Development and International Peacekeeping offer ‘primarily policy-relevant analysis’ (p. 220) and pertinent articles aimed at ‘mainstream security debates’ (P. 220), respectively, little evidence exists of international police reforms being placed into a wider intellectual framework. On the contrary, Hills argues, not only is research on police reform presented predominantly in conference or workshop proceedings and/or by intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) or international consultants, but many police advisers are retired or seconded non-academic officers, and the majority of academic consultants construct methodologically suspect descriptive publications that
merely assume ‘transferability’ (*ibid*, p. 220). In fact, much of the writing on the subject has been carried out by diplomats and military officers with experience in the field. This concentration has, according to Fetherston (2000), ‘tended to limit the accumulation of knowledge...with little generalisable value beyond a tentative list of do’s and do not’s’ (cited in Bures, 2007, p. 412), and international analyses of problems facing countries in transition have proven especially difficult when it comes to police issues (Rau, 1999, p. 357).

**Democracy-building and police reform**

Police reform is an important part of democracy-building because just as a democracy cannot be accountable or meaningful if violence and fear prevail, democracy-building in post-conflict zones cannot be successful without the provision of order and security. Likewise, since policing mirrors governance just as governance reflects policing, the police are a key presentation of the state’s authority and values (Bayley, 2006, pp. 17-18). One critical question that remains, however, is whether a democracy can be designed. Bastian and Luckham (2003), on the basis of their case studies, suggest that this question ‘should be answered in the negative. Democratic constitutions do not guarantee democracy; nor, however carefully drafted, do they necessarily reduce conflict’ (p. 304). To support their claim, they point to the many difficult ‘constitutional experimentations in multi-ethnic societies’ (*ibid.*), singling out South Africa as an exception for its process of reconciliation rather than constitutional design based on international invention (*ibid.*). In fact, Bastian and Luckham (2003b) argue that it is arrogance for various experts, NGOs, and politicians to assume that they can create democracies by designing institutions, pointing also to such sustainability issues as what happens when the international community leaves. Wilén (2009) points to the false economy created by all the foreign organisations that need goods and accommodation, as in the case in Liberia and the Solomon Islands (Barlow, 2008). Not only have the normative consequences of such ‘forced’ democratisation yet to be investigated, but attempts to bring Western democracy to areas like the Middle East have themselves been a source of conflict (Baylis, 2008, p. 239). Such endeavours are in fact exceptionally challenging and raise vital issues about the ‘credibility, capability, and legitimacy of international institutions’ (Biersteker, 2002, p. 171). According to Bastian
and Luckham (2003a), the issue is not whether democracy can be designed but that today there seems to be no alternative option.

One frequently used policing ‘model’ in IPRMs is ‘community policing’, which follows the principles of democratic policing, the touchstone by which the international community now assesses new, emerging policing systems. The indicators of democratic policing have thus become rooted in international and regional agreements and guidelines (Caparini & Marenin, 2005), like the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979) and the European Code of Police Ethics (Council of Europe, 2001). Marenin (1998) identifies six such principles – ‘effectiveness, efficiency, accessibility, accountability, congruence and general order’ (p. 169) – and then explains congruence by linking it to a country’s culture, laws, and ideology. Whereas some countries (e.g. Norway and Britain) are steered mostly by law and a code of conduct, other countries (e.g. those in the Middle East) are dominated by factors like culture and ideology, which also define the nature of the police service (Marenin, 1998, p. 170). As a result, Ferguson (2004) claims, creating brand new police services focused on preventing and investigating crime while simultaneously upholding law and order and imposing Western democratic standards is an exceptionally difficult task, one that demands strong local ownership (Ferguson, 2004, p. 7). The key to achieving this task is a good and trusting relationship between the community and the police. Donais (2005) concurs, calling for a ‘less paternalistic forms of outside engagement’ in police reform missions (Donais, 2008).

Another problem is the lack of coordination and conflicting priorities between the different international players; for example, the UN, EU, Council of Europe, and OSCE (Donais, 2005; Eide & Holm, 2000). This problem is typified in Afghanistan, where different international organisations and countries are each ‘doing their own thing’ (Hartz, 2009; Høgseth, 2007). Hence, to encourage continuity between peacekeeping and peace-building missions, St-Pierre (2007) argues that the UN Security Council, the DPKO, and the Peace Building Commission should work more closely together. At the same time, however, according to both Osland (2004) and Woodward (2003), the different countries involved are also working for their own interests, thereby
disregarding the essential role of local ownership. Yet if the locals are left out, there is little chance that peace and democracy can be sustained in the region (Osland, 2004, p. 557; Woodward, 2003, p. 300). Holm & Osland (2000) therefore emphasise the importance of understanding that post-conflict national police reform is a minefield of vested and conflicting interests.

Definitions and terminologies

Although various terminologies cover IPRMs, the field suffers from a lack of common definitions. In fact, according to Bures (Bures, 2007), the largest root problem within international peacekeeping is the basic lack of consensus on definitions, terminology, direction, success criteria, theoretical foundation, and proper analyses. Such a problem is perhaps not surprising given that international police reform, and its numerous new terminologies, emerged within the framework of UN peacekeeping operations, which lacks a consensus even on the basic term ‘peacekeeping’ (ibid, p. 412). As Findlay (2002) points out,

[p]eacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter; it has never been guided by established theory or doctrine; the term was invented long after practice had begun; and improvisation has characterised its evolution ever since. (p. 4).

Even the definition offered by Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2008) in their glossary to the Globalisation of World Politics is problematic because describing peacekeeping as ‘the deployment of UN presence in the field with the consent of all parties’ (p. 585) narrows the actors involved to the UN. Not only does modern peacekeeping often involve a number of other active parties, but some peacekeeping operations have been conducted without the consent of all parties involved. Moreover, as Ferguson (2004) shows in his ‘Police Reform, Peacekeeping and SSR,’ traditional first- and second-generation peacekeeping has shifted to a third-generation peacekeeping of ‘peace support operations (PSO)’ (also sometimes referred to as ‘peace operations’) in which police ‘must be given a major role’ if stability and economic development are to be ensured (p. 5).
Another important term in this context is the concept of ‘security sector reform’ (SSR), first introduced by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) together with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Developed in the 1990s in Eastern Europe, the SSR concept stems from both the development community (in recognition of the security sector’s important role in democracy development) and the field of civil-military relations (Edmunds, 2008, p. 1). However, although the term is now being used to define a whole-of-governance reformation of a state’s security sector when that state is unable to provide security for its people under democratic principles, Zedner (2003) criticises such an application:

Security is a slippery concept. Its meaning are multiple without clarity about which meaning is intended (or understood); exactly what is being provided and consumed, sold and bought, promised or sorts remains obscure. (p. 154).

Bayley and Perito (2010) endorse the SSR concept, arguing that such a holistic approach is essential to success. The UN, having experienced growing pressure to assist nations with SSR, established a UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force in 2007 (Greener, 2009a, p. 243). The Secretary-General defines SSR as follows in his 2008 report, Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform:

...a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without UN Security Council Resolution and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. As the Security Council noted, security sector reform ‘should be a nationally owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question’ (Secretary-General, 2008, section 17).

The EU has also adopted the SSR concept with the aim of creating an umbrella for all the different sections and concepts that fall within this framework. Ioannides and Tondini (2010), however, argue that because of a lack of clear strategies, SSR drowns within other concepts and that the EU’s SSR approach – only too clearly demonstrated in the EU’s attempt to lead the reconstruction of the Afghan National Police (ANP) – has been to ‘think holistically, act fragmentally’ (Byman, 2011). According to Janssens (2010), some academics are also critical of SSR because linking development and security results in a blurring of the boundaries that makes it difficult to set the two
sectors apart (p. 84). Moreover, too much focus on security may lead to an overprotection of the development sector, which in a risky environment can hinder them from doing their job (ibid.), a recurrent problem in Afghanistan.

This diversity of terminologies around UN missions – peacekeeping, peace operations, peace support operations, and security sector reform – as well as the increasing number of new terminologies in the field is partly a product of the change in focus from military intervention to a more civilian orientation, or in EU parlance ‘crisis management’. The goal of such civilian crisis management, however, is not as clearly defined as its military counterpart, and Ioannides (2008) argues that this lack of a clear definition threatens the effectiveness of the civilian part of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) process (pp. 8-9). In the absence of a clear definition for ‘civilian crisis management’, and given the blurred comprehension of what European security is, the EU uses the term inconsistently and without any correspondence to the terminology of other international organisations like the UN and OSCE (ibid.). Blockmans and Wessel (2009) are highly critical of this interchangeable use of concepts like crisis management, conflict resolution, and peace building (p. 6), claiming that in the EU context, the term ‘crisis management’ is used an umbrella term for both police and military CSDP missions, independent of whether preventative measures are taken to hinder the outburst of a conflict and/or whether the goal is to restore peace or rebuild a country. Instead, the term is used to describe any EU efforts to provide security. There is even a panoply of classifications in the different civilian CSDP operations themselves, including ‘rule of law missions’, ‘peace monitoring missions’, ‘security sector reform’ missions, ‘civil protection missions’, ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ missions, and ‘conflict resolution’ missions, to name a few (ibid, pp. 269-270). The confusion arising from this lack of consensus and understanding of terminology puts at risk any clear direction and results in a lack of holistic approaches, especially in multilateral missions involving an abundance of different actors.

**Category and context**

IPRMs can be classified into three categories: multilateral or regional missions led by large international organisations and bilateral missions led by one country in direct co-
operation with a recipient country. A multilateral police mission is coordinated, centralised, formal, and inclusive, meaning a multitude of contingents from around the world can contribute various degrees of competences (Guille, 2010, p. 39). However, because CIVPOL contingents ‘represent a plethora of police cultures and policing concepts’ (Holm & Osland, 2000, p. 211), multilateral missions, although capable of ensuring a holistic approach, are often slow and bureaucratic, and can face problems if the conflict climate suddenly shifts. Hence, ‘multilateral mechanisms of co-operation must not remain a “paper exercise”’ (Elsen 2007, p. 22, cited by Guille, 2010, p. 39) but rather must be ‘more effectively used [with the] right balance … between mechanisms of co-operation and the development of trust for a successful outcome (pp. 39–40).

The classic multilateral IPRM is exemplified by the UN missions to Liberia (UNMIL) to which Norway has deployed police officers since the beginning of 2004 (examined in Chapter 6).

A bilateral mission, in contrast, is based on an agreement between only two countries – the donor and the recipient. Such missions tend to be carried out by informed and motivated actors (Guille, 2010, p. 39) able to secure efficient, often practically oriented albeit exclusive cooperation, but whose operation across a broad arena risks a fragmentation that could hinder coordination and quality assurance. Nevertheless, such bilateralism is often an efficient and agile way of avoiding slow and heavy bureaucracy, leading Guille to argue that some kind of bilateral co-operation is pivotal within any form of international co-operation but that the macro level must be used as an umbrella (pp. 39–40). Donais (2005), however, in his pointed article ‘Post-Conflict Policing’, attributes the lack of continuity and constancy within multilateral police missions to a constant shift of personnel and political priorities, with the added complication of trying to coordinate bilateral programmes into multilateral ones (p. 227). The bilateral mission is exemplified by Norway’s extensive bilateral police reform programmes in Eastern Europe throughout the late 1990s and most of the 2000s, including the JUNO Project in Serbia (examined in Chapter 5), initiated in 2000 under the OSCE umbrella.
A regional mission, on the other hand, is something ‘in between’, meaning that it has all the features of the multilateral form but the parties come from the same region, which may be an advantage given that similar cultural backgrounds can result in ‘fewer disagreements blocking strong action’ (Diehl, 2008, p. 79). Nevertheless, the number of contributors may be restricted, as when the EU sought to have only EU member countries involved in its EUPOL–A police reform mission to Afghanistan (examined in Chapter 7).

Nor do IPRMs differ only in type: they also take place under very different sets of conditions and more often than not are not only extremely complex but also unique, which ‘complicates any analysis’ (Bayley, 2006, p. 14). In fact, Bayley underscores that police assistance is influenced by many contextual factors: one mission can take place in a country undergoing peaceful change and another in a country where government has changed because of civil war and/or international pressure (ibid.). Diehl (2008), for example, points out that Serbia and Afghanistan are two very different settings, the first needing mere support to help with the reform process; the latter requiring a full rebuilding of the police service, including the creation and training of a non-existent police force from scratch. There are also contextual differences between civil war conflicts and interstate conflicts with reform in a country experiencing internal civil strife being more challenging than that in a country suffering conflict with another state (p. 135). Other conditions that may play in are whereinto the conflict phase the deployment takes place, and cultural and religious factors (ibid.). As Kaldor (2003) has also pointed out, citing the demands for international community ‘trusteeship’ generated by the crisis in the Balkans and the failure or collapse of some African states, in post-conflict reform programmes, security services also depend on international sources of finance, none of which are directly liable to the state (ibid., p. 224).

**Strategies and goals**

One of the many problematic issues within the IPRM area – one due possibly to their political nature – is the lack of long-term strategies and clear goals. Bayley (2001, 2006), for example, has consistently argued that reform programmes are internationally politicised and almost solely focused on quick short-term goals rather than feasibility,
resulting in a flow of programmes and money being directed at problems without any detailed statement as to how they will produce the desired result (Bayley, 2001, p. 19). Bayley and Perito (2010), after examining various stabilisation and reconstruction missions, also report that despite extensive funding, no proper strategic plans exist and the training of local police is ‘a phantom activity without any clear system’ (p. 124). As important, they point out, these activities are not evaluated for impact or outcome (2010, p. 125). Most particularly, they criticise the lack of strategies for conflict management and rebuilding and the resulting ad hoc decisions in most missions, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq (2010). Hence, despite the UN Security Council’s 2006 promise to provide clear guidelines on what missions must do to protect civilians, a 2009 report by the UN Secretary General shows a ‘clear disconnect between mandates, intentions, expectations, interpretations and real implementation capacity’ (cited by Tan, 2010, p. 1). Diehl (2008) also levels criticism at the formulation of UN mandates through political negotiation, which leaves them deliberately vague, devoid of clarity, and inflexible to the constant shift in conflict states (p. 123).

Giegerich (2010) further argues that the EU is reactive rather than proactive, that its impact is unclear, and that its planning and implementation suffers as a result of its wish to demonstrate a ‘capacity for action’ (p. 51). Osland (2004), after studying the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), reports that the BiH police reform process has not been successful, with internationally seconded EUPM personnel claiming that the political agreements are ‘not worth more than the paper they are written on, because reforms are never implemented’ (p. 556). She also argues that the EU support of myriad activities in BiH was devoid of any distinct strategies, goals, or comprehension of why these activities were carried out (p. 554). Blockmans and Wessel (2009) temper such negativity by pointing to the extensive challenges around planning and creating appropriate mandates for CSDP missions while managing coordination with other international organisations and states (pp. 274-275). Isabelle Ioannides (2008), however, who has published extensively on the EU internal structure, CSDP police missions, accountability in the CSDP, and EU crisis management, is also highly critical:
[The] EU lacks a global vision on crisis management and therefore on police reform. This absence of overall direction at a strategic level obstructs EU coherence and effectiveness at an operational level when implementing police reform in post-conflict societies. (p. 1).

Without doubt, there is a gap between discourse and practice within the CSDP policy (Ioannides & Tondini, 2010), which echoes Giegerich’s (2010) argument that the EU is reactive rather than proactive and their impact is unclear (p. 51).

**The military and the police**

Another common issue in international missions is the role of the military versus the police. Although the security sector encompasses all state institutions and actors with a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens – including the military, police, paramilitary forces, intelligence, and secret services – all these agents have ostensibly different roles and functions. McFarlane and Maley (2001), for example, discuss the police and military roles in a disrupted state, pointing out that although military peacekeeping operations are conducted to enforce stability, it follows logically that a holistic conception of the security sector transcends military calculations alone. When the country has entered a post-conflict phase, there is a need to re-establish the rule of law and create a safe environment for the local community (ibid., p. 186). This re-establishment demands different skills than those of the military peacekeeper (Dahlstrom, 2007, p. 1), yet the international community has only slowly recognised the importance of the police in post-conflict reform of a state’s security sector (Ferguson, 2004; Mani, 2000, pp. 9-10; Murray, 2007). Brown, Barker, and Burke, cited in Greener’s (2009b) New International Policing, express surprise that the UN, in its peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP), ‘took so long ... to call on professional police from Member States to facilitate peace-keeping operations’ (p. 23). Greener also finds it ironic that international policing remained so underdeveloped for so long after the deployment to Cyprus, with the international community not realising the value of integrating police as part of a peacekeeping mission until the mid-1990s (ibid.).

Most important, compared with the military, the civilian police have suffered from a severe lack of developed doctrine (Hansen, 2002). Whereas part of the military’s
primary task is to plan operations, the police must transfer their experience from domestic policing to their execution of reform programmes, which involves a very different set of tasks. The police also have far fewer resources than the military, especially in UN missions, and the number of military versus police staff that produces doctrines and plans within the DPKO is much lower. As emphasised by the Brahimi Report in its call for more police involvement in pre-mission planning (UN, 2000), these weaknesses enfeeble collaboration between the military and the police during the initial period of a mission.

Bayley and Perito (2010) clearly illustrate these differences between military and police tasks in their critique of U.S. naïvete after entering Iraq with a strong military force and overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his regime. One immediate outcome was the unprecedented pillaging of Bagdad, which came as a shock to the American forces, who simply stood on the side-lines and watched. The soldiers complained that they were neither trained to fight crime nor to do regular police work, and this lack of training caused tension and increased violence between the insurgents and the soldiers (Bayley & Perito, 2010). As Hansen (2002) so succinctly puts it, ‘the military simply does not know how to police’, which leads to risk when the military starts to train local police or conduct police tasks (as they currently do in Afghanistan). Hansen also points to the wide differences in military versus police culture and organisation and to the risk inherent in the military’s assumption that it can take on policing tasks of undermining emergence of the rule of law (ibid.).

In the opening to their book, *The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime*, Bayley and Perito (2010) relate an anecdote that goes right to the heart of one of the text’s core messages – the importance of the police role in rebuilding a state:

> A US Marines officer newly returned from fighting in Iraq asked us, ‘How should I have gone about training Iraqi police in a place where security has not been fully established, insurgent attacks were still common and criminal gangs operated with impunity?’ (p. 1).
Policing, they argue, should be done by the police and not the military. Even though co-operation between the military and the police may be necessary to provide security for the police (as is also the case in Afghanistan), the pitfalls in military-police co-operation are worth examining. Many police reform programmes, for example, ignore the issue of legitimatisation and place an exaggerated focus on security, which results in a blurred distinction between the military and the police (ibid., p. 125). They also emphasise that the international community should have picked up some ‘lessons learned’ from previous missions – for example, for example those in Bosnia and Kosovo – especially, the importance of planning the police reform process in detail before starting a mission and the inability of military personnel to train local police. The sharp criticism of training police officers to become ‘little foot soldiers’ that tackle insurgency alongside the military pervades their book.

Hills (2000), who has conducted comprehensive surveys of policing reforms undertaken in Africa since the 1990s, argues that successfully liberating and democratising post-colonial states requires a distinct divide between the police and the military. Such a division is necessary because post-colonial societies often have unstable political environments, including a dysfunctional justice system buttressed by poorly trained, under-resourced and corrupt police who may be politically engaged or involved in the conflict itself (as in both Afghanistan and Liberia). In such an environment, a close relationship between the military in a mission and the local police may seriously undermine public trust in the latter because the citizenry see internal security forces as oppressors (ibid.). The public may also be hostile if the existing police force, instead of protecting the people, has been protecting the government as an arm of the state, a situation fundamentally opposite to any form of democratic policing (Donais, 2005). Thus, in countries in which institutions of internal security have been used to enforce leaders’ personal powers – a common practice in Africa – it is vital that the police have a distinctive civilian stamp and be clearly separated from any link to state repression.

Bayley and Perito (2010, p. 70) distinguish the roles of local and foreign military from those of local and foreign police. Insecurity will influence police effectiveness and if the police tackle insurgency, it may also have an impact on their daily tasks. It is therefore
important that the international community engage in counter-insurgency, meaning that ‘international forces should privilege policing over military activity’ (ibid., p. 71). In fact, Janssens (2010) argues that this issue is part of the reason military-police boundaries have been blurred in many places, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. That is, there is a focus on training the local police but the number of competent international police personnel is insufficient, with the military ending up training the police (Janssens, 2010, pp. 86-89). Contradictory, David Last (2010), in his *Blurring Military and Police Roles*, calls for a closer relationship between the police, paramilitary (e.g. gendarmerie), and the military, especially within international deployments like Afghanistan. There is a difference, he claims, between a ‘stable domestic setting’ and securing the safety of the inhabitants in a conflict zone (ibid., p. 33). At the same time, military resources and capacities are often used in support of essentially civil missions, as in the case, for example, of humanitarian missions and rescue operations. In this context, bundling and effective coordination of available assets make a vital contribution to overall efficiency and mission effectiveness of such missions (Rehrl & Weisserth, 2010, nr. 7.1).

**Police training**

One challenge within the international community is to persuade enough qualified police officers to seek deployment to IPRMs and properly prepare those who do. Janssens (2010) lists three significant reasons for the low numbers of international police deploying to Afghanistan: the lack of incentives for (Western) police in terms of recognition and reimbursement, the fact that deploying countries cannot spare an adequate number of officers, and the lack of sufficiently qualified and adequately trained personnel (2010, pp. 86-90). Major Terje Bruøygard, of the elite Telemarks battalion, however, in his chronicle of the police handling of the act of terrorism that occurred in Norway on 22 July 2011, points his finger at the system itself. Criticism, he argues, must not be targeted towards single police officers but towards the system that has the responsibility to train, equip, and prepare officers for their future tasks. He supports his claim by quoting Dave Grossman, a researcher on police and military in battle: ‘You do not rise to the occasion in combat. You sink to the level of training’ (Bruøygard, 2011). Diehl (2008) claims that the case of UNPOL personnel is also
especially difficult in that many of these police officers are not sufficiently trained for tasks that can differ greatly from those they perform in their homelands (p. 86). Ferguson (2004) makes a similar comment about CIVPOL personnel:

The officers that make up CIVPOL missions are largely capable professionals in their home policing environments but that does not necessarily qualify them for training local law enforcement agencies, yet this has become part of their mandate. (p. 7).

However, even though the different standards of education and training for police personnel around the world present practical difficulties, countries still recruit their IPRM personnel without regard for basic necessary skills (e.g. driving and using a computer) (Atraghji, 2006; Osland, 2004). Yet as Bayley and Perito (2010) so pointedly remark:

Training and mentoring require special skills and the ability to adapt them to different environments. Successful training abroad begins with better training at home. (p. 125).

Donais (2005) also points to the fact that post-conflict police reform has often been seen as a mere technical exercise in training and organisational administrative changes rather than as an intrinsically political process of reorganising power within different societies. Bayley and Perito (2010) agree and are critical of the excessive focus in many missions on training police officers in great numbers based on the principal that ‘one size fits all’. Hence, a major point in their book is that ‘roles determine training, not the other way around’ (Bayley & Perito, 2010, p. 3); that is, reform and training are often set in action based on what is feasible and not on a needs analysis (ibid, p. 71). They also ask what type of training is the right one if that goal is to be achieved. In many countries today, the police are repressive and protect the state not the inhabitants. Hence, the authors underscore the importance of longer basic training (a minimum of 6 months) in core police tasks, emphasise that quality is the key, and suggest that police reform should comprise a shift in police attitude and behaviour towards the public based on basic values like politeness and helpfulness (Bayley & Perito, 2010, p. 124). Their argument is supported by a current report on the situation in Afghanistan, which blames the short 8-week police training for the failure to achieve a trustworthy police
service. Helge Lurås, advisor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and Kristian Harpviken, Director of Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), are both highly critical of the focus on quantity in police training in Afghanistan, claiming that the short and superficial training has resulted in widespread discipline problems within the Afghan National Police (Krughaug, 2010).

As Bayley and Perito (2010) have demonstrated, one of the primary tasks for deployed police officers in most overseas missions is to train the local police, whether or not a particular police officer has the skill or the knowledge to do so. Personnel in modern IPRMs are also tasked with a series of responsibilities that may range from early monitoring to overseeing public order policing, securing elections, liaising between different agencies, encouraging and shaping reform plans, assisting in humanitarian activities (Ferguson, 2004), and advising investigators. The role of the deployed police officer in the above tasks, however, may become particularly blurred by a lack of clear strategies and specific action plans or proper pre-deployment training. Hence, Donais (2005) argues that

[although] the multicultural nature of policing missions is an asset in terms of legitimacy, it is simultaneously a liability in terms of efficiency. Because of their composition, CIVPOL missions tend to incorporate (often awkwardly) a range of different policing cultures, varying levels of competence and commitment among individual officers, and different moral and ethical codes, all of which further undermine the ability of individual missions to consistently promote a single coherent set of policing norms and practices. (p. 227).

To address this problem, Fetherston (2000) recommends a closer linkage between the macro- (broader political context), meso- (administrative functions), and micro-levels (police officer), both to better prepare the police officers and to enhance the strategic planning. For a professional mission to be conducted, it is important that all persons involved be aware of the level to which they belong and the role they are expected to play. For complex missions like Afghanistan, however, with so many actors involved at so many levels, the picture can be confusing, prompting Ferguson (2004) to insist that the ‘mandated levels of co-operation and coordination between these bodies … be examined with a view to determining what effect [they have] on the police missions at an operational level’ (p. 7).
A mid-range theory

One of the challenges for this research is that although international relations theory covers the overall logic and motivation for involvement in peacekeeping operations (see Chapter 1), it has been difficult to identify a mid-range theory of international peacekeeping that encompasses IPRMs. The research has therefore, to some extent, been carried out in theoretically uncharted territory and must touch upon a variety of theoretical directions. Given the over 80 (UN and EU) missions since World War II and the notable growth in the international peacekeeping, Bures (2007), in his extensive yet succinct review of the quest for such a theory, finds it remarkable that a well-developed theory of international peacekeeping does not exist (p. 407). Instead, as Fetherston (2000) complains, international peacekeeping continues to be an ‘over-taxed ad hoc system’ whose community remains ‘largely in the dark in terms of improving analysis, effectiveness and successes’, a blindness that she attributes to the absence of theoretical underpinning in the field. Gilady and Russet (2002), while agreeing that the field lacks any coherent direction or recognisable theory, point specifically to a need for more scientific research on the topic. However, Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2004) suggest that the dearth may stem from the political – and thus inconsistent – nature of international peacekeeping (p. 14). As Bures (2007) observes, most studies have focused on the process, product, policies, and results of individual missions rather than analysing the concept itself. Yet what may be needed is a much more interdisciplinary approach to analysis.

Gheciu and Welsh (2009), in their assessment of the normative case for post-conflict reconstruction, list the various reconstruction rationales given by international actors but also refer to the lack of theory within the field. They not only predict that traditional approaches will come up short but are doubtful that any progress can be achieved by simply ‘improving coordination among different actors engaged in reconstruction or increasing the amount of resources available for statebuilding’ (p. 143). Rather, they demand more profound and precise normative theorising to achieve an acceptable resolution (ibid.). The OECD (2008), in its ‘Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities’, stresses the crucial need to
differentiate ‘failures of the theory of change’, which point to the failure of a peace-building activity because of false underlying assumptions about how to make changes, ‘from a failure in implementation’, which refers to a difficulty in completing the activity itself (inputs/outputs, staff capability, timing, location or budget) or management systems (OECD, 2008, p. 40). Murney and McFarlane (2009) make a similar point:

The most common manifestation of this problem is the inappropriate transposition of theoretical or conceptual constructs onto actual situations, resulting in misguided efforts to solve the wrong problems. This condition is aptly described in colloquial terms as seeing what you want to see, not what is there. (p. 211).

Conclusion

Karns and Mingst (2001) argue that there is much to be learnt from determining why the UN fails in some places and succeeds in others (p. 220). The 1999 UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), for example, is one of the few CIVPOL missions to receive praise from the international community; most particularly, because of its firm action and long-term engagement. Such long-term commitment is a major focus in Decker (2006), and Masliansky (2004), in his Iraq: Ways to Rebuild Better, gives the following advice: ‘be patient – complete reconstruction cannot occur overnight’ (p. 19) because it takes years to re-establish law and order based on democratic principles. Donais (2005) also refers to the limited success of CIVPOL missions, claiming that

[v]ery few ... have dramatically and irreversibly transformed the police services of post-conflict states into models of democratic policing, while only a handful can be said to have markedly improved the level of professionalism, impartiality, and honesty among their host-country counterparts. Explanations for the rather modest record of international efforts to transform public security institutions in post-conflict environments can be found both in the nature of the task and the character of the institution charged with accomplishing it. (p. 2).

This literature review has identified a number of reasons for what Donais (2005) labels peacekeeping’s ‘modest record’ of transformation and has identified assorted literature that expresses concern about IPRM provision from different perspectives. As regards Norway specifically, although the country has been a significant provider of such international assistance for 23 years, there has been limited research on the
nation’s long-standing engagement in IPRMs. Literature on the police officers’ own experiences in the field, which is imperative for improving IPRMs, is also sparse, making this aspect a potentially rich source of data to be mined and analysed. Most particularly, the literature review identified no comparative analyses of Norwegian police officers’ experience in the three missions studied here, which also represent the three different types of IPRMs: JUNO (bilateral), UNMIL (multilateral), and EUPOL–A (regional). This research gap is the void that this study seeks to fill by making a significant original contribution to the field, the research design and methodology for which is outlined in the next chapter.
Chapter 4 – Methodology

This research uses a multiple case study design to evaluate the process of Norwegian police deployment to bilateral, regional, and multilateral police reform missions. Specifically, it comprises three separate case study’s (JUNO in Serbia, UNMIL in Liberia, and EUPOL in Afghanistan), each with its own separate conclusions, and a cross-case analysis that uses NVivo 9 software to produce comparative findings from which to draw overall conclusions. Whether the goal is to deepen understanding or underscore certain commonalities or variations, if the methodological challenges of comparing even two countries are to be overcome, specific comparative methods must be chosen and the focus narrowed down to specific issues (Nelken, 2002, p. 185). Separation of these similarities and variations was achieved using the type of matrix suggested by Levi-Faur (2004). The overall task was to compare these three (types of) missions in three different countries (cases) using the Norwegian police as the thematic factor.

International comparative studies

This choice of a multiple case study design combined with a comparative cross-case analysis is particularly suitable for investigating the complex IPRM environment. As Pakes (2003) points out,

[a] comparative analysis of policing requires a great deal of knowledge regarding the context in which it operates, which makes case-studies and focused comparisons appropriate methods of analysis. (pp. 26-27)

Bayley (1999, p. 3), however, argues that comparative studies are not actually a ‘choice’ in social sciences because all science is comparative and dependent on the analysis of multiple cases, a sentiment echoed by Nelken (2010), who posits that ‘comparison is the essence of all social enquiries’ (p. 13). Bayley therefore claims that ‘comparative study is a misnomer’ (1999, p. 4) and that it is more correct to refer to research distinguished by the geopolitical location of the cases studied as international studies of a social phenomenon. Mawby (1990) emphasises that one key to good comparative work is realizing that not everything is transferrable: an experience from one society does not automatically translate to another (p. 11). He also questions the bases used
for comparison, pointing out that there is no ‘right way of classifying societies’ but that comparison should focus rather on the situation in, and the similarities and differences between, the societies under study (p. 20).

Any comparative case study between two or more countries/cases is subject to several methodological challenges, not least of which are the obvious problems related to country differences in background, culture, and language, the context of the conflict, and the rules regulating police services. Pakes (2010) also discusses the ‘methodological hazards’ of what to observe and whom to talk to (p. 23). The latter, particularly, may be a challenge in that although the locals may be forthcoming and positive towards the researcher and the project, their responses might not reflect reality (ibid.). Hence, even when significant differences exist between the countries studied – like the significant cultural and religious differences between Serbia (Europe), Liberia (Africa), and Afghanistan (a Muslim country) – Pakes encourages comparative study and suggests that instead of striving for methodological perfection, it is more important to carry out a ‘balanced’ methodological assessment when evaluating the findings (ibid., p. 25).

Evaluation

An evaluative design addresses the intersection between different research aims (e.g. input and outputs, goals, target groups, tasks, time, and finances) (Sverdrup, 2002, p. 113). The methods used for such evaluation, however, depend above all upon the evaluation’s objective and the criteria to be analysed (Paffenholz & Reychler, 2007, p. 39) but also on the level of scientific rigor to be applied and the size of the available budget. Despite some claims that evaluation has no basis in theory, it is, like all other research, theoretically grounded and methodically and empirically guided (Sverdrup, 2002, p. 19). Although the types of evaluation are myriad, at its essence, evaluation means to ‘measure the effects of a program against the intended goals’ [author translation] (Weiss 1972, cited by Sverdrup, 2002, p. 25). This latter definition, however, is quite narrow as evaluation can be applied to processes, the results of processes – whether intended and unintended, and implementation, as well as impact (Paffenholz & Reychler, 2007, p. 36). Fundamentally, evaluations are of two types:
formative evaluations that seek insight into ways to improve the intervention in question, and summative evaluations that assess and judge the interventions’ quality and success in meeting its objectives; for example, a post-intervention assessment to document the lessons learned and progress achieved (Paffenholz & Reychler, 2007, p. 37). Some authors, however, prefer to use the terms ‘goal-oriented approach’ (summative) and ‘process-oriented approach’ (formative) (Sverdrup, 2002, p. 28), which more clearly explain the evaluative focus.

Although social components can be examined in several ways, in evaluations it is common to use a wide spectrum of social science methods (Sverdrup, 2002, p. 115) to either generate observations whose analysis generates new knowledge that is later articulated as theory (the inductive approach) or to test the validity of a theoretical assumption of how something is structured (the deductive approach) (Befring, 2007, p. 19). These two approaches are also linked by parts of theories constructed through observation, which can be tested by deriving new hypotheses from the theory or by generating a pendulum effect between theory and empirical findings (Grønmo, 2007). Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2008a, p. 4), for example, argue that a theory is a ‘simplifying device that allows [one] to decide which facts matter and which do not’ (p. 4). Mere observations, however, do not necessarily lead to knowledge about why a phenomenon occurs (Fjelland, 1999, p. 97). Rather, they can confirm its existence through a process known as naive empirics, in which the ‘immediate sense experience is by itself sufficient to provide the foundations for knowledge’ (Uebel, 1992, p. 205). Revealing the causes of the problem’s occurrence, however, demands that observations be theorised through the formulation of testable hypotheses (Fjelland, 1999, p. 97; Grønmo, 2004). Testing hypotheses, in turn, implies the need to find information that is relevant to the project and then ask conceptually derived questions in order to make the concepts measureable. Such questions, whose properties research is meant to investigate, are referred to as variables (Befring, 2007, p. 99) and are themselves one criterion sometimes used to differentiate research types:

Authors often define qualitative inquiry by comparing it to quantitative inquiry. In general terms, Ragin (1987) accurately characterizes a key difference when he mentions that quantitative researchers work with a few variables and many
cases, whereas qualitative researches rely on a few cases and many variables. (Creswell, 2007, pp. 15-16).

According to Aase and Fossåskaret (2007), qualitative research is as thorough as quantitative research and so should not be looked upon as an easy substitute for a ‘statistical’ or quantitative study. Yin (2003) supports this view, pointing out that just as qualitative research can be data driven and properly scientific, quantitative research can be ‘soft’ because of unsuitable numbers or insufficient evidence and that both cases are ‘attributes of good and poor research’ (p. 33). Creswell (2007, p. 16) characterises qualitative research based on the following key elements:

- Natural setting (field focused) as the source of data
- Researcher as key instrument of data collection
- Data collected as words or pictures
- Outcome as process rather than product [emphasis added]
- Analysis of data inductively, attention to particulars [emphasis added]
- Focus on participants’ perspectives, their meaning [emphasis added]
- Use of expressive language
- Persuasion by reason

**Figure 4.1: Quantitative versus qualitative methods**

![Figure 4.1: Quantitative versus qualitative methods](source: Adapted from Aase & Fossåskaret (2007).)
Figure 4.1. display the two types of methods, quantitative and qualitative, based first on the number of units and variables and then on the techniques for collecting empirical material and the degree of researcher involvement. According to Yin (2003), each approach has specific advantages and disadvantages dependent on three conditions: (a) the type of research question(s), (b) the extent of investigator control over actual behavioural events, and (c) the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena.

Case Study

In Yin’s (2003) words, case studies have ‘a distinctive place in evaluation research’, particularly when there is a need to explain the ‘presumed causal links in real-life interventions’, a phenomenon far too multifaceted for surveys or experimental strategies (p. 14). Although they use many of the same techniques as histories, however, they include two sources of evidence that are normally absent from histories: direct observations and interviews with persons involved (ibid., p. 8). Hence, whereas a survey is the best method for statistical generalisation – although with a high risk of recall bias – an appropriate case study provides a solid basis for analytical generalisation (ibid., p. 37). Most particularly, as Yin points out, the case study is an empirical enquiry that ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context’ (ibid., p. 13). It thus seeks to provide more in-depth understanding of a subject than can be gleaned from ‘representative’ survey data (Hayden & Shawyer, 2004, p. 45). Herein, however, lies the primary disadvantages of the case-study; it relies strongly on researcher interpretation and the aims underlying the case selection (ibid.).

The choice of a case study design must evidently be based on the specific research questions to be answered (Sverdrup, 2002, p. 13), but one guiding principle is that this design is particularly appropriate when the case(s) involve(s) political science, sociology, or evaluation. Therefore, in a way, case studies are the primary object in any evaluation research because any projects initiated to improve a situation can be seen as a special case (ibid., p. 127). Moreover, although case studies are appropriate for use in both process- and goal-oriented approaches, they fit particularly well with process analyses because qualitative data allow the detailed study of particular themes or
projects (ibid., p. 130). Further advantages are that case studies allow for a thorough analysis even in the presence of a large number of variables, and their most typical source of information, the qualitative interview, is ideal for a detail-oriented approach.

In general, the case study design uses multiple sources of evidence, is all-encompassing, and profits from earlier development of a theoretical proposition to assist in the collection and analysis of data (Yin, 2003, p. 14). Admittedly, some methods might be secondary to others; however, as shown in Figure 4.2, working with different methods in parallel is common research practice; for example, using structured qualitative interviews as preliminaries to fieldwork or following open-ended exploratory fieldwork with a questionnaire to establish how widespread the findings are (Fangen, 2004, p. 140). To reinforce the validity of such conclusions, case studies must involve the gathering of several sources of data (triangulation), which in this study include (i) open-ended interviews with key personnel, researchers, and politicians; (ii) focused interviews with practitioners; (iii) observations; (iv) surveys; (v) historical archives; and (vi) primary data such as policies and secondary data such as literature (see Figure 4.2).

**Figure 4.2: Convergence of evidence**

Source: Adapted from Yin (2003, p. 3).
The reason for using more than one method (see figure 4.2) is to produce a result that
does not depend solely upon how any one method is conducted or used (Hayden &
Shawyer, 2004), thereby enabling the cross-checking of information (Sverdrup, 2002, p. 112). For a case study, such data collection has the advantage that the findings and conclusions, being based on many different but corroborative sources of information, have the potential to be more accurate (Sverdrup, 2002, p. 112; Yin, 2003, p. 98).
Bayley (2006), in his discussion of democratic policing development, agrees that such
corroboration is necessary and criticises the use of quantitative experiments to
evaluate democratic foreign assistance, and argues that a qualitative design based on
observations and interviews is the proper methodology for such studies (pp. 123-125).
Fangen (2004), however, recommends combining observation with both qualitative
interviews and document analysis (p. 141; p. 149), arguing that doing so provides a
solid foundation for validating the findings (ibid.). Nevertheless, several other
researchers have suggested replacing quantitative labels like ‘validity’, ‘rehabilitate’, and
‘generalisation’ with other criteria more suited to the qualitative method’s distinctive
character; for example, ‘credibility’ instead of ‘validity’, ‘transferability’ instead of
‘external validity’, ‘dependability’ instead of ‘rehabilitate’, and ‘verification’ instead of
‘objectivity’ (Cuba & Lincoln, 2005).

**Comparative research: multiple case study design**

Creswell (2007) defines the case study as a type of qualitative research design in which
the researcher investigates a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems
(cases) over time. These systems are bounded by time and place, and it is the case itself
– for example, a programme – that is being studied. The data collection should be
thorough and involve multiple rich data sources:

> The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study,
is that it tries to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were taken,
how they were implemented, and with what result. (Schramm, 1971, cited by
Yin, 2003, p. 12)

Yin (2003), however, sees no vast differences between the single case study and
multiple cases studies, claiming only that multiple case designs are often regarded as
more convincing than a single case study, meaning that the overall study is seen to produce stronger evidence (p. 46). By definition, comparative case studies include more than one case, most often, in the case of IPRMs, a comparison of two or three countries. In both types of case study, however, the key question is how to select jurisdictions for study, a procedure commonly effected using the ‘most similar’ and/or the ‘most different’ design:

A most similar design takes similar countries for comparison on the assumption that the more similar the units being compared, the more possible it should be to isolate the factors responsible for differences between them. By contrast, the most different design seeks to show the robustness of a relationship by demonstrating its validity in a range of contrasting settings’. (Hague et al., 1998, cited by Pakes, 2003, p. 17).

Of the two, ‘most similar’ designs, which often involve neighbouring countries, countries in which the same language is spoken, or even former colonies, tend to be easier to achieve. ‘Most different’ designs, on the other hand, tend to involve a selection of at least one jurisdiction that is alien to the researcher, with all the associated problems of familiarising oneself with the system and all its intricacies. Because such complications often co-occur, Leishman (1999) labels them the ‘gang of four’: problems of gaining meaningful access, cultural literacy, ethnocentric bias, and language (cited by Pakes, 2003, p. 17).

Whichever the type, each case study should be indicative rather than representative. That is, because sufficient empirical evidence allows qualitative data to be generalised, the case and findings should be justified based on previous literature. Hence, the separate conclusions from the three different case studies in this research – JUNO/Serbia, UNMIL/Liberia and EUPOL/Afghanistan – must not simply be copied into the final conclusion. Rather, a proper cross-case analysis of the findings must be conducted that includes a thorough discussion of all the separate conclusions (see Figure 4.3 below). It is particularly important in such analysis not to erroneously liken multiple cases to multiple survey respondents; that is, to follow a ‘sampling’ logic rather than a ‘replication’ logic (Yin, 2003). The cross-case analysis technique used in this research, which involves no more than 3 cases, is referred to as a literal replication;
analyses with more than 3 cases are labelled theoretical replications. Figure 4.3, adapted from Yin (ibid.), outlines the replication approach applied in this project.

**Figure 4.3: Replication technique for the multiple case study design**

![Diagram of the replication technique for the multiple case study design]

*Source: Adapted from Yin (2003).*

As the figure 4.3 shows, the case study design commences with theory development and the design of a data collection protocol. It is particularly important to note that each specific case study comprises a ‘whole’ study, one that requires congruent evidence on the facts of the case and the conclusions drawn. These conclusions from each case can then be regarded as information needing replication using other individual cases (Yin, 2003, p. 50). Each case, together with the multiple-case results, should end in a conclusion. Conclusions for the single cases should show how and why a specific proposition was proven (or not proven); conclusions across the cases should demonstrate the scope of the replication logic and why some cases were expected to show one type of result and others (if any) contrasting results (ibid.).

The cases in a multiple case study research design may be holistic, meaning that each case is considered separately at an abstract level; or embedded, meaning that the
analysis delves down deeper to an operational level (Yin, 2003, pp. 52-53). The number of cases necessary for a study depends above all on the required degree of certainty – as with statistical significance, the larger the number of cases, the greater the certainty. Nevertheless, realistically, this number is constrained by the amount of resources and time at the researcher’s disposal (ibid., pp. 47–52). The rationale for multiple case studies often originates from earlier hypothesising on various types of conditions and the need to have sub-groups of cases that embrace each type (ibid., p. 52).

Research design

The research design, the plan that guides the researcher through an investigative process, rather than being a logistical plan, addresses logical problems. It is therefore vital to avoid situations in which the findings do not address the initial research question (Yin, 2003, p. 21). As Yin (2003) explains it,

[a] research design is a logical plan for getting from here to there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. (p. 20).

Developing a case study design, therefore, can be more challenging than implementing other research strategies, especially given the lack of related textbooks in many social sciences. Nevertheless, it is important not to see such a design as a modification of the research designs used in other strategies. Rather, the case study is a distinct research method that comprises five essential factors:

1. A study’s question – (how and why)
2. Its propositions, if any – (hypothesis)
3. Its unit(s) of analyses – (e.g. are the case(s) individuals, programs, implementation processes. or others?)
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions – (e.g. the use of analytical techniques like pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analyses, logic models, and cross-case syntheses)
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings. (Yin, 2003)

The key to choosing the right unit of analysis is to state the primary research question precisely (Yin, 2003, p. 24), which in turn requires the theoretical development that is a vital step in case studies. Some topics, for instance, may provide a plentiful theoretical
framework on which to build the case study, but for other themes, the literature may be insufficient to provide any theoretical base (pp. 29-30). The use of theory thus becomes the ‘main vehicle for generalizing the results of the case study’ (ibid., p. 33). Sverdrup (2002) also stresses this point, stating that it is vital for an evaluator to reveal the implicit theory on which measures are based and find academic theory that supports it. In this way, theory itself can become more explicit and thus more analysable (p. 64).

Data collection

One classical challenge within the case study design is that the researcher cannot rely on the help of rigid replication during the research process. Hence, as Fangen (2004) points out, the need for flexibility characterises qualitative methods in general and fieldwork in particular, which Wadel (1991) describes as a ‘round dance between theory, method and data’ (cited in Fangen, 2004, p. 39). In practice, therefore, the investigator must make intelligent decisions during data collection based on the data collected, keeping in mind why the study is being done, what evidence should be sought, what variations can be anticipated, and what would constitute supportive or contrary evidence for any given proposition (Yin, 2003, p. 63). In these circumstances and given these challenges, it is important in any case study design to develop a solid protocol that enhances the reliability and integrity of the case study research. For Yin, such a protocol would include the following:

1. The purpose of cases studies and research questions
2. A review of case study nominations and of nomination procedures (review the protocol being used for screening the nominations)
3. A schedule for researching the case studies (define the deadlines)
   a. Preparation period
   b. Arrangement of site visit (draft a confirmation letter to be sent to the site)
   c. Site visit
   d. Follow-up activities (draft a thank you letter to be sent to the site)
   e. Preparation of case study report
   f. Submission of draft report to site for review (draft a transmittal letter to accompany report)
4. A review of the case study protocol
   a. Discussion of relevant theoretical frameworks and literature
   b. Development or review of hypothetical logic model, if relevant (sample)
c. In-depth discussion of protocol topic (discuss topic importance and possible types of evidence to be collected in relation to each topic)

5. An outline of the case study report (prepare a draft outline that shows the major potential headings for the report)

6. Methodological reminders
   a. Fieldwork procedures (discuss methodological principles)
   b. Use of evidence (review evidence types and the need for convergence)
   c. Note taking and other field practices
   d. Other orienting topics

7. Reading materials
   a. Sample case study reports (refer to samples from related studies; review desirable and features of these samples)
   b. Key substantive books and articles (ensure that the relative priorities among these works are appreciated). (ibid.)

Data analysis

The data analysis of findings generally includes coding, categorising, examining, charting, and recombining the qualitative data to address the initial aim of the study. According to Yin (2003), analysing case study data is particularly difficult because the methods are not clear cut, making analysis ‘one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing case studies’ (p. 109). Admittedly, researchers do tend to search for formulas or tools; however, doing so is only useful if the researcher has an overall analytical strategy and knows what to look for. One increasingly used tool is a software analytical programme to assist in coding and categorising large quantities of narrative text. Such tools are of particular advantage when ‘(a) the narrative texts represent a verbatim record in an interviewee’s remarks … and (b) the empirical study is trying to derive meaning and insight from the word usage and frequency pattern found in the texts’ (ibid., p. 110). The process is thus a content analysis designed to condense raw data into categories or themes using inductive reasoning by which the themes and categories materialise from the data into natural units through the researcher’s thorough examination and continuous comparison (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 2). This type of narrative analysis, in which the focus is on careful readings of stories told by informants, aims ‘to understand human experience and/or social phenomena through the form and content of stories analysed as textual units’ (Fritz, 2008, p. 6).
Because an analytical strategy is necessary to guide the overall case study in this present study, analytical manipulation was affected by carefully compiling a matrix of categories and placing the evidence within these categories using the analytical tool NVivo9. One possibility within this analytical technique is cross-case synthesis, which is particularly applicable in the analysis of multiple (more than two) cases. This technique deals with each case as a separate study and then produces word tables to display data from the individual cases according to a uniform framework across cases (Yin, 2003, pp. 133-137). Employing this cross-case analytical framework enables the identification of patterns and themes in the data that are common across cases. This approach also highlights cross-case variations and has proven a valuable way to identify successes and failures in cases with similar objectives. However, because examination of the word tables for cross-case patterns relies heavily on investigator interpretation, it is also necessary to accompany any conclusions with strong arguments backed up by other data and a strong discussion that supports or develops new theories.

The doctoral project: design and methods

This research uses a multiple embedded case-study design in which three police reform missions in Serbia, Liberia and Afghanistan are selected as the study cases. In line with Yin’s (2003) dictum that each case in a multiple study design case must serve a specific purpose within the general study (p. 47), each case study represents a specific type of IPRM: a bilateral programme (JUNO, Serbia), a multilateral regional EU programme (EUPOL–A, Afghanistan), and a classic multilateral UN programme (UNMIL, Liberia). The research adopts a multifaceted approach that involves the qualitative gathering of data from a range of sources.

One early phase in the research consisted of open-ended interviews conducted with interviewees who had an in-depth knowledge of this subject. The resulting data gave the researcher a broad background for, and insight into, this field of expertise, allowing me to discover gaps needing to be filled and providing a solid basis for the choice of each case study. They also helped me prepare a general set of questions for all police officers involved in international work. The sample of interview candidates for the in-depth interviews for each case study was identified with the assistance of the
Norwegian Police Directorate. To protect interviewees from any future repercussions, given the controversial topic, individual participants were guaranteed anonymity, although the case studies themselves are clearly identified (Yin, 2003, p. 158).

In the subsequent research phase, sub-archival records like policy documents, propositions, plans, and budgets were examined, together with previous studies of international police missions and police reform work (Neack, 1995, 1997; Eide and Holm, 2000; Hansen, 2002, 2008; Osland, 2004; Bayley, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2006; Bayley Perito, 2010). Also included were thorough analyses of appropriate theory; for example, those by Bures (2007) and Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2008b). Although Fangen (2004) suggests that such document analysis can range from the merely descriptive through complementary background information to a more thorough dissection, a systematic review of documents is central for the descriptive part of the evaluation process (Sverdrup, 2002, p. 120). Such document reviews, although they do not always allow identification of appropriate goals or avenues to reach them, can provide important information for answering the problems to be addressed \((\text{ibid.})\).

Synchronous with the literature reviews, visits were carried out to several organisations with special expertise in the field to gather knowledge and formulate a solid base for the interview questions. Specifically, these visits included trips to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Canada, and to the International Deployment Group (IDG) in Canberra, Australia, the site of a training camp that simulates a real-life mission. Consultations were also carried out with police reform experts at DCAF, Geneva, and a range of senior officials at UNDPKO in New York. All these experts provided different perspectives and insights and gave invaluable assistance in terms of both sharing their pool of knowledge and enabling a ‘snowballing’ of new contacts and places to visit. To test the validity of the preliminary findings among police officers from over 30 countries with long experience in IPRMs, a lecture on initial data was delivered at the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres in Bangladesh.
For two out of the three case studies (Serbia and Liberia), on-site field trips and observations were also conducted, together with on-site interviews with police officers deployed to the mission. The purpose of the observations was to supplement the case study data with qualitative information beyond that achieved through mere interviews (Sverdrup, 2002, p. 135). This fieldwork proved very useful in that it enabled a better understanding of the dynamics and routines within a mission and provided interesting insights into mission dynamic and the internal and external factors that influence development. Because observational data, although usually descriptive, can be marked by researcher interpretation, they raise several challenges, including the recording of field notes and accurate quotations, the security environment, the risk of information overload, the role of the observer as insider or outsider, and the relationship with those observed (Creswell, 2007, p. 139). According to Fangen (2004), the ideal in fieldwork is to maintain an open mind while at the same time retaining sufficient information to approach the fieldwork competently (p. 44). It is impossible, she suggests, to enter fieldwork without any previous knowledge whatsoever – ‘like a tabula rasa’ (ibid.) – but the researcher should be aware of being too informed in a way that produces pre-conceptions of the area of study (ibid., p. 45). Rather, the researcher should be present, should listen and converse but should not act (ibid., p. 103). Neither is it ideal to create an artificial, neutral situation, as in an interview setting; rather, the investigator should participate naturally within the research environment (ibid.).

Following the on-site visits, extensive interviews were conducted with deployed Norwegian police officers, as well as with politicians, bureaucrats, and experts, hereafter referred to as ‘senior officials’. Because of time constraints and geographic challenges, the intended goal of 50% coverage overall was not met; rather, approximately 25% of the total number of police officers deployed in the 2007–2010 period were interviewed. Among these, 8 police officers who had been instructors and project managers for JUNO Serbia were interviewed both on site and in Norway over a 3-year period from 2007 until 2010, 13 police officers connected with UNMIL Liberia were interviewed both on site and in Norway between 2008 and 2010, and 15 police officers who had been deployed to NORAF and EUPOL–A were interviewed in Norway between 2009 and 2010. In total, 36 Norwegian police officers were interviewed.
between 2007 and 2010 together with 21 co-operating partners and 42 experienced senior officials, representing a range of responsibilities, were interviewed either on mission site, at various international organisations, or in Norway. The final total of informants selected was 99, all of whom participated in in-depth interviews varying from 1 to 2½ hours long. Because the large amount of data generated by such interviews can easily become unwieldy, Sverdrup (2002) stresses the need to limit how many are conducted. Likewise, after a certain number of interviews, saturation can occur and the interviews become repetitive, a point in the data collection at which no new categories or themes emerge (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, pp. 317-318).

In this project, being a police officer myself was a clear advantage in that when something was unclear, I could ask control questions based on professional experience. I was also able to forge a professional bond that made the interview situation secure and familiar for the interviewees. Nevertheless, Sverdrup (2002), although she emphasises that conversations with informants are invaluable within almost all types of evaluation, also underscores the importance of being familiar with the case through a proper document research before interviewing (p. 122). She also expresses a preference that interviews be like conversations to facilitate deeper exploration of certain subjects and points to the importance of establishing trust to make the informant feel comfortable sharing information. According to Fangen (2004), adjustments should also be made to avoid a situation in which the interviewee tells the researcher what he or she thinks the researcher wants to hear. She further argues that it is important to demand both positive and negative information, to ask well-thought out follow-up questions, and search out concrete details about the case to avoid a biased picture.

The data from the on-site observations and subsequent semi-structured interviews were then analysed separately for each case study. First, a narrative analysis of the interview data was carried out with the assistance of the qualitative analytical tool NVivo9. After each case had been separately analysed, the data were cross-analysed to produce patterns of variation and outcome similarity on which to base theoretical development and conclusions. This cross-case comparison using NVivo9 condensed
meanings through word clustering (Khan & Vanwynsberghe, 2008) and allowed the creation of clusters or families of phenomena. Most particularly, this synthesis of opinions was categorised into three stages – pre-mission, in-mission, and post-mission – and then divided into cross-case similarities and variations under each stage. To assist in the systematisation, a cross-case analysis matrix of the word clustering was created, built on the comparative strategy suggested by Levi-Faur (2004). This matrix, adapted from Levi-Faur’s ‘cross-national similarities and cross-sectoral differences’ (p. 193), is presented in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Cross-case analysis matrix of word clustering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-mission</th>
<th>In-mission</th>
<th>Post-mission</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-case</td>
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<tr>
<td>similarities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-case</td>
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<tr>
<td>variations</td>
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Source: Adapted from (Levi-Faur, 2004, p. 193).

To avoid the common case study problem of selection bias – that is, a focus on either variations or similarities – Figure 4.4 includes both elements, a valuable technique since each is an ‘important dimension’ in reform program comparison (Levi-Faur, 2004, p. 192). Levi-Faur further advises that in order to generate sufficient answers, the analysis should alternate between theory levels, applying ‘research tools that are more in tune with international relations than with comparative politics and comparative public policy’ (ibid., p. 193).

Methodological challenges

Finding ‘the truth’ about IPRMs scientifically raises several distinct challenges. First, although evaluators do occasionally identify deficiencies in policies, strategies, and
interventions in terms of ‘unclear or unstated objectives, an unarticulated theory of change, or unclear programme logic, a lack of indicators or monitoring data, or no baseline information’ [emphasis in the original] (Paffenholz & Reychler, 2007), the absence of clear goals and success criteria in police reform programmes presents a major problem for this analysis. Pushkina (2006), for example, in discussing the ongoing debate within the peacekeeping community on how to evaluate UN performance, asks, ‘What does “success” in peacekeeping mean?’ (p. 1). What qualitative criteria should be measured: can the political mandate being addressed be one success and the mission’s contribution to international security and the end of human suffering another? Pushkina also emphasises that ‘prioritizing objectives is often problematic in evaluating peacekeeping success’ because the touchstones are many and must be looked at from a broader perspective (ibid., p. 2). Bures (2007), after reviewing a variety of research on peacekeeping operation evaluation, derives the following list of success criteria:

1) Whether the purpose of the mission, as stated in the mandate was fulfilled.
2) The impact of the operation on the local population.
3) The manner in which mission accomplishment has been achieved.
4) The contribution of peacekeeping to larger values rather than to self-serving gains.

(PP. 414-415)

This list, however, reflects the lack of consensus on the key issues of success, a lack of agreement that presents a severe obstacle to developing a theory of international peacekeeping (ibid., p. 415); how can success be measured if no-one knows what success looks like. Diehl (2008), in his book Peace Operations, points out that success is often defined based on ‘completion of individual tasks’ (p. 122), particularly because Security Council mandates, supposedly the overall guidance for a mission, are difficult to use as success measures. Most especially, they are (i) a political product and therefore vague, (ii) nonflexible in an often shifting conflict, and (iii) lacking in mandate clarity (ibid., p. 123). Paffenholz and Reychler (2007) therefore suggest that dealing with these gaps requires reconstruction of or compensation for missing data; for instance, the success criteria or goals used during the evaluation process. Nevertheless, such substitution can never fully replace proper planning.
One central element of evaluation is data collection and ‘getting the story’ of the programme or policy, including clarifications from the people involved as to why it unfolded as it did. Most often, evaluators gather information through (a) programme documents and reports, (b) data monitoring, and (c) field visits and/or interviews with programme staff, partner organisations, local/national officials, participants, and other suitable informants (OECD, 2008, pp. 36-37). Where access or security concerns hinder data gathering, other methods should be initiated to ensure the inclusion of perspectives from all sides of a conflict/programme (ibid.); for example, the extensive research I performed for the case of Afghanistan using academic literature, the web, policy papers, and newspapers to compensate for the lack of observations in the field. Interestingly, the breadth of this data collection resulted in the Afghanistan interviews being the most reflective and extensive of the three cases.

**Ethical issues**

Because I am a police superintendent, it is important to discuss the conflicts my position might raise. Reiner and Newburn (2000), in discussing the different relationships possible between a police researcher and the police, cites Brown’s (1996) classification of four probable permutations: ‘inside insiders’, the police studying the police; ‘outside insiders’, former colleagues studying the police; ‘inside outsiders’, researchers with a position in the police organization but no police background; and ‘outside outsider’, researchers studying the police from outside (Reiner & Newburn, 2000, p. 355). After being a police officer for 22 years and now working as a police superintendent, I naturally fall into the ‘inside insider’ category, having conducted operational police work for many years and knowing the ‘codes of the business’. Wadel (1991) refers to such research as a study within one’s own culture, one used as an ‘intake’ to further study. However, being a police researcher who had not been deployed to a UN mission also made me experience being an ‘outside insider’: the question ‘Have you been on any missions?’ came up regularly throughout the interviews. Once I confirmed that I had not worked on any missions but had conducted police training courses in Eastern Europe, I was clearly placed in the ‘outsider’ box. This placement was compensated for, however, on my part by using ‘cop’ terminology to gain an internal footing again.
These experiences made it important for me as the researcher to maintain something Reiner and Newburn (2000) refer to as a ‘reflexive awareness’ of the issue (Reiner & Newburn, 2000, p. 356). Specifically, I had to acknowledge that my role could be perceived differently depending on the informant, but that I, as an insider, could in most cases attain a level of trust and confidence that an outsider could not. I also have an understanding of the nature of policing, which made it easy to communicate with the informants. Being an insider also made it easier for me to obtain senior police chiefs’ permission to access police officers/informants. However, when such access was sought through their contractor, the Norwegian Police Directorate, some police officers became warier of my role and the views they expressed. As a result, although all my informants expressed an interest in being interviewed and did so voluntarily, for most of the police officers, it was an absolute requirement that they remain anonymous if I wanted them to speak freely. Several were afraid of retribution if their opinions became publicly known and of losing out on future deployments. I also experienced internal and external pressure to produce ‘positive results’ and come up with something ‘revolutionary’. There were also moments in which I had concerns for my future career, which periodically made it difficult for me to keep a necessary distance from the material.

**Time constraints and security issues**

This study also posed challenges related to the countries chosen for the research. Ideally, it would have been valuable to take two observational trips to each country to obtain different perspectives and see if time and change of management and personnel had had an impact. Achieving this goal, however, was only possible in Serbia; time and expense limited my visits to Liberia to one, and the increasingly dangerous environment in Afghanistan made it infeasible to conduct field trips of any value for the research, so these were replaced by extensive in-depth interviews in Norway with personnel from the Afghanistan mission.

Each of the next three chapters, Chapters 5, 6, and 7, covers one of the separate case studies: JUNO in Serbia, UNMIL in Liberia, and EUPOL in Afghanistan, respectively.
After first providing a background for the various conflicts, followed by an explanation of how Norway became involved in the specific programme, each chapter gives a narrative account of the police officers’ experiences pre-, in-, and post-mission and then draws conclusions for that particular case which can serve as a basis for later discussion.
Chapter 5 – Case Study Serbia

The previous chapters have laid out the background, context and challenges of IPRMs (Chapters 1, 2 & 3), and the design and applied methodology (Chapter 4). The primary data collected for this study is now presented through three narrative case studies. This chapter introduces the first of the three case studies, that of JUNO/Serbia, Norway’s longest standing bilateral commitment to an IPRM. The UN is the backbone of most IPRMs directly through a peacekeeping mission, or indirectly through a mandate for other organisations involved in the funding and deployments of missions. However, in Europe specifically, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation has been the umbrella for many bilateral IPRMs in the Balkans, including JUNO (JUGoslavia-NORway). JUNO aimed at modernising the Serbian police and focused on training the Serbian police in problem-oriented policing (POP), analysis, and strategic management. It was laid out throughout all of Serbia during the 2000s, commencing in a small town in the North of Serbia in 2002, and ending in 2009 with having trained all police managers in all police stations throughout Serbia.

In this chapter, the background for JUNO is first developed, enabling consideration of the five JUNO projects drawing upon documented experiences of the police officers involved, most particularly, in terms of project development, planning, and preparation; in-course experiences; and external challenges like co-operation and coordination. Finally, it gives an account of the post-JUNO experiences, including evaluation and reintegration. The findings reported are based primarily on focused interviews conducted between 2007 and 2010 with 8 practitioners closely involved with JUNO 1–5. The interview data is supplemented with information from two fieldtrips to Serbia observing two different courses and from interviews with Serbian police and administrative personnel with in-depth knowledge of the topic (n = 7). To ensure appropriate methodological triangulation (see Chapter 4), the analysis also draws upon secondary data (i.e. previous studies, reports, and academic literature). To protect anonymity, the interviewees are code PO to signify police officer, S to indicate country of mission, and a randomly assigned number (e.g. PO–S1). Analogously, cooperating partners from Serbia and a representative from an external assessment
organisation are designated by the letters CP–S. The Norwegian police officers’ responses have all been translated into English by the author.

**Background**

The former Yugoslavia contained many regions that are now independent countries, and the Balkans have for centuries been a melting pot with inhabitants from a range of different cultures and ethnic origins. Although those living in the region before war broke out in 1992 were racially similar, several long occupations by different empires (Kleiven, 2004a) had resulted in three main groups: Catholic Croats, Protestant Serbs, and Muslim Serbs. After President Tito died in 1980, anger and resentment that for many decades had been suppressed by Tito’s totalitarian form of government increased in the region (Kleiven, 2004b), especially after Milosevic came to power as President in the mid-80s. This tension resulted in a bitter civil war that began in Croatia in 1991 and spread to Bosnia in 1992 (*ibid*.). Although the Serbs’ geo-political goal was to join Croatia and Bosnia into a ‘Greater Serbia’, ethnic cleansing was the war’s main purpose – not its result. During the entire conflict, there was clear evidence of systematic rape, massacre, torture, and mass deportations (*ibid*.). By the mid-1990s, the Serbian police were in effect an oppressive political tool controlled by Milosevic, one whose foremost function was to suppress any democratic opposition and take part in the Yugoslavian war (Kvigne, 2010, p. 5). The war lasted over three years and ended in November 1995 (Beelman, 1999, p. 200).

After the war, the police service in Serbia became highly centralised, and the two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo lost power over the police (Bakic & Gajic, 2006). Under the new organisation, local policing suffered badly because every decision had to be approved by the central powers in Belgrade, and the police became politicised and ineffective (*ibid*.). Only subservient police officers became leaders, and there was no open competition for managerial posts (*ibid*.). By the time the conflict in Kosovo ended and Milosevic was overthrown in October 2000, the police were not only ill-equipped and characterised by out-dated reactive police methodology (Kvigne, 2010, p. 5), they had also distanced themselves from the public and were mistrusted. Meanwhile, because of the districts’ geo-strategic position – especially the important land, rail, and
waterways that transverse the area – the embargo that the UN Security Council had imposed on Serbia during the war had led to a huge escalation in crime: increased smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, petrol (gasoline), and other highly taxed goods, and the human trafficking and illegal border crossings of persons (including terrorists) from Asia and East-European countries (Glenny, 2009, pp. 42-43). Hence, as highlighted in two OSCE reports from 2001 (Monk) and 2004 (Downes), modernising the Serbian police was pivotal to fighting the crime problems in Serbia.

The OSCE established itself in Belgrade on 11 January 2001, and that same year, police consultant Richard Monk carried out an extensive study of the police service in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The purpose of his investigation was to ‘recommend what changes accompanied by international assistance were necessary’ to reform the police into a modern European police service (Kvigne, 2010, p. 4). Such reform entailed six prioritised areas: organised crime, accountability, community policing, education development, forensics, and border policing (Downes, 2004, p. 14). The key changes to be made were known as ‘the four Ds; de-politicisation, de-centralisation, de-criminalisation and de-militarisation’ (Bakic & Gajic, 2006, p. 6). The OSCE assisted the Ministry of the Interior with the police reform, while also trying to coordinate bilateral activities, and in March 2002, the ministry also received assistance from NGOs to publish its own vision of police reform. Although this vision included a long-term action plan for establishing a modern and democratic police service that correlated with recommendations from the OSCE (Downes & Keane, 2006, p. 184), neither of the post-Milosevic governments implemented a holistic strategy for the execution of actual police reform (ibid.):

As an accessory to the [vision] document, the MOI [Ministry of the Interior] developed the Police Reform Projects Catalogue consisting of 174 projects. However, the projects were just outlined and no prioritisation was made. Only overall goals were given in a few sentences. Neither a budget nor realistic implementation plans were included. The catalogue was more of a ‘wish-list’ than a realistic plan. (Bakic & Gajic, 2006, p. 6)

This failure resulted in a lack of overview, which in turn led to a lack of capacity, coordination, and many delays. At the same time, political influence was still excessive at every level, and the Ministry of the Interior was recorded as the head of the police
In June 2002, therefore, the ministry initiated a bottom-up tactic and selected several pilot sites across Serbia on which to implement a pilot community policing project in co-operation with international organisations (ibid., p. 21).

Setting up JUNO

It was within this context that the Jugoslavia-Norwegian bilateral agreement for the then Yugoslavia was initiated and labelled JUNO. The background for the JUNO mission was the realisation of a need to develop trust between the Serbian police and the locals following a conflict in which the police were part of the problem. As one interviewee, explained, ‘[t]he problem in Serbia has been that the police have not gotten a good testimonial from the inhabitants’ (PO–S2). JUNO therefore aimed at developing a closer connection between the police and the community, and from 2001 to 2009 the Norwegian Police Directorate and Serbia’s Ministry of the Interior initiated and implemented five projects, JUNO 1 to 5, focused on assisting the democratisation of the Serbian police through training courses in problem-oriented policing (POP), strategic analysis and management, and crime scene investigation. This bilateral co-operation between Norway and Serbia was based on a long history of trust:

PO–S7: Norway has a good name down here. We are a small country that is not suspected of having an agenda. I don’t think we do either. We don’t want to enforce a system on anybody. We show the Serbs what’s possible, and then let them choose themselves.

CP–S1: The [Norwegian] Police Directorate has been very helpful, not only when it comes to material support, but also in terms of training. The exchange of experiences that has been going on for 7 years has been of great value.

JUNO became one of the most all-embracing bilateral police reform missions Norway has been involved in to date. A significant amount of resources, both financial and human, were invested in JUNO, with Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocating a total of €2,000,000 into the JUNO project via the Norwegian Police Directorate.
Motivation for deployment

A total of 10 police officers (trainers) and three relocated Police Chief Constables were involved in the JUNO projects over an extensive period of time. Some of the instructors went to Serbia 8 times during one year for a period of two weeks per trip, meaning that they were taken out of service in Norway for a total of 16 weeks or one third of their working year. Unlike multilateral UN and regional EU missions, bilateral missions do not demand a full year’s engagement but rather frequent and repeated travels. Such an arrangement calls not only for the local Norwegian police leadership in the home districts to be understanding and willing to second its police officers on an irregular basis, but also for motivated personnel that are willing and able to engage on such a scale and in such a pattern of work duties:

PO–S1: I have an interest in this particular field of expertise. It is a challenging task. You learn something yourself from the interaction with your co-operating partner. We don’t know how this is going to pan out. In Eastern Europe, there is a lot we don’t know, and this has had an effect on JUNO. However, we experienced that we contributed in Serbia, and we achieved many of the goals we set out. Through JUNO, I felt we contributed to a change process in Serbia. Our contribution was one of many important elements.

PO–S8: I think this line of work is exciting, challenging, and developing. You see a result of your work, and I have wanted to contribute. My contribution may have had a positive effect. I thrive in an international environment.

All of the interviewees had conducted several courses and expressed a very personal involvement with the reform project. At the same time, they had built up considerable knowledge about the Balkan conflicts, the Serbian culture, and the crime picture in Serbia. None of the interviewees mentioned money as a motive, but, unlike police officers deployed through the UN or EU, they received no extra allowances or benefits.

Needs analysis

JUNO commenced with an initial meeting in Belgrade in December 2001 and was planned together with police advisers from the Norwegian Police Directorate and the Serbian Ministry of the Interior. A project plan was produced in March 2002, which led to a series of police training courses conducted during the rest of 2002 in a small district, the Backa Palanka Police District in Vojvodina in the north of Serbia (Ahnfelt & Kovacevic,
2003). The main objective of the project was to train the Serbian police in modern policing methods and the standards of democratic policing:

PO–S8: JUNO was an idea that came into being on a political level. Norway had supported the opposition against Milosevic. The climate within the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to support this. We had an idea around working locally in Bache Balanka in Vojvodina. We planned together with the Serbs and finished the project plan in April 2002. There was one project manager in Norway and one in Serbia. We sat down with the Serbs and asked them what they needed. They answered as best as they could, and we concentrated on two dimensions – training and equipment.

The initial JUNO project functioned as a pilot programme for the Serbian police in their wider police reform process, which was led and coordinated by OSCE (Ahnfelt & Kovacevic, 2003). The project was initially planned to last a year and include study visits to Norway by Serbian high ranking officials and training courses in Backa Palanka within the following fields: problem-oriented policing (POP) and community policing, developing management strategies and techniques, fighting narcotics-related crime, fighting financial crime, and developing forensics methods (ibid.). Nevertheless, the selection of POP as the focal topic for JUNO was not based on an extensive needs analysis but rather on the fact that the Norwegian police service at that time was using POP as their main crime prevention strategy and was in the process of implementing it throughout Norwegian police districts. The JUNO project was also initiated before any post-conflict strategic plan for the Serbian police had been produced, and as one of those involved in the JUNO planning pointed out, ‘If you don’t have a strategy plan, you can just walk out the door’. Several interviewees criticised both the supposedly random choice of POP as the primary method and the initiation of a reform project without a strategy:

PO–S7: Norway is not good at preparing what we are going to do beforehand either. I thought we had a plan and a strategy for what we are doing here in Serbia, but there is no direction. We are only working at an operational level.

Several of the interviewees stated that they looked upon JUNO very much as a political project:
PO–S1: I experienced my role in the project coming to life after a general request was put out asking, ‘Is there anyone who knows anything about crime prevention?’ When I then was considered for the project, there was no quality assurance afterwards. I could do exactly what I wanted. Clear goals were rarely set out. JUNO is a politically grounded project, which I as a specialist and course leader to a little extent was involved in, but which was easy to understand. I formulated my own success criteria to a high degree, both in terms of the technical questions and the more super eminent objectives that lay in the political mandate. Nobody was interested in looking at our professional goals. We were only to provide courses. However, the roles were unclear. I was both a leader and a doer. Planned everything myself. Nobody facilitates for you, and you are 100% responsible.

Some interviewees felt that JUNO initially had more to do with political symbolism than actual police reform, but others believed that the first JUNO project planted an important seed within the Serbian Ministry of the Interior. To ensure local ownership, training courses in community policing and POP were given to all police officers and leaders in the district. However, the first courses were a challenge to implement:

PO–S4: In the beginning, the course participants sat with their arms crossed, and they weren’t as engaged and eager as they are now. It had more resemblance with a sort of diplomatic meeting between old bosses. Some of the participants who were sent there didn’t know what sort of course they were attending.

PO–S1: The conditions at the police stations were sad. They obviously had a poor work environment physically speaking. The Serbian police are highly educated, so this made them embarrassed – they are a proud people. The international community put a knife to their throats to fulfil certain standards, but they were struggling economically. They had the knowledge, but not the technology.

These experiences with the poor conditions and the type of course participant chosen functioned as a form of needs analysis for the subsequent JUNO projects. This first project also enhanced the Backa Palanka Police District’s infrastructure through investment in vehicles, radio and telecommunication equipment, computers, forensics equipment, traffic safety equipment, and police station inventory (Ahnfelt & Kovacevic, 2003). This disbursement process was managed by the external International Management Group (IMG), which had been hired to monitor the project on behalf of the Norwegian Police Directorate, with a particular focus on equipment acquisition, strong controls to ensure cost efficiency and accountability in its use (IMG, 2006b), and
dispensation of funds according to project objectives (POD, 2006). Such monitoring was
designed to prevent the corruption common among Serbian police because of low
salaries:

CP–S3: There is a big problem with corruption within the police here in Serbia. The
police officers will demand money through traffic controls; it is accepted and understood because their wages are so low.

Preparation process

The instructors for the JUNO project did not apply through the regular channels used by
the other missions described in this thesis. Rather, they were hand-picked because of
their special knowledge of POP and strategic analysis and management. All the
Norwegian police officers ran training courses within their field of expertise (Ahnfelt &
Kovacevic, 2003), a general norm for European bilateral projects in which the different
projects are tailored to the recipient country’s requirements. The police officers were
not required to attend any preparatory training beforehand, presumably because the
post-conflict environment was safe, they were hand-picked experts, and several had UN
or OSCE mission experience:

PO–S2: I had conducted a POP project in my hometown and knew something about it. I was therefore invited by the JUNO project manager to conduct 14-day courses in Serbia with him. I also had previous experience from a mission with the OSCE.

PO–S1: I have never had any training. You often initiate preparations and meetings, but nothing is facilitated for you. I think we miss with the preparations; they are not thorough enough. In what context are we running this programme? Is it demands from the OSCE, the UN, or the EU? Is it a proper bilateral programme or is it more in terms of aid? We are really poor at this. I feel the instructors should be much more involved so the course gets to be as precise as possible.

All of the interviewees expressed a wish for better pre-deployment preparation, particularly in terms of contextualising the project.

JUNO 2–5

The positive feedback from all the parties involved in JUNO 1 set off JUNO 2, a
continuation of the pilot project established within the police district of Novi Sad in 2002
Although JUNO 2 was more or less built on the first project, some essential adjustments were made based on ‘lessons learned’ and because of the specific challenges involved in shifting from just one police station to a larger police district. This time, the development of management skills was particularly prioritised to better serve the public (IMG, 2006b):

PO–S1: We arranged a three-step programme with a two-day course for the top-management, and a one week course for the station commanders and the operational personnel on the ground.

An additional feature of JUNO 2 was the acquisition of equipment and instruments to update the crime scene laboratory and modernise the crime scene utilities, as well as training for the Serbian crime scene investigators in using the new equipment.

One important observation is that the JUNO 2 project was definitely affected by the March 12 assassination of Serbian Prime Minster Zoran Djindjic, which ‘signalled the active resistance to reform by organised crime syndicates (inside and outside the police)’ (Downes & Keane, 2006, p. 191). The Serbian police authorities’ investigation into the assassination disclosed the involvement of the Serbian Mafia (the Zemun Gang), and on 21 March, the Serbian General Public Prosecutor was suspended after the Deputy State Prosecutor admitted to being on the gang’s payroll. The Chief of Police in Novi Sad, Djordje Ostojic, a central figure within the JUNO 2 project, was appointed General Public Prosecutor and in Novi Sad he was replaced by Colonel Miladin Kostresevic, who came from a position in the Ministry of the Interior in Belgrade (ibid.). These events slowed the project down significantly:

PO–S1: The constant changes within the strategic leadership of the Serbian police and the Ministry of the Interior were sometimes a challenge. They were also very formal, but we had access to the Ministry of the Interior on a higher level than OSCE. The Serbian police officers that were involved in the programme were under significant control.

PO–S3: You could feel that management high up in the Serbian system sometimes hindered the work of our co-operating partners, but it always worked out after a while. I think the reason for that [hindrance] was the frequent change of people in leading positions within the police and the ministry.
The many changes within the ministry and the police, which resulted from the highly political nature of appointments to the top leadership in each, were a continuing challenge throughout the whole JUNO project period. The training finished in August 2004, but the final equipment was not delivered to the Novi Sad police district until January 2006 (IMG, 2006a). By this time, JUNO 2 had benefited from being harmonised and coordinated with OSCE plans for modernising crime scene investigation across the entire Serbian police force (Bjørkås, 2007). Nevertheless, although statistics show an almost doubling of evidence secured at crime scenes and a notable increase in laboratory examinations, there were no indications of more cases being solved (ibid).

JUNO 3 – based on JUNO 2 and focused on strategic planning, crime analysis, and POP – laid greater emphasis on specialists and aimed at being more ambitious and having a wider impact throughout the whole of the Vojvodina region (Ahnfelt & Gacevic, 2005). One innovative element of this phase was the implementation of a local POP project in each of the Vojvodina police districts (ibid.), and JUNO 3 in general was also designed to be part of the ‘safe community’ concept initiated by OSCE. An extensive summary report on the project (Lid, 2005) concluded that it had been a success, something that led to an expansion of the JUNO programme to include police districts in the whole of Serbia (Nålsund & Ahnfelt, 2007). JUNO 4 and 5 thus built on the earlier three projects, with a particular emphasis on top management, and added train-the-trainers courses to increase internal knowledge:

PO–S3: All the police commissioners had one day seminars last year together with half of the heads of the police stations. The other half is what we are going to teach now [in JUNO 5]. The present first course is a two-day repetition course for the Serbian police instructors. They have already received an OSCE [general] instructor course. We don’t have any elements of human rights and ethics – that is something that the OSCE covers. The intention is that the heads of all the police stations shall [eventually] initiate their own POP projects. When it comes to content, POP has been the governing idea/leitmotiv the whole time. The rest of the content has varied.

PO–S4: It is important to conduct these courses, because being a police commissioner today is totally different from what it used to be. In the earlier days, a leader needed to have a strong voice. Nobody protested; nobody opposed. Today’s leaders need totally different qualities. They need a lot of knowledge about management, laws, and regulations. As a leader, it is
important to invite your co-workers to express their personal opinions. The best strategies are a result of good discussions.

POP projects were this time initiated throughout Serbia’s 20 police departments, together with the implementation of an IT analytical infrastructure (ibid.). The interviewees, who had all been part of POP projects in Norway, expressed consensus on the importance of including top and middle management in POP project initiation to ensure a successful outcome. JUNO 5, which covered the Serbian police stations not included in JUNO 4 (Golub & Nålsund, 2008), trained around 100 leaders and had a particular focus on strategic analysis and management training:

PO–S5: These specific courses have gone down well. JUNO 5 is a direct continuation of JUNO 4. It is a course for station chiefs. It is like all the courses we have done. Half the participants are interested, half are not. Not all the leaders understand why they have to do strategic analysis. I am satisfied with them, but perhaps mostly with the instructors, maybe because they are young and enthusiastic. However, the whole system here is steered by other things than crime.

One aspect that most interviewees emphasised was the development over the years of a more positive course atmosphere, with attendees going from passive listeners to active participants.

A central element of JUNO 5 was the greater active involvement by the police academy and by the analytical group and leadership of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior. Another critical aim was to hand over responsibility for the courses to the Serbian police via the Ministry of the Interior:

PO–S3: From Norway having full responsibility for these courses, we are now dividing the responsibility with the Serbs. We, the instructors, used to plan everything, but we are now splitting it 50/50 with the Serbian police. However, the challenge is, of course, what do they want us to teach? We seldom get a heads up; we just have to play along and deal with whatever comes up. It is customary to hold a couple of planning meetings at the beginning of the year. We are then in the Ministry of the Interior and meet the head of the police unit and his men. It is approximately a two-hour meeting at which we discuss the topic for the courses. The next meeting is more detailed and we discuss form and dates. Serbia has had a free hand in determining the locations.
A frequent experience amongst the interviewees was a shift of plans and dates, something that frustrated several of the instructors. Others saw it as an inevitable part of Serbian culture and its hierarchal system.

**Co-operation and coordination**

Even though the Ministry of the Interior slowly took over more responsibility for the courses, the Norwegian police trainers experienced a clear lack of direction in the planning phase and the training, due partly to a lack intergovernmental co-operation between departments:

PO–S3: The last time we came down here, we sent an inquiry about meeting the head of police plus the head of analyses plus the head of education together. But of course, we got a one-on-one meeting with each of them. Our experience, and this is also the OSCE’s experience, is that the co-operation across departments within the Ministry of the Interior is poor. There is no communication. When we mention this, they get offended and claim that ‘we do have a good communication with the districts’, to which we reply ‘yes, but we mean the internal communication’.

PO–S7: There is no foundation at the top level in the ministry. The intergovernmental co-operation between the departments is poor.

This lack of internal co-operation within the Ministry of the Interior led to a lack of foundation, bureaucracy, and a system that was often too cumbersome to handle:

CP–S3: In Serbia, strategies are decided on the Ministry of the Interior level or on a district level. Strategies are already laid out, and this is something everyone has to follow. The Serbian police are not as free as the Norwegian. It is more hierarchical with a rigid structure. We have been lucky, because our leaders here in Serbia have recognised that doing a better job means change. That made the implementation of projects possible. However, not everything has been easy. To change people’s consciousness is a tiresome and unpredictable task, especially when a person is concentrated on his/her part of the puzzle, while others around are slacking. That in turn may result in the overall picture not turning out as expected. But I think the situation now is different. We have achieved a lot.

For the instructors, the co-operation did not only involve the Ministry of the Interior but also the OSCE, which in 2001 was designated coordinator of international assistance to reforming the Serbian police and also given the role of monitor and advisor in the reform
process (Downes, 2004). Visoka and Bolton (2011), however, after studying the OSCE’s actions in Kosovo, argue that international organisations that become involved in setting up missions in post-conflict states ‘risk pursuing overlapping and duplicating activities’ (p. 210), something that affects their effectiveness and also their influence. Working with OSCE was a positive experience for most interviewees, but some expressed ambivalence towards the co-operation:

PO–S1: The co-operation with the OSCE mainly went well, but it was a challenge that JUNO happened parallel to OSCE-initiated projects. For example, the OSCE conducted a course in community policing and a ‘train the trainers’ course parallel with our courses without them being coordinated in a productive way. The fact that Norway had a bilateral co-operation with Serbia on the side of the OSCE-initiated projects was both strength and a weakness. A strength, because Norway had direct access to areas in which the OSCE may have had problems, and a weakness when it came to coordination of information and knowledge transfer.

PO–S3: We had meetings regularly with the OSCE throughout JUNO. However, the co-operation was fluctuated somewhat because the organisation sometimes challenged us in such a way that we saw the OSCE as an opponent. I have thought a lot about why it was so, but maybe JUNO gained a footing in the Serbian police that gave us access to more information about what happened on the floor than the OSCE had. But I also have to say that there were times when the co-operation was excellent, and you really felt that we were pulling our weight together. I am sure it is easier for a small project group from Norway to obtain good co-operation than for large international organisations.

This observation that JUNO had easier access to and better co-operation from the Ministry of the Interior than OSCE emerged as a recurrent theme through the interviews. Downes and Keane (2006), in their discussion of the OSCE’s involvement in Serbia, also criticise the organisation’s attempt to assist the Serbian police in their reform processes, arguing that the OSCE struggles with understanding the difference between short-term training programmes and long-term reform initiatives (p. 181).

Gender and police culture

One topic that was conspicuously absent from the JUNO framework was gender, even though the OSCE had encouraged the Ministry of the Interior to target recruitment campaigns in the Serbian police service to minority groups (Downes, 2004, p. 48). More
specifically, the 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality, based on UN Security Resolution 1325 (2000), demands that gender be incorporated in all ‘activities conducted under the auspices of the OSCE’ (OSCE, 2004, p. 2). Nevertheless, although the intention was to increase the status of female police officers within the Serbian police service, few executive positions are currently held by women, especially at the highest level (Novovic, Vla, & Rakic, 2010). This absence was highly visible throughout the courses:

PO–S3: There were not many female course participants within the JUNO projects. There were a few, but it was a negligible number. We sought after it, but it turned out that almost no women were to be found in positions that resulted in participation in these courses. Within the area analyses, the split was half and half. It comes with the story that the OSCE through their projects initiated an increased recruitment of women to the Serbian police, and that women have now gained access to a much higher degree. We had one female instructor within narcotics, and the project leader for JUNO was a woman. Our interpreters were women, and that was not unproblematic in the beginning because the Serbian police officers had little respect for them. These were conditions we addressed, and such behaviour was not accepted. Other aspects of gender that were introduced through JUNO were a focus on domestic violence and rape. These were themes that originally had not been pertinent for the Serbian police. Following the introduction of this topic in several projects, this became a special field for them also.

Although one of the strategic foreign policy visions stated in Norway’s Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (Utenriksdepartementet, 2006) is the promotion of gender issues, this goal was not specifically included in any of the five JUNO projects. A few of the JUNO-initiated POP projects did, however, focus on domestic violence.

PO–S5: At a course during JUNO 3 in 2005, an example of a Norwegian analysis on domestic violence led to a discussion. There was a disagreement amongst the participants about whether this was something the police should be involved in or not. Several felt that this was going too far in terms of privacy. There was a clear divide between the older and the younger course participants. The law had changed fairly recently in this area.

Despite it being a healthy discussion, however, several of the instructors had issues with their Serbian colleague’s attitudes towards women and domestic violence, and felt their views were unethical and old-fashioned. There were also concerns about
professionalism. For example, during the author’s observation of a lecture in Serbia, one of the Norwegian instructors made the following comment:

PO–S4: A good culture is when the staff is highly motivated to do their job as best as they can. They should not be hiding away in their cars when they are on patrol, or eating hot dogs, drinking coffee, and buying stuff.

This remark was immediately commented on by one of the Serbian course participants who frustratedly replied that ‘that is the way police work is done here in Serbia’.

**Overall experience of achievement**

Even though all the interviewees encountered bureaucracy and some set-backs during their period of deployment, the end-note for JUNO was the initiation of over 100 POP projects. The interviewees all felt that JUNO had begun a change process in the Serbian police, an opinion also expressed by two of the Serbian co-operating partners in the Ministry of the Interior:

CP–S1: The changes didn’t occur overnight – it took 7 years to come to where we are now. We might have been (un)lucky that we were part of the process from the start, because we know all too well about all the difficulties we had to deal with. I don’t want to highlight our department, but I do believe that follow-up and constant awareness is very important. The same goes for our Norwegian partner, because it was always the same lecturers that took part in the training. I cannot answer if the whole police organisation has changed for the better, because that requires a big internal survey of the whole system. My impression is that the approach towards tackling problems has improved; to include partners, conduct analyses, and goal-oriented measures to solve the problems.

CP–S5: We now have a total of 60 security councils in all of Serbia. Different organisations run these. In the South of Serbia they work very well. Two of these are especially successful, namely Lajkovac and Bujanova. They also have good co-operation with Albania.

The Norwegian police officers were also satisfied with the outcome of their courses and expressed genuine content with their achievement. All of them thought their efforts had made a difference:

PO–S2: Because of the POP projects, they [the Serbian Police] achieved much better contact with the Serbian people. It [the POP projects] got them away
from the old-fashioned way [of policing]. It is now working well in Serbia. They are highly educated.

PO–S1: I learned a lot about humbleness and respect for the fact that we are not the only ones that know something about police work and crime prevention. I have learned about different cultures. And I gained experience that contributed to developing a model based on process and interaction.

All of the Norwegian instructors emphasised that Norway has much to learn from the Serbian police and felt that the courses resulted in an interaction of experiences and knowledge that went both ways:

PO–S3: JUNO has initiated many good projects here in Serbia, and this should give us ideas about how to do things in Norway. They are much better at implementing projects down here – they are open to change, which we are not in Norway. The management must get used to thinking strategically. There should also be an analytical unit within all police districts. This is something we are working on in Norway, but we still have a long way to go. Instead of using analytical personnel, we are using ordinary police officers to do the job, but they should be out in the streets! We struggle with the implementation of POP in Norway. Based on the experiences from Norway, where one of the failures with implementation was a lack of foundation on the managerial level, there is a need to train the leaders down here, right up to the top level. We should have conducted the same courses for the middle management in Norway as we are doing here in Serbia. I have suggested it several times, but nothing has happened.

PO–S4: The West is conducting a form of cultural colonisation here. However, within the police it is in many ways exactly like it is in Norway, although the police here are much more military than our police. They have very competent people down here; they just lack the tools we have; for example, analytical tools.

PO–S5: Several of the police districts did very good analyses in the pilot projects. There are many dedicated participants that accomplished a lot, often despite less than optimal computer solutions.

One of the Norwegian police officers, however, was sceptical about what had been achieved in Serbia, especially in the area of community policing:

PO–S7: What we have achieved? Community policing hasn't accomplished squat because community policing includes the wish to do something different. However, those who want to do something within the area of community policing are immediately relocated when they start accomplishing something.
What is really needed is awareness raising and a will on the political level and on the management side to change things.

Although this latter view deviated from the general opinion of the other interviewees, questions were raised about what impact JUNO had had.

Evaluation

The Norwegian police officers had all experienced some form of assessment of their work, and several evaluations of varying quality and scope have been undertaken since the beginning of the JUNO projects. No scientific evaluation has been conducted, however, and most evaluations were done by either the coordinators or the instructors themselves, who in essence assessed their own work:

PO–S3: When it comes to evaluations, we have tried a feedback form after JUNO 2. It did not work. In regards to an evaluation, we had a discussion with colleagues from the Ministry of the Interior and also the interpreters to get their point of view, but no formal evaluation. Quality assurance-wise we have an instructor meeting at the Police Directorate in which we go through the contents. We quality assure each other with the assistance of key personnel in the Police Directorate. When we come back from our courses in Serbia, we make a summing up on where we have been, what we have done, what our target group has been, and so forth.

Some evaluations have been more extensive than others, especially following JUNO 2 when, crime scene investigators carried out several extensive visits during 2006 that resulted in a detailed report on the experiences with donated technical equipment, the effect of competence training in crime scene investigation and criminal investigation, and the elements that needed improvement (Bjørkås, 2007). One finding was a deviation from the correct norms when writing crime scene reports and analyses (Bjørkås, 2007, p. 8), an observation supported by co-operating partners:

CP–S4: We teach them crime scene techniques in Southern Serbia but they cannot write proper reports, so they are useless in the courts!

An evaluation was also conducted after JUNO 3, when the instructors visited all the police stations at which courses had been held. The result was a voluminous, albeit highly descriptive, report (Lid, 2005):
As an example; if you have €200,000 and you say to the Serbs ‘we want to train the trainers’, they will say yes. The problem is that there are no proper assessments... In Southern Serbia they couldn’t do a proper evaluation because none was planned... The international community loves training because you can take a photo of this... Take a classic police reform programme in Serbia. The first year they do training, the second year they train the trainers, and the third year is in form of implementation and equipment distribution. How do you know that this is what they need? We ran a train-the-trainer’s course in Serbia. After the first group graduated, we waited for six months and then asked; ‘Where are the trainers now?’ We found that none of them were trainers! They were traffic officers, etc. What we should have done was to monitor their movements from the moment they graduated.

An evaluation trip conducted by the JUNO project team at the end of 2005, however, indicated a positive impact, with POP and the analytical tools being understood by the Serbian police officers and used in their everyday work (Lid, 2005). The whole JUNO project ended in September 2009 with a rather rushed sub-optimal assessment meeting:

PO–S3: I felt it was an abrupt ending to the JUNO project. I am not satisfied with how the project was finalised – it seemed stressed and not thought through.

The evaluation team were also denied access to any collaborating partners within the POP projects, meaning that they had to rely on local police claims that it had been successful (Lid, 2005):

PO–S1: JUNO hasn’t been evaluated, except from an internal review together with a questionnaire. However, internal reviews are very useful! We correct and direct ourselves towards the recipient country. The review informs the next course.

PO–S4: One feebleness of these projects is that there are no existing evaluations/results to show. The intention was to follow some of the projects around ethnicity and violence culture, which is dynamite material, but we have not succeeded. That is a problem because we don’t know if this is resulting in a positive change. I made a summary of the challenges that have been revealed through the implementation of POP in Serbia, where the most significant are [in place], those involving external partners, proper project descriptions, motivating police officers to work with crime prevention, and proper knowledge transfer.

One important aspect of JUNO 5 is that for the first time, in line with the recommendations in the National Strategy of Serbia for the Serbia and Montenegro's
Accession to the European Union (Serbian European Integration Office, 2005, nr. 4.5.1), the aspiration for EU membership was being expressed in the JUNO project plan. A total reformation of the criminal justice sector was one of the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for EU membership (EU Council of the European, 1993).

PO–S3: JUNO contributed to the Serbian police understanding that POP was a tool for them in their continuation to reach an EU standard within the Serbian police. I think that JUNO furthered innovation within their organisation.

Because the JUNO projects comprised a bilateral programme on the outer edge of OSCE, it is difficult to assess the extent to which JUNO contributed to the overall reform of the Serbian police, but the fact that Serbia submitted its application to join the EU on 19 December 2009 (Lowen, 2009) may be an indicator of success.

Post-JUNO experiences

All the interviewees questioned the lack of knowledge transfer back to Norway: the failure to identify lessons learned from the Serbian police that could be used by the Norwegian police service and the significant absence of interest in the knowledge the instructors had gained about the crime picture in the Balkans:

PO–S4: It is odd that the PST [Norwegian Police Security Service] is not interested in what we have learnt down here and what we know. We have become quite specialised when it comes to issues concerning Serbia.

PO–S5: [In addition to being an instructor for JUNO], I’ve lived 2½ years in Bosnia. No one from the police back home has been interested in my knowledge about, for example, the Mafia.

Oddou, Osland, and Blakeney (2009), in their discussion of the variables influencing the transfer process, emphasise that ‘the knowledge that repatriates acquire during international assignments is a valuable resource’, but one that few organisations take advantage of (p. 181). Because many of those returning home from international assignments talk little about their experiences in fear of alienating themselves from their co-workers, ‘unless the work unit sees repatriate knowledge as critical, repatriates may have little success in transferring knowledge’ (ibid., p. 193).
Conclusion

This case study of the JUNO projects in Serbia has established that the aim of the bilateral co-operation was to reform the Serbian police service in the area of crime prevention. The initiation of 100 POP projects throughout the project period suggests that JUNO was a success. The findings also reveal that the JUNO projects led to a change process within the Serbian police service towards more openness both internally and externally, and a shift in attitudes. One important factor that contributed to this relative success of the project was the level of continuity achieved: the same Norwegian police officers conducting courses over a long period of time. Another noteworthy feature was the IMG’s strict follow-up and control throughout the mission to ensure that money for infrastructure did not disappear and corruption was averted. Norway’s good relationship with Serbia secured a positive atmosphere, with easy access to higher management levels that made the bilateral co-operation less problematic than is often the case in multilateral IPRMs. A second vital point is that JUNO took place in a European country that is culturally and contextually closer to Norway than are the recipient countries in many of the other missions in which Norway is involved.

The political nature of the co-operation did influence JUNO in more ways than one. Predictability was a challenge because of the constant change in leadership brought about by the fact that police chiefs are politically appointed. These changes reset many of the projects and influenced project planning and direction. At the same time, a lack of a proper needs analysis made it more difficult to acquire a clear overview from the Serbs on what their needs were. Hence, problem-oriented policing was chosen as the main JUNO theme because it happened to be the method implemented in Norway at the time of JUNO’s initiation. Key issues that should have been explored, however, were left unanswered; most particularly, whether the POP projects initiated during the courses were in fact restructured old focus areas within the Serbian police being presented as new POP projects to satisfy JUNO requirements. Issues like bureaucracy also slowed the project down, especially in terms of cross-departmental coordination and co-operation. JUNO also neglected focus on gender, a contradiction to the stated overall strategic aims of Norway’s foreign policy in this area. Post-project knowledge transfer also appears to
have been virtually absent, and the police officers involved felt that their acquired expertise from working and co-operating with the Serbian police was not valued.

The overall impression of the experience of the work conducted and the achievements realised in Serbia during that period of time was precisely summed up by interviewee PO–S3:

The main change from then up to now is that they are much more open and honest. That has been a big transformation. They didn’t share anything in the beginning. This is probably the biggest change, and that they are much more active with the planning and carrying out. Still, here in the Balkans, you must take things as they come. You mustn’t stress – changes can and will happen. It is a different mentality. Sometimes I wonder why we are doing this. [The Ministry of the Interior] is hard to get hold of and difficult to work with. There is only one contact person at the Bureau of International Co-operation and when that person is away there is no one who answers the e-mail. One thing I am certain of is that it is important that we have a foot inside the door regardless of which effect the JUNO courses have directly on the reform of the police here in Serbia. It is not necessarily just the education that is the positive effect of JUNO, but everything that comes with it. We don’t have to go through all the bureaucratic links as OSCE does.

As already pointed out, however, JUNO, being a bilateral mission to a European country, was characterised by a relative contextual similarity between the contributing and recipient nations. To examine which issues arise for Norway and deployed Norwegian police officers when the context differs more notably – in continent, culture, and economy – the next chapter investigates UNMIL, the UN mission to Liberia, a multilateral mission led by a major organisation rather than a country that poses many interesting challenges.
Chapter 6 – Case Study Liberia

As a contrast to the bilateral case of Serbia examined in Chapter 5, this chapter explores the functions and experiences of deployed Norwegian police officers within a multilateral programme governed by a UN mission mandate and goals, the United Nation’s Mission to Liberia (UNMIL). After explaining UNMIL’s historical background and discussing the various challenges for police officers engaged in reform missions in one of the world’s most deprived countries, the discussion focuses on how police deployment is experienced in practice by the individual police officer on the ground. The findings are based primarily on focused interviews with 13 practitioners, carried out between 2009 and 2010, but are also supported by observational fieldwork in Liberia that included open-ended interviews with personnel from other countries (n = 13). Triangulation is again assured by the inclusion of secondary data from previous studies, academic literature, and policy reports in this area.

As before, to ensure anonymity, Norwegian police officers are designated by the code PO, a country indicator (L for Liberia), and a randomly assigned number, while non-Norwegian international co-operating partners are designated by CP–L, followed by a random number. These latter come from various external organisations and a number of countries – including Liberia, Sweden, UK, Iceland, Namibia, Peru and India – but no country code is specified to further protect anonymity. Again, the interviewees’ responses have all been translated from Norwegian into English by the author.

Background

Beginning in the 1820s, Liberia (liberty), which became the independent Republic of Liberia in 1847, was a place of settlement for colonies of liberated and escaped slaves from America. Because this colonisation displaced many natives, it has played a significant role in the long-lasting Liberian conflict. Since that time, however, the country has had a special bond with the U.S (Kunnskapsforlaget, 2008), with Liberia’s flag resembling America’s (but with only one star) and Liberians pledging allegiance to their flag (Simmons, 2003). The long-serving President Tubman (1943–71) opened the
country up to foreign investors, including the renowned American Firestone tyre company, which has been active in Liberia since 1926 (Firestone, 2010). This close connection was accentuated as recently as 13 August 2009 during the visit to Liberia of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (UNMIL, 2009a).

From 1980 to 1990, the country was ruled by the brutal dictator Samuel Doe, whose mal-governance in the 1980s is the key to understanding the country’s economic ruin and the crisis and contradictions of Liberia’s security sector (Kunnskapsforlaget, 2008; Loden, 2007). No sooner had Doe’s regime come to power than it abandoned all its election promises and instead began violating fundamental human rights and executing masses of citizens. Doe used the financial aid he received from America to increasingly favour his own ethnic group, the Krahn, which resulted in a mass of opposition forces united against him (Loden, 2007). By the late 1980s, the deepening political crisis and an invasion by Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) sparked Liberia’s civil war. To prevent Liberia from becoming a Libyan-backed permanent revolutionary base in West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established the Monitoring Observer Group peacekeeping mission (ECOMOG), which denied Taylor his victory. During the early 1990s, however, the war increased between the Taylor-backed Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), a loose alliance of Mandingoes and Krahn former soldiers of President Doe’s army (Loden, 2007; Omotola, 2006). A ceasefire was negotiated in 1996, and Taylor became President of Liberia in July 1997 as a result of his direct threat to resume fighting if he was not elected. After Taylor’s election, at the urging of ECOWAS and ECOMOG, attempts were made to reform the security sector; however, Taylor enforced the sovereignty of the Liberian Constitution and asked ECOMOG to leave, which resulted in on-going conflicts until August 2003, when Taylor was forced into exile in Nigeria (Omotola, 2006).

At about the same time, several high-profiled persons in Norway expressed concern for the volatile situation in Liberia. Among these was Raymond Johansen, Secretary General for the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), who appealed to the Norwegian government and the U.S several times in June 2003 to take action in the country,
arguing that the strong historical and political link between America and Liberia obligated them to do something (Johansen, 2003, 27th of June). Meanwhile, on 13 June 2003, the EU agreed upon a Declaration expressing deep concern about the situation in Liberia and demanding that all fighting and breaches of human rights cease immediately. This declaration was also signed by affiliated countries in Eastern Europe and the EEA, including Norway (Europaportalen, 2003). The UN Secretary-General (2003b, 2003c), in his reports to the UN Security Council, communicated concern about the turmoil in Liberia, which was further confirmed by information from the United Nations Office in Liberia (UNAMSIL) (Secretary-General, 2003c). Following these reports, between June and August 2003, the UN, together with the revolutionary movement in Accra, Ghana, composed a peace plan, the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), which was signed 18 August 2003 (Loden, 2007) and ended the brutal 14-year war (Jaye, 2009). Among other things, the CPA included reformation of the Liberian National Police (LNP) under the rubric of measures to address human rights issues (Article VIII).

To realise the very ambitious reform and restructuring programme proposed in the CPA, it was necessary to set up a UN peacekeeping operation in Liberia. In a special report on 10 September 2003, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation in Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It was recommended that the mandate ‘deploy a force to Liberia under Chapter VII of the United Nations’ (Secretary-General, 2003b, p. 4, nr 15), which included civilian police ‘to advise, train and assist the Liberian law enforcement authorities and other criminal justice institutions’ (ibid., p. 14, nr. 51). The Security Council followed the Secretary General’s recommendations and on 19 September 2003 issued UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003) establishing the mission (UN Security Council, 2003).

Needs analysis

UN Security Council Resolution 1509 asked the Secretary-General to produce progress reports on UNMIL every 90 days (UN Security Council, 2003). The first report of 15 December 2003 (Secretary-General, 2003a), which provided the model for future
progress reports, was divided into several theme areas. Under ‘Support for Security Reform’, it was noted that UNMIL would prepare for the deployment of 755 civilian police officers (now labelled UNPOL) and three Formed Police Units (FPU) units (a combination of military and police used for protective measures) comprising 120 armed police personnel to assist the Liberian National Police in performing its duties. The civilian police officers were to conduct a review of Liberia’s law enforcement system and develop a reform programme for the LNP (ibid.). At the time of the first report, 35 civilian police officers and one FPU had arrived and managed to train 20 police officers for an interim police force (ibid.). However, as one of the first to arrive at the UNMIL mission explained, the conditions were less than ideal:

CP–L8: We came when the mission started in 2003. We lived 15 people in one room – some slept on the floor; 15 shared one bathroom. The UN demanded water and electricity – you know UN is high maintenance. Us, they just dropped at the Mamba point area. Curfew was at 1800h – they were killing people at night – shooting in the air. When I came, there were no lights – totally dark during the night. The most difficult part in the beginning of the missions is logistics. I don’t know how many we were. Every flight that came had a bunch of new people. There was not much time to prepare or to have an induction course or anything – it was 2 minutes and ‘welcome’. It was absolutely nothing here! No cars, except UN cars and taxis. The roads were full of holes. We bought food from the locals. The streets were dumps. Six months after we arrived, the DDR [disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration] people still went on shooting. The UN came here and paid people to give up their weapons. It was not an honest DDR process – the people just gave up useless weapons. During the war, they gave whoever wanted to fire a gun a weapon. There were 100,000 ordinary people, soldiers, and children that got ‘disarmed’. They still have their weapons. They gave away crap and kept the good stuff. They would not give up their AK 47s – they are buried out in the bush somewhere. The only good thing here is that they did not use mines.

By March 2004, the deployed UNMIL police officers had done 2,000 shifts with LNP, covering crime investigation, community policing, responding to calls, and administering police records (Secretary-General, 2003c). On 12 July 2004, the National Police Training Academy (NPTA) reopened, and UNPOL established a police training programme (UNMIL, 2008b). From 2004 to 2006, UNPOL deactivated over 3,500 police officers and recruited 2,500 new ones (Loden, 2007, pp. 297-300). A training needs analysis (TNA) was conducted in 2004 that focused on the training needs of senior police officers and a training assessment report was issued in 2006. These two reports
led to the development of a diverse range of specialist training and leadership programmes (Secretary-General, 2006) to enhance LNP law enforcement capacity, including women and child protection investigation courses, basic fingerprint detection and records courses, and community policing courses (UNMIL, 2008b). Although the recruitment and training of the LNP commenced in 2004, logistics and infrastructure were lacking, as was a future strategy for developing the LNP:

PO–L13: The biggest mistake the United Nations has made and is making is that they have a lessons learned unit that does not work at all – especially not on the police side of things. They do not learn from the errors they made in Kosovo, East Timor, etc. For example, Liberia in 2003 – it takes time to get things started! The UN uses a lot of resources in recruiting new [Liberian] police officers and trains these without having the logistics and the infrastructure in order. The military has learned – they don’t do stuff like that – they don’t start with training before the logistics are in place. It kills all motivation.

UNPOL and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) did eventually work with the Liberian government to create and implement a strategic plan for the LNP, but this was not implemented until 2009, five years after the initiation of the mission. Hence, although clearly a step in the right direction, the plan has been criticised for arriving too late, for being far too detailed, and for lacking a holistic perspective:

CP–L10: I am working with implementing projects set out in the LNP Strategic Plan 2009–2013. When I came here, they had not broken the strategic plan into specific projects. Therefore, I first of all ran consultation meetings with the [LNP] to define some projects. Then it was the challenge of implementing them.

PO–L13: They reform some parts of the police, but not others. You therefore get a lot of duplicates – who is in charge of the security in the country? There is a bunch of people that gets paid and is administered to do the same type of work. There are 4,000 police officers in Liberia, but there is a pile of other agencies as well. The number of agencies should be reduced, but there is no plan for doing that. You need to look at the total picture. This is a huge flaw in most missions.

Many of the interviewees expressed similar views and felt the mission was ‘invented as they went along’.
Motivation for deployment

Norway was one of the first to deploy civilian police officers at the beginning of 2004 and has since deployed close to 70 police officers to UNMIL:

PO–L6: Norway deployed 4 police officers from the beginning, and these were referred to as ‘experts in mission’. The civilian police number for the first police officers we sent was very low – they had numbers 5 up to 8 – which is something that indicates that we were first in.

Norway increased its deployment from 6 police officers in 2005–2006 to 10 in 2007 and thereafter to 9 annually, with 9 Norwegian police officers currently deployed to UNMIL. The interviewees suggested several different reasons for wanting to work in an international mission:

PO–L2: My motivation was that I was fed-up – I needed something new. I had been through a breakup, and it was good to get away. I also needed the money and had wanted to do something like this for a long time.

PO–L3: My motivation for being deployed was that I wanted to try something new. I did not have any ideological ambitions, either before or during the mission. I had never had a passport or been further than Denmark before I was deployed, and I am over 50 years old. I had not practiced my English since grade school, and I struggled with that part of the interview.

PO–L4: My motivation was to learn something new; I was pissed and burned out. I had colleagues who had been out, and they were a source of inspiration. Family life with kids was over, so I had no practical or emotional reasons for not going.

Even though none of the police officers denied that money was a factor in their applying for international deployment, other motives like ‘excitement’, ‘a challenge’, and a ‘different culture’ came through more strongly.

Preparation process

The pre-deployment preparation for the police officers consisted of a standard United Nations Police Officers Course (UNPOC), and then a mission-specific course focused on Liberia and the UNMIL mission. UNPOC, which was developed by the Norwegian police, is a two-week training course comprising various elements important to an international mission, including human rights, women, peace and security, principles of
UN peacekeeping operations, and practical exercises (personal observation, UNPOC in
Stavern, Norway, June 2009).

PO–L2: I had UNPOC half a year before I left Norway. One of the best and most
enjoyable courses I have attended. The themes were good. Before we left for
Liberia, we had a mission-specific course. We met in Oslo and had 2 days with
culture, land information plus facts about the mission itself. It was very good
and unceremonious. When we came down to Liberia, we had an 8–9 days
induction course. It was a lot of repetition from the previous courses, but that
was fine.

PO–L4: The UNPOC was good, I didn’t miss anything. The UN system was
sufficiently covered. We also got information about Norway’s role. We learned
that we are not in any way to assist the country with weapons or military
training. We also got a good introduction to ethics. We were not to impose
ourselves on the country we came to. We had a quasi-physical test of 3,000
metres which everyone passed... The mission-specific course was not at all good
enough. It was a one-day course that painted a rosy picture of Liberia. That is
not how it is! I missed a bit more information about the place I was going to.

PO–L7: The preparation was OK, but I didn’t know much before I came here.
During the induction course, they implanted in us how poor the LNP was, but
the course was far from being concrete enough.

All of the interviewees were content with UNPOC, but there were various views on the
mission-specific course. A majority pointed particularly to a lack of contextualisation
during the mission-specific courses and no clarification of what the UN Security Council
Resolution mandates meant to their own deployment. Another aspect that
respondents commented on consistently was planning:

PO–L2: I did not see any strategies or goals. Concrete action plans were also
absent. In general, that was the rule. There was a clear lack of communicating
any strategic documents to the deployed police officers.

PO–L5: I did not see any goals or strategy plans before I left.

PO–L13: There is a lack of strategic plan implementation, also from the
Norwegian side. In Liberia, a strategic plan was first issued in 2008. That is four
years too late. If we had waited half a year in Liberia until well into 2004 and
produced proper plans – spent time on them – along with a plan on
infrastructure, then we would have done it right. In African countries, without
an established police, you must aim for quality when you go in.

None of the interviewees had been introduced to any form of strategy, action plan, or
concrete goals for the IPRM itself or for their deployment, a failure they severely criticised and a structure they sorely missed.

**Induction phase: knowledge transfer**

Although arriving at the UNMIL mission was exciting for most of the deployed Norwegian police officers, the one-week induction course they received did not prevent most from feeling ‘lost’ for a very long time:

PO–L11: The constant shift of people into positions is a problem. You use an enormous amount of resources learning new stuff – where should I ‘pick up this and find that’? I would have highly appreciated a person that followed me in the beginning and introduced me to new people and new things.

CP–L1: My being here makes no difference. There is a constant rotation – new people. No overlap, and I can certainly understand the LNP – they constantly have to relate to new people and I bet their thinking, ‘Oh, well, we just have to do what they say’. Here we come and start all over – again and again.

PO–L1: There should have been an overlapping system by which the new contingent arrives earlier than those who are going home to ensure a period of knowledge transfer. The knowledge transfer was really poor. When our departmental leader went back home, he took all his knowledge with him and just left us there.

This lack of overlap and poor knowledge transfer was repeatedly mentioned by the interviewees who, although many expressed an understanding of the extra costs such an overlap would entail, emphasised the parallel expense of having uninformed personnel ‘mucking around’ for a long time.

**Work tasks**

When the police officers arrived on site, they were assigned a variety of work tasks within UNMIL. Some were sent to train the LNP at the National Police Training Academy (NPTA) in Monrovia, whose renovation, together with the rebuilding of several police stations in different Liberian districts, had been enabled by a 2006 donation from Norway of over USD 7.5 million (UNMIL, 2008a; UNMIL, 2009b):
PO–L1: I worked at the NPTA. When it comes to training we get a lot done, but the bigger picture is a mess. We follow the Norwegian model down here when it comes to organising the training. The difference is that we are cutting the training period down to one year instead of three. The Americans are training the Emergency Response Units – there is a lot of shooting involved! I cannot identify with the Americans and their assembly line mentality. They have set a number they want to train – and that is their only target.

Others worked as advisors to crime scene investigators in Monrovia, which they found both interesting and challenging:

PO–L8: My contribution as an advisor has been on technical questions; case administration and file management to make sure that everything doesn’t float around. The LNP writes everything by hand because they don’t have computers. I need to be careful because they need to find the answers themselves. So I have to ask open-ended questions – ergo guidance. I sometimes need to push them to do their job, but it is like that at home as well.

To further strengthen the LNP and make it more independent and durable, UNMIL also has team site locations (each supporting several local police stations) in all geographic zones in Liberia. The Norwegian Police officers sent to different team sites outside Monrovia reported diverse experiences:

PO–L9: It is one lensman’s office out here. We have three LNP offices we are responsible for. We go through their books, read what they have registered, and give them advice. There are sometimes serious incidents that occur out here, and we then follow them out to the site and advise them what to do. We have a good standing with the LNP – they work better when we’re there than alone. They tell us that we are interested and really care.

PO–L13: We are always on duty, and the evenings pass really fast. We go for a walk around 1700h. We need to do it before dark, because the roads are made really dangerous by vehicles that drive at high speed without lights. UNPOL officers should be paid according to how much they contribute and for inconvenience! Our deployment is very different from that of those working in Monrovia. We have to drive 120 kilometres just to get petrol, and we are totally dependent on the Bangladesh military camp – we eat all our meals there. We have chicken and rice for breakfast, rice and chicken for lunch, and chicken and rice for dinner.

PO–L2: The duty was not meaningful. I wanted to do something, and I developed a programme for the investigators and the local police. That didn’t work; the team leader was negative and also, in the Liberian culture they say yes, but then they don’t do it. ‘African time’ [tomorrow] was another factor. The
problem is that they don’t have any good role models. There is nobody who walks in the front and shows them that this is worthwhile, rather the opposite. There aren’t any good incentive systems.

PO–L4: I was sent out in the bush, called the ‘livord’. It was close to the border with Cote d’Ivoire. On the other side of the border, there were rebels and thieves that conducted raids. We functioned as a buffer between the local tribes and the inhabitants. The frontier post was a sham – open smuggling went on. We asked the local police to do something, but received a letter that said that if we did anything, we would be shot and so would they. We had no protection – we slept in a barn. We weren’t told any of this before we left... Our daily work tasks were meant to be monitoring and advising.

The diversity of work tasks also included administering funds from a range of countries through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which had set up a Donoraid office within UNMIL:

PO–L1: UNDP gets the thumbs down from me. I have not been involved in an organization that explains away more, make excuses, buys time. We have Monday meetings, and there is always something they haven’t done. There are 4 people in the office with a pile of paper. They don’t even keep a log. It is only local people working there.

Nevertheless, the Norwegian police officers assigned to the UNDP’s Donoraid programme had significant powers, being able to control and determine which police projects around Liberia would receive funding, so it was perceived by most as a preferred posting.

The officers also severely criticised their placement in the mission without any apparent consideration of their specific expertise. When they came to Liberia, they assumed they would be working in their own special fields, but many received a surprise upon arrival:

PO–L1: Everyone should be picked on the basis of their expertise within a field. As it is now, you get placed randomly. People are moved around aimlessly. I worked together with a forensic expert – he was placed with the Emergency Response Unit! Police officers should be told what they are going to work on before they arrive. You should be able to apply for positions and keep them for the period you are down there. I had five positions during one year. The UN should have told Norway that they need one shooting instructor, one
investigator, etc., before the next contingent comes down so people can be assigned before they leave. But there is no system for this.

PO–L2: The way we were placed was characterised by chance. Take me for example; I have a long background as an investigator and thought the crime section would be perfect for me. But no, I was sent out into the bush, which made no sense.

FM–L8: I came to Liberia with 20 years of experience as an instructor but was placed as a female adviser for the sexual assault investigators. A male Norwegian colleague of mine has exactly that area of expertise, but he worked under Donoraid.

PO–L13: The UN may, for example, want 10 police officers with this and that qualification. However, when they get down there, they are placed in a totally different position. Although I have to say that it can happen that people who are good at something at home don’t want to work with this when they get down there and deliberately avoid it.

The reason for this personnel misplacement was explained by a senior executive within the UNDPKO (personal conversation, 8 September 2011):

As it is today, the commissioner sends requests for new police officers for specific positions two to three days in advance! We aim for not accepting requests less than three months beforehand, but preferably six months, so that we can find a new replacement. We are asking for profiles from the missions so that we can find the right staff. As things stand now, there can be vacancies for two to three months because of poor preparation in the missions. We have shifted focus from regular police to specialists within UNPOL, but Member States are not giving us the best. The good ones should be recruited and be there for up to four years. We need specialists, possibly recruited outside ordinary secondment. We need to professionalise the police.

Many of the deployed officers saw this lack of preparation for their arrival and their random placement in positions far outside their professional expertise as a sign of ignorance and a disregard for them as specialists. This perception affected their work. Another element that the overwhelming majority found irritating was the lack of a framework and clear goals:

PO–L1: I had to attend a lot of chiefs’ meetings. To my huge surprise, there weren’t any goals. I raised this as an issue because I found it essential if I was to do a good job, but I was not listened to. It wasn’t like this only applied for the six months I was there; it was like that all over and all the time.
PO–L7: There are too few guidelines. They talk about SOP [standard operating procedure] willy-nilly, but they are super general. They should have been more concrete. It takes months to get into things. It shouldn’t be dependent on how you are.

Wilén (2009) supports these views in her ‘Capacity-building or Capacity-taking?’, arguing not only that the lack of guidelines strongly affected officers’ duties during UNMIL but that it resulted in a marked individualism, which the interviewees also noted:

PO–L3: The system is influenced by individuals. It totally depends on who is there, and the system change depending on who’s there and where they are from.

PO–L2: The UN system didn’t care about our previous knowledge. It is incredibly random and dependent upon individuals.

One officer interviewed by Wilén in Liberia claimed that because the UN is an organisation made up of individuals, decisions made by only one person come across as UNMIL decisions even when they are simply the opinion of that single individual. This individualism within an institution, she claims, may be a result of the lack of planning and directives (2009, p. 342).

**Leadership**

Another concern expressed during the interviews was the issue of leadership within the mission. Some of the police officers only answered to their Norwegian contingent commander, but others had to engage with leaders higher up in the system:

PO–L1: The police commissioner fell out with everyone. It made the daily work difficult. He changed the lunch hour so there was not enough time to eat lunch. It is strange how these mechanisms can affect a mission. If I was a leader, I would try to get the best out of my men. Instead everyone had to defend what they did and was afraid before every meeting. My opinion is that the whole thing is corrupt. No one confronted the appraisal system; excellent – average – below. It is buddy-buddy. I totally lost faith in the system.

PO–L4: We worked together with Kenyans and Nigerians, and a Ghanaian too. The co-operation was poor. The Ghanaian was not nice, and he always needed to demonstrate against the ‘White man’. He made many strange decisions, and
he had many bush wives. He had a culture and a leadership style that was not positive.

PO–L8: UNMIL is a system in which people feel a bit gagged. If you come with something that can be interpreted as criticism, it is taken amiss. It is a very old-fashioned style of leadership – hierarchal, bureaucratic, and heavy.

This leadership style within the mission was a problem for many respondents, seen as something that affected their daily jobs and hindered a successful mission outcome. A senior executive at UNDPKO agreed with this perception (personal conversation, 8 September 2011):

We have always struggled to get good commissioners and deputy commissioners. We like to have good commissioners and not have to follow geographic considerations because we need the best. We also need to train these leaders in a generic/common leadership programme because it is not the same as being a senior manager for the police in [specific country] as it is to be a leader on the mission.

Being managed autocratically led to much frustration and loss of motivation on the part of the Norwegian police officers interviewed. Some also pointed to the differences in culture.

**Culture: internally and external**

Many deployed officers were further challenged by the various cultural backgrounds internal to UNMIL, which made it difficult to find a common understanding of roles, ethics, and responsibilities:

PO–L3: Of course, you need to start somewhere, but not all countries fit into the ‘model of democracy’. The UN is a hotchpotch of nations; everything from strict Muslim nations, to the West, to America, which has its very own special U.S. Marines way. This hotchpotch is supposed to build a nation in 5 to 6 years. It is totally unrealistic. The ideal would be to build an African nation, but that unfortunately often includes brutality and rape.

PO–L7: There has been some criticism against UNMIL – we work too slowly, and the progress is too slow. But we are 40 different nations with different backgrounds and different languages. We [Norwegians] are asked [by other international colleagues] to relax... it is not a problem not doing anything here. The initiative thing is a Nordic thing I think.
CP–L10: Many UN countries are former Commonwealth countries – working UK style, while Liberia is U.S. linked and has a U.S. style. Some of the UN countries have good tactical skills; for example, Pakistan. However, many of the countries that the UN is assisting elsewhere are here working in the mission... They are middle-ranking officers, and they are not used to working strategically. They cannot mentor and advise people on a senior level.

One police officer in particular, however, emphasised that a multicultural mission is valuable and that many of the officers from other parts of the world were highly skilled:

PO–L8: We [Norwegians] think we know everything and that how we do it is how others should do it. Other nation’s police forces can be at least as good. Take the Pakistanis for example; they are wise and engaged colleagues. I think we should confront our prejudices. There are a number of skilled persons from various nations in the UNPOL contingent.

Outside the mission, many interviewees felt it was challenging coming to grips with the African culture, struggling particularly with the different mind-set of their Liberian police colleagues:

CP–L2: We are trying to lead the way, teach them about farming. A lot of unemployed youth can be used. They go to illegal mining. The weather here is perfect for farming. But the Liberians see this as low class. However, we try to get people involved in agriculture. That is part of our exit strategy. It is working in some areas, but progress is limited and not too encouraging.

CP–L8: You can grow anything here – unfortunately the Liberians see working in the fields as low-class jobs. If they produce anything, it is only for themselves.

CP–L11: They live day by day; a ‘civil war economy’. If you give them a 10-dollar bill, they have used it the next day.

CP–L12: People need a vision, but the people under me live day by day. People are in a survival mode... They own nothing, so they lose nothing. It can be very destabilising.

This survival mode also influenced the attitude within the LNP. During my fieldwork in Liberia, several Liberian police officers at police headquarters slept on duty, came late to class at the NPTA, and upon arrival, were very relaxed and seemingly unaware that the tardiness was an issue, even after it had been addressed by the international instructors:
PO–L3: The pre-phase of the course went wrong. The communication between the African instructors and me got cut up – I did not understand the concept of African time.

PO–L12: The LNP is also slow. They are not too fond of writing, and they conduct interrogation in front of a lot of people. Their willingness to work is low, and they would rather that UNPOL did it.

CP–L12: It gets very stagnant here. They do the same thing every day. They do pay eye and lip service, but when I leave, they do what they want.

This ‘living in the now’ and lack of engagement was wearisome for some interviewees, but others blamed the international presence. According to Wilén (2009), there is external pressure in UNMIL to deliver quick results, which in turn puts pressure on the international personnel to conduct much of the work themselves to produce good numbers. This behaviour, however, ‘undermine[s] the basis for local ownership’ (Wilén, 2009, p. 342):

PO–L3: You want to do everything, all at the same time. This is because it is an international arena. UNMIL is a blueprint of the Western system and other UN missions. However, Liberia has lost a whole adult generation who didn’t go to school and who grew up during a civil war. There is nothing to build on. There is a lot of inefficiency in the UN system, but it is not easy. We operate in two time eras. The Liberians do not have email, so naturally that results in a lot of paper.

CP–L4: Where the LNP are today is a result of UNPOL and the mission. Everything they have today is the result of our mission. They are very dependent on UNPOL, especially in terms of mobility. [An LNP of the future] will need a lot more than today. Not only the organization, but also in terms of capability and infrastructure. Time is very short; it is not achievable. It is doable, but not at the pace it is going today. It is a difficult task.

CP–L11: UNPOL is much about being a transport for the LNP. We get a lot of ‘can you drive us here or there’. Is that knowledge transfer or training? What happens when we are not here?

Because capacity building has been slow in Liberia (Center on International Cooperation, 2010) and the LNP depends too much on the UNPOL contingent (International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 111-112), many interviewees pointed to the significance of the LNP developing independence from UNPOL, a development intrinsically linked with local ownership and building capacity (Secretary-General, 2002,
In addition to capacity building, infrastructure, equipment, and logistics have also been cited by the Secretary-General (2009) as pre-requisites whose absence hampers development:

PO—L9: Their equipment is just horrible; they don’t even have paper. They don’t have a sheet of paper when they do interrogation. Things like this should have been in place after 5 years!

PO—L2: The UN has allocated money for cars, police stations, and such, but there is no one that can maintain this. They don’t have any equipment, chairs, or tables either. Money disappeared, and the local leader for the police academy bought a Hyundai Santa Fe, which he had at his disposal with a private chauffeur.

CP—11: They don’t even have the basic stuff – they lack cars, car repair shops, spare parts, petrol, driving licenses, etc. Also, they aren’t trained in driving at the police academy.

PO—L3: They had an office for computer crime, but they had no work there of course, since they didn’t have any computers or power. You also wonder why the UN trains them in finger-prints when they don’t have a national database.

PO—L13: In Liberia, they should have created a Law Enforcement Trust Fund to cover wages. Today, all donations go into the UNDP Donoraid with all the costs, which is challenging in terms of quantity versus quality. You should have an account earmarked for LNP. Today, for example, one country donates a bunch of cars, but engineering workshops or gasoline is not included.

The low monthly wage of USD 80 is also a severe impediment to developing a credible justice sector (International Crisis Group, 2011b), a factor consistently mentioned during the interviews:

PO—L9: What is silly is that the UN expends 700 million on UNMIL on a police force that is very weak. They are poorly paid, and they also don’t get paid when they are supposed to.

CP—L3: It is not strange that corruption exists – many of the instructors from the LNP hadn’t gotten paid for three months.

PO—L11: When you know how much money is being donated and see how they misuse the equipment and how things just disappear. It is an insatiable hole.

PO—L1: There is an insane waste of resources there. A large amount of money is used on nothing. The system is also corrupt, and a lot of money disappears. It is all political, and that is what steers it all. They have gotten a new dormitory at
the police academy. But they raze it. They tear down the shower and take it with them, and they take the toilet ring out into nature and use it there.

Not only has former LNP Director Marc Amblard admitted that corruption exists within the force (Sonpon, 2010), but many of the interviewees argued that such corruption is impossible to tackle as long as it takes place at all levels of government.

**Bureaucracy**

The slow progress and lack of results was a problem that the interviewees attributed not only to the LNP but also to the UNMIL system, and many pointed to the need to find a better way of organising the mission:

PO–L5: Based on how things were down there, I think the Norwegians did as well as they could. It is the UN system that fails. It is a highly bureaucratic system. There is a lot of paper work and a lot of fuss over trifles. There are a lot of positions that need to be defended. The system could have been more efficient and co-operative.

PO–L1: It is a challenge that the UN organization is hard put to deal with; it is grotty and takes so much time. Every month, I had to go through a jumble of a system. It is a misuse of resources and paper that you wouldn’t believe.

PO–L4: We were told to submit positive reports to the UN system, i.e. New York [UNDPKO]. We were ordered to do so. We sent the nicest reports. If we sent negative reports, we were asked, ‘Aren’t you doing your job?’

CP–L8: The bureaucracy in the UN is a result of politics. But also, if you go to the people working in the UN, they are still in the 1960s. They do not know anything new – they live in the old world. They should retire many of those who have been there for too long and get new people in. The UN changes slowly.

Several of the interviewees had issues with the motivation of some UNPOL staff arriving in Liberia and questioned the grounds on which they were picked for deployment:

PO–L4: To be commissioner must be difficult in such a diverse environment. Everyone has their own agenda, and that agenda is to make money. The Africans in the mission were only there to make money – they earn 20 times what they do back home. They were not there to help and lived as cheaply as possible and did as little as possible. It is exactly the same with the East
Europeans. The Americans who were there had paid people money back home to get deployment.

PO–L9: There is a lot to say about the UN system. It is important to get the right leaders, but this is politics and not about who is best for the job. A lot of persons are here for the money, and that is their only motivation. It can be frustrating. For those of us who want to do a good job, it can be difficult. The wage is not tied to performance, and it should have been.

CP–L11: You don’t have to be an Einstein to see that police officers [in the] UNPOL [contingent] don’t work to their maximum. Of course, this is not any different from home, but it is so palpable here. I have no sympathy for international police officers who don’t do their work properly and only complain about trivial stuff like the lack of computers and the laziness of LNP officers.

The level of effort within the contingent varied a great deal, and a few of the Norwegian police officers had even been asked by colleagues from other nations to slow down so as not to make them look bad.

**Gender**

UNMIL has had a special focus on gender since the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security, whose key focus is ‘the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts’ (para. 6.). Liberia has considerable problems with rape cases and has a high incidence of human trafficking (International Crisis Group, 2011b). In 2009, rape was one of the most reported crimes in the crime statistics (Schia & Carvalho, 2009, p. 5). One of the Norwegian government’s main priorities in Liberia, therefore – one repeatedly declared in annual white papers – has been police training with a special focus on gender-based violence. To that end, the Norwegian Government has donated USD 1.6 million to build police stations in Liberia that include designated Women and Children Protection Centres, and such centres have now been established in over 20 locations (Schia & Carvalho, 2009, p. 9).

PO–L6: In terms of what is achieved in Liberia, we have managed to rebuild the Liberian police, but the rest of the criminal justice chain is a disaster. Norway, as part of its follow-up to the Security Council Resolution 1325, has built 15 new police stations, which all have a Women and Children Protection Centre. This
has been reported as very successful, but UN missions tend to write what New York [the DPKO] wants to hear.

PO–L12: Female police officers are extremely important. Women in Liberia have been very strong. Not necessarily equals, but very strong. The females tend to be better leaders. During the war, the women were braver than the men. The women made their mark. We have had practical examples to prove that. They are quiet leaders, but aggressive when needed. The young men lean on them for maternal support.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the first UN Resolution to focus on the role and impact of women’s contributions, also focuses on the recruitment of women into peace operations and conflict prevention (Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2010). The interviewees, however, criticised the Norwegian Police Directorate for not focusing more on recruiting female police officers, especially to fill senior positions:

CP–L9: I think it is noteworthy that they send so few women to Liberia from Norway, because 1325 also includes that aspect! I know you have initiated the WCPCs in Liberia, but it is also important to deploy women to missions. You need to put the 1325 into context – translate what it means for [the deployed police officers’] work and what it means to the local police. If you problematise it before they leave for deployment, then they are much more prepared.

Deployed police officers assigned to work under 1325 found it challenging and stressing to work with cases that involved women and children, particularly in co-operation with African colleagues. Some of the female Norwegian officers were chosen to advise gender-based violence investigators purely because they were women and not because this area was their field of expertise:

PO–L1: You cannot deploy peacekeepers from, for example Zimbabwe, who do not consider it rape if the woman who has been assaulted has children.

PO–L8: We had a nasty case in which a little girl had come home late and was punished by her father who put chilli pepper in her vagina. One of the UNPOL investigators from Nigeria said, ‘Yes, but that is common – that is not a sexual offence’. And I thought, ‘and I have to work with her’. It is a challenge to work with a colleague who has a completely different view on human rights and how to do the job.

Claims about sexual abuse carried out by UN peacekeepers in Liberia have also emerged and can be traced back to 2001 (Ni Chonghaile, 2002). Several of the
interviewees had experienced the involvement of UNMIL or LNP colleagues in different forms of sexual offences or other criminal acts:

PO–L3: I had a boss in UNMIL that had prostitutes with him every night, and I didn’t like that at all.

PO–L8: There has been a problem with officers from the mission buying sex.

PO–L10: My work has been two-fold. I started working with non-compliance, which is the internal affairs unit. They investigate UNPOL down here. We investigated complaints against the police, especially the ERU [Emergency Response Unit], which is an American project within UNMIL. They had many shooting incidents that weren’t good; for example, of robbers during flight, but we have stopped that now. There has also been rape committed by high-ranking officers, corruption, etc. However, the response to this is inadequate. There are also problems internally in the UN with officers buying sex and committing assaults. But... this is an African mission, and it is up to the individual country to set the rules when these incidents occur. Norway sends their officers home if they find out. This is something that is outwardly flagged, but I would say the follow up is so-so.

PO–L12: Many of the LNP are involved in criminal acts. That goes for the FPUs [Formed Police Units] as well. We are talking about robbery, rape, and theft. The control mechanisms are low.

Although many interviewees saw the strong focus on woman and children within UNMIL as positive, others questioned its priority, suggesting that basic policing skills were more important and necessary before specialised skills were introduced:

PO–L11: I think it is great that there is so much focus on women and children here in UNPOL, but I find the intense focus a bit odd – this is something even we in Norway struggle with. That something as hard and difficult should get so much money and focus. My opinion is that they struggle so much with basic police work that maybe it would have been a good idea to raise that level before going ahead with specialised courses.

Similar views are expressed in Schia and Carvalho’s (2009) report, Nobody Gets Justice Here! Addressing Sexual and Gender-Based Violence and the Rule of Law in Liberia:

The issue of SGBV [sexual and gender-based violence] tends to be fragmented and the response to it addresses specific issues which often fit with the narrow agendas of international donors rather than taking into account the needs of the institutions of the rule of law as a whole... As long as no one in Liberia gets justice, women and children will not get it either – regardless of how many
police stations and courthouses built. The international response to SGBV in Liberia focuses too much on symptoms and too little on causes. (p. 1).

Overall experience with achievement

The training at Liberia’s NPTA was seen by many of the interviewees as one of the success stories from UNMIL. Four thousand new police recruits have been recruited, including 400 female LNP officers and an additional 500 police specialists. By June 2007, the LNP trainers at the NPTA had developed a new basic recruit training programme comprising six months of in-class academic training and six months of field training:

CP–L7: Training is the success of UNMIL in Liberia. The relationship here at NPTA between NPTA and the LNP has been exceptional compared to other team sites. When it comes to basic training, 80% of the training is conducted by the LNP. This is also the case within specialist training. That has been a positive development. In the beginning, the LNP wasn’t able to teach anything, and all our training was conducted under trees and tents. Now we have classrooms and dormitories. This is thanks to leader of the Norwegian NPTA and Norway. He has also asked for more donor aid from Norway, for fences and small dormitories. The challenges here are instructional skills. We should have something after basic instructional training – something continuous. A more general challenge is the salary package – it is not attractive at all. Also, the financial ability to sustain the training is difficult. My fear is that the efforts and work that have been put in by UNMIL will be lost in the future.

Overall, the vast majority of the interviewees felt that their presence and the work they had carried out were of importance. They all believed they had made a difference:

PO–L4: I must admit that there are not many results written down, [but] there was a lot of good done! They are so cruel to each other there – yes, they go to church on Sundays, but they do a lot of horrible things to each other. Our contribution is an important seed.

FM–L13: It feels important that we are here. The locals are very worried about the fact that the team site may be shut down after we leave.

FM–L9: It is good to work here, and the contact with the locals is good.

Most particularly, there was a sense of being successful in the build-up of training courses and facilities at the NPTA, together with a common consensus on having contributed to a change within the LNP. Nevertheless, most of the interviewees were
pessimistic about Liberia’s future, and few believed that either the LNP or Liberia as a country was viable on its own without the UNMIL presence:

CP–L2: The Liberians will start to fight the day the UN leaves. The root causes of the problems have not been properly addressed between the colonisers and the indigenous people.

PO–L11: The UN contributes to the peace here. If we hadn’t been here, there would have been trouble. There is an explosive atmosphere here. The UN contributes to stabilising the situation. However, the UN system is unbelievably inefficient. I have never done so little over such a long time...

Post-deployment experiences: reintegration

Both during deployment and after returning home, a vast majority of the interviewees encountered what they described as a ‘let-down’ at their work place in Norway in terms of interest from their superiors and managerial follow-up:

PO–L6: My strongest criticism is levelled towards how the Norwegian police officers are met upon return. They don’t get to share or use their knowledge – nobody is interested. It borders on shameful in terms of how most of them are treated. It is a paradox that within the military it is a plus to have international deployments. You do not get promotions there without having been deployed. Here it is looked upon as a holiday. We have a long way to go!

PO–L3: Homecoming? There was no reception. When I came back to work, I did not have a computer or an office, and I didn’t get them until some weeks had gone by. When I was deployed, I did not receive a single e-mail or anything. I had no contact with my employer when I was in Liberia.

PO–L2: During the deployment it was OK – the contact with the station chief was fine. When I returned, some of my colleagues asked me about the mission and some didn’t. What struck me was that none of the top management showed any interest. It was not interesting for the chief constable that I had been deployed – neither was there any interest in what I could now contribute. However, I predicted that [lack of interest] beforehand, and I was prepared. When you are in mission, the leader should call frequently and/or send emails and internal notifications.

PO–L12: There is one thing that provokes me in terms of my colleagues: 85% of them ask ‘how much money did you earn?’. A few of them are decent though. I didn’t go just for the money – I am adventurous. If I had been a leader, I would have been proud if any of my employees went on a mission. I would have had a conversation before they left and frequently kept in touch during their stay. I
would also have asked them to give a lecture for their work colleagues upon return.

According to Dupont and Tanner (2008), such organisational challenges in deploying and reintegrating civilian police peacekeepers have also been experienced in Canada. To address such problems, they suggest that

[the] deployment and reintegration stages of a police peacekeeping mission should be included in the assessment of its success, and that unless contributing police organisations find ways to improve the experiences of their returning officers, the sustainability of UN police peacekeeping deployments could become problematic. (p. 134).

Similar findings on managing the return of deployed police officers have also been reported for the UK, Austria, and Norway (Atraghji, 2006).

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the background and development of UNMIL, a UN multilateral mission to Liberia, including Norway’s involvement from the first deployments in 2004. In addition to addressing the Norwegian police officer’s motivation for seeking deployment and their pre-deployment preparation, it has recounted their various experiences on the UNMIL mission, ending with reintegration issues. A majority of the interviewees expressed a belief that UNMIL has been a vital contributor to stability within Liberia and that the police officers’ presence offered essential assistance to the LNP. They also see the development of the National Police Training Academy, a police recruit training programme, and Women and Children Protection Centres as successes. All the police officers felt their contribution was of significance but that the level of influence and positive impact depended on the type of work they were assigned. The fact that the UN was the only organisation conducting the IPRM made the UNMIL efforts more coordinated and holistic, which averted problems of fragmentation and duplication.

Nevertheless, in the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, it is argued that ‘enormous obstacles remain’ in terms of security and justice sector development in
Liberia (Center for International Cooperation, 2011), a claim that the findings from this case study support. The interviewee responses also suggest various explanations as to why progress has been slow, pointing to the lack of planning and framework, in particular, as a serious impediment. The interviewees also blamed the lack of knowledge transfer upon arrival, which consequently led to slow progress, and the misuse of expertise involved in randomly placing police officers without any consideration for their prior knowledge. Because UNMIL was a multilateral mission, challenges like bureaucracy and different backgrounds, cultures, and views on human rights and ethics within the UNPOL contingent made it difficult to create a cohesive foundation for co-operation, and differences in leadership style and quality were seen as a further hindrance to success. Many respondents pinpointed the need for the Norwegian Police Directorate to improve the preparation for missions in terms of more extensive mission-specific courses. Ideally, these courses should include a ‘translation of mandates’ into practice; for example, by explaining what they mean for the individual police officer, modeling the framework and plan for Norway’s involvement in UN IPRMs, and arranging a more positive return experience for deployed police officers.

For further comparison, the next chapter will focus on the European Union’s Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL–A), a regional mission to a country whose history of civil war is similar in some ways to that of Liberia. In Afghanistan, however, the conflict is on-going and the conflict level far higher, and the mission involves innumerable actors, which makes it the most complex IPRM to date.
Chapter 7 – Case Study Afghanistan

Having examined a *bilateral* police reform project in Serbia (Chapter 5) and a *multilateral* peacekeeping mission in Liberia (Chapter 6), this analysis now explores an **EU regional** contribution to an IPRM, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL–A). Although the primary focus of this case study is the Norwegian police officers’ experiences of being deployed to a regional mission, Afghanistan represents a particularly complex case: simultaneous to its deployment to EUPOL–A, Norway deployed additional police officers to its own bilateral project in Afghanistan (NORAF) and one police officer to UNAMA, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. Hence, many of the police officers interviewed had experiences from both EUPOL–A and NORAF, a cross-over that necessitated inclusion of experiences from both missions. This chapter, therefore, first provides the background for both NORAF and EUPOL–A and then concentrates on the Norwegian police officers’ deployment experiences on the most complex and dangerous IPRM to date.

Again, the findings are based primarily on focused interviews with 15 practitioners, supplemented by interview with one co-operating partner (n=1), conducted mostly during 2010 and secondary data from official reports and academic articles. As in the previous two cases, the police officers interviewed are designated by the PO code followed by A for Afghanistan and a random number, while co-operating partners from other organisations – several of whom have been deployed to Afghanistan and/or work in mission planning – are designated by CP–A, followed by a random number. Senior officials are coded with an E followed by a random number. All interview responses with Norwegian personnel have been translated from Norwegian to English by the author.

**Background**

Afghanistan means ‘Land of the Afghans’, another name for the tribal Pashtuns who inhabit that region. Because of its geo-strategic position in Central Asia, untapped mineral sources, and special demographics, Afghanistan has been thrust into turmoil for centuries. In the 1800s, Russia, Iran, and Great Britain fought over the country, and
Great Britain attempted several unsuccessful invasions (Kunnskapsforlaget, 2008). Afghanistan became an independent state in 1919 and remained a monarchy until 1973 when it became a republic. The country developed a close relationship with Germany in the 1920s, and in the 1960s and 1970s, under the reign of the former King Mohammed Zahir Shah, Germany and Afghanistan had especially strong bilateral ties (Hyman, 2002, p. 305). As a result, the national civilian police force of that era, having been trained by both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, was based on a European policing model (Crawford, 2008; Fetherston, 2000; Murray, 2007). Afghanistan also had a close relationship with the Soviet Union, which took a ‘tacit monopoly in the development of Afghanistan’s rich natural gas and other mineral resources’ (Hyman, 2002, p. 306). In 1979, however, a coup led to the Soviet invasion and resulted in the police becoming much more militarised over the following decade. Because Afghanistan then became a communist state under the Soviet Union, the coup also led to a re-establishment of the police co-operation with East Germany (Crawford, 2008). Nevertheless, conflict between the strong KGB-trained State Information Service (KhAD) and the Ministry of the Interior led to a power struggle and to several armed encounters between the ministry’s infantry force and KhAD’s army division (Murray, 2007, pp. 109-110). These encounters were the beginning of the breakdown of the police as a civil institution (ibid.). In 1989, with extensive assistance from America, the resistance group, the Mujahideen, successfully forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan (Crile, 2003); however, fighting continued between rival local guerrilla factions from various tribes, leaving the country war-torn and plagued by massive breaches of human rights (Amnesty-International, 2003). Although efforts were made to set up a new police service after the war with the Soviet Union, the civil war put a stop to the reform, leaving Afghanistan without a civilian police service until a new reconstruction period began in 2002 (Murray, 2007).

In 1996, the fundamentalist Taliban conquered most of Afghanistan, strictly enforcing Sharia law over the next 5 years and driving inhabitants to live in constant fear of severe breaches of human rights, including stoning or decapitation, imprisonment without trial, and gender-based violence (Amnesty-International, 2003). The 9/11 attacks led to a U.S.-led military operation that ousted the Taliban regime in the fall of
2001, and the UN, together with representatives from Afghanistan and the Great Powers (America, the UK, Germany, Japan, and Italy), consequently convened a meeting in December 2001 in Bonn in Germany where they signed the *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions* (Miller & Perito, 2004). This so-called Bonn Agreement was the foundation for creating an interim Afghan state and for inaugurating Hamid Karzai as Interim President. Using the 1964 Constitution as its foundation, the Bonn delegates established an interim system of law and governance, presented a plan for the creation of a new government and a new constitution, and approved the deployment of an international military force to ensure security in Kabul (ibid.). This international military body, named the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (Hurrel, 2002), came under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) and was delegated to NATO (i.e. a Chapter VII operation). ISAF sent its first troops to Kabul in January 2002 and by the summer of 2002 had deployed 5,000 troops from 19 countries to Afghanistan (Høgseth, 2008).

The Bonn Agreement divided the security reform in Afghanistan into five functions, each of which had its lead nation: Germany took responsibility for the Afghan National Police (ANP); America, for the Afghan National Army (ANA); Japan, for disarmament; the UK, for counter-narcotics; and Italy, for the legal sector. This arrangement, however, was far from successful; it resulted in a fragmented approach with little coordination between the different sections, leading to considerable overlap and duplication of work (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 10). Germany, whose task it was to reform the ANP, focused primarily on the basic training of police officers at a lower level, thereby neglecting middle and higher ranking officers. America, which felt that the training was progressing too slowly, became increasingly more involved, with training supplied mainly by DynCorp, a private contractor engaged by America Department of Defense (ibid., p. 11). DynCorp, however, engaged retired American police officers to train the ANP (Bobbitt, 2008), a programme that has received severe criticism for being opportunistic and poorly managed (Hills, 2008).
The worsened security situation in Afghanistan and the poor state of the police led the Pentagon to involve U.S. Army in civil affairs in the spring of 2003, with the initiation of a programme to deploy ‘provincial reconstruction teams’ (PRTs) near major cities throughout Afghanistan. These PRTs were supposed to offer assistance in rebuilding local infrastructure and providing local safety but not carry out any police functions (Miller & Perito, 2004). These teams, under the NATO command authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), 1413 (2002), and 1444 (2002), represent the international community’s attempt to stabilise areas outside of Kabul: EUPOL–A, for example, relies on the PRTs to guarantee protection. Questions have been raised, however, about their effectiveness (Dempsey, 2007), especially given that different PRTs, supposedly customised to the requirements of the various areas, vary a great deal in structure, size, and focus:

PO–A6: Each of the 32 districts has a PRT team – they are there to build up security, both police and military. They have one police service in Afghan, so Kabul should deliver some guidelines – but this is not being done today. Each region is living in their own world with their own training programme. There is also the warlord issue — for example, the Herat district close to Iran – one of the richest provinces of the Afghan. The warlord refuses to pay taxes to Kabul – he retains all revenue from customs, etc. – and the police are bought and paid for. It is no wonder that the police would rather work there because they get paid very well.

Many critics claim that the composition of PRTs has led to a ‘little Europe’ within Afghanistan, with different countries having different emphases and prioritisation. For example, some nations, like Germany, have a sharp division between the military and civilians, whereas others, like the UK, have a close relationship between the military and civilians (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005). This difference has led to complications of coordination, especially for Germany, which has subsequently assumed various levels of responsibility (Greener, 2009).

Needs analysis: NORAF and EUPOL–A

The backdrop for deploying Norwegian police officers to Afghanistan was Norway’s reluctance to participate in the Iraq conflict, leading the U.S to urge the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (MFA) to contribute police personnel to Afghanistan (MFA official,
personal communication, 27 February 2007). Norway then offered to send police
advisors to Afghanistan, and a pilot project was initiated in the spring of 2003 (UD

PO–A6: We received a mandate from the Ministry of Justice and the Foreign
Ministry to develop an instructor pool of 10 people to shorter missions of up to
3 months. That’s how Afghanistan came into the picture. In 2003, the focus was
on gender plus human rights plus management training. At that time, there
were only 16 women in the whole of the Afghan police. We brought in
instructors and conducted training with the chosen subjects. The pilot project
was tested for 3 months, and then we brought back our experiences. It was
consequently decided by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to create a mission in Afghanistan – a bilateral mission.

Based on the experiences from the pilot project, an agreement (NORAF) was drawn up
between the Norwegian Government and the Afghan Interim Government to
contribute to rebuilding the Afghan National Police (ANP) with assistance from the
Norwegian Police. Norway then sent five police advisors to the Kabul Police Academy to
train the Afghan police in human rights and ethics, and gender issues. These topics
were chosen both on the basis of political priorities within Norway’s foreign policy and
out of an idealistic notion that these courses could contribute to a change of attitude
within the ANP. Norway’s bilateral engagement through NORAF, however, effectively
meant an addition to the multitude of countries and organisations that run
programmes in Afghanistan.

The EU became actively involved in the Afghan conflict on 16 November 2005 with the
Council of the European Union’s EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration – Committing to a
New EU-Afghan Partnership, which promised ‘to secure a stable, free, prosperous and
democratic Afghanistan’ (Guille, 2010). Signed on 31 January 2006 in London, the
Afghanistan Compact declared that Afghanistan, together with the international
community, should work towards creating an Afghan state that had sustainable
economic and social development while prioritising good governance and human rights
(ibid.). In an October 2006 report to the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC),
the Joint EU Assessment Mission advised the achievement of strategic influence
through a police mission to Afghanistan (EU Council of the European Union, 2007). In
its Conclusions, the Council endorsed the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for an EU
Police Mission to Afghanistan to develop an Afghan police force founded on local ownership and respect for human rights and within the framework of the rule of law (CEU, 2007). UN Security Council Resolution 1746 (which extended the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) embraced the EU’s decision to launch a police mission, and on 16 May 2007, the Afghan Government invited the EU to proceed with an EU Police Mission to Afghanistan or EUPOL–A (CEU, 2007) and thus take over Germany’s role as key partner on police reform (International Crisis Group, 2007). The political value of this proposed mission for the EU internationally was considerable, so despite several critical voices (see for example Gya, 2007), the mission was approved.

Motivation for deployment

By 2007, Norway had 9 police officers deployed in Afghanistan through NORAF, but was being asked to deploy another 9 police officers to EUPOL–A. Not wanting to surrender the NORAF project, in 2008, Norway had to double its overall Afghan contingent from 9 to 18 in order to fulfil that request and keep the bilateral NORAF project going. The police officers that accepted a deployment to Afghanistan all had similar motivations for applying:

PO–A8: My motivation for the deployment was challenge. I wanted to do something different and to widen my horizons. It was never about excitement or money! I had too much excitement in Croatia. I was totally blank when I went there in 1992. Too many do it because of the money, and stay too long because of it.

PO–A4: I wanted to go to Namibia in 1989, but the kids were too young. My motivation was excitement, adventure, passion, and to experience something new – get some air under my wings. The salary was sent to those at home – I wanted [my wife] to be free to choose to pay for extra help if she needed it – make her every day as easy as possible when I was away.

PO–A7: My motivation was that I got bitten by the bug. I also felt I could contribute something. I knew that I was coming to a Muslim country – it was the same when I was deployed to TIPH [Temporary International Presence in Hebron]. Being a woman my age helped – they are more focused on age there; they have a lot more respect for the elderly. That was evident in Hebron. New cultures are exciting, and money was no motivation.
PO–A15: I had one unusual goal – I had just broken up with my girlfriend, so I wanted to travel as much as I could. On every leave, I would travel somewhere around the world. I was also a bit fed up with my work back home – the work pressure.

Although some interviewees were open about money being a motivation, most listed other factors as more important. The majority emphasised ‘experiencing another culture’ and ‘working in an international environment’ as the principal reasons for going.

**Preparation process**

After being vetted through security clearance and an interview, all police officers first underwent the UN police officer course (UNPOC) in Stavern, Norway, before being asked by the Police Directorate to accept deployment to Afghanistan (which they were free to decline). Most interviewees looked upon UNPOC as good, useful, and relevant, although some thought it was too easy and rather one-dimensional:

PO–A5: I had the UNPOC course in 2002. We learned a lot about laws, regulations, human rights, and ethics, and there were a lot of exercises. It did not give me so very much. There were many foreigners there, so the course was held in English.

PO–A15: I had the UNPOC course in 2008. I expected more practical stuff. There was a lot of classroom during those two weeks, and a lot about the UN which wasn’t relevant for us going to Afghanistan. The physical test was a farce. There were people on the course who walked through the trail and who was still sent out. But it was a comfortable course – cosy.

In contrast to UNPOC, the subsequent mission-specific course that prepared the police officers for the mission to Afghanistan was perceived by the majority as substandard:

PO–A5: The mission-specific course for Afghanistan consisted of a lot of shooting and driving lessons. We had some from the armed forces who briefed us. I felt the course should have presented a more realistic picture of how dangerous it is down there with the road bombs and body bombs. It is a real danger, with kidnappings, etc. Still, there are police officers being deployed without once being approved for carrying weapons and some were physically unfit.
PO–A2: The Afghan [mission-specific] course was 4–5 days and [full of] good stories. It was not satisfactory. It should have prepared you for what lays ahead, but it is not good enough! You need more knowledge on what you are about to face; the area, the context, the security situation, etc. The military has 6 months of preparation. We on the other hand get down there, and we don’t have a clue on how the PRT works.

PO–A15: The mission-specific course was a 5-day course. There were some lectures that were good – for example, one on culture – and some lectures from the military that were relevant. There was also quite a bit of shooting practice. However, there were course participants who didn’t have operational approval or were not certified to use a pistol – unbelievable! That should have been a minimum requirement for applying for international deployment. There is an enormous gap in terms of operational skills on the course – some were originally investigators and some were operational experts. So it is a bit odd that the training is so basic and short. I thought the course should be further developed, but we weren’t heard. My opinion is that the mission-specific courses should have been a lot more on tactical training – for example, in terms of hijacking, routines in term of radio communications, and other practical stuff. We were also given information on the course that was abominable compared to the actual facts; for example, in terms of insurance. We should also have been certified for driving vehicles before we went down there.

PO–A14: In regards to the length of the [mission-specific] course, I would like to compare it to the military that has a minimum of 2 months and up to 6 months of preparation. A one-week course is way too short. We work with the military and share responsibilities down there. Hence, we should have had some weeks with the military in advance.

Most of the interviewees also felt a lack of contextual understanding during the mission-specific course, and complained of not receiving a proper introduction to the mandates and agreements that cover EUPOL–A and NORAF. None saw any strategies or plans either before or during deployment:

PO–A5: What was missing was a plan for the six months I was there. There were no overall goals, which is strange. Considering how much effort they put into this. It is the Foreign Ministry that pays, so maybe that is why. The mission in Afghanistan is very politically controlled. Norway has no power down there – it is the major nations that determine everything.

PO–A10: I saw no strategy or action plans before we left. None! I was only informed that I was going to Meymaneh. I would have liked to have had a description of some features and goals. POD [the Norwegian Police Directorate] should be able to create proper descriptions of functions to others.

PO–A11: I saw no strategy plans or goals for the job. I felt that was a drawback.
PO–A12: There were no plans or goals for the mission in Afghanistan.

All the interviewees were critical of the lack of strategy plans and clear goals, as well as the absence of task descriptions for the posts to which they were assigned. For some, this lack of information resulted in insecurity and uncertainty about what they could expect during deployment.

Induction phase: knowledge transfer

Arriving in Afghanistan was overwhelming for some of the deployed officers, who experienced serious confusion. Many arrived to find that little had been prepared for their arrival:

PO–12: We had to produce everything ourselves. I was told to get out there and find myself a job! It had not been taken care of before I came down – and of course it should have been.

PO–A2: The week-long induction course in Kabul is just basic with some driving lessons, and in Meymaneh we got nothing. The people that were supposed to receive us were sick, and it was a turnaround in the PRT, so it was just bullshit altogether. The same happened in December when new people arrived. You haven’t got a chance to prepare yourself once you are down there, so you need to be approved for vehicles and weapons before take-off. You also need to learn how the Afghan Security Forces work.

Most particularly, although all the officers initially received a general induction course, there was nobody there to introduce them to the work assignments they were about to commence:

PO–A4: There was no overlap period with those who were going home; they returned on the plane we came down on. A one-week overlap with the ones going home is completely necessary. In my official capacity, I met people who were deadly offended that I hadn't made contact – but I didn’t know who they were – nobody had introduced me or informed me! There was no knowledge transfer – no folder with things that were important to know. This led to several set-backs. A one-week overlap for team leaders is a drop in the ocean in terms of costs. We managed it with the guy that came after me – he came a month before I left.
PO–A5: What we can do better is in terms of overlap, since most of us begin from scratch. The ideal would have been a one-week overlap – that is, being introduced to your contact person at the police stations. The first few months we get to do very little. We had to familiarise ourselves with the system and persons from scratch. If the authorities really want to do something, then they should organise proper overlapping.

PO–A7: There was no overlap in EUPOL. It would have been a good idea. To personally introduce a colleague to your Afghan colleagues – to hand over information and everything that has been worked on. You can continue the work instead of starting from scratch. Bringing up confidence right away is important.

This lack of knowledge transfer and the absence of an overlap period in which to ‘learn the ropes’ not only caused much frustration, for some, it led to a great deal of ‘down time’:

PO–A2: The first few weeks in Meymaneh, we went around and trampled. One was sick and one was busy. Those who had gone home had only left a little folder with some information and instructions. Things haven't moved on. Things are only established but nothing evolves. To me it seems that there is no thought behind it.

PO–A12: When I arrived, there were two police officers who had been there for 6 months. They had gone for 6 months without anything to do!

Work tasks

For many of the Norwegian police officers, the work tasks revolved around training. There were a variety of training programmes, ranging from basic police recruitment training at the Kabul Police Academy to *ad hoc* shooting courses out in the districts:

PO–A4: I talked to the [elite] Telemark Battalion, who told us about local Afghan police officers who stood by the ring road outside Gormach without ammunition just waiting to die. We were asked if we could train them; we then did a week out in Gormach on basic police training. That's when I realised how bad it was! During shooting practice, they didn't once aim at the asset. They also had no training ammunition. We did apply for it, but we didn’t get it because apparently it was against some convention. At least we got them trained so that they hit half of the figure.

Some of the interviewees were assigned to advise local police leaders, something that several, being young and without any management experience in Norway, found
challenging and a bit odd.

PO—A11: The work tasks varied. There were a lot of meetings with the general. I was the contact person for co-operation. I also did some courses – shooting and first aid. We did feel that we introduced new knowledge to the police down there, but you see, they have other concerns...

Some of the EUPOL–A police officers were assigned to assist the Afghan Border Police (ABP); others conducted training courses and were involved in the Ring of Steel project, security check points around Kabul and Meymaneh city:

PO–A7: EUPOL started in 2007. It had only been around for 14 months when I came. Felt chaos to begin with! What was I specifically to do?? There were some ad hoc decisions – some sudden decisions that were made. When I was assigned to the border police at the airport, we were at the airport every day and had meetings, and specific tasks were set in stone. When I was reassigned to the Kabul City police, my Danish colleagues and I set up a plan for how we should go about things, and we planned them together with the National Monitoring Team - an Afghan team that dealt with wages and localities for police personnel.

PO–A15: I am so happy that I came to EUPOL. I came to the training part – Kabul City Police Project Team, KCPPT, – and I got the responsibility for that. EUPOL had two departments in Kabul; an HQ where people weren’t happy because they sat inside all day working with strategy plans; and one camp which was operative; it was all about training. I was assigned there. It was perfect for me – a good combination of work assignments. I was involved in the Ring of Steel plus courses and training for the ANP in traffic, etc. At least we got to do something concrete, and we saw results. I knew that when I had done a course for 25 people, I had achieved something. If I had a week off, I would work with the Ring of Steel and a helicopter project. There were also many co-operation meetings where you did some networking. I got to be the coordinator for the EUPOL courses – it was me who initiated the courses, so it was only natural. I had an exposed job: I went out to the Ring of Steel posts, and I had to get out of the car and talk to the ANP – that was quite dangerous. I was particularly worried about men in Burka, posing as women. There was a distinct difference between EUPOL and NORAF – I thought without a doubt it was best in EUPOL.

Some interviewees criticised their mission placement in relation to their specific expertise. On arrival in Afghanistan, they had assumed they would be working within their area of competence or on a project they had specifically requested and/or been promised before deployment:
PO–A11: Before I left, I wanted to work with the Afghan Border Police, but when I got down there I got another job. Ironically, the one who got the position that I wanted in the ABP was not pleased; he wanted the job I got! The position I got was mentoring and training. But it was a hotchpotch of projects down there! Some were here and some where there, and there were no overall plans for the projects. The project in Meymaneh was too dependent on individuals. No holistic plans for what you were supposed to do within the different themes.

This random placement of personnel resulted from the absence of preparation and a structural framework, as well as poor leadership:

PO–A3: NORAF had no superior leadership. A consequence of that was that it ended up with shooting courses, field training courses etc., without any specific direction.

PO–A15: There was no internal control of us who worked at EUPOL. If I had been a leader there, I would have made some demands in terms of what should have been done. My leader was terrified of friction.

Another problem seen as partially a leadership issue was that most work tasks were initiated by the interviewees themselves, something that facilitated individualism:

PO–A1: I feel we run the project as we want to in Afghanistan. The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have great faith in us, and they therefore give us a lot of freedom. In terms of the Afghanistan project, it has lived its own life down there for a long time. It is very dependent on individuals.

PO–A3: The system is very dependent on individuals!

PO–A5: The six months in Meymaneh were very good. That had to do with the leader there at the time. But it so dependent on individuals and personalities! It all depends on who is the head.

Senior officials for their part argue that recruiting capable leaders to Afghanistan has proven challenging because of the extreme risks and the amount of responsibility on the individual contingent commander. Leaders also have to relate to their own country’s priorities, something that led to frustration among the interviewees, who often received contradictory messages:

PO–A2: In EUPOL, there are some strong personalities who are passionate about projects they want se see through. The poor Afghan police were getting projects shovelled on to them – there is no coordination.
Coordination

According to Hartz (2009), most countries originally planned to phase all their bilateral police projects into EUPOL–A; however, most, like Germany and Norway, ended up continuing their police projects outside the EUPOL–A umbrella and kept on with their bilateral activities because of political pressure. Many had deployed their police officers to the American ‘Focused District Development’ (FDD) police training programme, an 8-week police training programme for the ANP developed and conducted by the U.S military.

PO–A1: Take the Americans; they belch forth heaps of dollars. They go in with quantity and not so much quality. They donate lots of equipment without giving anyone training in how to use it. The biggest challenge is to coordinate this effort. The Afghans have started to complain; they get so confused. EUPOL’s intention has been to coordinate the contributions from Europe and be a counterweight to the USA.

Not only is there an unclear state of communication between the international actors in Afghanistan (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009), but despite the 2006 establishment of an International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) to coordinate all police programmes in the country, the reality is that the U.S runs over 90% of the police reform projects, none of them coordinated by the IPCB (Hartz, 2009):

PO–A6: The main problem on the police side down there is that no one is coordinating it — you have UN + EUPOL + all the bilateral projects with all their agendas. It is the United Nations that has the mandate through [its Security Council], but it has no influence over the other nations.

PO–A11: There was a lot of insecurity around EUPOL and FDD. Even if [the leader] had control, there was a huge lack of coordination around aid. One hand did not know what the other was doing.

Up until now, the different countries from the international community have contributed as they have seen fit without any consideration for actual necessity, and the Afghan government has no overview of all the different programmes currently being run around the country.
Internal and external challenges

The number of bilateral programmes conducted outside EUPOL–A was often defended on the grounds of the lack of efficiency within EUPOL–A, and many interviewees struggled with the internal work culture:

PO–A9: The EU said that they would take responsibility for the CID [Criminal Investigation Department] in Kabul. But they had no people — and the people who were there came and went all the time. My American counterpart and I were there the whole day. The EUPOL colleagues were there just shortly before lunch, and then they left. There is something wrong with the system; all too few and too much to do. The EUPOL people came in at 9:10 AM and left at lunchtime. They went around and talked to people for a few hours, and then they disappeared... They have a huge HQ where they sit and move papers – it is filled with project teams and management. They weren't there! We were out there all day. The EUPOL system is very bureaucratic. It is easy for something to slip by. There is something wrong with the system. It is the reason they don't get applicants. All countries have their own projects, which is much better.

Some interviewees blamed the lack of efficiency in EUPOL–A on the volatile situation in Afghanistan. Most particularly, EUPOL had received a mandate that did not account for a worsened security situation and did not provide enough resources, either in terms of equipment or personnel (Solberg, 2011, pp. 51-53). Consequently, an overwhelming majority of the interviewees were critical of EUPOL’s handling of the security situation:

PO–A2: The security within EUPOL the first 6 months was completely rigid. Completely closed! It made it impossible to do the job. Everything had to be approved by EUPOL. There was no communication between EUPOL in Kabul and Meymaneh. It was very frustrating.

PO–A9: Those who were in the EUPOL system were subject to a completely different security regime. They had to abide by a rigid security system.

PO–A10: We have to ask if we must follow EUPOL – what is the utility value? Norway should perhaps only work bilaterally. Because of EUPOL’s security practices, we had to keep the bilateral going to get us out to the rural areas. Why do they spend so much time on security? We are in Afghanistan – we are at war. We must do our job.

Another internal issue within EUPOL–A to which interviewees alluded repeatedly was the bureaucracy, which most described as ‘excessive’:...
PO–A4: EUPOL being bureaucratic is the understatement of the year! At the end, you had to send daily reports about what you had done, and what you should do. It took up tremendous resources.

POA–10: EUPOL has 370 employees in total – but when two-thirds are sitting in the EUPOL headquarters, one must ask, ‘What can they achieve?’. Even when they see that they cannot manage to carry out even a minimum, they do not change. The number of [daily] reports in the EUPOL system is totally extreme. When you see how much time is being used on writing reports, you understand that something is wrong somewhere.

PO–A14: My first impression of EUPOL was that it was bureaucratic and impulsive. What is it EUPOL wants and what is its goal? A typical thing was that they would initiate projects and then abandon them a month later. Another thing was that we had to report weekly and monthly and participate at seminars and conferences that had little to do with our district. Also, a lot of post came from Kabul with a lot of questions we had to answer. All of this stole a lot of time.

Many of the interviewees also emphasised that it was not only the bureaucracy that hindered faster development but EU’s flawed attempts to micro-manage from Brussels:

E-29: The detail-oriented management can be attributed to thin structures within CIVCOM and the CCP in Brussels and little knowledge and practical experience. They are anxious for control and put forth questions all the time. Ideally, it should be enough with report every 14 days.

Many felt Brussels was on them all the time and constantly asking for results. This form of control led to a disproportionate amount of time being spent on reports, time they could have used on training and developing the ANP.

Nevertheless, not all of the hindrances faced by the interviewees in their attempts to develop the ANP were connected to internal issues within the IPRM. One external issue was the difficulty of mixing modern Western perceptions of policing with traditional Afghan culture. Afghanistan has never had a central government, and most of the country is made up of small societies with their own laws and traditions:

PO–A7: We went a 100 years back in time when we travelled there.

PO–A8: Building a state in Afghanistan? There has never been a state there – it has always been a federation.
PO–A2: It is necessary to take into account the Afghans and their culture. We cannot change it in the short time we’re there. Villagers go to the Taliban to get them to sort out the conflicts instead of going to the police. We need to arrive at a police force that is working based on their own traditions.

Many of the interviewees found the Afghan views on time management troublesome; for example, Afghan colleagues’ cultural resistance to planning ahead made setting up meetings and facilitating courses extremely problematic:

PO–A10: It was a nightmare trying to get to an agreement – it was Inshallah, which means tomorrow. Also, the time concept in Afghanistan – it is 1388 [which became 1389 in March 2010]. Clothing, markets, huts made of dirt. They live from sunrise to sunset. To have a clear time schedule agreed with an Afghan is impossible. They don’t manage more than a few days ahead. We can agree on meetings and courses, but if we don’t remind them a couple of days in advance they forget the agreement. A community that has been at war for 30 years does not plan longer than a day ahead. They have lots of mobile phones – and that’s what the boss had them use when they wanted to communicate with us.

Another factor that the interviewees found challenging, was the ANP’s work conditions. Tonita Murray (2007), in her article ‘Police-Building in Afghanistan’, emphasises the huge challenge of rebuilding a police service of 50-70,000 police officers when almost all are untrained, unequipped, and illiterate, and morale is low. The interviewees echoed this concern:

PO–A13: In Afghanistan, there are 82,000 police officers. Half of these were on drugs. Not all of them could read and write. The police lost more men than the army, and I think maybe that is why they were on drugs – because of the tough environment.

For the interviewees, this tough environment for the ANP and the ABP proved arduous, and this subject sometimes triggered strong emotions during the interviews:

PO–A3: You have Maslow’s hierarchy of needs; meaning to get something done, certain criteria must be met. We quickly observed that they needed basic courses to survive. We informed the leadership in the district that the ABP lacked water, food, shelter, and diesel, and we got guarantees that [they] had got it – but when we checked they hadn’t....

PO–A11: They lacked shoes, food, uniforms, and fuel. We felt we were there to take care of their primary needs more than anything else. I felt they weren’t susceptible to learning. Other things should have been covered first – basic
needs. It sometimes happened that we arrived at a police station where they had no shoes...

PO–A14: The border police definitely had the worst conditions, absolutely miserable! They had little water and food, and they were also robbed by criminal gangs. When we saw the conditions, it felt meaningless to teach them about policing. What was useful for them was weapons training and security. We organised projects where we got to secure the posts, and we taught them about hygiene, water supply, and medical service, especially in terms of injuries connected to car crashes or overturns. The logistics within the border police is something that functions badly. They are supposed to get water, food, and fuel transported to them, but it is not regular or predictable. There were also taking things by the load through corruption – we know that 100%. There was massive corruption down there.

Within the Afghan police, there were also problems related to ethnicity, no apparent chain of command, and poor central control, which effectively led to severe breaches of the ethical and legal framework (Murray, 2007, pp. 109-110), including corruption:

PO–A1: Corruption is a big problem within the Afghan police. It is corrupt all the way through the system... and money talks. It is a huge challenge when you are trying to build a civilian, democratic police system.

PO–A7: There was lot of corruption there – protection money was given to the police, which subsequently led to people having no confidence in the police. However, it’s very difficult for them — they have such poor wages. Some of them conducted traffic controls during the night in roundabouts to get some extra money. The top police commanders take everything. It was said when I was there that some of the police chiefs were dollar millionaires.

PO–A5: You see a lot of police, especially in Kabul, who run traffic controls — much of it is targeted against the Taliban and terrorism. Around 60% of the police down there are illiterate. Corrupt as hell! The check posts were pure revenue sources.

All the interviewees had witnessed corruption on one level or another. They also commented on a related issue: the apparent waste of resources that occurred during their stay:

PO–A15: Is there a lot of waste down there? YES!! I experienced that a lot of ammunition, for example, just disappeared. In regards to donations, I think it is a purely political reason why they let the Afghans control it themselves. We gave them flashlight, search mirrors – they always came back for more – the equipment just disappeared. No one is held accountable – there is no control.
Nor was waste the only issue: much of the equipment donated failed to match the needs of the local conditions, so all the interviewees advocated for better needs analysis and quality assurance from the donating organisations and countries:

PO–A4: We got sent PCs and communication systems, which were completely useless down there. God help me, there was so much waste down there. For example, there was a pool of cars where millions of dollars had been spent on so much electronic equipment that the cars were out of service for months. It was top gear, but the software led to problems — they had to get the new stuff from NATO, which is an organisation that is not working well with EUPOL... What works best in this country are simple, ordinary cars — with manual gears, but no one took into account the local conditions. There were also constant changes — new forms — it was a cash drain. However, ironically, EUPOL has no money for projects; they have to beg for it through, for example, the Germans, who spent a lot of money on projects.

PO–A9: The Germans had taken it upon themselves to coordinate, but they were more occupied with their own success and less occupied with what the Afghans needed.

PO–A10: Think about how much money Norway is donating to the civilian agencies without knowing what the money is being used for! I got a shock when I heard the size of the sums being spent — 25 million [Norwegian] kroner was donated to security projects in Faryab Province. It was also shocking to learn how freely they allocate the funds.

Police versus military

The picture has been further complicated by the lack of a clear distinction between the roles of the military and the police in Afghanistan (Hartz, 2009; Murray, 2007). The interviewees also referred to the ambiguity inherent in the blurring of these roles, which added another complexity to their stay:

PO–A11: We lived in a military camp and had to follow their rules. We were dependent on good will from the military. There were some co-operation issues between the police and the military; for example, around the exchange of intelligence. The military withheld information but expected the police to share everything.

PO–A9: We had a civilian advisor in the camp who started a well-drilling project in Faryab Province. He administered a huge budget, but unfortunately he was terrified of being identified with the military, so a lot of money went instead to
NGOs. That was a shame because the military, with their knowledge, could have done it so much more cheaply and – more important – gotten some good will from the local community. The military were not supposed to help, but they did it anyway. Among other things, they collected money for an orphanage.

PO–A10: In the Police Mentoring Teams, there are civilian police called police advisors and military personnel called mentors. But how far can police advisors travel into rural areas together with the military? And why are we not protected by the Geneva Accords? We have only a departmental agreement from 2003. We should have been combatants, whatever that provides us in terms of advantages and limitations.

The ANP has to a large extent been trained by the Americans as a paramilitary force to support counter-insurgency operations rather than as a police service focused on the rule of law and community safety. Hence, although some interviewees were positive about the American FDD training programme, believing that EUPOL–A could not possible handle such a vast task, others were more sceptical, agreeing with Miakhel (2010) that such a programme, although perhaps efficient in terms of counter-insurgency objectives, will not be successful in establishing community-level security and gaining public trust (p. 3):

PO–A10: The military is now supervising and mentoring ANP together with the police and what does that do to ANP? When the military gets involved without the proper skills to train civilian police – what happens then?

Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Kai Eide, in an interview upon his return from Afghanistan to Norway, stated that there are also other sides to military versus civilian development, with short-term military goals being prioritised over long-term civilian objectives:

The civilian contribution has been neglected. There has been too much focus on the military…. I was shocked when I saw how short sighted and incoherent was. Why was it like that? Probably because all the countries came in with their own solutions and priorities, and with an idea that it was possible to achieve quick progress. You do not know the Afghan society, then. It is far more complex than that. It is not only that there has been a waste of money, but also that expectations have been created that are impossible to live up to [author’s translation]. (Tommelstad, 2010).
Eide (2010) further argues that the international community has treated the Afghans far too arrogantly, which has resulted in hostility towards both deployed police officers and military personnel.

**Gender: the NORAF project**

One of the focus areas in Afghanistan, particularly for the Norwegian contribution, has been gender issues. Afghanistan has accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and has lately pursued the enhancement of women’s contribution to peace and security issues at all levels (Afghanistankomiteen i Norge, 2011). Norway has endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 1325 through the NORAF project, which seeks to strengthen the representation and capability of women in the Afghan police:

PO–A7: The Norwegian police are good. The NORAF women’s project especially has been commended – we share our knowledge and we are open. We must have contributed something for we are being praised very highly.

Norway is also actively seeking to recruit Norwegian female police officers for deployment in Afghanistan, something that has been a challenge because of the security situation in the country. Kvigne (2010) in her report on the recruitment of policewomen to leadership positions in international peacekeeping operations, claims that female police officers with children are more hesitant to serve in high-risk areas like Afghanistan than men (p. 11). Yet according to Norwegian Ann-Kristin Kvalekval, who headed the Police Advisory Unit at UNAMA from 2010 to 2011, international female police officers are of great value:

I am convinced that the fact that I am a woman brings influences to the police both female and male here in Afghanistan. It is good to be a role model and to show the Afghan female [police] officers that they are not alone (2011).

One significant role model and guiding star for women in Afghanistan is General Shafiqa Quraishi, Director of Gender, Human, and Child Rights within the Ministry of the Interior. Quraishi began her career in the ANP, and Norway strongly supported her promotion from colonel to general. In that position, she is responsible for improving the conditions of female police officers in the ANP with a long-term aim of recruiting
5,000 police women by 2014. The recruitment of female police officers, Quraishi argues, is vital, especially from the viewpoint of security: because male officers are forbidden to search women, male suicide bombers frequently dress themselves in burkas to evade detection (Solberg, 2011). One such situation was personally witnessed by one of the interviewees:

PO–A4: [Chief of Police] General Andarabi called us in. They were to arrest a mullah who was wanted for the murder of a police chief some months before. They had intelligence on where he was, and they wanted the PRT to assist. He looked upon me as a PRT though I am a police officer, and he did not see the difference. To conduct such an operation was probably right on the edge of the mandate, but we never got an introduction to the mandate anyways. We just knew we were supposed to mentor, and we interpreted that broadly. We set up a good protection team and took with us the necessary equipment. We drove to a deep canyon where some part of the Taliban and the criminals were located. But we were a major force – 25 cars in a large convoy, so we were blown long before we arrived. Afterwards, we received feedback from General Andarabi. He argued that we should have brought police women with us because mullahs often hide inside burkas and these were not searched.

Nevertheless, even though some of the interviewees were positive about the NORAF women’s project in Meymaneh, others expressed doubts and felt it was politically motivated to promote Norway:

PO–A5: There were [Afghan] women at the police academy, but I think it was all to please the crowd.

PO–A12: This is high-politics – NORAF is nothing.

PO–A15: I was first assigned to the women’s project in NORAF in Kabul. I was not content with this. There was no steering and no direction – we got the message that ‘you can run this yourselves’. I came down when they did not have any courses, so what were we supposed to do then? We went on a visit here and a visit there and drank lots of tea. It was so political. We were to write monthly reports about everything we did for the women, but we didn’t do anything – not for the two months I was there ... only meetings and tea. Not a meaningful duty – lacked a clear mandate and proper steering. NORAF didn’t reach their set goals – not during the time that I was in Afghanistan.

Yet even though the actual effects of the project were questionable, other interviewees expressed the need for an overall special focus on gender in Afghanistan, regardless of project type:
PO–A1: Their view on women is extreme. The headmaster at the police school committed sexual assaults against the police women when I was deployed to Afghanistan. It happened on the school premises. They are pure fuck-objects. We [Norwegians] don’t respect that, but we have to accept it. We cannot push how we see it on them – we need to talk about it – change their attitudes gradually.

Katzman (2011), in a discussion of Afghan politics, elections, and government performance, argues that there have been some improvements in the form of women in government positions. However, there is still clear evidence of numerous abuses against women, such as denial of education, no law against sexual harassment, and a very light punishment for rape (a maximum of two years in prison) (p. 49).

Overall experience with achievement

A majority of the Norwegian police officers were critical of Norway’s presence in Afghanistan and sought a legitimate justification for being there. Yet although some felt there was no meaning in the deployment, most felt that their presence was of importance and had made a difference:

PO–A14: Though there weren’t any goals and we had a fairly unrestricted duty, the job that we did gave meaning and I feel we did a good job.

PO–A5: The Norwegians do the bilateral down there much better than EUPOL’s staff. The Norwegian police force is good. We absolutely do have something to contribute there.

PO–A2: The Norwegian police are good at being visible. We like to do something, and we do not hide away. We are easy to collaborate with, because we are all equals and don't focus on rank.

Overall, there was a consensus among the interviewees that they had contributed but that the efficiency was poor, primarily because, according to Hartz (2009), there is no joint international approach on rebuilding of the ANP and each institution or country has done what it thinks adequate, characterised by ad hoc solutions:

PO–A10: Of course it is politics – we have the means and the will (Norway is the third largest contingent in EUPOL). But who should be a part of it, and what do we get back for the effort? We must aim for something that gives more quality;
for example, a training centre within operational disciplines – and reading and writing – 80% of the police force in Faryab Province cannot read and write. We cannot give them courses in policing when they can't read and write! What is needed is a comprehensive needs analysis! It is sporadic now. We have been there since 2004, and early during the deployment it had me wondering; why are we not more precise on what we want, and why we are there? If such analysis had existed, we could have built a stairway, step by step. However, then Norway would have had to be clear – what do we want, and what is it we want to prioritise. If you ask me about Afghanistan, I will say that we are there politically, but not technically – there are a lot of limitations and shortcomings, for example, in terms of coordination.

There is also no standardisation process within the mission, and Norway’s focus has shifted in line with various political priorities (Hartz, 2009, p. 14). Bauck and Strand (2009), in their report on the Norwegian contribution to the Afghan justice sector, claim that the responsibility for the projects was placed on those involved without any defined starting point, plans, or clear goals for the project.

Post-deployment experiences

Upon return, most interviewees had poor experiences with the follow-up from their workplace, and some experienced difficulties reintegrating and/or received little interest from their work colleagues:

PO–A10: Follow-up from home? Well, hee-hee … what is the point of knowledge if you can't share it with anyone. Follow-up has been poor from my employer – totally lacking. I talked to the Police Commissioner when I was home on leave, but no great interest.

PO–A14: I haven’t been used for anything since I got home. Feel I have been forgotten. I sent some travel letters to work but got little response. Poor follow-up from the leaders, so I sent a letter with suggestions on how to do it the next time someone returned from deployment. I got typical comments on being on holiday and questions about salary from my colleagues. I have had no debriefing from PST or Kripos. However, I had a debriefing with POD. And we have a new boss in our operational department who has talked to me – I appreciated that.

Research by Celik (2010) identified similar issues, including a sense of separation from colleagues, little support from leaders or supervisors, and adjustment problems (p. ii). This lack of follow-up also tends to be pervasive throughout the service:
E–25: The follow-up from the districts reaches from zero to pretty good. Østfold and Agder police districts get good feedback from returning police officers, but in most police districts there is no follow-up. We have sent out a circular letter to the entire police service in which we address these issues, but the letter it has not been followed up. I am sure that if you called all our 27 police districts, only three have arranged for a contact person for deployed personnel. We are where the Norwegian Armed Forces were previously. [The international deployment] is restraining the police officers’ careers. If you want to make a career within the Norwegian Armed Forces, you must have at least one international deployment.

After returning to their work places in Norway, the interviewees were invited to a 2-day debriefing at the Holmekollen Park Hotel together with all other police personnel deployed to international police reform missions during the previous 6–8 months. The debriefing, conducted twice a year, consists of gatherings at which everyone describes their own missions, in addition to a separate group session within each mission in which individual experiences are shared in full:

PO–A2: There hasn't been any follow-up from POD this side – the debriefing in October was a waste! It was far too long between return and debriefing.

PO–A15: I think the reception we got when we returned was poor in terms of it being 2010 and the amount of money we spent on the mission itself. They should have been able to do better. I mean, flight-overweight being a focus or an issue? Unbelievable! I was almost hit by an accidental shot on a terrace when I was there, but there was no interest or focus. At the doctors, I just filled out a form and was there for 3 minutes. No one from my local station was interested. They should do more in 2010 – there should be a checklist from POD that all police districts should be obliged to follow; for example, something as simple as checking which obligatory courses I had missed during the year. The debriefing in October at Holmenkollen Park was more of a social gathering than a serious debriefing, I think – it is enough to say I returned in May....

Some of the police officers returning from Afghanistan had lost faith in the system and expressed cynicism, an outcome that Bayley & Perito (2010) argue is for the most part not the result of adversity overseas but of how they are treated upon their return.

**Conclusion**

After describing the background of the EU’s mission to Afghanistan, including Norway’s bilateral contribution, NORAF, this chapter has painted a picture of the Norwegian police officers’ experiences in their deployment to the most complex and difficult IPRM
The interview responses include severe criticism of the poor pre-deployment preparations and the lack of a structured framework to guide the mission. A majority of the interviewees also found that the knowledge transfer upon arrival was less than adequate and subsequently led to an initial period of confusion and a great deal of ‘down time’. Many experienced poor leadership, and this, together with a lack of planning, resulted in a variety of individuals having a strong influence and steering the mission in different directions. This lack of holistic planning also caused other serious problems, including no coordination between the many programmes running in Afghanistan. A majority of the interviewees felt that both EUPOL–A and NORAF were steered by politics, leading to a constant shift in programmes and an absence of long-term planning. At the same time, poor needs analysis by many of the contributors to the Afghanistan mission led to the waste of huge amounts of resources, something that caused much frustration among the interviewees. The worsened security situation also had a significant effect on the execution of the mission, particularly for the Norwegian police officers that were part of EUPOL–A, which had a rigid stance on security. This mission also received severe criticism for being bureaucratic and micro-managed. More important, the horrific conditions surrounding the Afghan National Police – the lack of basic requirements like water, food, housing, shoes, and adequate wages – resulted in a poor learning environment and a challenging work setting for the deployed officers. Problems related to the misuse of drugs and illiteracy were also a trial for those who trained the ANP and the ABP.

Although Norway has managed, through NORAF, to put gender issues on the map, and a number of police officers have been trained and better equipped, there is no clear evidence that the Norwegian bilateral police assistance in Afghanistan – whether through NORAF or through EUPOL–A – has had any effect on the ANP as an institution. Rather, the findings indicate overall that the challenges in reforming the ANP seem insurmountable. These issues will be developed further in the next chapter, Chapter 8, which uses a cross-case analysis to highlight the similarities and variations between the three missions.
Chapter 8 – Cross Case Analyses

There are no strategic plans on Norway’s part. Take the entire Balkans – not a strategic plan that I know of. Not Afghanistan either. And the UN missions are in a way living their own lives. (PO–A6)

Introduction

As previous chapters have shown, initiating and implementing police reform in other countries is a complex and problematic endeavour, one that demands knowledge, experience, skill, understanding, and holistic planning. With over 20 years involvement in international police reform missions, Norway is an experienced actor in the area, so providing an overall picture of the Norwegian police IPRM experiences is highly relevant to the field. To this end, this chapter presents a cross-case analysis of the three preceding case studies, Serbia/JUNO, Liberia/UNMIL and Afghanistan/EUPOL–A, which divides the IPRM deployment into three phases: pre-mission, in-mission, and post-mission. The overall data analysis reveals that, despite the inevitable cross-case variations stemming from mission type (bilateral, regional, or multilateral) and conflict environment, the three cases share many commonalities, which are discussed in detail below.

The analysis is based on interviews with over 99 people divided into three groups. The first group comprises 36 Norwegian police officers deployed to one of the IPRMs between 2008 and 2010. The second group are 21 ‘co-operating partners’ (coded CP) in the field and 42 ‘experienced senior officials’ (coded E) working in various Norwegian or international organisations involved in planning and executing these missions, many of whom had participated in, or dealt with, one or more of the three cases. As in preceding chapters, the Norwegian police officers (PO) are designated S, L, or A to indicate the country of deployment, followed by a random number. The analysis also includes observations from fieldwork in Serbia and Liberia, together with findings from research trips to Canada, Australia, Switzerland (Geneva), and England.
Using the qualitative analytical tool NVivo9, the data were interpreted through narrative analysis, a case-centred research method focused on careful readings of informants’ own accounts in order ‘to understand human experience and/or social phenomena through the form and content of stories analysed as textual units’ (Fritz, 2008, p. 6). Such content analysis uses inductive reasoning to condense raw data into categories or themes that manifest as natural units through the researcher’s in-depth examination and continuous comparison (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 2). More specifically, the cross-case comparison allows the creation of clusters or families of phenomena, whose meaning the NVivo9 software then condenses through word clustering (Khan & Vanwynsberghe, 2008). For manageability, the resulting synthesis of responses is categorised into three stages – pre-mission, in-mission, and post-mission – and divided within each stage into cross-case similarities and variations. This systematisation was achieved using a Cross-case analysis matrix of word clustering (see Table 8.1).

Table 8.1: Cross-case analysis of the three case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICE OFFICER EXPERIENCE</th>
<th>STAGE OF MISSION</th>
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<td>Pre-mission</td>
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| A. Cross-case similarities| 1. Politics and strategies  
|                           | 2. Contextualisation  
|                           | 3. Police officer motivation | 1. Needs analysis  
|                           |                  | 2. Continuity  
|                           |                  | 3. Plans and goals  
|                           |                  | 4. Individualism  
|                           |                  | 5. Work tasks  
|                           |                  | 6. Challenges  
|                           |                  | 7. Feelings of significance | 1. Knowledge transfer  
|                           |                  |                  | 2. Feelings of insignificance  
|                           |                  |                  | 3. Reintegration |
| B. Cross-case variations  | 1. Selection and preparation process | 1. Resource management  
|                           |                  | 2. Challenges  
|                           |                  | 3. Gender  
|                           |                  | 4. Overall experience with achievement | 1. Resource management  
|                           |                  |                  | 2. Evaluation |
Pre-Mission: Cross-Case Similarities

Politics and strategies

One of the first major findings is the lack of an overall strategy on the part of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and a lack of a specific action plan by the Norwegian Police Directorate for the deployment of Norwegian police officers to IPRMs. None of the interviewees reported seeing any strategies or action plans with the exception of descriptive project plans for the JUNO project in Serbia. Rather, the cross-case analysis indicates that these missions were above all steered by ad hoc political motives whose main aim was to consider international relations. JUNO, for example, was based on a political decision to assist in the reform of the Serbian police, a request made by Serbia because of its historically close relationship with Norway. A majority of the interviewees (i.e. 50% or more) also saw JUNO as primarily a politically grounded project, initiated to put Norway on the international map and prevent criminality in Serbia from reaching Norway. The reasons for the deployment to UNMIL in Liberia, plainly stated in the Norwegian Government’s annual budget white paper, were two-fold: the UN’s request for assistance and Liberia’s close connection to America, one of Norway’s closest allies. Norway’s entrance into EUPOL–A was similarly motivated: after four years in Afghanistan (through NORAF), Norway was an experienced actor in the area but also needed to maintain a close relationship with its ally the EU. Norway’s deployment of police officers to Afghanistan also created a positive atmosphere in terms of Norway’s relationship with America: in the words of Norway’s Ambassador to America Knut Vollebæk (2001-2007), ‘Norway’s star was on the rise’ (TV2, 16 November 2011).

Not only was the political backcloth similar for all the three cases, but the interviewees also felt that the missions were politically steered throughout rather than being formed by long-term strategies and conducted by experts in the field of reform processes. In fact, several of the senior officials argued that the MFA was far too detail oriented and should develop a greater ability to listen to experts and delegate responsibility. Some would have liked to see a better definition of roles, stating that the MFA should be strategists and those on the ground tacticians. This lack of strategy and the detail-oriented approach was manifested through a constant shift in short-term plans and an
ad hoc attitude in addressing problems, particularly in Afghanistan where, many respondents argued, Brussels should have supported the mission, rather than trying to lead it. Several of the interviewees even expressed cynicism and questioned the motives for deploying personnel: ‘Everything is so political – a show of power. It wasn’t idealism or charity – it was to keep the shit down there’ (E1).

Contextualisation
One consequence of the lack of strategy and specific action plan was a dearth of awareness about Norway’s motives for involvement, and in fact, the data clearly show that the interviewees wanted a more contextualised understanding, regardless of IPRM type. The police officers, for instance, expressed a need for better insight into the background of the conflicts and how to interpret the different mandates governing the missions, particularly in terms of the various organisations involved (e.g. the OSCE, UN, and EU). These officers would have liked a translation of the mandates into practice, especially in terms of what the mandates meant for their jobs in the field and what was expected of them.

Motivation
Although the preparation varied for the different missions, the motivation driving the police officers for all three was markedly similar. First, although none disregarded the money aspect when signing up for the IPRM, this aspect was not crucial for any interviewee’s decision. Rather most pointed to two factors: making a difference and experiencing new things; for example, a foreign culture. Many also expressed clear idealism and genuinely wanted to make a change. According to senior officials in Norway handling their deployment, however, this idealistic eagerness is not always a positive because it sometimes result in high expectations, which for most of the police officers are hard to moderate.
Pre-Mission: Cross-Case Variations

Selection and preparation process

One difference that did emerge between the three cases was the selection process. The police officers that were part of JUNO Serbia were hand-picked because of their field of expertise and because they were known to the project managers from previous experiences. None went through a selection process, and none received any preparatory coursework, neither UNPOC nor any mission-specific training. Some interviewees felt that this absence was a drawback and would have liked better pre-deployment preparation. Despite this lack of formal preparatory training, however, the JUNO project benefited from having a limited number of experienced instructors in the same positions over a long period of time because mission-specific knowledge was transferred informally both before and during the courses, thereby securing continuity.

For deployment to the Liberia and Afghan missions, the police officers applied to the Norwegian Police Directorate and underwent pre-vetting prior to formal interviews. All candidates also attended the general UNPOC course. When offered a mission by the Police Directorate, the interviewees were given the opportunity to decline certain areas but were simultaneously encouraged to agree to deployment to more exposed places like Afghanistan despite initial expressions of not wanting to go there. Female police officers, in particular, were sought out for such missions but were difficult to recruit, mostly because of family issues (Kvigne, 2010).

A great majority of the police officers thought the UNPOC was good or even excellent, offering relevant topics and a good balance between theory and practical exercises. At the same time, many expressed a belief that the requirements were far too low, commenting on the fact that police officers without a valid tactical operational certificate or approval for carrying a pistol were allowed on the UN course. There was also criticism of the lack of focus on fitness, and many recalled participants walking through the required running route and still passing the course.

Regardless of mission assignment, most interviewees were dissatisfied with the mission-specific course, criticising it for being too short and too narrow in content.
Most particularly, the respondents felt there was a gap between the macro and the micro level and would have liked it to offer a real-world translation of the mandates; what, for example, does policy mean for the practical level? Many wanted a better introduction to, and understanding of, reform processes, and a majority also wanted far more extensive tactical training. Another reoccurring theme, especially in terms of Afghanistan, was that the experienced personnel acting as instructors for the mission-specific courses were far too positive in their description of the IPRM: many interviewees would have liked more realism in the preparation phase. In particular, respondents expressed a wish for a greater focus on the tactical danger in Afghanistan or the many in-mission challenges in war-torn Liberia. Many described the preparation as ‘painting a rosy picture’, presumably for fear of losing candidates. For Afghanistan in particular, there was a wish for a longer, tougher curriculum and tactical exercises. Many of the interviewees referred to the 2–6 month training received by the Norwegian military before deployment and wanted the same amount of preparation time.

**Plans and goals**

Most of the instructors sent to Serbia were involved in the planning of the JUNO projects and thus able to influence the course design. Being a smaller bilateral project, the plans were naturally much more detailed than would have been possible in the two other missions. The Norwegian police officers deployed to the other two missions, in contrast, were given no meaningful translation of the mandates given by the UN Security Council and through the EU Council Joint Action and nor were these mandates transformed into plans or descriptions of functions on the ground. Rather, the police officers going to Liberia and Afghanistan were introduced only to overall floating goals like ‘assisting the local police in achieving democratic policing with a focus on human rights and ethics’. They were presented with no concrete specific goals for the IPRM before deployment. In Liberia, however, the Special Representative for the UN Secretary General did write critical reports that functioned as a sort of guideline and plan for what to do next.
In-Mission: Cross-Case Similarities

Needs analysis

A reoccurring issue within all three projects was that much of the curriculum within the projects was steered by, and consequently focused on, the donor country’s agenda. In the Serbian case, for instance, the initiation of the JUNO project was distinguished by relative randomness, by the asking of the question ‘is there anybody who knows anything about crime prevention?’ Once such an individual was identified, the police officer involved could prepare courses as he wanted and there was no subsequent quality assurance. Therefore, the method chosen for JUNO Serbia was the ‘problem-oriented policing’ concurrently being implemented as a strategy in Norway (Politidirektoratet, 2002). As a result, the focus of the course stayed the same throughout the project period. Experienced senior officials working in Serbia were somewhat sceptical of all the different donors doing things differently without any common strategy: ‘It is a seagull strategy – they come to shore, drop their shit and leave!’ (E20).

The majority of informants requested more realism in the programmes, suggesting that they should be based on the needs of the local community, not the donor countries’ priorities: ‘Good fact-finding saves time and money’ (E12). Many of the interviewees also complained that sometimes the projects lacked relevance or started at the wrong end before the basics were in place, which killed motivation. The data also revealed a demand for better quality assurance of the programmes initiated, with an emphasis on what the local police needed in terms of training. This issue was particularly important in Afghanistan where many of the courses were set up ad hoc by Norwegian police officers responding to problems on the spot. An overwhelming majority of the deployed police officers uttered frustration over the distance between political idealism and realism on the ground. Several mentioned Maslov’s hierarchy of needs, arguing that fundamental needs for the local police had to be in place before they could be trained in specialised policing methods. Some respondents used the phrase ‘creating a functional police’, meaning that proper wages and equipment had to be in place for the new service to function in an everyday setting.
Several interviewees also gave examples of strange initiatives; for example, training the Afghan police in border patrolling miles from the border, without available shelter, shoes, or water; or training courses on how to detect whether suspects were on drugs when half the police officers themselves were under the influence of narcotics. In Liberia, a computer crime office was set up even though the locals had no PCs or electricity, and across both Afghanistan and Liberia, many questioned why they were training local police in taking fingerprints when neither country had a national fingerprint registry. The respondents blamed all such inefficiency on insufficient needs analysis. Both police officers and senior officials admitted that they sometimes felt that projects were being forced upon the recipient country by the donor countries and that it was all ‘shadowboxing’ (E22).

**Induction phase: knowledge transfer**

One of the issues that emerged from the NVivo 9 analyses was continuity. The JUNO project benefited from long-term engagements (only three project managers over 8 years), which led to insight, adequate knowledge transfer, and constant follow-up that brought the project forward. Still, it was led by a police service whose top leaders were politically elected, meaning constant change in management. As a result, the project had to be reset whenever there was a political election, which meant that project managers continually had to introduce themselves to new people, who often had different priorities than their predecessors.

In Liberia, the issues around continuity were of a different kind – most particularly, the lack of overlap between those arriving and those going home. In most cases, the deployed police officers literally met each other at the airport as one arrived and one departed, meaning that all the returning officer’s knowledge, intelligence gathering, familiarity with territorial issues, and so forth went home with that officer. The new arrivals had to start from scratch and wasted a great deal of time being introduced to the system and learning the job. Nevertheless, in UNMIL, despite the constant rotation of police officers, the contingent commanders normally enjoyed an overlap period, and all the police officers worked under the same organisation. In Afghanistan, however, the police officers experienced the same problem with constant personnel change but
had the additional challenge of working under several organisations and a contingent spread over a wide area, resulting in the same things being done every 6 months and the same questions being asked over and over. As a result, the respondents recalled embarrassing instances of meeting older, traditional Afghan police leaders without a proper introduction, behaviour the locals consider rude.

In both these cases, the deployed police officers missed being given directions on how to interact with the different local and international partners, and even more so information on progress – for example, the stage at which they were entering the process and what kinds of steps had been taken before their arrival: ‘The mission suffers from the lack of overlap’ (A14). Although senior officials defended the abrupt hand-over and lack of overlap in Afghanistan and Liberia with arguments about logistics and increased expenses, there was a consensus among the interviewees that the long period taken by new arrivals ‘to learn the ropes’ hindered progress and was more expensive in the long run.

**Individualism**

On all three missions, the individual police officers shaped, formed, and invented their own work tasks, and some had significant influence over the development of courses and programmes. In fact, the data across all three cases revealed a system that depends on personalities rather than *vice versa*. Above all, the system appeared characterised by randomness and an *ad hoc* approach, and all the police officers claimed that for the most part, things happened simply on their own initiative. Indeed, many interviewees felt that they had been left to their own devices and that there was little quality assurance or interest in their performance. In addition, tasks and duties depended on the interest, views, and personality of the project leaders, meaning that these individuals had a great deal of power and autonomy and their views and actions could ‘make or break’ initiatives and the direction of police reform projects. Several senior officials expressed concern for this level of individualism within IPRMs, arguing that it could be destabilising and hamper the process rather than helping it.
Work tasks

The police officers’ work tasks were similar across all three cases, with a majority of those interviewed being involved in training. The training topics varied from the more sophisticated themes of problem-oriented policing and strategic analysis in Serbia (albeit over short 2–5 day periods) to general police training in a 1-year programme in Liberia to very ad hoc training programmes in Afghanistan that lasted from 2 to 8 weeks and were for the most part focused on shooting, traffic control, combat training, and first aid. For the Afghan National Police in particular, it was not unusual for Norwegian police officers to identify work tasks by observing Afghan police ‘lost in the street’, and several had stories of initiating shooting courses for police officers that ‘had just been given a uniform and weapon’ without any form of training. Many were shocked by how short sighted and incoherent the programmes were despite the extensive resource input in Afghanistan; such incoherence led to inflated expectations that, according to the officers, were impossible to meet.

Some police officers in Liberia and Afghanistan were also deployed to advise the local police in such areas as investigation and patrol duties, or were involved in the ‘distribution of donor funds’ (particularly in Liberia). This latter encompassed everything from administrative tasks to inspection of donor projects. The police officers involved in training felt that their days were meaningful and filled with concrete tasks that, being similar to their responsibilities in Norway, were relevant to their expertise. Conversely, the police officers given such tasks as meeting with local police heads to discuss police reform or the use of donor funds sometimes felt they were in ‘deep water’, working in areas outside their qualifications. Nevertheless, they accepted the tasks assigned to them and took a hands-on approach that is typical for most police officers and familiar to police professionals like myself.

Internal and external challenges

Co-operation within the mission

In Liberia, a majority of the deployed police officers found co-operation within UNMIL challenging because the mission involves contingents from all around the world, some
from poor areas that are themselves receiving assistance through the UN. Police officers from these contingents, the interviewees reported, had lower levels of education and lacked basic skills like driving vehicles and operating computers. One issue that was particularly difficult for the Norwegian police officers was the difference in attitudes towards human rights and ethics, and many were shocked by the disparity in views on the value of and respect for women and children: ‘Bangladesh sends people to teach human rights, something they violate in their own country’ (E22). A majority of the interviewees stated that they thought it was wrong to deploy police officers from countries that do not adhere to the principles of basic human rights.

This issue of human rights and ethics was less often mentioned in relation to EUPOL Afghanistan, because the contingents on this European mission came mainly from Europe. A majority of the interviewees uttered frustration, however, with the American way of training police officers, which they felt was far too military, and with the rigid German focus on security, which led to an inefficient workday. In Serbia, despite fewer cultural challenges, the Norwegian police officers experienced a very hierarchal structure within the Serbian police, and the first courses were hampered by the need to use formal avenues of communication and challenges linked to cultural (mis)understanding. In the first phase of the JUNO project, particularly, the instructors from Norway were confronted with a strict system and an old-fashioned leadership style that on occasion resulted in a strenuous learning environment or miscommunication in meetings.

**Conditions for the local police**

Several of the interviewees, both in Liberia and Afghanistan, referred to ‘Maslow’s hierarchy of needs’ (Jones, 2004), implying that it was hard to conduct courses when the police officers lacked such basics as food, water, and equipment. This issue was especially challenging in Afghanistan where many of the police stations, especially the border posts, were in poor condition and the deployed police officers spent a great deal of time acquiring basic necessities for the Afghan police officers. Nevertheless, the problem was also an issue in Liberia and Serbia, even though over the course of the mission, police stations in the poorest condition progressively received renovation
funding from a number of countries, including Norway. One consequence of this lack of basic necessities was that the Norwegian police officers felt they had to prioritise their time providing equipment for the local police rather than training them. Another challenge in Afghanistan and Liberia was a high level of illiteracy among the local police, which made it difficult to conduct the courses. This illiteracy stood in stark contrast to Serbia, where the level and quality of education were high. The NVivo analysis across all cases also shows that the respondents saw the poor wages for local police in all three countries as a significant issue in reducing personnel motivation and creating a window for corruption, which itself posed ethical issues, particularly in Afghanistan where this problem is pronounced.

Coordination

The lack of a unified multilateral approach in Afghanistan has led to a severely problematic hotchpotch of organisations and countries, all with their own projects and agendas. The result has been the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing and a lack of oversight and problems of coordination that frustrated the police officers because of regular shifts in priorities. Even though EUPOL–A was there to coordinate, most of the deployed officers called the task impossible as long as the Americans were ‘doing their own thing’. According to the NVivo9 analysis, this clash in cultures and training methods was also a significant concern for the majority of police officers that served in Afghanistan. Whereas EUPOL–A used civilian police officers to train the Afghan National Police in democratic policing, the Americans have been using the military (FDD) to train them in combat training. There was thus a clear divide among the interviewees about which of the two directions was more sensible. Some saw combat training as essential as long as the country is at war, while others believed it vital to separate the military from the police in order to create more stable communities. Regardless of their sympathies, however, the deployed officers needed months to gain an overview of all the organisations that conducted police training in Afghanistan, and several stated that the lack of coordination severely hampered the mission.
Similar issues emerged in Liberia where NGOs were coming in and introducing programmes outside UNMIL: ‘What you find is that you have different elements – the UN package and the NGO’s package, all working about it in different ways with different agendas and motives’ (E2, a senior official with the UN). Nevertheless, the UNMIL mission was, to a much larger degree, more successful than EUPOL–A in maintaining oversight and mission coordination, although it experienced greater difficulties with differences in training methods and style. The OSCE also struggled periodically with the need to coordinate bilateral programmes in Serbia, and the level of co-operation in the country between the OSCE and JUNO was inconsistent. JUNO, however, despite being under OSCE auspices, was a bilateral project that answered to the Minister of the Interior in Serbia and the Police Directorate in Norway and not to the OSCE.

**Bureaucracy**

Bureaucracy, in one form or another emerged as an issue in all three cases. The majority of the interviewees labelled both the EU and the UN ‘bureaucratic’ for being mired in a sea of papers, forms, and meticulous processes that very often led to a slow working pace. A reoccurring statement by the respondents from the Afghanistan and Liberia missions was ‘I have never done so little during such a long time’. Such idleness distressed many interviewees, who described themselves as hands-on police officers who wanted to do something. One explanation given by senior officials at the UN and EU was that the need for unanimity and joint decisions within both organisations naturally leads to a great deal of bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy was also an issue in Serbia but at the top level of the Minister of the Interior, which sometimes led to a certain degree of unsteadiness during the process because of time-management and predictability issues like sudden delays and postponed courses. A majority of the respondents across the cases reported feeling that at times bureaucracy severely affected the efficiency of the missions and reform projects.
Feelings of significance

The majority of police officers were highly motivated when they embarked on the different missions, and all expressed a desire to contribute to change. Likewise, the co-operating partners interviewed commented positively on how Norwegian police officers were perceived on the mission, particularly highlighting their egalitarian approach. Senior officials in both the UN and other organisations remarked that the Norwegian police officers were sought after because of their high standards, good values, and extensive education. One minor, albeit not insignificant point mentioned by many, was their good English skills, which were seen as important given the excessive demands for reporting to headquarters.

Across all three cases, every police officer felt he or she had added value to the mission and his or her presence mattered in some way or another. A majority commented that they were there to work and ‘not to barbeque’ (E12) and saw it as vital to interaction with the local population that everyone be treated equally. The Norwegians’ focus on hard and steady work, however, was not always seen as a positive because it showed up police officers from other contingents who had less competence or a different work ethic, which was not popular.

In-Mission: Cross-Case Variations

Resource management

One of the most recurrent themes throughout the research was resource management: the efficient or inefficient utilisation of personnel, leadership, technical equipment, and funding. The JUNO project in Serbia, for example, used the same pool of instructors over a long period of time, something that resulted in quality assurance and continuity. In such a small bilateral project, this practice was feasible because it was the theme (i.e. problem-oriented policing) and not the IPRM itself that steered instructor selection. As a result, the mission tasks were not constantly changing, the instructors were prepared for their duties when they arrived in Serbia, and their knowledge was leveraged to the fullest.
Police officers going to UNMIL in Liberia, on the other hand, could only apply for specific positions after their arrival, which regularly resulted in placements that differed from the officers’ expectations or preparation – or even worse, were outside their range of expertise. The interviewees gave a number of examples, for instance, of Norwegian police officers educated as operational and tactical instructors being assigned in UNMIL to advise investigators or those who had been forensic experts in their home country being used as instructors to train the highly operational Emergency Response Unit at the Liberian National Police Academy. This lack of attention to placement requests and appropriateness had also led, for example, to two police officers arriving at the same time being placed in diametrically opposite positions to their preferences and specialisations. As a result, many police officers had to start from scratch working with a theme with which they were unfamiliar, leading to expert thematic knowledge not being given to the local police. A majority of the respondents were highly sceptical about this disregard for their professional background, stating that it was a waste of resources and led to deterioration in motivation for the deployed police officers, who felt they had been forced into doing something they were not good at. The outcome was a great deal of down time and even months without specific duties. A general view was that UNMIL’s apparent priority was to find bodies to fill the empty spots rather than planning ahead and ensuring quality. Senior officials in the UN blamed these deployment misplacements on bad planning by mission leaders, who do not send out their personnel requirements in a timely manner (ideally, at least 3 months before the mission), which makes it difficult to recruit specific personnel from the donating countries.

The police officers deployed to EUPOL–A, in contrast, could apply for specific positions before departure. Nevertheless, the application period was so short relative to the long casework procedures that many ended up being shifted around after arrival anyway, something that was a cause of irritation and demotivation in those who experienced it.

One significant feature across the two cases was the feeling of randomness; the belief that little thought had been put into their deployment. Most particularly, the interviewees missed being given a description of their work tasks and a clear structure
for their time on the mission. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Police Directorate, however, argue that it is impossible to prepare such descriptions because of the nature of the conflict zones and that the mere presence of police officers on IPRMs is a valid enough reason for deploying them:

We mustn’t misappropriate the value of presence – we show the UN flag and create safety. There are a lot of things you cannot measure. Take the team sites – it is not much you get done but it is invaluable that we are there. (E23)

Leadership

In contrast to the many issues discussed above that can be attributed to the macro or meso level, one significant factor at the micro level is the operational leaders of the IPRMs, who in Liberia and Afghanistan naturally had an impact on the police officers’ duties. Many interviewees, for example, attributed the previously mentioned lack of work descriptions and stated goals to poor management. Both experienced senior officials and police personnel that had been deployed on multiple IPRMs argued the need to recruit skilled leaders to the different missions. At the same time, however, many asserted that because the recruitment of leaders to UN missions is too often based on ‘whose turn it is’ or which country has the most power, many of today’s leaders are simply not good enough. A majority of the interviewees also had issues with the differences in leadership style, claiming that the Africans and Asians were often authoritarian and placed importance on different values (e.g. discipline), whereas leaders from the West tended to ‘worship’ egalitarianism and independence.

Both the Norwegians and the international senior officials claimed that the Norwegian leadership style fitted very well with the mission demands in that the leaders tended to be independent, hands-on, and highly educated. Some interviewees, however, thought the Norwegian contingent commanders in both Liberia and Afghanistan should have provided more structure, control, and follow-up, and complained that too much was left up to them. Nevertheless, the recruitment of Norwegian leaders to UN and EU missions has been a challenge because of the lack of predictability, the politics surrounding the recruitment process, and a lack of training: ‘They don’t get any leadership training – out there they are going from being police officers to being a
business man’ (E18). Nor is it only the UN that faces such challenges in selecting adequate leaders. EUPOL in Afghanistan also encountered severe problems in recruiting leaders to their contingents, not least because of the security issues. Above all, it has proven difficult to encourage competent police leaders to take on that kind of risk and responsibility for their deployed personnel. For example, it is worth noting that the successor to Danish Police Commissioner Kai Vittrup was Finnish Brigadier Jukka Savolainen, a sign that the EU was forced to choose military personnel to lead their civilian police mission.

Another observation from the cross-case analysis was that the national politics attached to each mission resulted in the different leaders having conflicting interests and disseminating conflicting information. Such contradictions were particularly noticeable in Afghanistan where the EUPOL–A leaders did not have control over the disposal of their operational crew because of national restrictions and interests: ‘There is quite a bit of national limitation inflicted on the mission from each country, something that made the job very difficult’ (A14).

A second leadership issue in both Afghanistan and Liberia was the micro-management from headquarters in Brussels and New York, particularly noticeable within EUPOL–A but also reflected in Liberia by excessive requests to the police officers for reports. According to the interviewees, if they wrote negative reports, it backfired: ‘So evidently you are not doing your job properly’. Other than that, the police officers received no feedback on their reports to New York or Brussels, which made the reporting seem even more pointless. This demand for reports also stood in stark contrast to the lack of guidelines they themselves had received beforehand. Senior officials in both the EU and the UN blame such micro-management on weak structures and the bureaucrats’ need to control and be able to defend their positions: ‘There are good intentions in the UN, but everyone comes into it from different perspectives, and this leads to difficulties with collaboration. Some is go-go-GO (the security sector), but the development sector says, “no, we must take it slow – have a good process”’ (E3). In fact, many of the experienced senior officials looked upon the EU as particularly inflexible, rigid, and difficult to work with, and some claimed that the UN was easier to deal with.
Waste of funds
Whereas the use of funds in Serbia was controlled by the International Monitoring Group and that in Liberia by the United Nations Development Programme, no single overarching group holds the power of purse in Afghanistan. As a result, many interviewees, both practitioners and researchers, expressed frustration over the waste of money on equipment that did not work and the large amounts of funding that have disappeared. Interviewees from both Liberia and Afghanistan, for instance, recalled the donation by different countries and organisations of equipment that was useless to the mission – cars that did not fit the poor roads or technical equipment that was too advanced or demanded too much power. In fact, the cross-case analysis reveals consistent frustration with this failure to take local conditions into consideration. There were also many reports of equipment that disappeared, probably through corruption. Such misappropriation was a significant problem in Afghanistan but was also a concern in Liberia even though funding and equipment donations went through the UNDP. The reckless treatment of funded equipment by the local police was also an issue, one that interviewees attributed to the lack of training for locals in how to use the equipment: ‘There is an insane waste of resources, and an abundance of money is spent on nothing – it is all political’ (L1). Nevertheless, in the police officers’ experience, none of the above issues led to any reaction from the donors or mission leaders: ‘No one is made accountable, and there is no control’ (A15).

Internal and external challenges

Cultural and religious differences
As regards the possibility of reforming the Afghan and Liberian National Police into democratic police services, the interviewees all expressed scepticism because of the vast differences in culture. Many pointed to the local way of life as incompatible with the Western manner of policing, especially given the planning difficulties and civil war economy produced by 30 years of civil war: ‘If you give them a 10 dollar bill, they have used it the next day’ (CP–L11). Many commented particularly on the fact that communities that have been at war for 30 years do not plan longer than one day ahead. As a result, time management was an issue in both Afghanistan and Liberia, with ‘tomorrow’ expressed by ‘Inshallah’ in the first and ‘African time’ in the second. For
Liberia, the majority of interviewees saw the lack of focus on human rights as a severe issue: ‘Many of the developing countries in Africa have not had a history of being focused on HR, and it is therefore difficult for them to implement those ideas’ (E12). For Afghanistan, some pointed to religion as an incompatibility with democratic policing; specifically, the strict Islamic Sharia laws imposed by the Taliban, which enforce the stoning or execution of female adulterers, thieves, and homosexuals and supersede the national law followed by the Afghan National Police. Many interviewees expressed the feeling of going back a 100 years when arriving in Afghanistan; a reality, they pointed out, on which they had to base their work.

These problems encountered in UNMIL and EUPOL were not an issue in JUNO, primarily because Serbia has similar social structures and religious beliefs to Norway, and the police reform took place in a European context. Hence, although the Serbian police encountered severe problems after the Balkan wars – mainly because of their role during these conflicts – many police officers were highly educated and, in contrast to the almost non-existent police services in Liberia and Afghanistan when the missions were initiated, there was a more developed foundation on which to build.

**Security**

Because the police instructors in Serbia were working in a conflict-free area, they encountered no security issues other than the average city crime. During my 2009 research trip to Liberia, the security situation had vastly improved since 2003, an improvement that the interviewees attributed to the installation of street lighting the previous year, together with better roads, a functioning mobile network, and the presence of UNMIL. Nevertheless, a serious crime problem had led to a curfew for UN personnel at 2300h, and I personally experienced threats late in the evening from doped up Liberian men demanding money. It was Afghanistan, with its dangerous environment, that exposed the deployed police officers to the most extreme living and working conditions. Aware of the risk, they were all willing to accept it, and most encouraged more freedom of movement to enable them to do their jobs. In fact, most felt that EUPOL’s rigid view on security affected their ability to perform their duties: ‘EUPOL—A doesn’t understand where they are – they think they are in the Balkans.'
Everything should be safe and secure, and they cannot lose anybody. But it cannot be like that down there’ (A12).

**Police versus military**

In Afghanistan, the police versus the military was a difficult topic, one that elicited various responses from the interviewees. Some were very positive, claiming that the police were totally dependent on the military for security, so co-operation was necessary to produce ultimate results. Such was the case in Meymaneh, where the police officers had no freedom of movement and needed the military to escort them around. Others, however, lent towards the need for a clear divide between the police and the military so as to emphasise the civilian aspect of policing, as in the case of police officers working in Kabul. Even though some considered the police mentoring teams (a police-military co-operation in rural areas) a good idea, they pointed out that the internationally deployed police contingents, unlike the military, are not protected under the Geneva Accords. This lack of protection caused insecurity and confusion among the Norwegian police officers both during the pre-deployment phase and during the mission. Some felt that the international police in Afghanistan should be classified as combatants to gain better protection, but others feared that it would blur the roles. Many also highlighted intelligence sharing as an irritating problem within the police-military collaboration, complaining that the military withhold information on a ‘need to know’ basis but expect the police to share everything.

The role of the police versus the military was not a noteworthy issue for the JUNO project in Serbia because it was purely a police reform project in a post-conflict environment. UNMIL in Liberia, on the other hand, is an integrated mission in which the police and the military work together within certain areas; for example, during elections. UNMIL also uses formed police units (FPUs), military trained police units deployed to a mission specifically to protect groups of vulnerable people or exposed areas. Norwegian police officers posted to the Liberian ‘livord’ (outback) were also dependant on the Bangladeshi military for food. Nevertheless, there was a clear divide between the different roles within UNMIL, and none of the police officers were dependent on the military for security.
Gender and children

The focus on women and children through the specially themed UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security was high up on the agenda in Liberia and within the NORAF project in Afghanistan. In NORAF, the focus was on recruiting more female police officers to the Afghan National Police and training female police officers at the Kabul Police Academy. However, the courses run by NORAF were initiated by individuals, and with overall plan or superior leadership running the NORAF programme: ‘I never felt there was a plan behind it – it becomes what you make of it yourself’ (A2). As a result, many of the interviewees experienced a great deal of down-time and saw it as an idealistic project with no root in reality given the absence of equal rights in the country. Others, however, saw it as a meaningful entry into a dawning development.

In Liberia, the focus on women and children was very much reflected in the establishment of the Women and Children Protection Centres within select police stations throughout the country. However, as in NORAF Afghanistan, a majority of the interviewees felt this initiative was more idealistic than realistic in terms on both feasibility and effects on the ground. Many saw it as political symbolism, and some were highly critical, believing it to be a ‘forced’ project as long as nobody was addressing the overall attitudes towards human rights in Liberia. Nevertheless, some felt it was highly necessary to focus on the protection of women and children in a country characterised by massive reporting of gender-based violence.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) was not, however, a focus in the JUNO project, neither within the course curriculum nor in the selection of instructors or participants. Moreover, even though one of the project managers wanted more female participants, it was not feasible because the Serbian female police officers did not rank high enough within the Serbian police to attend the courses (which for the most part were aimed at station commanders or higher).
Overall experience of achievement

As regards the police officers’ overall satisfaction with the different missions, the data indicate that the police officers deployed to Serbia were the most content, followed by Liberia and Afghanistan. The police officers in Serbia worked in a peaceful environment over shorter periods of time and in a European setting that shares many commonalities with Norway. Most were also involved in the project for several years and so could see the development and progress with their own eyes. In particular, they were content with the shift in attitude within the Serbian police in terms of openness and responsiveness to new ideas.

In Liberia, the majority of the interviewees were first-timers with no previous deployment experience who arrived at a mission that had been well established for over 6 years. A majority of the police officers did report that because of UNMIL, things were changing within the Liberian National Police, but they found the progress slow and the situation unstable. The Norwegian police officers deployed to Liberia were less critical and more positive than those deployed to Afghanistan, most of whom had multiple missions behind them (some from the Balkan wars) and were familiar with both mission life and danger. Afghanistan, on the other hand, is a high risk zone, which leads to extreme security measures, a notable point given that officer satisfaction depended on whether they had been deployed to NORAF or EUPOL–A. The former were generally more content, but they also had shorter work days and more freedom of movement. The excessive focus on security, particularly in EUPOL, led to stress for some of the police officers deployed to that mission. A great majority of the police officers interviewed questioned their deployment and wanted justifications for why they were there. Interestingly, although the respondents expressed various levels of criticism, the data show that all the police officers interviewed reported a feeling of making a difference and a belief that their contribution was important. Quite frequently, however, they felt that this difference applied only to a few individuals not to an impact on the overall reform of the police service.
Post-Mission: Cross-Case Similarities

Debriefing

All the police officers underwent some type of debriefing, although in the JUNO context, it was not specifically designated as such. After officers returned from each JUNO project, the Norwegian Police Directorate arranged an assessment meeting at which participants discussed the process and the courses and were able to highlight various learning outcomes that could affect the next project. Police officers returning from Liberia and Afghanistan underwent a joint debriefing for all police officers returning from various missions (for example Sudan and Haiti), conducted twice a year at the Holmenkollen Park Hotel in Oslo. These sessions includes a general introduction by a psychologist to the normal reactions following a deployment, after which selected returning officers give detailed presentations on each mission to provide insights into the different experiences. Although there is also a mission-specific group debriefing, no individual debriefing is offered, an omission that a majority of the interviewees saw as highly negative. Some of the police officers also had to wait several months for the debriefing, which caused considerable frustration. A few even chose not to participate because they felt it was meaningless so long after return. In addition, even though all the respondents reported that the gathering was a joyful social event, some questioned the use of the term ‘debriefing’ when it was not conducted individually immediately after homecoming. Many also expressed concern about sharing their views on the mission: ‘Many of the older [officers] said straight out that they wanted another mission and that they held back their thoughts and views on controversial issues. They were afraid of being blacklisted. I think it instead should be an environment that encourages openness and feedback’ (A12).

Knowledge transfer

A majority of the police officers were eager to share their knowledge not only with their own police department but also with specialised police units within the Norwegian police service that could benefit from the information gathered (e.g. the Norwegian Police Security Service and the National Criminal Investigation Service). The experienced senior officials had an issue with the lack of connection to and an
exchange of knowledge with such specialised units and wanted to see a knowledge bank and systematic gathering of information from returning police officers. It is worth noting that all the police officers interviewed expressed contentment with being interviewed for this doctoral project, particularly with the fact that someone was interested in their experiences and opinions. All the returning officers said that they would have liked to be listened to more and that their acquired knowledge could be beneficial in terms of intelligence and value to future missions. Such knowledge transfer was generally looked upon positively by senior officials in the Norwegian Police Directorate, although some of the higher ranking officials were sceptical about creating unrealistic expectations for the quality of future missions. Specifically, they argued that there is only so much Norway can do in an international setting filled with a multitude of conflicting elements.

**Reintegration**

The data analysis revealed a severe breach in reintegration procedures for returning police officers: a majority of the interviewees across the cases experienced a feeling of insignificance upon return. Most particularly, they were disappointed with the lack of acknowledgement and argued that their local leaders did not see the value of the acquired knowledge they brought back to their work place. Senior officials working in the Police Directorate were also critical of how police districts receive their returning officers, and one even termed it ‘shameful’ (E6). Only a few of the deployed police officers had experienced any interest from their police leader in Norway either during their stay or upon return. Sadly, all the interviewees had experienced derogatory comments from colleagues: ‘Have you earned a lot of money?’, ‘Have you been on holiday?’, or ‘You’ve been working out I see’. The police officers with experience from multiple missions had much lower expectations than first-timers and were much more cynical about returning to the work place. Some, however, reflected upon this cynicism and saw it as a negative that their previous reintegration experiences had made them so critical of the system.
Post-Mission: Cross-Case Variations

Evaluation

In general, the IPRM field is characterised by a notable lack of scientific evaluations that can be used to outline lessons learned and improve current and future missions. Admittedly, descriptive assessment reports are available for the JUNO project in Serbia, and special reports by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General describe the situation in Liberia and set out new benchmarks, thereby providing some form of assessment and a basis for success criteria and progress control. Nevertheless, as several experienced senior officials complained, overall, ‘the UN doesn’t evaluate [its] missions’, even failing to monitor local police actions after training. This failure implies a risk that all has been done for nothing: ‘We have sent so many police officers on train-the-trainers course – but no one comes home and trains anyone!’ (E18).

A great majority of the interviewees, and in particular senior officials, were critical of the lack of consistent evaluations; not only an evaluation of the IPRM itself, but more important, of the deployed personnel’s own role in the mission and their achievements out in the field. As regards Norway specifically, senior officials within the Norwegian Police Directorate complained that the small number of internal employees and a lack of analytical expertise hampers the development of action plans, proper preparation, and evaluations. In the words of one Norwegian senior official: ‘We are poor at process. We don’t manage it at home either. We conduct target-oriented management, but we lack a critical eye’ (E22). Several of the interviewees also argued that the police experts in the Police Directorate had too many tasks and suggested that certain administrative tasks should be handled by civilians – for instance, pre-training by the Norwegian Police University College and evaluations by analytical staff – leaving the police experts free to plan and assist deployments. Others blamed the Norwegian government’s insistence on the ability to deploy quickly and be ‘everywhere’ for a poor systematic approach that results in ‘haste making waste’ (E11).
Conclusion

This cross-case analysis of three case studies in Serbia, Liberia, and Afghanistan has examined the Norwegian police officers’ experience with IPRMs pre-mission, in-mission, and post-mission. As expected given the different nature of the missions, the analysis revealed several variations across the cases, including pre-mission preparation, in-mission challenges, resource management, the security situation, and the implementation of Resolution 1325. Nevertheless, it also identified many commonalities across the cases, such as the police officers’ motivation for deployment, a lack of strategies and action plans, a lack of knowledge transfer, and poor reintegration procedures. Although some of these issues can best be described as ‘internal affairs’ for whose outcome Norway bears the sole responsibility, many can be attributed to factors that are difficult for Norway to control because of IPRMs’ complex nature. These central analytical findings and their overall implications for Norway are discussed in more detail in the next and final chapter, which also generalises them into a larger theoretical framework and makes recommendations for addressing some of the problems identified.
Chapter 9 – CONCLUSION

The focus of this study has partially been on Norway’s overall contribution to IPRMs and partially on IPRMs in general; most especially, as reflected in the experiences of deployed Norwegian police officers set against the normative goals of the policy makers. Because the literature review identified very few comparative studies within this specific area, with the notable exception of Bayley and Perito (2010), and found no narrative accounts from police officers with the exception of Goldsmith (2009), the analysis drew primarily on interviews with 99 people, fieldwork and study trips to 11 countries, research on relevant organisations, and extensive review of secondary data. The interviews, particularly, recorded the experiences of the police officers in their own voices, which allowed a unique comparative study of the three different types of missions: multilateral (UN), regional (EU), and bilateral (Norway/Yugoslavia). In keeping with the narrative tone of the empirical data that guided the development of the case studies (chapter 5, 6 and 7), this conclusion has focused on the voice of the individual police officers, all of whom provided reflective thoughts on the many challenges of IPRMs.

This chapter therefore concentrate on developing a explanation for why IPRMs are not more successful by re-examining some of the central analytical findings positioned on three linked levels of responsibility, the macro, the meso, and the micro levels. This complexity of levels is vital to emphasise because the roles and responsibilities within IPRMs are tightly connected, meaning that it foregrounds a series of conflicting demands and motives that can pull the mission in different directions. The interplay between the levels, therefore, is of key importance. As the main focus of this thesis is the police officer, it will commence with the micro-level, visiting their key issues and find reasoning on the meso- and macro-level.

There are two macro-levels that intertwine with respect to Norway’s involvement in IPRMs; on the one side, the management levels of the UN in New York and the EU in Brussels, and on the other, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice and Public Security. The same bipartition is found on the meso level between
the UN and EU mission headquarters and the CIVPOL office of the Norwegian Police Directorate, both of which are in charge of the daily operational micro-level of the mission. Ideally, doctrines and strategies on a macro level should guide the policies and action plans on the meso level, whose purpose is to direct the tactical operations on a micro level. Hence, both Druckman and Stern (1999) emphasise that more thought should be given to the link between the micro, meso, and macro levels. In the same vein, Fetherston (2000) argues that peacekeepers should be better trained in the broader political context, while politicians and policy-makers should fully understand and consider the reality of practical implementation. She thus recommends that the practice of peacekeeping should be founded on a theoretical framework that takes into account both the anticipated aims of the policy-makers and the resources available for those working on the ground (ibid.). As seen in chapter 1, international relations theory can deliver explanations for actions that take place on a macro-level, but as seen in chapter 3, no homogenous theory that applies to the meso- and micro level of IPRMs can be found. Though Linden, Goldsmith & Murphy in 2007 pushed for a doctrine on IPRM ‘that is based on theory and research concerning policing’ [emphasis added] (2007, p. 171), five years later no such doctrine exists and Dr. Mark Downes, head of the International Security Sector Advisory Team at DCAF, stresses that it is imperative that the UN immediately develops an universal doctrine that applies to all IPRMs (personal conversation, 26 of August 2012). This study therefore aims to contribute to the development of international police science that ‘focus on what is universal and central to police and policing’ [emphasis added] (Linden, Goldsmith & Murphy, 2007, p. 171).

**Micro level**

In the cross-case analysis, severe criticism was directed by the Norwegian police officers at the meso level in all three stages, pre-mission, in-mission, and post-mission. Pre-mission, the police officers encountered insufficient planning and preparation, manifested through inadequate mission-specific courses. Though they were content with the general UNPOC course, most felt unprepared for the mission itself, and no plans or framework existed to guide them before departure. Dissatisfaction was also notable around the poor needs analyses beforehand that led to an excessive waste of resources in-mission, which shocked the interviewees. The analysis revealed a desire by
deployed officers for better needs analyses in the pre-mission phase, not only to target the audience to be trained, but also to ensure that the right manpower is deployed and the right equipment donated. In reality, however, many projects appear to be steered by the (hidden) agendas of the donor countries or organisations and/or their misconceptions of what the needs really are. Too often, the result is the shipment of useless equipment or the initiation of unrealistic programmes.

In-mission, the police officers’ practical experience clearly points to a chasm between idealism and realism, an incongruity between the idealistic goals of the mandates and policies and the reality on the ground. Within regional and multilateral operations, mission life mostly failed to coincide with the police officers’ expectations, and many issues within the mission seemed not to make sense. The cross-analysis revealed a lack of personnel overlap and subsequent knowledge transfer upon arrival in-mission, with police officers having to start from scratch again and again, causing a great deal of down time and inefficient use of resources. The Norwegian Police Directorate has split its annual contingent into two departures every half-year so that experienced personnel always can be present, but no-one provides follow-up for the specific positions, which leaves personnel lost for a long time. Because most competent individuals preserve the knowledge gleaned on missions, this absence of overlap causes the mission a loss of vital institutional knowledge - their departure creates a knowledge vacuum.

The police officers had a reproachful view on the lack of focus on the practical and professional side of policing in-mission, a focus they felt were overlooked or disregarded by the macro- and meso-level. For example, external factors like low wages, corruption, and poor equipment for the local police caused frustration, as did the lack of a clear mission framework, longstanding goals for on-going projects and continuity. There was a clear perception that progress could have been much faster had there been more predictability and better management and organisation. Despite a desire in the international mission arena for a long-term approach, out in the field, most police officers experienced a constant shift in goals and projects. New focuses took over old projects, which resulted in short-term solutions and frustrated
international police officers. The demands for fast results from the macro and meso levels both nationally and internationally not only led to constant changes but often conflict in what the micro level perceived to be important from their professional police point of view. For instance, as the cross-case analysis showed, several of the deployed police officers experienced being moved from one project to another mid-project, having to start from scratch on the new one, often after a political visit from the meso or macro level. This ‘trimming the sails to the wind’ imbued the missions with an ad hoc feeling, which can only partially be excused by the unpredictability of a crisis. And, these crises, although different, inherently include similar elements, so a standard framework for IPRMs should be developed that enables police officers to better prepare both physically and mentally.

The concurrent lack of guidelines led to some individuals on the ground having a great deal of power while others slipped into obscurity. Although such power can be positive in that it leads to independence and initiative, it can also result in an absence of control and a self-contained system that fosters individualism. In fact, according to the cross-case analysis, a direct consequence of this lack of a solid framework and structure was that most action on the ground moved from the bottom up, not from the top down, so that the system depended on individuals rather than the other way around. This reliance on competent individuals makes the right choice of the IPRM leader vitally important, especially for larger, more complex missions. Hence, although leadership is not such a major issue in small, self-driven projects like JUNO Serbia, which have no day-to-day management needs, in Liberia and Afghanistan, where leaders have a significant impact on the mission, it is a vital denominator.

The cross-case analysis further revealed an institutional disregard for the police officers’ professional expertise, with officers being assigned without meaning or consideration for their previous training. An overwhelming majority of interviewees deployed to Liberia and Afghanistan found that the system lacked familiarity with, and respect for, the particular skills required for conducting specific police tasks. In fact, personnel placement came across as random and personal rather than well considered and centrally decided; apparently, Norway is sending out highly qualified specialists
who expect to make good use of their expertise and find it extremely frustrating when that is not the case. Also, the deployed police officers were used extensively to reform local police services, though reform processes are not the expertise of an operational police officer or an investigator. In fact, the research findings suggest that one consequence of putting police officers in charge of reform is a disproportionate focus on local police training, possibly to the detriment of other more appropriate interventions. Undoubtedly, this misplacement is not only a waste of resources but leads to a loss of motivation in the individual police officers.

Another key post-mission finding from the cross-case analysis relates to Norway’s handling of its deployed police officers upon return. The lack of follow-up from the police officers’ local work places greatly disappointed many respondent. The Norwegian Police Directorate’s choice of two collective debriefings a year was also seen as unsatisfactory by a majority of the interviewees, who felt that their well-being was not being properly looked after and that their acquired knowledge was not appreciated, which could lead to demotivation. Moreover, at the briefings, the returning police officers tended to recount positive experiences from the mission and restrain negative feedback for fear of losing out on future deployments. This lack of critical sharing was based on the police officers’ perceptions that they would be ‘punished’ and forfeit future missions if they told the truth. This unwillingness to communicate openly was also coloured by their being positioned in a hierarchical police system in which criticism is generally not welcomed. Such an environment poses great risks in terms of accountability...

**Meso level**

Answers to some of the critique from the micro-level, such as insufficient planning and preparation, are the responsibility of the Norwegian Police Directorate. This discontent, in particular with the mission-specific courses, resulted from such factors as resources, priorities, organisation and competence. Fetherston (2000) for example, suggests that peacekeepers should receive training beforehand that places heavier emphasis on contextual and conceptual matters, or, in Bures’ (2007) words, ‘the broader political context analysis’ (Bures, 2007, p. 416). The core question then becomes that asked in
Chapter 8: ‘What does policy mean for the practical level?’ Bayley and Perito (2010), argue that both the quality and the context of the pre-training is poor, which may be owed to the lack of conceptual and contextual understanding of the mission overall.

One explanation offered for the insufficiency of both the mission-specific courses and the needs analysis is the limited number of mission support employees at the Norwegian Police Directorate and the large amount of responsibility they must handle. As of July 2012, 64 police officers were deployed to different missions worldwide, but the CIVPOL office of the Norwegian Police Directorate has employed no analysts and is staffed by only 4 police officers to handle all missions, including all administrative and personnel issues related to deployment. In other words, in stark contrast to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who operate their missions with a ratio of 1:3, the Norwegian staff/deployee ratio is a mere 1:16 (senior official of the Norwegian Police Directorate, personal communication, 7 August 2012), which drastically limits what can possibly be achieved.

In-mission, the meso level is two-fold, consisting usually of the Norwegian Police Directorate together with the UN or EU headquarters running the missions. The UN, having by far the most experience and the best capability to facilitate IPRMs, should by now arguably have been able to develop the more advanced systems and secure a better quality and holism within their missions. However, as the literature review clearly showed, multilateral missions are not only large and cumbersome but strongly affected by the consensus mind-set that dominates the UN because of its diplomatic foundations and the pursuit of influence by a limited set of member states. As a result, actions take time and solutions are often shaped by the path of least resistance, with many compromises and little efficiency. Such ponderousness may inhibit a range of incentives from both internal and external partners and from police officers on the ground. The UN is also highly bureaucratic and expends considerable resources on administration. The critique raised by the micro-level on the absence of continuity (overlap) that is vital for success is often excused on the grounds of financial and logistical issues by UN (e.g. a doubling of personnel would require extra space, a doubling of wages, and thus increased expenses). Nevertheless, at a minimum, a
system for collecting and leveraging knowledge should be created. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Jan Egeland, Director of the European branch of Human Rights Watch,

> [w]orking bilaterally is not an option, and the UN has definitively the best track record. Look at the development in several countries in South America and Africa. This is something you couldn’t have achieved working bilaterally or with the EU for that matter. They have used a billion dollars in Afghanistan, meaning that in Afghanistan, the West has used four times the sum used in all other UN projects [author translation]. (Personal conversation, 24 March 2011)

As regards the EU, both practitioners and bureaucrats working for the EU in Brussels noted that the Union is better at creating institutions than running them. That is, although the EU looks good on paper in terms of the right thoughts and theories, it is a political and diplomatic organisation with inadequacies when it comes to turning theory into practice. Such inadequacy can be partly attributed to discussions being characterised more by politics than practical operational challenges, which leads to a flawed basis for decision-making. In addition, the EU is even more dependent than the UN on a joint approach and struggles with formulating a solid structure and foundation for its decisions. This lack of familiarity and insecurity with operational issues leads to a detail-orientated style of mission management, often dubbed ‘Brusselisation’, which manifests in a constant demand for reports and meetings that will enable it to stay in control. This excessive demand for detail in turn results in resources being tied up in reporting and administration instead of on-the-ground presence among the local police. In such a bureaucratic system, one based on management rather than involvement, humanity suffers: security comes first. This rigid focus may stem from a lack of experience and a lack of structural foundation that ensures transparency and accountability in any event.

Conversely, according to both the primary and secondary data, bilateral reform projects like JUNO Serbia can ensure continuity, feasibility, and accessibility. However, failure to incorporate and coordinate them within an overall framework can result in a fragmented and overly complex mission. Such fractured complexity was clear in the case of Afghanistan, where incoherent national police projects led to significant coordination problems.
Post-mission, the cross-case analysis pointed particularly to a significant lack of mission evaluations, not only by Norway but also by the major actors like the UN and the EU. Most especially, the data revealed an absence of any generic standard for needs analysis and assessment, leading to future planning being based on reports on activities rather than on evaluations (see Chapter 1). In the Cost of War, a documentary about Norway's involvement in Afghanistan (TV2, 16 November 2011), Socialist Left Party leader Kristin Halvorsen raised two important questions: ‘Why are we deploying people without knowing what kind of effect their service has’ and ‘Does this deployment result in change in a positive way, or can it be disturbing or even destructive?’ [author translation]. These concerns may be expressed in one crucial question: Why are appropriate evaluations linked to specific goals not planned for during the pre-assessment phase? Customary answers include the fact that they may be costly and demand a lot of resources. Also, the IPRM may be based on overall political goals and/or lack success criteria, making it difficult to measure. However, more prominent and disturbing is the possible concern for the actual result of the evaluation – for example, it may reveal a need for better preparation, or poor outcomes may lead to projects being shut down. This can result in a bad reputation for the donor country(ies) or organisation(s) responsible, and consequently lead to less funding for new projects. Cynically speaking, IPRMs will never be evaluated properly, because the international community will not like what they find.

An austere criticism from the police officer was around the issue of reintegration. Despite a letter from the Norwegian Police Directorate encouraging police districts to implement better reintegration procedures, most Chief Constables have failed to address this issue. Such failure may be attributed to the fact that IPRMs currently give no credit within the organisation for a Chief Constable’s losing personnel for a considerable amount of time and that the Norwegian Police Directorate has initiated neither incentives nor penalties to deal with this loss. The data also revealed less than satisfactory debriefing routines – only two debriefings annually, which resulted in some police officers having to wait up to 5 months before being debriefed. Not only are there obvious dangers connected to such frivolous management of returned personnel (e.g. PTSS), but the practice results in a major loss of up-to-date intelligence and important
area knowledge. Another clear finding was that the Norwegian Police Directorate disapproves of criticism from returned police officers, which produces a distorted picture of the mission conditions, both externally and internally within the Norwegian contingent. Hence, if returning officers are to believe the claims by employees of the Police Directorate’s CIVPOL section that they welcome feedback as long as it is ‘productive’, the creation of an environment in which any feedback and criticism are encouraged should be an important goal for ensuring progress, transparency and accountability.

Macro level

Norway is but one of many contributing actors and is thus not singlehandedly responsible for – or capable of – transforming a complex system that represents a myriad of diverse interests. Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly solutions to many of the challenges identified in the cross-case analysis, be they the remit of Norway, the UN, or the EU. The cross-case analytical findings showed that, because the UN is very much about diplomacy and the EU is about protecting its foreign policy objectives, politics are a significant part of the processes surrounding IPRMs and have a vast influence on the progress and outcome. Though there may be an idealistic notion of changing the overall system on the macro-level, this is in reality not doable. UN, for example, is a diplomatic organisation, not a nation-building organisation (see for example chapter 2 and chapter 6). However, there are elements within the system that is possible to change, and most notably is UNs current system that chooses leaders based on ‘whose turn it is’, rather than who is right for the job. As a result, the emphasis on balance and power often outweighs the need to find qualified personnel (Hochschild, 2010). Also, although unsuitable leadership can be partly attributed to inadequate training and education in human rights and ethics, it can also be blamed on the absence of guidelines and expectations from UNDKO or EU Brussels as to how they expect their leaders to manage the mission.

Another heavy critique that was directed to the macro-level was the abundant waste of resources (man-power). This may be due to bad planning, which can be partly blamed on the UN system not thinking far enough ahead, but it also results from the constant
shift of personnel within a mission and/or bad leadership. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that policies and direction come from the headquarters in Brussels or the DPKO, where many staff members are unfamiliar with police functions and/or do not understand the difference between the police and the military. A focus on resource management would thus be an investment for both the UN and the EU, and it could be argued that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being a large financial contributor to the UN and also the EU (through EEA), should push for better usage of its deployed personnel. It could even be argued that the Norwegian police officers’ excellent reputation (remarked on by a significant number of co-operating partners in this research) is a valid enough basis for such a request.

Being outside the EU, Norway must develop its own foreign policy, and since it seemingly wants to project itself as a soft power, this policy often accommodates conflicting interests (as seen in Chapter 1). On the one side is the traditional, realistic view on security and self-interest as linked to the transatlantic dimension, NATO cooperation, and a gradual approach to the EU; while on the other is the more idealistic, humanitarian, and moral aspect. The country’s foreign policy objectives are therefore flexible and pragmatic but too often ambivalent. For example, the part of Norwegian foreign policy designed to secure Norway’s position and interests and promote it in the international arena is solidly rooted in realism. From this perspective, deploying highly educated Norwegian police officers – whose combination of skills, belief in equality, and benevolence makes them sought after not only by the UN and the EU but for a flux of bilateral proposals – is a political tool to strengthen international relationships. Nevertheless, research has also shown that part of Norway’s foreign policy can be positioned squarely within liberalism, with Norway’s involvement often marked by the desire to make a change, particularly in the areas of human rights and gender, even where such a goal appears realistically unachievable, such as in Afghanistan. Therefore, through its police deployments to IPRMs, especially to strategically important countries, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs fulfils its international obligations, thereby protecting its security needs, while projecting a humanitarian face through development and democracy building.
As emphasised in the introduction to this thesis, however, this complexity within Norway’s foreign policy often leads to vague policies and short-term planning that (negatively) affects Norway’s overall contribution to IPRMs and ultimately, the Norwegian police officers on the ground. According to Krogstad (2012), the political reason for this lack of strategies is obvious: clear directives would pit donor countries with widely different police traditions against each other – if everything was too explicit, IPRMs would not work. As a result, politics is steering nearly everything at the expense of quality. Most particularly, the direction and intensity of involvement is based on the standing government’s views and Norway’s overall desire to be ‘everywhere’, meaning that the involvement tends to be fragmented and not well thought through. Hence, although the intrinsic value of presence itself is staunchly weighted by the Norwegian government, it is not understood by demotivated deployed personnel. Such a situation, Norwegian senior officials admit, is not ideal, and the quality should be better. They are, however, faced with a conundrum:

What if we hadn’t been there? Shall we just sit still and not do anything? Liberia and Afghanistan are far from being states governed by law, but we cannot wait until that is the case – we need to do something now.

However, such national interests and motives and the importance of presence and quantity often override the joint coordination of a contribution. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, tends to push topics that it sees as important (e.g. gender issues), sometimes at the expense of the recipient country’s needs. In addition, missions are often characterised by ad hoc decisions and a sense of haste, which is often excused by the fact that IPRMs tend to take place in chaotic conflict zones. Yet police reform, rather than being a short-term solution to humanitarian crisis, is part of a long-term development, so sufficient time should be allotted to solid preparation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this display of haste has both positive and negative features: positive because Norway is focused on being able to respond quickly and act wherever and whenever needed (or when it is beneficial for Norway...); negative because quality suffers.
Conclusion

By providing an overall analysis of Norway’s contribution to IPRMs, this thesis has sought to explore the interplay of different factors that cause these missions to unfold as they do. Over the last 23 years, Norway and other Western countries have gained considerable experience with IPRMS and should currently have enough knowledge and capacity to organise, plan, train and prepare selected personnel for these missions professionally, as a minimum because of the moral imperative - police officers are actually sent to high risk zones. In reality, however, serious impediments still exist that are hindering success, so it is valid to ask whether the major contributors are thinking more of political symbolism than factual police reform. The experiences of Norwegian police officers deployed to different types of IPRMs paint a picture of an international arena torn between idealism and realism, one characterised by a pragmatic approach focused on action and quantity rather than development and quality. Because of a lack of doctrines and strategies and a system that is not sufficiently well grounded, IPRMs suffer from an absence of long-term goals, success criteria, and planning. Conversely, goals are often vague and over-ambitious, demanding results that promote output rather than outcome. These findings suggest a serious need for a more solid framework – one that is quality assured and that weights quality over false perceptions of efficiency and a concern for absolute numbers. In essence, the research has shown that less is more. Put simply, the primary focus of any IPRM should be a functioning police service based on the context and traditions of the given country, armed with the basic equipment necessary to tackle the requirements of the local population.

One particularly interesting point in this study has been the coherence in the views expressed by the Norwegian police officers interviewed and in the experiences of the police officers and senior officials working in various organisations around the world. Independent of each other, these respondents showed a striking congruence of opinion. In fact, the analysis revealed a general consensus among the informants on several factors they thought vital for success: well-thought-out and appropriately tailored mission planning; pertinent pre-mission courses with a strong focus on context; on-site preparation for their arrival at the mission; matching of their expertise with their assignment; qualified and strong leadership; and a substantial debriefing.
upon return to ensure maximum knowledge transfer to domestic police partners, both internal and external. All the informants reported experiencing the absence of some or all of the above factors, an absence validated in the academic literature (Bayley, 2006; Bayley & Perito, 2010; Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007; Dupont & Tanner 2008; Murney & McFarlane, 2009). The cross-case analysis also revealed that police officers in bilateral projects like JUNO were far more content than those in multilateral and regional missions, not only with the mission experience itself, but most particularly because their expertise was being used to the fullest, suggesting that from a policing standpoint, bilateral IPRMs are to be preferred.

**Final reflections**

Is it possible to do more and is it worth the cost? These questions have played in my head since the beginning of this research. In all honesty, the level of criticism on my part towards the seeming randomness and lack of preparation within IPRMs was stronger going into the project than coming out of it. The complexity of these missions is striking, as is the distance between idealism and reality on the ground, which has made this an extremely challenging study. Though being exceptionally fortunate having been sponsored both by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Police University College, this has occasionally put a great demand on my ability to keep a professional academic distance.

However, the level of commitment and dedication of individual actors has stood out, from the different policy-makers to the operational police officers, all expressing a genuine concern and a wish to make a difference. The deployed police officers particularly showed a high level of knowledge and insight, which made it especially discouraging that most felt their experiences had been disregarded. Hence, as a final comment on the weakness detailed in this study, I draw on the words of Taleb and Blyth (2010):

> The system is responsible, not the components. (Taleb & Blyth, 2011, p. 36).
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Appendix 1 – Interviewee Overview

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<th>Country</th>
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**CODING**

- **PO** = Police Officer
- **CP** = Co-operating Partner
- **E** = Experienced Senior Officials
Appendix 2 – Field Work Overview

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APPENDIX 3 From Mission Idealism to Operational Realism

Appendix 3 – Dissemination

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<td>2011, March - The Norwegian Police Directorate. Presentation of PHD project.</td>
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<td>2010, September - Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). <em>Presentation of PhD-project. Oslo</em></td>
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<td>2010, April - Department of Research, Norwegian Police University College. <em>Presentation of PhD-project. Oslo</em></td>
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<td>2010, March - Research Scholars in the Norwegian Policing Community. <em>Presentation of PhD-project. Oslo</em></td>
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<td>2009, November - CEPOL Police Science Conference. <em>Presentation of PhD-project. Amsterdam.</em></td>
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<td>2009, September - European Society for Criminology: <em>First In, Best Dressed? The importance of the police in post-conflict democratic reform.</em> Ljubljana, Slovenia.</td>
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<td>2009, March - The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <em>PhD-seminar – presenting the project for sponsor.</em> Oslo</td>
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**LIST OF PUBLICATIONS**
