SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND
THE CONFUSION AND COMPETITION NEXUS:
THE CASE OF KOSOVO

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for an award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the University of Portsmouth

March 2011
Abstract

This work examines security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict states. It proposes that intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) are significantly impeded in their pursuit of coherent and effective SSR programmes by internal and external rivalry and contradictory agendas. These difficulties occur at both systemic and actor levels. Current institutional theory has little to say on the role of confusion, rivalry and competition in shaping IGO behaviour when operating in the security sector. As SSR is a crucial but challenging component of peacebuilding it is essential to identify the sources of these influences, explain their impact, and suggest ways by which impediments to SSR outcomes may be mitigated.

Using the 2006 Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) as a case study, the thesis analyses how inter- and intra-IGO relationships affect SSR. It explores the lack of a clear definition of SSR and the dispute over its scope and application. It then evaluates relationships between international and local actors and the efficacy of SSR monitoring methods.

The thesis reveals that confusion, competition and rivalry are common in a SSR programme. By diverting attention from the objectives of SSR, inter-and intra-organisational and inter-personal enmities are key factors in undermining security reform initiatives. Dispute over the practical application of local ownership of SSR and how programme effectiveness is measured serve also to dilute the impact of SSR.

The thesis provides policy recommendations intended to reduce the effects of inter-and intra-organisational rivalry and competition. It proposes greater inclusion of the private sector and academic institutions in the planning and execution of SSR. It suggests areas where academics and practitioners might direct their efforts to improve SSR planning, employment and evaluation thereby producing a more effective approach to future security sector reform activities.
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Declaration

Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award.
# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

## A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAK</td>
<td>Alliance for the Future of Kosovo Party (&lt;i&gt;Alianca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës&lt;/i&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>Advisory Unit on Security, UNMIK</td>
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## B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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## C

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Christian Action Research and Education NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCG</td>
<td>Core Consultative Group (ISSR)</td>
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<td>CCK</td>
<td>Coordination Centre for Kosovo</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Council (Kosovo)</td>
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<td>CFA</td>
<td>Central Fiscal Authority (Kosovo)</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Chairman–in-Office (OSCE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIU</td>
<td>Criminal Intelligence Unit (Kosovo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COBRA</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Committee (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMKFOR</td>
<td>Commander NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMKPC</td>
<td>Commander Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence and Security Building Measures</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Communities Security Council (Kosovo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DEM</td>
<td>Department for Emergency Management (Kosovo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFI</td>
<td>DeticaDFI Management Support Corporation (US)</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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</table>
DHoM  Deputy Head of Mission (OSCE)
DJA    Department of Judicial Administration (Kosovo)
DoD    Department of Defense (US)
DPA    Department of Political Affairs (United Nations)
DPED   Department of Police Education and Development (Kosovo)
DPKO   Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations)
DRC    Democratic Republic of Congo
DSACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
DSRSG  Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)

**E**

EAR    European Agency for Reconstruction
EC     European Commission
ECJ    European Court of Justice
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EDP    European Defence Policy
ENP    European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP   European Security and Defence Policy
ESS    European Security Strategy
ESRC   Economic and Social Research Council
EU     European Union
EUFOR RD European Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo
EULEX  European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUMS   European Union Military Staff
EUPSC  European Union Political and Security Committee
EUSR   EU Special Representative

**F**

FCO    Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment
FFM    Joint EU Council-Commission Fact Finding Mission
FRY    Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

**G**

GCPP   Global Conflict Prevention Pool (UK Government)
GDP    Gross Domestic Product
GVA    Gross Value Added

**H**

HA     Humanitarian Assistance
HoM    Head of Mission (OSCE)
HQ     Headquarters
<table>
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<th>I</th>
<th>International Community</th>
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<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICM</td>
<td>International Civilian Mission</td>
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<td>ICO</td>
<td>International Civilian Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMPP</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Processes</td>
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<td>IOs</td>
<td>International Organisations</td>
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<td>IOB</td>
<td>Independent Oversight Board</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-accession</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>ISSR Steering Committee</td>
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<td>Internal Security Sector Review</td>
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<td>J</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Team</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
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<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav National Army</td>
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<td>K</td>
<td>Kosovo Consolidated Budget</td>
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<td>Kosovo Centre of Public Safety Education and Development</td>
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<td>KCPSED</td>
<td>Kosovo Development Strategy Plan</td>
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<td>Kosovo Energy Corporation</td>
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<td>Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development</td>
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<td>KVM</td>
<td>Kosovo Verification Mission OSCE</td>
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<td>L</td>
<td>Liaison &amp; Monitoring Team KFOR</td>
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<td>LDK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo Party (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës)</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan (NATO)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>Millennium Development Goals (UN)</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
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<td>United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MNTF</td>
<td>Multinational Task Force</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Municipal Security Committees (Kosovo)</td>
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<td>MTI</td>
<td>Ministry of Trade and Industry (Kosovo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFZ</td>
<td>No Fly Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSCSEC</td>
<td>National Security Council Secretariat</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Solidarity Programme</td>
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<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative (Bosnia-Herzegovina)</td>
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<td>OKPCC</td>
<td>Office of the KPC Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi (L’Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi)</td>
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<td>OPS</td>
<td>Office for Public Safety (Kosovo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORA</td>
<td>Reformist Party ORA (Partia Reformiste ORA)</td>
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<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Directorate Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAT</td>
<td>Principal-Agent Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>Provisional Business Registry</td>
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<td>PDK</td>
<td>Democratic Progress of Kosovo (Partia për Progres Demokratik e Kosovës), later renamed Democratic Party of Kosovo</td>
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<td>PDSRSG</td>
<td>Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace (NATO)</td>
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<td>PISG</td>
<td>Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (Kosovo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAP-DIB</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace-Defence Institution Building (NATO)</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee (EC)</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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**Q**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUINT</td>
<td>Group comprising of the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain, France, Germany and Italy</td>
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**R**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RACVIAC</td>
<td>Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTK</td>
<td>Radio Television Kosovo Public Television Channel</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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**S**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<td>SECI</td>
<td>South East European Cooperation Initiative</td>
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<td>SEE</td>
<td>South East Europe</td>
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<td>SEECP</td>
<td>South East European Cooperation Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEESAC</td>
<td>South Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Personnel in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SILSEP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITCEN</td>
<td>Situation Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>SILSEP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium-sized Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>SPAC</td>
<td>Senior Public Appointments Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOC</td>
<td>Stability Pact Initiative to Fight Organised Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSRG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDAT</td>
<td>Security Sector Development Advisory Team (UK Government)</td>
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<td>SSDDT</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Development &amp; Defence Transformation</td>
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<td>SSDP</td>
<td>Security Sector Development Programme</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>STM</td>
<td>SAP Tracking Mechanism</td>
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U

UK United Kingdom
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITAF United Nations Unified Task Force in Somalia
UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNNY United Nations Secretariat in New York
UNOSEK United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future status process for Kosovo
UNRRA UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
US United States of America
USAF United States Air Force
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USIP United States Institute of Peace
USOP United States of America Office in Pristina

V

VFM Value for Money

W

WEU Western European Union
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organisation

Others

3SD UNDP Project: Support to Security Sector Development.

G77 The largest intergovernmental organisation of developing states in the United Nations.

Kosovar Term used to describe Kosovo citizens of ethnic Albanian origin.

Kosovans Term used by the international community to describe Kosovo citizens of all ethnicities.

Kosova Kosovar Albanian name for Kosovo.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my appreciation to all those who participated in the research for this thesis despite their busy schedules. Their insightful comments on the role of international organisations in advancing security sector reform greatly enriched our discussions.

To the Economic and Social Research Council, which financed this work, I extend my thanks. Their support made a great difference to my ability to concentrate on the task in hand and ensured that the thesis was completed.

Most of all, however, my best wishes go to the leaders and people of the fledgling Republic of Kosova who face a challenging and uncertain future in a quickly changing world:

Këtë tesi i dedikohet tërë popullit të Kosovës, për përpjekjete tij në kaluarën dhe për suksesin e tij në ardhmen.

Ovaj postavka je posvećen svim ljudima Kosova, za njihove ranije borbe
i njihove buduće uspehe.
Dissemination

Publications


Presentations


“Operational Challenges in Implementing SSR: The political dynamics and issues of local ownership involved in SSR work”. International Security Sector Reform Conference, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sandö, Sweden, 7-11 February 2011.


“European Security and the Evolution of SSR”. UACES International Conference University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom, 3-6 September 2008.


Chapter One: Introduction

Post conflict situations are among the most complex challenges facing the international community. Responding to them requires a cogent blend of political, military, civilian, humanitarian and development activities (UN, 2005, pp.15-16). Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a crucial part of this mix. Post conflict recovery and development is aided by the creation of a secure environment with the security sector under civilian democratic control; an approach that includes institution building, organisational reform and support to civil society organisations (CSOs).

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the challenges that affect SSR policy making and practice. Confused aims, competing remits and roles, within and between intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), dilute efforts to achieve security and detract from the objective of creating stability and peace. As SSR is a crucial but demanding component of the peacebuilding process it is essential to identify the sources of discord, explain their impact and suggest ways in which competition and confusion can be overcome. The objectives of the thesis are to identify impediments to successful security reform and to make recommendations for future SSR programmes.

Violence and intra-state conflict often are consequences of governmental failure to provide stability and security for citizens. Although IGOs are aware that peace and development processes cannot be effective in situations of societal disorder, peacebuilding programmes traditionally have concentrated on institution building rather than security reform. However, as a broader understanding of the security sector has overtaken early definitions of civil-military relations, SSR has become an integral part of third party peacebuilding interventions (Forman, 2006, pp. 26-32).

Nevertheless donor governments are frequently reluctant to finance activities relating to the security sector. This is based on a belief that SSR focuses on achieving efficient military capacities and counter-terrorism programmes (Von Tangen Page & Hamill, 2006, p.2). Some donor states claim that security sector structures are, by
their nature, hierarchical and authoritarian and therefore are contrary to the values of conflict transformation. Others point to the militarism that they see as endemic in security structures and pervasive in states that are strongly influenced by their military elite. These traits are viewed as obstacles to peacebuilding (McCartney, Fischer & Wils, 2004, pp.5-9). However, SSR is a reform process that should be applied in areas where development is hindered by weaknesses in the security and justice sectors and exacerbated by a lack of democratic oversight. Additionally, SSR can encompass a range of key development objectives, including poverty reduction, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and the promotion of human rights (Helly, 2006, pp.1-2). Recognising this fact, in 2009, the then UK Secretary of State for International Development (DFID), Douglas Alexander, announced that central to his Department’s future strategy would be the creation of security along with development: “people want security and justice in the same way as they want sanitation, education and healthcare” (Baldwin, 2009, p. 33). The new Coalition Government has endorsed this sentiment and DFID’s 2011-2015 Business Plan reflects a commitment to promoting a secure base for development in post-conflict and fragile states (DFID, 2010a, pp.2; 13).

This wider application of SSR can, however, bring difficulties. The broadening of the scope of SSR to include reforms that exceed the traditional concept of civil-military relations means that security reform programmes have become particularly demanding. Such multi-faceted programmes must be understood and managed with care to ensure the success of the intervention. In addition, broader SSR means that IGOs and international organisations (IOs) find that they are competing over both the concept and management of SSR and, as a result, expensive programmes may fail to achieve their objectives.

The need for a democratically controlled security sector was well demonstrated in Kosovo. Following the 1999 conflict and the creation of a United Nations (UN) led administration it became apparent that the security sector would have to be rebuilt. This undertaking had to consider the likelihood that the province would gain its independence from the Republic of Serbia. The security institutions would first become the responsibility of the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) and then the government of a sovereign state.
The 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) is one of the more recent SSR programmes undertaken under the auspices of the UN. The ISSR has the distinction of being the only SSR review to take place in an internationally administered province of a sovereign state, a situation that provided numerous opportunities for confusion, competition and rivalry within the context of SSR. There were also external considerations, which included time-critical negotiations over the province’s political status and the reactions of neighbouring states. In addition, the province had an inexperienced and partly functioning local government, hampered by inter-ethnic tensions.

The UN, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation represented the international community in Kosovo for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Each had their separate understanding of, and agendas for, the reform of Kosovo’s security sector. The ‘international community’, in particular the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (US), Germany and Russia were keenly interested in the status of Kosovo and its security sector. While the ISSR programme was being conducted the Kosovo PISG pressed for a decision on the final political status of the province. However the Serbian Government insisted that Kosovo should remain a part of the Republic of Serbia and the UN endeavoured to reach a negotiated settlement on the issue. Thus the ISSR was conducted in an atmosphere of contending opinions and agendas that would impact on its viability and outcomes. The ISSR programme therefore provides an effective case study for this thesis and for examining the competition, rivalry and confusion, which detracts from the objective of creating stability and peace after conflict.

When examining the influence of institutional competition related to SSR, there is a lack of literature specifically dedicated to the subject. In addition, there is little cross-fertilisation between different academic areas. Security literature seldom takes note of organisational and institutional theory, social psychology and sociological behaviour concepts (Palmer & Dunford, 2008, pp.20-32; Albanese & van Fleet, 1985, pp. 244-255). Indeed, Higate and Henry (2009, p. 16) suggest that:
“sociological, anthropological and post-structural approaches to peacekeeping remain underutilised at the expense of macro-level political science or international relations theorising...[there is a] scarcity of accounts that take the embodied experiences, beliefs and feelings of both host populations and those employed in missions...”

This thesis draws together theories on group and institutional behaviour and the causes of both inter- and intra-organisation and inter-personal rivalry and competition. It relates these theories to the practice of SSR and makes recommendations for the conduct of future security reform interventions and for further research into the conduct of SSR programmes.

The thesis will also examine the problems associated with the measurement and evaluation of SSR programmes. Peake and Scheye (2005, pp. 295-327) contend that because SSR is a process, many of its goals are vague and lead to badly constructed indicators. Brozka further emphasises the imprecision related to the measurement of SSR:

“Currently, the security sector reform debate reflects a disparity characterised by a long list of general recommendations of what could and should be done, on one side, and a shorter list of concrete suggestions based on a thorough analysis of the problems in a particular post-conflict situation on the other side”(2006, pp. 1-13).

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) also stresses the need to close the gap between concepts and practice. It describes the analytical deficiency of SSR thus:

“There is a need to develop more comprehensive approaches to assessment that result in the design of realistic and focused programmes that support partner countries. A more effective approach to monitoring, review and evaluation is also vital. Indicators are needed to track progress through the results chain from inputs, process, outputs and outcomes through to impact” (OECD, 2007, p. 24).

Donor states increasingly need to justify the cost of SSR and security sector management programmes to their finance ministries. IGOs engaged in these programmes are constantly under pressure to monitor their activities and more accurately evaluate the outcome of their endeavours. The way that the current monitoring and evaluation regimes might be improved will explored in this thesis.
1.1. The Setting for the Thesis

Achieving a common approach to SSR has proved difficult, as demonstrated by contemporary international peacebuilding and post-settlement security reform initiatives. There have been several examples of post conflict reform programmes that have been unable to achieve their desired aims and objectives. Afghanistan and Iraq and, to a lesser degree, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and East Timor, for example, continue to be problematic for the international community as the intended transition from conflict to sustainable peace has faltered (Rathmell, 2005, pp. 1013–1038; Krause & Milliken, 2002, pp.753–774; Chopra, 2000, pp. 979–1000; Bieber, 2002, pp.25-29). Post-conflict countries can seldom mobilise the human and financial resources needed for humanitarian relief and subsequently for economic recovery and the burden therefore falls upon the international community (UNDP, 2008, p.3).

The involvement of international agencies in the remit of sovereign states has increased in recent years (Law, 2007, p. 17; Fitz-Gerald & Lálá, 2003, p. 9). The international community has been faced with a series of intra-state conflicts and humanitarian crises, which have led to action to resolve disputes, restore order, and build a viable security and economic base. In the Balkans and Eastern Europe the collapse of communism saw the elites within former communist countries striving to adopt pluralistic, democratic models of government. Although there were non-violent transitions, some states found this process challenging. Violence amongst ethnic groups, as they endeavoured to promote and protect their own identities and economic standing, has both caused and fed instability (Verdery, 1994, pp.33-59; Horowitz, 1985; Toft, 2003). Inter-ethnic violence, in some cases, has caused substantial population movements and the destruction of economic and social infrastructures. The ensuing disorder has provided a platform for the growth of intra-state violence in the vacuum left by the breakdown of the rule of law.

Kaldor (1999) argues that the emergence of such ‘new wars’ marks a fresh development in conflict and the efforts required to overcome it. Despite her claim that the post Cold War period has seen a transformation in the nature of conflict, the change may not be as dramatic as suggested as intra-state violence has existed alongside inter-state conflict. Nevertheless, statistics indicate a shift in the direction
of intra-state violence; for example, of the 118 conflicts between 1989 and 2004, 90 were intra-state, 21 were internationalised intra-state conflicts, and only seven were ‘traditional’ inter-state conflicts (Harbom, & Wallensten, 2005, pp. 623–635). A further development since the Cold War is the increase in ‘frozen conflicts’: areas of disputed territory whose status is unresolved.

Transnational organised criminal networks are active in such weak states (Kemp, 2004, pp. 43-59). Such networks expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the deregulation of international financial markets in 1989. Current estimates suggest that trans-national crime accounts for nearly one-fifth of global gross domestic product (GDP) (Glenny, 2008). Lord West, the former Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Security and Counter Terrorism, believes that, “the threat of organised crime to weak and post-conflict states is high and is exacerbated by the downturn in the global economy” (2009, p.7). In such environments, states can lose their monopoly on the use of force with the rise of criminal and terrorist groups (Williams, 2004, p.37). Individuals are the main victims of this “terror-crime nexus” (Benedek, 2010, pp.3-16) and due consideration must be given to the role of human security in SSR. Whilst military and internal security forces can moderate violence, the re-establishment of human security and the rule of law necessitate much wider engagement and substantial effort.

Over the last twenty years, missions have been undertaken to resolve conflict and restore political systems. These have ranged from peace operations in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia in the early 1990s to the administration of collapsed societies, such as BiH, Kosovo, East Timor and the Solomon Islands in the late 1990s. Since 1989, the frequency, scale, scope, and duration of such missions have steadily risen. In the forty years from 1948 to 1988, the UN had 15 peacekeeping operations around the world. In the period 1989 to 1999 that number increased to 31, a frequency approaching one every six months (United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.3-6) and, by the end of 2009, there were 39 operations involving 96,328 military and police personnel (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2010). The UN, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU have adapted to this new environment by widening their mandates in the area of promoting peace and security (UN General Assembly, 2004; European Communities, 2005; Ferrero-
Waldner, 2008; NATO, 2009). However, one of the international community’s most difficult challenges has been how to translate the lessons learned from experiences gained from security sector interventions into strategies for promoting sustainable peace and security in post-conflict and transitional societies (Hänggi, 2005, pp.119-125).

The need for coherent security sector strategies is urgent as the cost of post-conflict intervention in terms of lost lives, divided communities and devastated livelihoods can be immense. In Iraq there have been over 4,500 killed and 44,000 wounded coalition troops. In Afghanistan, there have been more than 1,250 coalition deaths (iCasualties, 2010). The numbers of civilian causalities in Iraq and Afghanistan are not accurately recorded but are estimated as in excess of 95,000 (iCasualties, 2010). Additionally, the financial cost continues to rise; for example, the UN peacekeeping budget for FY 2006/7 was some US $5.5 billion and for 2008/9 circa US$6.8 billion (UN DPKO, 2007; United Nations Department of Public Information, 2008). In 2006, a US congressional analysis showed that Iraq post-war activity was costing circa US$ 2 billion a week and the coalition presence in Afghanistan was costing US$ 370 million each week (Bender, 2006). In 2008, the US Congressional Budget Office stated that US$1 trillion to US$2 trillion a year was a more realistic figure for continued engagement, depending on force levels (Herszenhorn, 2008). The financial and human cost to the international community of resolving violent conflicts is, therefore, substantial and the processes for achieving sustainable peace and development must be carefully considered (Chalmers, 2005, pp. 4-7; DFID, 2003, pp. 2-9).

1.2. The Hypothesis

The principal assumption of this thesis is that IOs and IGOs (1)*, acting either bilaterally or multilaterally, have a shared desire to ensure peace and stability in post-conflict states. However officials, in international institutions and their member states, have their own agendas and perceptions with regard to SSR and these may conflict.

* Notes and interview information related to the Thesis Chapters can be found at Annex A.
The hypothesis of this work is that IGOs are significantly impeded in their pursuit of coherent and effective SSR programmes by internal and external rivalry and contradictory agendas. Inter- and intra-organisational and inter-personal rivalry and competition substantially diluted the effectiveness of the Kosovo ISSR programme. The thesis identifies the sources of confusion, tension and antagonism within the ISSR programme, explains their impact and suggests ways that competition and rivalry can be alleviated in future SSR endeavours.

The presence of competition within and between organisations is well documented. Competition and rivalry is studied in developmental psychology, in social psychology and sociology, in administrative sciences and political science as well as in economics (Smith, 1984, p. 248; Alcock, 1984, pp. 385-408). Additionally there is a body of literature referring to institutionalism and inter-organisational relationships. Although some current literature analyses regime-building processes, few studies examine the interaction of whole organisations. Therefore, research on organisations has not produced scientifically robust models for interaction, nor have concepts of competition and rivalry been sufficiently tested in various policy areas (Borchert, 2001a, pp. 165-215; Nerlich, 1994, pp. 283-304; Peters, 2004, pp. 381-402; Schmidt, 2001, pp. 149-63; Yost, 2007). Significantly, the effect of rivalry and competition on the conduct of SSR programmes and their impact on IGO relationships with local actors and institutions has not been closely examined. Academics have tended to follow a rationalist methodology looking for causal relations between actors; however inter-organisational competition is defined broadly in terms of whether one institution affects another’s development, performance or effectiveness (Gehring & Oberthür 2004, p. 247; Stokke, 2001, p. 2; Loewen, 2006, pp.11-15; Young, 1996; Oberthür and Gehring, 2006a, b, c.). Only a small number of studies have focused on the difficulties caused by competition among international organisations (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, pp. 699-732).

Nevertheless, bureaucratic politics manipulate the course of SSR programme planning and execution. Officials try to influence or shape the policy-making process. In most cases, this process is characterised by conflict and bargaining as officials compete for control of the same policy space (Brewer, 2008, pp. 37-53). Often the routines they establish and the devices they employ to cope with
uncertainties and work pressures influence the decisions made by these bureaucrats. In effect, these influences fashion the policies (Lipsky, 1983, pp.3-23). However, Page and Jenkins (2006, pp.13-18; 137-142) believe that the policy roles of middle-level bureaucrats are largely neglected in sociological theories of bureaucracy. They suggest that, "much policy work is usually conducted with few direct and specific instructions from ministers and senior officials" and that bureaucratic reality does not necessarily conform to theoretical models. They argue that despite many studies concerning bureaucracy a variety of activities that affect policy outcomes, particularly among mid-level officials, have been neglected in contemporary studies (2006, pp. 181-182).

IGOs are prone to bureaucratic competition; indeed, fundamental to the hypothesis is that competition is universal among international and national institutions and this impacts on the judgement of all those involved. It is argued that SSR has typically been viewed from the perspective of its place within the peacebuilding lexicon where it is seen as a tool used to assist in stabilisation. Consequently contemporary research into the evolution of SSR has largely neglected the detrimental effect of inter- and intra- institutional competition and inter-personal rivalry on post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives.

Nevertheless, there is a considerable body of literature on inter-organisational associations in International Relations (IR), much of it concentrating on Euro-Atlantic security institutions. This literature examines competition among organisations, especially among trade and environmental regimes. Most of these studies discuss the symptoms of competition and rivalry, perceived as dysfunctions that hinder the potential of inter-organisational cooperation. Nonetheless, theory-driven research takes little notice of this phenomenon. International organisations are perceived mainly as instruments in the hands of nation states, created by self-concerned hegemony, or as "arenas for acting out power relations" (Martin & Simmons, 1998, p. 746; Rittberger & Zangl, 2006, p. 6).

As institutional theories have proliferated across the social sciences the impetus has been to explain how social orders are produced, whether they are developed in markets, political domains, the legal field, or between organisations. Researchers
have strived to show that the institutionalisation, particularly in Europe, has occurred through a set of self-reinforcing processes. As one set of European institutions has grown, it has influenced the behaviour of others and actors have begun to take decisions in light of institutional structures and their norms and rules (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-957; Fligstein & Sweet, 2002, pp. 1206-1243). However, neoliberal and sociological institutionalists seldom view institutions from a rivalry perspective. Many academics believe that organisations are essentially ‘good’ and few have pointed to serious conflicts between them (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Indeed, Keohane (1989, p.174) suggests that:

“…without international cooperation, I believe that the prospects for our species would be very poor indeed. Cooperation is not always benign; but without cooperation, we will be lost. Without institutions there will be little cooperation”.

Arguably, such a view is based on a predisposition to discourage deep analysis of the internal and external agency of organisations and, therefore, the significance of competition and rivalry. This tendency applies equally to the study of SSR. There is therefore a requirement to reconcile the theoretical view of international organisations with the empirical reality of intra- and inter-organisational competition within the field of SSR. It is posited in this thesis that neoliberal and sociological institutionalism, although contributing to the understanding of SSR practice, does not adequately explain the influence of the rivalry and competition that occurs at the inter- and intra-organisational and personal levels. In addition, there remains a need to discover how competition is provoked within institutions and to identify the causes of conflict. Examining theoretical views of institutional and personal behaviour and relating these to empirical evidence, the thesis will draw conclusions on how competition and rivalry impacts on the application of SSR.

In addition, the thesis will explore the confusion that it generated by the lack of a viable monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for SSR. Security sectors consist of many elements and each differs in its purpose, functioning and orientation. The difficulties encountered go to the very root of M&E practice in that there are no agreed criteria for determining indicators of effectiveness within SSR or what outcomes are to be achieved. It is therefore difficult to track and evaluate changes, especially as several others may affect one sub-sector. Additionally, there is no
international blueprint for what a security sector should look like and therefore there are no agreed international models against which to measure outcomes (Chanaa, 2002: Rynn & Hiscock, 2009, pp. 4-20; Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 2008, pp. 4-5). Consequently it may be argued that SSR is a process established by the social practices of the actors concerned in SSR programmes and this view will be explored in the thesis.

There are also issues of donor bureaucracy and politics in that donor-supported SSR often promotes interventions more closely in line with the donor’s needs than those of the host state. Caparini (2005, pp.82-83) notes that donor priorities tend to shift frequently, with resultant fluctuations in the levels of funding. With donor-driven implementation, planning tends to be top-down and influenced by donor priorities, while accountability is directed upwards towards the donors. SSR programme goals are sometimes intentionally ambiguous, either to give the programme space to develop or because the programme is guided by unstated external political objectives (Chianca, 2008). Thus the practical and often urgent need to produce measured outcomes from SSR programmes conflicts with the reality of the lack of a credible means of doing so. It therefore might be suggested that measuring and evaluating the SSR process is a fruitless undertaking, given the difficulties of quantifying its impact and effectiveness.

However, current M&E frameworks for SSR programmes are typically defined by the donor’s institutional requirements. External funding is essential to most SSR programmes and donor organisations and finance ministries require detailed explanations of how effectively their money is being spent. Additionally, host states need to be reassured that SSR interventions are designed for the good of their government and people and not solely the projection of the external actor’s national interest priorities (Behn, 2003, pp. 586-589). Although the difficulties of evaluating SSR programmes are acknowledged, it is suggested that M&E is now a firm requirement of donor states. Indeed, the latest DFID’s review of their bi-lateral and multi-lateral programmes has stated that the Department will, in future, subject all candidate programmes to a rigorous assessment of their value for money and how results will be monitored and evaluated (DFID, 2011a, iii, 1-6; DFID, 2011b, pp. 13-14; Hansard, 2011, p. 167-169).
1.3. **Field Research and Methodology**

1.3.1. **Case Study Methodology**

In order to explore the influences of competition and confusion on the practice of security sector reform, research by case study was chosen as the methodological approach for this thesis. Several authors have provided guidance on interpretative research (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Klein & Myers, 1999; McKay & Marshall, 2000) and, in particular, case studies (Yin, 1984; Walsham, 1995; Darke et al., 1998). Stake (1995, pp.18 -21) suggests that cases studies concern people and programmes and seek to come to an understanding of their activities. He asserts that each case studied is similar to others but, at the same time, unique. Research focuses both on their uniqueness and their commonality and observes the subjects with a desire to learn how they function.

Erickson (1986) proposes that the most distinctive characteristic of case studies is the emphasis on interpretation. He argues that case studies are situations where the key analysis is not based on the researcher’s views but those of the people being studied and, therefore, interpretation is a major part of the research. The aim of a case study is to understand what is going on. The facts will then emerge from the research process in what Parlett and Hamilton (1976) describe as progressive focussing. Marshall and Rossman (2006, p.61) assert that unless a study is narrowly construed, researchers cannot examine all the relevant circumstances and personalities in any depth. Some research is location specific, as in this case where an actual SSR process in a post-conflict territory has to be studied. Critics of case studies suggest that the decision to focus on a specific setting can be constraining, as the study is defined by, and linked to, a particular event and population. In debates over the merits and disadvantages of case studies the problem of generalisation is raised. However, it is argued that such study is less constrained by place or population as many detractors might suggest, as the results of the work can be extrapolated to other situations of similar enquiry and then tested by further research. A case study is an experiment to test a theory; “case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes” (Yin, 1994, p.10). Niederkofler (1991) suggests, “the case study investigator's goal is not
to demonstrate the validity of an argument for statistical populations or universes. Rather he aims to create and expand rich theoretical frameworks that should be useful in analysing similar cases”. The selection of a case study methodology for this work was based on this premise: SSR, as a new and complex undertaking, does not lend itself to being neatly fitted into existing theories. SSR is evolving and, it is proposed, so should the investigation of the theoretical basis for interaction within the process. It can be argued that the strength of case studies is their internal validity, but their weakness is the external generalisability. However, it is submitted that there is a trade off between the two types of validity that, in the study of SSR, can be helpful. If is considered that a case study is complementary to more extensive research, then follow up research may provide answers about frequency distributions and statistical answers (Swanborn, 2010, p. 71).

There are also differing opinions as to how many case studies should be undertaken to ensure that the evidence revealed could be generalised. A frequent criticism of case study methodology is that, if it is dependent on a single case, then it is not possible to reach a comprehensive conclusion. Giddens (1993) suggests that case studies are suspect because they lack sufficient robustness to constitute a broad analysis. However, Yin (1994) and Hamel, Dulfour and Fortin (1993) argue that the goal of a case study should be to establish parameters and then apply them to future research. Consequently even a single case study can be considered acceptable provided that it meets the established objective. Moses & Knutsen (2007, pp. 289-290) believe that there is “need to encourage problem-driven (not methods-driven) science” in terms of research methodology.

The typical characteristic of case studies is that they work towards a holistic understanding of cultural systems of action (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 1991). Cultural systems of action refer to sets of interrelated activities engaged in by actors in a social situation (Stake, 1995). Feagin (1991), Stake (1994) and Yin (2002) believe that although case studies are not sampling research, the selection of a case must maximise what can be learnt from it, taking account of the time and funding available for the study. Case studies therefore tend to be selective, focusing on issues that are essential to understanding the structure being examined. This means that the researcher considers not just the perspective of the participants, but also the
perception of relevant groups and the interaction between them (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 1991).

Literature provides an insight into the acceptance of case studies, despite criticism of them as a methodology when used as a single case. Hamel (1993) characterises the use of a single study as a concentration of the global in the local. Yin (1989) believes that general applicability results from case study methodology, which can be seen to satisfy the three tenets of qualitative research: describing, understanding and explaining. Despite reservations about the application of the particular to the general in case studies there has been a renewed academic interest in their application. Strauss and Glaser (1967) developed the concept of grounded theory and this, in part, stimulated the renewed use of case study methodology (Tellis, 1997, p.13).

Grounded theory is a systematic generation of theory from data that contains both inductive and deductive thinking. One goal of a grounded theory is to formulate hypotheses based on conceptual ideas and to discover the participants’ main concerns and how they try to resolve them. Thus grounded theory attempts to conceptualise what is going on by using empirical data. The researcher does not formulate the hypotheses in advance since pre-formed hypotheses are excluded (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Consequently qualitative research logic, which employs a systematic and comprehensive examination of a limited number of cases in order to provide generalisations, is created and is termed analytic induction (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 2006). Cressey, (1971), suggests the stages of analytic induction are: defining the field; hypothesising an explanation; studying one case to see if it fits the facts; modifying the hypothesis or the definitions in the light of this; and reviewing further cases. According to Cressey, analytic induction re-defines the phenomenon and re-formulates the hypothesis until a universal relationship is established.

In terms of the process of how theory is generated, such qualitative research is broadly characterised by the process of analytical induction, in which the researcher moves from observation to generalisation. Inferences are made from specific observations to more general rules in order to construct a hypothesis. This methodology was developed as a means of systematising and adding rigor to the
process of analysis and the development of theory from data. Within the broad tradition of qualitative research, rather than collecting information to test a hypothesis, the explanation arises from the findings of the research (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001; Clarke, 2005; Pidgeon, 1996; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2006).

1.3.2. Selection of the Kosovo ISSR

It is posited that, by using the Kosovo ISSR as the single case study, the author was considering the latest and most holistic example of security sector review and reform available. This imperative drove the decision to take the Kosovo ISSR as the subject of study. SSR is not an established and well-tried practice; it is barely twenty years old and is still evolving. There remain differences of opinion over its definition, scope and applicability. In addition, there is a lack of consensus over who, in terms of both application and ownership, should take the lead on SSR programmes. The fact that the international community was so intimately involved in the governance of the province of Kosovo and that the ISSR was part of the process of transferring responsibility for the security sector from the UN to local government control made the presence of confusion and competition, at all levels, a major factor in influencing the outcome of the programme.

It is submitted that the case of Kosovo is particularly germane to the study of SSR as its model of international intervention and transitional administration in post-conflict situations has been repeated, since 1999, in Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor. The UN Integrated Mission, first conceived in Kosovo, is now the standard for UN stabilisation missions. As in Kosovo, subsequent international transitional missions have been particularly concerned with the democratic management of the security sector and this functional area is typically the last to be handed back to the local authorities. Thus, the Kosovo experience has laid down the norm for current stabilisation and SSR missions.

The Kosovo ISSR was, and remains, the most holistic SSR programme ever undertaken. It took place within the wider model for international intervention and transitional administration in post-conflict territories, which has now become the
standard, and as such presents a worthy case for study. Additionally, the underlying tensions, rivalry and institutional confusion demonstrated in Kosovo are being repeated across current practice of SSR. The author asserts that if time and resources were available for other case studies this would improve the evidence of applicability of his findings and indeed, he recommends that such studies take place.

1.3.3. Field Research

The field research for this thesis has consisted of a series of interviews carried out during the period October 2007 – March 2008. In all, 60 interviews were conducted. The interviews were designed to allow participants, who are or were involved in the Kosovo security sector, to discuss the 2006 Kosovo ISSR and relate their views on the interactions of the actors in the process.

Semi-structured questionnaires were used as a basis for dialogue. Tailored questionnaires were prepared for members of the international community (representing the EU, KFOR, OSCE, UN, UNDP and Diplomatic Corps) and those participants from the local population (See Annex B). It was found that the set questions frequently led the participant to cite examples to support his/her perceptions on matters of inter- and intra-institutional and personal rivalry and competition.

During 2006 the author was involved with the Kosovo ISSR. However, the only association between the work undertaken by the author and other ISSR researchers, as recorded in their Final Report (Cleland Welch, Kondi, Stinson et al, 2006) and that undertaken for this thesis is that the ISSR programme was used as a case study. Apart from the modalities of the ISSR process, described in Chapter Four, none of the work carried out in 2006 for the ISSR programme has been used as part of this thesis.

In 2007/8, interviews were undertaken in the United Kingdom, Belgium and Kosovo. Each interview lasted between 40 minutes and one and three quarter hours, dependent on participant responsiveness. The majority of the interviews were conducted face to face, with only three being conducted on the telephone. In some
cases, participants were interviewed more than once; this was either because additional information had been gained from other sources and needed to be verified by a second (or third) participant or because the participant ran out of time and the interview had to be continued at a later date. The selection of participants was based on two factors, firstly, the overall population of Kosovo (see Table 1.1 below):

Table 1.1: Population of Kosovo (Source: UNMIK Communities Section FOU/DCA).

Secondly, the interview schedule took account of the ethnicity of those who had been involved in the ISSR process (see Table 1.2 below).

Table 1.2: Community Participation in ISSR.

Of the 60 participants interviewed 34 (56.6%) were members of the international community, 26 (43.4%) were members of the Kosovo community. Of
this second group, 17 (65.3%) were ethnic Albanians, 6 (23.2%) were Serbians and 3 (11.5%) were from other ethnic groups. Within the distribution of interviewees there were further divisions, according to the professional affiliation of the participant. The breakdown of this distribution, which corresponded with the level of involvement of the organisation/group in Kosovo’s security sector and the ISSR process, is shown in Table 1.3 below.

It will be noticed that the percentage of international participants is lower by 7% than the percentage participation in the ISSR process. There are two reasons for this discrepancy. Firstly the rapid turnover of international personnel in Kosovo meant that a number of persons involved in the ISSR process had left the province (and in most cases, the international organisation) in the period between the end of the ISSR process in December 2006 and the start of the interviews for the thesis in October 2007. Secondly, it was important to ensure that the local population, particularly the minorities, was adequately represented in the sample.

The Serbian political leadership in Kosovo boycotted the ISSR process. The Serbian objections were not to the security review process per se but on being asked to work with the PISG and leaders of Albanian political parties. As they did not recognise the PISG or Albanian political structures, they could not be involved in a Steering Committee that had the Kosovar Albanian President, Prime Minister and
leaders of the major Albanian political parties as members. Nevertheless, as the second largest ethnic group in Kosovo, it was important that Kosovo Serb views were addressed during research for this thesis. Indeed, a small number of Kosovo Serbs had contributed informally to the ISSR discussions. Therefore six persons were interviewed; these were Kosovo Serbs involved in diplomatic, political, academic life and the media.

The participant numbers for the other ethnic groups was increased from 3%, (percentage participation in the ISSR process) to 11.5% (3 persons) of the local participants interviewed to take due account of their views. Among those interviewed were eight members of the ISSR Steering Committee, representing a cross section of both the international community in Kosovo and the local political leadership. The latter participants were selected to reflect the balance of ethnicities on the Steering Committee.

In all eleven persons did not wish to be interviewed and, apart from the expected reluctance of the Serbian community to participate, members of the international community were less disposed to share their views, particularly on matters related to intra-institutional competition. Nine persons, who consented to be interviewed, wished to remain completely anonymous.

The basis of the methodology for the field research was analytic induction (Znaniecki, Becker and Katz, 1934, pp. 102-137; 1958, pp.652-660; 1983, pp.127-148; Becker, 1958, pp. 653 & 658). Analysis was tentative and provisional throughout the study and only became comprehensive once the data was collected. Analytic induction was chosen as the method of research because it requires a researcher to look at an event and develop a hypothetical statement of what has happened. Whilst gathering data for this thesis the hypothesis was developed and refined.

Auerbach (2003, p.24) suggests that, “…the qualitative research paradigm assumes that the best way to learn about people’s subjective experience is to ask them about it, and then listen carefully to what they say.” Although, examination of current social practices shows that interviews are a pervasive way of acquiring information,
the understanding of the information gained from such interviews is often complicated and this was the case during the research. In order to gain maximal understanding as many as possible of the interviews were tape-recorded. The recorded and fully transcribed interview provided distinct advantages over the non-recorded interview where notes are taken, either contemporaneously or made soon after the interview was concluded. The recorded interview allowed the researcher to analyse the responses of the interviewee; emotions, hesitations and responses which might otherwise have been missed had the interview is not been taped. In addition, by being able to transcribe every word and response, the possibility of missing vital information was reduced.

However, in interviews conducted in the Albanian language, the advantages of the recorded interview were lost. The immediacy of the response was frequently impeded by the need to translate back and forth in two languages. The added length of the recording also tended to outweigh the advantages of recording the interview as transcription became convoluted and time consuming. Unrecorded interviews presented difficulties; the process took longer and the flow of the dialogue, on occasions, was interrupted when the researcher needed to check that a point had been fully understood or clarification of a statement was required.

The traditions of the Balkans region dictate that lengthy reviews of history, cultural differences and perceived wrongs are undertaken whenever participants are asked to comment on their relationships with other nationalities, organisations or political parties. This tendency was ably demonstrated during the interviews in Kosovo. Auerbach (2004, p.24) believes that people almost always talk about their experience in a storied form and thus qualitative research is based on stories. This belief was borne out during the research. Allied to the tendency to relate experiences in story-form, the participants preferred to have the full attention of their interviewer and this was difficult when taking contemporaneous notes. The problem was overcome by having an interpreter/assistant make notes of the interview alongside the researcher. This had two advantages; firstly, it allowed the researcher to concentrate more fully on the participant’s demeanour and body language and, secondly, the opportunity was presented to be able to check that he had correctly noted what was being said.
At the outset of the research phase it was intended that the computer-based qualitative data analysis software program ATLAS.ti would be used to code and analyse of the data. This programme provides a reasonably easily understood and operated tool for the systematic coding of data. It is beneficial to the analysis of the research in that it saves time and collation effort whilst presenting a record of analysis and interpretation of data which could be interrogated by other researchers or reviewers. In practice the data from interviews, whether transcribed from notes made by the researcher and the assistant during the interview or in the case of taped interviews soon after the event, was manually coded using a naming and colour-coding process. This time consuming manual process was the only practical way of capturing the information given the acute lack of electricity in Kosovo, which precluded the reliable and efficient use of computers and the software package designed to assist in this task. It was also believed that the author and the assistant/interpreter were sufficiently conversant with the subject matter to be able to analyse the data in a more systematic and critical manner, using data immersion techniques, than the ATLAS.ti specialist package could provide. However, it is noted that Lee and Fielding (1993) and Dey (1993) suggest that the shortcoming associated with computer coding have less to do with the programmes and more to how they are used and applied.

In interviews, conducted in a language other than English, an interpreter was used. Although the author has a working knowledge of the Albanian and Serbian languages, he was not confident that it was sufficiently fluent to conduct in depth interviews. However, it is acknowledged that difficulties can arise when using an interpreter during interviews and therefore great care was taken in the selection of a suitable individual. The person who filled this position was a Kosovar Albanian. She was chosen for three reasons; firstly, the author had worked with her for a period of eight years and had developed an excellent relationship which allowed the interpreter to very accurately mirror his questions and even the tone of his voice; secondly, she holds a first class honours degree from a United Kingdom University and has undertaken research methods training and, thirdly, she had worked as a Research Associate at the Kosova Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) and had a full understanding of the ISSR process. In light of these additional skills the interpreter doubled as an assistant and shadowed the author whenever possible.
The interpreter/assistant was paid for her work, using Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funds, and signed a contract, which outlined not only her duties but also the ethical parameters that applied to her work during the field research.

Although the interpreter attended all interviews in the Albanian language, some interviews in English were conducted without her presence. This was for two reasons; firstly, there were security restrictions (for instance, when visiting the KFOR Headquarters and Serbian areas) and, secondly, there were a few occasions when the participant wished to speak to the author privately. Whenever possible, however, the interpreter was included in the interview process to verify that data had been recorded accurately. This was achieved by her making notes in Albanian during the interview and then, in the evenings, comparing her notes with those taken by the author. In matters of interpretation from the Albanian language the author generally deferred to the native language speaker’s elucidation of what had actually been said rather than what he thought had been said.

Interviews with the Serbian participants were conducted in English. This was necessary as no Serb participant would consent to be interviewed with a Kosovar Albanian present and it was deemed more beneficial to conduct the interview in English rather than using an unknown interpreter. However, no discernible difference was noted between the attitudes of those being interviewed with the interpreter present and when she absent.

Conventions covering the protection of the rights of participants were observed throughout the interview process. Whenever a tape recorder was used it was essential, given the sensitivity of the subject, that principles on the usage and ownership of the material were established. There was, therefore, a need to confirm that the participant was comfortable with a recording being made, thereby gaining informed consent. Several participants indicated that they were unwilling to have their voices recorded whilst others wished to be assured that the recording would be destroyed immediately after transcription. In all, 13 (22%) of all the interviews were recorded. A number of those interviewed, when asked if they wished to remain anonymous, made it clear that they did not wish to be identified by name or position. Although the comments of those who wished to remain anonymous may have been used in the text of the thesis,
the participant is not identified and their names and occupations do not appear in the
list of those interviewed attached at Annex C.

1.3.4. Relating Theory to Practice

Security sector reform programmes grew out of the need for development agencies to
take note of the effect of the security situation when dealing with the aftermath of
conflict or transition. SSR programmes, therefore, are most likely to driven by
external actors. These actors can be national governments in their capacity as
development donors, NGOs or IGOs. Indeed IGOs have assumed, in recent years,
significant responsibilities in shaping the SSR agenda. They have played a central
role in designing and delivering SSR programmes and a number of them have
developed, or are developing, policy frameworks to guide their various SSR activities
(Law, 2007, p.4). It is clear therefore that, when seeking models to explain the
influences that impact on SSR, institutional theory should be considered.

The investigation of the way institutions affect society began in the late 19th
and early 20th century. The early study of political institutions concentrated on the
instruments of government and the state with an early exponent, Weber, focusing on
effect of bureaucracy and institutions on society (Radkau & Camiller, 2009). In the
late 20th century however, institutional studies expanded; Meyer and Rowan (1977),
DiMaggio (1983), Powell (1983; 1991) and North (1993) wedded neo-
institutionalism to economics and sociology, as well as international relations and
political science.

It may be argued that an institution is a compilation of rules and practices. It is
embedded in structures of meaning and resources, which can normally endure even in
the face of rapid personnel change. Indeed, it is considered by some to be able to
resist the personal preferences and expectations of individuals and overcome
changing external circumstances (March & Olsen, 1995). While the concept of
institution is central to political analysis, there is a wide diversity within and across
disciplines as to what type of rules and relationships can be construed as institutions
(Goodnin, 1996, p.20). The term institutionalism suggests a general theoretical
approach to the study of institutions and a set of ideas and hypotheses concerning the
relationship between institutional characteristics and agency, coupled with
performance and change. Institutionalism emphasizes the social construction of institutions and points to their inward-looking nature. Institutions may be said to enable, mold and constrain actors and are creators of identities and roles (March & Olsen, 2006, pp.4-5). Within the institutional perspective it is assumed that institutions serve to create order and predictability. However, there is evidence that, in the field of SSR, this order and predictability is often absent. Indeed, when faced with the realities of IGO engagement in SSR, institutional theory has nothing to say on why such missions, undertaken by international institutions either singly or in concert, frequently fail to achieve sustainable results, thereby condemning millions of people to poverty, misery and even death.

The author suggests that there is a gap between theory and practice when observing the security sector. There is a discrepancy between a westernised ideal of how the security sector should be structured and function, and the reality of how security sectors actually operate. In addition, although contemporary literature focuses on the roles and interaction of institutions and international organisations, there is an absence of understanding or theoretical discourse on rivalry and competition within and between IGOs when attempting to stabilise post-conflict countries and reform their security systems. The author proposes that no one theory or theoretical approach is sufficient to explain what governs the practical delivery of SSR. The study of security sector management and reform is in its infancy and the evolution of SSR theory is not well developed; indeed, Fitz-Gerald (2009, pp. 13-15) agrees the author’s contention that SSR does not conform to a single set of theories and is at a too early a stage of development to have formed its own. However, institutionalist understanding of cognitive paradigms and normative frameworks might be applicable to the work of IGOs in the field of SSR but it may be that, as Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond observe, “the social world, including the activities of institutions, is complex and beyond the comprehension of a single body of theory” (2004, p. 14). This proposition will be explored throughout the thesis.

Underlying the complexity of social interaction in the field of SSR and germane to this discussion is the reaction of states and institutions to the issue of inter-state and IGO cooperation over matters of security. Lipson (1984, pp.1-23) believes that when
economic or environmental relations are at stake, “cooperation can be sustained among several self-interested states”, whereas such collaboration is “more impoverished … in security affairs.” He suggests that, “significantly different institutional arrangements are associated with international economic and security issues” and the likelihood of cooperation is markedly different within these two areas (1984, p.18).

Conscious of the political, human and economic cost of failure in the security sector, there is an ever increasing international donor community requirement for the monitoring and evaluation of SSR programmes but, as yet, no methodology has been found that adequately fulfils this remit (Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 2008, p.1). Practical conceptual tools need to be developed to analyse the actors involved in the security sector, the process in which they interact, and the outcomes from those interactions as the reform process is undertaken. The current discrepancies in M&E serve to exacerbate the confusion that surrounds SSR activities. The thesis will explore possible models for overcoming the deficiencies in this area.

1.4. The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into two sections; the first section examines theories related to international stabilisation and state building interventions, IGO and local involvement in the processes of achieving sustainable security, the evolution of SSR, its concepts and possible related theories. It identifies and discusses consensus and divergence in the views of academics and practitioners on what constitutes SSR and whether there should be a more holistic approach to the problem of security, as used by the Kosovo ISSR. Starting this first Section, Chapter Two explores intervention and institutional theory and the challenges of measuring progress in SSR programmes. Chapter Three considers theories of cooperation and competition within and between institutions and between both international and local functionaries. Chapter Four examines academic and practitioner debate on the concepts, theories, structure and methodology of SSR and its relationship to peace building, human security and local ownership. It analyses the processes by which those involved in the security field have reached their conclusions on how SSR
should progress and what this has meant in practice. The fifth Chapter discusses the principal IGOs involved in SSR and examines their relative competencies and their relationship with one another.

The work contained in the second Section of the thesis is largely based on the research data collected in the field during 2007/8, described above. Opening this section, Chapter Six examines the historical background to, and development of, the Kosovo ISSR. Chapter Seven explores the principal IGO involvement in the Kosovo ISSR and considers the relationships that were critical to the outcome of the process. It analyses the dynamics of the interactions, at both international and organisational levels, between actors who formed part of the international community response to the SSR process. The empirical findings are synthesised with the theoretical literature explored in Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter Eight the relationship with Kosovo’s local leadership is examined, including how deeply the Kosovo political leaders were engaged in what was described by the OECD as, “…one of the most ambitious and holistic efforts at SSR undertaken in recent years, both in scope and methodology” (OECD-DAC, 2007, p. 249). In Chapter Nine, the above discussion is related to the wider field of SSR, particularly its association to ongoing dialogue in the EU, the UN and NATO on the application of SSR. It also connects the theoretical literature and empirical findings on competition and confusion within and between international organisations. In this concluding Chapter recommendations are made on the direction of future research in order to produce more coherent SSR interventions.
SECTION ONE

Chapter Two: Considering Intervention, State Building and Institutionalism

Introduction

The hypothesis of this work is that IGOs are significantly impeded in their pursuit of coherent and effective SSR programmes by internal and external rivalry and contradictory agendas. An examination of the conduct of IGOs and their officials when creating or restoring democratic governance and management of the security sector is long overdue. In particular, inter- and intra-organisational confusion and competition and the relationship between the international community and local actors is an area that has not yet been fully explored. However, academics have made detailed studies of international intervention in the affairs of post-conflict and failed states and have theorised on the nature of institutionalism and the relationships between organisations and states.

In endeavouring to determine the role of competition, rivalry and confusion in the conduct of SSR by IGOs it is necessary to review the relevant theories of state building intervention, institutionalism and performance measurement. This Chapter therefore examines the literature dedicated to international intervention and transitional administration. It relates the theories of institutionalism to the growing involvement of the international community, through IGOs, in stabilisation missions. The Chapter explores these approaches and theories in order to determine if any can adequately explain the competition and confusion nexus. Whilst proving useful in setting a baseline for SSR activities, it is suggested that none of the theories examined have explored their relevance to the security sector in any depth. Neither do they provide explanations for the effect that competition and confusion has on the conduct of SSR, which the author argues, impacts significantly on the outcome and sustainability of security reform programmes.
2.1. International Stabilisation and State Building Interventions

There are currently between forty and sixty states, with a total population of some two billion people, which have either collapsed or are on the brink of failure. The world’s most pressing problems: terrorism, drugs and human trafficking, extreme poverty, ethnic conflict, disease and genocide tend to originate in such states (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p.23). Thus fragile and post-conflict states pose a threat not only to the security of their citizens but also to democratic states and their way of life. The problem, however, is not new; the 1947 Truman Doctrine noted that the half of the world’s population was living in poverty and constituted a threat, not only to themselves but also to the more prosperous areas of the world (Duffield, 2001, p. 35).

Given this dilemma, the logic of the security paradigm in the early 21st century has necessitated the consideration, by the international community, of intervention in the sovereign affairs of failed and failing states to encourage stability and to provide the momentum for development and economic progress. This type of intervention has become more prevalent, in recent years, and is promoted by western democratic governments as state building in the name of global stability (Chandler, 2004; Duffield, 2007). In the light of increasing international intervention in the governance and administration of post-conflict territories, an understanding of the theories that elucidate the drivers of international engagement, in post-conflict and fragile states, is necessary.

Current intervention theory literature is largely based on empirical observation of the practices and normative frameworks of international transitional administrations and on the imposition of democracy by external actors (Caplan, 2002; Chesterman, 2004; Bain, 2003; Paris, 2002; Zaum, 2003, 2004). This literature is drawn from four separate approaches that have a direct bearing on contemporary issues in the field: firstly, those dealing with concepts of sovereignty, trusteeship, and neo-institutionalism, secondly, those concerned with the challenges of weak or failed states, thirdly, the literature dealing with peace-keeping and peacebuilding and fourthly, theories directly concerned with the practice of international interventions.

A common feature in this literature is an interest in the concept of sovereignty and the international community’s right to interfere with it (Krasner, 2004; Keohane,
2003; Fearon & Laitin, 2004). Zaum (2004, p. 13) suggests that the international community’s authority to govern “has remained largely unquestioned.” However, others challenge this assumption, considering such intervention as neo-colonial due to its authoritarian nature (Paris, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2004; Chopra, 2000b; Chandler, 1999).

It could be stated that imperialism did not end when the European empires relinquished their colonies after the Second World War but was just pursued by other means. If this premise is accepted then the expression, neo-colonialism, might be used to describe the ongoing nature of imperialism. Yet it may also be contended that the term is controversial because its meaning is complex, being used not only as a synonym for contemporary forms of imperialism and also, in a polemical way, in reaction to any unjust and oppressive expression of western political power. However, scholars in postcolonial studies such as Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (1998) do see neo-colonialism as being advanced firstly through "development and dependency theory" and then through "critical development theory" (pp. 49-56). Young (2001) suggests that developing, transitional and post-conflict states find it difficult to escape from the western notion of development. Classification, economic growth factors, the way economic output is measured, and the progressive linear model of development, along with the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), have become so deeply entrenched that post-conflict and developing states have no other recourse but to be part of the western system. Nkrumah (1965) explains how western powers responded to the success of national liberation movements, such as the one he led in Ghana, by shifting its tactics from colonialism to neo-colonialism:

"Without a qualm it dispenses with its flags [and] claims that it is ‘giving’ independence to its former subjects, to be followed by ‘aid’ for their development…Under cover of such phrases, however, it devises innumerable ways to accomplish objectives formerly achieved by naked colonialism" (1965, pp. 21-22).

Zisk Marten (2004) makes a comparison between modern peacekeeping and former colonial interventions by Britain, France, and the US. She suggests that modern peacekeeping operations are very similar to colonial dominance at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. First among these similarities is the motivation behind the operations. She notes that national interest took precedence
over humanitarian goals during the colonial period but, whilst acknowledging that modern peacekeeping missions give consideration to humanitarian objectives, she argues that national interest remains key to peacekeeping and stabilisation operations. Another similarity she explores is that both colonisation and peacekeeping strategies are directed to winning the local population’s hearts and minds. Colonisation and peacekeeping were, and are, undertaken to stabilise and then mold the target country and population in a manner acceptable to the interventionalists. Furthermore, both peacekeeping operations and colonialism require that the intervening authorities select the political winners in the new local order and, when doing so, they favour those people who are supportive of their efforts. Such practices occurred in both modern peacekeeping models and in the colonial period examples that she studies.

Security Sector Reform is becoming a key dynamic in stabilisation missions and the external political weight involved in such programmes is immense (Smith, 2001, p. 13). The prospect of obtaining NATO or EU membership, for example, has been used as a ‘soft’ condition to motivate new and potential members implementing SSR (Avagyan & Hiscock, 2005, p. 15). As with any other development issue, the extent to which donor activities in SSR are motivated by political motives is moot. It may be questioned for whom SSR is being designed, in whose interest, and whose criterion constitutes operational success. The activities related to SSR also presents the risk of concealing obscure motives and attracting unrelated projects. Additionally it might be suggested that, in some cases, there are financial and economic incentives behind SSR, determining where the reform efforts will be carried out. It should not be overlooked, for instance, that the “UK and US, at the forefront of SSR, are also leaders in the international arms trade” (Smith, 2001, p. 15). Although the correlation between SSR and financial motives remains difficult to verify, such potential linkages should not be disregarded.

Concern over the use of SSR as a neo-colonial tool has been raised in the UN Security Council. During a debate held in 2007, Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz, in his capacity as Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, spoke on behalf of the 118 non-aligned states expressing concern as to the motivation behind security sector reform initiatives. He stated that:
“Carrying out the rehabilitation of security sectors in states emerging from conflicts is a matter that should be decided by national governments as part of their nationally-led strategies for post-conflict peace building, taking into consideration their own needs and priorities, the socio-cultural particularities, and the specificities of each case. It is not the prerogative of the international community to prescribe the road ahead for them. National ownership is key in this regard” (Díaz, 2007).

Thus it is clear that there are valid questions over the use of SSR and its motivation. It might therefore be argued that SSR is part of a neo-colonial agenda, which aims to fashion developing states in the image, and to the advantage, of the western powers providing stabilisation assistance.

Authors, such as Chopra & Hohe (2004), Chesterman, (2004) and Caplan (2005), address this inequality of authority and influence between external and internal actors in stabilisation situations. The debate revolves around questions as to how deeply external actors should intervene, how long the intervention should last and what should be the stabilisation strategy. In all these works, however, discussion centres on the international approach and does not examine the internal stresses affecting the international transitional mission or the relationship between it and the local authorities.

It has been suggested above that one of the key areas of international intervention is SSR and there is a continuing debate over the linkages between it and stabilisation, state building and development (Fitz-Gerald & Lálá, 2003). The scope for debate is wide as SSR brings together political entities, the military and development agencies in a combined approach that creates dispute over which security and related functional areas should be included in the process (Ball and Brzoska, 2002; Hendrikson & Karkoszka, 2002).

The practice of SSR is typically undertaken, on behalf of western democratic states, by IGOs and therefore institutional theory is germane to the understanding of SSR implementation. In addition, but not examined by current security literature, there is the question of the relationships within and between IGOs and the interaction of their functionaries. The association between IGOs and the host nation is of particular concern when accessing the viability of externally imposed SSR.
complexity of SSR is that the requirement for reform typically occurs at the same
time as a whole range of other interventions (political, governmental, developmental
and economic) and, in some cases, unstable situations including open conflict. There
are academics that question the viability of SSR in such contexts, believing that it
cannot deliver sustainable outcomes (Egnell & Halden, 2009). This poses significant
concerns for stabilisation and the promotion of democratic governance because the
creation of legitimate institutions is predicated on the achievement of sustainable
security (Hänggi, 2005, pp.14-17).

2.1.1. The State Building Paradigm

In the new millennium, state building has become a focus of international
attention to promote stability in the face of seemingly growing threats from terrorism,
illegal migration and organised crime originating from failed or fragile states.
However, the institutionalist theoretical view of state building is shaped by a Western
concept of what a modern state should look like. The state building paradigm is
predominantly one where failed or transitional states are encouraged to evolve along
the lines of Western models to the point where they become rational bureaucracies
with a democratic, free-trade, pro-growth orientation that provides them access to the
benefits of the international system.

It is necessary, therefore, to consider the foundations of state building, which
have increasingly been used in the development of stabilisation theory and practice.
State building interventions, by the international community, are rooted in Weberian
understanding of state legitimacy and Western concepts of state formation (Sica,
2004). Weber argued states must attain a legitimate domination that demonstrates the
extent to which the bureaucracy and social groups acknowledge the authority of a
leader. He also maintained that there are three types of legitimate domination:
charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. Importantly, Weber recognised that
legitimacy formation, creation and maintenance are not single or separate events, but
a continual process based on engaging the citizens and their emotions (Collins, 1986).
Germane to this thesis, these requirements are difficult to convey in matrices and
logical frameworks, something that is often overlooked by donor states when
demanding precise monitoring and evaluation of stabilisation and SSR programmes.
Whilst Weber was concerned with legitimacy formation, Tilly (2000; 1990; 1975) has focused on a process that, he argues, essentially involves violence, control and taxation:

“State building provided for the emergence of specialised personnel, control over consolidated territory, loyalty, and durability, permanent institutions with a centralised and autonomous state that held the monopoly of violence over a given population” (1975, p.70).

The conduct of war brings territory under a ruler’s control, which then requires governance and protection, necessitating taxation and the formation of bureaucracies. Taxation then becomes a primary driver of resource accumulation. Tillian and Weberian theory has several commonalities. Firstly, they agree that the formation of a state requires significant violence; secondly, once in power, elites must monopolise the internal threat of violence and, thirdly, they must create an administration to raise funds to provide benefits and protect the state from external threats. Indeed, civil war or intra-state violence could be considered the first stage of state formation (as in the case of Kosovo) and it might well be argued that external interventions could hinder the process of state formation (Luttwak, 1999).

The latter two stages in state building, monopolising violence and raising funds, translate in the 21st Century as the “construction or strengthening of legitimate governmental institutions in countries emerging from civil conflict” (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p.1). This requires significant security governance and economic management reform. DFID has issued a Working Paper (Waites, 2008), which argues that stabilisation is a political process rather than just a question of technical capacity enhancements. Drawing on Waites’ model, which focuses on civil society theory and the relationship between civil society and the state, the Working Paper sees stabilisation involving political compacts, the prioritisation of core government functions and the willingness to respond to public expectations.

Despite this seemingly logical evolution, some commentators argue that modern state building is ineffective. Firstly, it is argued that intervention is unable to escape the realpolitik of international relations (Chandler, 2004). Secondly, intervention may not always be in the best interests of the local population who,
many cases, are assumed by external actors to be incapable of improving their own situation (Hellander, 2005). Bellamy (2010, pp. 51-57) argues that the international intervention in Kosovo acted as an important catalyst for subsequent development of thinking on sovereignty as responsibility. However Judah (2000, p. 84) claims that, while NATO member states emphasised that violations of human rights in Kosovo led to intervention, this was not the central issue:

“At the heart of the matter was a fundamental struggle between two people for the control of the same piece of land. … However, human rights have become an influential factor in shaping international politics. This is not to say that the Kosovars did not suffer grievous human rights abuses at the hands of the Serbian authorities … but … we can now see how the question of human rights became another weapon in the arsenal of the Kosovars.”

The rules governing intervention constitute an important part of international law but intervention, as a distinct practice in international affairs, did not exist until there was a state into which military troops could be interjected (Lang, 2009). This understanding was to be enshrined in the 1965 UN General Assembly Resolution 2131(1965) which undertook to protect the sovereignty of developing states in the context of the Cold War. However, there are assumptions surrounding stabilisation intervention that derive from the “responsibility to protect” concept (Evans, 2008; United Nations General Assembly, 2005, pp.1-5; Baranyi, Salahub et al, 2006). Nevertheless, the Kosovo intervention exposed a lack of constitutional order, at the global level, to cover this type of eventuality (Lang, 2010, p. 76).

2.1.2. The Limits of Euro-Centric Approaches

The difficulties of stabilisation and state building could arguably be the result of flaws in applying existing state building theory to post-conflict situations. Firstly, the empirical evidence base for ideas of state formation rest upon the Western European experience, which may not be entirely applicable to non-Western state building, particularly in countries without colonial histories (Ayoob, 1995). This is particularly significant for stabilisation and SSR as currently there are many nations that are deemed to need state building assistance but have little experience or understanding of Western democratic ideals. These include Afghanistan, Nepal, Yemen and Somalia as well as others, which have a colonial past, including Georgia, the Balkans,
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Indonesia and Kazakhstan (Stabilisation Unit, 2008). Intervention, in the European context, was historically a process of forming a state system. However, the type of wars that formed European states are not the same as the ‘new wars’ of the post Cold war era, which are more likely to be internal conflicts rather than inter-state wars (Luckham, 2004; Kaldor, 1999).

Contemporary thinking on stabilisation and state building seems to reflect a modern version of both Tilly and Weber’s work. The aim is the creation of a democratic state that is managed by an efficient bureaucracy, with territorial integrity, which can raise taxes (Helander, 2005; Call, 2008). These theories do not take into account the processes required for externally led (or assisted) state formation and the dangers this may engender (Barnett & Zurcher, 2009). Indeed, externally led state formation may require certain pre-conditions in order to succeed, including a homogeneous core of political leaders and the creation of a national identity (Taylor & Botea, 2008). Grindle and Mason (2002; 2007) argue that, for many countries, good governance is a distant possibility. States that suffer from weak or nonexistent institutions, insecurity and poorly developed human resources are likely to be overwhelmed by all that is needed to achieve good governance. They posit that it makes sense to find ways to reduce this burden on developing states by reordering the objective of reform activities to be that of ‘good enough governance’. Nevertheless, getting good enough governance is fraught with the potential for failure. Grindle and Mason make the valid contention that obtaining of good governance is a long-term objective, requiring substantial local buy-in, and efforts to achieve it will often be drawn out and uncertain.

The bar for state formation is set high; there are very few examples since the 17th Century where any sovereign state has been able to provide all attributes of the model state in all of its territory (Milliken & Krause, 2003). Therefore it may be argued that post-conflict or fragile states have little hope of growing into the modern form of statehood. However there are alternatives to European state formation model. These tend to emerge in historical anthropology, particularly from the Early State School, which is centred on the work of Claessen and Skalnik (1978, pp.3-31). They argued, drawing upon Engels, that that there were two paths to state-formation; as result of class and/or surplus imbalances and as a result of coercive force. It is in
the application and study of state formation in non-European states where the analysis opens up several alternative understandings the state. Furthermore, not only are there several forms of state, an idea that draws upon Weberian thinking, but also state formation in different parts of the world have distinct attributes. There may be several processes of state formation, which acknowledge local physical imperatives (land mass, climate etc.) and that the cultures which evolve in these spaces may desire different forms of statehood, distinct from a homogeneous European inspired model. If this premise is to be acknowledged, then too must be the concept of local ownership primacy in any intervention and stabilisation process.

2.1.3. The Use and Impact of Democratisation in State Building

As the peace dividend heralded by the end of the Cold War proved transitory it became clear that IGOs, including the UN and NATO, were faced with a growing number of world crises, including challenges from globalisation. It also saw a more engaged western international community striving to ensure that the ideals of good governance were promoted. In conjunction with expanding multi-lateral programmes, bi-lateral donors also enlarged their activities in this arena, increasing their financial and political involvement in programmes aimed at state building in response to their own geo-strategic need for stability. This has involved an evolution in the terminology to address emerging issues and an expansion of the institutions that are involved in the process. For example, within the international system there are now some 24 organisations involved in peacebuilding and stabilisation missions (Barnett, 2007).

The existing instruments for supporting state building are typically centred on the UN Security Council, which can mandate missions under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945, Art: 33-51). The political nature of UN interventions has grown since the end of the Cold War. This has enabled the UN to take on a more robust role, an ideal that has been sponsored by successive UN Secretary-Generals since Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (United Nations, 1992). The number of UN peacekeeping missions has grown rapidly since the 1990’s and in order to meet these expanded political goals, UN agencies have extended their
remits, with a bureaucratisation of development and state building practice especially in the security sector (Ball, 2001, pp.45-66). The paradigm, which has driven interventions since Namibia in 1989-1990, has drawn significantly from Western traditions of state building. Additionally, the international community methodology has relied on modern Western experience and systems of governance rather than more nuanced and culturally sensitive processes.

This approach has also influenced SSR programmes, which are often instigated in a form that assumes that they should be generally the same process as was used in the last place they were implemented. The emerging practice is to employ a form of ‘liberal peace’ as a way of expanding international, normally Western, influence (Chandler, 2004; Duffield, 2001; 2007). This is not dissimilar to the process of state building in the 19th and 20th Century when British colonial functionaries relied on experience gained in the early days of the British Empire to institute state building processes (Dodge, 2006). It should not, however, be overlooked that the current international focus is on linking security to good governance and economic development as a method for ensuring a social contract between population and state (DFID, 2009, pp. 69-88; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008). This approach suggests that, by delivering basic security and justice, coupled with adequate education, health and infrastructure, citizens will more willingly accept the state authority.

It is helpful to understand why democracy is seen, in the Western prospective, as a justification for international community interventions “...and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy” (Fukuyama, 1992, pp. 42-43). The democratic peace agenda argues that democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies and they seldom take up arms against one another (Tures, 2001, pp.227-228). However the concept, which promotes the Kantian view of a perpetual democratic peace, is flawed. In order to demonstrate the peaceful nature of democracies, academics have sought to measure monadic, dyadic and systemic relations between states (Mitchell et al, 1999, pp. 783-789) but these interpretations have ignored long-term trends. Farber and Gowa (1997, pp. 393-398) suggest that it is not democracy in itself that promotes peace, but it is common interest that is crucial
for international stability. Derrida is dismissive of Fukuyama’s view on the universalisation of Western liberal democracy, proposing that:

“… at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelise in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realise itself as an ideal of human history; never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity” (1993, p. 63).

Indeed, it may be argued that, by ignoring the realities of contemporary intra-state conflicts, democratisation models tend to focus on inter-state relations and ignore the fact that establishing democracy can be a highly adversarial measure within states (Huntingdon, 1997).

Many democracy promotion theories arise from structuralist, modernist and transitional positions. The structuralist model, which stems from Moore’s (1996) theories on the social origins of democracy and dictatorship, relied heavily on class as an explanation for the paths taken by states. However, the causation impact between class structure and political strategy, the changing character of the state or the impact of the nationalism is in doubt (Potter et al, 1997). Lipset’s modernist approach argues that democracy is an inherent evolution as development indices increase (Lipset, 1959, pp.69-105; Rustow, 1970, Potter et al, 1997). Inevitably this is linked to the liberal peace agenda, which attempts to combine development, economic growth and democratic governance (Duffield, 2001, Paris, 1997). The theory is however challenged by the difficulty in identifying causality in the variables and how they influence democracy (Potter, et al, 1997). Rustow (1970) proposed a less developmentalist hypothesis that is predicated on the transitional nation. He identified the key requisites for democracy as being national unity, which is often born out of conflict. It might be suggested that once the fighting abates a stage is reached when a conscious decision is made, by leading factions in the conflict, to move to a democratic system of governance. This system must then be habituated so that it becomes the norm (Rustow, 1970, pp. 337-363).

Thus is can be argued that much of the literature concerning the peace making nature of the democratic system ignores the potentially destabilising impact that the imposition of democracy by outside agents might engender. The promotion of liberal democratic governance is often viewed as the overarching panacea for a fledgling
state’s ills. However, this approach can be problematic when applied to weak and failed states, where the imposition of democracy may lead to renewed conflict by allowing space of dissent (Mousseau, 2001, p.458). Therefore the need to address the governance of the security sector becomes a very pertinent issue. SSR, particularly in post-conflict settings, is often necessary to establish a system that is able to provide genuine public security on which to build the framework of overall democratic governance (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p.32).

2.1.5. Development, Capacity Building and Stabilisation

The developmental approach to stabilisation, favoured by the international community, tends to focus on donor state led processes that are often being carried out in the context of a global policy framework. However, it was the political conditions of the Cold War that prevented the merging of development and security endeavours and distorted their conceptual relationship (Duffield, 2001). Providing support to the security sector during the Cold War effectively became “an instrument of power politics” (Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p.4). Security was essentially a military issue, which meant that non-military institutions did not engage. This was particularly the case when confronting the economic and developmental aspects of the military (Ball, 2001, pp. 45-66). Development and capacity building during this period, while linked to foreign policy, was separate from military activities. However, towards the end of the Cold War there was a greater appreciation of the links between security and development as a tool for democratisation (Thompson, 1987, pp. 126-149) and this linkage has grown considerably since that time.

What is significant in a development paradigm, geared towards stabilisation and security reform, is the degree to which bi- and multi-lateral donors have taken an interest in the way these activities support politically orientated goals. Of importance in the debate on the role of development and capacity building in stabilisation is the understanding of how development can contribute to stability and security reform. However, it is not clear that development activities, implemented in insecure environments, necessarily lead to greater stability. Polman (2010) and Maren (1997) assert that Western development aid, in post-conflict situations, is frequently manipulated by local elites. They suggest that, when Western states react to human rights abuses and the breakdown of security in post-conflict situations, they flood the
country with money, food and materiel. A high proportion of this development aid will not reach those requiring it most but will be appropriated by corrupt elites and will often finance the resumption or continuation of conflict. Additionally, evidence from Afghanistan indicates that there is no causal link in delivering development and capacity building programmes and increased support for the host nation government by its people (Wilder, 2010). Furthermore, in some cases communities seem to have no difficulty in accepting development and capacity building support at the same time as assisting or participating in attacks against their benefactors (Lister, 2006).

Therefore development and capacity building does not necessarily lead to stability, nor does it seem to promote legitimacy in insecure environments over the longer-term. Although in secure areas aid can have a role in promoting state legitimacy, the gains are often reversed if the security situation deteriorates (Wilder, 2010). Moreover, there is evidence that not only can development be ineffective, but that it can also be counter-productive in promoting stabilisation. Okuonzi and Macrae, when studying medical aid and health sector capacity building in Uganda, argued, “that inappropriately designed rehabilitation strategies obstruct rather than enable the development of sustainable systems” (1995, pp.127). Similar negative outcomes have been noted in Afghanistan where development aid has, in some instances, had a destabilising affect (Wilder, 2010).

Whilst these concerns are emerging from the field, there is also broader unease regarding the ability for development assistance, at the macro level, to encourage stability. Evidence from Sri Lanka suggests that pledges of international development, in the context of other non-aligned donors and national policies, can hinder the potential impact of the overall recovery package thus undermining the belief that development leads to security (Goodhand & Walton, 2009, pp.303-323). Therefore, doubts about impact of development and capacity building in insecure environments abide. In light of these uncertainties the concept of development, as the key driver of security, may well be incorrect and a significant level of effort and funds, provided by the international community, is wrongly directed. Stabilisation theory recognises the goal of a stable political settlement, but the current concentration of the stabilisation effort is heavily weighed towards development assistance. Efforts to reform the security sector and foster local political legitimacy
are less well developed (Berger & Weber, 2010). It is suggested that a greater focus on the external funding for SSR, ensuring the democratic management of the security sector, can greatly assist in achieving the donor states’ political and strategic objectives. It is also mooted that, if SSR planning and execution is carefully managed, less of the donor’s funds will be vulnerable to misappropriation and can be channelled towards achieving sustainable security and, therefore, sustainable development.

2.2. International-Local Balance

Whilst external actors, engaged in stabilisation and SSR programmes, may enjoy extensive political authority they rarely exercise it without contact and consultation with the local elites (Chesterman, 2004, Chap.4). One of the most vital roles of the intervening organisation is to liaise and cooperate with local authorities and leaders. However, Doyle (2002, p.73) suggests that in reality, “from a domestic point of view, a local authority shares temporarily, and usually conditionally, some of its own legitimacy with the international peace operation”. Tension or competition between international and local actors is thus almost inescapable. Indeed, this was illustrated in Rwanda where:

“Rwandan state officials … found the process of security sector review, championed by the OECD and the UK’s Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT), overly intrusive” (LSE, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010, pp. 14-15).

The most common international intervention mandates are to advise, assist and monitor. This is often the approach taken when the international community cannot achieve consensus or where the need for intervention is not considered significant. It also occurs when there is a belief that deeper international commitment will not succeed or is too expensive. Such mandates place international officials in a mentoring or monitoring relationship with officials of a domestic government. This is the UN’s traditional approach to peace support operations (PSOs) and how it is most used to operating. An international presence can provide assistance, coherence and an international standard for the development of government structures and democratic norms. This often means that when the:

“…local structures in place may be mishandled or abused, spawn an opposition, and constituted a source of conflict, the trust authority behaves as an independent advisor, identifying
flaws in the local system and suggesting corrections” (Chopra, 1998, p.14).

Examples include Sierra Leone (UNSCR 1998c, para 8) where the mandate was “to establish a presence…to assist the Government” and “to cooperate with the Government”. In Afghanistan the mandate is to “monitor and assist in implementation…advise the Interim Authority” and “use…good offices…to facilitate resolution” (Bonn Agreement, Annex 11).

Krasner (2004) suggests that international transitional administration succeeds best where the key actors are willing to work in concert. However:

“…it is more difficult is cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq; that is where local leaders have not reached agreement on what the ultimate outcome for their polity should be and where they think about positioning themselves to win support from parochial constituencies when transitional administration, along with its large foreign military force, comes to an end (2004, p.105)

Keohane (2003, p.275-298) and Krasner (2004, pp. 85-120) have evaluated the role of external actors in the reintroduction of sovereignty, with Krasner proposing a graduated view of sovereignty and a phased transference of power to local authorities. Keohane points out that, “…at first, sovereignty may not be unbundled, but actually denied, as in trusteeship arrangements” (2003. p. 297). Caplan suggests that “…the pace of devolution [must be] commensurate with the demonstrated ability of the local leadership to meet specified benchmarks” (2005, p. 215).

However, in many conflict-affected countries the actors within the security sector often have acquired powers that are above the law. Sometimes, instead of serving the population, security actors are used by the state to oppress the opposition and increase the militarisation of society. In some states, powerful militaries have destabilised civilian governments. In others, the security sector receives a disproportionate amount of the national budget, thus redirecting resources from social development to military expenditure. In the reconstruction and transformation of any post-conflict situation, SSR is a key component of stabilisation. Undoubtedly, reducing the size, budget and scope of the security sector and reforming it to become more transparent and accountable to its citizens is a difficult task in any country.
Nevertheless, the character, size and function of a national security system are critical to shaping the nature of the government and society (UNDP, 2000a, pp. 12-13).

In recent years, international donors have begun to support SSR in developing and post conflict countries. Their focus has been on the importance of good governance and civilian control of the security sector. Their activities include the provision of technical advice to governments on issues of fiscal responsibility and oversight. They have offered training programmes for military and civilian leaders in accountability, transparency and human rights. Work on strengthening government institutions and building civil society capacities to provide input into and monitor of the security sector is also provided. Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005, p.1) note that:

“Without a secure environment and a security system that ensures security even after the departure of international peace operations, political, economic, and cultural rebuilding is impossible. The latter can take place only in an environment where the local security sector is subjected to a rigorous democratisation process, putting the security forces in the service of society’s safety, not its destruction, and where both internal and external security forces are contributing constructively to the rebuilding of process”.

Engaging in SSR requires a long-term commitment by external actors. It also requires sustained funding and resources. Providing adequate money and resources however are not enough for a successful outcome, as demonstrated by the failure of SSR in Haiti despite major pledges by numerous donor states, including the US, France and Canada (Law, 2006b, p. 34). More important is the political will to sustain involvement until national actors are mature enough to assume responsibility for their own security sector governance. This requires political ‘exit strategies’ to be replaced by ‘transfer strategies’ linked to realistic and durable benchmarks (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p. 36).

The potentially negative impact of external actors on post-conflict societies must, nevertheless, be acknowledged. There are criticisms of the authoritarian approach employed by some external actors. Knaus and Martin, examining the intervention by the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, argue that the High Representative undermined local democracy by forcing European-based reform on local elites. They liken the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to an Imperial Raj (2006, pp.6-74). Chopra (2000b, p.35) makes a similar observation
about the UN administration in East Timor. Local officials are often overwhelmed by the demands made on them by external missions. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) “frequently presented regulations on complex matters to the [East Timor] National Council but gave it little time for study” (Gorjao, 2002, p. 317). This type of disregard frequently engenders frustration at the lack of opportunity for local participation. Chesterman describes the annoyance of the East Timorese who saw their role “as observers rather than the active players we should start to be” (2001, p.67). Mango (2001) has asserted that UNTAET had very different priorities from those of the East Timorese, with all legislation and decision making power reserved to the UN Transitional Administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello. The members of the National Council were appointed, not elected so “the East Timorese had a voice, but the people had never been told how to use that voice” (Mango, 2001, p.1). Etzioni suggests that “…external powers are particularly hampered in promoting deliberate change [by] a limited understanding of the local culture and societal formation; an unwillingness to make the sacrifices involved; the opposition generated by the mere presence of outsiders; and faulty theories of societal engineering” (2004, p.5).

In some cases, local consent turns to non-compliance, resistance and parallelism. In the worst case the international stabilisation mission is subjected to direct attack. In Cambodia, despite prior agreements, the Government rejected UN oversight (Dobbins et al, 2003, p.73). The Khmer Rouge was regularly obstructive and the Phnom Pehn authorities undertook a media campaign against the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UN officials were unable to gain access to administrative structures and were prevented from monitoring and supervising officials (Doyle, 2002, p.84). The continuing insurgency in Afghanistan demonstrates both the inadequacy of external intervention, as a force for change, and the way that the perceived illegitimacy of outsiders can strengthen groups opposing the creation of new structures. In terms of achieving sustainable peace, the situation in post-conflict Iraq revealed how creating a stable democratically governed society is impeded by the inability to provide basic levels of security as a precondition for rebuilding the economy (Slocombe, 2004, pp. 232-255).
However, not all commentators hold a negative view of external intervention. In contrast to Chopra, Mango and Chesterman’s belief that the UN were too authoritarian in East Timor, Hood (2004, pp. 48-51) asserts that UNTAET, despite its difficulties and failings, has assisted the building of an independent nation and the creation of a civil administration after centuries of colonial rule and an oppressive military occupation. This achievement, he believes, was underpinned by credible security guarantees and an international presence that was largely welcomed by the local population. Thus it is posited that rather than the success of a stabilisation mission being predicated on the levels of internal and external authority, and the efficiency of the international IGO, it is a subtle mix of all these elements plus the ability to foster the confidence and support of local elites and civil society that determines the outcome.

SSR is an integral part of the stabilisation process and is subject to similar challenges. Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2005, pp. 19-45) offer a comprehensive account of the problems facing SSR implementation, with a particular focus on the role of the international donor community. They note that the importance of SSR for national, regional and international security has only recently been acknowledged by international donor states and recipient societies. However, the recipients of such assistance are often sceptical about the conditions attached to reform efforts, and attempts by external actors to force their own institutional and structural preferences on societies in post-conflict transition. The manner of the intervention is also critical; Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2005, p.21) argue that, “past security assistance programmes were often ill-conceived and poorly implemented.” They emphasise that close cooperation between local stakeholders, the implementing IGO and the international donor community is crucial in ensuring successful security reform efforts.

In recent years, however, the problems facing the implementation of SSR have become more pronounced. Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2005, p.25-32) point to the potentially detrimental effects of the war on terrorism may have on SSR in countries where state compliance is needed to suppress terrorist elements. In some such cases, repressive states and security apparatuses will be strengthened if their authoritarian grip on power is considered to be useful in fighting terrorism.
Additionally, there is a danger of causing a dependency culture which creates de facto multi-lateralist states that leave nothing behind when international support is withdrawn (Cawtha & Luckham, 2003, p. 325).

SSR is a complex and multidimensional political process. In its most holistic form it embraces security, political, social and economic dimensions. While it is necessary to define appropriate measures and timetables for SSR programmes, this can be difficult when the approach is not paralleled by “high-level strategic and administrative coordination” among the different actors involved in post-conflict peacebuilding tasks (United Nations, 1998, para 64). Moreover, to assure any chance of sustainability, SSR programmes must have as an aim the timely transfer of responsibilities. In this context, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) notes that, “the long-term aim of international actors in a post-conflict situation is ‘to do themselves out of a job’ . . . [allowing] local actors to take over responsibility for rebuilding their society” (ICISS, 2001, para. 5.31).

However, the need for local inclusion is not solely confined to the international community. Local ownership of security reform activities must not be reserved to an elite group of military or internal security officers. It is noted that very few women or even local NGOs enter into the discussions surrounding the security sector, as it is often perceived to be the domain of security experts and is sufficiently mysterious to discourage non-military individuals and groups from entering the debate (UN, 2002).

On occasions, however, advocacy groups such as human rights and women’s organisations can press for reforms and insist on transparency, while raising public awareness through the media and ‘town hall meetings’. For example, in Nepal, women’s groups have trained the military in human rights law to give them a better understanding of how to treat the public (Chuter, 2000). In South Africa, local NGOs raised concerns about the environmental and health damage that military activities might cause, including the harmful affects of depleted uranium from weapons systems (Anderlini, 2004). Yet despite the opportunities that exist, more often than not, civil society is excluded or chooses to stay away from security sector discussions. During the peace talks in Sudan, the committee addressing security sector issues was made up entirely of military commanders (Farr, 2002). In Nepal, the National
Security Council was comprised solely of army personnel and representatives from the Defence Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office (Chuter, 2000).

It is in these difficult, and often confrontational, circumstances that attempts at SSR and the fostering of democratic civilian management of the security sector is undertaken. Both local elites and donor states will be expecting certain outcomes from the SSR programme. Often these expectations will be dissimilar and, on occasions, diametrically apposed. It is therefore necessary to set benchmarks, baselines, aims and outcomes for a SSR programme which have the agreement of donors, the wider international community and local leadership and civil society.

2.3. The Challenge of Monitoring and Evaluation

When considering SSR, it is important to understand that reform programmes are costly undertakings, which are typically financed by the international donor community. The justification of the cost of a SSR programme is often a matter of concern to national audit authorities. For example, the Kosovo ISSR cost £1.15million, shared between five donor states and the UN. All the donors called for a full account, from the ISSR Secretariat, of how their funds had been utilised. Herbertson (2010, p.2), of the DFID International Director’s Office, has stated that, “what concerns donors and finance ministers is not how much money is spent but what are the measurable outputs achieved”. This imperative is summed up in DFID’s recent paper on stabilisation practice (2010b, p. 48):

“DFID is planning to pilot test a revised approach to value for money (VFM) that includes specifying the expected returns of each intervention. This pilot can help test the viability of assessing VFM in the area of state-building and peace-building, where there are particular challenges in defining and measuring impact”.

The need for a credible M&E system for the conduct of SSR is self-evident, based on the practical requirement to have an effective programme strategy that will ensure that agreed objectives are achieved and that sufficient donor funding is available.

The question of how to measure agency and programmes effectively in ways that help improve performance is one of the more taxing issues in both public
management (Behn, 1995, pp.213-324) and in non-profit organisations (Young, 1997, pp.193-201). Performance measurement is the study of objective, quantitative indicators of various aspects of the performance of programmes and agencies. Different kinds of performance measures are defined to track particular dimensions of performance, such as operating efficiency, productivity and cost-effectiveness (Poister, 2003, pp.3-5).

Performance measurement is intended to produce objective, relevant information on programme or organisational performance that can be used to strengthen management of the project, inform decision making and increase accountability (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Monitoring and evaluation is designed to have a significant impact on behaviour, decision-making and outcomes or, as Osborne and Gaebler put it, “what gets measured, gets done” (1992, p. 146). M&E focuses attention on what is being measured and on the performance itself. It motivates practitioners and organisations to work to improve programme implementation. Hatry (1978, pp.28-33) asserts that there is a need for M&E because, “unless you are keeping score, you can’t tell success from failure”. Thus, M&E is essential for letting practitioners and officials know how a programme is progressing so that they can act accordingly to maintain or improve performance.

While characterisations of M&E are numerous, the OECD-DAC (2002b, pp. 21-27) definitions will be used for the purpose of this thesis:

“Monitoring: A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and main stakeholders with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds;

Evaluation: The systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors. Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy or programme. Evaluation, in some instances, involves the definition of appropriate standards, the examination of performance against
those standards, an assessment of actual and expected results and the identification of relevant lessons”.

The need to plan change, set targets and monitor the progress towards achieving objectives has led to an proliferation in studies on the difficulties facing SSR programme M&E. Researchers (Albrecht, 2009; Armytage, 2006; Babaud, 2009; Borchert, 2009; Flew & Rynn, 2009: Hvidemose & Mellon, 2009; Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 2008; Engel et al, 2006) have all identified a broad list of challenges relating to the M&E of SSR. These are categorised as the difficulties faced when undertaking M&E generally; SSR-specific challenges and problems arising from poor programme design and management:

a. **General Challenges.** The most significant challenge to any M&E system is resistance to the process by those who are invited to make use of it. Programme staff and management often perceive M&E as burdensome, unnecessary or threatening. There is often resistance to investing in expensive M&E systems, regularly set at circa 5-10% of the programme cost (OECD- DAC, 2008b; DFID, 2005). Researchers have also noted that practitioners and local elites may see donor-driven, results-oriented M&E, as undermining local ownership. Moreover, project managers do not devote enough time to developing, agreeing and building support among key stakeholders for a methodology to measure change (Foglesong, 2003, p.12; Rynn & Hiscock, 2009, pp. 4-20).

b. **SSR-Specific Challenges.** Security sectors consist of many elements differing in purpose, functioning and orientation. The difficulties encountered go to the very root of M&E practice in that there are no agreed criteria for determining indicators of effectiveness within SSR or what outcomes are to be achieved. It is therefore hard to track and evaluate changes, especially as several others may affect one sub-sector. It is also difficult to find evaluators with the knowledge of both SSR and M&E, especially from developing countries. Additionally, there is no international blueprint for what a security sector or system should look like and therefore a lack of agreed
international models against which to measure outcomes (Chanaa, 2002: Rynn & Hiscock, 2009, pp. 4-20; Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 2008, pp. 4-5). There are also issues of donor bureaucracy and politics in that donor-supported SSR often promotes interventions more closely in line with the donor’s needs than those of the host state. Caparini (2005, pp.82-83) notes that donor priorities tend to shift frequently, with resultant fluctuations in the levels of funding. Heavy reliance on external donors can undermine longer-term capacity and sustainability. With donor-driven implementation, planning tends to be top-down and influenced by donor priorities, while accountability is directed upwards towards the donors. Many SSR programmes do not pay sufficient attention to building host country M&E capacities and information management systems and, therefore, M&E is often seen as solely part of a donor agenda (Chapman & Mancini, 2008). Programme goals are sometimes intentionally ambiguous, either to give the programme space to develop or because the programme is guided by unstated external political objectives (Chianca, 2008). The OECD-DAC Handbook (2007, pp. 240-243) advocates an integrated approach to security and justice reform but differing donor policies on SSR present a challenge. This makes coherence an issue for both monitoring and evaluation.

c. The Challenges of Programme Design and Management. Many SSR programmes make little preparation for M&E during the project design stage (Rynn & Hiscock, 2009, p.4). In addition, M&E is often under-resourced; rarely adhering to the proposal that 5–10 percent of programme budget should be spent on M&E systems. Local participation in the M&E is also inadequate, with marginalised groups, beneficiary populations and rural inhabitants routinely being excluded from the process. Undue reliance on information from security sector institutions and partner government officials is often observed (Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 2008, p. 5). SSR project managers have difficulty setting benchmarks and baselines, using primary research and external data sources, given time pressures and the difficulty of collecting
information, especially as national systems and capacities for data collection and analysis are often weak (Rynn & Hiscock, 2009, p.6). Consequently, the underlying change management that should inform the design of an SSR programme is obscure. M&E systems therefore tend to concentrate on monitoring programme goals and do not explore whether the programme design is appropriate, is addressing the right issues and deploying an appropriate methodology. Evaluators tend to concentrate on the views of the SSR programme staff in order to explore the basis for the project, rather than analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the programme approach (Dalrymple, 2009; Clingendael, 2008).

In recent months the UK Government has turned its attention to the need for measuring the efficiency of their activities in post-conflict environments, including the M&E of SSR. They have acknowledged that the Departments of State involved in post-conflict activities are lacking credible M&E tools (Blair & Cleland Welch, 2010, pp 3-4) and that an imperfect M&E system cannot, in these circumstances, be simply abandoned; it must be improved. Such improvement can only be achieved by cooperation between governments, host nations and the IGOs charged with providing stabilisation and SSR.

2.4. The Role of Institutionalism

Intergovernmental Organisations play a vital role in both security sector reform and management initiatives. In virtually all of the recent SSR programme deliveries, IGOs have either led the activities or supported the lead provided by other actors (Law, 2007, p. 3-4). How this role is undertaken is vital to fostering durable security and to providing a firm platform for sustainable development, which is necessary for the revitalisation of post-conflict and fragile states.

The mechanism for the realisation and promotion of human security and the protection of human rights tends to be the promotion of democratic governance. Fragile states often lack the capacity, legitimacy and the will to deliver a
democratically managed security sector. In such cases the international community may have to act as the catalyst for democracy and good governance in the interests of both the transitional state and wider regional and international security. The concept of SSR has grown out of this realisation and it has fallen mainly to IGOs to undertake the processes of reform on behalf of their member states. It is therefore, apposite that the key theories dealing with the work of institutions and organisations are considered when ascertaining what influences the way that IGOs function.

Institutionalism can be traced back to organisational theory and has developed its own distinct schools over the last thirty years. The genesis of this new or neo-institutionalism comes from attempts to understand how and why organisations work (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.936). Barnett and Finnamore (1999, pp.702-704) suggest that there are two strands of institutional theory; one seated in economics and the other in sociology. The economic line is based on rationality and efficiency concerns whilst the sociological strand focuses on issues of legitimacy and power (Powell & DiMaggio 1991, pp.6-8).

Economic-based institutional theory assumes that the organisational environment lacks social rules, cultural content, or other actors beyond those constructing the organisation. Efficiency concerns are the dominant characteristics driving the foundation and behaviour of institutions. Sociologists, however, study organisations in non-market situations. Organisations and institutions are seen to respond to other actors, who are in pursuit of their own interests, and to the normative and cultural forces that shape how they conceptualise their own undertakings. When viewed in this way, organisations may be seen to exist for reasons of legitimacy and normative fit rather than efficiency (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991: Finnamore, 1996; Scott, 1992).

The assumptions within each major tenet of institutionalist theory raise questions about organisations. The economic approach is based on the enquiry into why business firms are created. Theories have been developed to explain the existence of business organisations, which see their role as finding solutions to trading problems and other market imperfections (Williamson, 1975; 1985; Coase, 1937). These economic-based institutional theories also inform debate over
international organisations. Neoliberals and neo-realists understand world politics to be equivalent to a market place filled with rivals (Waltz, 1979, p. 23). Thus, like economists, some political theorists see organisations as solutions to problems of competition, incomplete information and high operational costs (Vaubel 1991, p.27; Dillon, Ilgen & Willett, 1991).

Observers of international relations (IR) have, in recent years, become interested in the norms of behaviour, culture and identity of political life (Finnimore, 1996, p. 325). Sociologists working in the area of institutional theory have made assumptions about the role of norms and culture in IR that appear to challenge realist and liberal theories in political science. Indeed, within the field of sociology, argument:

“…locates casual force in expanding and deepening Western world culture that emphasises Weberian rationality as a means to both justice…and progress. These world cultural rules constitute actors, including states, organisations and individuals, and define legitimate goals for them to pursue. World cultural norms also produce organisational and behavioural similarities across the globe that is not easily explained by traditional paradigms in political science” (Finnamore, 1996, pp. 325-326).

Although neoliberals and realists disagree about the degree to which anarchy, an interest in relative versus absolute gains and fears of deception undermine international institutional arrangements, both agree that organisations help states further their interests (Baldwin, 1993; Krasner, 1991, pp.341-344). Organisations are deemed to be important because they are a focal point for political activity and because they provide incentives and constraints for political actors (Stienmo, 2001). However, organisations do not always act in the service of member state interests and this tends to weaken the hypothesis that organisations merely provide vehicles for discourse, goal achievement and information flows (Barnett & Finnamore, 1999, p.703). There is confusion over what ‘institutionalism’ is and how it differs from the organisational-based theories that preceded it. Hall and Taylor (1996, p.937) suggest that part of this uncertainty is based on the fact that institutionalism does not represent an integrated body of thought but rather consists of three ‘new’ schools: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.
2.4.1. Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism has developed from group theories of politics and structural functionalism. Structural functionalism and group conflict theories had pluralist and neo-Marxist variants, which were to influence the development of historical institutionalism (Blackburn, 1972; Block, 1987; Carnoy, 1984). Historical institutionalists are primarily interested in understanding political outcomes. Building on the work of Katzenstein (1976), academics have studied specific historical events across time and space. It became clear that there was no explanation for the inevitable variations without exploring the way in which institutions shape political processes and their outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen et al., 1992). Hall and Taylor (1996, p.937) suggest that there are several features that separate historical institutionalism from the other schools of neo-institutionalism. Firstly, in contrast to rational choice and sociological institutionalism, it rarely makes assumptions about the relationship between institutions and individuals. Secondly, it emphasises the asymmetrical relations of power. Thirdly, historical institutionalism is of the view that social causation “will be mediated by the contextual forces of a given situation, often inherited from the past” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.941). Historical institutionalists do not argue that institutions are the only vehicle for understanding political outcomes; rather they see institutions as intervening variables through which disputes over interests and power are fought (Pearson & Skocpol, 2002, 693-721).

Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 28) believe, however, that change is a product of external influences, not of the system or organisation itself. Although historical institutionalists do not deny that outside influences can bring change, they argue that it is the product of a number of factors that come together at the same time. They seek to explore these issues through analysis of the various factors that have common characteristics and affect each other over time (Orren and Skowronek 1994; Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth, 1992; Whitehead, 2002).

2.4.2. Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice institutionalism grew from studies of economics and agency theory. Rational choice institutionalists broadly view organisations as being logically constructed by individuals who are acting from self-interest (Shepsle & Weingast,
Rational choice institutionalists view institutional equilibrium as the norm. They argue that self-interest is best served when the rules are stable and actors operate within the rules. Although it is possible that not all the relevant actors are comfortable with a given institutional structure, it is typically seen to provide dependability (Shepsle, 1986).

Rational choice theorists explain the existence of institutions by the value they have for the actors involved in the decision-making process (Simon, 1991, 125-134; Williamson, 1981, 548-577). They view the relationship between institutions and actors as an approach in which the actor’s preferences are assumed to be outside institutional analysis. This contrasts with sociological institutionalism, which is seen to have a cultural approach, implying that institutions influence preference formation (Thelen, 1999; Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Additionally, rational choice theorists assert that, as human beings are rational entities, policy is characterised by extended periods of stability. Nevertheless, there are shifts in the institutional equilibrium, which may be the product of external influences on the system (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). This can be categorised as the punctuated equilibrium model of change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). This model suggests that changes occur only incrementally and are inextricably linked to the rationality of decision-makers.

The rationality of individuals is guided by a mixture of the information they possess, their cognitive limitations, and the amount of time available for the decision-making process (Simon, 1991, 125-134) and can be considered as part of bounded theory or rationality (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). This view of rationality is pertinent to the conduct of SSR in that, more often than not, many strands of information, direction and freedom of action are unavailable to the practitioners in the field. Decision-makers seldom have the necessary capabilities and resources to arrive at the best solution to a problem. They therefore tend to apply rationality only when
they have simplified the choices available to them. Rational choice institutionalists see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas and emphasise the role of strategic interaction in the determination of outcomes. However, rational choice theory is unable to explain why systems move from a particular symmetry to another (Bates, de Figueredo et al., 1998, pp.604-5).

For rationalist scholars, the central goal is to uncover the laws of political behaviour and action. Academics in this tradition generally believe that once these laws are discovered, models can be constructed that will help understand and predict political behaviour. Rational choice scholars look to the real world to see if their model is right rather than looking at the real world and then searching for plausible explanations for the phenomenon they observe. Understanding real outcomes is not the first point, creating, elaborating, refining a theory of politics is (Weingast, 1996, pp. 167-190). This means that most rational choice academics are not as interested in a comprehensive understanding of real institutions or a historical phenomenon, so much as in comprehending a theoretical principle or logic.

2.4.3. Sociological Institutionalism

The third school of institutionalism asserts that actors face institutional pressures to conform to cultural norms and expectations, regardless of the implications to the efficiency. The challenge of this school is the distinction between those parts of the social world reflecting means-ends rationality and those that represent culture. Sociological institutionalism argues that the procedures that drive institutions be seen as culturally specific practices (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.946). These culturally based models seek to find an explanation for why organisations adopt certain beliefs and structures and how they spread, over time, so that different organisations have a propensity to adopt the same policies and practices (Meyer, 1994, pp. 56-57).

Sociological institutionalists propose that organisations become alike because they adopt socially defined practices that are promoted by the wider institutional environment (Dacin, 1997, pp. 46-81). The institutional environment encourages uniformity because it consists of paradigms and normative frameworks that limit the options that decision-makers see as legitimate (Campbell, 2002, pp. 21-38).
“Organisations often adopt a new institutional practice, not because it advances the means-ends efficiency of the organisation, but because it enhances the social legitimacy of the organisation or its participants” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.946).

DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue that organisations adopt similar composition and practices by mimetic, normative and coercive isomorphism. By “mimetic isomorphism”, organisations imitate other organisations that are seen as legitimate and successful. By “normative isomorphism”, organisations comply with normative standards promoted by acknowledged authorities. By “coercive isomorphism”, organisations comply with formal rules and informal pressures promulgated by acknowledged authorities. Miller and Banaszak-Holl (2004, p.5) refer to DiMaggio and Powell’s mimetic and normative processes as “horizontal isomorphism,” and coercive processes as “vertical isomorphism.” They suggest that organisations exercise horizontal isomorphism and governments contribute to vertical isomorphism.

Both traditional emulation and isomorphic models suggest that policy adoption provides a means for overcoming uncertainty. However, they differ in explaining what organisations are uncertain about. Emulation models presuppose that organisations are undecided as to what is economically or politically efficient and, as a consequence, they look to others to provide them with guidance (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Nevertheless, Walker (1969, pp.880-889) suggests that legitimacy is an important factor when considering courses of action. Once a policy has been adopted by a number of other organisations, it is legitimised and therefore becomes attractive. Institutional theorists argue that adopting a culturally accepted policy increases an organisation’s legitimacy. Both isomorphic and emulation theorists suggest that the likelihood that an organisation will adopt a particular policy will rise as the number of other institutions adopting it grows.

Sociological institutionalism perspective suggests that organisations may also look to the wider institutional environment for direction. In addition to horizontal isomorphism, organisations are subject to both formal and informal pressures exerted by other organisations and by the cultural expectations of the society within which they operate. This may be termed vertical isomorphism. Sociological
institutionalism examines the informal, socio-cultural consequences of societal beliefs that:

"construct and legitimate organisational forms, inspires and shapes organisational norms and ideals, and even helps to constitute the identities and capacities of organisational actors" (Edelman & Suchman, 1997, 479-515).

Faced with the dilemma of insufficient information, time and resources functionaries often undertake short-term activities to deal with pressing problems. In doing so they are prone to mimic policies adopted by other organisations so that their activities are legitimised. As a result, organisations often adopt policies that are not the most efficient (Meyer & Rowan. 1977, pp.340-363; Miller & Banaszak-Holl, 2004). Thus, other organisations may become models for what is acceptable and appropriate but not necessarily apposite and efficient.

Sociological institutionalism places less emphasis on power or norms and more on the socio-cultural construction that guides individual behaviour within organisations. Sociological institutionalism does not view social patterns as moving towards equilibrium, as rational choice theorists believe, nor does it see change as being constrained by norms and traditions as in historical institutionalism. Themes in the sociological institutionalist school include the functions of institutional forms; the specificity of institutional performance; and the quest for organisational legitimacy (Brinton & Nee, 1998; Campbell & Pedesen, 2001; DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Levi, 1990).

Most pertinent to the thesis hypothesis is that many sociological institutionalists emphasise the interactive character of the relationship between organisations and individual action. Individuals characterise themselves as social actors by engaging in behaviour that reinforce the network in which they are involved. The institutional world provides a means of accomplishing this imperative. The relationship between the individual and the organisation is, therefore, built upon reasoning and the individual gains by working with institutional models to reach a desired course of action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, pp.1-40). This does not, however, suggest that individuals are not rational or goal seeking. Sociological institutionalists propose that what an individual sees as rational action is essentially
socially constructed. Whilst rational choice theorists describe individuals or organisations as seeking to promote their own interests, sociological institutionalists describe them as wishing to define and express their identity in socially appropriate ways (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 949). Because sociological institutional theory emphasises the role that collective processes of interpretation and legitimacy play in the creation and development of institutions, it can be said to better explain institutional inefficiencies than rational choice theory (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Hall & Taylor 1996, p. 953).

However, Immergut (1998) argues that, despite their apparent differences, the institutionalist schools share the belief that individuals do not express preferences. Individual decisions do not equate to collective decisions because of the influence of institutions tends to be biased in particular directions. Rational choice theory points to the equilibrium of preferences, whilst historical institutionalism favours the maintenance of the status quo and sociological institutionalism the consolidation of institutional authority in a changing environment.

2.4.4. Western Culture, Institutionalism and Fragile States

The Weberian view of bureaucratic organisations is that they represent the most efficient and effective way to coordinate complex issues and relationships. However the difficulty with this theory is that bureaucratic organisations have spread more rapidly than the arenas that were deemed to have created them (Finnemore, 1996, p.329). Meyer and Rowan (1977) contend that bureaucratic structures did not spread because they were needed, rather that they did so as a result of being seen as a social good. They exist and proliferate not because they perform an essential function but because they are externally legitimised (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 340-363). This external legitimisation, according to Finnemore (1996, p.331), is the product of Western culture, whose central feature is that rational action is both good and natural. However, this view of positive rationality is less obvious to non-Westerners who tend to structure social action in terms that do not coincide with the Western rational thinking (March & Olsen, 1989, Ch.2). Nevertheless, as the modern bureaucratic state has become the most legitimate and, therefore, the most attractive form of
political organisation so there have been clear consequences. With the perception that a territory is more acceptable if it is a state, many political contests have become more difficult to resolve. Self-determination is often seen to equal the need for statehood and this escalation in the appeal of statehood has led to the creation of a number of ineffective and fragile states (Meyer, 1980, Strang, 1991, pp. 143-162; 1990, pp. 846-860; Jackson, 1990).

Given the increased desire for statehood, practitioners have become aware that the primary agents of SSR are a democratic, well-functioning, bureaucratic state and an articulate civil society. However, it is often overlooked that before 1900 there were no genuinely democratic countries in the world. There was little expectation that democracy would spread across the globe and no great enthusiasm for it to do so (Portillo, 2010). A nineteen-thirties newspaper editorial suggested, “…it may be that the system of parliamentary government which suits Great Britain suits few other countries besides” (Times, 1936, p.2). As late as 1941 there were only 11 states in the world that could have been truly considered democratic (Keane, 2010). Even today many states do not operate in the way that Western donor communities would prefer (Luckham, 1994). States are not always functional or effective providers of security, economic growth or equal rights, yet many observers assert that sovereign states are robust organisational structures that have outlasted other forms of government. Given the weakness of many less-developed states, this can only be explained by accepting the influence of external support for the notion of statehood (Boli, 1987; McNeely, 1989; Meyer, 1980; Ramirez & Thomas, 1987; Strang, 1991).

Sociological institutionalism’s interest in isomorphism is helpful when examining this viewpoint. States with very different circumstances generally look much alike. For example, Boli (1987) notes that declarations of citizen rights are similar across the international system but have little to do with the actual the rights prevailing in specific countries. In the security sector, states tend to display a comparable form of isomorphism. Most countries have a defence ministry, even if there is no external threat. Virtually all states have an army, navy and air force, even if the need for them is not entirely clear. Eyre and Suchman (1992) suggest that military expenditure is viewed as having a strong cultural and legitimising role and as a strong indicator of statehood, even if it makes little economic or security policy
sense. Most recently, the spread of SSR departments across IGOs, including the UN, NATO and the EU, is an example of this form of isomorphism. Thus sociological institutionalism’s proposal that organisations become analogous because they adopt others socially defined elements and practices is seen to work in the security sector just as much as it appears to guide the actions of organisations. Institutional theories provide a complex view of organisations, in that they are seen to be influenced by normative pressures, sometimes arising from the state and sometimes from within the organisation itself. Under certain conditions, these pressures lead an organisation to be guided by legitimising elements, which can deflect attention away from task performance and goal attainment. However, adoption of these legitimising practices, leading to isomorphism within the institutional environment, does increase the likelihood of organisational survival (Zucker, 1987, pp 443-464). As will be discussed in Chapter Three, it leads also to domain similarity and the resulting competition and rivalry.

**Conclusions**

The zeal for statehood, since the end of World War II, along with the events surrounding the end of the Cold War have created a difficult environment for IGOs wishing to bring stability and peace to post-conflict territories. The enthusiasm for democratic statehood, and its sub-text of nationalism, has made the resolution of intra-state conflicts more difficult. However, much of the literature concerning the nature of the democratic system ignores the potentially destabilising impact that the imposition of democracy by outside agents might engender. The difficulties of stabilisation could be said to rest on errors in the application of state building theory to post-conflict situations. Western European experience may not be applicable to non-Western stabilisation. Ignoring the realities of contemporary intra-state conflicts, democratisation models tend to focus on inter-state relations and overlook the fact that establishing democracy can be a highly adversarial measure within states. Coupled with genuine concerns by some states that SSR is a tool of western neocolonialism, there are difficulties over the concept of local ownership and self-determination in security sector management matters. The dichotomies of local engagement and the effects of the developmental approach to stabilisation and SSR, favoured by the international community, often overlook the culture, sensitivities and
aspirations of the host nation. This is coupled to the pressures that emanate from the donor states to conform to their understanding of the SSR requirement. This can lead to difficulties associated with the measuring and evaluation of SSR programmes with both donors and host states requiring proof that the planning and conduct for SSR programmes meet their often conflicting needs.

It falls mainly to IGOs to initiate and deliver SSR and these organisations are subjected to pressures arising from both the wider environment, where events conspired to bring about the need for change, and from within the organisations themselves. Within the security sector a combination of a lack of information, time and freedom of action affected the choices available for decision makers. The end of the Cold War saw an increase in the IGO isomorphism, as will be described in Chapter Five. This institutional survival mechanism creates domain similarity, which in turn leads to competition, rivalry and confusion. This all has resonances with new institutionalist theory, where rational choice, historical institutionalism and the isomorphic consequences related to sociological institutionalism have some significance.

Nevertheless, although enthusiasm for neo-institutionalism has grown over the last twenty years so has scepticism. It has been questioned if the new schools of institutionalism have presented anything innovative in the field of organisations and politics (Jordan, 1990, pp.470 -484; Peters, 1999, pp. 205-220). The unravelling of institutionalism is also difficult “in multilevel and multicentred institutional settings, characterised by interactions among multiple autonomous processes” (March & Olsen, 2009, p. 8) as is the case in SSR programme delivery. Some observers (Fehr & Gächter, 1998; Olsen, 2005) note that actors within organisations sometimes deviate from what institutional rules prescribe. It is argued that it makes a difference how interaction, experience and memory are organised and to what degree goals are shared, and how the needs of the organisation are satisfied. Actions are also affected by the ratio of long-term employees to newcomers or outsiders, opportunities for promotion and the prestige of different groups within organisations (Lægreid & Olsen, 1984, pp. 845-859). These influences on the coherence of an organisation will be explored in Chapter Three.
Nevertheless, Miles and Snow (1978, pp.21-32) argue that institutional effectiveness relies on the perception of the operating environment and decisions about coping with it. They believe that this process can be broken into three areas for which management must seek to find solutions. These areas are entrepreneurial, engineering and administrative and typically occur simultaneously. Taken in the round, the principle objective is to reduce uncertainty within the organisational operation. The ideal organisation will have systems that ensure efficiency and reduce uncertainty, while simultaneously allowing appropriate innovation (Brown and Iverson, 2004, pp.377-400). This appreciation fits with the work of IGOs in the field of SSR. There is a need for project planning and the selection of methodologies, effective communication and comprehension of the local environment coupled with clear management objectives and the monitoring and evaluation of outcomes.

There is, nonetheless, a danger in relying too heavily on just one set of theories when examining a subject as wide ranging as the reform and management of the security sector. Understanding security sector issues requires that researchers consult a wider literature than they are perhaps accustomed to. It is proposed that the external relationships and internal feuds associated with international post-conflict endeavours had a pronounced effect on intervention outcomes. As an example, Shephard (2010, pp.21-30) notes that the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), set up after the end of World War II to deal with displaced persons, was constantly challenged by competing ministers, administrators and officials, and donor state dominated strategies. Whilst Washington, London and Moscow argued over funds, manoeuvred for influence and debated priorities, practitioners in the field tried to deal with the daily problems of tending to displaced persons from all over Europe. It is posited that little has changed in the last sixty-five years and modern IGOs still find it difficult to function harmoniously.

In March 2004 Kosovo erupted into a week of violence, which led to loss of lives, widespread destruction of homes, churches and businesses. The casualty toll was 22 dead and 600 injured, including 11 peacekeepers and 61 police officers. Some 3,600 people were made homeless (UNMIK, 2004b). In a report to the UN Secretary-General, Kai Eide (2004) concluded that the riots were a result of the fact that the efforts of the international community with regards to Kosovo had become
static and inward looking, without direction and internal cohesion. The international institutions on the ground were victims of confusion and competition, stemming from a lack of coherence, direction and overall planning.

There may be a case for applying the theories of institutionalism when examining the pressures created on IGOs when engaged in SSR and security sector management activities. However, it is argued that there is another layer of interaction that exists within organisations, which has a negative impact upon the practice of SSR. Underlying the complexity of institutional interaction and germane to this discussion is the reaction of states and institutions to the issue of cooperation over matters of security. It behoves those who wish to explore the application of SSR to take their investigation beyond the theories of institutionalism and examine the influence of confusion, competition and rivalry within and between organisations active in the security field. It is submitted that it is these pressures that impact upon the outcome of SSR programmes rather than the more erudite theories of institutionalism in its various forms.

The next Chapter will examine the theories of inter-organisational competition and rivalry. It will examine the importance of human agency in decision-making and consider the causes of rivalry, competition and cooperation at the inter-personal level.
Chapter Three: Cooperation, Rivalry and Competition in International Organisations

Introduction

The terms ‘competition’ and ‘rivalry’ often are used interchangeably but are distinct terms. Competition is the act of seeking to gain what another is endeavouring to acquire; such as superiority, the means to gain advancement or when two or more persons are engaged in the same enterprise and each are seeking patronage or market share. Although competition is often confused with conflict, there are important differences between the two concepts. Modern society has a tradition of competition in both work and leisure activities. Most competition however, contains the seed for potential conflict. Conflict and competition have a common root because in each case individuals or groups are usually striving toward incompatible goals. The major difference exists in the form of interference that blocks attainment of the goal. In competition between groups working toward the same goal, the competitors have formal and informal guidelines that limit what they can do to each other in attempting to reach their goal. Mack (1969, pp.327-337) illustrates the difference between competition and conflict by discussing a foot race: as long as the participants are running without interfering with each other, competition exists. If one runner interferes with the progress of other, so long as the action is defined by both involved parties as interference and not as an acceptable act under the rules, the nature of the interaction has changed and conflict exists.

Rivalry, on the other hand, can be characterised as an antagonistic situation that poses one actor or a group of actors against another and tends to drive behaviour towards recurring conflict over an extended period. Unlike competition, which tends to have set parameters, rivalry will fluctuate over time but is likely to reoccur as incidents are presented as catalysts for the ongoing enmity (Thompson, 1978, pp. 1231-1232).
It may be argued that not all competition and rivalry is detrimental; it can provide a reason to aspire to greater effort or provide a benchmark for activities. Indeed conflict theory suggests that individuals, society and organisations compete to maximise their benefits, which inevitably contributes to social change and therefore competition is a necessary force for progress (Collins, 1974, pp. 56-61). Wolff (2001, p.103), for example, implies that, “NATO seemed to have lost its traditional purpose of a collective defence alliance with the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989.” This suggests that NATO needed Warsaw Pact competition in order to give it a purpose and an objective. Indeed, it was only with the emergence of other threats and the creation of other roles that the Organisation retained its prime position in the security architecture of Europe. Thus ‘constructive competition’, the type of contest that provides a reason for an institution, or indeed a person, to exist and to operate can act as a spur (Deutsch, 2006, pp. 23-43; Tjosvold et al, 2003, pp. 63-84). The antithesis to ‘constructive competition’ is that which undermines and impedes work towards stated aims and objectives. However competition and rivalry is actor specific and grounded in the agency of decision-making bodies. This Chapter will consider ‘destructive’ competition, which may include rivalry in its construction, and its effect on SSR.

3.1. Human Agency in Decision-Making

There has been a recent revival of interest in the self-referent experience of human agency, which argues that self-generated activities lie at the heart of causal processes. These activities contribute to the meaning of most external influences and also function as important determinants of motivation and subsequent action. The capacity to exercise control over an individual’s own thought processes, motivation, and action is a distinct human characteristic. Consequently, because judgments and actions are partly self-determined, individuals can effect change in themselves and their situations through their own efforts.

The manner in which human agency operates has been conceptualised in at least three ways: as autonomous agency, mechanical agency, or emergent interactive agency (Bandura, 1989, p.1185). The suggestion that human beings serve as entirely
independent agents of their own actions has few advocates, however, environmental
determinists occasionally promote the view of autonomous agency in arguments
designed to repudiate any role of self-influence in causal processes (Barling & Abel,
1983, pp. 265-272). In terms of the advocates of mechanical agency, it is an internal
instrumentality through which external influences operate mechanistically on action,
but it does not itself have any motivative, creative, self-reflective or self-directive
properties. In this view, internal events are products of external ones devoid of any
causal efficacy because the agency resides in environmental and action within a
system. In this model of reciprocal causation, action and environmental events all
operate as interacting determinants. Any account of the determinants of human
action must, therefore, include self-generated influences as a contributing factor

Germane to the mechanisms of personal agency, is an individual's beliefs as to
their capability to exercise control over events that affect their lives. Self-efficacy
beliefs function as an important set of proximal determinants of human motivation,
affect, and action. They operate on action through motivational, cognitive, and
affective intervening processes. Self-efficacy beliefs affect thought patterns that may
be self-aiding or self-hindering. These cognitive effects take various forms; much of
human behaviour is regulated by forethought involving recognised goals with
personal objective setting influenced by a self-appreciation of capabilities (Bandura

Thus, in the course of social interaction, humans mutually transform each
other to produce a new level of reality and this social reality is the world that
individuals inhabit. As Durkheim (1976, p. 422) recognised, this social reality is
depends upon the fact that humans acknowledge their relationships with each other.
The importance with which social relations are invested is unique to the intercourse
of human beings. Weber was similarly impressed by the potency of human social
relations and described sociology as “a science concerning itself with the interpretive
understanding of social action” (Weber 1978, p.4,). He explained “action is social in
so far as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is
thereby oriented in its course” (Weber 1978, p.4).
For Weber, human social action was distinctive because it was directed towards others. The mutual reaction of others was an intrinsic element of human interaction. Moreover, these interactions were never independent of human consciousness. Individuals came to a mutual understanding of what their interactions signified. Human social relations were ultimately dependent on the shared meanings that the participants attached to their actions and relations.

Within political structures there is an ultimate decision-making unit that, although it may change with the nature of the problem and with time, shapes policy. Hudson (2002, pp.3-4; 2005, p.2) suggests that, while most contemporary IR theory places the state at the centre of policymaking, individuals, acting singly or in groups, are at the heart of the decision-making process. She argues that few mainstream IR theories take note of the human agency and, this omission means that the essential media for change, creativity, persuasion and accountability, are missing. Indeed, policymaking is actor-specific and as states are abstractions they cannot have agency. Nevertheless, if using a realist approach, a decision-making group can be regarded as a unitary rational actor and therefore equivalent to a state (Hudson, 2005, p.2). This approach, however, denies the role of human agency in decision-making. Stressing the role of decision-makers in IR makes it possible to look beyond the abstract state to consider the influence of the officials who act on behalf of the state and society (Snyder et al, 2002, p.31; 1954, p.54).

Once human agency is taken into account the decision-making process becomes far more complicated. The roles of emotion, intellect and the health of individuals come into play. Therefore political psychology, neuroscience and behavioural science can contribute to the exploration of these areas, including an analysis of the pressures that leaders and decision-making groups may endure at times of crisis (Bechara, 2004; Crawford, 2000; Gertner, 2003; Janis, 1982: L’Etang, 1970; McDermott, 2008; Park, 1998; Post & Robins, 1990).

Hermann and Hermann (1989, pp. 363-364) suggest that there are three types of decision-making units; single groups, multiple autonomous actors and predominant leaders, which may, rarely, include Weber’s charismatic authority (1947). The single group consists of a body of individuals that make decisions collectively. Multiple
autonomous actors are separate individuals or groups that, although not hierarchically related, can act in concert to solve a problem. A predominant leader is an individual with the power to make unopposed choices. Each unit is influenced by pre-existing knowledge, culture and values and by the character and history of those participating in the decision-making process.

In the planning and execution of SSR all of these units may be deployed. During the Kosovo ISSR a single group, SSDAT, undertook the scoping and proposal stage of the planning cycle. The various security committees of UNMIK and the ISSR Steering Committee were comprised of multiple autonomous actors and a predominant leader controlled UNOSEK.

Schafer & Crichlow identify three significant control variables in the process of reaching decisions: the contextual sensitivity of the decision-makers, the difficulty in obtaining consensus in the group and the relationships among the actors (2002, pp.48-65). A contextual sensitive decision-maker will be aware of the varying rationale and ambiguities related to a particular decision and will be generally flexible in reacting to alternatives and new ideas (Nydegger, 1975; Driver, 1977; Streufert & Streufert, 1978). Nevertheless, even given a flexible decision-maker, group dynamics remain complicated. When decision-making units are small, members have greater loyalty to the group and are more likely to share core beliefs. Often members will support each other’s predispositions and feel comfortable with collective decisions. This will tend to harmonise their deliberations and consensus can be reached quickly. Although this will contribute to rapid problem solving, individual creativity and independent thinking may well be lost in the pursuit of group cohesiveness as ‘groupthink’ takes over (Baron, 2005, pp. 219-253; Esser & Ahlfinger, 2001, pp. 31-39; Janis, 1972, p.9).

Multiple autonomous actors act together to solve a problem. However, because of the need to form coalitions, the decisions of multiple autonomous actors tend to be more measured than those of a single group or a predominant leader. Nevertheless, if group members have a greater diversity of values, positions and perceptions disagreement will prevail. The most difficult of the variables to predict is the nature of the relationship between individual actors. Often these relationships
will depend on past interactions and the presence of divergent core beliefs and they also can be influenced by wider issues, including the need to further personal ambitions or increase status within the group (Tetlock, 1979, pp. 1314-1324; McGrath, 1984; Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 383-385; Hermann, 1981, pp. 209-232).

Single group decision-making is most common in contemporary governments, typically consisting of, for example, National Security Councils, Cabinets or the UK civil contingencies committee (COBRA). These groups will have the authority to take decisions without consulting other groups. Prompt consensus on decisions to overcome problems is at the heart of single group decision-making. Due to the urgency to act in a crisis, factors outside those already known to the group often have little bearing on their decisions. Members of the group reinforce each other’s judgment and feel secure in their collective decisions (George, 1980; Hermann & Hermann, 1989; Janis, 1972).

When considering the predominant leaders decision-making process it is the character of the individual that is of significant importance. If the predominant leader is driven by conviction then he/she is likely to view information in a manner that confirms his/her beliefs. This type of leadership has been styled as “autocratic” (Bass, 1981) or “crusading” (Stoessinger, 1979); such leaders tend to surround themselves with like-minded people who share their ideas and aspirations. The more pragmatic leader is open to opinions and suggestions and views incoming information judiciously. Such a leader strives to be flexible and will more readily adapt to changing situations. However, it is a rare predominant leader that does not possess a strong belief in the validity of his/her judgement (Ziller et al, 1977; Stroessinger, 1979, Gardiner, 1983).

The multiple autonomous actors group is most susceptible to external influence. It must seek information on both the environment in which it operates and on other actors in order to judge how it will be affected in its decisions. Single groups and predominant leaders are less constrained by situational complexities and therefore are likely to follow more extreme courses of action. In the case of multiple autonomous groups, each actor is likely to be convinced of the validity of his or her
own beliefs and distrust those of other parties; thus it is more likely that a higher degree of diplomacy and a lower level of resource commitment will be the outcome (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 369).

Alison and Halperin were early exponents of the crucial role of human agency and the decision-making environment in the formation of policy, suggesting that both shared values and the organisational process will affect the bargaining process and the outcome (1972, p. 43). Thus an essential element in the consideration of decision-making is the forum in which the decisions are made, taking account of the personality, social and cultural dynamics of the decision-makers and the internal and external pressures they experience. This mixture of the human component and the bargaining forum creates a predisposition for rivalry and competition.

### 3.2. Considering Inter-Organisational Competition and Rivalry

Rivalry and competition are prevalent within international relations and exist, often concurrently, at different levels. Competition is most often found at the intra-organisational and inter-personal levels when departments, institutions and individuals compete for influence or status. Competition is typically short lived but may frequently recur, although not necessarily among the same actors. Rivalry is more regularly found at the inter-organisational level and is exercised for very similar reasons as competition, which is to gain patronage or ascendancy. Rivalry, however, is likely to recur over an extended period of time and is more prone to be acted out with the same protagonists (Wayman, 2000, p.228; Colaresi & Thompson, 2002, p.285). Within the international system competition and rivalry can be witnessed on several levels of analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competition and Rivalry Groups</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>System</strong></td>
<td>East-West bloc rivalries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional</strong></td>
<td>The Balkans or Middle East conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational</strong></td>
<td>IGO /IO rivalries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td>Inter-state conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureaucratic</strong></td>
<td>Rivalries among departments, services or sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group</strong></td>
<td>Ethnic, class or religious conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal</strong></td>
<td>Competition between individual people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Competition and Rivalry Groups (adapted from Biermann, 2007, p.12).
All these stages of interaction, except for the systemic and inter-personal levels, include intra- and inter-level elements. Most of the competition and rivalry groups feature prolonged interaction mainly because they all, with the exception of the inter-personal plane, involve multi-level decision-making by a substantial number of actors. Thus they evoke elements of both rivalry and competition.

Within IGOs there are varying levels of competition and cooperation that affect the relationships between them. Even when co-operating, organisations try to position themselves to best advantage over other organisations. Law (2008, p.58) suggests three strategies that IGOs employ to leverage these relationships, as illustrated at Table 3.2 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Defensive** | a. Ignore other IGOs.  
b. Gather intelligence on other IGOs.  
c. Privilege declaratory cooperation with IGOs. | NATO, EU and OSCE strategies during and just after the Cold War in relation to each other. |
| **Enhance** | a. Compensate for a lack of policy tools, resources and relevance.  
b. Secure legitimacy for international interventions.  
c. Build alliances with like-minded actors.  
d. Create inter-institutional synergies.  
e. Provide services for other IGOs | a. All IGOs in relation to the UN.  
b. The OECD relationship with other IGOs through OECD-DAC.  
c. EU and NATO through Berlin Plus.  
d. The COE through support to EU enlargement strategies. |
| **Transformative** | a. Colonise other IGO functions.  
b. Merge with or absorb another IGO. | a. The approach of some EU member states to NATO.  
b. EEC to EU, WEU to ESDP. |

Table 3.2: IGO Strategies and Tactics (Adapted from Table 3.3 in Law, 2008, p.59).

The organisational, bureaucratic and inter-personal levels of competition and rivalry are relevant to this thesis. IGOs exist, in part, at the will of the core member states and so it is important to consider not only competition between IGOs but also between their member-states and within their administrative structures. The problems of the OSCE and NATO, for example, cannot be appreciated without considering the underlying antipathy of their member states; between the USA and Russia, in the case
of the OSCE, and between the US and France, and Turkey and Greece, in the case of NATO. Similarly, competition between the DPKO and UNDP within the UN system, as each manoeuvred for supremacy in the peacebuilding and SSR arena is relevant in this respect. Elvemar, speaking on behalf of the EU, recognised these problems of antagonism and lack of coordination:

“The EU supports all efforts to solve the problems of fragmentation within DPKO and … fully recognises the need to strengthen DPKO's links with other relevant parts of the UN system... the EU has repeatedly stressed the importance of co-ordination at every level, both at headquarters and equally important in the field. Co-ordination mechanisms within the [UN] Secretariat should be used to their fullest extent” (European Presidency, 2001, pp.1-3).

This fragmentation typifies the discord between the internal mechanisms of an IGO. Dijkstra (2008, pp.5-10) suggests the relationship between the European Commission and the Council Secretariat results from the way in which member states have delegated tasks to each institution. Since 1999, the Council Secretariat has tried to fill the political void left by the relative absence of the European Commission in political aspects of European foreign policy (Duke & Vanhoonacker, 2006). In attempting to do so it has come into competition with the European Commission, which has sought to maximise its competences beyond first pillar activities (Downs, 1967; Majone, 1996). Although both institutions have found ways of improving inter-institutional relations, structural problems remain. Indeed, Dijkstra believes that increased competition occurs when the Commission and the Council’s roles overlap and the division of labour is unclear (2008, p.2).

Competition and rivalry likewise occur within both national government and business structures. Examples of bureaucratic discord are numerous; it has been described by Halperin (1974), when analysing bureaucratic rivalry in US national security circles, as being the outcome of a mixture of objective interests (in this case National Security), organisational interests (Executive or Military) and personal interests. Within industry, the effect of competition and rivalry has long been recognised. Employees are prone to forming power bases of like-minded colleagues and withholding information from rivals. It is not uncommon for differences of opinion over project deliverables, requirements, scope and risk perceptions, engendered by rivalry, to adversely impact on productivity (Mochal, 2005).
The need to track profit and loss means that monitoring and evaluation of industry’s efficiency is better developed than within IGOs. This equally applies to the understanding of the effects of competition and rivalry. A study for the Confederation of British Industry (CEDR, 2006) has concluded that, despite that fact that the private sector is alert to the problem, conflict resulting from internal and external rivalry and competition costs UK businesses *circa* £33 billion every year. One financial expert (Esson, 2009) suggests that, on average, this equates to each business losing approximately 4.3% of gross value added (GVA).

The problem of competition and rivalry is present in relationships between the principal actors in peacemaking. Within the British system many senior military officers consider that the military understands post-conflict situations, but DFID does not. General Sir Michael Jackson believes that the British Army appreciates the need to become involved in simultaneous military and civilian post-conflict activities whilst DFID is “less than wholehearted about helping in the reconstruction efforts” (2007, pp. 213; 341). His convictions are not completely accurate but are firmly held and occasionally have influenced his relationship with the Secretary of State for International Development. (1) The UK Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, is more forthright suggesting there is arrogance among civilian organisations about military involvement in post-conflict situations. He believes that most civil servants consider that they understand SSR far better than the Armed Forces. Furthermore, Richards sees institutional rivalry, organisational envy and personal ambition at the root of most problems confronting coordinated international response to post-conflict stabilisation (2008, pp.11; 17). The civilian view is expressed by Fergusson (2008) who suggests that the military is driven by the need to find quick solutions to short term urgent problems and often loses sight of the long-term objectives confronting development and political agencies. Moller (2008, p.9) sees the difficulty as a lack of common ground between organisations when considering security and stabilisation problems. He cites as an example the lack of cohesion between the UN DPKO, UNDP and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in their understanding of security reform. Summing up the difficulties, Etherington (2008, p. 6) suggests that, in the post-conflict stabilisation process, “if there is no agreement on the problem, then it is very hard to find a solution.”
A neo-realist argument is that international organisations reflect the interests and concerns of the most powerful states (Krasner, 1991, pp.336-366; Mearsheimer, 1995, pp. 5-49). A related rational choice argument is that cooperation requires an abrogation of the status quo and that this step is typically avoided (Duffield, 2009, p.640). Nevertheless, neo-realists may have overstated the prevalence and magnitude of these concerns. Such worries are not always present in the conduct of inter-institutional affairs and may not be sufficient to inhibit cooperation. Concerns about relative gains should be less prominent between allied organisations than relations between adversaries. Alignments may be highly stable in some situations, particularly when institutions are faced with a common rival.

However, the root of the problem lies deeper than mere institutional protectionism and disagreement over objectives. Underlying organisational rivalry is a strong element of individual ambition and competition in bureaucratic politics, “the personal is tightly interwoven with the institutional. It is a rare player who can keep the two distinct, much less view the both apart from substance” (Neustadt, 1972, p.78).

3.3. The Causes of Rivalry

Competition and rivalry often are used as synonyms (2), both terms symbolising a contest between opponents for a prize or advantage. Yet, as close as they are literally, the words rivalry and competition separately imply different attitudes and actions. Rivalry is used more often than its synonym to indicate aggressive action, overriding ambition and uninhibited emotions. Competition can be as intense as rivalry but also can be viewed as a positive act. Competition, not rivalry, allows a clearer view of an opponent because the competitor does not feel compelled to deny the skill or nobility of his opponent. The opposite of competition is cooperation, whilst the antithesis of rivalry is partnership. Rivalry and partnership can have behavioural consequences; rivalry tends to produce conflict, whilst partnership engenders cooperation. Competition tends to be short lived but rivalry and partnerships are more often longer-lasting events. Thus, continuity and durability are the two main components of rivalry, provoking serial crises involving the same actors over extended timeframes (Colaresi & Thompson 2002, p. 285; Wayman, 2000, pp. 228).
Calculating the frequency of disputes occurring within a predetermined time typically identifies rivalry. However, this approach produces analytical problems, including the possibility that rivalry analysis is restricted to a method for distinguishing between groups or states that engage in frequent and infrequent conflict. Rivalry often is equated with military conflict but there are, in fact, profound differences in the levels of rivalry and competition. This thesis concerns rivalry and competition well below the level of militarised dispute therefore neoliberal and sociological institutionalism approaches are more useful. Organisational and social network theories are more appropriate for the examination of inter- and intra-organisational competition and rivalry (Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger, 1996, 2002; Gehring & Oberthür 2003, 2006; Verbeek, 1998, pp.11-26; March and Olsen, 1989; Archer, 1993).

Although the foundations of rivalry are often unclear, rivalries can be determined by structure and quickly accumulate and, over time, become set in intensity (Goertz & Diehl, 2000, pp. 202-205). They can, however, also evolve gradually in response to interactions among competing groups, which display increasing distrust and hostility as the effects of past negative exchanges feed suspicion. This suggests that both structural and relational perspectives are key components of rivalry and that it is initiated and maintained by both structural and actor-driven causes. Indeed, it is arguable that presenting them as alternatives is misleading, as structure and activity are both essential in the concepts of competition and rivalry. They both have a structural and a relational dimension and these dimensions interact with one other.

The duration of rivalry produces its own outcome. A consequence of duration is that ‘psychological baggage’ in the form of prejudice and negative opinions accumulate and lead to distorted information processing and biased group responses (Colaresi & Thompson, 2002, pp. 265, 269). Unsympathetic images of the rival are formed and internal solidarity and external hostility emerge. A variety of psychologically generated misconceptions, including stereotyping and the forming of definite, inflexible opinions accrue. Suspicion becomes a major restraint to the development of trusting relations between opposing sides and, therefore, organisations involved in protracted rivalry increasingly distrust each other's motives.
Over time suspicions of hypercritical behaviour, the spreading of disinformation and the fear of failure heighten the difficulties of seeking cooperation (Tetlock, 1998, pp.868-912; Vasquez, 1996, pp. 548-549). Internally generated pressures also apply; neither side wishes to expose itself to the condemnation that would arise should negotiations with the rival have an unsatisfactory outcome.

Rivalry presupposes a state of domain similarity, which implies a shared issue area with related overlaps of competency (Van de Ven & Walker, 1984, p. 601). Thus, two organisations take on increasing significance to one another once they begin to coincide in a substantial manner. This phenomenon has echoes of the horizontal isomorphism explained in sociological institutional theory where institutions adopt socially defined practices that are promoted by the wider institutional environment.

During the Cold War, domain similarity was limited among the Euro-Atlantic security institutions as each tended to have its own responsibilities and the divisions between them were clearly defined. When the organisations started their internal transformation processes, in the early 1990s, domain similarity and isomorphism materialised and functional and regional overlap became a significant feature of the new security structure. Thus it has been contended that institutional structure can affect inter-institutional relations (Waltz, 1979, p.65; Keohane, 1993, pp. 506-508). However, others suggest that individuals are able to transcend the constraints of structure, with structure and agency acting as complementary forces. Although human behaviour and actions are influenced by structure, individuals can modify structure to suit their own purposes (Archer, 1996; Bourdieu, 1977; Khandwalla, 1981, pp.411-412; Ritzer, 2000).

Competition and rivalry are closely related to the pursuit of power. The realist concept of power proposes that it can be structurally (Mearsheimer, 2001) or anthropologically (Morgenthau, 1948) motivated. Anthropological study suggests that groups, tribes and packs are committed to survival and the struggle for power is one of their main collective instincts. Organisational research (O’Brian & O’Neill, 2000, p.6) has found that the same imperatives apply in both public and private institutions. The primary institutional requirement for survival is the ability to
manage change pro-actively on a continuous basis. Organisations must continually recreate themselves by being innovative or face elimination as their legacy becomes ineffective or uneconomic.

Intergovernmental Organisations must likewise evolve or disband; indeed a substantial number have failed to survive, as witnessed by the closure of some 30 per cent of all international organisations between 1981 and 1992 (Borgatti & Everett, 1992, pp.221-235). The relationship between IGOs takes on a particular significance in the race to survive. Indeed social network theory suggests that relative positioning is highly significant within international organisational systems and, of necessity, this means that survival mechanisms must come to the fore. As networks emerge a process of demarcation takes place and each organisation assumes, for a period of time, a specific network position in order to protect itself. In this manner, the profile of each organisation is relationally defined and therefore becomes part of its identity (Aldrich & Whetten, 1981, p. 399; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999, pp. 1439-1493).

Within Europe presently there are a large number of overlapping, closely linked institutions that serve to make the attributes of relativity an important feature of their interactions. As an example, it is generally perceived that the EU and NATO are at the heart of the Euro-Atlantic security network, whilst the OSCE is on the periphery. As the OSCE’s worth is perceived to be negative relative to that of the others, its protestations that it is being sidelined by NATO and EU tend to indicate a fear of becoming irrelevant (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006, pp. 6-7). The negative image it portrays can adversely impact on its ability to draw the support needed to sustain itself.

In times of budget restraint and with much duplication of membership (and therefore available funding sources) international bureaucracies have fertile ground for rivalry. Member states allocate resources to IGOs based on that organisation’s relevance to their perceived national interests, thus institutional preferences drive resource allocation. It is apparent therefore that those organisations that command the greatest prestige can draw the greater attention (Alvarez and Robin, 1992, p. 1398). This then impacts on their ability to attract funding support and thereby to function effectively in relation to other organisations and institutions. To take again
the example of the OSCE; European Foreign Ministers meet monthly in the EU, but OSCE member state Ministers for Foreign Affairs meet only once a year. Therefore, a weakened OSCE is further undermined in relation to its IGO rivals.

Some theorists argue that positioning is a system-induced mechanism of rivalry. However, it does still allow actors to follow a range of options. The application of these options are sometimes called ‘turf wars’ and can be illustrated by the desire of the OSCE not to lose further influence to the EU and by NATO’s wish to avoid losing ground in the security field. Each organisation assumes a specific network position and the profile of each organisation is relationally defined and becomes part of its corporate identity (Gulati & Gargiulo 1999, p.1448; Aldrich & Whetten, 1981, pp. 385-408, Burt, 1976, pp. 93-122).

However, the actions of organisations can create concern for other institutions. The post-Cold War transformation of NATO did not appear to some observers as an adjustment in order to remain relevant in a changing world; rather it was seen as “aggrandisement” designed to “achieve an improved position” and motivated by “ambition as well as fear” (Yost, 2007, p.103). This is true also of NATO’s partnership mechanisms that are seen by some observers as an attempt to expand influence and power (Higate & Henry, 2009). Nonetheless, positioning is essential if IGOs are to achieve even a modicum of autonomy within the systemic network.

3.4. Autonomy, Authority and Competition

The pursuit of autonomy by IGOs is widespread; an organisation that lacks freedom of action is neither a useful tool for its member states nor a competent partner for other international organisations (Donno, 2006). The less restricted the capacity to act, the more autonomously an IGO can pursue its goals. However, autonomy has negative as well as positive consequences; although it may increase the ability of an organisation to act it can also obstruct cooperation. The search for autonomy tends to deter organisations from seeking to co-operate and hinders those organisations, which have achieved a measure of collaboration, from furthering their mutual aims (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, pp.701-703).
The main challenge to IGOs is the need to remain relevant in a frequently changing environment. Cooperation can detract from the relevance of an organisation as its skills and attributes can become diluted by the need to share knowledge, material and position. If an organisation maintains its autonomy it is more able to maintain its relevance in relation to other organisations. Isomorphism and domain similarity increases the need for this relevance. Relevancy is therefore the outcome of increased stature, which, in itself, is generated by increasing institutional autonomy and authority (Aldrich & Whetten, 1981, p.399; Gulati & Garguilo 1999, p.1448).

Neo-institutionalism suggests that organisations exist to improve cooperation and solve problems. As attractive as the idea of cooperation might be in certain circumstances, cooperation means reducing autonomy and having to include the preferences of partners in the policy making process (van de Ven & Walker, 1984, p. 601). Thus, the sharing of security assignments, between IGOs, is often circumvented because to cede responsibility, in terms of operational tasking, tends to open an authority gap which can, and probably will, be filled by another organisation. In a situation of domain similarity, the division of assignments will always imply the ceding of authority and thus creates the conditions for rivalry. Role sharing tends to sanction encroachment, with long-term implications for potential future mission assignments and, therefore, the stature and authority of an organisation. The new UN integrated mission structure is aimed at generating, through role sharing, a mechanism by which all UN activities can be coordinated and controlled. However, this initiative has caused competition within the UN system over matters that rely on cooperation and coordination to succeed. Thus, as a result of the desire to protect organisational relevance, the guarding of autonomy has significant appeal to IGOs.

It is arguable that it is the probable cost of cooperation, in terms of conceding autonomy, which detracts from the act of collaboration in the first place. It can be contended, however, that assignment sharing can serve to clearly define roles and responsibilities and consequently reduce rivalry. However this action would undoubtedly place limits on how far an organisation could functionally expand and commit to a role that might become too restrictive at some future time. This diminution in an organisations’ ability to evolve in times of crisis and change, thus
reducing its options for survival, is unattractive to an IGO that wishes to compete within the system network.

On occasions, however, organisations have to cooperate. This was the case in Kosovo where the UN, OSCE, and EU were allied within the pillar system of UNMIK. Nevertheless, when cooperation among potential rivals takes place, there can be misunderstandings and misdirection brought about by the problems arising from domain overlap and the influences of durational rivalry. Furthermore, the pursuit of autonomy does not abate because a form of cooperation has been entered into; indeed, the efforts to maximise autonomy can have the effect of reducing the will to collaborate, as will be discussed in Chapter Six.

Cooperation is rarely symmetrical and, among the Euro-Atlantic security institutions, asymmetry seems to be the rule; asymmetry causes one-sided dependence and the resulting unevenness tends to exacerbate rivalry (Marsden, 1992, p. 1889). Examples of this are numerous; for instance, NATO has needed UN mandates to sanction its operations but the UN needs no authorisation from NATO in order to act. The EU needs NATO for military planning and manpower, not vice versa, and the OSCE relies, in part, on grants from the EU budget. Nevertheless, IGOs place a strong emphasis on the principle of non-hierarchical equality when reviewing their relationships with each other, as witnessed by the pronouncements of equality and cooperation by de Hoop Scheffer when referring to the relationship between his organisation and the EU (2002, p.2). Such pronouncements, however, may be rhetorical and hide the inequality among the organisations. Thus, as subordination is abhorrent, rivalry is accentuated. This leads to struggles for autonomy that, in turn, mean that cooperation becomes problematic.

Cooperation can increase the desire for autonomy, thus discouraging future collaboration. When the UN and NATO were working together during the Bosnian conflict in the early 1990s the technical relationship for determining NATO air operations was a system of ‘dual-key’ arrangements. This meant that NATO could not initiate air operations over BiH until consent had been obtained from the UN Military Commander. Additionally, permission for offensive action had to be countersigned by the SRSG of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
Zagreb (Power, 2008, p.161). Smith (2005, p. 342) suggests that the decision to have a NATO no fly zone (NFZ) over UN ground troops reflected the classic dichotomy of two military chains of command, in this case overlayed by a civilian authority in certain instances. According to Shawcross (2000, p. 155) the heart of the problem lay with the UNSC that controlled the UN Secretariat, and therefore UNPROFOR, to the extent that there was little leeway for decisive action. The UNSC had expected the opposing parties in BiH to respect UN authority and so initially believed that robust military action was unnecessary. Thus UNPROFOR was not properly equipped for military action but NATO was. However, to acknowledge this fact would undermine much of the UN’s autonomy and authority. The ‘dual-key’ measure proved so restricting for NATO that it now insists on unified command and control of its deployed and support forces. Leurdijk suggests that this demonstrates an “autonomy model”, as NATO “is not willing to subordinate itself to the UN under all conditions” (2004, pp. 26-27). This in effect created, as will be described in Chapter Six, the dualism of military and civilian implementation that prevailed in Kosovo.

Lessening dependency can become a principal aim of organisations having to commit to cooperation. Eliminating the need for reliance on another organisation is an attractive proposition. NATO took this step in 1999 when it conducted military operations against the Milošević regime without UNSC authorisation. Likewise, the decision to create a mission support department within the DPKO, with the prospect of establishing a command centre for peacekeeping operations, can be perceived as a move by the UN to replicate NATO’s integrated military structure in order to reduce the UN’s dependence on that organisation. However, removing or reducing dependency between organisations to nullify rivalry will not present a complete solution for, within the internal structures of IGOs, there is similar scope for antagonism.

Decision-making in the EU takes place in a normative environment where compromise is part of the organisational culture; indeed Caroline Lucas MEP suggests that it is welcomed within the EU’s legislative bodies, unlike in many member state parliaments. (3) An example is the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which has evolved a distinct style of decision-making, which includes mutual responsiveness, a consensus-making reflex, and a culture of
compromise. However, there also exists a high level of administrative rivalry among the committees operating within the Council’s infrastructure, which negatively affect the decision-making process (Lewis, 2000, pp. 261-289). Rivalry is especially pronounced over the competencies for Pillar Two (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and Three (Justice and Home Affairs), which serves to make decision formulation in the areas of security and peacebuilding problematic (van Eekelen, 2002, pp. 23-38).

Reference already has been made to the difficulties that have occurred between the UN DPKO and UNDP. These problems are based on the need for the internal structures of the organisation to gain authority and autonomy within the confines that bind them. This requirement is born of the need to gain ascendancy and keep open options for future negotiation and action. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) point to the primacy of organisational legitimacy over organisational efficiency. When forced to choose between efficiency and authority, organisations will select options, which preserve and enhance their standing in relation to other institutions. Legitimacy leads to the continuation of resource and finance streams upon which the organisation depends. Reliance on maximising organisational legitimacy rather than growing internally generated efficiencies is a strategy by which organisations seek to reduce turbulence and maintain stability (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, pp. 348-349). It is also the product of the pressures brought to bear on international bureaucracies by the principals that give them their existence; the member states.

3.5. Member States and Intergovernmental Organisations: Partners or Rivals?

Intergovernmental organisations are composed of member states and international bureaucracies, which can be further separated into intra-organisational groups. Inter-organisational cooperation and rivalry are the result of multifaceted intra-organisational processes, whereby one actor frequently gains internal dominance when defining the relationship with other organisations. This driving force can be a key member state or group of states, the vigour of the international bureaucracy or an intra-organisational group or key official (Biermann, 2007, p. 25).
Those who judge IGOs to be no more than devices of the member states believe that competition and rivalry is located at the member state level (Archer, 1993, pp. 130-152; Rittberger & Zangl, 2006, p.6). However, those who see IGOs as semi-autonomous actors with their own influence and agency on international affairs, see international bureaucracies as contributors to competition and rivalry (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, pp. 25-27). Although in matters of security, member states have yet to significantly relinquish autonomy to international organisations nonetheless IGOs have the capacity to influence the opinions of security actors from member states through their military committees. However, this influence is not as powerful as national political factors, which pose the most constraint on cooperation in matters of security (Yost, 2007, p. 140).

Decision-making in security institutions is generally based on consensus and therefore inter-governmentalism dominates. Each member state, regardless of size, has the potential to shape an inter-organisational relationship according to its own parochial interests. This tendency has proved to be an enticement to misuse, especially among those member states represented in only one of the concerned organisations. The Turkish-Greek-Cypriot dispute in NATO and the EU demonstrates how relatively easy it is for an individual state to block wider international decision processes in the furtherance of their national agendas. Another example is the blocking by Greece of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s (FYROM) entry into NATO, at the April 2008 Bucharest summit, in a dispute over Macedonia’s name. By disrupting NATO and EU expansion, Greece appears to have contravened its undertaking in the 1995 Interim Accord between the two states not to let the name issue stand in the way of FYROM’s membership of international organisations. Thus organisational frameworks can be undermined, as the institution becomes an instrument in the hands of member states in pursuance of inter-state rivalry. Although the antagonistic role perception may not necessarily be shared by the membership of the organisation as a whole, it appears true that a small minority of its members can commandeer the institution. Thus actor-driven special interests can override cooperation.

It has been earlier suggested that institutions tend to be ranked in terms of relevance and authority and, as a consequence, resources are granted, tasks assigned
and attention paid accordingly. However, as long as organisations do not overlap, it is difficult to shift resources, tasks and attention from one to another. During the Cold War, only NATO was available to the western powers for collective defence so the extent to which members were satisfied with the organisation was of little consequence as it was not possible to shift support to another institution. The only alternative was to leave all or part of the organisation, as France did in 1966 when it left the integrated military structure (Van Herpen, 2009).

However, when alternatives become available and overlap comes into play, institutional preferences gain relevance. There currently exists considerable overlap, especially in Europe, with numerous institutions attempting to coexist. Within the system there is increasing duplication of competencies, which allows for choice among organisations and, as a consequence, the strategies of the member states as to institutional preference. In effect, the availability of alternatives creates incentives for “the strategic selection of favourable venues from among a plural menu of alternatives” (Yupille, 2006, p. 1). This strategic selection can affect both the intra- as well as the inter-organisational approach of member states. For instance, France has stressed the primacy of the UNSC, not least to protect its own great power status. The US, conversely, has sometimes seen UNSC membership as a hindrance, as it has served to delay or block decision-making and interfere with the autonomy of action, which the US has become inclined to exercise. The American decision to act without UNSC agreement in Kosovo and Iraq ably demonstrated their position on this matter. Nevertheless, the desire to be free of constraint or to act in a manner that favours perceived national interest or domestic political agendas produces dilemmas. This is illustrated by recent actions in the Middle East where the policies of the US, undertaken without international agreement, have caused numerous states to express their deep concern.

These contrary intra-organisational strategies are derived from the presence of choice. The freedom of choice between international institutions has, therefore, become an additional source of rivalry and, thereby, has reduced the opportunities for cooperation. However, although it can be seen that IGO structure provides the basis that can support rivalry it tends, in the main, to be actor-driven since member states are primarily interested in advancing their own authority and autonomy. In some
instances, although not by any means exclusively, this interest is exercised through the influence that states can bring to bear through their own nationals working within IOs and IGOs.

**3.6. International Officials and Interpersonal Competition**

The UN has codified its principles of international service in a volume of Staff Regulations. When discussing individual involvement in rivalry and competition, Article 1, Regulation 1.1b, which contains the Oath of Office for its officials, is of relevance:

> “I solemnly declare and promise to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any Government or other authority external to the Organisation” (UN, 2003, p.1).

Other international organisations have similar strictures on their staff to try to ensure that they work in a non-partisan manner for the good of the IGO and international community rather than for the parochial interests of their home state or another state or organisation. In this manner IGOs attempt to limit the pressure that member states can bring to bear on their nationals serving within the international civil service. However, a combination of concerns and inducements, along with sociological and physiological influences, rather than oaths of office determine the decisions of individuals on matters of loyalty.

The basis for loyalty is assumed to be concerned with human need. It is the promotion of a sense of belonging, security and prestige that upholds allegiance (Costa, 2003, pp. 519-548; Guetzkow, 1957, p.47; Druckman, 1964, p. 44). It reflects the human need for attachment (Terhune, 1964, p.258; DeLamater et el., 1969). However, collectively social behaviour appears to be motivated by the requirement for a complex mixture of emotional association, the achievement of personal goals and the need for status (Meilaender, 2003; Druckman, 1994). Individuals inevitably will seek out the best source of these stimuli and grant it their loyalty. It was noted at Section 4.1 above that the smaller a group, the more its members support each other’s predispositions and feel comfortable with collective decisions (Baron, 2005, pp. 219-
Social research into the relationship between an individual’s positive feeling for a group and negative feelings towards others have found a strong relationship between in-group loyalties and the tendency to denigrate others (Feshbach, 1987; Berry, 1984; Kosterman and Fesbach, 1989). Duckitt (1989), however, suggests that the more secure individuals feel within their group and the healthier their relationships are within it, the less likely their need to distance themselves from others outside the group. Thus both inter- and intra-group dynamics are relevant to group behaviour and its outcomes.

Within the administrative structure of IGOs there exists an arena for interpersonal rivalry and competition based on the nature of the duties performed by functionaries outside their countries of origin. A number of social research papers have presented theories on the dynamics of organisations with members of different nationalities (Adler, 2002; Jackson et al., 1997; Snow et al., 1996). Much of this research focuses on the cultural differences of group members. Some analysts have made the assumption that group members’ values directly relate to nationality and thus to their perceptions and behaviour (Cox, 1993, pp.82-89). Others have examined the sources of diversity in multi-national teams that go beyond varying national attributes but include demographic diversity in terms of gender, race, age and education (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000, pp.26-49; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998, pp.77-140). These studies, however, generally have ignored the differences in status attributed to group members based on the disparities in international experience and expertise.

Haas (2003, pp.10-19) believes that there are two distinct platforms for the attribution of status in international organisations. These relate to whether an official is a “cosmopolitan”, that is someone who has lived and worked in several countries, or a “local” who has lived and worked in the country wherein the organisation operates. To establish that cosmopolitans and locals can be viewed as status categories, Haas (2007, pp.12-20) identifies status characteristics and the expectations that are associated with those characteristics. While some status characteristics are seen as attributes from which wide assumptions of credibility and acceptance can be inferred, other assumptions of ability are specifically related to where the officials lived and worked.
Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch (1980, pp. 479-508) suggest that status diversity has implications for the dynamics of international groups and for the interaction between international and local institutions working closely together. They propose that this occurs because status hierarchies in groups reflect expectations about the task-related competencies of group members. This serves to categorise interactions within those groups, influencing how people behave toward one another and how group dynamics are governed. Other researchers have shown that lower status group members feel compelled to conform to the demands of higher-status group members and, consequently, perform less effectively than these higher-status members (Alkire, Collum, & Kaswan, 1968, pp.301-308; Kirchmeyer, 1993, pp.127-148). In contrast, individuals who have acquired status through the accumulation of expertise and experience display more confidence and are more willing to share information and to promote their own opinions. In addition, these opinions are more likely to be sought if they are seen to be based on hard-earned experience. Such status tends to increase an individual’s influence (Stewart & Stasser, 1995, pp.619-628; Wittenbaum, 1998, pp.57-84).

Weber’s theories on social stratification reflected the interplay between wealth, prestige and power. An individual’s position can be shown in the social order through their status (Weber, 1947). Haas (2003, p.13-14) proposes that both cosmopolitans and locals have equal opportunities to establish high status within and between organisational groups because each category is expected to assist their group interpret knowledge, obtained from outside sources, accurately. Merton (1957, pp.23-39), however, is more prescriptive in his evaluations of the different entities, suggesting that locals are individuals whose interests are confined to the community in which they exert influence, whilst cosmopolitans are individuals who are oriented to the world beyond the community in which they exert influence. Gouldner (1957, pp. 282-386) has viewed this dissimilarity in an organisational context, defining locals as persons whose primary loyalty is to the employing organisation, and cosmopolitans as those who are oriented to a greater extent towards their professional community beyond the organisation. The distinction between organisational and professional role orientation has a firm grounding in empirical research (Becker & Billings, 1993, pp.177-185; Cornwall & Grimes, 1987, pp. 281-298) but study of status diversity in groups usually focuses on the relationships between high and low
status members where the status hierarchy is clear. The dynamics of participation and influence in multinational groups, where more than one member with high status exists, creates different dynamics but it is generally assumed that where there are several high status individuals in a group, these individuals will be similar in background to each other (Owens et al., 1997, pp.16-19). Thus the differences between locals and cosmopolitans can become accentuated.

Within organisations the criteria for status attributions are numerous and diverse; sometimes persons with different status characteristics, such as cosmopolitans and locals, can be considered to have high status. Whilst cosmopolitans may be considered superior to locals in some settings and locals may be viewed as better in others, in ambiguous situations such as Kosovo where an international (cosmopolitan) administration was vying with an institution of self-government (local), status competition was likely to be more adversarial than current theories might suggest.

Thus, within an IGO there exist a number of levels of competition that are more related to the structural and administrative aspects of the organisation than the inter-personal. The nature of the international civil service raises questions of loyalty and status. However, the influences on individuals can be complex as international functionaries will compete for position and influence on several levels; firstly within their home countries in order to secure recognition (emotional association) and then within the IGO to secure advancement and ensure continuing employment (personal goals and status). This second challenge is made more difficult by the preference of many IGOs to make ‘Mission Appointments’ which tie human resource contracts to the mandate of a particular mission rather than assuring tenure. These pressures serve to increase rivalry between the functionaries and can disrupt the important balance between individual cooperation and competition.

3.7. Individual Cooperation and Competition

Cooperation has been analysed in game theory by means of a non-zero-sum game called the "Prisoner's Dilemma". This concept was originally conceived by Flood and Dresher and further developed by Axelrod (1984). The two players in the game can choose between two moves, either "cooperate" or "defect". The proposal is that each
player gains when both cooperate but, if only one of them cooperates, the player who
betrays the other (or “defects”) will gain more. If both defect, both lose but not as
much as the co-operator whose cooperation is not returned. Axelrod explored the
conditions under which essentially self-centred actors will spontaneously cooperate.
He used, as an example of the benefits of this action, the spontaneous incidents of
cooperation during the First World War when troops on one side would refrain from
directly targeting the enemy in the opposing trenches. This would allow the opposing
side to minimise casualties. The strategy would continue to work as long as they
reciprocated in kind. Thus cooperation was rewarded and proved that “cooperation
based on reciprocity can develop even between antagonists” (Axelrod, 1984, pp.21-
22).

However, it can be seen that there are numerous pressures that can be brought
to bear on organisations to promote and maintain authority and autonomy when faced
with overlap and domain similarities. It is suggested that the rivalry and competition
that arises in the various planes within the international system closely mimic the
competition that occurs in nature. Thus arguably these tendencies to promote the self,
in relation to others, will exist in individuals working within international
organisations and institutions. These tendencies will operate just as strongly at an
inter-personal level as within a group setting. Indeed, personal relationships are
largely founded, as with inter-organisational relations, on interaction and inter-
personal communication (Anderson and Neistadt, 2003, p.3).

Generally, a deficiency of trust and the resultant breakdown in communication
are at the heart of deteriorating inter-personal relations. The lack of trust may be
engendered by competition and the resulting emotional reaction to it. It also can be
provoked by a clash of personalities, which may result from a lack of effective
communication between individuals. Trust between individuals may take months to
build but can be rapidly displaced by the loss of intercommunication or respect.
Individuals typically wish to feel that they are valued (emotional association and the
achievement of personal goals and status). An individual who feels undervalued
becomes anxious and can become alienated from his or her co-workers and
interlocutors; this in turn can lead to inter-personal rivalry. The situation becomes
more complex when there is inter-personal competition at the intra-organisational
level. As was witnessed in Kosovo, competition between UNMIK and UNDP was accentuated by inter-personal rivalry between officials within these organisations.

When such conflict occurs, the way in which it is managed can determine whether relationships will function effectively or if they will disintegrate. Six inter-personal conflict management styles have been identified by researchers and can be categorised as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Styles</th>
<th>Action and Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avoiding Actions</td>
<td>A retreat from the conflict but typically results in nothing being resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoothing Actions</td>
<td>Focuses on accepting the situation as it stands and emphasising areas of agreement; this is likely to only provide a short-term solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromising Actions</td>
<td>Compromising is bargaining; if both sides agree a definitive solution can be achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcing Actions</td>
<td>Forcing is an authoritarian style that results in the promotion of one viewpoint at the expense of all others and the lack of consensus will typically result in the prolonging of the dispute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborating Actions</td>
<td>Collaborating reflects a long-term strategy; once everyone comes to agreement, a long-term solution is possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confronting Actions</td>
<td>The confronting mechanism seeks to define and addresses the core problem, looks for alternatives through dialogue and provides a solution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 3.3: Inter-personal conflict management styles. (Adapted from Burnette & Forsyth, 2003, pp. 7-13; Forsyth, 2006, pp. 64-67).

To properly apply conflict management actions time is needed but, in international interventions, time is not a readily available commodity. In determining the best approach to ensuring inter-personal harmony it is therefore necessary to consider the relative importance of the inter-personal conflict, time pressures, the location of the actors, and how the approach relates to strategic goals. Once again, using Kosovo as an example, the time pressure on the conduct of the ISSR was such that there was little time for establishing effective conflict management measures.
Notwithstanding these techniques for resolving inter-personal conflict, the condition remains one of the most potent drivers within inter- and intra-organisational relationships, particularly in testing field conditions. Ichheiser believes that:

“False images often come from genuine illusions, errors of judgment, or social defamation, and are not always a rationalisation of pre-existing feelings. Inter-personal misunderstandings do not automatically correct themselves but may become chronic and reciprocal, the persons adjusting their behaviour in various ways to the false images” (1943, p.302).

Contemporary managerial emphasis on collaboration overlooks these obstacles. Organisational structures tend to encourage the build-up of negative perceptions. This occurs because their ‘pyramidal values’ stress the importance of institutional goals, based on rational concepts, rather than acknowledging the emotional aspects of inter-personal relationships within and between organisations. Organisations are interested in power and those further up the hierarchy will react to inter-personal conflict below them by tightening controls rather than dealing with the root causes of the problem. As a result, organisations tend to experience progressively deteriorating inter-personal relationships and, therefore, overall effectiveness (Argyris, 1965, pp. 102-110; Banner, 1994, pp. 250 -253; Daft, 2003, p. 412-416; Schein, 2004, pp. 113).

Thus inter-personal interactions, and the negative competition which can result from them, are a crucial part in determining organisational effectiveness in relation to other organisations and institutions. Task oriented organisations value individual achievement and reward success proportionally according to the individual contribution to group objectives. Whilst equitably rewarding performance can further goal attainment it also encourages inter-organisational competition (Forsyth & Kolenda, 1966, p.140). Within groups the balance is equally delicate; when individuals believe that they are being afforded less status or reward than they deserve they become hostile to those who they perceive to be treating them unjustly and to those who are seen to have benefited unfairly. However, when organisational or group success relies on the interdependence of individuals, then individual ambitions must be subjugated to group objectives. This situation requires that individuals suppress intra-group hostility to avoid adversely affecting group cohesion (Rees & Segal, 1984, pp. 328-329).


Conclusions

Relations between and among governments and international organisations are based on human decision-makers, acting singly or in groups. Few mainstream IR theories take a wider view of human agency. They tend to have a rather fixed belief that self-interest is the predominant driver and, therefore, the essential mediums for change, creativity, persuasion, accountability and rivalry, are missing. Institutionalists see organisations as providers of platforms for cooperation and problem solving, which tend to replicate each other’s structures and rules in a form of isomorphism. However, rivalry between member states is a major source of inter-organisational discord. States can use their intra-organisational veto power to disrupt relations with another organisation in pursuit of their own parochial interests. They can, because of the freedom of choice now available in the international system, select the forum which best fits their purposes and have greater flexibility in their decisions as to which organisation is granted funding, resources, and authority.

Rivalry and competition has behavioural consequences, and even the logic of ‘less rivalry, more cooperation’ cannot be adequately proved. It is possible therefore to envisage cooperation in the midst of rivalry, although it may only exist temporarily. Rivalries evolve in phases, which are driven both by the concerns of actors or groups of actors about relative positions. Inter-organisational rivalry intensifies in times of strong actor-driven, and fewer problem-driven, concerns. Domain similarity and the effects of mimetic, normative and coercive isomorphism as described by DiMaggio and Powell (1991) tends to deepen this rivalry. Thus when uncertainty over relative positions increases, and external problems seem manageable, actor-driven concerns gain prominence and rivalry spreads. The process of competition is more volatile than rivalry but is shorter lived. It can be aimed at specific goals and perpetrated against specific actors or groups of actors. It is more individualistic in nature and, although most commonly found at the intra-organisational and inter-personal levels, it can equally exist on other planes.

The search for organisational autonomy places a constraint on inter-organisational collaboration; cooperation is about sharing assignments and responsibilities and thus leads to the reduction of autonomy. There is a constant
struggle, especially in asymmetric relationships, between maximising autonomy and keeping control. Therefore cooperation can have the effect of increasing rivalry as established positions are challenged and authority questioned.

Sociological institutionalism suggests that individuals characterise themselves as social actors by engaging in acts that reinforce the network in which they are involved. The institutional world provides a means of accomplishing this imperative. The relationship between the individual and the organisation is, therefore, built upon reasoning and the individual gains by working with institutional models to reach a desired course of action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, pp.1-40). Inter-personal competition can result from group pressures or internal and external rivalries. These experiences can interact and produce the mistrust and anxieties that fuel rivalry. A fear of loss of personal status, position or authority can be seen as triggers to competition and rivalry. Unequal status contributes to feelings of insecurity, as does equal but opposing status. These negative stimuli can be prevalent in international and local organisations striving to work alongside each other in post conflict situations. Persons valued within their own organisations can find that respect is less forthcoming outside their own group, which leads to the psychological state that fuels incidents of rivalry and competition. Nevertheless, organisational accomplishment depends on the cooperation and coordination of individuals within the group. Therefore it is crucial to ensure that individual ambitions are subjugated to the achievement of objectives. This, however, is a difficult goal to achieve, particularly in a post-conflict setting, which inter alia will already be burdened with suspicion and insecurity. In many cases, time restraints will also preclude the deployment of effective conflict management techniques.

The next chapter examines how IGOs developed their understanding of SSR and, as they did so, discovered that to be effective inter-organisational coordination and cooperation was necessary. However, international and regional actors are numerous. Each has different expectations, capacities and methodologies and many have no desire to be coordinated. Thus, rather than cooperation, competition at both the executive and operational levels becomes problematic. The chapter will examine the attempts by IGOs to define and refine their understanding of SSR and their
subsequent discovery that they had no adequate way of measuring the efficiency of their methodology or its impact on the host state.
Chapter Four: Peacebuilding, SSR, Local Ownership and Intergovernmental Organisations

Introduction

Rather than bringing a time of global harmony and cooperation, the end of the Cold War heralded an era of multi-polarity generated by new variables, among them the difficulties unleashed by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the abrupt shift to an unregulated market economy and the struggle within former client states to rebuild governmental and other institutions on the basis of democracy and the rule of law (Burack, Lewis, Marks et al, 1999, pp.5-6). These all created a climate of uncertainty at least as potent as that experienced during the Cold War.

Cold War realities had meant that international support for military or police reform was often used by donor states to advance their own national foreign policy and security goals. However, with the end of the Cold War, it became possible to see the concept of security reform as a tool for greater public wellbeing and an essential element of development (von Tangen Page & Hamill, 2006, p.4). The role of the state and its relationship with its security institutions were judged as directly influencing the conditions for sustainable development and for the promotion of human and physical security. The impact of security actors on the wider conditions within a state became better recognised (Duffield, 2001: 2007; Kalder, 1999: 2003).

SSR may be considered to be a model that originated from debate within the development aid community concerning linkages between security and development. Hendrickson (1999, p.7), for example, suggested that security expenditure needed to be viewed not only from the perspective of protecting the state and its population, but also in terms of how excessive defence and internal security costs could detract from funding vital social services and requirements. It was, therefore, necessary to understand the composition of the security sector, the
responsibilities of security actors and the relationship between these actors and other components of the governmental machinery. Effective management, accountability and transparency in the security sector were deemed essential. The need to develop democratic control mechanisms, to provide security that did not threaten democracy and human rights or undermine development goals, became the central principle for security studies academics.

In order to understand the basis for SSR and its emerging role in the peacebuilding process, this chapter examines the reconceptualisation of sustainable peace, development and security. It then discusses the role of institutionalism in governing the actions of IGOs involved in SSR, before examining the relationship of human security to SSR and finally considering the importance of local ownership to SSR programmes.

4.1. Intergovernmental Organisations in the Contemporary Security Era

Intergovernmental first made an appearance in the nineteenth century and, since that time, have greatly increased in number with some 244 IGOs now in existence (Union of International Associations, 2009). Originally, IGOs were seen as bodies through which states sought to pursue national interests in a regional or international arena. States embraced the IGOs as an environment of enhanced predictability for consultations with other states and a valuable meeting place. Such functions continue to be important in the self-understanding of most IGOs and their member states. Increasingly, however, IGOs are seen as actors in their own right and purveyors of policies, which would possibly falter without their engagement and sponsorship (Law, 2007, p.4). IGOs can furnish a in which all member states, regardless of size or influence, can be heard. They can also provide the continuity and longevity that is often lacking in democratic states, which are subject to the vagaries of election cycles, and government reshuffles. However, there are difficulties that confront IGOs. There is evidence that their importance has past its peak; the number of IGOs has declined since 1985, probably for growing economic instability and the unwillingness of richer states to shoulder the greater part of cost (Archer, 2001, pp. 31-36). As discussed in Chapter Three, several IGOs have also
faced criticism from their member states, including the UN, which has had to contend with deep criticism of its management and policies, the OSCE, which has had the Russian Federation attempt to reorder its priorities and the EU and NATO, which experienced in-fighting between its member states.

However, security requires stability and this necessitates some cooperation between states and institutions. Neoliberal institutionalists, whilst accepting the neorealist view of international politics, identify reasons why states may cooperate within international institutions (Keohane, 1984; Stein, 1990). Whilst not directly addressing the question of whether institutions bring peace, they focus on the question of cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Martin, 1992; Oye, 1985). Some proponents of this theory suggest that there is a correlation between cooperation and security stability. Glaser (1994) makes this linkage but the offensive realist, Mearsheimer (1998, pp.329-384), dismisses it, based on a belief that liberal institutionalist definitions of cooperation avoid military and security issues whilst engaging with economic and, occasionally, environmental issues (Haas, Keohane & Levy, 1993). Mearsheimer’s position is one of pessimism:

“The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. . . . Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states, which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. . . . This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic (2001, pp.2-3).

There is, however, a less fatalistic approach; contrary to the beliefs of exponents of neo-realism and neo-liberalism there is a body of theory that suggests that IR is primarily socially constructed and is given its form by processes of social practice and interaction. Wendt (1991) posited that shared ideas, and the identities and interests of actors, inform the decision-making process; what applies at the individual level must apply at the collective level as it is human beings who constitute the state. Thus human beings ensure that state behaviour will follow a particular pattern because they have appropriated ideas, which may include other
theories about the structure and relationship of behaviour. McSweeney (1999, p. 105) considers that “the social constructionist perspective is that IR encompasses the domestic sphere no less than the international, the inter-societal no less than societal”. Finnemore (1996, p.2) believes that social interaction is at the heart of this process and that national interest is constructed through social interaction. Many constructivists look at social reality in the international arena as the social constructs of the key actors. Thus they challenge realist assumptions about how the international system operates, especially with regard to security issues (Biersteker & Weber, 1996; Gow, 2005).

Adherents to theories of functionalism have, however, approached the problem from the position that organisations operate in terms of their function and the way that individuals and groups interact. Common interests and needs are seen to create connections and foster cooperation in a manner not dissimilar to constructivism. Functionalists believe that international cooperation fosters links that temper state sovereignty and that understanding arises from that cooperation. The functionalist views international cooperation as growing from a technical base into socio-economic spheres and then eventually into the political arena. The neo-functionalists, however, see the process more as cooperation growing from collaboration and interactions within IGOs (Mitrany, 1966; Haas, 1964). To further explain the roots of this technical basis for cooperation, critical theorists seek to move the emphasis from an empiricist perspective to a view based on theories of transformation, including the various schools of institutionalism (Geuss, 1981; Willard, 1996).

Intergovernmental organisations concerned with security issues, those termed by Duffield (2009, p. 638) as “inclusive and exclusive contingent rules international security institutions”, constitute an important sub-set of international and political institutions more generally. Little has been written about these organisations, although the subject of international institutions has received wide academic coverage. With the exception of a few commentators (Duffield, 1991, pp. 379-406; Haftendorn, 1999, pp.3-17; Jervis, 1983, pp. 173-194; Keohane, 1999; Müller, 1993, pp. 361-388; Wallender, 1999) theoretical discourse is based mainly on research into political economics and environmental cooperation (Keohane, 1984; Young, 1999).
The majority of writers have made no attempt to distinguish between international institutions operating in different arenas.

Whilst institutionalism is pivotal to political analysis, there is wide diversity over what kinds of rules and relationships are construed as institutions (Goodin, 1996, p.20). Neo-institutionalism emphasises the internal structure and social assembly of organisations; it views them not solely depending on structures and rules but also as the forum for creating equilibrium among individual actors. Neo-institutionalism may have different schools but they all relate to, and interact with, two perceptions of the political system. The first is the rational actor perspective that sees political life as influenced by exchanges among self-serving and manipulative actors. The second is a cultural community perspective, which sees political life based on shared values in a community of common culture, experience and vision (March & Olsen 2009, p.4).

Within institutionalism the building blocks are seen as rules and practice, connected and perpetuated through a sense of membership and recognition of shared roles (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 16; Dworkin, 1986, p. 29). As noted in Chapter Two, sociological institutionalism places less emphasis on power or norms and more on the socio-cultural construction that guides individual behaviour within organisations. Themes in the sociological institutionalism include the functions of institutional forms; the specificity of institutional performance; and the quest for organisational legitimacy (Campbell & Pedersen, 2001; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Rules and practices specify what is normal, what is expected and what makes sense in a community (March & Olsen 2009, p.8). However rules embody historical experience and stabilise norms, expectations and resources, whilst providing explanations and justifications for the way in which action is taken. Regulations are shaped by an analysis that is built upon experience, memory and trust (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 21; Dworkin, 1986, p. 37). Nevertheless, members of an organisation tend to become instilled with the various identities associated with the role of the organisation. They tend, therefore, to define themselves in terms of these identities and act to accomplish them rather than determining expected consequences (Simon, 1995, pp. 115, 136).
Schattschneider (1960) believes that, while institutions provide governance and create bias, they do not ordinarily determine outcomes. The casual relationship between institutional arrangements and policy is complicated. The casual chains can be said to be indirect and organisations can be seen to either constrain or enable situations without being the immediate and direct cause of policy (Orren & Skowronek, 2004. pp.43-46). Indeed the very legitimacy of democratic organisations is based, in part, on the prospect that they will impart open-ended processes without determining outcomes (Pitkin, 1997. p. 79). Whether institutions take the form of a set of rules or collective organisational actors, some institutionalists question how significant their effect actually is (Keohane & Martin, 2003). States create bodies, such as the UN Secretariat and the NATO International Staff to undertake executive functions. These bodies are given responsibilities, resources and freedoms that enable them to act with considerable independence (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Although they are not typically able to act in a way that contravenes the interests of the states that created them, their autonomy allows them to perform many functions more effectively than individual, or groups, of states. Even when working on behalf of states, their perceived non-partisan nature will often make their activities more acceptable than similar actions undertaken by an individual state (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, pp. 13-18). In the security sector, the UN and NATO are often required to perform as mediators with their high officials’ perceived impartiality enabling them gain concessions on disputed issues. An example is UN peacekeeping missions, which allow powerful states to support conflict resolution without becoming directly involved in the matter (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 19; Tuschhoff, 1999, pp.140-161). Thus as the end of the Cold War ushered in new era for IGOs, so those working within them found that they were faced with new and testing challenges.

4.2. Fostering Liberal Democratic Values

As the Cold War drew to a close, a multi-polar structure replaced the bipolar world and international politics became more complicated (1). Globalisation and economic interdependence had forged links and created rivalries that had been less apparent in bipolarity (Buzan, 1991, pp.434-447). Economic and societal security became a
greater factor both in, and on the peripheries of, the ‘First’ and ‘Second Worlds’ and greater concern was raised over communal identity and culture. It appeared that reconceptualisation of security based on international society, characterised by the development of shared norms, values and understandings, offered a method of coping with international anarchy. The idea of ‘comprehensive security’ was a demonstration of this new agenda and took into consideration the wider issues of societal security, thereby deepening as well as widening security concepts. This meant that particular social groups might see the need to protect themselves against a range of forces, some of which may be posed by the state wherein they dwelt (Waever, 1993, pp.21-24). Security therefore became more than merely a by-product of either power or peace:

“In the broad concept, security could be defined as the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change that they see as hostile” (Buzan, 1991, pp.431).

It was necessary however for this perception of security to take account of the rise of ethnic nationalism and conflict which both resulted from, and contributed to, the collapse of state structures. When state structures weaken or new states are created out of the collapse of larger entities, distinctive groupings have a higher awareness of their individuality, which is likely to engender alarm in those outside their ethnic grouping (Doornbos, 2006, p.6). The tensions caused by the breakdown of state structures can be mirrored in intra-state security dilemmas; insecurity occurs when conditions within a state are similar to those between states in the international system (Posen, 2001, p.14). The absence of effective sovereignty means that sub-state groups must provide their own security. Rationalists suggest that a combination of external and internal pressures will set off conflict, including the political manipulation of ethnic fears and prejudices, as witnessed in the Balkans at the end of the last millennium. Indeed, the instability brought about by the disintegration of a political regime is made more volatile as elites contrive to manipulate ethnic and nationalistic feelings for their own ends (Brown, 2001, p.12; 1993, p.27).

It is posited that the problem that confronts all security referents today is ‘insecurity’, rather than ‘security’. This insecurity is rooted in the change in the systemic balance of power and the numerous pressures on individual states, multinational organisations and on groups and individuals within and across those states.
and institutions. Insecurity then embraces all levels of analysis from the individual to the systemic and crosses a wide range of areas, including cultural, economic, environmental, political and military affairs (Grenfell & James, 2008).

The end of the 20th century marked a rearticulation of sovereignty and security and saw increased humanitarian intervention both in sovereign issues and international judicial systems. This development came at the price of lessening control over state sovereignty and independence. The new pattern of conflict, prevalent in the 1990s, made third party intervention develop, broaden and adapt its approach to new challenges. Higate & Henry (2009, p. 11) suggest that, with the success of liberal democracy, the maintaining of “liberal democratic institutional forms of state, through facilitating the emergence of liberal democratic institutions and values” was to become the aspiration of western powers. They endorse the views of Paris (2001a, pp. 638-639) who suggests that, “peacebuilding operations embody...a globalisation of the very idea of what a state should look like and how it should act.” With the complexities of these initiatives, fresh conflict resolution strategies and peacebuilding concepts were developed. These approaches generally agreed that transformation must be undertaken simultaneously across several levels of society thus concentrating and coordinating conflict resolution efforts (Cooper, 2004, pp.3-4; Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2005, p.21; Lederach, 1997, p. 31-39).

Lederach (2003b, p.843) visualised a peacebuilding pyramid structure in which the process had to extend beyond elite political actors and the peace negotiations they undertake. Within this structure there are three separate but interrelated processes: if one adds a political framework to one face of Lederach’s pyramid model and security, socio-economic situation and reconciliation and justice to the remaining three faces, it is possible to show that every aspect of peacebuilding has its own top, middle and grassroots levels within the overall process. Whilst the top levels of leadership in post-conflict situations are high profile, addressing the middle and lower levels of society is crucial to peacebuilding. Middle level actors have contacts both upwards and downwards within society and those on the grassroots level are connected to the general populace and, therefore, are often better attuned to its needs, as demonstrated at Table 4.1 below.
Chapter Four

Table 4.1: Peacebuilding Model (Adapted from Lederach’s Model (2003b, p.843).

The security sector lends itself to this approach in that engagement must be multi-layered; democratic oversight established (top level) institutions must be reformed (middle level), and the population reassured that the institutions of state security are established for their protection and not just for the state itself (grass roots level).

Post-settlement states offer distinct opportunities for grass-roots transformation in that the post-conflict period may present fertile conditions for political and thereby security reform. The population has experienced upheaval and has come to expect change; vested interests may have been weakened and approaches previously rejected for political, legal, or administrative reasons now may be more openly received (Gupta et al., 2005, p.8). Consequently, decisive multi-faceted reform may work better in SSR than in other development scenarios.
However, the realisation of these wider goals is demanding. The UN claims, having engaged in frequent peacebuilding actions, to understand the difficulties:

“No other operation must set and enforce the law, establish customs services and regulations, set and collect business and personal taxes, attract foreign investment, adjudicate property disputes and liabilities for war damage, reconstruct and operate all public utilities, create a banking system, run schools and pay teachers and collect the garbage-in a war damaged society…In addition to such tasks, these missions must also try to rebuild civil society and promote respect for human rights, in places where grievance is widespread and grudges run deep”(United Nations, 2000, p.7).

4.3. Sustainable Peace and Sustainable Development

The long-term resolution of conflicts cannot be achieved whilst the more conspicuous sources of hostility remain unresolved. Although it has been proposed that to allow conflict to reach its natural conclusion where all the protagonists become exhausted or one wins decisively thus resolving political arguments and leading to peace (Luttwak, 1999) there has been little acceptance of this course of inaction by the UN members states and great powers. Typically, conflicts have been interrupted early on, before they reach a point where peace is more attractive than war. However, political agreements and settlements rarely hold if the communities involved do not back them. Many peace settlements founder because suspicion and hostility remain, dividing people along political, cultural or religious lines (Donini, Minear, Smillie et al, 2005, pp.52-55). Creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace and development requires wider efforts, aimed at generating trust among divided communities. This can be achieved by fostering, in the community, the values of tolerance and respect. These values cannot be externally imposed, as they require the acceptance and involvement of the population.

Endeavours to promote a more inclusive approach help pave the way toward successful political dialogue and, in post conflict situations, support the process of reconciliation. When the peaceful coexistence of different communities is threatened by underlying tensions, these actions can help prevent overt conflict. Progress must be achieved on multiple levels; government policies must be connected closely with civil-society initiatives aimed at reconciling divided societies. The building blocks
of sustainable peace, therefore, are well-functioning systems of governance, which are responsive to basic human needs (Sampaio, 2008; Peck, 1998, p.45).

Sustainable peace entails participatory processes aimed at providing, and then protecting, the civil and political rights of all citizens. It requires the provision and maintenance of durable institutions, which ensure that citizens receive equal treatment under the law and that their human rights are guaranteed. Sustainable peace also benefits from the establishment of equitable economic and social rights that respect the distinctive cultures and identities of all members of the population. Policies of cultural pluralism are necessary to allow groups to consolidate their own sense of identity and exercise their cultural rights. In addition, sustainable peace may involve territorial boundary changes to satisfy demands from ethnic groups for greater autonomy and control. Electoral reform also may be necessary to ensure greater access by the population to political decision-making. Democratic transition requires the support and active participation of governments and must engage civil society. In addition, more equitable distributive policies are required to provide economic opportunities for disadvantaged groups.

However, in order to take root, sustainable peace also requires dominant groups to be convinced that their own interests lie in the development of a secure, just and stable society (Van der Stoel, 1994, pp.35-37; Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para.15). Despite political rhetoric, international community efforts to secure peace are not entirely altruistic. Failed states can provide havens for transnational threats, including organised crime, drug and human trafficking. Thus, the driving force behind increasing international engagement in post-conflict countries is the desire to avoid the spill over effect of insecurity. Although it is challenging to turn around a failed state, the cost of doing nothing is often greater (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, p.3).

Successful peacebuilding requires planning, coordination and sustained commitment by both local and donor partners. It involves a range of approaches, processes and stages necessary for creating sustainable relationships and governance structures. Sustainable peace also requires a policy approach tailored to the problems facing a post conflict society. Those undertaking reforms must have a clear
understanding of the root causes of the conflict and an appreciation of the benefits and risks of the remedial methods chosen. The UN, in December 2005, created a Peacebuilding Commission to address the gaps in peacebuilding strategy, within the UN and the global system, by providing a coordinated and rational approach to peacebuilding and facilitating dialogue amongst the key actors. It was designed to marshal resources and to propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building, and sustainable development (United Nations, 2007, pp.4-5). However a High Level Panel, convened to examine the early work of the Commission, found that there was “little cooperation between groups within the UN family on peacebuilding and related activities” (Tanner, 2006). This lack of cooperation and insufficient guidance and oversight by the UN General Assembly and Economic and Social Council was cited as a contributory reason for the lack of progress by the Peacebuilding Commission (United Nations, 2006, pp. 5-7).

Sustainable development is perceived as integral to sustainable peace. The UN recognises that much must be achieved in the areas of poverty relief, education, economic development, health, gender equality and environmental sustainability if peace is to be assured. These objectives have been acknowledged by the agreement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in September 2000. The Goals were introduced as an attempt to encourage the international community to take collective action to improve conditions in the developing world and, thereby, help to avert the circumstances that often lead to conflict. Whilst advances have been made towards meeting the targets, progress is slow. This lack of success is engendered by the sheer size of the task and the inability of UN member states to agree a joint methodology to undertake the required action (DFID, 2007, p. 2). Recognising these failures, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon requested the support of world business leaders for the MDG saying that:

“This is the first time that the United Nations is reaching out to business ... you are here at a critical time, on the eve of our summit to step up efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Frankly, I am worried that we are going to miss this historic opportunity to reach the Goals. The very grave fact is that many countries are not on track (UN, 2008, p.1).
Faced with these very real difficulties, academic debate on peacebuilding interventions is extensive but often contradictory. Many academics and practitioners disagree on how to deal with the realities of post conflict reform and reconstruction. Paris (2004, pp. 370-372) considers that intrusive operations, including those that temporarily take over a state's administration, are the way to assist post-conflict states. Ashdown (2007, p.19) agrees that the international community must “accept the challenge of creating a broad framework of international law to govern the global space”. However, he also notes (2007, p.126) that whilst the international community is “very good at military planning for war…it spends neither time, resources nor energy on the civilian planning for what will happen the moment after the war ends”. These views, whilst accepting the limitations of recent international interventions, fail to acknowledge the need to engage the local community and its leadership in any security reform and development endeavour. Kent (2005, p.10) points to the pivotal place of local ownership in successful peacebuilding and SSR activities but concedes that the international community’s ability to comprehend local aspirations and concerns is weak due to a lack of engagement with the population below the level of government officials.

Zist Marten (2004, pp.32-58) claims it is a “flight of fancy” to think that international administrators can bring the values, structures and processes of liberal democracy to post conflict societies. She argues that international missions should confine themselves to maintaining security, whilst allowing local actors to devise their own political and economic systems. In line with this argument, Mueller (2004, pp. 23-46) presents a new model for the future of post-conflict peacebuilding and development, which he terms ‘police-keeping’. He believes that post conflict countries urgently need to develop functioning state institutions that can effectively regulate their own territories. These views have merit in that the more holistic the intervention by the international community the more difficult it is to resolve the problems confronting the post- conflict state. However, it must always be considered that the state itself may not have the resources and expertise to overcome the problems facing it. From this reality has come the shift to the integrated UN mission where a wider engagement by more actors is envisaged.

Thus there is contention over what peacebuilding consists of, how it should be applied, and over the level of intervention. Experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan,
BiH, Kosovo and East Timor would suggest, however, that ‘police-keeping’ is not enough. Sustainable peace is based on sustainable political and economic development that requires much more than merely an international police or military presence. The idea that security and development should be connected is intuitive (Ball, 2001, p.48); security and the performance of the security sector are closely tied to poverty reduction and development. Development requires a secure environment in which to flourish and the transformation of the security sector is critical to the success of peace agreements and to implementing structural reforms. This is the strength of SSR; a reformed security sector that takes careful note of local security aspirations and involves the local population and its leaders in the reform process provides the bedrock for sustainable peace and development.

4.4. Security Sector Reform

The concept of SSR was first articulated, to a wider audience, in 1998 during a speech by the then Secretary of State in the United Kingdom’s (UK) Department for International Development (DFID). The need for comprehensive reform of the sector had been earlier identified by Ball, Hendrickson and Woodward (1988, pp. 20-34; 2001, pp. 3-11), but it was Short (1998; 1999; 2002) and the policy statements of her Department (1999; 2000) that made security sector reform prominent as a concept. However, there is little agreement on the definition of SSR. Edmunds (2002, p.1) believes that there are, “…no clear or agreed set of definitions for SSR. Present usage tends to be dictated by the concerns of particular academic or policy communities”

The term ‘security sector reform’ is not universally accepted: some organisations prefer ‘system’ to ‘sector’ to stress the inclusion of local actors other than the armed forces. Other variations have been coined such as ‘transition’ (Hills, 2000, p.48) and ‘transformation’ (Cooper & Pugh, 2002). The UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) uses, ‘justice and security sector reform’ (UNDP, 2002) thus further complicating the debate. There is an increasing recognition that solutions to complex security sector problems must involve the promotion of the rule of law and good governance, the protection of individuals and
address social and economic needs. In addition they must seek to uphold human rights and deal with a broad range of security actors and threats.

The OECD-DAC views SSR as more than relating only to the traditional areas of the military, police and justice and brings in such entities as government departments, private companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and paramilitary forces. To mark this wider engagement, OECD-DAC use the term “security system reform” and cites the overarching objectives for international actors engaged in supporting post-conflict or developing states as:

- The establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system;
- The improved delivery of security and justice services;
- The development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process;

Consequently, although the term ‘security sector’ can be used to describe institutions legitimately entitled to intervene by using force to protect citizens, uphold law and order and state institutions, and safeguard the borders of the state, this definition could be considered to be too narrow. In some cases, especially in the aftermath of internal conflict, peace agreements may allocate legitimate roles to some non-state security actors as was envisaged in Southern Sudan (Baranyi, Salahub & Abatneh, 2006).

The concept of security and the reform of the security sector, therefore, can be viewed in many forms. They may be confined to purely issues pertaining to the defence of the state from external threats or broadened to envelop wider development agendas, including economic issues, health and human rights. Nevertheless, although the definition of SSR has evolved considerably it must always embody values of pluralistic democracy, democratic control, transparency, honesty and humanity. The diversity of these views has caused problems for academics and practitioners who continue to look for workable definitions for both the security sector and security reform (Edmunds, 2007, p.23; Bailes, 2008, p.xv).
A major issue in agreeing a definition of SSR is what security, in a post-conflict environment, actually means. It is clear that security represents different things to different people; it varies depending on whether it is being defined by the armed forces, aid workers, politicians or local populations (Donini, Minear, Smillie et al., 2005, p.v). The premise of ‘negative peace’ versus ‘positive peace’ and of security in military terms, as opposed to security in human terms is significant:

“The absence of fighting (negative peace) can be seen as an end state sought for some, while others would have a much broader approach to security, encompassing political, as well as economic and social, aspects (positive peace)” (Tardy & Mani, 2005, pp. 3-4).

In addition, often security institutions are less guarantors of security than agents of insecurity. Finer (1962, p.5) believes that armed forces and militia can have an overwhelming political advantage over civilian organisations in terms of organisation, symbolic status and the force of arms. In order to address this imbalance emphasis, in the application of SSR, has been placed on the need to achieve democratic civilian oversight of the armed organisations and the reform of civil-military relations. At its most rudimentary level, therefore, SSR seeks to improve the professional capacity of the security sector whilst endeavouring to ensure that security actors are free from corruption, are democratically accountable and that human rights are respected (von Tangen Page & Hamill, 2006, pp.2-3). Cooper and Pugh suggest that:

“…A prerequisite for social development and human rights protection is the security and stability that comes through an effective, impartial and humane introduction of law and order, alongside the extension of sound governance to the military sector itself” (2002, p.14).

As SSR has evolved so the scope of the concept has increased; however, this evolution has not been uniform within and between IOs and IGOs. Each has tended to adopted SSR strategies to suit their particular areas of interest and legitimise their position in a changing world. The OSCE has advanced a concept that addresses economic, environmental and humanitarian dimensions, as well as military reform issues. NATO has developed its own approach to SSR, which is more concerned with the governmental/military interface, whilst the UN has sought to deal with a wider range of security threats embracing policing and the rule of law (Law & Myshlovksa, 2008, pp.11-12; Myshlovksa, 2007, pp. 27-30; UN, 2005, p.4). This interest in SSR, following on from its adoption by other IGOs, provided an additional
raison d’être for NATO’s continuing relevance in the international security arena and also followed the tenets of institutional isomorphism.

Individual states also have been active in development and peacebuilding and have tailored their SSR agendas to suit their requirements. France, for instance, has adopted a comprehensive approach to SSR that sees the reform process taking account of all security actors including private security companies, judicial institutions and the mechanisms of democratic oversight by relevant government ministries (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes, 2008, pp.4-6).

The US is less advanced in its development of a SSR concept than many of its European allies. The main advocate for security reform is the Department of Defense (DoD) but the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department also have input into the process (Ball, 2005, pp. 16-18). The main driver for the US concept of SSR is the International Military Education and Training Programme which schools US allies and other nations in the management of defence resources, improvement of military justice and the fostering of an understanding of the principles of civilian control of the military (US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2008). It is, however, not enough to merely reform the armed forces, police and justice sector.

If SSR is a vital requirement for the creation of sustainable peace and development then it cannot be confined to matters of civilian control of the armed forces. More must be done to introduce security, human rights and good governance to a post-conflict scenario and this requirement brings with it difficulties of scale. A decision has to be made on how far the SSR process should involve itself in areas beyond the relationship of a civilian government with its agencies of enforcement.

A wider, more holistic, approach to SSR is apt to use a broad comprehension of security and will be faced with making decisions on which areas of governance and the wider social needs of the population should fall within its orbit (von Tangen Page & Hamill, 2006, pp.2-3; Edmunds, 2002, pp.1-3). With the development of thinking on the practice of SSR it is increasingly accepted that a narrow definition risks underestimating the importance of CSOs as core SSR actors and stakeholders and of
the role of private (or non-state) security entities. With these imperatives in mind, the table below demonstrates the possible range of actors associated with SSR.

| Core security actors                                                                 | Armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias). |
| Security management and oversight bodies                                              | The Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civil review boards and public complaints commissions). |
| Justice and law enforcement institutions                                             | Judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems. |
| Non-statutory security forces                                                        | Liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies; political party militias. |
| Other Departments identified by the population as relevant to security               | Ministries of Health, Education, Social Welfare, Trade and Industry, Minority Affairs; Civil Service; Municipal Authorities; Non-Governmental Organisations. |

Table 4.2: Possible Security Sector Actors (Adapted from OECD-DAC, 2007).

In Kosovo, the ISSR programme remit included those local institutions and organisations to which the UN Administering Authority (UNMIK) had allocated a legitimate role in the internal security of the province and its citizens. It further included the civil authorities mandated to control and oversee these agencies. These encompassed interior and finance ministries, national security agencies and the judiciary, and relevant functions and institutions of the legislature (or, in the case of the Administering Authority, those departments which dealt with the matters that ministries within a state would normally handle). In addition, the security sector was taken to cover non-statutory security forces, such as private security companies and politically funded intelligence agencies, where they existed and impacted upon security. The entities to be included in this holistic approach depended on the perceived threats to security as determined by the citizens of the province rather than by the intervening international organisations. Thus the OECD-DAC wider security system approach was embraced and, indeed, enhanced.
However, Germann (2002, p.16) believes that SSR is rarely engendered by the state itself as such fundamental reform is seldom seen to be in the interests of the dominant group. Thus the issue of local ownership comes to the fore; SSR is far more likely to be effective if the donor and recipient state governments have compatible objectives. It has therefore been mooted by some commentators that, despite the possibility of increasing discord over SSR theories and practice, a broader focus is required on the nature of sustainable peace and its building blocks (Annan, 2001, pp. 2-3; Ebnöther & Fluri, 2005, pp. 10-17). Indeed, the scope of activities that may occur during a SSR programme can, itself lead those involved to widen their engagement and give rise to ‘generational evolution’.

4.5. Generational Security Sector Reform

SSR has evolved to be more than simply the democratisation and professionalisation of the forces of security and justice within a state. Edmunds (2002, pp.7-16) believes that there have been two generations of evolving SSR methodology, which has moved the process from the reform of traditional civil-military institutions to dealing with wider issues of democratic oversight and transparency. Borchert (2003, pp.5-10) goes further, suggesting that there is a third generation of SSR that provides capacity building and improved cooperation among security sector actors (See Table 4.3 below).

Table 4.3: Generations of SSR Methodology (Borchert, 2001b, p. 4).

First generation SSR is concerned with the establishment of arrangements for democratic civilian control over the security sector and the de-politicisation of its
actors. This involves the establishment of clear structures for civilian control through distinct lines of responsibility laid down for the military leadership, the Defence Ministry and Parliament, and a delineation of responsibilities between various levels of government. Civilian-dominated chains of command are created to ensure that control of the security sector remains in civilian hands and that the security sector actors’ roles are limited by legislation. First generation SSR also is designed to aid the professionalisation of security sector structures. This entails defining tasks and organisations in line with democratically agreed national security policy and legislation.

Second generation SSR evolved to bring about the consolidation of the procedures of civilian oversight of the security sector and its attendant actors. It deals with the way institutions implement policy and improve effectiveness and efficiency. It seeks to negate the disproportionate influence the military may have on defence policy, which may have been brought about by an absence of civilian expertise and interest in defence issues. The enhancement of a knowledgeable civilian core group that has the experience to provide effective oversight of the more technical aspects of defence policy is a fundamental second generation SSR concern. A related issue is the development of the capacity of security sector administrators and officials to implement security policy and to effectively support oversight and transparency.

Third generation SSR involves civil society in security sector issues. Societal legitimisation of the security sector’s functions is regarded as vital to wider security roles, such as humanitarian intervention, which are more complex than the conventional defence of national interests. In addition, civil society has a part to play in the strengthening of democratic control of the security sector. It provides, through the media, NGOs, academics and other organisations, an alternative, non-governmental source of information on security issues for both policy makers and the public.

There was a tendency for international bodies to approach SSR in a compartmentalised manner, with different aims and objectives, and without necessarily linking the processes together in an overarching strategy. However, as
thinking on the composition and methodology of SSR evolved, there was recognition that effective and enduring reform was possible only if the process embraced a more inclusive definition. There was, nevertheless, a danger that too broad a definition could cause a loss of focus and make the process unmanageable. Notwithstanding such difficulties, account had to be taken of parallel reform efforts in areas such as electoral systems, justice and the rule of law. Third generation SSR takes this wider approach and moves towards the concepts of democratic governance, building capacity and international / national cooperation (Borchert, 2001b, pp. 5-10).

Edmunds (2007, p.25: 2003, p.16) considers SSR as a process through which security sector actors adapt to the political and organisational demands of transformation. Therefore SSR is a normative-driven process of change that considers how the security sector, within a framework of civilian control, can contribute to the security of the community. However, SSR has consequences that are based on considerations of value and to decisions based on the interests of the actors involved at both international and local levels (Luckham, 2003, p.12).

The EU saw SSR as a process that should be applied in countries where development was hampered by structural weaknesses in the security and justice sectors. The EU approach encompassed a broad variety of assistance programmes, such as the development of norms of ‘good practice’ in the security sector, enhancing civilian control over the military, community-based policing and justice reform and the control, collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons. In 2005, the European Council adopted an SSR concept in relation to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (European Union, 2005d) and, the following year, the European Commission produced a communication relating to Community SSR activities (European Commission, 2006). This third generation SSR approach came about, in part, because of the requirements imposed by the conditionality of membership of the Euro-Atlantic structures, which required reform and democratisation of the security sector in states aspiring to EU membership (Borchert, 2003, p.4).

A linear theory of generational evolution is a tidy but inaccurate way of explaining the generational progression of SSR. In reality, the migration from one
level to the next has been spasmodic and experimental. First and third generation SSR may exist alongside each other, undertaken by different IGOs. In Kosovo, the UNDP were assisting the PISG in the restructuring and democratisation of the KPC, whilst, at the same time, the OSCE were conducting programmes to educate civil society and the media in policing and justice matters.

The decision to widen the scope of a SSR programme is frequently taken in an *ad hoc* manner by practitioners in the field rather than by policy makers or theorists. This indicates that often pragmatism, based on local conditions, rather than overarching strategy has widened the scope of the SSR process. Although acknowledging the need to take account of local conditions, Edmunds (2002, p.9) observes that connecting with local actors and creating local oversight structures is difficult to achieve in the context of international intervention. Notwithstanding the difficulties of engaging in a ‘local’ approach, once SSR practitioners move away from their own perceptions of security to the realities, as perceived by the local population, they find that what is viewed as state, community and personal safety is closely linked to concepts of human security (Shaw, MacClean & Black, 2006, pp.3-19).

**4.6. Human Security**

Research in the security field has raised the question of what actually constitutes ‘security’. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (1994) pointed to the difficulties that arise:

> “The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly... It has been related more to nation states than to people…Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives” (UNDP, 1994, p.22).

This Report often is credited with the first use of the phrase ‘human security’ but the implications of the term were recognised much earlier and the links between military victory and the security of the population were made. In 1945 the US Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, Jr., commenting on the formation of the UN said:
“The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is ... where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure ...an enduring peace” (Alkire, 2001, p.13).

In 2003 the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Ogata and Sen, presented the then UN Secretary-General, Annan, with a list of policy conclusions based on a definition of human security agreed by the Commissioners, “freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p.1). Annan (2000, p.1), in his turn, believed that human security was greater than merely the lack of violent conflict for it must embrace all the elements of human rights, good governance, access to education and health care. Booth (1991; 1999; 2007) endorsed this emancipatory approach, arguing that, in order to allow all citizens to fulfil their potential, they must be freed from the constraints that would otherwise restrict their growth as human beings.

Building on this theme, the UNDP suggested that food security, health security and environmental security should be seen as vital to overall human security (1994, p.23). The intent of human security was to act as a bridge between the concepts of the freedom from fear and the freedom from want. However, the UNDP Report went further than simply providing the connection between overcoming fear and want by emphasising that the central referent of security was the individual, stressing that it was concerned with human life and dignity (UNDP, 1994, p.22).

Academics too have sought to define the constituent parts of human security. Thomas believed that:

“Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met” (2000, p.37).

Others attempted to determine the components of human security. Cockrell (2000, pp. 24-26) suggested that threats to human security might be classified into four broad categories: economic, personal, community and political security. Nevertheless, the definitions of human security remain numerous and often contradictory. Although such broad definitions are largely accepted in the realm of practitioners, the concept in the academic world “has often been greeted with
scepticism or worse, silence” (Paris, 2004, p.370). Paris suggests that definitions of
human security are extensive and indistinct (2001, p.88) but acknowledges that the
language of human security has served to unite a wide spectrum of actors around the
concept that foreign policy should give prominence to the welfare of individuals.
However, he emphasises the problems arising from the lack of definitional boundaries:

“…because the concept encompasses both physical security and more
general notions of economic and social well-being, it is impractical to talk
about certain socioeconomic factors causing an increase or decline in
human security, given that these factors are themselves part of the

Nonetheless, the quandary is that the widening of the definition of human
security makes the establishment of its priorities more complicated. Narrowing the
definition tends to reduce its political prominence but the wider the definition of
human security the less likely its objectives will be achieved (Macfarlane, 2004, pp.
368-369). King and Murray are conservative in their definition, suggesting that
human security refers only to that which gives an expectation of life without
generalised poverty (2000, p.15). Buzan (2004, p. 369) also is sceptical, believing
that, if the referent of human security is the individual, then little differentiates its
agenda from that of human rights and therefore the effectiveness of the concept is
undermined. Rummel (2003, p.3), on the other hand, proposes that consideration
must be given to a broader approach to human security as the trademark of future
security reform policy.

The definition of human security becomes more complicated when national
governments, international institutions and NGOs become involved. Annex D lists
some of the descriptions used by Governments, NGOs and institutions. The range is
wide; from ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions’ to ‘threats to human
survival, daily life and dignity’. Rothschild (1995, pp.55-56) has placed human
security squarely in the centre of the concept of the security of nations. She suggests
that national security must extend downwards to individuals and that the security of
nations must extend upwards to the security of the international system. The overall
concept of security also must extend horizontally from military to political,
economic, social, and environmental or, in other words, ‘human security’.
In cases where governments listen to the fears and aspirations of their populace, injustices are likely to be lessened or resolved whilst complications will arise when governments ignore or repress the concerns of their population (Gurr, 1993, p. 12). In response to this, the concept of human security has been presented as a basis upon which state security can be built. Indeed, those states that are generally secure tend to be those that provide the most human security to their populations. Furthermore, the dynamics of weak or malfunctioning states tend to force their political elites to further reduce their security and that of their people. In order to enhance their own security, governing elites are tempted to accumulate power by investing in the military and internal security apparatus and by using repressive policies. This tends to lower human security by subjugating the populace and drawing away funding that could be used to improve the human condition (Peck, 1998, p. 16). Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that, by working to enhance human security within the state, it is probable that the climate for conflict prevention can be enhanced.

The EU already adheres to most of the general principles of human security, even if it does not always articulate them as such. In December 2003, the European Council approved the European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council of Ministers, 2003). Although the ESS does not explicitly outline a EU human security agenda, a Report (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004) encompassed a set of principles for human security. These included the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, regional focus, the use of legal instruments and the appropriate use of force. The report called for a Human Security Response Force comprising of 15,000 members, of which at least one-third was to be civilians, with a legal framework to oversee decisions on intervention and to direct operations on the ground. The Report suggested that the Force should operate in an area between military intervention and peacekeeping in order to uphold human rights and support law and order reform.

However, the Report’s recommendations remain largely unimplemented. Current indecision over the future of EU expansion has undermined the EU’s most effective tool for the promotion of human security. If it can no longer hold out the hope of eventual EU membership to those in its regional backyard, it will be difficult
to ensure progress towards human rights and security in those states aspiring to EU membership. As well as these implementation difficulties, the Study Group largely ignored the political and administrative obstacles to EU-wide foreign policymaking. This particularly applied to the proposal for a Human Security Response Force, which would have needed the support of all EU member states, including the acceptance of the principle that internal and external security are inseparable, which is still not accepted by some member states (Kotsopoulos, 2006, pp.12-13).

The lack of a universally accepted definition of human security creates barriers to framing coherent policy. In addition, the political and practical difficulties of implementation on the ground have led to a dilemma for practitioners wishing to translate theory into SSR practice. There is a need to ensure that SSR processes, arising from outside intervention, are accepted by the civil society and population as well as the implementing partners. Thus, to ensure that human security is a principal underpinning of the SSR process it is necessary that the local population be included in the shaping of the security environment.

4.7. Local Ownership

The term ‘local ownership’ has been commonly used in the development community for some time but its precise meaning, in the context of conflict transformation processes, is unclear (Aga Khan Foundation, 2005). Literature addressing the concepts of local ownership and its implementation rarely signifies direction by local actors. Rather it refers to the respective capacities of mainly international stakeholders, including their ability to set, and take responsibility for, a development agenda and to attract and sustain support for it (Saxby, 2003, p.7).

The same lack of definition occurs when theorists attempt to focus on local stakeholders. Here the term ‘local security actors’ may be used but there is rarely any consideration of who these actors are (Diamond, 1999, pp. 77-86; Peck, 1999, pp. 39-45; van Tongeren, 1998, pp. 21-26; van Tongeren, 1999, pp.124-133). Such discussion that has taken place typically focuses on the role of external actors within the host state, all the while suggesting that local actors need be involved in the process (perhaps in a ‘supporting role’). This highlights the difficulty of identifying...
local SSR partners; a requirement that is crucial for the planning of projects wishing to engender local input and involvement. Current SSR interventions seem to suggest that it would be more accurate to use the term ‘local inclusion’ rather than local ownership as this more accurately denotes local involvement that falls short of ownership.

However, despite the lack of consensus over the term, the emphasis on the role of local actors has, since the mid 1990s, been a common component of the literature on conflict transformation. As conflicts take place within societies, it is within these societies that SSR measures must be rooted. Acknowledging the importance of nurturing civil society, theoretical literature encourages local actors to manage security transformation processes. Indeed, fostering and supporting local actors with an active interest in building peace are seen as key principles of post conflict development management despite the ongoing confusion over who such local actors really are (Ropers, 2000, p. 35).

Woodward (2003, p.300) suggests that “the dominance of Western interests over local interests in shaping the demands for security sector reform in south-eastern Europe goes so far as to deny the declared interests of the region’s citizens”. Field experience has shown that SSR activities are often unsustainable if they are interpreted and designed wholly by outsiders and merely implemented locally (Edomwonyi, 2003, p.43). Post conflict management initiatives require local ownership of the security reform process, in order to guarantee its effectiveness and sustainability. The population and its leaders have a pivotal role in the formation of peacebuilding processes as they are the primary source of legitimacy, local ownership and sustainability, with such involvement being essential to the long term effectiveness of democratic reform efforts (Caparini, 2005, p.69; Ball, 2000, pp.16-17).

The involvement of local actors in the SSR process has consequences for the conceptualisation of activities and interventions by third parties. While most international actors agree on the merits of local ownership, there are differing perceptions of the implications of participation by local actors and the resultant repercussions for third parties. Involvement by local actors in the SSR process may
be desirable, but the reality of such participation carries with it difficulties both for the intervening parties and the local participants in terms of control and design. Bryden observes that a flaw in SSR practice lies in the fact that it is, “externally induced, funded and driven, creating an inherent tension between local ownership and external assistance” (2006, p.23). He believes that donors, multilateral organisations, NGOs and commercial companies involved in peacebuilding activities have displayed little appreciation of local culture and circumstance, resulting in unfulfilled prospects and disenchanted local actors (2006, p.23). Scheye, commenting on Kosovo, believes that in dealing with internal security there was a lack of dialogue between the local population and the central security institutions, including UNMIK (2007, pp.27-28). Others note that the role and influence of civil society in the post-conflict reconstruction of security institutions has received little systematic analysis and that there is very little engagement with the local population, by peacebuilding missions, below the level of senior government officials (Caparini, 2005, p.69; Kent, 2005, p.40; Law, 2007, pp.12-17). Abdela (2000, p.3) shares this view suggesting that in Kosovo “…the population and community leaders felt completely excluded from the process of trying to find new solutions”

Thus an environment is created where the local population sees the international community as imposing its norms with little regard to the wishes, aspirations and culture of civil society and its leaders. Local populations and their leaders frequently are asked to comply with norms imposed by the international community. However much these norms may be welcomed within the population there remains a bias towards the wishes of the norm-setters, which can become an irritant. They become an obligation rather than something readily and easily accepted (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 887-917). Compliance works best in a climate of shared norms; however in order to achieve this, persuasion and socialisation into particular behavioural patterns is required. Wiener (2002, p.8) suggests that such forced acceptance of norm-construction is likely to impede norm resonance. Cortell and Davis (2005) believe that only by ensuring international norms are tailored to local conditions can they be successfully transmitted, whilst Schwellnus (2005, pp. 65-70) believes that norm setting processes instigated by domestic actors rather than IOs or IGOs are more effective.
Thus the imposition of norms, despite the expectation of being accepted by the norm-followers because of the perceived benefits, can lead to rejection and the undermining of the overall reform process. Even though this difficulty can be overcome by promoting local ownership, the reality is that often other priorities get in the way. Grazhdani (2) commenting on peacebuilding and SSR in Kosovo suggests that the international community was so immersed in international issues that it had no time to build local ownership.

Even when efforts are made to secure local ownership, the choice of local partners typically reflects the principles, values and interests of the intervener. The choice of local associates entails a decision, most likely taken abroad, as to who might be of most benefit to the intervening body in terms of acceptance of its views and agendas. This can have the effect of creating the possibility of local power shifts, as one group is favoured over another. However, if the local populace is engaged in the design of an SSR intervention then the security fears and aspirations of those at the grass-roots (or the ‘many’ as illustrated in Table 2.1) can be used as a guide to what should be considered in a SSR project. Yet engaging the local population in dialogue appears to create difficulties for the international community. Christian Action Research and Education (CARE) notes that, during the period 2004-2006 in Kosovo, IGOs and NGOs were “biased towards working with people who were easier to reach and… easier to work with.” Often they selected participants from programmes run by other agencies doing similar work in the same geographical area. This tended to create educational, class and urban predispositions (2006, pp.60-61).

Despite all these shortcomings, at the core of SSR philosophy is the ideal of a security reform objective, which has been achieved in cooperation with the host state and its population. If achieved, this will be beneficial for the host state and for the wider international community. Thus an “end-state, free of conflict and rooted in democratic principle that can attract foreign investment and contribute to regional stability” can be achieved (Ferguson, 2004, p. 4).
Conclusions

Kagan (2002, p.12) suggests that, “the transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe’s new mission civilisatrice…the Europeans have a new mission born of their own discovery of perpetual peace”. Paris (2002, p.637) sees the mission to export principles for the culture and structure of a state as another form of modern imperialism. However, the success of this mission involves more than simply the absence of war; it requires the provision of security across a broad spectrum. A set of liberal beliefs, which fit into the European model of conflict management and normative views have been, adopted for its peacebuilding activities.

The decision-making processes within peacebuilding and security sector governance are typically, but not always, associated with IGOs (Young, 1989). From this point of view, IGOs have become the tools used by member states to pursue their collective or individual interests, although over time IGOs have been granted freedoms that have allowed them to act more autonomously. In the security arena, these IGOs have often performed many functions more effectively and economically than ad hoc groupings of states or bilateral intervention (Duffield, 1999, p. 644). However, although sociological institutionalist theory suggests that international institutions take the form of sets of rules or collective organisational actors, reflecting isomorphism with the institutional environment, in reality IGO approaches to the reform of the security sector often differ widely one from another. These differences highlight an institutional bias towards areas in which the IGOs feels most comfortable.

Notwithstanding this bias, to judge how deeply SSR should be involved, beyond the democratisation of the forces of security and justice, raises problems of definition and the design of SSR methodology. Security sector reform is a youthful concept, which is still evolving. It does not appear to adhere to any one theory or group of theories. However, because it is rooted in the work of IGOs and is strongly influenced by the national interests of mainly Western member states, that have begun to coalesce around the promotion and practice of SSR, it may be said that it is grounded in the broader tenets of sociological institutionalism. Indeed, the growing political and organisational demands for SSR outcomes to conform to and extend the
growth of Western ideals of democratic governance and human rights lend weight to the belief that the theories of sociological institutionalism are at play.

Nevertheless there remains a lack of coherence over the constituents of the security sector and its reform. Although there has been three accepted ‘generations’ of SSR, difficulties remain in creating an effective process through which security sector actors can adapt to the political and organisational demands of post conflict transformation. These deficiencies are based on the lack of agreed designations and strategies for security reform and a lack of consensus over how deeply and widely the security sector should be perceived.

The definition of local ownership and how far the concepts of human security should be included in the SSR process also pose challenging questions. Although local ownership is generally accepted as a crucial component of SSR there is little agreement over what the term means in practice and what or who constitutes a local actor. In addition, there is evident tension between local ownership and external security reform assistance. In a number of SSR missions there has been a marked lack of dialogue between the local population and its leaders and the external organisations executing the reform process. A more accurate term to describe the current involvement of the domestic population and its leaders in SSR is ‘local inclusion’.

Coupled with this disjuncture between external providers and local actors is the issue of human security. Academics and practitioners are unable to agree on what constitutes human security and how far it should be included in SSR. Debate over the precise meaning of human security is ongoing but it has become more relevant with the rise of low intensity conflict and intra-state violence. Concepts of human security and the degree of protection and assistance required differ from situation to situation, state to state, and even from individual to individual. Darby and MacGinty (2003, p 273) believe that:

“There will be a broadening of the remit for peace, with a new emphasis on human rights, economic reconstruction and democratisation, as well as the traditional concern with political and constitutional matters. The business of making peace will continue, but will change”.
Chapter Five: Intergovernmental Organisations and SSR

Introduction

To explain the performance of IGOs in SSR it is necessary to examine the development of the understanding of SSR and its application by IGOs and their member states. This chapter discusses the uneven conceptualisation of SSR which has adversely affected both the SSR efforts of IGO actors and their interaction.

Just as security is a field within politics, IGOs constitute an important subset within international institutions and political institutions more generally. However, little has been written about the role of IGOs in security sector reform. Most scholars have concentrated on other realms such as international political economy (e.g. Keohane, 1984) or international environmental cooperation (Young, 1999). There has been, however, a great deal of literature dealing with the work of NATO, the OSCE and the UN but is has not focussed on the relatively new field of SSR.

An assessment of IGO performance in SSR must take into account three factors. Firstly, security concerns are not new, the terminology and formal application of SSR is less than twenty years old. Secondly, there is considerable diversity amongst IGOs, in terms of focus, the extent of SSR mainstreaming and geographical scope. Thirdly, the objectives of SSR interventions are often vague, thereby complicating evaluation of the process. This is further exacerbated by the fact that currently there are no overarching systems of performance measurement for SSR. Monitoring and evaluation of SSR programmes increasingly is required by donor states, which base their funding on evidence that their desired outcomes are achieved.

The success of SSR initiatives depend on IGOs and member states having the political will to ensure a comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable approach to its application in the field. An SSR strategic concept is the precondition for ensuring an IGO can effectively mobilise its resources and work effectively with other SSR actors. This objective, however, is yet to be achieved in a comprehensive and
effective manner. The International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that, “security sector reform continues to be a neglected stepchild both financially and in terms of strategic planning” (2006c, p.3).

5.1. Intergovernmental Organisations: Developing a SSR Concept

Intergovernmental organisations play a pivotal role in determining the outcome of the SSR process; indeed, in almost all recent SSR programme deliveries, they have either led the project or have closely supported other actors in its provision. The manner in which this responsibility is planned and executed is fundamental to the success of security reform and to other parallel processes designed to deliver peace and security in a post-conflict environment.

The principal organisations concerned with peacebuilding and SSR activities are the EU including the Council of the European Union (European Council), NATO, UN, and the OSCE. However, these bodies have reached their understanding of SSR by different routes. They all have approached the concept from their own unique appreciation of what SSR means for them rather than developing strategies based on engaging with the recipient state and cooperating with other IOs and IGOs.

The EU’s role in SSR has progressed along two distinct paths; the first was the Union’s emergence, following the end of the Cold War, as among the largest of all the international development donors. In this role, the EU when considering SSR has been principally motivated by concerns related to aid and development. The second driver has been the EU’s role as a global security player, through the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and its engagement in an increasing number of PSOs. It was not until 2003 that the EU produced the European Security Strategy (ESS), which stressed the requirement for the EU to consider a wider range of missions, including undertaking SSR as part of its institution-building activities (European Union, 2003, p.2). In 2005-2006, the European Council and Commission adopted their respective SSR concepts, which affirmed the EU role in SSR and specified various ways in which it could contribute to security transformation activities.
The EU came to consider security sector reform issues later than many of its member states. This was, in part, because of Commission and the European Council divergence on their respective understandings of SSR. The Commission saw SSR as a function of its good governance agenda and favoured a “broad security concept, which focuses not only on the external security … but increasingly on … human security, both in terms of individuals’ physical security [and] the protection of their rights” (European Commission, 2006, p.2). The European Council had a narrower focus that was rooted in its mandate. It was founded to promote the development of common democratic principals throughout Europe, thus its approach to SSR has been conditioned almost exclusively by governance concerns. The European Council focuses on human rights and the rule of law, coupled with the requirement of governmental accountability in these areas. It emphasises the belief that without democracy there can be no security.

Although the European Council appears to have a narrower understanding of its security mandate it does recognise that most EU interventions in the security field require a mix of civilian and military expertise. This has led to the creation of a Civilian-Military Cell in its Secretariat (Council of the European Union, 2005, para. 22-23). Indeed, although EU divergence on SSR reflected the make-up of the EU itself, as its understanding of SSR increases so security is becoming, “a cross-cutting issue for all EU institutions…and provides a unique opportunity to develop a unified EU approach to security” (Law & Myshlovsk, 2008, p.4).

In July 2005 the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) mandated the Council Secretariat to develop, in cooperation with the Commission, a draft EU concept for SSR for ESDP missions. In parallel, the Commission developed, in collaboration with the Council Secretariat, an SSR concept of its own that focused on its responsibilities in the developing world. These initiatives were designed to bring the work of the Commission and the European Council together by setting out the respective responsibilities of the two pillars as well as the modalities for joint action (Law & Myshlovsk, 2008, pp.19-31).

Nevertheless, although the EU has committed itself to contributing to security and stability through the ESS and subsequent policy statements have specifically
mentioned SSR as a key element of this strategy, the EU still lacks a comprehensive SSR policy framework. SSR spans a range of issues and activities within the European Community and Council and there is a risk that individual *ad hoc* interventions will fail to maximise their potential without an overarching strategy (Helly, 2006, p.7).

The United Nations has approached SSR by an entirely different route. The prominence of SSR in the UN follows decades of UN Security Council (UNSC) and UN agencies’ involvement in SSR in practice if not in name. However, only in the last seven years has the UN begun to utilise SSR as an all-embracing term for those activities. The expansion in UN SSR philosophy was related to the growing recognition of the linkages between security and development. This was acknowledged in the 2005 World Summit statement (United Nations, 2005b, pp. 20-21), which noted the importance of SSR as an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict environments. However, expectations for an expanded UN role in SSR have been hampered by a continued lack of both a common understanding of the basic concepts and a comprehensive policy framework across the UN system. Additionally inter-departmental competition over the ownership of SSR practice within the UN has discouraged cooperation in the field.

The lack of a comprehensive and coordinated UN approach to SSR in post-conflict environments has degraded the ability of UN missions to assist national transitional authorities in the early restoration of effective, democratically controlled and sustainable security institutions and processes. Banal and Scherrer (2008, p. 47) note that in Burundi (ONUB), the UN functionaries had to establish a mission-specific understanding of SSR because there were no guidelines from DPKO in New York. Consequently those field staff engaged in SSR tended to interpret what was important to the reform process in different ways. However increased interest within the UN Headquarters in New York (UNNY) and field missions for a more strategic and coordinated approach to post-conflict SSR led to the creation, in 2007, of a Security Sector Reform Team within the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. The aim of this new team is to determine common principles and objectives for the development and implementation of UN assistance to SSR and to clarify the roles and responsibilities for SSR across the UN system. At the time of
writing, the SSR Team had participated in the UN technical assessment missions in East Timor, Somalia and Burundi and provided a small inter-agency team to Southern Sudan to assess UN coordination challenges (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010, p.2).

NATO has long been involved in facilitating defence reform in its member and aspirant member states. It has made democratic governance of the security sector, and the ability to contribute to the Alliance's capacities, central to its criteria for enlargement (NATO, 1995, p.4). The nucleus of NATO’s current SSR programmes lies in its Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Membership Action Plan (MAP) processes. NATO has developed measures designed to strengthen the effectiveness and accountability of institutions concerned with defence. Programmes such as the Partnership for Peace-Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) have explored issues relating to the security sector beyond purely defence and military matters (Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, pp. 5-13) as accountability and democratic oversight of the security sector have often been inadequate in the subject states. However, NATO involvement is this area is strongly weighted towards capacity building activities.

Whilst NATO’s contributions to SSR, particularly within the Balkans region, have been significant they have also tended to evolve in an eclectic fashion. There has been reluctance in NATO, because of perceived political sensitivities, to grasp the tenets of third generation SSR. However, there has been some movement to rectify this situation; at the 2006 Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government, the final communiqué contained declarations that indicated a measured shift in the NATO’s position on SSR. The document articulated the direct linkage between security and development and stated that: “…there can be no security … without development and no development without security” (NATO, 2006, para. 12). It highlighted the need to coordinate with other actors, especially the UN, EU and the OSCE (NATO, 2006, para. 9), and directed the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to develop a policy to:

“…increase NATO’s ability to provide practical advice on, and assistance in, the defence and security-related aspects of reform in countries and regions where NATO is engaged” (NATO, 2006, para. 12).
The OSCE does not have a mandate to undertake SSR per se but the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (OSCE, 1994) is the main OSCE statement on security reform. The Code calls for the democratic control not only of the military but also paramilitary, internal security forces and intelligence services, and of the police. It links the behaviour of security actors within a country to its external security relationships and considers their effective oversight and democratic control to be an indispensable element of stability and security. The Code and SSR, while differing in terms of status, content and objectives, have several common and complementary elements. The OSCE has a strong conflict prevention dimension and, in addition, has governance and human rights credentials through its Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The OSCE also conducts other SSR-related activities in the field, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, border management and rule of law activities.

The OSCE has evolved to meet the challenges of internal conflict in the states that emerged after the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More recently, the OSCE’s centre of attention has moved eastward as concern over conflict in the Balkans gave way to conflict prevention in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Despite some difficulties over contradictory agendas and mission overlap, OSCE field missions have been seen as generally effective tools for managing post conflict situations. The practice of putting international officials on the ground for the long term, so that they can develop an understanding of local dynamics and build relationships with local officials, has assisted in this regard. The OSCE’s role in SSR is concentrated mainly on discrete areas such as police reform, action against human trafficking (undertaken by ODIHR) and democratic oversight of armed forces. It has yet to develop a holistic approach to SSR although, as will be described in Chapter Five, it was instrumental in assisting the Kosovo ISSR with its endeavours to include the Kosovo population in its examination of the province’s security sector.

The development of a common SSR concept for all the main IGOs and IOs has not been without its problems. The main impediment has been a lack of consensus on how best to proceed with the practical aspects of SSR. The EU has adopted a Policy Framework of SSR (General Affairs Council, 2006) which provides it with a common
conceptual guide for SSR based on the 2005 EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR (Council of the European Union, 2005) and the May 2006 Concept for European Community Support for SSR (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b). The difficulty remains however that this policy framework, although a foundation for improved coordination in the EU, does not address the challenges of implementing SSR in practice (Doelle & Gouzée de Harven, p.52). When considering the development of the EU’s strategies for SSR the EU High Representative Javier Solana believes that:

“…civil and military initiatives need to be better linked to the EU’s longer term conflict prevention and development programmes... we should develop integrated military and civilian…teams, including the full spectrum of necessary competencies” (Council of the European Union, 2005, p.3).

Likewise the lack of a framework for SSR within the UN has led to a diversity of explicit or implicit SSR mandates, inadequately funded and ad hoc implementation and confusion about leadership and the division of tasks within the UN system. However, in 2007 the UNSC requested a comprehensive report on the UN approach to SSR (UNSC, 2007). Subsequently, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations noted the need for a more holistic and coherent approach to SSR within the UN system (2007, part II, para 142) and asked the Secretary-General to submit a report on SSR methodology. The Report (UN, 2008) whilst acknowledging that there was no single model describing the security sector, suggested that the UN understood it to include:

“…defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector are…also included. Furthermore, [it] includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security [and] other non-state actors … include customary or informal authorities and private security services” (UN, 2008, para. 14).

The Secretary-General’s Report goes on to refer to SSR as:

“… a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state and
its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law” (UN, 2008, para. 17).

These wide definitions must, however, be considered in the context of the growth in complexity of UN peacekeeping missions. There is a shortage of SSR capacity and expertise within the UN in both the UNNY and in field missions. Implementing SSR mandates requires specialists not commonly found amongst UN and other IGO staff and consequently the competition for ‘mission appointed’ short-term SSR experts is fierce. The UN DPKO has addressed this problem; the Security Sector Reform Team has formed an SSR Expert Consultants Register to overcome the fact that the demand for personnel skilled in SSR currently far outstrips UN capacity (Rigg, 2008).

In recent years, mission integration has become the guiding principle for the design and implementation of UN operations in post-conflict situations. Integrated missions are generally understood to be multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations led by an SRSR. Integration is viewed by the DPKO as a way to improve the management and impact of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations (Campbell, Kaspersen & Weir, 2007, p.4). Hierarchical management is a key aspect of integrated missions as it generates a mechanism for central decision-making by which all UN activities can be coordinated and controlled (Eide, Kaspersen, Kent et al, 2005, p. 9). The evolution of the integrated mission has highlighted the fact that UN peacebuilding operations are increasingly engaged in SSR activities. In addition, the UNSC has acknowledged the need to consider SSR priorities when mandating a UN operation. It also has noted the importance of communication among the different UN entities and other relevant actors, in order to ensure that SSR considerations are adequately addressed during the implementation of UNSC mandates (United Nations Security Council, 2007, p.1).

There is however a tendency for UN missions, due to the interim mandates granted by the UNSC, to concentrate on immediate capacity building needs for security and justice institutions rather than wider SSR. As the integrated mission concept develops this should improve, but changing the short-term focus of SSR concepts within the UN structure, particularly in the DPKO, could prove challenging (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2007, p. 11).
NATO sees itself as part of a broader grouping of IGOs and IOs delivering SSR but feels that, given its extensive experience of defence reform issues, it should be closely involved in coordinating SSR efforts in the field. Not all organisations are comfortable with NATO’s position on SSR coordination. The NATO General Secretary seemed aware of these sensitivities and, at an inter-organisational conference in Munich, assured the audience that his call for better coordination was “not because NATO wants to co-ordinate all those international organisations, but because NATO wants to co-ordinate with them and that is … fundamentally different than the co-ordination of them” (de Hoop Scheffer, 2007c). Notwithstanding the sensitivities of coordination and cooperation, in view of the importance of SSR to a number of NATO’s current missions, it would seem prudent for NATO to develop a policy framework and key guidelines on SSR in order to achieve a more coherent approach.

### 5.2. Intergovernmental Organisations: Internal Considerations and Dissension

Achieving agreement between the numerous stakeholders and actors involved in the conceptual development process of SSR is a challenge. Some theorists question if SSR is a useful instrument in post-conflict development policy. Concerns range from the suggestion that SSR constitutes a European centre-left project, seeking to impose liberal ideals on transitional and post-conflict states, to claims that it is devoid of significant meaning as it pays no attention to the underlying causes of insecurity in developing countries. SSR theory has been criticised for being overly confident about the possibilities for external manipulation of internal political and social structures and, thereby, underestimating problems related to local acceptance and ownership (Chanaa, 2002; Fayemi, 2001; Luckham, 2003, p.11; Williams, 2000; Wulf, 2000).

Practical details, such as who pays for an SSR intervention, also are germane to the challenge of launching the SSR process. The willingness of donors to engage in SSR support is not assured. Development donors first became collectively engaged in security-related issues towards the end of the Cold War but, for a number of development agencies as well as international financial institutions, legal restraints
on their ability to fund security reform measures limited the span of programmes that could be undertaken (OECD, 2001; Ball, 2001). In addition, many states are sceptical about the desirability of investing in costly and often inconclusive SSR processes. In several donor countries, defence ministries are responsible for security-related assistance projects in the developing world and mistrust development donor motivation (Brzoska, 2003, p.4). Thus it has become necessary for IGOs to progress SSR often without the assured support of many of their member states.

Within the EU, the Petersberg Declaration (1992) foresaw EU military intervention in humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. However, until recently there was very little coordination between member states on matters of security. In March 2003, the EU launched the Concordia mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), its first military operation. In 2004, NATO formally concluded its Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and handed over peace stabilisation duties to a European Union force (EUFOR). These events indicate improvement in EU cooperation on military matters but much remains to be achieved in terms of wider coordination and cooperation.

Institutions are more than simple agents of their creators and often produce results by means of autonomous action. In the context of the EU, supranational institutions, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Commission produce such consequences, even in areas where no direct or overt transfer of powers has taken place. Dimitrakopoulos (2001, pp.107-131) argues that supranational institutions circumscribe the use of executive discretion by national governments by blurring the line that distinguishes between the ‘two faces of power’. However, where security and the commitment of national security resources are concerned, member states seem reluctant to accept the supranational ideal and therefore the strategic-political capacities of the EU remain relatively weak (Ekengren, 2007, pp 47-52). Although there is currently a growing awareness that Europeans are facing security challenges which can best be handled collectively, there is no indication that member states are prepared to commit to a common approach which would require them to give up a proportion of their sovereignty over
security assets and strategies for the sake of collective EU efficiency and effectiveness.

Some members of the European Parliament are concerned that action to resolve this dilemma is not progressing fast enough. Baroness Sarah Ludford MEP (1) believes that the EU must face up to the contradiction of wanting the EU collectively to be both capable and effective in the projection of SSR matters and the fact that member states have not endowed the EU with the competence to ensure that that security sector effectiveness runs through all the 27 member states. There is very little coordination between member states on matters of general security; Shepherd (2007, pp. 20-24) believes that enlargement has moved the EU’s political balance away from a European-led approach to security as new member states seem to prefer NATO pre-eminence, thus keeping the USA engaged in European security matters.

This is not to say that the new member states are opposed to ESDP, indeed as it has developed so their support for it has increased but undoubtedly some prefer a view of European security which keeps the US involved in the planning and execution of security initiatives. Many European capitals still focus almost exclusively on NATO as the fulcrum of the transatlantic relationship, ignoring the central role of the EU (Kay, 1999, pp. 149-185). However security threats and risks are no longer clear issues of war and peace but rather posed in the areas of terrorism, trade and energy. The institutions of the EU, whose leverage ranges from financial and economic policies through humanitarian aid to military intervention, are increasingly as well placed as those of the US to face modern security challenges, including the promotion of SSR (Bet-El, 2008, 13-17).

Baroness Ludford (2) is concerned that, “there is a sort of turf war between the EU and NATO over security sector information and, as responsibility is power, neither organisation wants to give anything up”. Although some progress is being made to provide for better coordination on security matters within the EU, its member states and in its relationships with other IGOs, there is still much work to be done to improve internal and external cooperation.
In 2006 the UN realised that it needed greater synergy between its security, aid and development activities coupled with improved coordination between the departments working in these areas. This insight led the Secretary-General to form a Working Group on Security Sector Reform, which includes representatives of the DPKO and the UNDP. In 2006 Slovakia facilitated a series of workshops to examine the lessons learned from recent peacekeeping operations. These focussed on reforming the security sector in post-conflict environments, promoting the rule of law and good governance and on measures for preventing countries relapsing into conflict (United Nations Press Office, 2007, p.1).

Although the UN is involved in both security and development activities, it has failed to build effective links between the two. The lead agency for development is the UNDP, which has SSR-related programmes in areas such as democratic governance, the rule of law, crisis prevention and poverty reduction. In security matters, the principal actor is the DPKO which leads on peacekeeping and PSOs. Significantly the DPKO becomes operational only in a conflict or immediate post-conflict setting whilst the UNDP typically has a long-term development presence. However, the fact that the two UN organisations often find themselves working in the same SSR framework brings difficulties of coordination and programme uniformity.

In September 2007, DPKO established a division for Rule of Law and Security Institutions. The new division covered SSR, DDR, Police, Judiciary, Corrections Services, Mine Action and the new SSR Team. Under instructions from the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee on Rule of Law, (Annan, 2006, Annex 1, pp.1-2) DPKO claimed a lead role on all major Rule of Law and related SSR activities. Paragraph 3 of the Policy Committee decision directed that ‘lead role’ implied:

- Primary Counterpart of the Government;
- Identification of Key Partners;
- Strategy Development;
- Resource Mobilisation.

Significantly, the lead role was not based on capacity or programme related expertise, but rather on whether DPKO was present or not. This provided DPKO with a generic
lead role on substantive matters in all of its mission areas. If capacity was lacking, the lead role remained with DPKO but it could draw on UNDP and the capacity and resources of other agencies.

However, since the promulgation of this directive, the proposed task allocation has been increasingly viewed with scepticism within the UN. The new division of responsibility was seen as straying into the mandates and programming modalities of the UN agencies. The one-size fits-all decision at UNNY was perceived to contravene the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which rests on the principle of country-specific assessments and consultations prior to each DPKO deployment. The majority of the current or forthcoming DPKO mission areas in conflict/post-conflict countries also were UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) priority countries, in which UNDP was running or building SSR and Rule of Law programmes.

In mid 2007, the UNDP sought to reposition itself on SSR and Rule of Law and to encourage collaboration with DPKO based on the UN’s Integrated Mission strategy. In September 2007, a UNNY Code Cable was sent to all DPKO field missions (Guéhenno, 2007, pp.1-9). Outlining the chain of command modifications, it urged closer collaboration in matters pertaining to SSR. Whilst the Code Cable acknowledged a coordination role for DPKO, it was less explicit on ‘lead roles’. It suggested that wherever a DPKO mission was deployed the SRSG would have the overall coordination responsibility. However, it did not exclude the UNDP from coordinating alone or co-coordinating with DPKO in areas, such as SSR, that clearly fell within UNDP’s mandate.

Notwithstanding this measured approach to DPKO primacy, the UNDP’s belief was that the Strategic Plan for SSR and Rule of Law in the years 2008-2011 (UNDP, 2000a) could not be adequately applied in post-conflict situations as community security and transitional governance outputs would fall largely outside UNDP lead responsibilities. In addition, the UNSC Executive Board decision on the role of UNDP in crisis and post-conflict situations, which had determined that UNDP had a substantive security role in post-conflict countries, (UNSC, 2000, pp.6-8) could not be satisfactorily applied. Thus a rift had been created within the UN system on
matters that relied heavily on cooperation and coordination to succeed. Although, at face value, the decision to “urge closer collaboration” (Guéhenno, 2007, p.1) in matters of security institutional reform was well-advised, the manner in which it was presented was always likely to exacerbate tensions between UN departments and agencies.

The DPKO faced an additional difficulty in that the G77 states are sceptical of the motives behind the increased UN enthusiasm for SSR. Many of the non-aligned states suspect that SSR is a western power manoeuvre to legitimise intervention in the sovereign interests of developing states. This attitude has brought dissension within the UN membership, which has slowed progress towards evolving a coherent policy for dealing with security reform. Strategies to deal with the G77 position on SSR had to be devised; a senior UN official stated that, “It is no secret that the G77 is negative so we have had to package SSR as part of nationally driven capacity building programmes rather than present them as UN initiatives.” (3)

NATO’s International Staff likewise has experienced difficulties with their attempt to develop a collaborative policy concept for SSR. In 2005 an unpublished paper on SSR policy formation, by the Defence Planning and Policy division of NATO’s International Staff, highlighted inconsistencies in NATO’s position on the conduct of SSR activities. (4) In addition, some member states believe that SSR should be in the remit of the EU and that NATO should restrict its activities to defence reform. (5) These difficulties serve to accentuate the problems of SSR policy planning which requires consensus to move forward. Much of the problem with the NATO approach to SSR is based on their view that ‘security’ means ‘military security’ and not the more holistic approach undertaken by the UN and EU. Although it might be argued that NATOs interest in SSR is another way to legitimise the organisation post-Cold War, the reality is that NATO would rather confine its security reform involvement to purely military matters. Nevertheless, NATO has had several SSR-related involvements that point towards a more expansive SSR role in the future. These include the creation, at its Joint Force Headquarters in Naples, of a department dedicated to developing NATO’s position on SSR.
The OSCE also suffers from member state discord. Some Eastern-bloc members think that the OSCE still spends the larger share of its resources in Southeast Europe, despite what are seen as more pressing needs in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Additionally, Russia’s enthusiasm for OSCE has declined as the organisation assumed missions that involved Moscow’s national interests, such as in Georgia and Kosovo. Russia is particularly critical of ODIHR, which is responsible for election monitoring, accusing it of bias and remains hostile to its practice of issuing comment on elections soon after the polls close. Adding to the difficulties facing OSCE there has been discussion about its legal status; as the Organisation has no founding treaty that may act as a basis for its existence it lacks a ‘legal personality’ under international law, which creates problems in contracting and procurement. However, the United States has strongly resisted giving this legal status, fearing a loss of US influence over the Organisation (Brander & Estébanez, 2007, pp.2-5).

Despite having 90% of its staff deployed in operational field missions, there has been criticism of OSCE’s methods and objectivity. Bernabéu (2007, pp.83-89) has reviewed the ways in which security, the rule of law and democracy have been interwoven in the context of the OSCE component of the UN mission in Kosovo. She considers that the conflicting objectives and the needs and constraints of different actors have adversely influenced the reform of the security institutions and the democratisation process. Bernabéu believes that not only are SSR and the OSCE’s democratisation agendas often incompatible, but also that measures adopted by the Organisation to cope with post-conflict security challenges affects both these agendas. There is, she contends, considerable overlap in purpose between the varying elements of the OSCE and mission programmes are often uncoordinated. Furthermore, she suggests that the OSCE’s theoretical discourse on SSR is not matched by practices in the field.
5.3. Intergovernmental Organisations: Competition and Competency

The most critical component for the involvement of international organisations in the fields of peacebuilding and SSR is the ability to coordinate and cooperate. IGOs traditionally have been seen as instruments through which states pursued national interests in the regional or international arena, “states saw IGOs as providing an environment of enhanced predictability for consultations with other states and as a ready meeting place” (Law, 2007, p. 4). Increasingly, however, IGOs have evolved to become crucial elements in the spread of ideas and the promotion of policies that could possibly fail without their engagement and sponsorship. Therefore IGOs have had a key role in developing norms for SSR and in spreading an embryonic understanding of the relationship between the condition of the security sector, sustainable social development and economic viability. However, despite this advance in understanding, divergence still exists between, and within, many IGOs on how best to progress SSR in post conflict situations (Scherrer, 2007, pp. 181-195; Law, 2007, pp.7-17).

There remains a lack of coherence within IGOs over the understanding of the ‘security sector’ and its ‘reform’. Different organisations use different definitions of the security sector, the EU favours the OECD DAC definition, whilst the UN has created its own understanding of the security sector. This divergence in definitions leads to varying approached to reform. Although there have now been three accepted generations of security sector reform, the evolution in thinking has not overcome the difficulties facing security sector actors when responding to the political and organisational demands of post conflict transformation. This failure is based on the lack of agreed definitions and strategies for SSR, coupled with a lack of academic and practitioner consensus on how deeply and widely the security sector should be viewed. Arising from this debate is the dilemma of what constitutes ‘local ownership’ and how far the myriad concepts of human security should be included in the reform process.

Notwithstanding the recognised need for coordination and cooperation between the various actors in SSR, international engagement has shown a marked lack of
synchronisation. One reason for this failure is the lack of coordination among the international groups:

"Many of the organisations that intervene [in post-conflict situations] often do so with a strategy and presence that is ignorant of what has gone before them, and unaware [of] how their efforts might be consistent and supportive of the efforts of others, rather than independent or in competition with them" (Chayes & Chayes, 1998, p. 281).

Organisations involved in SSR seldom have the time or resources for research and contingency planning. SSR interventions more often than not are launched without recourse to earlier missions or to initiatives taken by other international bodies. In addition, despite the growth in the clearinghouse concept (6) for discrete areas of technical involvement, there is no single overarching body that can initiate or coordinate the diverse groups working in a post-conflict environment. Attempts have been made to introduce such a coordinating body into intervention mechanisms but the results have yet to make a significant impact. As an example, an attempt by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to harmonise the activities of the UN, NATO and NGOs through a Coordination Centre established in Pristina, directly after the end of the conflict in Kosovo in June 1999, was a failure. Each organisation preferred to make its own arrangements and to direct its efforts as it chose. This led to some areas being over subscribed with international assistance and advice, whilst others received no support or guidance whatsoever. It appeared that most IGOs and NGOs focused on their own perception of what was required and pursued that aim without regard for the work being undertaken by others. (7)

In traditional SSR, objectives have tended to be set by whichever organisation or state was prepared to intervene. Consequently, the need for adherence to national interest goals and for political compromise often has led to indistinct and incoherent aspirations and a lack of clarity in the objectives. These problems are compounded if the mission is hastily mounted with little or no forward planning. Some actors now recognise the need for strategic operational planning in readiness for possible interventions. The military have customarily made generic plans for a variety of situations but, until recently, forward planning has been lacking in the principal IGOs (Chayes & Chayes, 1998, p.302). This lack often stems from a deficiency in cohesion between the members of the organisation. Law, (2007, p.3) notes that many IGOs have found that disagreements between their members have led to a lack of
consensus on major decisions. Mobekk (2008, pp 124-125) observes that an absence of an integrated vision on SSR in the organisation’s headquarters will undermine the work carried out in the field. Without agreement on strategy by the headquarters and the team undertaking SSR activities there is little chance of success. This was the case in the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) where the only agreement was that there was no established concept for the SSR process.

Inter-organisational competition and overlap also can cause disruption in both the planning and execution of SSR programmes. Khandwalla (1981, p. 411) argues that, “an organisation creates part of the competition it confronts”. The decision of the Euro-Atlantic security institutions to duplicate one another was as much a conscious choice as was the EU decision in 1999 to undertake a role in military crisis management, thus duplicating NATO’s decision-making bodies and capabilities. The EU created a number of committees similar to the corresponding NATO bodies: the Political and Security Committee (PSC) bears a resemblance to the NATO Council, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) to NATO’s Military Committee and the EU Military Staff (EUOMS) to NATO’s Military Staff. Whilst displaying the tendencies described in sociological institutionalism theory these overlaps nevertheless lead to competition; organisations offering similar competencies compete for their place on the international stage.

Determining which competencies have true strategic value to an organisation requires a different perspective. In recent years, the concept of core competencies has been added to the debate (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). Core organisational competencies refer to skill sets and technologies that enable an organisation to provide particular benefit and hence to compete more effectively. Organisations will have necessary competencies and differentiating competencies. Necessary competencies are those that create value, whilst differentiating competencies are those that give an organisation a competitive position. These differentiating competencies are what Itami (1987) refers to as the organisation’s competitive weapons, and Stalk (1992) and Lawler (2001) consider as the basis for competition. Hamel & Prahalad (1994) argue that it is crucial for an organisation concerned about its future success to be pre-emptive in its development of competencies in order to maintain a competitive edge. Thus, a strategy for future competitiveness necessitates
that organisation leaders concern themselves with enhancing core competencies whilst avoiding cooperation with other organisations possessing similar abilities (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Collis & Montgomery, 1998). This predisposition runs contrary to the most effective method of achieving the objectives of SSR operations.

Given that cooperation between the various actors is best practice in SSR then the public statements of the involved organisations have generally been helpful. Solana, for instance, has stated that “…as far as NATO is concerned, we will in the coming years be literally working side by side in the security field” (2004, p.9) and de Hoop Scheffer has said that “…NATO and the EU have worked together very effectively, and I am optimistic about our ability to do so again …” (2007, p.2). It should be acknowledged, however, that there could be a gap between public rhetoric and reality. Frequent references to difficulties at the strategic level of the EU and NATO suggest that there are a number of obstacles to cooperation, many of which are political in nature. Indeed De Hoop Scheffer (2006, pp.16-17) devoted part of his speech, at the Security and Defence Agenda Conference, to the need to break the deadlock in the NATO-EU relationship. Nevertheless, some European nations who are members of both NATO and the EU seem concerned that a deeper relationship between the two organisations could provide the US with undue influence over European affairs, which might prove detrimental to ongoing European integration. De Hoop Scheffer, referring to this dilemma, suggests “…some [member states] deliberately want to keep NATO and the EU at a distance from one another” (2007, p.9). IGOs have both strengths and weaknesses in the area of cooperation and coordination, which impact on their ability to react to, and perform in, the post-conflict arena. Despite attempts to harmonise both internal and external action, only in the realm of discreet technical functions has some success been achieved. The multiplicity of tasks required for even a limited SSR programme makes it difficult for individual IGOs to successfully engage. However, international organisations have both strengths and weaknesses in the SSR field; Table 5.1 below gives a summary of each for the subject organisations:
### Table 5.1: Summary of IGO Strengths and Weaknesses in the SSR Field

(Adapted from Table 1:2 in Law, 2007, p. 18)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th><strong>Strengths</strong></th>
<th><strong>Weaknesses</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Union</strong></td>
<td>A prominent international development donor with an emerging security capacity, which is developing its own SSR concepts. Has the Stability Pact as a platform for SSR work, along with the criteria for security reform for states desirous of accession status.</td>
<td>Lack of coherence between SSR activities of Council of European Union (mainly ESDP) and Commission (mainly development); lack of resources for more widespread and challenging security contingencies. A perceived withdrawal from the aspirations of further EU enlargement, which has been a useful tool for setting SSR norms in aspirant countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</strong></td>
<td>Only multilateral organisation capable of protecting actors delivering SSR in hostile environments; experience in successive generations of defence reform. It is currently developing its own SSR strategies.</td>
<td>Some member states are resistant to developing concept for SSR (i.e., for defence reform and its implications for the rest of the security sector); weakening transatlantic solidarity in sharing the security burden and the weakening appetite for, and capacity of, many member states for SSR activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations</strong></td>
<td>A relatively well developed organisation in SSR terms, which possesses global authority, albeit sometimes questioned, for third-party interventions, decisive for SSR in post-conflict environments. Is moving towards a more active role in SSR.</td>
<td>Lack of coherence between the UNDP and UNDPKO who are its main SSR actors; lack of support for SSR among permanent UNSC members; questionable prospects for developing SSR concept acceptable to all members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</strong></td>
<td>First comprehensive approach to security sector, developed by both transitioning and developed democracies; comprehensive approach to security; almost one-third of world’s states are members.</td>
<td>No consensus to update Code of Conduct norms to correct shortcomings and integrate innovations provided by SSR. Challenges from within its ranks to OSCE acquis and questioning of the organisation’s relevance by some members has led to growing dissension within the organisation which may undermine its authority and ability to act.</td>
</tr>
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5.4. Measuring Security Sector Reform

A further factor that adversely affects the successful implementation of SSR is the lack of a universally recognised measurement tool for SSR outcomes. Analysis of how SSR programmes are managed on the ground and how outcomes are monitored and measured is spasmodic. There is a significant gap in research exploring the management challenges of SSR interventions. One reason for this gap is:

“…because the mainstay of research supporting SSR is undertaken primarily by specialists in the fields of conflict, development, political and global security studies, …management-related dilemmas for SSR specialists have not enjoyed deep investigation” (Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, 2008, p.1).

Many management approaches do not survive long in the public sector, being quickly overtaken by new ideas (Poister, 2003, p. xvi) however, performance management has become an essential part of the oversight mechanisms of modern states. Monitoring and evaluation are seen to provide the tools necessary for the maintenance of control over organisations, projects and programmes. Additionally, they provide financial bodies and donors with a way to hold organisations and practitioners to account and are a critical part of result–oriented management.

Many SSR guidelines stress the need for monitoring and analysing the institutions and stakeholders of a host nation security sector. Within the SSR community there is the US Government’s Interagency Security Sector Assessment Framework (2009) and the OECD-DAC Handbook (2007). Additionally, there are DFID instructions (2003) for the monitoring and evaluation (M & E) of its field programmes, which have on a number of occasions been used to evaluate SSR projects. The UNDP capacity assessment methodology (2000), and the European Commission guide on analysing and addressing governance in sector operations (2008) have also been used as SSR M & E aids. There also exist thematic assessment aids that can be adapted to measure SSR activities and their outcomes.

These guides and assessment aids all make implicit the need to assess relevant sectoral actors and the impact of security development programmes. When analysing local actors the legitimacy and capacity of an institution to carry out its mandate are
of primary importance (Clingendael, 2005, p.36). In addition, both the formal law, and the informal ‘rules of the game’, institutionalisation, distribution of power, and state-society relations are recommended for consideration (Clingendael, 2007, p.10). However, there is often no structured way of observing institutions and outcomes; rather questions that give an overview of institutional arrangements are utilised. There is currently no universally approved method of measuring the impact of SSR projects on local institutions and their capacity to manage the security sector.

There are commentators who suggest that attempting to measure security sector management and reform is a subjective enterprise and there can never be agreement on what exactly should be measured. These commentators go to the heart of the present problem with SSR M&E. However, it would be naïve in the extreme to imagine that donor states and IGOs will continue to grant the funds required to run an expensive SSR programme without some attempt to measure the outcomes and effectiveness of the endeavour. Indeed, increasing pressure of public funds will only make the requirement more urgent. Imprecise as it undoubtedly is, the measurement and evaluation of SSR programmes is here to stay.

Various organisations have attempted to overcome this vexing problem. Within the UNDP’s assessment methodology, capacity is addressed by examining ‘how’ development can work better” (UNDP, 2008, p.4). There are five functional and technical capacities which UNDP identifies: capacity to engage stakeholders; capacity to assess a situation and define a vision and mandate; capacity to formulate policies and strategies; capacity to budget, manage and implement, and capacity to evaluate (UNDP, 2008, p.13).

The OECD-DAC has developed an Implementation Framework for SSR (IF-SSR) (OECD, 2007) designed to close the gap between policy and practice and provide guidance on evaluation and monitoring of SSR in the field. Prior to the publication of the IF-SSR, organisations employed a wide variety of results-based management measurement models to evaluate the results of SSR interventions. The logical framework (Cordingley, 1995; DFID, 2003, Chap. 5) has become generally accepted as a tool for reporting against a series of SSR project benchmarks. It was designed to ensure that realistic, actionable and achievable indicators were used for measurement purposes and, therefore, was adopted by the UNDP and the World Bank
for measuring the effectiveness of their field programmes (UNDP, 2002; World Bank, 1996).

Despite the acceptance of the ‘logframe’ approach, Banal and Scherrer (2008, p.46) note that there remains a lack of adequate performance indicators for SSR. Furthermore, a study analysing SSR logical frameworks questioned the applicability of the objectives used. It was suggested that they tend to reflect the core competencies of the initiating institutions rather than the programmes’ strategic objectives (Fitz-Gerald, Molinaro & Neal, 2001). Thus more work is needed to design a measurement technique, which is robust enough to accurately reflect the aims, objectives and expected outputs of the SSR programme and its effectiveness in terms of impacting on the particular security sector under reform.

**Conclusions**

The inherently political nature of SSR requires a nuanced analysis of the security threats, of potential national security strategies, the feasibility of sustainable security architecture and the viability of civilian oversight. In addition, civil society and local communities should be involved in such assessment. SSR programmes require proficient coordination which is a challenging goal given the multitude of international and local institutions involved. An SSR strategy in a post-conflict setting will have extensive scale and scope. International and regional actors will be numerous and each will have different expectations, capacities and methodologies and many will have no desire to be coordinated. Cooperation can give way to competition, with attendant rivalries at both the inter-organisational and interpersonal levels. Thus SSR becomes a complicated and politically charged undertaking grounded on conflicting understandings and diverging attitudes over the structure and scope of the process.

Any SSR activity must be accurately measured, for the reassurance of practitioners, donors and recipient states alike. There is little evidence that effective measurement is being undertaken. Evaluating the performance of an SSR programme is critical to assessing its sustainability and therefore requires an approach that takes
note of wider strategic perspectives. A SSR programme that cannot detail its achievements with any quantifiable accuracy undermines the benefits accruing to the host state and lessens the validity of external interventions. SSR must be approached with a high degree of planning and coordination. However, the difficulties of launching and successfully completing a SSR programme often are further complicated by interactions among and between the actors undertaking the process. These interactions can influence and distort security reform efforts as much as any lack of strategy, definition or resources.

In the next section of this thesis the influence of competition and rivalry on the 2006 Kosovo ISSR will be examined. Starting this section, Chapter Six will examine the political and domestic situation in Kosovo leading up to the 1999 conflict and after the entry of NATO and UNMIK into the province. It will then trace the inception of the Kosovo ISSR and how it was influenced by competing national, organisational and personal agendas.
SECTION TWO

Chapter Six: Kosovo’s Internal Security Sector Review

Introduction

The most effective way to test the reliability of theoretical work is to subject it to the rigors of implementation in the field. The theories of SSR were so tested in Kosovo in 2006. This Chapter focuses on the security sector review process undertaken there: the Kosovo ISSR. The name of the programme was indicative of the debate which took place during its inception; it was not to be a Security Sector Reform programme in name, it was not to encompass the whole spectrum of the Kosovo security sector (NATO forces in Kosovo were excluded from the outset) and there was dispute, at international level, over the inclusion of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in the Review. Despite these restrictions, however, the ISSR programme was designed to indicate the way forward for the future of the security sector in the UN administered province.

This Chapter sets the context in Kosovo and then summarises the methodology for the Review. It assesses the development of the ISSR process and the decisions that led to the way it was structured. However, as further Chapters explain, the programme was subject to acute challenges as international and local competition and rivalry moved the process away from the model originally envisioned by its creators.

6.1. The Background to the ISSR Programme

In 2006, on the instructions of SRSG Søren Jessen-Peterson, a review of the internal security sector in Kosovo was undertaken with the purpose of identifying the internal security threats, based on a survey of local population perceptions, and determining how well the PISG was equipped to handle these threats. It also was charged with
identifying which, if any, additional measures were needed by the PISG to ensure stability and security. This was particularly relevant to a post-status agreement Kosovo that would, most likely, not have the benefit of international security sector support. The work was, although not by design, to take place alongside the Kosovo Final Status Talks in Vienna. These negotiations sought to determine if the major international powers, along with the Republic of Serbia and the wider Balkans region, would agree to an independent Kosovo.

The events, which were to shape Kosovo in 2006, began before the 1995 Dayton Agreement that ended the war in BiH. In 1991, the Badinter Commission sought to resolve the differences between the states of the former Yugoslavia and establish their legal status. The Commission determined that Yugoslavia was disintegrating and that the republics seeking independence were new states and entitled to international protection. Kosovo, however, was unable to make a case for inclusion in this agreement as, in 1989, Serbia had revoked the province’s autonomy and removed its “…prerogatives of a republic, including its own constitution, government, and an equal voice within the collective federal presidency” (Caplan, 1998, p.748).

Kosovo was marginalised again when the EU decided against insisting that President Slobodan Milošević comply with the requirement that the privileges afforded the autonomous regions, prior to 1990, be restored to the province on the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In 1996, the EU recognised the FRY but decided not to press for special status for the Kosovar Albanians. The EU merely observed “… that it considered that improved relations between the FRY and the international community will depend, inter alia, on a constructive approach by the FRY to the granting of autonomy to Kosovo” (Bulletin of the European Union, 4-1996, p.58). The General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH did not include Kosovo as international mediators believed that the talks had reached a critical phase and it would be unwise to alienate President Milošević, who was seen by the international community to be the ‘honest broker’ in the negotiations, having brought the Bosnian Serbs to accept many of the issues under discussion. Thus, by failing to press the Serbian leadership on the matter of Kosovo, the international community helped to create the environment for a rise in militancy in the province that would lead to the conflict of 1999.
Once agreement had been reached over BiH, events in Kosovo took on more urgency with the rise in Albanian militancy against the Serb authorities in the province. The international community quickly recognised the increasing danger of the situation. It was evident that unrest in Kosovo could quickly turn to violence and its effects, in terms of refugee flows and spreading inter-ethnic aggression, could destabilise the surrounding region. Indeed, given the sizable ethnic Albanian populations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the then province of Montenegro their respective Governments were particularly apprehensive. In 1997, NATO’s Foreign Ministers confirmed that the Alliance’s “interest in Balkan stability extended beyond Bosnia to the surrounding region, and expressed concern at the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo” (MOD, 2000, p.6).

Recognising the hesitant way that it had dealt with the conflict in BiH, the international community’s reaction to the rapidly increasing violence in Kosovo was to be more certain. Indeed, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, said at the time, “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can longer get away with doing in Bosnia” (Caplan, 1998, p.745). United States Envoy Richard Holbrooke worked to achieve agreement from Serbia to the requirements of UNSCR 1199 which demanded a ceasefire and withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian forces from Kosovo (UNSC, 1998, Art. 1, 4a).

However, the violence in Kosovo continued to escalate and, as the end of 1998 approached, Belgrade refused access to the International Criminal Tribunal to a site of alleged atrocities at Račak, in the Štimlje Municipality of southern Kosovo. The Serbian authorities ordered an OSCE Verification Mission (KVM), sent to the province to monitor human rights violations, out of the province. The KVM remained, after intense international pressure on the Yugoslav leadership, but the situation was deteriorating quickly:

“On 28 January 1999, NATO issues a ‘solemn warning’ to Milošević and the Kosovo Albanian leadership. On 29 January, the Contact Group summoned the Yugoslav/Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leadership to talks at Rambouillet in France. Greater emphasis was added to the summons the next day when NATO issued a statement reaffirming its demands and delegating to the NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, authority to commence air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory, should such action become necessary” (MOD, 2000, pp. 8-9).
Nevertheless President Milošević, believing that he could split the NATO coalition and achieve victory or at least partial success, showed little indication of complying with the UN Resolutions (Posen, 2000, p.39). Despite last minute shuttle diplomacy by Holbrooke, NATO air operations against Yugoslav forces began on the 24th March 1999. The seventy-nine days of conflict in the province and the NATO bombing of targets in Kosovo resulted in mass refugees flows into the surrounding countries. Some 109,000 persons, mainly ethnic Albanians, were forced to leave Kosovo between March and June 1999 and many thousands more were internally displaced (Ball, Betts, Scheuren et al, 2002, p.5).

The legitimacy of NATO’s actions in Kosovo was, from the outset of the crisis, unclear. NATO did not have the backing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to use force but justified its actions on the basis of acting in an international humanitarian emergency. Criticism was drawn also by the fact that the NATO Charter specifies that NATO is an organisation created for defence of its members, but in this case it was used to attack a non-NATO country that was not directly threatening any NATO member. NATO countered this argument by claiming that instability in the Balkans was a direct threat to the security interests of NATO members, and therefore under the terms of the NATO Charter military action was justified.

NATO engaged the Serbs with no clear idea of how it was to conclude the conflict and eventually extract itself from the province. This has led to an international involvement in the province that remains largely open-ended. The aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, for many Albanians, Roma, Ashkali and Serbs in the province, was to present a bleak existence. A combination of years of Serbian neglect and NATO bombing had left the province without regular electricity or water supplies. In June 1999, as NATO troops entered the province, banks, schools, hospitals and clinics no longer operated and shops and factories were abandoned; many looted and burned by the Serbs.

At the termination of the NATO’s Operation Allied Force, the UN Security Council passed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999) (UNSC, 1999a). It established:
“an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of a provisional democratic self governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all the inhabitants of Kosovo” (UNSC, 1999a, p.3).

The situation in Kosovo facing the UN Interim Administration was far from encouraging. A month after NATO and the UN had taken over the administration of Kosovo some 650,000, mainly ethnic Albanian, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to their homes; 250,000 in the first nine days. At the same time, 200,000 Serb and Roma refugees left, after many had witnessed their homes and businesses destroyed by the returning Kosovar Albanians (NAO, 2000, p.14). Del Pointe observed that this ‘reverse ethnic cleansing’ was “as serious as what happened there before [NATO's intervention] (Bardos, 2003, p.150).

Internal displacement was to continue to be a problem long after the conflict. It is estimated that some 230,000 Serbs were internally displaced between 1999 and 2004 (OMPF, 2004, p.1) and, according to UNHCR statistics (2007, p.4), 257,000 non-Albanians remained registered as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in July 2007. Of these, some 206,500 persons were displaced in Serbia, of which 21,000 were within the province of Kosovo. Most of IDPs were Kosovo Serbs who had fled their homes at the end of the conflict in 1999, either leaving the province or taking shelter in one of the Serbian enclaves.

Since June 1999, migration from the undeveloped countryside filled the towns; unemployment soared to 57.1%, with 70% of 16-24 year olds out of work. In April 2009 the World Bank (2009, p. 2) reported that 45% of Kosovo’s population lived in poverty, defined as subsisting on €1.42 (£1.00) a day, whilst 15% lived in extreme poverty living on less that €0.93 (£0.66p) a day. Children, young people less than 24 years of age and elderly female-headed households disproportionately lived in extreme poverty. Those younger that 24 years of age made up about 54% of people facing extreme poverty, while those aged 15 to 24 made up 22.4%. In addition, Kosovo's social services deficits, particularly in education and health provision, had
not been remedied (UNDP, 2006, pp.29-30; pp.39-45). The infrastructure remains fragile; as late as November 2010, power cuts occurred daily throughout Kosovo.

In this unstable environment UNMIK and KFOR attempted to administer and reconstruct a society. Kosovo was to be an entirely new style of UN mission. International organisations, under a UN mandate, would take responsibility for administering the province. Nation states would only be responsible for security through the NATO led KFOR. Under the authority of UNSCR 1244 (1999), the UN took responsibility for the province with the task of establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety. The UNSCR 1244 (1999) emphasised the temporary nature of the UN presence, noting that the powers of the administration were undertaken pending a final settlement and that UNMIK’s role was to “oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement” (UNSC, 1999a, para 11f).

UNMIK was also a new departure for the UN in terms of its operational power and authority (Matheson, 2001, p.76). In Kosovo UNMIK faced the difficulty that Kosovo was not a state so that, in addition to administering the province, they were tasked with guiding Kosovo towards an undefined ‘final status’. UNMIK’s mandate from the Security Council included “the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, and facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords” (UNSC, 1999, supra note 20, para 11(a), (c)). UNMIK was tasked with acting as a transitional administration and with organising and overseeing the development of provisional institutions to which it could transfer administrative responsibly, including responsibility for the Kosovo security sector. “While the roadmap and timetable for achieving these goals is largely left unspecified in the UN Resolution, its clear intent is to promote a high degree of democratic self-governance” (ICG, 2000, p.95). Self-governance for Kosovo was planned from the outset and was rooted in UNSCR 1244 (1999). One of the guiding principles espoused by UNMIK Civil Affairs Department was the integration of local capacity. Instructions to UNMIK Municipal Administrators read, “As integration proceeds, the level of day-today executive control exercised by the interim administration should
diminish, although the ability to intervene when needed will be retained (UNMIK, 2000). However, there was no elaboration as to how this was to be achieved in practice or how the capacity of the local administrators was to be measured. The instructions to the UNMIK staff assumed both that capacity existed and that there was a willingness, by the local administrators, to cooperate. The fact that both were lacking, coupled with the ambiguity of UNSCR 1244 (1999), was to lead to conflicting interpretations as to the way forward by Kosovo’s political representatives, UNMIK and the representatives of the Kosovo Serbian population (Muharremi et al, 2003, p.1).

In this uncertain atmosphere, the UN feared that any decision about Kosovo’s end-state would be destabilising, given the complete rejection of the idea of a separate Kosovar state by the Serbs. Instead of focusing on Kosovo’s future status UNMIK proposed the idea of ‘standards before status’, whereby the achievement of certain administrative, social and political goals were made the prerequisite to a decision on status. As the majority Kosovar Albanian population were intent on independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this policy was not well received by the Kosovar leadership and, as a consequence, UNMIK began to see the Kosovar Albanian community as an obstacle (Lovelock, 2005, p.121).

From the beginning of its mandate UNMIK was to face a rival for political power in Kosovo. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), under the leadership of Hashim Thaçi, began organising a provisional government even before UNSCR 1244 (1999) was signed. By June 1999 the KLA leadership was able to deploy civil administrators to 27 of the 29 municipalities in Kosovo where the Kosovar Albanians were in the majority. At the head of each municipal administration was a Mayor, appointed by Thaçi, who was typically a former KLA member. Each municipal administration was divided into departments dealing with health, economic planning, judiciary, public order and defence. A local Albanian who had some knowledge of the area of responsibility headed each department. Meanwhile, Ibrahim Rugova and Bujar Bukoshi, the President and Prime Minister of the pre-conflict parallel government, continued to claim that they represented Kosovo in the wider political arena.
The UNMIK was formed on 13 June 1999 with just eight officials under the leadership of Sergio Vieira de Mello. The UN administrators had no accommodation, vehicles, communication equipment or funding. The UK Government DFID had to provide communications and a one million Deutschemark trust fund to get UNMIK operational (DFID, 2000b, p.3). By the end of June 1999 the number of UN officials had grown to 24 and by September to several hundred. Few of the officials had any knowledge of Kosovo and it was to be a year before any appreciable numbers of professionals were deployed. Kosovo was not, at this stage, a popular mission. The lack of electricity, heating, water, food and fuel made Kosovo an unattractive place for UN functionaries. By June 2000 UNMIK had only 292 professional staff against an authorised strength of 435. Recruitment of UN staff in the municipalities was at just 42 percent of the requirement (Independent International Commission Report on Kosovo, 2000, p. 17).

The KLA took advantage of this slow build-up and consolidated their hold on both the cities and the villages. They patrolled the streets and issued bulletins on safety, security and public behaviour. Their confidence was such that women members of the locally employed staff at the DFID headquarters in Pristina reported that they were being stopped in the street and told that they must cover their hair, “on orders of the KLA command” (Jaka, 1999). The ICG commented that, “a painless takeover [by the UN and NATO], which might have been possible in mid-June without opposition, is no longer possible now that the UÇK [KLA] structures have gained strength and confidence” (ICG, 1999, p.7). The situation was further complicated for the UNMIK as many of the international officials had formed the opinion that Bernard Kouchner, who has succeeded Vieira de Mello as SRSG, had been advised by the US State Department not to quarrel with Thaçi (King & Mason, 2006, p. 76).

The KLA asserted that they were co-equals with the UNMIK administration but, in reality, tended to rival the international administration. Whilst UNHCR were struggling to find and transport materials to assist in the reconstruction of destroyed houses before the onset of winter 1999, the KLA mobilised their connections in Albania and FYROM to procure building supplies and then deployed ex-KLA
personnel to help villagers repair their houses. By winter much of the reconstruction was completed with little assistance from UNHCR and the donor community.

The UNMIK administration continued to be hampered by a lack of staff, resources and leadership from New York. King and Mason, (2006, p. 79) note that UNSCR 1244 (1999) left unresolved “the underlying cause of the conflict; who was to rule Kosovo”. Rather than working to facilitate a resolution of the dispute between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in the province and settle the matter of the future of Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR strived to engage with the former leaders of the KLA in order to achieve some level of security, administrative and political leadership. This meant that both UNMIK and KFOR were more concerned with placating those who opposed inter-ethnic tolerance than seeking ways to promote a multi-ethnic society. On 21 June 1999, Hashim Thaçi, the KLA Commander, signed an undertaking with the Commander KFOR that the KLA would demilitarise within ninety days, in line with the provisions of UNSCR 1244 (1999). Although many thousands of weapons were surrendered, the KLA effectively continued to exist as a quasi-military organisation. KFOR found it necessary to conduct cordon and search operations to recover illegal arms from KLA caches. In mid-2000, a British Army patrol, having observed suspicious activity near an Albanian village, recovered a significant number of weapons and ammunition. The political effect of this seizure forced the former KLA Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Agim Çeku, to take action to rid Kosovo of illegal weapons, lest he be accused of allowing the peace process to be obstructed by supporting a continuing armed KLA presence in Kosovo (Lovelock, 2005, p.145).

In almost every aspect of Kosovo’s reconstitution, KFOR supported UNMIK’s political strategies but, when dealing with the KLA, there was no military option and it was necessary to develop a political framework within which the KLA could be contained. To achieve this aim, the idea of the KLA being transformed into a uniformed, unarmed non-military organisation, to be called the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), was conceived (Covey, 2005, p.106). The most militant of the KLA leadership were uninterested in performing civilian activities, seeing their organisation as the genesis of a Kosovo army to be deployed once KFOR withdrew. The political wing of the KLA, led by Thaçi, therefore focused on how to use the threat of an uncontrolled KLA to strengthen its negotiating position. Thaçi and his
KLA colleagues did not see a demilitarised KLA as the end of their aspirations for a Kosovo army or as undermining their political power, rather the formation of the KPC would buy time for the KLA political leadership and provide work for many of the ex-fighters, who were otherwise untrained for civilian life (Covey, 2005, p.106). SRSG Kouchner was able, under the terms of UNSCR 1244 (1999), to disband the KLA and mobilise the KPC but, although the new entity was styled a Civilian Emergency Response Organisation, in reality it was the KLA under another name (Colletta et al, 2008, pp. 33-36).

Five thousand ex-KLA fighters joined the KPC and 2,500 the Kosovo Police Service (Hienemann-Grüder & Grebenschikov, 2007, pp.34-35). In September 1999 the formation of the KPC began and three weeks later the Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PDK) Party was formed with Thaçi as its leader. Most of the regional groupings that had served as the KLA’s political network were consolidated into the PDK, with the remainder forming the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) Party under Ramush Haradinaj, another senior KLA leader (Covey, 2005, p. 107).

Despite the substantial powers given to UNMIK and KFOR in 1999, there was, nevertheless, a security vacuum in the aftermath of NATO’s intervention. UNMIK were slow to take over security coordination and Bono (2010, p.134) suggests that KFOR were unwilling to take on this role because of a ‘turf-war’ with UNMIK over the nature of its responsibilities. The delay in the deployment of UNMIK and the failure of KFOR to act meant that local institutions representing the Kosovar Albanian and Kosovo Serb communities took root and organised security and justice structures themselves (Bono, 2010, p.34; ICG, 2006, p.17). The former KLA fighters continued to murder and harass their political opponents and support insurgencies on Kosovo’s borders and in neighbouring FYROM (ICG, 1999b, pp.12-17, 2006, pp. 20-21; Human Rights Watch, 2008, p.10).

The international handling of the situation was not helpful. It was noted by the Serbs that when US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pristina, on 15 July 1999, she kissed Hashim Thaçi in full view of the world media. Thaçi had been declared a war criminal by Belgrade and was seen to be vigorously asserting the legitimacy of his provisional government in the province. This very public act by
Albright sent a message to the Kosovo Serbian population that the US approved of Thaçi and the supremacy of the Kosovar Albanian cause. Thaçi also was aware of the signal and renewed his efforts to consolidate power in the hands of his new political party (Vaknin, 2004, p.27).

Thus the international administration in Kosovo got off to a less than auspicious start. The inability to match the clarity of purpose and resources of the local Kosovar Albanian leadership was to place UNMIK in a difficult position which was not to improve over the next ten years. The stated aims of UNSCR 1244 (1999) were to deter renewed hostilities in the province and establish a secure environment. It also called for the demobilisation of the KLA and the establishment of provisional institutions of self-government. These aims had the backing of the UN Security Council and major nations in EU. However, it was the interpretation of how these aims were to be achieved and how the final status of the province was to be determined which was to cause the difficulties that arose in the first half of the new decade.

Whilst UNMIK struggled to deal with local realities, at the international level the troop contributing states was consolidating their own positions. The French sought control of the north of Kosovo, where the territory abuts the demarcation line between Serbia proper, Montenegro and Kosovo. Perhaps reflecting the French relationship with Serbia, France saw advantage in stationing its troops in the Mitrovica region; a situation that remains extant today, despite the 2001 and 2004 riots, which clearly indicted the Kosovar Albanian dislike of the French Brigade in Mitrovica city. The US and Germany also ensured that their KFOR troops were positioned in areas which most suited their national interest. The US military took the Municipalities in the south of the province, which has seen the least fighting and disruption during the conflict. This allowed US troops to consolidate their wider geopolitical interests by the construction, at Ferizaj/Urosevac, of the largest US Military installation outside the US at that time, (Global Security, 2007, p.1). Germany took military control of Prizren, a town close to the Kosovo/Albanian/ FYROM border. This again reflected a political decision to place troops in a less volatile area where German influence could be gained whilst ensuring force security (Cleland Welch,
2006, pp. 221-239). However, German KFOR was to soon realise that Prizren was the centre of KLA influence and organised crime interests.

Intra-state conflicts create difficulties for international institutions, particularly in terms of accountability and responsibility. The decentralised nature of authority means that the mission undertaken by the intervening institutions can drift dangerously as they attempt to regulate the behaviour of the factions within the state (Carr & Callan, 2002, p.195). This occurred in Kosovo; UNMIK sought to build a multi-ethnic culture, however this objective proved contrary to the wishes of the ethnic Albanian majority population in the province. Severe ‘reverse ethnic cleansing’ targeting the Serbian population continued in the years after the conflict. The Kosovo Serbian leadership, encouraged by Belgrade, refused to accept the authority of the Albanian dominated PISG and declined to take part in the democratic processes that had been put in place by the UN and the OSCE (ICG, 2008, p.3).

UNMIK and KFOR’s efforts to protect the minority population were largely inadequate and in some instances they stopped trying. A Tufts University study (Donini & Minear et al, 2005, p.4) into security in Kosovo concluded that minority communities believed neither KFOR nor other international organisations were considering their security a priority. Rather, the international community in Kosovo seemed more concerned with their own protection. Another study (Cleland Welch, 2006, pp.233-234) suggests that incidences of KFOR troops failing to engage in situations that required the defence of the population and their property were born of caution engendered by military doctrine and reinforced by domestic political pressure. The military chain of command sought to reduce the possibility of troop casualties by, whenever feasible, avoiding involvements in dangerous situations. This was not unusual; for example, in Somalia preservation of soldier’s lives had become the most important criteria after attacks on US forces (Lancaster, 1993, p.A1). Thus, force protection appeared to override concern for the security of the local population.

Kosovo has suffered since 1999 in ways other than human and physical security; the economy, which was not strong before the break-up of Yugoslavia, was badly disrupted by the conflict. Since 1999, to boost the economic system, UNMIK and the EU have tried to attract foreign investment to the province. However, there are
significant areas where inefficiency, excessive bureaucracy, low business acumen, institutional greed, corruption and a lack of professionalism contribute to a negative impression of Kosovo as a venue for investment (Cleland Welch, 2009, pp. 45-48). The inability of the international organisations in Kosovo to solve the problem of inadequate electricity supplies and attendant public utility provision was seen as a serious de-motivator to inward foreign investment. Economic growth therefore was slow and, because of a decline in support by foreign humanitarian aid donors and a lack of dynamism in the economy, unemployment remains among the highest in the world. National statistics place unemployment among people aged 15 to 24 at 70 per cent, unemployment of women at 60 per cent, and total unemployment at 41 per cent; above 50% for the majority population and up to 90% for the minorities (Alexander, 2008, p.13).

Shortcomings with respect to the competitiveness of the economy, the need for continuing structural reforms and a high unemployment rate were considered by the EU as pressing challenges to investment, trade, employment and economic growth. The UNDP and the World Bank concurred with this view suggesting that the lack of a skills base to meet the demands of the labour market, stemming from the poor quality of the education system, was a significant contributory factor to the high level of unemployment in the province (World Bank, 2008, p. 6; UNDP, 2006, p.58).

In 2003, UNMIK introduced a mechanism by which, they believed, growth towards a stable and secure society could be achieved. The Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP) constituted a comprehensive approach to addressing the main challenges facing the province. The Standards consisted of a list of eight areas in which Kosovo needed to make progress in order to become a functioning society. It also was designed to act as a benchmark for the development of Kosovo’s institutions thereby giving the basis for the opening of Final Status talks. The eight standards were: (1) the creation of functioning democratic institutions; (2) a functioning rule of law; (3) freedom of movement for all citizens; (4) sustainable returns and the rights of communities and their members; (5) a legal framework for a sustainable, competitive market economy in place and implemented; (6) the fair enforcement of property rights to allow all people to own and live in their homes anywhere in Kosovo; (7) constructive and continuing dialogue between the PISG and their counterparts in Belgrade over practical issues such as energy, transport,
communications and missing persons and (8) that the KPC fully complied with its mandate as a civilian emergency organisation, operating in a transparent and accountable manner and representing all communities of Kosovo. The Standards for Kosovo document, which had been approved by the UN Security Council in December 2003, had the objective of creating a province where all its citizens, regardless of ethnic background, race or religion, were able to live, work and travel without fear (UNMIK, 2004, p.2).

Despite these efforts to create a rapid return to ‘normalcy,’ UNMIK and KFOR soon lost the support and trust of both the majority Albanian and minority Serb population of Kosovo. This loss of faith was engendered by dissatisfaction within Kosovo society over the palpable lack of progress in resolving the final political status of the province, the continuing economic stagnation, and deepening concerns among ethnic Albanians over Belgrade’s attempts to consolidate political control in some parts of the province (ICG, 2004, pp. 1;2). It was, however, the lack of a resolution of the status question that increasingly was to become the dominant issue. Kupchan (2005, p.36) suggests that the political, economic and ethnic realities on the ground made independence for Kosovo the only viable option. Kosovo’s state of political limbo, coupled with the deteriorating relations between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority populations had left the province in a position where nothing could be planned with certainty and where the economy and inter-ethnic relations were moribund. Throughout the province, hostility divided Albanians and Serbs and the multiethnic society desired by the international community had failed to materialise.

In concert with the lack of progress on final status for province, the slow movement towards establishing a self-governing multi-ethnic state was to become a characteristic of UNMIK’s administration of Kosovo. Although UNMIK Regulations 2001/9 and 2001/19 created the PISG, initially only the areas of administrative and legislative authority over the judiciary were transferred to Kosovo institutions. Other competencies were transferred in 2002 but these did not include political oversight or control of internal and external security matters. These were to remain the responsibility of UNMIK. This lack of local institutional authority over Kosovo’s security sector reflected the perceived need to control the security situation with the international community remaining the principal authority in the province. By 2004,
the wish to maintain the *status quo* had become so ingrained within the UN Administration in Kosovo that Kai Eide, the Permanent Representative of Norway to NATO, noted that:

“…with few exceptions, the efforts of the international community had become a static, inward-looking, fragmented and routine operation. The international community, therefore, gave the impression of being in disarray, without direction and internal cohesion. The international organisations on the ground - and in particular UNMIK - have also been victims, stemming from a lack of direction and overall plan provided by the international community. For UNMIK, this has been an untenable situation. In the absence of a strategy with any sense of direction, they have been used to keep the lid on” (2004, pp. 4-5).

The tensions within the Kosovo community broke out into major riots in 2001 and 2004. At the same time, the much-diminished Serb population withdrew its support for the international community’s democratic processes. In the 2004 and 2007 Assembly and Municipal Authority elections less than one percent of the Serbs eligible to vote did so (UNMIK, 2004, p.2; Komisioni Qendrori Zgjedhjeve, 2007, pp.1-2). Constantly underlying these problems was the impasse over Kosovo’s independence, desired by the Kosovar Albanians and rejected by the Kosovo Serbs. This combination of problems was not helpful:

“UNMIK’s structure and mandate are now exposed as inappropriate to prepare Kosovo for the transition from war to peace … and from international political limbo to final status. The international community had beguiled itself into believing that the patchy half-promises of its undertaking to begin reviewing Kosovo's final status by mid-2005 represented a complete policy. Unable to agree on what that final status should be, it relied on the naïve assumption that delaying the decision would allow passions to cool” (ICG, 2004, p.i).

The effect of UNMIK’s position on the Kosovo populace was illustrated by surveys conducted among the local community. Tufts University researchers found that the UN administration was seen by the majority of Kosovo citizens of all ethnicities as “an arrogant bureaucracy …feeding on itself” and as “getting in the way [of progress]” (Donini, Minear et al, 2005, p.31). Lesley Abdela, Deputy-Director Democratisation for the OSCE, stated that the local population felt impeded rather than liberated by UNMIK. Part of the problem was the Kosovo people and their community leaders felt excluded from the process of trying to find new solutions.
They were neither employed, apart from in menial positions, nor were consulted by the international elite (Abdela, 2000, p.3). This ran in direct contradiction to Evan’s assertion that:

“…the responsibility to rebuild …must be directed towards returning the society in question to those who live in it and who, in the last instance, must take responsibility together for its future destiny” (2001, p. 45).

However, it also was true that the problems of Kosovo’s economy and social structures were too large for the newly created and very inexperienced PISG to handle alone. The Serbs had excluded the Albanian leadership from all forms of public office, for over ten years. In addition, the post-1999 Kosovo leadership had been largely drawn from the upper ranks of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and had little or no civil administration or political experience.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that the UNMIK administration, by not allowing those in political office to make their own mistakes and learn from them, slowed the transfer of competencies from the international community to local control. This failing was based on the belief that keeping authority in the hands of the IOs and IGOs in the province would contain the situation. The dysfunctional state of affairs was, however, taking place in a province that was economically distressed. The population was struggling to maintain the semblance of a working society whilst, all the while, becoming aggrieved over the lack of progress by the UNMIK and international community alike towards creating workable solutions for Kosovo’s future.

In March 2004 riots on a scale not seen in Kosovo since before 1999 broke out in the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) they were provoked by dissatisfaction over the international community's lack of purpose over the future of the province, UNMIK's inability to solve the problems of unemployment and the economy and Belgrade's continuing capacity to annoy and frustrate the Kosovar Albanians (2004, pp. 4-5). The riots unnerved both local politicians and the international organisations in the province; they were a clear indicator that the province was not as contained as many had thought. Eide (2004, pp.2-3) asserted the events of March 2004 demonstrated that Albanian extremists were ready to ignite inter-ethnic tensions and seek to further reduce the Serb population in Kosovo. A feeling that Serb leaders, both in Belgrade
and Kosovo, were delaying the process of defining future status for the province, he believed, fuelled support for such extremists. In the more nationalistic political circles in Belgrade, however, the violence in Kosovo provided “domestic justification to consolidate …[action] to protect co-nationals, even at the risk of renewed international isolation” (ICG, 2005, p.8).

In 2005, UNMIK decided that a security review was necessary to lay the foundation for the eventual handover of competencies to the PISG, particularly in the light of possible status clarification in the months to come. The initial requirement was to review the whole spectrum of security in Kosovo but the Kosovo Contact Group was uncomfortable with the idea that KFOR would fall within the remit of the ISSR. The Kosovo Contact Group comprised of representatives of the USA, UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation. It was first created in response to the conflict in BiH at the beginning of the 1990s with a composition that included four of the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the countries that contribute the majority of the troops to peacebuilding missions in the Balkans. In addition, representatives of the EU Council, EU Presidency, European Commission and NATO commonly attended Contact Group meetings.

The Kosovo Contact Group requested that there should be no review of the KPC, as it considered that it was a civilian emergency response organisation and not a security force. This immediately led to Kosovar Albanian suspicion that the international community was trying to exclude the possibility of the KPC becoming a national Army after independence, something almost universally desired by the ethnic Albanian population as they saw the KLA (now making up a sizable part of the KPC membership) as their saviours in 1999 (1).

However, the initiative of a security review, leading to security sector reform, was not before its time for in the minds of many working in Kosovo:

“…a sound and holistic security sector reform programme, initiated early after the end of the open conflict in 1999, could have led to the development of a more stable, predictable and sustainable security sector in Kosovo. Instead, and in part due to the unresolved issue of Kosovo’s final status, a hotchpotch of projects and initiatives came and went, filling some gaps within the security sector but without an all-encompassing and long-term approach” (Mellon, 2006, p.8).
6.2. Kosovo’s Security Sector Review

A UK Army Major General, Adrian Freer, who was the Coordinator of the KPC in 2004-5, originally suggested the creation of a Kosovo Security Sector Review. General Freer had served in Sierra Leone, where he witnessed the involvement of the British Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) in the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project (SILSEP). He persuaded the Kosovo SRSG, Søren Jessen-Peterson that such a review was well overdue in the province and should be undertaken before the final status talks began. Jessen-Peterson was well aware that the viability of Kosovo as a state would depend on the peaceful co-existence of all ethnic groups within the territory and its acceptance within the region. To achieve this end, an established security and justice sector, overseen by impartial institutional structures that were subject to the rule of law, were a necessary element for moving the status issue forward. Consequently, he requested the assistance of the UK’s SSDAT to assess the current security situation in the province and determine whether a security sector review process could be utilised to deal with the specific circumstances of Kosovo.

The UK Government supported a SSDAT survey in Kosovo that would be used to design the methodology for the Review. The survey was to take account of the expected United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) negotiations on the future status of the province. A Scoping Mission was undertaken by the SSDAT in March 2005 (Security Sector Development Advisory Team, 2005b, pp. 2-5). SSDAT advised that Kosovo would benefit from a security sector review; their Study had found that there was a need to establish commitment and ownership for implementing and sustaining the underlying principles of SSR. The SRSG, the Prime Minister and the President of Kosovo and senior officials in the UNMIK Pillars endorsed this advice and the PISG indicated that they favoured the proposed Review and were willing to support it (SSDAT, 2005, pp. 2-6). It was determined that the ISSR would be a staged process, with each stage being completed in turn and the information gained fed into the succeeding stages of the process (see Table 6.1 below). The programme was to be funded by international donations, at an estimated overall cost of US$2.3million (£1.15million), and was to be managed by the UNDP. The whole Review was to be completed within a period of twelve months.
Table 6.1: ISSR Stages as envisaged by SSDAT.

Each stage of the ISSR was to be overseen by a Steering Committee consisting of international and local leaders and further validated by a Core Consultative Group (CCG), consisting of designated local civil society leaders. It also would include an extensive community consultation programme. This approach was designed to provide local ownership of the process, address the concerns of ordinary people, and give a voice to local NGOs and security sector management officials. The SRSG emphasised that the ISSR was:

“…essentially a review by Kosovans for Kosovo; I encourage all individuals and communities to participate in the process; the review needs constructive participation from everyone; at every stage it will be open and transparent to all” (Jessen-Peterson, 2005, p.1).

Jessen-Peterson (2006, p.10) was keen, in the light of criticisms by Eide and others of UNMIK’s lack of commitment to local participation, to acknowledge the need for local ownership. He also wanted a stocktaking exercise to take place, which would determine the policies and structures best suited to the development of a democratically controlled and affordable security sector. Jessen-Peterson was determined that such an exercise should be transparent and that the results would be publicly available so that any lessons learned could be put to good use. He emphasised that the ISSR was an instrument for the future of Kosovo, explaining that it was “…a process that will produce an improved security environment for all and create the conditions conductive for economic investment, peace and justice, and participation in the international community” (UNMIK Press Office, 2006, p.1).

The Kosovo ISSR was to be a consultative process designed to give the leaders and people of Kosovo an opportunity to consider issues that would provide a
definition of security concerns, interests and the future security architecture in readiness for the process of determining final status. The ISSR would be structured to analyse the existing security capabilities, and identify any new institutional capacities required to address the threats identified through the consultative processes. In addition, it would identify policymaking development requirements and the structures necessary to support internal and external security needs following a determination of Kosovo’s final status.

Security sector review processes are an essential part of understanding the impact of changes in the security sector and for establishing the overall reform of governing institutions. These initiatives are often limited, either by scope or methodology, to internal institutional reviews with limited public consultation. Sometimes SSR programmes focus on single security issues, such as policing or strengthening civil-military oversight. In the case of Kosovo, the process of reviewing the security sector, either as discreet issues or in a holistic manner, was to be extremely challenging given that the internal security of the province remained an UNMIK reserved competency. Additionally, the Kosovo Contact Group had excluded KFOR, which had responsibility for border and external defence issues as well as aid to the civil power (currently UNMIK), from the Review.

SSDAT decided that the Kosovo’s ISSR process should examine not only those existing institutions which were judged to impact on internal security (except KFOR or UNMIK) but also to envisage which security institutions would be required in an independent Kosovo. This meant that many of the Review’s recommendations would be dependent on the resolution of the province’s final status. Therefore, the ISSR faced two significant gaps; firstly, Kosovo had no existing local internal security institutions or policies, beyond the police and judicial structures that had been developed by the international community with minimal local input. Secondly, the ISSR team had to make recommendations for security institutions prior to the determination of the province’s status, including what international security and oversight mechanisms would remain in place after final status had been agreed.

The support of key international actors was essential to the success of the ISSR programme. The lead in securing this support was taken by an ad hoc ISSR
Preparatory Working Group set up by SRSG Jessen-Peterson. The Working Group was led by the Head of the UNMIK Advisory Unit on Security (AUS) and consisted of an UNMIK Political Affairs Officer, a representative of the UNMIK Office of the Kosovo Protection Corps Coordinator (KPCC), two advisors from the Office of Public Safety in the Kosovo Prime Minister’s Office (OPS), and the UNDP Kosovo Programme Analyst for the Security Sector Portfolio who explained that:

“… foreign governments were asked to provide diplomatic support and public endorsement to enhance the credibility and visibility of the process; the UN, UNMIK and NATO were asked to provide political support, to lobby and promote the ISSR in various fora, and to share information relevant to the ISSR; and the PISG was asked to endorse the process and to commit to the full cooperation of its officials. The full involvement of local authorities was crucial since the ISSR could only be successful if the PISG believed in the benefits of the process and its end-result” (Mellon, 2006, p.12-13).

However, this important part of the preparatory process was delayed because the DPKO, which was responsible within the United Nations Secretariat in New York for the UNMIK mission, took several weeks to review and approve the ISSR process. This delay was engendered by internal UN rivalry, which will be explored in detail later in the thesis. Without DPKO approval, the SRSG in Kosovo could not publicly endorse the ISSR programme. The delay in receiving approval from DPKO affected the other preparatory tasks and significantly delayed discussions on the ISSR procedures with other governmental and political bodies.

Despite Jessen-Peterson’s personal support for the concept of a security sector review in the province and his emphasis that the ISSR was essentially a review by and for the people of Kosovo, it soon became evident that not all the members of the local and international communities agreed with him. The SSDAT Scoping Study had recommended that the ISSR working structure should consist of a Steering Committee (ISC) with high-level representatives from UNMIK, the PISG, political and religious leaders, and minority community representatives. The Steering Committee comprised of the following members:
The Steering Committee would be supported by a Secretariat located in the Office for Public Safety, within the Office of the Prime Minister. A Research Team, consisting of ten persons and located within the ISSR Secretariat, would coordinate the ISSR consultative work, along with the Steering Committee review process. The flow of information from the local consultative groups, through the Secretariat to the Steering Committee, whilst keeping the Kosovo assembly informed, is illustrated below:
However, from the outset, there was resistance to the Steering Committee both from within the Kosovo Serb political structure and from some of the Albanian political parties. The Serbs did not wish to be associated with a body that was predominantly Albanian and international community based. Their ongoing boycott of the PISG structures and Albanian political institutions made it impossible for them to sit on a Committee that had the Kosovar President and Prime Minister as members. Additionally, some Kosovar political party members were uncomfortable with the structure of the Committee, seeing it as biased towards the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) Party, which held the majority of the Ministries with responsibilities related to security sector. Although the Albanian political representatives were, on occasions, persuaded to be present at Steering Committee meetings, the Serb politicians never attended.

The first Stage of the ISSR process was completed in April 2006. The findings from this Stage became the basis for a wide-scale public outreach.
programme conducted in Stage 2. It was during this part of the Review that the perceptions of the people of Kosovo on what affected their personal and community security were obtained by a series of public consultation initiatives. Stage 3 then took the findings of the public consultations; together with the external threat review conducted in Stage 1 and related these findings to the existing PISG institutions with responsibility for overcoming the identified threats. This stage was designed to determine if these institutions had the capacity to deal with the identified threats. Stages 4 and 5 were based on the findings of the review of capabilities at Stage 3. During these two Stages, the ISSR researchers identified where capacity-building measures would be required. Stages 6 and 7 then began the process of identifying what would be needed to make the PISG capable of managing the security sector in Kosovo without international community assistance, including the creation of new Ministries and Departments.

This work led to the designing of a Security Sector strategy, including identifying the new institutions and oversight mechanisms required in the event of Kosovo gaining independence. Finally, the ISSR was charged with preparing strategies that could be presented to potential donors in order to obtain funding for projects to carry out the capacity building initiatives identified during the ISSR process. This information was encapsulated in the ISSR Final Report and led to the creation of a follow on UNDP programme called the Support to Security Sector Development project (3SD).

6.3. Public Awareness and Consultation

A core objective of the ISSR was to expand public awareness and dialogue on issues of security in Kosovo. In addition to the municipal consultative meetings conducted in Stages 1 and 2 of the process, a public outreach strategy was developed. The outreach campaign had several phases:

a. **Awareness Raising** through consultative town hall meetings and media tools such as TV and radio spots, billboards, press conferences and interviews with members of the ISSR Secretariat and members of the PISG. These were used
to explain the ISSR programme to the population, with the aim of encouraging participation in the public consultation process.

b. **Deepening Understanding and Encouraging Public Ownership** of ISSR process and security issues through use of direct outreach tools such as publications and TV advertising. This included a series of debates on UNMIK public service television (RTK) and local radio stations.

c. **Collection of Public Input** through a “Have Your Say” Bus travelling in urban and rural areas of Kosovo distributing information material and taking direct comment from the public. The interviews with ISSR members on Kosovo radio and TV stations all had a ‘phone-in’ option allowing the listeners to make their comments. Suggestion boxes were placed in public buildings across Kosovo to allow citizens to drop off their comments on security. Finally an “ISSR hotline” allowed the public to express their opinions either via telephone or via email.

d. **Verification of Initial Findings** was undertaken by relating the threat analysis to public opinion in order to verify the findings. These findings were further verified through consultative town hall meetings, public debates, discussions and opinion-editorials.

The goal of the public outreach strategy was to ensure that all of Kosovo’s communities were not only aware of, but had the opportunity to be engaged in, the ISSR process. Furthermore, the campaign sought to enhance the level of public dialogue about security and encourage transparency among Kosovo’s security institutions. Bringing members of the public together in a debate enhanced this aspect with those PISG officials involved in security matters. Illustrations of the public outreach programme are at Annex E.

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**6.4. The ISSR Threat Analysis**

The internal security threat analysis stage of the ISSR process was completed in partnership with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
In concert with this internal study, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, undertook a wider regional analysis of the security threats. The objective of this work was to identify key drivers that were likely to shape Kosovo’s security environment. In order to verify the findings of the DCAF and KIPRED research, the OSCE organised 32 Municipal Consultations across Kosovo where over 800 people participated in discussions covering the issues that most concerned them in terms of Kosovo’s security. As an example of the feedback obtained from these consultation meetings, Table 6.4 below illustrates the security-related concerns most frequently mentioned by all participants, regardless of ethnicity. Poverty shared the highest percentage along with unemployment (18%) followed by corruption among officials (16%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diseases</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organised Crime</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity Provision</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Safety</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Violence</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4: Responses of Kosovo Citizens of all ethnicities in relation to perceived threat.

The next chart (Table 6.5) indicates the three types of threats that the participants in the Municipal Consultations considered as most significant. The numbers illustrate the frequency with which each threat was assigned the highest category of importance.
The public consultation data showed that Albanian citizens put unemployment and the moribund economic situation in Kosovo high among the security threats, at 37% of all threats identified by those consulted (Table 6.6 below). The Serbian population, the largest minority community, largely concurred by rating unemployment and the economy at 30% of all threats identified by those who responded (Table 6.7 below). The economic situation not only produced major concerns about job security, lack of job prospects and general poverty, but also the indirect consequences stemming from these difficulties, such as increased crime and corruption.
In addition to the public consultations, 100 Kosovo professionals from academia, non-government organisations (NGOs), gender issues groups and the existing security institutions, KPS, UNMIK Police and KFOR formed a Core Consultation Group. This Group was designed to further enhance the dialogue and discussion related to threats and security needs.

Saferworld then correlated the findings of all these consultations including data from a household survey of 12,000 homes, conducted by the Gani Bobi Institute at the University of Pristina, and from the UNDP’s South Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC, 2006). This method of data collection involved adding the questions used in the Municipal Consultation Meetings to the Gani Bobi Institute questionnaire. Although not an ideal method of data collection it had the advantages of being free and available within the required timeframe.

These activities helped to ground the findings of the two research institutes, DCAF and KIPRED, and verify information gathered from the UNDP Early Warning Reporting system and KPS crime statistics. The findings then were outlined in a
threat matrix. Table 6.8 demonstrates the interlocking nature of the threats identified by the Kosovo participants.

Table 6.8: Interrelationships between identified threats. (Cleland Welch, Kondi, et al., 2006, p.6).

The Kosovo ISSR also examined the more traditional aspects of the security sector. It reviewed the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the Kosovo Correctional Service (KCS), the Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs, the Security Services and Border and Customs Services. It then made recommendations for the future security architecture of an independent Kosovo. These included the creation of a National Security Council, Assembly Select Committees on Security, Policing and Intelligence and suggested mechanisms for the creation of a Kosovo Defence Force. An obstacle encountered by the Review team was the lack of any authorised defence force and intelligence service, over and above those provided by the international community through NATO and the UN. ‘Intelligence Services’ existed in Kosovo but were firmly linked to political organisations and were outside the democratic control of either the international community or the PISG.

The ISSR Secretariat had to consider whether it should make recommendations on the creation of a defence force given the uncertain future of the province. The majority population in Kosovo believed that the KPC, which had been born out of the KLA, was a Kosovo National Army in waiting. This was anathema to
the minority Kosovo Serb population and to the authorities in Belgrade, who saw the members of the KLA, and the KPC, as outlawed guerrilla fighters and therefore inappropriate as the basis of a future Defence Force. Some members of the Kosovo Contact Group also held this view. However, the SRSG, SSDAT and the membership of the Steering Committee decided that the KPC had to be included in the Review otherwise the will of the majority community on this issue would prevail without input from the minority population. It was therefore necessary for the ISSR to project its recommendations into the future, beyond the life of UNSCR 1244 (1999). The ISSR Secretariat decided that it must consider a form of security architecture for Kosovo that could be applied only if independence, however conditional or limited, was granted to the province. At the same time, it had to be careful not to stray into the bailiwick of the UNOSEK, which was considering the matter of Kosovo’s final status.

UNMIK had almost completed the transfer of competencies to the PISG for the KPS, Border and Customs Services and KCS, by the time the ISSR process had started, and therefore they presented a reasonably coherent structure for review. The Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs were created during 2006 and offered a far more difficult area for appraisal. The judiciary had struggled for some time, even under UNMIK control, to gain the confidence and support of the population and it was recognised, by the PISG and the ISSR Secretariat, that improvements were very likely to be necessary (Cleland Welch, Kondi, et al, 2006, pp. 30-31, 62-69).

To complete the review of the capabilities and capacity building needs of the PISG security related institutions, the ISSR Secretariat began work on identifying relevant institutions across Kosovo at the local, regional, and province-wide levels to be targeted for interviews and more detailed study. The institutions were selected for their responsibilities in relation to the perceived threats identified in the earlier work of the ISSR researchers. As well as the traditional security institutions, the Ministries of Employment & Economy, Trade & Industry and Education and Health were all selected for review (Cleland Welch, Kondi et al, 2006, pp. xiv-xv). The ISSR researchers designed a set of questions to serve as a basis for interviews and data collection with Ministry officials and also conducted a review of primary sources, which included Kosovar and International institutional reports and official
documents. Overall, the ISSR team completed more than seventy interviews with a variety of regional and local officials and their international advisers. The ISSR Gap Analysis, which was to determine what additional capacity building measures were necessary to allow the Ministries and Departments fulfil their roles more effectively, was based on OECD’s “DAC Development Partnership Forum: Managing for Development Results and Aid Effectiveness (OECD-DAC, 2002). The rationale behind the use of this methodology was that the ISSR programme took place in the context, and bore many of the characteristics, of a development programme rather than simply a review of technical assistance measures.

As the ISSR methodology evolved it became apparent that an Interim Report would be required to allow the Steering Committee to judge the progress of the programme. In addition, Maarti Artisaari, the head of UNOSEK, requested regular briefings on the progress of the ISSR. The Interim Report, based on the first four stages of the ISSR programme and the initial institutional reviews, was produced in June 2006. The report was taken and approved by the Steering Committee and then briefed to UNOSEK in Vienna.

6.5. The ISSR Report

The ISSR Final Report consisted of a discussion of the threats to security, as perceived by the people of Kosovo, and an analysis of existing PISG institutions that had an impact on, or oversight of, the measures to deal with the perceived threats identified through the ISSR process.

The ISSR process used two key concepts to underpin the programme. The ISSR threat analysis provided a platform for consultation across the PISG and the general public, as well as for the functional analysis and recommendations contained in the ISSR Final Report. However, the Copenhagen Criteria were also used for gauging the success of the PISG institutions. In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council recognised the right of the countries of central and Eastern Europe to join the European Union, once they had satisfied conditionality criteria. This consisted of three norms: firstly, there a political condition: the development of stable
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; secondly, an economic standard: a functioning market economy; and, thirdly, the incorporation of the Community *acquis*: adherence to the various political, economic and monetary aims of the European Union (Europa, 2007, p.3).

Given the local leadership of Kosovo’s aspirations that the province, at some future date, would become part of the wider European community, the ISSR utilised the Copenhagen Criteria as a widely acceptable benchmark for their process. This acceptability was enhanced by the fact that the Copenhagen Criteria were already linked to the Kosovo Standards laid down by UNMIK in 2003. The approach was reinforced, in July 2006, by statements by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP in a joint report with the Commissioner for EU Enlargement. The report noted that:

“…the EU has sent a clear message to Kosovo’s authorities that fulfilment of the UN standards is not only needed to pave the way for a status settlement, but also for the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria in the longer term”(EU Press Office, 2006, p. 2).

The Final Report was prepared, in October and November 2006, for publication in December 2006. However, there was reluctance within the ISSR Steering Committee to publish it as the UNOSEK Final Status recommendations, due in October 2006, had been delayed to allow further negotiations between the Albanian and Serbian delegations. Some Steering Committee members, principally from the international community, feared that publication of the ISSR Report might detract from the work being undertaken to find a basis for agreement between the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian negotiators. This position was based on the fact that the ISSR Final Report made recommendations for security institutions in a future independent Kosovo. It was considered by some Steering Committee members that ISSR was pre-judging the final status outcome. By contrast, Artisaari was keen to see the document published as a precursor to his own report to the UNSC, which would include recommendations on security in an independent Kosovo.

**Conclusions**

The requirement for a review of the Kosovo security sector arose from the need to rationalise administration in the province following the conflict of 1999. Although the
arrival of the UN in June 1999 brought a measure of administrative oversight and internal security, the UNMIK engagement was an interim measure mandated by UNSCR1244 (1999). Under this Resolution and the Rambouillet Accords, it was envisaged that there would be an elected domestic administration, which eventually would become the Government of Kosovo after the dissolution of the Resolution.

Over time the people of Kosovo, particularly the Kosovar Albanians, became impatient with the UNMIK failure to create a viable economy and with the lack of progress on determining the final status of the province. The UNMIK recognised that it needed to demonstrate that advances were being made to ensure an orderly transfer of competences, including those in the security sector, from international jurisdiction to the PISG. At this point the methodology for the ISSR was suggested to, and accepted by, the SRSG and the principal local leadership.

The SSDAT methodology for the ISSR was based on a high degree of local ownership of the review process and on ensuring that both the population and their leaders were informed and consulted throughout the programme. At the same time, international community actors were to be apprised of the findings and conclusions at each stage of the review, in concert with regular briefings to the ISSR Steering Committee and Kosovo Assembly.

However, this holistic approach was designed not only to ensure local involvement; the review also aspired to more than dealing solely with the traditional relationship between security actors and security institutions. It took note of the perceived security needs of the population and then analysed the capacity of PISG institutions to deal with the identified security threats. This took the Review into areas that many would not consider the province of a security sector review, such as the impact of the economy, educational and health services on the overall security of the population. The ISSR found, from their public consultation, that the population of Kosovo were concerned not only with those institutions that directly provide security within Kosovo but also with the competence of the ministries and institutions that had an impact on their daily lives. Therefore, matters of health, education, trade and industry, employment, the provision of electricity and the efficiency of the civil
service all played a part in determining if the people of Kosovo feel secure in their homes, their communities and their society.

This holistic approach goes beyond the remit of the SSR process. Although the OECD heralded the programme as far reaching (OECD-DAC, 2007, p. 249), it was a challenging process and engendered strong opinions among the international community and the local leadership alike. There were those, principally within the UN and international communities in Kosovo, who saw the holistic and locally centred process as a threat to their authority over the security of the province. Within the local community, there were those who believed that the ISSR might undermine the positions held by those who considered themselves the architects of the Kosovar Albanian victory over the Serbs in 1999 and, therefore, were the natural custodians of Kosovo’s security. At the same time, there were many among the minority population who feared that the recommendations of the ISSR would offer too much authority in security matters to the Albanian majority population thus undermining their own sense of security.

Thus the difficulties of establishing cooperation and eliminating inter-institutional competition, already identified in earlier chapters, were found to be present in Kosovo. Indeed, they appeared more acute than had been experienced by other SSR processes, as the problems not only encompassed a multiplicity of organisations and departments but also seemed more pressing because of the limited time available to undertake the ISSR programme. In addition to the incidents of rivalry at the local level, the problems of competition at the strategic level were also to impinge on the work in the field.

The next chapter examines the relationships within and between the international organisations working, both locally and internationally, in the area of Kosovo’s security. These relationships and organisational interactions impacted upon the structure and implementation of the ISSR programme and served to shape its outcomes. The competition for ownership and influence over the security sector in Kosovo, within and between the international communities, provide insights for future security reviews and security sector reform.
Chapter Seven: ISSR, Rivalry, Competition and the International Community

Introduction

“International organisations have become major players on the international scene, whose acts, actions and omissions affect individuals, companies and states” (Wellens, 2002, p.i). Clark (1999, p.4) suggests that organisations perform within the dual realms of organisational action and the context in which they have to operate. Organisational action is the indeterminate outcome of struggles between people, who deploy different resources (Clegg, 1989, p. 197).

This chapter describes and examines the relationships within and between IGOs and the key international actors, the UK, US, Germany and Russia, in Kosovo at the time of the ISSR programme. It assesses the impact of the relationships between these actors and the programme and relates them to the theories discussed in Chapters Two and Three. It seeks to discover how far rivalry and competition influenced the outcome of the ISSR programme.

7.1. The UNMIK Structure, UNDP and ISSR

In the first mission of its kind, UNMIK brought together four functional ‘pillars’ under UN leadership in Kosovo. Although not designated as such, the UNMIK could be termed an integrated mission in the sense that it was a multi-dimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation involving a number of IGOs, headed by a SRSG. Under the provisions of UNSCR 1244 (1999), UNMIK was charged with the restoration of an autonomous, self-governing Kosovo, capable of exercising democratic governance (UN, 1999, p.2). In order to achieve this aim, along with the wider objectives of restoring democratic institutions and economic stability, UNMIK organised itself as follows:
Pillar 1: Headed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and responsible for coordinating humanitarian assistance;

Pillar 2: Headed by the UN DPKO and responsible for public services;

Pillar 3: Headed by the OSCE and responsible for institutional development and human rights;

Pillar 4: Headed by the EU and responsible for economic reconstruction and development.

Separate from this structure were a number of other UN agencies, including the UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme (WFP). These UN bodies were not included in the UNMIK framework as it was considered that they were in support of the main operation and their incorporation into the pillar system would make it too unwieldy. However, in 2000 after the UNHCR component was downsized and removed from the pillar structure (thus reducing the ‘pillars’ to three), no attempt was made to integrate the other UN Agencies into the UNMIK formation. Paradoxically, the configuration of UNMIK, after the departure of UNHCR, created a stovepipe effect that exacerbated intra-organisational tensions (1). Rees suggests that, “the divisions between the UN, NATO, OSCE and EU make it virtually impossible to create mission coordination” (2006, p.13).

By the end of 2005 UNMIK, along with KFOR, had established a basis for security in Kosovo. The incidence of ethnic violence had decreased from its height in 2004 and, in general, the citizens of Kosovo lived in an uneasy equilibrium. However, the ICG (2005, p. 1) believed that, “the status quo would not hold… Kosovo Albanians were frustrated with their unresolved status, the economic situation, and the problems of dealing with the past.” UNMIK had, by 2005, delineated the essential institutional frameworks by which justice and human security could be delivered. It had been less successful in delivering initiatives that could develop the ability of the PISG to control internal security. Where progress was made, in the areas of policing and corrective services for example, the work in capacity building was largely outsourced to the OSCE. Kosovo’s SRSG therefore believed that the time was right
to move ahead with a security review leading to reform, to be undertaken in close cooperation with the local community and its leaders.

Although the product of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence/Department for International Development/Foreign and Commonwealth Office (MODUK/DFID/FCO) sponsored SSDAT, the UK Government determined that the Kosovo security review programme should not be seen as a solely British endeavour. A member of the SSDAT Scoping Study Team, which tested the feasibility of the ISSR programme, believed that:

“…there was sufficient concern within the UK Government that Kosovo would once again erupt into violence; consequently they did not wish to be seen as the only donor state supporting a SSR process that might go very wrong. In addition, it was a matter of cost; the UK did not want to foot the whole bill for ISSR.” (2)

SSDAT believed that the ISSR should be supported by international donors and suggested that the programme be placed within the Support to Security and Rule of Law Cluster of the UNDP mission in Kosovo. The UNDP had committed itself to placing the prevention of conflict at the centre of its poverty reduction activities. Consequently, SSDAT let it be known that they believed that the ISSR process would benefit from UNDP’s experience in the development sector and from the relationships built up by UNDP Kosovo office with key local stakeholders. (3)

The UNDP was housed separately from the UNMIK Headquarters in Pristina and was seen as a junior partner within the Kosovo international community. Indeed, a study found that there was an, “absence of a formal relationship between UNMIK and UNDP” (Conflict, Security and Development Group, 2003, p.31). Many UNMIK staff considered UNDP as an interloper in the immediate post conflict arena and that the organisation possessed limited expertise in the security field. This low opinion of UNDP’s abilities was shared in the UNNY where an independent assessment, led by Kaldor, concluded that UNDP was overextended and that it tended to replicate its programmes from country to country thus repeating mistakes and shortcomings (UNDP, 2006, p.41). Despite these reservations, SSDAT believed that UNDP Kosovo would be a suitable candidate for the role of overseeing the ISSR process. It was the only international agency that could receive and dispense donor funds and this ensured that UNDP was given
oversight of the programme (Security Sector Development Advisory Team, 2005b, p.7). Thus the base from which the ISSR structure could be built was put in place.

7.2. Inter- and Intra-Organisation Rivalry and Cooperation

The most critical component for the involvement of international organisations in the fields of peacebuilding and SSR is the ability to successfully coordinate and cooperate (Law, 2007, p. 4). Intergovernmental organisations have both strengths and weaknesses in the area of cooperation and coordination, which influence their ability to perform in the post-conflict arena. This was to prove to be the case in Kosovo. Cooperation and coordination difficulties, however, were to impact on the ISSR programme before it was even started.

7.2.1. Intra-Organisation Rivalry: DPKO and UNDP.

If international donor partners were to be found for the ISSR programme, a single agency needed to act both as the banker for the donations raised and as a guarantor of the technical competence of the programme. Nevertheless, it quickly became apparent that there was opposition within the UN pillars in Kosovo to the UNDP taking on this overarching role; one UNMIK official suggested that, although UNDP Kosovo’s function in the ISSR process could be that of a banker, it had neither the capability nor the experience to get involved in the technical aspects of an SSR programme. (4)

Opposition to UNDP Kosovo being the custodian of the ISSR programme was to also be found in the wider UN system. A senior UNMIK official remarked that, “DPKO was against the idea... there was no guidance from New York and we took this to mean that they …wished that it would all go away.” (5) In the UN Secretariat the reaction to the ISSR programme being placed within the UNDP was equally unequivocal leading another official to suggest that, “UNDP in New York did not understand SSR. They lacked expertise in the security field and did not fully appreciate the linkages between development and security.” (6)

At an early stage in the ISSR preparation it became evident that, despite the SSDAT planning, funding was to be a problem. UNDP Kosovo turned to the UNDP
Headquarters in New York for financial assistance. They approached the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) for funding of the ISSR. (7) At first, the BCPR appeared keen to be involved, indicating that they might invest US$1 million. However, after the UNDP Deputy Resident Representative in Kosovo had emailed the BCPR eight times in three weeks, requesting information on the allocation of the funding but receiving no response, he became concerned that the programme would fail before it had started. (8) The problem appeared to be a delay in gaining clearance from the DPKO in for UNDP to undertake the review. This was necessary because the DPKO was the administering department for UNMIK within the UNNY and no UN related activity could take place in Kosovo without its approval. (9)

On the 31st August 2005, the BPCR coordinator informed the UNDP Deputy Resident Representative in Kosovo that additional financial clarification was needed by DPKO. UNDP Kosovo responded by saying that “until this time we had not received any indication that further clarification was necessary, nor did we know that the proposals would not be on the agenda for the 23rd August [funding allocation] meeting”. He added that, “… it was a bit frustrating to be in the dark for so long and now we had to wait another two weeks [until the next allocations meeting].” (10)

On the 5th September 2005 the requested clarification information was sent to New York and ISSR funding was placed on the agenda of an Allocations Committee scheduled for the 16th September 2005. An official in UNDP Kosovo informed the BPCR coordinator that:

“…many potential donors have mentioned that their financial support would be conditional to the commitment of other donors to ensure that there is a multi-national, collegial support to ISSR and not a single source support. Consequently, my hope is that should BCPR accept to fund part of ISSR, the support to this process will automatically become an international one and many of these other donors will then follow suit.” (11)

The Security Sector Advisor to the BCPR then informed UNDP Kosovo that the ISSR proposal was not in the correct UN format and that a more detailed case for funding had to be made. On the 8th September 2005, the UNDP Headquarters Senior Programme Manager for the Western Balkans, suggested that the original US$ 1 million request was too high and that UNDP Kosovo’s bid had to be adjusted downwards.
At this point the media took an interest: *Zeri*, a daily newspaper in Kosovo, stated that it “…had found out that the ISSR Secretariat has not done its job as expected because it is not even established due to lack of funds for developing this process” (Krasniqi, 2005, p.2). This press report spurred UNDP Kosovo to greater efforts; by the 15th September 2005 the reworked format and budget, confirming the total requirement at US$ 2,310,908.00 had been lodged in New York, ready for the following day’s Allocations Committee. On the 16th September 2005, UNDP New York informed UNDP Kosovo that the Allocations Committee had been postponed because of the UN World Summit. Ironically, it was at this Summit it was noted the importance of SSR as an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict environments. It was not until the 17th October 2005 that the Committee finally granted US $672,840.00 to the ISSR programme. This was fully three months after the start date for the programme envisaged by SSDAT and not one member of the ISSR Secretariat had been recruited:

“…by that time, the preparatory work had suffered serious delays, the credibility of the process had been questioned, and some donors and partners manifested an understandable uncertainty regarding the long-term viability of the review process” (Mellon, 2006, p.18).

Much of the delay in getting the ISSR budget requests tabled at the BCPR Allocations Committee was occasioned by inter-organisational rivalry between the UNDP and the DPKO. A senior diplomat, seconded to UNDP New York by a member state, believes that the DPKO were displeased when it was decided that UNDP was to be the institutional home of ISSR. (12) DPKO’s view was that SSR was primarily a peacekeeping operational tool and only secondly an aid to institution building and post-conflict development. Therefore, the DPKO (and by extension, UNMIK Pillar 2) believed that they should be responsible for the ISSR programme rather than the UNDP. There was, however, another strand to this rivalry; competition between the DPKO and UNDP was a longstanding issue. Since the early days of the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (UNPROFOR) there had been rivalry between the two UN departments over their respective role in peacekeeping and post-conflict development.(13) Tetlock (1998, pp.868-912) suggests that, if there has been competition between organisations over an extended period, distrust increases between them. This distrust erupted over the ISSR programme as both the DPKO and UNDP firmly believed that the other wished to
take control of SSR to “corner the market as far as post-conflict security reform was concerned.” (14)

Emanating from the highest level, this rivalry was taken up in the field in Kosovo, where cooperation between UNMIK and the UNDP often became the least desirable course of action. Moller (2008) has noted that a lack of common ground between and within organisations is based on differing approaches and understanding of the problem. He suggests that they are particularly prevalent in matters concerning security where traditionally cooperation was hindered by suspicion and mistrust of outsiders (2008, p.9). It became evident that, despite the backing of Kosovo’s SRSG for UNDP involvement in ISSR, there were some within DPKO New York who opposed any security related activity being undertaken outside the DPKO bailiwick. One official in UNNY believes that DPKO attempted to undermine UNDP’s efforts to get the ISSR programme under way by disputing UNDP Kosovo’s ability to undertake the management of the programme; “It was a hatchet job to get at UNDP.” (15)

Mearsheimer (2001) and Morgenthau (1948) both suggest that rivalry is closely related to the pursuit of power. Many realists argue that positioning is a system-induced mechanism of rivalry. In Chapter Two it was noted that sociological institutionalist theory suggests that organisations pursue legitimacy over efficiency and that organisations will typically select options that enhance their standing in relation to others over action that leads to more efficient working practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Maximising organisational legitimacy rather than growing efficiency is a strategy by which organisations seek to reduce turbulence and maintain stability (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, pp. 348-349). In addition, the organisation that commands the greatest esteem is able to draw the greater attention (Alvarez and Robin, 1992, p. 1398), which then improves its ability to attract funding and to function effectively in relation to other organisations and institutions. So it proved with the rivalry between the DPKO, UNMIK and UNDP over the Kosovo ISSR.

The DPKO’s determination to direct the UN’s SSR efforts has resulted in the forming of a SSR Team within the DPKO in New York. This has created ongoing
friction between the DPKO and UNDP. At the time of writing, the dispute over the ownership of SSR continues in East Timor, where work to reform the security sector is being hampered by just the same territorial debates between DPKO and UNDP as occurred in Kosovo.(16) Thus rivalry and defensive behaviour has been demonstrated in response to the interaction between the two entities, with its attendant increase in distrust and hostility. Duration also has become a factor in the ongoing rivalry between the two agencies; Colaresi and Thompson’s (2002, p.269) suggestion that negative opinions and prejudice increase over time is ably demonstrated by the ongoing antagonism between DPKO and UNDP.

However, this was not the only impediment to the programme; there was also reluctance by some UNDP senior officials to assume what was regarded as a difficult and politically sensitive process.(17) Within UNDP Kosovo there was the perception that, in the UNDP New York Headquarters, some senior officials would prefer that the programme failed to attract the necessary funding and, therefore, would have to be abandoned. This ambivalence was based on the fact that many high level officials had no understanding SSR.(18) Indeed, Scheye notes (2008, p. 201) that the BCPR “washed its hands” of the ISSR and “no bureau staffer was conversant with the programme findings or challenges”. There was also a measure of ‘not invented here syndrome’ (Husted & Michailova, 2002, pp.60-73; Katz & Allen, 1982, pp. 7-19) in that the information produced by SSDAT was not fully accepted by UNDP. This inability to recognise the value of new external information, assimilate it, and apply it is largely a function of an organisation's level of related prior knowledge. An individual's capacity to accept information is a function of both prior knowledge and their multiplicity of experience. At the management level, absorptive capacity is affected by the diversity of expertise within an organisation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, 128-152). This diversity of experience and expertise were clearly lacking in UNDP Headquarters. Therefore, despite the Kosovo SRSG’s wishes, confusion generated in part by intra-organisational rivalry and competition, surrounded the ISSR process. The ICG noted “although blessed by the UN Secretariat in mid-2005, it has lacked senior support … and finding funds for the ISSR Secretariat has been difficult” (2006, p. 10).
7.2.2. Inter-Organisation Competition: Kosovo IGOs and ISSR.

A manifestation of the institutionalist pursuit of legitimacy over efficiency was to be found in the UNMIK Headquarters in Kosovo. At the beginning of 2006, there were five UNMIK Working Groups considering the post-Final Status arrangements; two of which dealt specifically with the security sector. They were made up of representatives from all the Pillars in UNMIK. These working groups, one of which had no less than thirty members, struggled to define the role that the various international agencies might play post UNSCR 1244 (1999) and where any residual UN presence might fit into the new EU led structures. The ICG commented that:

“…despite the new [PISG] ministries and the ISSR, which is meant to produce Kosovo’s own proposal for security services configuration, UNMIK continues to be the driving force behind new security initiatives” (2006b, p.4).

Thus UNMIK staff was displaying the classic behaviour, described by Law (2008, p.59), whereby they sought to dominate Kosovo’s security agenda by surrounding themselves with like-minded actors and excluding those who might oppose them. Through these unwieldy committees they strived to maintain their legitimacy over security issues and to position themselves to the best advantage in relation to the PISG and the EU.

However, despite the attempt to gain consensus of opinion, the UNMIK security working groups found their existence constantly under threat as they sought to remain relevant to the changing environment. The UNMIK Security Working Group Steering Committee was to be chaired by the new arrived Principal DSRSG, Steven Schook. The size of the committees, designed in part to enhance the control of the security agenda by UNMIK, had the effect of making consensus difficult. The need to form coalitions among the multiple autonomous actors slowed the decision-making process and the relationships among the committee members often were strained. Schook, after discovering that the Steering Committee had little direction or purpose, handed the responsibility for chairing the meetings to the KPC Coordinator, Major General Christopher Steirn.
Hermann & Hermann (1981, pp.209-232) have noted the problems associated with multiple autonomous actors and suggest that issues of personal ambition and status within the group can influence them. Schook did not want to be linked with a failing structure so early in his tenure and Steirn, having been given the role of chairman, needed to demonstrate that he could turn the situation around. (20) Steirn, fearing that the UMIK Security Working Groups would collapse because of lack of direction, convinced the Kosovo Contact Group that he should be formally instructed to produce a matrix for the orderly hand-over of responsibilities from UNMIK to either the EU or PISG. (21) A member of the ISSR Secretariat commented after attending a Steering Committee Meeting, “Steirn suddenly found his Committee had a role so he could barely contain his excitement”. However, dissent within the Steering Committee continued as the UN, NATO and OSCE vied for position. (22)

The role of human actors and their decision-making environment will affect both the decision-making process and the outcome (Alison & Halperin, 1972, p. 43). Thus an essential element in the consideration of decision-making is the forum in which the decisions are made, taking account of the personality of the decision-makers and the internal and external pressures they experience. This mixture of human agency and the bargaining forum creates a predisposition for rivalry and competition (Biermann, 2007). Thus the process of defining the security sector in Kosovo and handing over of control to the Kosovar authorities was not going to be achieved as easily as some international officials, including the SRSG and COMKFOR, had hoped.

Throughout his time as SRSG, Jessen-Peterson had asserted that the ISSR programme was one of his top priorities but when the UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council on Kosovo was published ISSR did not feature. A SSDAT official commented:

“We have just had sight here of the latest Secretary-General’s report on Kosovo and, what do you know, there is not a single mention of ISSR, even in the dedicated security section. With [ISSR] advertisement hoardings all over Kosovo, one has to wonder what planet UNMIK are on, especially as they requested the programme.” (23)

Thus, Jessen-Peterson’s support for the programme and for local ownership of the security sector largely was disregarded both in UNNY and by his own staff.
Veton Surroi, a leading Kosovar politician, aptly summed up the position of Kosovo’s SRSG, “You will have god-like status in Kosovo, but no real power. The fact that you are omnipotent with a UN mandate does not add up to much” (2004, p.1). The position of a UN Special Representative is always a difficult one. Although the figurehead of the UN Organisation in the field, they are seldom trusted in New York and often find that their decisions are undermined. Vieira De Mello found himself in this position both when SRSG in East Timor in 1999 and Iraq in 2003 (Power, 2008). This was certainly the case in Kosovo; “…the tendency [of UNNY] to second guess their people on the ground…significantly reduced the UN Kosovo mission’s ability to deal with crises and press forward advantages at key moments” (Ashdown, 2007, p. 170). Annoyed by UNNY’s interference, Bernard Kouchner, when SRSG in Kosovo, placed on the door of his office a sign that read, “UN Motto: No good deed goes unpunished, no bad deed goes unrewarded.” (24) Suspicion and the need to assert authority over the field mission was a feature of the UN’s handling of UNMIK leading to Eide’s (2004, pp. 4-5) assertion that UNMIK was used by the DPKO to keep the lid on the Kosovo situation.

In June 2006, UNMIK produced a report reflecting the key findings derived from their proposals on future international arrangements in Kosovo. The eighty-four-page report (Wesslau, 2006) did not mention the ISSR’s recommendations for the orderly handover of security responsibilities to the PISG. A UN official remarked that the work seemed, “largely concerned with preserving positions for currently in-post UNMIK international staff after the conclusion of UNSCR 1244.” (25) Indeed, this attitude had become the tenor of the UNMIK mission. Higate and Henry (2009, p.69) noted that, in 2006, Kosovo had become “a ‘cushy’ tour for UN Staff … and that the longer the tensions existed, the longer these privileged individuals were able to enjoy the relative safety of the province.” Therefore there was unwillingness among many UN officials to work at finding solutions for Kosovo. This organisational culture, Higate and Henry assert, was more “a matter of contingency rather than outright conspiracy” (2009, p.69).

In this atmosphere of institutional foot-dragging, it was the ISSR’s concern with matters outside the strictly traditional view of SSR that seemed to exasperate those who saw the governance of Kosovo as their business. A number of officials,
both in Kosovo and in the wider international community, suggested that a shortcoming of the ISSR was that, although it pointed to the problems facing the security sector in the province, it did not satisfactorily present solutions to these problems. One official concerned with Kosovo’s security and development suggested that the “threats were not adequately linked to remedies” (26). He used the example that, when dealing with the economy, the report recommended strengthening the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s (MTI) capacity to attract foreign investment but it did not describe how this was to be achieved. A prominent economic expert was Joachim Rücker, who was to become Jessen-Peterson’s successor as SRSG in Kosovo. Foord suggests that:

“As the former head of the EU pillar of the interim administration, Rücker had been the official with the greatest responsibility for the economic development of Kosovo...he was perhaps less than welcoming of a review that could be seen to be trespassing on his territory and moreover, a report that stated what needed doing, without answering the question of how (2007, p. 47).

The ISSR Secretariat experienced hostility from several other international institutions. An ISSR team member commented that the European Commission (EC) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) had made it clear that they regarded economic development as “their job.” Their view was that it was the task of the Kosovo Development Strategy and Plan (KDSP) to make macro-economic recommendations. Whilst the ISSR Secretariat was invited to contribute material to the KDSP, the economists involved in the KDSP were unprepared to return the favour (27). The propensity for rivalry was to overcome the need for cooperation.

The ISSR was working in line with OECD DAC and UNDP principles, which proposed that development and security policies should be integrated. These principles also determined that SSR should be founded on multi-sectoral strategies, based on an assessment of the security needs of the people and the state (OECD DAC, 2007; UNDP, 1994). However, there was concern, within the international community in Kosovo, that these values were not adequately reflected in the ISSR programme, “because of a lack of cooperation between the review team and international economic expertise” (Foord, 2007, p. 48). Lafay (2000, pp. 47-63) points to the presence of inter-level rivalry in the management of information in bureaucratic settings, which mirror the lack of trust between international
organisations in Kosovo. In this case the lack of cooperation was to undermine the effectiveness of the ISSR programme’s economic review.

Some IGO relationships with the ISSR Secretariat were clearly strained. The ISSR researchers felt that they were regarded as latecomers and interlopers in Kosovo and that many officials considered that the responsibility for a security review should lie with them and not with UNDP. As the scope of the ISSR became more widely known there was concern among officials that their departments would be criticised in the ISSR Final Report and that their personal positions could be undermined. The imperative to preserve reputations and, ultimately, employment prospects appeared to infuse any issue concerning the work of UNMIK and other institutions or agencies. Additionally, there seemed to be a form of denial prevalent in UNMIK that prevented many officials from accepting that their influence in Kosovo was drawing to a close. Several UNMIK officials were so confident that they would be in Kosovo for many years to come that they moved their wives and children from their home country to Kosovo despite UNMIK being a non-family mission. (28)

7.2.3. Cooperation or Assimilation: UNOSEK and ISSR.

The most important organisation for the ISSR Secretariat, after UNMIK, was the UNOSEK, which was overseeing negotiations on the future status of the province. The delays in the start of the ISSR programme meant that it could not finish the review before UNOSEK started its work, as had been envisaged by the SSDAT. Therefore, although there was no formal connection between the two organisations it was essential that, given the overlap in timing of the two processes, the ISSR worked closely with UNOSEK.

Towards the end of 2005, the international administration in Kosovo faced the possibility that the province might, within eighteen months, become the first post-colonial state to emerge in Europe since the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. In October 2005, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, decided that the time had come to settle the future of the province. He announced that he would appoint the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy for the future status process

Given the parallel paths to be taken by UNOSEK and ISSR, it was agreed that the ISSR Coordinator regularly would brief the UNOSEK staff. He would present an interim report on the review process in early June 2006, followed up by a fuller report in September 2006. To assist in the passage of information, President Ahtisaari appointed Brigadier General Dennis Blease, a NATO officer seconded to UNOSEK, as the liaison officer between UNOSEK and ISSR.

Once the relationship between the two organisations was established, the UNOSEK insisted on the right to embargo publication of any recommendations from the ISSR that they felt might jeopardise the Final Status negotiating process. This was particularly relevant in the case of determining the need for a future Defence Force for Kosovo. The creation of a Defence Force was viewed by the Serbs and some European states as unacceptable, given the presence of a large NATO force in the province and the history of the KLA and its linkages to the KPC. The Kosovar Albanians, however, generally were resolute that the KPC would form the basis for a national Army once independence was declared. The ISSR, after due consideration, decided that they would recommend the creation of a small Kosovo Defence Force, after independence, drawn from all citizens of Kosovo. The UNOSEK requested an embargo on this draft recommendation until after the meeting in Vienna, at the end of July 2006, when the Albanian and Serbian negotiating teams were to face each other for the first time. It transpired that the fortuitous timing of the publication of an ICG Report ‘An Army for Kosovo’ (2006, July 28) allowed the ISSR Secretariat, with the agreement of UNOSEK, to promote their ideas, using the medium of the ICG Report, without giving the negotiators cause for alarm.

Contrary to the experience with other UN organisations, cooperation between UNOSEK and ISSR was achieved with only a limited amount of opposition from some members of Ahtisaari’s team. However, all was not completely straightforward; there was palpable tension at the first meeting in Vienna, in March 2006, held to discuss the strategy for ISSR and its relationship with the UNOSEK. Some UNOSEK officials were suspicious of the ISSR programme believing that it
could hinder their work. Opposition to the ISSR was confined to two groups within the UNOSEK structure; the representatives of the US Government and those who had served with UNMIK. Their objections were largely based on two factors; in the case of the US officials, the objective was to ensure that the UNOSEK process was completed on time and with the result required by the US Government; the political independence of Kosovo. These officials were suspicious of any parallel programme that might be used by either the Albanian or Serbian negotiating teams to delay or derail this objective. The second group was officials that were closely linked to UNMIK (and would return to it once the UNOSEK mission was completed). They carried with them the prejudices related to the UNDP and its ability to fulfil the ISSR remits (29).

The firm support for the programme, displayed by President Ahtisaari, ensured that the two endeavours were able to co-exist and to cooperate. Ahtisaari was briefed on the final recommendations of the ISSR Report in November 2006 and, despite lingering objections from some of his officials, endorsed them. In this case, Ahtisaari clearly demonstrated the attributes of the predominant leader; “A man of great authority, he ran his office with the proverbial iron fist in a velvet glove. Everyone knew who was in charge” (30). Consequently, the security section of the UNOSEK recommendations for Kosovo’s final status bears a close resemblance to the ISSR recommendations for the Kosovo’s Security Architecture (see Cleland Welch, et al, 2006 pp. 134-153 and United Nations Security Council, 2007, p. 49).

Thus, elements of the transformative strategies described by Law (2008, p.58) were at work, with the ISSR integrating with UNOSEK, less in a formal manner than as a collaborating body cooperating for mutual benefit. UNOSEK’s focus on working in harmony with the ISSR team was because it had a clearly defined objective that had to be completed in a finite timescale. There were no personal reputations at stake or threats to continuing employment, as was the case with UNMIK. Cooperation, including taking note of the preferences of partners, was demonstrated. However, in reality, UNOSEK always was the dominant player, with ISSR requiring its acceptance of their findings and recommendations, despite being an independent body. UNOSEK was able to cooperate with ISSR because it provided a means of airing possibly unpalatable recommendations ahead of any formal
UNOSEK statement. Nevertheless, one UNOSEK official was clear that, had the ISSR made recommendations that ran contrary to Ahtisaari’s wishes, these proposals would certainly have been prohibited or their publication delayed until after the UNOSEK recommendations had been made public. (31)

7.3. The Implications of Interpersonal Rivalry

Collective social behaviour is motivated by the requirement for emotional association coupled with the need for status and the achievement of personal goals (Meilaender, 2003; Druckman, 1994). However, Kosterman and Fesbach, (1989) suggest that the relationship between an individual’s positive attitude to his peers and associates and negative feelings towards others are largely based on in-group loyalties. In the context of IGOs there exists opportunities for inter-personal rivalry and competition based on the nature of the duties performed by functionaries and their corresponding relationship with officials from other organisations. The greater the domain similarity the more intense the animosity can be. In several cases this was borne out by experiences during the ISSR programme.

A part of the Office of the SRSG for Kosovo was the Advisory Unit for Security (AUS), which had been created to coordinate the actions of KFOR and UNMIK Pillar 2 within the security sector. The AUS was partnered with a new entity in the PISG, the Office for Public Safety (OPS) and the AUS and OPS were, by default, to become the drivers for the activation of the ISSR. The AUS consisted of only four people, of whom only one had any military or security sector experience. Nevertheless in late 2005, in the absence of the ISSR Secretariat under the control of UNDP, this small team was made responsible by the SRSG for setting up the internal security review process. There was some satisfaction in the DPKO Pillar 2 of UNMIK that UNDP had fallen at the first fence. One official remarked, “UNDP had lived up to their reputation... they were totally ineffectual.” (32)

However, the SRSG’s initiative to appoint his AUS as the activation unit for the ISSR was to have repercussions. The Head of the AUS, having taken responsibility for the programme, proved reluctant to hand over to the ISSR Secretariat once it was formed. He insisted that he undertook all briefing of senior
officials, including the SRSG, Commander KFOR (COMKFOR), Contact Group, the UNOSEK Team and the EU, on ISSR matters. Indeed, the Senior Political Adviser to the SRSG was so confused over the ownership of ISSR that, when the newly appointed ISSR Coordinator called to brief the SRSG in late January 2006, he was directed to the Head of the AUS as “he was running the ISSR.” (33)

The AUS also organised, early in 2006, a Donor Conference in conjunction with the British Office in Pristina for the funding of security sector capacity building initiatives. This ran contrary to the ISSR methodology, which called for the views of the local community, and their leaders to help shape the security related capacity building measures to be adopted. This issue was to create a rift between the ISSR Secretariat and the AUS. It was only a combination of the Head of the AUS reaching the end of his tour of duty and the confusion among the donor community, over which organisation was to be the custodian of their funds, which ensured that the AUS finally gave up its hold on the process. Nevertheless, the episode created distrust between the AUS and ISSR, which were not overcome during the lifetime of the programme. (34)

At the beginning of 2006, the AUS had only been established for a few months and the first Head of Office was a newly promoted Colonel with ambition to undertake further UN employment. He was new to the UN system and keen to make his mark in UNMIK. His deputy, a statistician with no background in security matters, also was keen to further his career. He had applied for a post in the UN Secretariat in New York, in the security field, and wanted to ensure that his superiors in UNMIK would support his application. (35) Duckitt (1989) and Berry (1984) believe that there is a direct link between the feelings of confidence within a group and the relationship with others outside that group. The leaders of the AUS needed to prove their worth within UNMIK and it is possible that they saw the ISSR as an impediment to their ability to demonstrate their control over security sector matters in Kosovo. These feelings of insecurity and the need to further their personal ambitions led to ambivalence over the ISSR programme. (36) Neustadt (1972, p.78) has noted that, “the personal is tightly interwoven with the institutional” and the marriage of organisational competition and personal rivalry was evident throughout the life of the ISSR programme. In Chapter Two it was noted that many sociological
institutionalists emphasise the interactive character of the relationship between organisations and individual action. Individuals characterise themselves as actors by engaging in acts that reinforce the network in which they are involved and the institutional world provides a means of accomplishing this imperative.

Van de Ven and Walker (1984, p. 601) have suggested that rivalry presupposes a state of domain similarity, which implies a shared issue area with related overlaps of competency. This overlap became a major obstacle in Kosovo and the difficulties over who was in charge were to continue to create competition and rivalry. (37) In 2006 the European Commission began to prepare for the expected downsizing of UNMIK and the hand-over of monitoring responsibilities to the EU. However, the Commission was slow to build up its team in the province. By July 2006, there were just 26 EU planners in Kosovo and discussions with the UN had begun only in June. UNMIK SRSG Jessen-Peterson realised that it would be helpful to bring the EU into the ISSR process and therefore appointed Torbjörn Sohlström, the Personal Representative of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in Pristina, as Deputy Chairman of the ISSR Steering Committee. (38) This appointment signalled the increasingly important role that the EU would play in the future of Kosovo.

Sohlström was initially pleased to be afforded a leading position on the ISSR Steering Committee and with the acknowledgment of the EU’s future pivotal role in Kosovo. However, he soon became disillusioned by the process as he was rarely consulted on security matters by the UNMIK AUS and KFOR and felt that the ISSR Steering Committee international members did not show him due deference. (39) This situation arose due to the continuing struggle for dominance of the security sector. (40) The COMKFOR also was reluctant to discuss military matters with Sohlström, given that EU role would be confined to monitoring progress in the area of rule of law and governance. (41) The situation worsened when Joachim Rücker who had replaced Jessen-Peterson as the SRSG decided that, as he was unable to attend the third ISSR Steering Committee (and his first as SRSG), he wanted his Principal DSRSG (who did not have a seat on the Steering Committee) to take the chair in his absence. He was dissuaded from following this course of action by his political advisers, who could see the diplomatic difficulties that this action could engender. However,
Rücker decided to cancel the meeting, despite the wishes of the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo to meet under Sohlström’s chairmanship. (42)

Two issues brought about these difficulties; firstly, the UNMIK leadership was resentful of the EU’s growing influence in the province. Increasingly, the PISG were consulting the EU representative rather than the UNMIK SRSG as they perceived that the future of Kosovo lay in eventual membership of the EU. In the manner of a lame-duck administration, UNMIK was seen to be shedding power and influence and the media and the PISG were constantly alluding to its perceived errors. The EU, on the other hand, was seen to be essential to the future economic survival of Kosovo and to hold the prospect of eventual EU membership, something the UNMIK was never able to promise, let alone bestow. The Prime Minister Thaçi was to state, after the declaration of independence, that:

“The EU mission was invited by … Kosovo; it is therefore welcomed by us and all the citizens. It will fulfil its role in accordance with the mandate given to it, as it is a counselling mission and not a parallel mission with Kosovar institutions. Kosovo has a European perspective…Kosovo’s vision is very clear, integration into EU and NATO” (Radio Free Europe, 2008). (43)

The Kosovo Early Warning Report noted that UNMIK's approval rating in July 2006 stood at 30 %, falling to 28% in October, and that it constantly ranked as the least respected organisation in Kosovo (USAID, 2006, p.13).

The nature of the personalities involved also was a factor; Sohlström was thirty-four years old and the personal appointee of Solana. He therefore wished to demonstrate a proactive role for the EU in Kosovo with himself as the leading actor. Rücker was 55 years old and wary of anything to do with security. His previous high administrative positions, before coming to Kosovo, had been as Mayor of the City of Sindelfingen in Baden-Württemberg in Germany and Head of Finance and Budget in the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Sarajevo; he was therefore an economist with limited experience in post conflict security. (44) Rücker relied upon Principal DSRSG, Steven Schook, for advice on all matters to do with the military and internal security. Schook had been a Brigadier General in the US Army and had previously served in KFOR. Rücker also had a German COMKFOR and, given his nervousness over security issues, leaned heavily on both his American Deputy and
the German Military Commander for advice. A UNMIK Regional Administrator believed that:

“Rücker was completely out of his depth. He had been put in to see UNMIK out of Kosovo, when it was thought that independence was imminent. As a former mayor and accountant he was in a situation he was not qualified to handle.” (45)

In the event, Sohlström did not attend another Steering Committee meeting. The move to bring the EU closer to the ISSR process had miscarried. The relationship between the EU and UNMIK was further strained when no decision was taken in the UNSC over international oversight of the new state. An NGO official in Kosovo suggested that:

“The EU is struggling to establish itself north of the Ibar [River], and the south is far from a done deal. Brussels was counting on a Security Council resolution that would have asked UNMIK to pack up … and establish the EU as the new top man in town, but this didn't happen. So EU [personnel] are being deployed throughout Kosovo and find themselves stepping on UNMIK counterparts who are still firmly on the job, with no instruction as to any departure or handover… The ICO is lacking the legal basis of a UN Security Council resolution to back its executive powers and potential interventions, so we are faced with two agencies claiming executive powers, UNMIK and the ICO (46).

The relationship between UNMIK and KFOR was vital to the international administration in Kosovo. These two organisations bore the brunt of the work to establish a secure and functioning society out of the post-conflict chaos of June 1999. At the beginning of the ISSR process, KFOR was commanded by General Giuseppe Valotto of Italy who showed enthusiasm for the programme. A factor influencing his support was the relationship between UNMIK and other organisations working in Kosovo. Successive UN SRSGs had been resentful that they had little jurisdiction over the KFOR Commanders (COMKFOR) who reported to and received instructions from the NATO headquarters in Brussels. King and Mason (2006, p.149) comment that:

“The level of coordination, control and communication between the military and civilian sides of the international administration depended upon the personal dynamics between the KFOR Commander and the SRSG”.

A number of the military commanders since 1999 had made it clear that they intended to run their operation as they saw fit with little regard to UNMIK’s political
intentions or strategies (King and Mason, 2006, p.150). The propensity for rivalry between NATO and other IGOs has already been noted earlier in this work and is recounted in some depth by Cascone (2008, pp.143-158) who suggests that there is an element of ‘muddling through’ in the relationship between NATO and other organisations in the field. Indeed, approaches to the normalisation strategy for Kosovo differed between the COMKFOR. Higate and Henry (2009, p. 68) point to the difficulties inherent in KFORs peacekeeping role which “perpetuated and reinforced” the distance between ethnic groups in the province by “providing too much security” for minority groups in their enclaves. KFOR sought to protect minorities from attacks by helping to secure ethnic enclaves. This spatial separation contributed to a hardening of ethnic divisions and ran contrary to the stated UNMIK aim of a multi-ethnic society.

Nevertheless, in at least one area KFOR tried to encourage integration between Serbs and Albanians. Shopping days were organised to allow Serbs to move freely in the Albanian-dominated town of Gnjilane, which, whilst not making the town multi-ethnic, allowed a degree of normalcy for the Serbian population (King & Mason, 2006, p.112). As an adherent to this more open policy General Valotto saw an opportunity, through the ISSR, to engage more closely with the communities. He also noted the reluctance of the UNMIK AUS to connect with the programme once the ISSR Secretariat had been established. This lack of UNMIK enthusiasm gave him the opportunity to support ISSR efforts with KFOR resources and, consequently, be involved in determining Kosovo’s future security structure. (47)

General Valotto noted that the ISSR did not have the necessary resources to undertake a full survey of the perceptions of security in the community. He therefore offered his military Liaison and Monitoring Teams (LMT) to assist the ISSR Secretariat gather this information. He also invited ISSR Team members to accompany him on visits to Municipal Mayors. Almost at once, difficulties arose from the General’s open attitude; UNMIK officials, who believed that he was interfering in civilian matters, frowned upon his visits to the Municipalities. The General was annoyed by this reaction and cooperation with the ISSR ceased.(48) His irritation with UNMIK remained until the end of his mission. On leaving his post in
August 2006, he remarked that the ISSR Coordinator would need a great deal of luck to complete his mission given the attitude of some highly placed UN officials. (49)

The incidence of inter-personal discord was not confined to UNMIK. In the autumn of 2005, meetings took place between the OSCE Deputy Head of Mission (DHoM), UNMIK and SSDAT to discuss the possibility of OSCE hosting the ISSR process. After a number of discussions, and consultation with the OSCE Headquarters in Vienna, this proposal was rejected. A senior official, who was to become the main interlocutor between OSCE and the ISSR Secretariat during 2006, believed that the OSCE Mission in Kosovo did not feel that it had a mandate for SSR, being authorised for only institutional capacity building within the province. He further believed that, as the ISSR process was initially unclear and wholly unfamiliar to the OSCE management, they were reluctant to become involved. Consequently, as there was no one at senior level in the Kosovo Mission with SSR experience, it was decided to reject the proposal. (50)

The OSCE Head of Mission (HoM), Werner Wendt, represented Pillar 3 on the ISSR Steering Committee and as the ISSR process became clearer OSCE Kosovo took a closer interest in the programme. Their senior officials realised that there was a distinct institutional and capacity building element in the methodology. The Deputy Head of Mission (DHoM), Jens Modvig, saw synergy and, perhaps, overlap in the OSCE and ISSR mandates and advocated closer OSCE involvement in the programme.

This closer association took several forms; the OSCE recently had reconstituted its field structure within the 32 Municipalities of Kosovo. There was a realisation that the public outreach process of the ISSR was a unique opportunity for the OSCE field teams to get a better understanding of local issues. At this early phase, the ISSR public outreach programme was proving difficult to translate into action on the ground. Seeing a role for his organisation, Modvig offered the services of the OSCE Community Safety Programme as the vehicle for arranging and conducting public consultations.
As the OSCE grew more confident of their involvement in ISSR, Modvig established and chaired an OSCE Internal Security Development Coordination Working Group, which was much influenced by the ISSR methodology. However, the HoM did not support this initiative; a senior OSCE official suggests that, due to acute personal differences between Wendt and Modvig, the Working Group was not allowed to fully cooperate with the ISSR programme. In addition, Wendt did not relay the recommendations of his Deputy to the ISSR Steering Committee. The OSCE official commented that, “if Modvig suggested one thing, then Wendt would do the opposite.” (51)

Personal relationships are largely founded on interaction and inter-personal communication (Anderson and Neistadt, 2003, p.3). Generally, a deficiency of trust and the resultant breakdown in communication are at the heart of deteriorating inter-personal relations. The lack of trust can be promoted by competition and the resulting emotional reaction to it. It can also be provoked by a clash of personalities, which, *inter alia*, may be the result of a lack of effective communication between individuals. Thus it is argued that these tendencies to promote and protect the self, in relation to others, exist in individuals working within international organisations and, in the case of the ISSR programme, influenced the understanding of what it was trying to achieve.

### 7.4. State Influence on the ISSR Programme

Those states that had an interest in the future status of Kosovo and its effect on the wider Balkans region wanted to have a basic understanding of the methodology and progress of the ISSR programme. Donor and Contact Group member state views on, and aspirations for, Kosovo were to impact on the programme. Pressure to conform to a particular standpoint was placed on the ISSR Secretariat by these states, often through functionaries working within international organisations. The reasons for such pressure were not always readily apparent as they formed a ‘sub-plot’ to the larger act being played out in the international arena. This was not an unusual occurrence; Webster and Walker (2009, p. 31) note that balancing pressures from
governments, donors, partners and beneficiaries are a particular source of tension in field operations.

**7.4.1. The United Kingdom**

The United Kingdom, having started the Kosovo ISSR process with the UK Government sponsored SSDAT as its main architect, displayed a waning of enthusiasm for the task. Beyond the UK’s public face on SSR there was rivalry between the MOD, DFID and the FCO. This was based on a disagreement over which Ministry held primacy for policymaking on SSR and its relationship to development. The MOD believed that security reform, a type of defence diplomacy, was its responsibility and should be largely restricted to the traditional areas of the first generation SSR. A comment made, by a senior MOD official to a member of SSDAT, on the ISSR methodology was that it should have “stuck to creating a Ministry of Defence for Kosovo.”

DFID viewed SSR more broadly with development at the centre of the process. Meanwhile, the FCO had become increasingly concerned that the MOD and DFID were straying into their areas of expertise and responsibility and that SSR and defence diplomacy should be subjected to FCO oversight and direction. Indeed, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard is of the opinion that, “there is not doubt that inter-institutional jealousy was present in the reaction of the FCO to the MOD’s growing involvement in defence diplomacy.”

Another facet to this problem was that both the FCO and DFID had ongoing projects in Kosovo, which ran parallel to the work of the ISSR. DFID had the Kosovo Development Strategy and Plan (KDSP) process, which aimed to provide a strategic vision for Kosovo thus allowing the PISG to allocate its resources more effectively and to better co-ordinate donor inputs behind Government priorities. It also had a Public Administration Reform programme designed to build capacity for policymaking, planning and coordination at the centre of government. Finally, DFID ran a Functional Review of Ministries project, which was intended to help identify and develop new functions for the Government should a final status solution, be found.
The FCO British Office in Pristina was responsible for the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) programme for Kosovo on behalf of DFID and the MOD. The GCPP was established in March 2001 with the aim of reducing conflict, including the potential for war. The FCO had responsibility for GCPP projects related to dealing with organised crime and strengthening democracy and inter-ethnic relations; DFID were accountable for projects related to safety, security and access to justice; and the MOD for projects related to SSR. Two senior UK Government officials suggest that it was inevitable that the representatives of all three organisations were wary of ISSR and how it might impact on the projects being funded through the GCPP. (56)

Notwithstanding their internal disputes, the three UK Government Departments were remarkably unified in the face of perceived interference in their projects by the ISSR Secretariat. DFID had reason to fear the influence of the ISSR as they were responsible for the far reaching and costly KDSP project which was due to report at about the same time as the ISSR. It seemed incongruous that a Department of State, which co-sponsored the SSDAT, was financing and managing a parallel project. A DFID official based in London suggests that the only explanation was that it had failed to grasp the meaning of holistic SSR and believed that ISSR would not stray beyond dealing with military, police and judicial matters.(57) Whatever the reason, the result of DFID’s reluctance to engage at strategic level was to influence the reactions of officials in the field, so serving to transmute “…the initial enthusiasm for ISSR into a position amounting to denigration.” (58)

The MOD and FCO had combined their efforts on GCPP, which was managed from the British Office in Pristina by a Lieutenant Colonel, who acted as the Defence Adviser. Relations between the British Office and the ISSR Secretariat rapidly became strained because of the considerable overlap in their work and the British Office’s support for DFID’s refusal of further funding to the ISSR Secretariat.(59) The situation was not helped by the British Office’s encouragement for the UNMIK AUS’s security support donor conference described earlier in this Chapter.

In mid June 2006, when the ISSR Coordinator requested additional funds for ISSR from the UK, the Defence Adviser told him that there would be no further
funding from the MOD, DFID or FCO. The distancing of the UK from UNDP security reform activities did not end with the ISSR. In August 2007, the UK declined to contribute to the funding of the UNDP Support to Security Sector Development (3SD) Project, which was to implement the recommendations of ISSR. In March 2008, after Kosovo’s independence had been declared and the UK had recognised the Republic of Kosova, the British Office refused a request by UNDP 3SD Project Manager to organise a briefing by the UK FCO, MOD and the Government Communications Unit in London for the new Kosova Government Security Adviser. DFID then announced that 3SD was to be ‘MOD-led’ as far as the UK interests were concerned. For its part, an MOD official is reported to have declared “we are not in the market for a ‘son of ISSR’ offering more theoretical and conceptual stuff which UNDP and some others are gearing up for”. This official then emailed the 3SD Project Manager stating that the British Office would be advising all UK Government Departments not to support the UNDP 3SD initiative. There was, therefore, a continuation of the UK policy of non-support to the Kosovo SSR process under the auspices of the UNDP. Over a period of eighteen months the UK had changed its position from sponsoring UNDP’s security sector efforts in Kosovo to withdrawing support for it. However, the GCPP fund continued to contribute to security initiatives in Kosovo on a bi-lateral basis. Thus, having been established during 2006, the animosity between DFID and UNDP continued and increased; a situation which accorded with Colaresi & Thompson’s, 2002, pp. 265, 269 view that prejudice and negative opinions accumulate with time. Unsympathetic images are formed and hostility emerges. Suspicion becomes a major restraint to the development of trusting relations between the opposing sides and, therefore, organisations involved in protracted rivalry are prone to distrust each other's motives (Tetlock, 1998, pp.868-912; Vasquez, 1996, pp. 548-549).

7.4.2. The Federal Republic of Germany

Germany’s participation in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 represented a turning point for Germany foreign and defence policy in relation to the use of military force in crisis management. The deployment of German troops on Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO air campaign, and thereafter on PSOs in Kosovo signalled that Germany’s constitutional post war reluctance to burden share in deployments
alongside NATO allies had been overcome. However, Germany still remained a cautious actor where troop deployment was concerned, despite its seeming sea change in the late nineties (Miskimmon, 2008, p.1).

Germany had maintained a considerable degree of continuity in its foreign and security policy after unification, which included a desire not to take part in large-scale military operations. In 1999, Germany’s presidency of the G8 and the EU/WEU gave credence to its efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis, thereby demonstrating to the German people that its participation in the Kosovo air campaign was very much a last resort. The decision to be involved in the Kosovo mission brought about significant adjustments in German foreign policy after 1999. These included the development of the Bundeswehr as a globally deployable force and the emergence of Germany as a leading actor in crisis management operations, largely within ESDP. It also generated an acceptance of Germany’s international responsibilities within the majority opinion in the Bundestag, where constitutionally all deployments of the Bundeswehr are debated (Miskimmon, 2008, pp. 2-3).

There was not, however, complete consensus within Germany on involvement in Kosovo; the use of military force had been a difficult issue for policy-makers since the end of the Cold War, to which was added sensitivities concerning Germany’s role in the Balkans during World War Two and the Luftwaffe’s bombing of Belgrade. In addition the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Green Party coalition government had strongly held convictions, on non-violent means for solving crises, to overcome. Nevertheless when the Kosovo dilemma emerged Joschka Fischer, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was inclined towards action stating, “…I haven’t only learned no more war, I’ve also learned no more Auschwitz” (Financial Times, 1999, p.3). The Green Party was not entirely convinced that Germany should support NATO in Kosovo; Hans-Christian Ströbele summed up the difficulties when he stated, “I am ashamed for my country that is again conducting war in Kosovo and again throwing bombs on Belgrade” (Friedrich, 2000, p.18). Gerhard Schröder also faced opposition in the SPD, including confrontation with Oskar Lafontaine who was opposed to action in Kosovo. Nevertheless, Fischer was able to survive a party debate in May 1999 which, had he lost, would have brought down the SDP/Green coalition. He
proposed a motion for a ceasefire to resume diplomatic efforts to end the hostilities. This ‘Fischer Plan’ was eventually to evolve into the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (Miskimmon, 2008, p. 5).

Germany’s ability to continue to successfully balance its internal and external difficulties in the crisis management arena has regressed since the late 1990s. Disagreements over the question of armed action were to come to the fore again, in the new millennium, when Germany was at odds with the US over the Bush Administration’s policies post the 9/11 attacks. The pressure on the Atlantic Alliance was considerable and Germany found itself at the forefront of the argument. The break in relationships became very public with Condoleezza Rice’s pronouncement that the USA would, “punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia” and Donald Rumsfeld’s denouncement of the Franco-German European alliance for their opposition to the Iraq invasion in 2003. (63)

The lessening of transatlantic influence was to impact on Germany’s confidence in terms of forming a coherent foreign and security policy. This confidence gap was further enhanced by the EU enlargement to 27 states, which made it more difficult for Germany and other older member states to continue to assert their influence on the workings of the EU. The Iraq invasion and its consequences for Germany highlighted the difficulty that faces a middle ranking power which had been reliant on multilateral cooperation at times of stress in the international community.

In the early 2000s Germany began to regain confidence in its ability to operate through multinational interaction; it took control of the EUFOR Democratic Republic of Congo mission and believed that ESDP could be a significant mechanism through which it might conduct its foreign and security policy. Germany however soon discovered that, with the ESDP’s lack of cohesion and scope and NATO’s continued dominance of hard security, there was a limit on what it could achieve within this medium. Nevertheless, Germany found that it could fulfil some of its defence and security aspirations by involving itself in NATO field missions. KFOR has had two German Commanders in the last seven years and they have been noted for their “steady, if uninspiring hand.”(64) Germany also had military control of the Prizren
sector of Kosovo since 1999. An OSCE official commented that, “Prizren was always seen…to be the model sector; well controlled, clean and orderly; just like a German town (61)” but this was to change in 2004.

During the March 2004 riots, Albanians looted and burned 29 Serb churches and monasteries in Prizren, and forced several thousand Serbs to leave their homes. The Daily Telegraph, quoting excerpts from a report on the conduct of the 3,600-strong German contingent based in the city, disclosed that UNMIK police were left to fend for themselves at the height of the rioting:

"Despite continuous appeals for help from KFOR, nobody from the military appeared to back up the police… [German] KFOR proved to be incapable of carrying out the duties to which it has been assigned" (Paterson, 2004, p.5).

The ICG believed that:

“…a more determined effort by German KFOR could have prevented the destruction of churches, monasteries and seminaries. There were reports of soldiers stepping away from their checkpoint positions as mobs approached (2004, p.20).

It is the opinion of the commander of the Multinational Task Force (East), which abuts the German area of operations (AOR), and of the KFOR Chief of Staff that the perceived failures during the 2004 riots affected the thinking of the German Government on Kosovo. The basis for this attitude was that Germany judged members of the KPC, and those associated to it, as the main instigators of organised crime in the German AOR. They were also seen as orchestrating many of the problems that beset the German soldiers during the 2004 riots. One view was that the KPC commander in the region could have halted the destruction by ordering the rioters off the streets. (65)

This mistrust of the KPC and its senior officers was to put the German KFOR at odds with the local population. The lack of progress on defining a future for Kosovo had angered Kosovar Albanians who believed the KLA (whose ex-members made up the bulk of the KPC) were the victors in the Kosovar Albanian struggle to gain independence for the Serbs. Many felt that this victory was now being denied them by UNMIK and KFOR. The ICG position on the local population’s views was that:
“…many Kosovar Albanians had come to believe that the KLA heritage was being delegitimized by the peacekeeping mission. In autumn 2003 this began to dovetail with deft Belgrade tactics that unnerved Kosovar Albanians, who saw their liberation struggle being bracketed as criminal - squeezed by both Serbia and the international community. Criminal elements in turn exploited this nervous reflex by wrapping themselves in the KLA banner” (2004, p. 8).

Indeed, the Germans were not alone in their mistrust of the KPC; the COMKFOR in 2003/2004, General Fabio Mini, considered the KPC and organised crime to be ‘two sides of the same coin’, a view which was in accord with the belief pertaining in Belgrade. The ICG noted that, in September 2003, Mini briefed the incoming SRSR, Hans Holkeri, on alleged KLA/KPC-criminal networks from evidence provided to him by the Serbian security services (2004, p.8, footnote 34). Both Ashdown (2007, p.126) and Shawcross (2000, p.351), commenting on the immediate aftermath of the 1999 conflict, note that Kosovo was supposed to be administered by the UN but the KLA had seized businesses and, as related in Chapter Six, established networks of local ministries and were collecting taxes.

Thus it was not surprising to find that the German position on ISSR was one of extreme caution, preferring the status quo of strong oversight of the Kosovo security sector by NATO through KFOR. Perhaps based on its experiences in Prizren in 2004, it became apparent that the German Government wished to see the dissolution of the KPC and, preferably, no local security force whatsoever. Brigadier General Blease noted that the Germany delegation in the Quint went to considerable lengths to water down the UNOSEK recommendations on the creation of a Kosovo Security Force (KSF). Blease was moved, at one point, to comment to Ambassador James Pardew, Deputy Special Adviser to the US President and Secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton implementation, that some of the suggestions made by the Germans could have, “a deleterious impact on the creation of the KSF and the potential length of the KFOR mission.” The Germans seemed determined to delay the handing over of the security mandate; they objected to the wording of the draft UNOSEK Recommendations and indicated that the transfer of security responsibilities to the PISG and KSF should be “at a later stage.” Blease commented to Pardew that, “if NATO is going to get out of Kosovo in the medium term this phrase needs to be removed.”
The Political Adviser to DCOM KFOR believes that Germany’s reluctance to see a national army for Kosovo stemmed from two imperatives; the belief that there was no need for such a force, given the strong international military presence in Kosovo, and nervousness about the involvement of former KLA fighters in the structure:

“The German position is still grounded on [UNSCR] 1244 and will probably not change. The main point is the principle that there has to be a clear break between KPC and KSF.” (69)

The German Head of Mission in Pristina, who was adamant that Kosovo did not need an Army but rather a small Gendarmerie, confirmed this view. He believed that, if a KSF was thought to be desirable it should be no more than Battalion strength (about 800 personnel) and should confine its activities to the ceremonial, plus some UN Peacekeeping support roles. (70) The Quint German delegation’s reaction to the ISSR’s recommendations was in a similar vein. (71) This position reflected the concern of the German Government in relation to responsibility for security within the province after final status had been determined.

More critical to the presentation of the ISSR final recommendations were the actions of the COMKFOR. General Roland Kather of Germany had replaced General Valotto in August 2006. General Kather was uneasy about the possible impact that the ISSR Report might have on the Serbian population, despite the fact that the findings had been briefed to a wide audience, including members of the Serbian Parliament, in Belgrade on the 4th October 2006 and widely reported by both the Albanian and Serbian media. He was keen that his time in Kosovo would run smoothly and that there would be no repeat of the problems that faced the German military in 2004 when province-wide rioting had broken out. (72)

Although his position automatically made him a member of the ISSR Steering Committee, General Kather avoided being briefed on the ISSR and his role on the Committee. He caused the final Steering Committee meeting to be cancelled on two occasions when he became unavailable at the last minute and persuaded the SRSG that the meetings should not be convened without him. Significantly, it was General Kather who took the initiative to delay the publication of the ISSR Final Report in December 2006 and who ensured that NATO was not associated with the Report.
when it was eventually published in January 2007. A communication from his Military Assistant to the ISSR Coordinator stated that:

“He [General Kather] wants me to make sure that you know his opinion:
1. He agrees to the release of the document, however he is convinced that this - a few days before the visit of Pres. Ahtisaari - is an inappropriate timing. 2. The content of the document is not fully agreed upon by all members of the board. 3. COMKFOR in this moment only agrees with those proposals and recommendations of the document, which are not depending on a later status agreement (i.e. future KSF) [Kosovo Security Force]. 4. There will be no participation of KFOR in the release or any conference.”(73)

His remark that the document had not been fully agreed by all members of the ISSR Steering Committee referred to the fact that the SRSG had stated that, as the representative of the UN Secretary-General, he had no authority to agree any recommendations that fell outside the life of UNSCR 1244 (1999).

The recommendations that gave General Kather the most difficulty were those that dealt with Kosovo’s security architecture, once authority had passed from UNMIK to the Government of Kosovo and, additionally, those that dealt the future status of the KPC. A senior diplomat in Vienna believed that COMKFOR’s opposition stemmed from the position his national Government had taken on the future of the KPC and the employment of ex-KPC personnel in a future Kosovo security force. (74) This view was later confirmed by the KFOR Chief of Staff. (75). The COMKFOR, as the senior NATO commander in Kosovo, nevertheless was moved to follow the instructions of his home state. Meilaender (2003) considers that social behaviour is motivated by the requirement for a complex mixture of emotional associations. Commanders of multi-national forces often are divided between the requirement to provide unbiased leadership of an international force and the need to remain loyal to their homeland and principal employer (Costa, 2003, p. 523). This role can become difficult, particularly when the objectives of the home state do not accord with the wishes of the international body. Costa (2003, pp. 519-548) believes that individuals, faced with this dilemma, will inevitably seek out the best provider of guarantees for the achievement of personal goals and status and will grant it their loyalty.
Thus the German view on the future security of Kosovo and the Kosovar Albanian citizens’ desire that their former guerrilla army should be the basis of the new national security force were at odds. The experience of German KFOR soldiers in Prizren had a negative influence on the opinion of the German Government. This attitude was to drive their reactions to the ISSR Final Report, given that it made recommendations contrary to their views on the future security arrangements in Kosovo.

### 7.4.3. The United States of America

The Americans were initially unenthusiastic about the ISSR programme. On the 10th August 2005 Larry Rossin, the then American Principal DSRSRG, told a senior military officer that the American Representative Office in Pristina (USOP) was strongly opposed the ISSR and wished to see any donated monies used for minority returns initiatives. Rossin stated that:

“…[I ] had no faith in ISSR; it had too much process and too little activity. The USOP believe that the SSDAT process was appropriate for an established government but not for Kosovo. I was personally so against it I even considered not getting involved in the selection process for the ISSR Coordinator.”

The ICG commented that, “among those blowing cold draughts on the ISSR, the US has been concerned by its slow rhythm, risking the introduction of delay into a final status it wants decided within 2006” (ICG, 2006, p. 21). The US was keen to see the situation in Kosovo resolved: “Clinton had acted to end tyranny in Kosovo and now the US wanted to demonstrate that it could support the creation of a Muslim state. This would balance what was going on in the Middle East.”

The State Department was keen to see Kosovo move swiftly towards independence. Early in the new millennium, US policymakers began to emphasise the need to find a viable political settlement for Kosovo. In 2006, U.S. officials made repeated statements against maintaining the status quo and in favour of resolving Kosovo’s status in order to achieve US goals for a peaceful Balkans region (Kim & Woehrel, 2008, pp.2-3). Since 2004, leading U.S. officials had publicly expressed U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence and it was feared by the US State Department and the USOP that ISSR might interfere with this ambition by making
recommendations that would prove unacceptable to one or other of the negotiating parties. (80) Thus national agendas drove the US reaction to the ISSR programme.

At the same time as the ISSR was being planned, the Pentagon was embarking on its own SSR programme for Kosovo. This project had been sub-contracted to a private consultancy firm, DFI Government Services, based in Washington D.C. The review “Security Assessment of the UN-Administered Province of Kosovo: Security and Threat Assessment Roadmap and Recommendations” was conducted over a period of just a few weeks and the first draft was presented to the Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department in February 2006. However, the DoD and State Department were unhappy with the recommendations of the DFI Report, which was judged to be lacking in detail. (81) The Report was never published and the DoD began to reconsider their opposition to the ISSR process.

Meanwhile, in Pristina, the ISSR Secretariat was undertaking a concerted effort to influence the thinking of the Americans on the ISSR programme. They were well aware that without the support, or at least acquiescence, of the US there would be little international backing or finance for the programme. These efforts in Kosovo, plus the DoD and State Department’s disappointment with the DFI Report, bore results and the USOP Defense Attaché warmed to the ISSR process. In June 2006, he arranged for a Constitutional and Governance Lawyer to join the ISSR Secretariat, at the Pentagon’s expense, to draft the recommended legislation for the Kosovo security architecture post- UNSCR 1244 (1999). In addition, the DoD approved the placing of a second US national in the Secretariat as the Strategic Drafter of the ISSR Final Report. UNDP was then able to demonstrate that the US were content with the ISSR programme and this helped considerably in fund raising and with the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the international community.

The initial reaction to the ISSR was akin to that of a number of other countries in that the Americans were worried that the process might interfere with the UNOSEK negotiations. In addition, the DFI security review was underway and the DoD and State Department saw no reason to support ISSR when they had a process, over which they had control. This negative position was to change, however, for three reasons: firstly, the less than detailed report produced by DFI was countered by
the ISSR’s Interim Report to UNOSEK, which the ISSR Secretariat shared with the American Office in Pristina; secondly, UNOSEK’s acceptance of the Interim Report calmed US fears that there would be a disconnect between the two processes and, thirdly, the backing of the US Defense Attaché in Pristina for the ISSR process helped sway doubters in Washington D.C.

A convert to the ISSR process within the DoD was the Chief of the Balkans Desk, who had attended the Chiefs of Defence Staffs Contact Group briefing in London conducted by the ISSR Coordinator in June 2006. Having listened to a detailed account of the process being undertaken and the efforts to include the views of the population, regardless of ethnicity, he was persuaded that ISSR would benefit the final status discussions. For the ISSR process the backing of the US DoD and State Department, albeit low key, was a major advantage.

7.4.4. The Russian Federation

The situation within the Kosovo Contact Group was further clouded by the Russian Federation’s attitude to the future status of the province, itself engendered by national considerations (Gvosdev, 2006). Russia strongly objected to what it described as a dangerous precedent for separatists. However, the separatist theme was moderated by Moscow according to context: Russia opposed separatism in Chechnya, but endorsed the efforts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to break away from Georgia. It also used separatist entities in the Trans-Dniestria region to put pressure on Georgia and Moldova. The separatist movements in all these areas demanded Russian recognition, and subsequent incorporation into Russia (Brudenell, 2008). Therefore Russia found itself in the position that, if it agreed the Ahtisaari plan, it would have to insist that the same approach be applied to Russian allies or lose face both with them and with its own increasingly nationalist population. Should, on the other hand, Russia disrupt the Ahtisaari plan on grounds of opposing separatism it would have to find a better rationale to encourage its own separatist clientele.

As an historical ally of Serbia, Russia needed to demonstrate support for Belgrade’s position, particularly at a time when Putin was promoting an image of
himself as a defender of Russia and its allies against the perceived aspirations of NATO. Russia had reacted badly to NATO’s military intervention in 1999 to the extent that public opinion polls demonstrated the collapse of popular Russian approval of the USA and moved the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to denounce NATO’s action as a violation of the UN Charter. In the wake of the military intervention and the air campaign against targets in Serbia and Kosovo, the Russian Ministry of Defence suspended its involvement in NATO programmes and recalled Russian students from US Military Education Institutions.

The situation was exacerbated by American plans to place anti-missile bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia also was concerned about the expansion of NATO into the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Many influential Russians accused NATO of seeking to carve out a sphere of influence in the Balkans region and there was complaint about perceived indifference to Russian concerns (Arbatov & Hartelius, 1999, pp 9-17; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, pp. 36-43). The Kosovo issue also had implications for Russia in the Islamic world: helping Muslim Albanians win independence might help the Western powers repair their image in the Middle East, whereas resisting the Albanians’ bid for secession would cause difficulties for Russia in many Muslim states (Zarakhovich, 2007, p.14).

Averre (2008) suggests that the legacy of the 1999 NATO action in Kosovo coloured Russia’s attitude to European security developments and to foreign and security policy. He is of the opinion that Russian belief that NATO’s action in the Balkans in 1999, “was a selective defence of interests of the leading Western powers” has influenced Moscow’s position on subsequent developments in the region, particularly Kosovo’s independence (2008, p. 11). This attitude led Russia to withdraw from the Kosovo Contact Group consultations and to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, warning:

“Attempts to present [Ahtisaari’s] proposals to the Security Council… are pointless and counterproductive. I cannot imagine how it can adopt a resolution that would not be acceptable to the Serbs … They should have thought about that before, such as when they bombed Serbia without a mandate from the Security Council and attacked more than military targets” (Der Spiegel, 2007).
Thus, Russia’s objections to the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state were to cloud all the issues surrounding the future of Kosovo, including the ISSR process.

Given Russia’s intransigence over the future of Kosovo a group, known as the Quint, became an informal vehicle for discussion among the key countries. In essence, the Quint, made up of the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, was the Contact Group without the Russian Federation. The Quint of Foreign Ministers originally had developed during the 1999 Kosovo campaign. The existence of the Quint was hidden, during the conflict, to avoid offending other alliance nations but it was this group that first put together NATO’s conditions for the ending of the campaign. Seven years later it was to take the lead in efforts to achieve political agreement for the future status of Kosovo (Prantl, 2006, pp.209-249) and it was the representatives of the five states who would consider the ISSR process.

The ISSR Secretariat briefed the Quint through the medium of the Chiefs of Defence Staffs monthly working group meetings. Such was the Quint’s concentration on the outcomes of the UNOSEK deliberations anything that might detract from that process needed to be neutralised. The ISSR fell within this category.

(82)

Conclusions

Duffield (2009, p. 648) suggests that empirical evidence points to IGOs having modifying effects on state behaviour by the presence of international rules and through state involvement in such organisations. However, he concedes that little has been said, within the field of institutionalist theory, about how these effects occur and more empirical research is needed to explain the triggers for such behaviour.

This Chapter has provided evidence of competition and rivalry within and between the IGOs involved with Kosovo’s SSR programme. This existed on three levels: within IGOs and government departments, between organisations and between the international officials. The first level was demonstrated by the rivalry between the UN DPKO and UNDP, as they vied to control of SSR processes. Rivalry was most evident in UNNY, where DPKO hostility to UNDP being given the lead on the
ISSR programme contributed to the delay in approving the ISSR budget, thereby impeding the start of the process. However, the rivalry was present also in Kosovo where the events related in this Chapter demonstrated UNMIK’s desire to continue to control the security sector in Kosovo. This wish, motivated by both organisational and personal considerations, impeded a timely transfer of security information and authority from the international community to the PISG.

Rivalry and competition between government departments was demonstrated by the actions of the UK Government in relation to the ISSR programme. Rivalry was centred on disputes over which Department of State held primacy for policymaking on SSR matters. To further complicate matters, three UK Departments of State had projects, aimed at reforming the security sector, running in Kosovo at the same time as the ISSR programme. This resulted in tension between the UK government and UNDP, which contributed to the withholding of support for the follow on UNDP 3SD implementation project. Halperin (1974) has described similar rivalry within the US Government; Dijkstra (2008) within the EU structure and Esson (2009) demonstrated its presence in the private sector.

As noted in Chapter Three, individual relationships have a marked effect on the success of any enterprise. In particular, a programme that involves international functionaries holds the possibility that national interest will influence the decisions of those who should be acting in a non-partisan manner. Personal ambition or the need to secure or retain employment is a powerful incentive to act in other than an impartial manner. Sinclair’s (1934, p.148) suggestion that, “it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on him not understanding it” may apply in these cases. The need for officials to demonstrate success in order to further personal aims, as described by Feshbach (1987) and Berry (1984) was identified in Kosovo. Much of what happened at field level was driven by individual motives which accords with Meilaender’s (2003) belief that the reasons for inter-personal rivalry are complex and often are motivated by the desire to fulfil personal goals and achieve recognition within their own peer group.

Institutionalist theory suggests that individual decisions do not equate to collective decisions because of the influence of institutions tends to be biased in
particular directions. Rational choice theory points to the equilibrium of preferences, whilst historical institutionalism favours the maintenance of the status quo and sociological institutionalism the consolidation of institutional authority. As states and organisations vied over the ISSR process all of these theoretical positions became evident and, from the friction that they caused, so rivalry and confusion ensued. Institutional theories provide a complex view of organisations, in that they are seen to be influenced by normative pressures, sometimes arising from the state and sometimes from within the organisation itself. These pressures tend to lead an organisation to be influenced by the need for legitimisation, which can deflect from task performance and goal realisation.

Coupled with these issues was the influence of inter-personal communication. Anderson and Neistadt (2003, p.3) have indentified inter-personal communication as a key driver within IGOs. An influencing factor in Kosovo, during the ISSR, was the interaction of individuals at the senior level. Thus the relationship between the SRSG and the Personal Representative of the EU High Representative for the CFSP in Pristina was to have a negative effect on the ISSR process. The reluctance of the Head of the AUS to relinquish his authority over the ISSR process, once the Secretariat was established, likewise led to friction between individuals in the Secretariat and members of his Unit. Equally as corrosive was the animosity between the OSCE HoM and DHoM, which adversely affected cooperation between the ISSR Secretariat and the OSCE. In addition, the criticism of the COMKFOR by UNMIK, for involving his organisation in matters they believed to be outside the KFOR area of responsibility, denied the ISSR a useful agency for reaching the Kosovo population.

The ISSR programme was considerably influenced by the discord within and between IGOs and their officials. The delay in starting the review process came close to halting the programme completely. The fact that the ISSR programme ran parallel with the UNOSEK negotiations was a major contributor to the unease felt about the programme by several states. It was competition and confusion in UNNY that led to the prolonging of the start-up period, impeded the recruitment process and obstructed the search for donor funding. In addition, inter-personal rivalries were such that much of the impact of the programme, in terms of achieving a more meaningful survey of local communities, was lost. Had the OSCE and KFOR
been able to lend greater assistance to collecting data from the municipalities the research of the ISSR programme would have been better informed. Finally, animosity between UNDP ISSR and the British Office, DFID and the COMKFOR was to undermine the essential follow-on work of the UNDP 3SD project to implement the ISSR recommendations. (85)

The ISSR programme may well have been better been placed within the UNMIK DPKO-based Pillar 2 structure. This would have been possible if a mechanism could have been found for administering donor funds. However, Rees (2006, p.23) notes that the UN DPKO was “not well suited to provide for a successful SSR.” He suggests that SSR increasingly needs the skills of administration, institution building and policy development that are not available in the peacekeeping operations community and that this type of engagement is “deeply political in nature” and therefore needs experienced staff (2006, p.25). Given the empirical evidence there was, during 2005/6, a mix of competition and rivalry, between the UN DPKO and UNDP New York, over the ISSR programme. These difficulties then affected both progress and relationships on the ground in Kosovo. Rivalry within the UN over the ownership of SSR, which was to continue into the future, had an immediate impact on the ISSR process.

Edomwonyi, (2003, p.43) has noted that SSR activities are invariably unsustainable if outsiders design them and they are merely implemented locally. In addition, there has been a tendency for western democracies to use post-conflict interventions to instil principles and practices, which are wholly inappropriate for the culture of the host state (Ashdown, 2007, p. 135). As was noted in Chapter Two, Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2005, p.21) emphasise that close cooperation between local stakeholders, the implementing IGO and the international donor community is crucial in ensuring successful security reform efforts. The fact that SSR is funded, planned and driven by the international community means that tension between local ownership and external assistance is created (Bryden, 2006, p.23). The ISSR was designed to overcome this problem by drawing the local community into the heart of the process. Although some success was achieved, significant additional involvement of the local community and its leaders would have been accomplished had there been less animosity within and between the international agencies in Kosovo. In the next
Chapter the relationship between the international community, the ISSR Secretariat and the local leaders and community will be examined.
Chapter Eight: ISSR and the Local Community

Introduction

The ISSR was designed to be a holistic process that placed emphasis on local ownership. It was necessary, therefore, to ensure that there was local leadership and community involvement in the programme. Thus the relationship between local and international actors was to have a marked effect on the ISSR process.

Local ownership has long been advocated as a crucial aspect of SSR. Ball (1998) believes that SSR must integrate all issues relevant to internal security and the civilian institutions responsible for managing and monitoring the security sector. Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002, pp.30-33) describe SSR as an attempt to develop a coherent framework for reducing the risk that state weakness will lead to violence. These definitions suggest that SSR has two different but closely connected goals. The first is to make certain that security sector authorities function effectively and efficiently. The second is to ensure that these authorities have effective democratic oversight of the security sectors' performance. Sugden (2006, p.2) refers to the first goal as the efficiency aspect and the second as the democratic aspect. Local ownership of both these aspects is a critical element in ensuring that they function effectively.

Nathan (2007, p.8) argues that SSR programmes must be flexible and responsive to local actors and conditions. Local ownership must be the primary objective for developing an approach to SSR that empowers local actors, thereby increasing the chance of long-term success; reforms should be designed, managed and implemented by local actors. To be effective, SSR requires a context of democracy or democratisation, the technical and material capacity for sustainable reform and a willingness on the behalf of the local government to exercise control over the security sector. All this can be achieved only if the local community and its leadership are working in concert with the SSR programme.
Although donors and IGOs generally acknowledge these tenets, they are frequently breached in practice. Donor governments often impose their own models on local actors thereby creating the risk of generating resentment and resistance. A major oversight in SSR planning has been a lack of local input and the resultant deficiency in local ownership of the reform agenda. Although many donors and IGOs have made public commitment to the principle of local ownership, this has become more a rhetorical device rather than a guide to practice. Despite the theoretical commitment to the notion, in practice it is frequently reduced to a demand for acquiescence by recipient governments to externally produced strategies.

In emerging democracies and post-conflict societies, external actors regularly ignore the principle of local ownership. There are several explanations for this. Many developing states have weak governments and fragile civil societies. In the aftermath of war and state collapse, the government can lack legitimacy or local actors may lack the expertise to prepare sound security policies. In addition, the political elite can be too divided or disorganised to reach consensus on policies and priorities. Therefore IGOs and donor government officials are inclined to justify the absence of local ownership on the grounds that local actors lack capacity and legitimacy (Nathan, 2007b, pp.6-7). Yet these are precisely the problems that SSR is meant to address and their presence should not constitute valid grounds for circumventing local involvement in SSR programmes. If the security of citizens is to be enhanced, and if the provision of security is to conform to democratic norms, then it is crucial to rebuild the capacity and legitimacy of the institutions and actors that comprise the security sector of the host state.

The attitude of donors may, in fact, be based on ignorance of local communities and their attitudes to security. At an international workshop, held at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy to consider security reform in the post-conflict phase, a broad consensus was reached by the delegates that the international community see locals as a homogeneous entity and has little comprehension of their needs. There was a belief that the opinions and concerns of local communities should be better accounted for, but there persists a lack of knowledge about how this should be done (Tardy & Ama Mani, 2005).
However, Reich (2006, pp.5-13) argues that the pursuit of local ownership in externally funded projects is counterproductive, if viewed as a project objective. She suggests that, instead of aiming towards the impossible goal of literal local ownership of a foreign-funded programme, the focus should be on the nature of the relationship between donors and beneficiaries; “It is within this relationship that power is or is not shared and that the equality of the partners may or may not be realised”. Nevertheless, the aim of local ownership has importance as a policy ideal.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of definition and application, the principle of local ownership is applicable in both post-conflict and developing states, and in sectors other than security, such as development and economic reform. The absence of local ownership of SSR is detrimental to the realisation of security reform and, therefore, it should be pursued as a matter of necessity.

8.1. Partnership, Participation or Patronage

As noted in Chapter Two, although used extensively in conflict transformation and development literature the term ‘local ownership’ has never been precisely defined (Aga Khan Foundation, 2005). Although local ownership has been afforded increasing prominence in post-conflict and development fields, the literature directly addressing its conceptualisation or implementation is modest (Saxby, 2003) but it is apparent that the term is seldom used to indicate full control by local actors over all aspects of the peacebuilding or security reform process.

Commentators on SSR increasingly have acknowledged the significance of local actors, with activities being more conceptualised as an engagement involving the entire recipient society and not as a top-down process. Supporting local actors who wish to build security should be seen as a “key principle of civil conflict management” (Ropers, 2000, p.35). Narten (2007, p.7-9) however suggests that, from the beginning of UN peacebuilding in Kosovo, the interaction between external and local actors seems to have been significantly influenced by promises of local ownership by external peace-builders that had little foundation in practice.
Elsewhere, however, attempts have been made to include the local community in its own security solutions. Despite the problems confronting Afghanistan there is one area where a modicum of local ownership success has been achieved, namely, the creation of Community Development Councils (CDC) under a National Solidarity Programme (NSP). This has allowed local communities across the country to decide where funds should be used for the common good without interference from international organisations. All that is required of the NSP participants is that they form a village council, have a quorum of the community to determine their projects and place the details of expenditure in a public place for all to see. In concert with this initiative, the Afghan National Army Programme is designed to create units made up of recruits from different parts of the country, thereby reducing ethnic separatism. These initiatives served to create a sense of empowerment and trust within the communities (Lockhart & Ghani, 2008, p.93: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008). Rather than perpetuating the traditional international community-led peacebuilding and SSR initiatives, a more perceptive and inclusive view of local involvement should be embraced.

The ISSR was committed to wide consultation with the local community and its methodology was based on local ownership and involvement of the people of Kosovo and their leaders. In the Foreword to the ISSR Final Report, signed by the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo, it was written that the review had, “taken the thoughts, fears and aspirations of all the people of Kosovo and translated them into positive recommendations of how threats to our security can be dealt with” (Cleland Welch, Kondi, Stinson et al, 2006, p. ix). However, only days after the ISSR Report had been published the UK based NGO, Saferworld (2007), commented that the review had undertaken only limited public consultation. Additionally, in an email sent at the beginning of 2008 to the Director of the Security Cluster in East Timor, an official from the ICG commented that:

“The 18-month ISSR … was compromised … by the political context in which it was conducted. It was created largely by UNMIK and the UK and initially lacked wider political support. In its latter stages the political requirements of interested bodies and countries fed a top-down dynamic into a comprehensive review that claimed to be approaching security from the bottom up.” (1)
Given the emphasis by the creators of the ISSR on the need for local ownership it is significant that the above criticisms were made. The UNDP already had acknowledged the UN’s failings to engage the local community:

“Kosovo in some ways best exemplifies the pitfalls associated with peacekeeping operations that mutate into state-building exercises: the failure of the international community to shift in a timely enough manner its mindset from operational fire fighting to transition planning. While this strategic choice makes sense in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict, …the focus [should] be on engaging the local population in institution building with the view of promoting democratisation, good governance, and sustainable development” (UNDP, 2004b, p.32).

From the beginning of the ISSR programme the SSDAT had insisted that the Review “be based on the principles of [local] participation and ownership to determine what might be the most effective design for the security architecture of Kosovo after final status” (Security Sector Development Advisory Team, 2005b, p.3). This position was established on the joint UK DFID/FCO/MOD declaration that SSR must “engage the interests of local constituencies at the earliest opportunity…[and] local partners for capacity-building measures” (Global Conflict Prevention Pool, 2003, p.6) and the OECD DAC statement that:

“if local ownership of security system reform processes is to be taken seriously, international support should help increase the capacity of partner country policy makers and civil society to analyse, understand and debate their own security problems” (OECD DAC, 2005, p. 37).

8.2. Involving the Local Community

The ISSR Secretariat set out to embrace the imperative of supporting local actors in building peace. It based its review on the Kosovo population’s perceptions of its security. Some 8000 interviews were conducted throughout the 32 Municipalities of the province and the goal of this public outreach was:

“to ensure that all of Kosovo’s communities were not only aware of, but had the opportunity to be engaged in the ISSR process…[with] the aim to enhance public dialogue about security and encourage transparency among Kosovo’s security institutions and policy making process” (Cleland Welch, Kondi et al, 2006, p.5).

The ISSR Secretariat also engaged with civil society through their consultative groups (Chapter Five, Table 5.3). Civil society plays a vital role in encouraging
transparency and accountability in the security sector. It was, therefore, encouraged to have a role in influencing security policy formation and to help inform the wider society. Donors and practitioners frequently advocate the importance of local ownership and civil society to SSR, but in many cases their policies actually impede deep and meaningful involvement (Ball, 2006, pp.49-61). Despite the opportunities that exist, more often than not, civil society and particularly women are excluded or choose to stay away from discussions on security matters (Anderlini & Conaway, 2008, p. 34). Nevertheless, Kosovo citizens generally were enthusiastic about their involvement in the ISSR programme. The ISSR Final Report noted that, in the opinion of local communities, the public outreach programme and consultative groups had “given an opportunity for many different communities to have their voices heard [on their security] for the first time” (Cleland Welch, Kondi et al, 2007, p. 18).

Although it is acknowledged by Saferworld (2007, p.3) that the first part of the aim of local participation was achieved, the second requirement of embracing the views of the Kosovo policymakers was deemed to be less successful. Saferworld believed that ISSR had failed to address fundamental questions, particularly how the new security architecture was to bind together the Albanian majority and Serb minority populations. This was of particular importance in the north of the province where a tightly knit Serb population, with the backing of Belgrade, continued to defy both the international and local authorities in Pristina and where the international community’s authority was weak. Therefore, according to Saferworld, although the ISSR made a contribution in persuading European governments of Kosovo’s future need for its own security infrastructure, the review’s outcomes had failed to gain the unqualified respect of professional peers (2007, p.1).

This perceived failure largely was based on the inability of the ISSR Secretariat to fully engage the local politicians in the review process, despite being partnered by the Prime Minister’s advisers in the OPS and being based in the Prime Minister’s Office. The membership of the ISSR Steering Committee embraced a cross section of Kosovo’s local leadership (see Chapter Five, Table 5.2) including representatives from the Turkish, Bosniac, Gorani and Egyptian communities, two Opposition Party members and Kosovo Serb representation. However, the Serbs refused to attend any
of the Steering Committee meetings and Kosovar Albanian opposition party members attended only spasmodically.

These difficulties could have been foreseen; the Serb leadership had been boycotting meetings where the PISG was represented as they had declared that they did not recognise the PISG or its Kosovar membership. There were two Serbian members of the PISG who had participated in Kosovo Assembly meetings until the start of the UNOSEK negotiations but the Serbian political leaders in the North of Mitrovica and in the enclaves largely ignored them. The animosity between the Serbian hard-line nationalist politicians and those Serbs wishing to open dialogue with the ethnic Albanian dominated PISG and the international community in Kosovo was demonstrated in a violent manner. Oliver Ivanović had defied the Serbian Government in Belgrade by taking part in elections to the Kosovo Assembly and had been advocating closer dialogue with UNMIK and the PISG. He was to be the subject of an alleged assassination attempt when his car was blown up in North Mitrovica (Center for Security Studies, 2005; Staletović, 2005).

In addition, Kosovo politics was at a critical juncture, leading up to possible independence, and the Kosovar Albanian opposition parties actively were distancing themselves from the PISG leadership. An opposition party member, who attended some of the Steering Committee meetings, commented that although his party leadership believed that the ISSR was beneficial to the determination of the future security architecture of the province, they did not believe that the PISG was capable of driving through the necessary reforms. It was, in his opinion, only through a change of government that anything could be achieved and, therefore, his party would not support the security reform measures put forward by the PISG. (2)

The attitude of those members of the PISG who were active in the ISSR process was important to its success. There was a misconception among many Kosovo Assembly members that local ownership meant exactly that; the ISSR would be staffed and run by Kosovars and paid for by the international community. One Kosovar official suggested that this was the main failing of the process; it had not handed over responsibility for the structuring of the security sector to the PISG but continued to dictate what would happen in Kosovo, post independence, from an
international community point of view. His opinion was that “this was not local ownership; it was local dictatorship” (3). Conversely, a UNMIK official suggested that, “ideally the [ISSR] posts would have gone to Kosovans, but the truth was there was nobody who could have done the job.” (4) However, Narten (2008, pp. 369-390) makes the point that the later local ownership is achieved and authority is transferred to local representatives, the more local actors are likely to challenge the legitimacy of the reform agenda and engage in confrontation with international actors.

The difficulties over local involvement in the security sector were not confined to the ISSR process. The UNMIK Security Working Group Steering Committee was reviewing the orderly handover of security arrangements to either the EU or PISG during 2006 (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1). However, the Committee refused to involve any PISG representatives in their deliberations, on the basis that UNMIK was still in charge of security issues.

Moreover, Principal DSRSG Schook delayed the setting up of the Prime Minister’s Situation Centre (SITCEN), designed to keep the PISG Cabinet informed of security incidents in the province, believing that the PISG should not be involving itself in security matters (5). Even when the UNMIK Security Working Group reached the stage of deciding the shape of the future security architecture for Kosovo it was disinclined to include Kosovo institutions in the debate because of a belief that security matters should remain solely in the hands of UNMIK until final status was implemented. The prejudice went even further; whilst granting the ISSR Secretariat a seat on the Security Working Groups Steering Committee, UNMIK officials were unwilling to allow an Albanian (from the Republic of Albania) diplomat, who was the ISSR’s Governance Adviser, to attend Security Working Group meetings. Only internationals from northern Europe or the US, it seemed, could be trusted with Kosovo’s security. (6)

**8.3. Perceptions of Local Ownership**

Towards the end of 2005 recruitment of staff to the ISSR Secretariat began. The problems over the comprehension of local ownership quickly became apparent: the post of Coordinator was advertised and a shortlist of candidates was advised that they would be interviewed, by telephone, by the SRSG, Prime Minister and Resident
Representative UNDP Kosovo. The time for the scheduled calls passed without any interviews taking place. Finally, a UN staff member rang the candidates to say that the interviews were cancelled because, “the shortlist had been reduced to one applicant who would be called to Pristina for a formal interview by the selection board.” The interview took place on the 2nd December 2005 but without the SRSG, who was in New York. Larry Rossin, the Principal Deputy SRSG, took his place. It transpired that the Kosovar members of the selection committee (the Prime Minister and his Security Adviser) were annoyed that there were no local candidates for the position and that, although all the candidates were highly qualified in the field of SSR, only one had any relevant experience of Kosovo. They therefore insisted that only the candidate who had previously worked in Kosovo be interviewed and that the others be dropped from the list. (7)

The recruitment of other members of the team was equally challenging. The Security Sector Development Adviser was due to be interviewed in late November, by telephone. This interview was cancelled when the Kosovar members of the panel walked out in protest to the position again being offered only to international candidates. The Kosovar board members finally were persuaded to undertake the selection procedure with no Kosovar candidate and the international aspirants were finally interviewed in late December 2005.(8) In the same manner, the Media Adviser had her first interview cancelled because there was again no local candidate. To make matters worse, no interpreter had been provided for the non-English speaking members on the Selection Board, who promptly left in protest.(9) The Kosovar members of the Board were persuaded to return to interview her after several days delay.

It is perhaps understandable that PISG officials were angered that the initial short-list for the composition of the ISSR Secretariat did not contain any Kosovar candidates but the UNDP human resources department claimed that no local applicant met the professional requirements.(10) It was only following a boycott of the selection process by PISG officials, including the Prime Minister, that the search for suitable local applicants was accelerated. It was agreed that UNDP would hold interviews to find local candidates to fill the positions of expert advisers, in a supernumerary role, as part of the capacity building process of the programme.
Underlying this dispute was the problem of ethnocentrism. Bennett (1999) and Rosinski (2008) have explored issues of cultural influences to explain the inclination to ignore information that does not match an individual’s cultural norms. They suggest that ethnocentrism is an assumption that an individual’s own culture is the centre of reality. There is a tendency to ignore differences, evaluate differences negatively and downplay their importance. Ethnocentricity was to influence both international and the local understanding of the ISSR programme.

Foord believes that there was consensus in favour of local involvement in the ISSR process amongst internationals. However, he suggests that there was a need to strike a balance between local ownership and the capacity of the local officials and politicians:

“[They] were all aware that local ownership was key; but less the Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) and a few in the KPC, neither was there sufficient understanding of the issues nor was there the capacity for the hard work needed to undertake this sort of project; thus the over-reliance on internationals” (2007, p. 58).

The reasons for the capacity shortfall can be explained by the fact that there was no Kosovar Albanian involvement in security policy formation after 1989 due to discrimination against them by the Serbs. One UNMIK official suggested “we didn’t want people who were involved security before 1989 because they learned the communist way of doing things and are no use to us when trying to build a democratic system” (11). Foord (2007, p.56) suggests that it is ironic that the security review process, which drew upon the tenets of local ownership, found that the Kosovar Albanians and minorities were penalised because of the discrimination practised against them by the Yugoslav Government in the late 1980s and 1990s.

In addition to a lack of local security expertise in Kosovo, the review had to deal with the immature state of politics within the province. Mellon noted that “PISG officials seem to have seen in the ISSR Secretariat an opportunity to increase their political influence”; and, “people, including government officials, often tend to look [at] such projects with an intention to personally profit” (2006, pp.7-8). As soon as the ISSR Secretariat announced the recruitment of local advisers many Kosovar politicians suggested persons known, and in many cases related, to them as potential candidates. This attempt at nepotism was not confined only to the local leaders. A
high level international official openly lobbied UNDP for a job for his partner although she had no relevant qualifications and was not a Kosovo citizen but came from the Republic of Albania. (12)

The financial difficulties related earlier in this thesis also were to have repercussions in the relationship between the local leadership and the programme. Due to the delay occasioned by the difficulties over funding the ISSR, it was decided that the first two stages of the process should be sub-contracted to the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The decision to bring in DCAF was taken by SRSG Jessen-Peterson, a former director of the Centre. The Netherlands agreed to pay for the first two ISSR stages through DCAF who, in turn, sub-contracted the in-country work to KIPRED. This created tensions within the Kosovo PISG; Edith Harxhi commented that “because there was a feeling that the fledgling institutions of self government had been so hard won it was inconceivable to the politicians that a process of such importance should be given to an NGO, even if it was a local one. Once again internationals had disregarded local sensitivities.”(13)

Within a few weeks of the ISSR process getting under way, as the result of an internal AAK Party reorganisation, Bajram Kosumi was replaced by Agim Çeku as the Kosovo Prime Minister. Kosumi’s Security Adviser, along with most of the civil servants in the Prime Ministers Office, was removed from his post. Thus the tendency within Kosovo politics to replace civil servants, who elsewhere would act, as continuity through any change of government or leadership, was to undermine sustainability within the security sector. This lack of continuity was not confined to the local community; by the end of August 2006, all the key international players in Kosovo who had been present at the start of the ISSR process had gone; the SRSG, Principal Deputy SRSG, COMKFOR, Head of the UNMIK AUS and KPC Coordinator had all changed. However, most germane to the local ownership objectives of the programme was the rapid change in PISG politicians and their staff. The limited ownership of the ISSR by the PISG was, in part, a factor of the lack of continuity. Where elsewhere a firm government lead would be the feature that would make such a programme sustainable, in Kosovo the PISG relationship with the ISSR
programme was marred by a lack of continuity in both the political and civil service structures.

**8.4. Engaging with the Kosovo Serb Leadership**

Just as important to the future security of Kosovo was the ability of the ISSR Secretariat to engage with the Serbian politicians in Kosovo in a meaningful way. Although able to interview a fair representation of the Serbian community, during the public outreach programme, the ISSR researchers had far less success with the Serbian politicians. Some were content to speak privately to the ISSR team and all accepted copies of briefing papers and meeting minutes but none would attend official meetings or comment openly on the process. Most of the Serbian leadership in Kosovo saw the ISSR as “a coalition of the international community and the Albanians for the removal of the Serbs from Kosovo.”(14) The line taken by Serbian politicians in the enclaves and north Mitrovica was that the only legitimate source of security they would accept was an International Community commanded and Serbian manned Police Force, with the overarching protection of the Serbian Government in Belgrade.(15) Many Serbs worried that an independent Kosovo with a strong security sector, particularly if it contained a Kosovar security force, might be used to persecute the minorities. Consequently, they preferred to see an international presence as the instrument of security in Kosovo. (16)

Commentators generally acknowledge that oversight of the ISSR process by the PISG was poor (Rees, 2006, p. 37; Saferworld, 2007; ICG, 2006, p. 56). Some members of international community were critical of the programme for failing to fully engage with the PISG, however, a UK civil servant suggested that planning for the Kosovo security sector was not likely to begin with Prime Minister Çeku looking at a report to see what other Kosovar citizens wanted.(17) Additionally there were those who believed that, in some quarters of the international community, there was little interest in the ISSR being truly locally owned. Foord suggests that the real reason for the ISSR was that the international community did not trust Kosovar politicians to do what they wanted them to do in the security sector (2007, p.41).
The OECD DAC (2007, p. 28) believes that, “reform processes inevitably create winners and losers as they challenge vested interests and power relationships… justice and security reform is therefore best approached as a governance issue and not simply as a technical activity”. The OECD DAC (2007, p.29) further suggests that, “external actors may initially be required to take more of a leading role to help stabilise the security situation. But the focus should be on building the capacity of local actors to take on the leadership role as soon as possible”. Indeed, Lulzim Peci, the Director of KIPRED holds that:

“The expectations of the ISSR process will be fully met if its outputs and the new security architecture of Kosovo will address the concerns of its citizens and ethnic communities. However, the achievement of these expectations will depend on …the effectiveness of [the] international missions in making Kosovo self sustainable.” (18)

In 2008 the UNDP had secured funding for the support to security sector development project (3SD), following on from the ISSR recommendations. It planned to hand this follow-up programme to the Kosova Government within two years. At the time of writing none of the 3SD projects have been transferred to the new government. (19)

To many citizens of Kosovo it appeared that the international community did not believe that Kosovars could handle their own affairs and that their declared independence was being undermined.(20) As faith in the international community’s desire to promote local ownership waned the people of Kosovo began to show their frustrations. At the end of 2008, protests over the deployment of the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which included nearly 2,000 EU police, justice and customs officials, were a weekly occurrence in Pristina, despite the earlier acceptance of mission under the Artisaari plan. The offices of the ICO were mortar bombed and EULEX vehicles attacked in November of the same year.

**Conclusions**

The Kosovo ISSR was to be the most holistic and locally oriented SSR programme to be undertaken. However, its critics suggested that it failed in the second part of this aspiration, as it had not fully engaged with the local community despite its ambitious outreach programme. Perhaps most damaging to the eventual outcome of the ISSR
process was the belief by local Kosovar officials and politicians that they were being treated as second-class citizens in relation to the internationals involved with the programme.

Equally damaging was the refusal by UNMIK to involve Kosovars in the deliberations on the future structure of the Kosovo security sector and the Principal DSRSG’s reluctance to allow the Prime Minister an overview of security within the province. A belief was created within the Kosovar leadership that a divide existed between the ‘cosmopolitan’ internationals and the ‘locals’ and this led to a lack of faith in the ISSR programme. Baskin (2005, pp.4-29) points to missed opportunities by UNMIK and other IGOs to engage with the local leadership, coupled with a lack of a consistent strategy to enhance local ownership of democratic transition and the accountability of local authorities. Webster and Walker (2009, p. 34) have stressed that a major challenge in post-conflict situations is the lack of transparency and communication between national and international leadership, which leads to poor working relationships. They state that this “can be one of the greatest obstacles to an effective response”. However, relevant to this discussion is the view that unless local governments share the financial and intellectual burdens of a SSR programme or at least get involved in the design of the project the 'local buy-in' will be superficial and the level of involvement, responsibility and accountability will remain low. (21)

Underlying the interactions at local level during the ISSR process, were the ongoing tensions between the ethnic groups. Although levels of violence had diminished over the years since 1999, there remained hostility that increased with the prospect of independence. The ISSR Secretariat attempted to overcome the effect of these tensions by inviting all members of the Kosovo community to comment on their personal and collective security. At community level this strategy worked well. However, because of the hostility within the Kosovar political arena and the boycotting of the ISSR Steering Committee by Serbian politicians, this approach was less well developed within the PISG and at the minority population political level. Thus the inability of the ISSR Secretariat to surmount the acute sensibilities of local leaders was to undermine the effectiveness of the programme. Ethnic group rivalry was always likely to be present in the post-conflict situation in Kosovo. It was, indeed, a leading factor in the internal security situation in the province and was
highlighted in the ISSR Final Report along with other drivers of insecurity (Cleland Welch, Kondi et al, 2006, pp.8-14). Perhaps a clearer understanding of the vulnerabilities of the politicians within the PISG and a more considered approach to the question of cross-ethnic receptiveness and ownership of the ISSR process would have assisted in bringing about a more coherent involvement of the local authorities.

Although SSR takes place in a variety of environments, thus limiting the applicability of generalisations, there are lessons that can be learned from programmes that have already taken place. There has been very little examination of past SSR interventions when designing new endeavours. In a complicated arena such as the security sector, IGOs should avoid formulaic approaches to SSR and should instead develop programmes that are flexible and responsive to local actors and conditions. The final Chapter of this thesis explores how the difficulties encountered by the Kosovo ISSR, in terms of the contradictory understanding of SSR and the influence of institutional and personal competition and rivalry might be avoided in future. It then draws together the findings of the research and makes recommendations for ongoing work in the SSR field.
Chapter Nine: Implications, Recommendations and Conclusions

Introduction

This thesis has considered the sources and impact of confusion, rivalry and competition within and between organisations undertaking SSR in post-conflict states, using Kosovo as the case study. It has identified a continuing debate over what constitutes the security sector, how far it should take account of the doctrines of human security and local ownership and how widely the reform process should be applied. It has examined the linkages between the theories of neo-institutionalism and rivalry and competition between and within IGOs and how the strive for legitimacy can disrupt goal achievement and efficiency.

Caparini (2004, p.4) has observed that SSR requires inter-agency cooperation but that this is rarely achieved in practice. The study of the 2006 Kosovo ISSR has tested the hypothesis that IGOs are impeded in their pursuit of coherent and effective SSR programmes by internal and external rivalry and contradictory agendas. The presence of inter- and intra-organisational and inter-personal rivalry and competition were found to have significantly diluted the effectiveness of the ISSR programme.

Despite assertions that local ownership is the key to security reform, international actors give scant regard to the security aspirations of local communities. Hendrickson (2000) suggests that insufficient attention has been paid to the balance between external and local visions of reform, the role of civil society in SSR and the impact of institutional fragility on reshaping the security sector. It has been established that the ISSR Secretariat attempted to overcome these failings but was hampered by a lack of commitment to local ownership by many of the international elite in Kosovo.

Security sector reform can only be successful if the aims and objectives of the SSR programme are rational and achievable, whilst taking account of the risks and difficulties inherent in the work to reform and manage security sectors after conflict.
or state failure. It is only by monitoring and evaluating the outputs of the reform process that a clear understanding of its accomplishments can be gained. It was found that monitoring and evaluation procedures were not undertaken in Kosovo and therefore a precise measurement of the ISSR’s achievements could not be made.

This concluding chapter will rehearse these findings and suggest strategies for reducing the influence of rivalry, competition and confusion in the application of SSR.

9.1. Institutionalism, Competition and Rivalry

Neo-institutionalists argue that organisations create a set of formal rules whenever they see that these rules will serve their interests. They do so by increasing the options available to states and by altering the incentives to select appropriate courses of action. Institutional theorists see four ways by which institutional rule sets can make a difference, firstly by acting as a focal point to help states solve macro-level coordination problems (Duffield, 1992; 1994). Secondly, they may assist in ensuring standards of state behaviour. Thirdly, institutions can reduce uncertainty. If cooperation and adherence to rule sets have been accepted then states can gain a clearer understanding of other’s interests and capabilities. Finally, institutions provide opportunities for negotiation. By reducing the price of interaction, institutional procedures assist states to resolve disputes and to react effectively when non-compliance occurs (Keohane, 1984, pp 86-88; Martin, 1992, pp. 143-178; Tuschhoff, 1999, pp. 140-161).

Proponents of institutionalism also to the pursuit of organisational legitimacy and suggest that organisations look to the wider institutional environment for direction. In addition to the isomorphism, produced by this quest, organisations are subject to pressures exerted by other organisations and by the expectations of the society within which they operate. Thus isomorphism and domain similarity are often the outcome of the need for both legitimacy and institutional survival. Functionaries become inculcated with the identity associated with the role of their organisation and tend to define themselves in terms of this identity (Simon, 1995, pp. 115, 136).
Three decades ago Meyer, Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1977) articulated the initial neo-institutional arguments. This new vision proposed that formal organisational structures reflected not only technical demands and resources, but were also shaped by institutional forces, including rational myths, knowledge legitimated through culture and the professions, public opinion, and the law. The basic idea was that organisations were deeply embedded in social and political environments and thus organisational practices and structures were often reflections of, or responses to, these beliefs and conventions.

The argument emphasised the relevance of systems, cultural scripts, and mental models in shaping institutional effects. It was, however, somewhat vague in respect to the mechanisms by which culture and history cemented the social order and constrained organisational choices. Early theoretical thought identified institutional effects as concerned principally with social stability, drawing attention to processes that functioned as stable patterns for activities that were routinely enacted (Jepperson, 1991, pp.144-145). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) highlighted coercive, normative, and mimetic processes. Scott (2001) developed three pillars of the institutional order: regulative, normative, and cultural/cognitive. Each of Scott’s pillars offered a different rationale for legitimacy, either by virtue of being legally sanctioned, morally authorised, or culturally supported. These key treatments of institutional mechanisms underscored that it is critical to distinguish whether an organisation complies out of expediency, from a moral obligation, or because its members cannot conceive of alternative ways of acting.

This thesis has employed neo-institutionalism as its initial basis for theoretical discussion. The approach was used as it was argued that IGOs were the main producers of SSR activity and interacted with governments and departments of state. It therefore was axiomatic that institutional theory would have a part to play in determining of the influences on the practice of SSR. Indeed at the strategic level there was some resonance for, as was noted in Chapter Five, the end of the Cold War saw an increase in the IGO isomorphism. This institutional survival mechanism created domain similarity, which in turn lead to competition, rivalry and confusion. This had a degree of synergy with neo-institutionalist theory where rational choice, historical institutionalism and the isomorphic consequences related to sociological
institutionalism have significance.

However, it has been questioned if the new schools of institutionalism have presented anything innovative in the study of IGOs engaged in security sector reform and management. It has been noted that the unravelling of institutionalism is difficult “in multilevel and multicentred institutional settings, characterised by interactions among multiple autonomous processes” (March & Olsen, 2009, p. 8) as is the case in SSR programme delivery. Some academics (Fehr & Gächter, 1998; Olsen, 2005) observe that actors within organisations sometimes deviate from what institutional rules prescribe. It has been argued that it makes a difference how interaction, experience and memory are organised and to what degree goals are shared, and how the needs of the organisation and the individual are satisfied.

Nevertheless, Miles and Snow (1978, pp.21-32) suggest that institutional effectiveness relies on the perception of the operating environment and decisions about coping with it. Taken in the round, the principle objective is to reduce uncertainty within the organisational operation. The ideal organisation will have systems that ensure efficiency and reduce uncertainty, while simultaneously allowing appropriate innovation. This appreciation is in accord with the work of IGOs in the field of SSR. However, it is concluded that although the theories of the neo-institutionalism may be useful for understanding the strategic level of the institutional environment, in which SSR operates, it is silent on the issues that dominate and shape the successful realisation of SSR in the field. It is argued that the theories of neo-institutionalism, in all is guises, is better suited for the more ordered world of business, corporations and organisational headquarters than for the highly volatile, acutely political and uniquely unpredictable world of grass-roots security sector management and reform.

That being said, neo-institutionalism is based on the insight that organisations operate amidst both competitive and cooperative environments, along with other organisations. This attention to the structure of relations and the formulation of logics within a field has provided an opportunity to study the emergence of competing mind-sets and logics, as well as an understanding of how contention develops. The latter focus has led some institutionalists to consult with political sociologists and social movement analysts (Davis et al, 2005). While several early
statements, such as by DiMaggio (1988) and Powell (1991), noted the limitations of institutional arguments with respect to assuming that ideas and practices spread seamlessly and without contestation, more recent work (Schneiberg & Soule, 2005) has looked at how political opportunities and cultural frameworks shape the diffusion process, and note that social movements are critical to the acceptance of ideas. Another strand of research (Drori et al, 2006) has pursued the development and diffusion of new modes of governance at the transnational level. Research on the world polity stresses that organisational fields transcend national borders, and while some note that global associational activity generates common standards and evaluative metrics, others (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006) point to complex coalition formation and multi-directional influences and conflicts.

An institution is a web of interrelated formal and informal norms governing social relationships. It is by structuring social interactions that institutions produce group performance (Nee & Ingram, 1998, p.19). There is, nonetheless, a danger in relying too heavily on just one set of theories when examining a subject as wide ranging as the reform and management of the security sector. Understanding security sector issues requires that researchers consult a wider literature than they are perhaps accustomed to. This thesis has proposed that the external relationships and internal feuds associated with international post-conflict endeavours had a pronounced effect on intervention outcome, which goes beyond the more structured approach of the neo-institutionalists.

Higgot (2009, p. 627-629) believes that any future research into institutionalism must be bedded in the wider study of governance and the ability of IGOs to provide more effective decision-making and, at the same time, legitimate their actions. He suggests that it will be difficult to separate practice from theory in such a research agenda. Despite normative arguments for multilateral cooperation, via IGOs, in reality such cooperation will be difficult to realise and the key issues for future research will revolve around questions of what supports or undermines this goal.

It has been suggested above that the theories of institutionalism are less apposite below the macro-level of investigation, however they provide a sound base
for further analysis of what drives the functioning of organisations involved in security sector reform and management. They are less certain when the influence of competition, confusion and rivalry are considered. The institutional requirement for legitimacy and survival remain extant at both the systemic and actor levels but it is argued that other forces are also at play. Legitimacy, within institutionalist theory, depends not only on actions that accomplish objectives, but also that actors behave in accordance with legitimate procedures ingrained in a culture (March & Olsen, 1986). However, the legitimacy of structures, processes and efficiency do not necessarily coincide and thus rivalry and competition ensues. Thus, as has already been noted, the unravelling of institutionalism is difficult in the context of a multilevel and multicentred institutional setting as is the case in SSR programme delivery. Understanding security sector issues requires an exploration of a number of issues not commonly considered by the academic community when researching security sector management. Thus this thesis has proposed that the external relationships and internal feuds associated with international post-conflict endeavours have a pronounced effect on SSR outcomes.

Previous Chapters have examined the competition and rivalry that engenders discord between organisations and officials when engaged in SSR activities. Chapters Five and Six pointed to the occasions of competition and rivalry leading up to and during the Kosovo ISSR and how they undermined the work being undertaken in the province. This existed on three levels; within IGOs and government departments, between organisations and between the international officials.

It has been noted in Chapter Four that rivalries are determined either by structure or in response to interactions among competing groups. However, it is contended that rivalry is initiated and maintained by both structural and actor-driven causes and that presenting them as separate stimuli is misleading. Structure and activity are both essential to the concept of competition and rivalry between organisations and social groups. Rivalries have a structural and a relational dimension and both interact. Through functional and regional overlap organisations become significant for one another. Although seemingly structural, domain similarity is an actor-driven choice and although it does not predispose organisations towards rivalry it enhances the prospects for reinforcing rivalries.
The search for central positions in a network is the primary causal mechanism for rivalry among organisations. Even though it is structurally motivated, it allows a range of options, from defensive positioning to protect relative positions to strategies for the offensive expansion of the organisation’s domain and its strive for legitimacy. The pursuit of organisational autonomy can restrain organisations from cooperating. To cooperate means sharing responsibility and therefore reducing autonomy. There is a dichotomy between maximising autonomy and keeping control, thus cooperation can even have the adverse effect of increasing rivalry. What an organisation, or department within it, perceives as defensive positioning, others see as encroachment upon their own domain. Inter- and intra-organisational rivalry is engendered and maintained. Thus rivalry is an antagonistic role perception, posing one against another. This antagonism tends to become constant over time and accumulates ‘psychological baggage’ which distorts perceptions and creates distrust.

In Kosovo the incident of rivalry and competition were present on a number of behavioural levels. The first was the intra-organisational rivalry between the UN’s DPKO and UNDP, the outcome of which served to delay implementation and funding decisions in New York. This, in turn, created suspicion in key states and organisations, which feared that, because of the delayed timing, the ISSR would encroach upon the UNOSEK final status process. The seven-month delay in starting the ISSR programme also disrupted inter-organisational relationships in the field. Having been made accountable for implementing the much delayed programme, the leader of the UNMIK AUS was reluctant to hand the process over to the incoming UNDP team. This was to cause friction between the two organisations, which remained throughout the ISSR process and beyond into the UNDP’s 3SD programme.

Inter-personal rivalry and competition also were present during the ISSR programme. Personal rivalries contributed to the erosion of the ability of the Kosovo ISSR to fully achieve its aims. Social psychology theories suggest that individual actors within groups are likely to be convinced of the validity of their own beliefs and distrust those of others. The Head of the UNMIK AUS, the Principle DSRSG, Head of the OSCE Mission and the COMKFOR all displayed this distrust when dealing with aspects of the ISSR programme. Relations between individuals also played their
part in the blunting of the ISSR’s validity. The OSCE assisted the ISSR Secretariat gather information from the local population. With their mandate to further good governance in the province they were ideally placed to undertake similar assistance with the PISG. However, personal animosities within OSCE mission meant that this support was never fully realised, as the acrimony between senior officials fed into OSCE’s relationship with the ISSR process. It a similar manner, the unease of SRSG Rücker over security matters and of the emerging role of the EU in Kosovo led to decisions being made which caused offence to the principal EU official in the province, who then withdrew from the ISSR Steering Committee. Anderson and Neistadt’s (2003, p.3) contention that inter-organisational relations are largely founded on inter-personal communication was substantiated in Kosovo.

The approaching decisions on the future political status of the province served to undermine international engagement in the security review and reform process. International backing, both in the province and in the wider international community, was at best apathetic. Arguably the setting and timing of the ISSR programme was such that it could not succeed. Many of the impediments to international support to the programme were based on concerns that it would detract from the final status negotiations. However, intra-organisational competition and rivalry delayed the start of the ISSR programme, which originally had been designed to precede and complement the work of UNOSEK.

The presence of other internationally sponsored security-related activities, running parallel to the ISSR programme, served also to detract from its impact. Timing and the situation within which the ISSR had to operate were of the utmost importance to its outcome. Delays occasioned by rivalry and competition, compounded by confusion over its objectives, was to shape its outcome.

The US DoD and State Department’s initial ambivalence to the process was a factor in the slow realisation of donor support for the programme. The desire of Germany to avoid the creation of a local military force for Kosovo, based on KPC / KLA membership, served to delay the publication of the ISSR Final Report. Time and space therefore became major factors in determining the outcome of Kosovo’s ISSR.
Given the importance attached to SSR interventions it is clear that the international community should seek to provide assistance in a manner that takes a long-term perspective. Discussion on the approach to SSR increasingly recognises the need to combine the economic and social aspects of security with traditional military reforms. Security reform interventions need to be designed to provide a long-term solution to the challenge of rebuilding formal security mechanisms in a post-conflict society. In the case of Kosovo, however, this imperative seems to have been overtaken by the apparent need to get the ISSR ‘out of the way’.

Thus the problems confronting the ISSR were related to the failure, at policymaking level, to take note of the likelihood of inter-organisational competition, given the circumstances prevailing in Kosovo in 2006. This embraced the inherent need of organisations to pursue autonomy and longevity and the negative effects of domain similarity. The underlying tensions generated within the IGOs and the competition between the international and local communities were to have a marked effect on the progress of the ISSR programme.

In sum, if the likely occurrence of rivalry and competition is anticipated and addressed within the planning and design phase of the process, then their influence can be minimised. The necessity for strategic, integrated planning before a SSR intervention is of paramount importance. Looking to the future of Kosovo, Dagand (2008, p. 9) stresses that coordination and cooperation across the external relations and legal competences of the EU institutions will be necessary if security is to be maintained in the new republic. The European Commission will need to support Kosovo in its socio-economic and administrative restructuring, in conjunction with reforms under the EULEX mandate. Attention to a security and development nexus in approaching SSR, across EU institutional implementation, should reflect the stipulation of the Lisbon Treaty to ensure EU cross-pillar cooperation. The requirement for poverty reduction and human development, within a stable security environment is critical to averting the tensions created by the lack of opportunities for Kosovo citizens. Without adequate consideration to these needs, rising discontent within Kosovo could fuel further conflict in the region.
9.2. Planning, Coordination and Cooperation

In Chapters Two and Three the approach to understanding security, the security sector and its reform were examined. Each major IGO had viewed SSR from different standpoints and competition between organisations has caused disruption in both the planning and execution of SSR programmes. The inherently political nature of SSR requires a nuanced analysis of the security threats, of potential national security strategies, the feasibility of sustainable security architecture and the viability of civilian oversight.

In Chapter Four, Lederach’s pyramid was used to illustrate the requirements for peacebuilding and, when characterising the essential elements for planning a SSR intervention, the building metaphor can be used again. The foundation of any SSR programme must be solid; there must be a clear and collective understanding of what the security sector consists of and how it is to be reformed. Agreement should be reached, at all levels of participation, on the scope of the reform processes and the objectives of the SSR programme. The donors, local actors, practitioners must share this understanding and the institutions engaged in the process. Etherington considers this to be a practical “unitary framework, based on the search for coherence” (2008, p.6). The basis for SSR must consist of agreed solutions that delineate the scope and size of the intervention.

However, there continues to be wide debate as to exactly what constitutes the security sector and how it is to be reformed. There is a plethora of interpretations and IOs and IGOs continue to deliberate over them. The OECD has followed up its seminal examination of security reform (OECD-DAC, 2005) with two further works (OECD-DAC, 2007: OECD-DAC, 2007b) expanding its view of SSR and how it should be applied in the field. The larger IGOs also are refining their understanding of SSR. In June 2008, the UN brought together SSR practitioners, from across the UN departments and agencies, to familiarise them with the UN’s emerging view on the application of SSR.1 Meanwhile, NATO, at its SSR Department in Naples, continues to develop its own SSR methodology.2
The academic community also is considering how SSR should be conducted. During 2008, three major works were published exploring the theory and practice of SSR (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2008; Spence & Fluri, 2008; Law & Myshlovska, 2008) and numerous conference papers were presented and published on the subject. Despite this activity, it is disconcerting to find that the major IGOs and IOs seem unwilling to pool their knowledge or strive to reach a shared understanding of the difficulties facing SSR application in the field. Additionally, none of the organisations appear to have requested recipients of reform programmes to comment on SSR methodologies or indicate if the objectives of the host state had been achieved. Although the debate is extensive, there is yet to be a universal understanding of objectives of SSR and how they should be achieved.

There is little sign that organisations are coalescing around a common approach to SSR. For instance, the planned 2010 DFID Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation Support (SSDDT) programme in Southern Sudan will use the OECD Implementation Framework (OECD-DAC, 2007b). However, the UN, the US and other international actors will operate in Sudan alongside DFID. There are indications that these organisations do not share DFID’s enthusiasm for the OECD’s Implementation Framework and will base their activities on different methodologies.

Thus there is still a need for a pan-organisational agreement on the basics of SSR. The definitions of the security sector, the depth and breadth of the approach to its reform and how donors, organisations and practitioners cooperate in the forming of a concept for SSR should constitute the foundation for SSR practice. Debate on SSR should not be undertaken in isolated groups or solely within institutional structures. Etherington believes that there is:

“…a need to raise the game; integrated pre-planning is very necessary with a blurring of the boundaries between civilian, military and local authorities. Regrettably, institutional protectionism is very present in the existing system” (2008, p.8).

Nevertheless, the international community has had difficulty with the concepts of security and there is a responsibility to ensure that governments provide security for all their citizens. An independent Commission on State Security and Intervention introduced the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept in 2001. The
R2P was prompted by the turmoil in Rwanda and the Balkans and is grounded in the belief that the state has primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens. In December 2005, 150 countries in the UN General Assembly endorsed this concept (United Nations General Assembly, 2005, pp.1-5).

State sovereignty implies responsibility; when a state is unwilling or unable to provide security for its people, the wider international community has a collective responsibility to take action. This action may include the use of military force in exceptional cases. Evans suggests that R2P is far better equipped to end mass atrocities than is humanitarian intervention (Evans, 2008). However, much remains to be done to solidify political support and understanding of the R2P concept and to build institutional capacity (Powers, 2008, p.365).

Contemporary research into the security sector and human security has given rise to debate on what actually constitutes ‘security’. Further, it has been observed that security means different things to different people at different times. This implies that, given the SSR’s ephemeral nature, the promotion of human security, as a constituent part of the process, is difficult to characterise and equally challenging to achieve. However, it is clear that to have any chance of providing security for the population of a post-conflict state there must be clear understanding of what is required and how it is to be achieved. This will require close coordination between both international and local actors.

Jackson (2007, p. 212) uses the analogy of a length of rope to describe PSOs in post-conflict situations; traditional security sector reform is only one strand that makes up his rope; others are economic and social progress, political stability and humanitarian assistance. Singularly the strands cannot resist the strains inherent in the post-conflict environment but together, he suggests, “the strands become stronger than the sum of their parts.” This example can be equally applied to the application of SSR in that the means of achieving the overall objective must be interrelated and coordinated.
The illustration, however, emphasises the need to understand exactly what constitutes the security sector and how holistic the reform process must be. It has become fashionable to talk about ‘holistic SSR’ but there remains little understanding of what this means in practice. It is often left to the practitioner on the ground to determine how wide the interpretation of the meaning of the word ‘holistic’ should be. Thus the donor community, IGO and the local community have little idea, before a SSR programme starts, what the project is trying to achieve, save for broad assertions of realising sustainable peace and security.

9.3. International Control or Local Ownership

The importance of local actors has been increasingly acknowledged, with peacebuilding activities being conceptualised as an activity involving the entire society (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999). Indeed, experience has shown that such actions are unsustainable if they are conceptualised entirely by outsiders and merely implemented locally. Local actors have to be integrated into the design and decision-making process in order for the process to work at all. It is crucial for long-term sustainability that conflict transformation efforts are locally conceived and led (Edomwonyi, 2003).

However, little account is taken by the international community of the fact that some states see SSR as a tool of western neo-colonialism. Incentives, such as
NATO or EU membership and the PfP, to encourage the implementation of SSR can be viewed by some nations as ways to increase western control. The extent to which SSR activities are devoid of political motives is questionable, as is who are the greatest beneficiaries of the process. There are fears that SSR is merely a cover for an intrusion into the sovereignty of the host nation and that it conceals more malign, self-serving motives. Additionally, some states suspect that there may be financial and economic incentives behind SSR, determining where the reform efforts will be carried out. These fears can serve to undermine more altruistic and humanitarian motivations and inhibit cooperation and partnership.

Current democratisation models primarily focus on inter-state relations and ignore the fact that establishing democracy can be a highly adversarial measure within states. This focus adds to the difficulties of pursuing the concept of a mutual exploration of local ownership and self-determination in security sector management matters. The dichotomies of local engagement and the effects of the developmental approach to stabilisation and SSR, favoured by the international community, often overlook the culture, sensitivities and aspirations of the host nation. This is coupled to the pressures that emanate from the donor states to conform to their understanding of the SSR requirement.

Earlier in this thesis it was noted that the ISSR Secretariat strove for local ownership of the programme but failed to fully engage the Kosovo political leadership. This failure, in part, can be traced to the reluctance at a high level within the UNMIK to allow the PISG to become involved in security matters. In Chapters Six and Seven it was suggested that the UNMIK’s attitude was founded on the belief that the local leadership were incapable of dealing successfully with Kosovo’s internal security problems. The resultant exclusion of the PISG from security planning ran entirely contrary to the aims and objectives of SSR, which include the promotion of both capacity building and local ownership. Zerinini (2008, p. 11) believes that SSR must include integrated action that allows a policy process that is owned by the host nation. This did not occur in Kosovo.

The lack of a coherent understanding, at strategic level, of what constitutes the security sector and its reform impacted on the ISSR programme’s ability to interact
with the local population. At no time in the development of the ISSR process was the scope and depth of the review delineated, or was there prior discussion with the PISG on which Ministries or Departments were to be the subject of review. The initiators of the programme did not direct the ISSR Secretariat, in any detail, as to how the review of the security sector should be undertaken. It became the responsibility of the ISSR Secretariat to decide what was to be reviewed and how far reaching that investigation should be. (5) The ISSR researchers therefore determined to take the security perceptions of the Kosovo population and then review the capabilities of the Ministries and Departments, which had influence or responsibility in the areas identified by the population as a threat. At no stage in its deliberations did the Steering Committee question or modify the recommendations set before it. (6)

It appears that reliance on the practitioners to decide on the methodology for an SSR intervention is not an unusual feature of SSR interventions. Hänggi and Scherrer (2008, p.235) note that generally there has “been a lack of SSR strategy … emanating from headquarters…SSR strategies mostly evolved on an ad hoc basis within field missions”. This was the situation also in the SSR missions in Burundi (Banal & Scherrer, 2008, pp. 46-48), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Dahrendorf, 2008, pp. 68, 90) and in Haiti (Mobekk, 2008, p.153). Arguably devolving responsibility for the shape and scope of a SSR programme to the lowest level is the practical and, indeed, the only feasible solution. By leaving the detailed planning to field missions, the programme will be grounded at ‘grass-roots’ level and can be adapted for local conditions, thereby taking account of local requirements and aspirations. However, it is apparent that often this is not a conscious decision by policymakers; rather it comes about due to the absence of coherent planning. Practitioners, in the absence of strategic guidance, tend to do what they think is best and often this ad hoc approach leads to a disorganised approach which undermines the value of the intervention.

Any merit accruing from the ‘grass-roots’ approach can be maximised only if there is genuine local inclusion in the process. In Chapter Two it was noted that local ownership is difficult to achieve and indeed the best that can be hoped for is the active inclusion of the local population and leadership in the SSR process. It was observed in Chapters Six and Seven that, during the Kosovo ISSR, there were
elements within the international community who discouraged local inclusion in the security review and reform process. Again this is not atypical; recent research reveals that “local actors were not always present in the discussions on international support to SSR…and the needs of the [local] authorities were not always understood” (Banal & Scherrer, 2008, p. 53); “…local ownership [is] disregarded…and there [is] a tendency to define local ownership too narrowly…civil society [is] left out of the process” (Mobekk, 2008, p.152).

However, Hänggi and Scherrer assert that, of all the SSR programmes they have studied, only the Kosovo ISSR utilised a broad local consultative process (2008, p. 233). Nevertheless, criticism of the ISSR programme was not that it had ignored local inclusion but that it had failed to convince the local leadership to become actively engaged in the process. This was certainly true as there was no overt participation by the Serbian leadership in the ISSR and many of the Kosovar opposition political parties were ambivalent about the programme. In Chapter Seven the reasons for this were discussed; however, it was a significant lapse in a programme that heralded itself as being based on local ownership. Nonetheless, it is not completely the fault of the international community that local leaders are not more committed to security reform. A senior NGO official has remarked that:

“When institutions start paying for their own consultants, then we will see real commitment. Unless the local institutions start paying for the SSR projects or at least get involved in the design of it and publicly sign binding memorandum of understanding, the local buy-in will remain superficial and the level of involvement, responsibility and accountability will remain low.” (7)

It is probably too ambitious to expect post-conflict states to fund their own SSR activities but the official’s point is clear; local leaders must be actively encouraged to become involved in the design and development of a SSR strategy. Chapter Two contained discussion of the issues of partner identification, the lack of dialogue with the local population and the problems of creating norm resonance, all of which impede local ownership. Some “national governments [are] not willing to engage in SSR at all” (Hänggi and Scherrer, 2008, p. 233). Nevertheless in order to achieve a sustainable outcome to SSR activities local commitment must be realised. However, both local and international acceptance and approval of SSR programmes will be based on successful outcomes. In Kosovo, there existed a miscalculation that was to
undermine the impact of the ISSR Secretariat’s work. This was the absence of a viable monitoring and evaluation system, which could have strengthened the authority of its work.

**H,9.4. Measuring Progress**

In Chapter Two it was noted that the application of security reform in the field has lacked a credible and universally recognised measurement tool for SSR outcomes. Despite the effort of the international community in supporting the SSR interventions there remains little agreement on how programme success should be measured. Saferworld (2007, p.1) has suggested that:

“…practice and thinking in this area is at best divergent, at worst significantly lacking [and that] while the task of monitoring and evaluating SSR interventions may not be significantly different from that in related fields, the lessons and methods of humanitarian aid, conflict prevention and development do not appear to have been consciously analysed and taken up”

With its emphasis on transformational change of security institutions, many of which have been leveraged by elites to gain and maintain power, SSR is necessarily political. There will therefore be dichotomies resulting from reform efforts; some groups, such as military and political leaders from both predecessor and current regimes, are well aware that their authority and power is in danger of being undermined. SSR practitioners, therefore, operate in a highly charged milieu, where asking politically sensitive questions or sharing sensitive data with unapproved parties, could have negative outcomes. They must impress the advantages of SSR on local stakeholders, working with and supporting their host nation counterparts in designing and implementing SSR programmes that reflect the state’s cultural norms, political realities, and other needs so that improvements can be sustained over the long-term. SSR assessment has two imperatives; the initial assessment to understand what is required, what the capacity of the host nation’s institutions are and how best to undertake the reform process. The second assessment should provide feed–back to both the donor and host nations on the performance and applicability of the reform process. This second imperative is essential to gain and maintain funding for the SSR programme.
The initial assessment of SSR needs provides a tool for future change management efforts, as it provides a vision of the current state of the host nation’s security sector. This data can be used to determine opportunities for aligning stakeholder and donor priorities and challenges that need to be mitigated. If grounded in well-formulated data, assessments can also be used to establish SSR project baselines and assist in the measurement of programme applicability. While the assessment is not an end to itself, it nonetheless can provide practitioners with the political and diplomatic cover to develop knowledge that will support programme planning and implementation without raising stakeholder expectations to unrealistic levels.

All SSR programmes come with at least an element of donor national interest in their make-up. It is therefore essential that the host nation’s trust be gained, even when it is clear that SSR is being undertaken in the donor states’ national interest. Stakeholders are not naïve; they understand that donor priorities drive SSR projects and therefore they may need convincing that the reform process will meet their own interests. Security sector reform implies that a nation’s security systems and processes are deficient and require reform. In some post-conflict environments, the word “reform” is presumptuous. Furthermore, even the term ‘assessment’ can be threatening, signifying a shift in power and attack on national sovereignty. This can prove an impediment to building collaborative, trusting relationships on the ground. In several SSR projects it has been found that the word ‘development’ elicits better responses from host nation stakeholders and may be more appropriate politically (Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, 2009, pp. 6-7).

However, SSR initial assessments can be used to build awareness of, and consensus around, the need for change. Although SSR practitioners typically develop the questions they ask host nation stakeholders, it may be beneficial if they can help their host nation counterparts ask the questions themselves. SSR practitioners should display political and cultural sensitivity and avoid stigmatising institutions and processes, which also necessarily characterises local actors. If SSR practitioners position their work appropriately, they can reinforce a state’s commitment to rebuilding its systems and processes and involve civil society in the reform process. If they position it poorly, however, they could gain, at best, superficial commitment and
National actors are in the best position to determine their priorities and which initiatives will strengthen the capacity and capabilities of state and non-state security and justice providers, while addressing critical issues. The goal is to create a highly responsive security system: one that does not simply meet current needs, but also evolves to keep pace with a changing society. To accomplish this objective, a host nation will need to involve stakeholders at all levels, so that ownership is truly “local” and reform efforts benefit all the citizens in communities throughout the state, not just elites or certain ethnic groups.

Security sector reform practitioners should take care to maintain an open mind and practice cultural sensitivity in their work. SSR’s mostly western-based practitioners will bring biases into the initial assessment phase, which can influence the questions they ask, the recommendations they make, and the programmes they seek to design. For example, SSR actors’ bias to set up state-centric judicial systems that may not translate to certain countries’ judicial systems was demonstrated in Kosovo when international lawyers instituted a legal system based on the western style legal system which had to run alongside the already established Yugoslav law and laws created by UNMIK in the early days of their administration (Betts, Carlson et al, 2001, 371-382). Even so, maintaining parallel systems may be nothing more than a political and financial expedient to keeping a fragile peace while working towards creating systems that protect the rights of all citizens, not just certain ethnic, political or religious groups.

Nevertheless, national actors faced with the potential loss of power may sometimes acquiesce to an initial assessment for one reason only: so that they can maintain full control of the process. In such a scenario, potential spoilers may be senior members of the recipient government who ostensibly cooperate, simply because they view the political risk of explicit opposition as more dangerous to their interests than short-term acquiescence. However, donor state national concerns can sometimes blind donors to political and other realities that indicate a lack of state readiness for SSR. Launching SSR programmes when the host nation lacks the
political will or capacity to help drive them is politically high risk, as well as of questionable effectiveness. That being said, external actors are primed to engage and will often overlook warning signs so that they can move ahead with development programmes. This needs an accurate assessment of the situation, both political and technical, in the host nation and an understanding of the problems that will confront practitioners undertaking the reform process.

Although these are all relevant capacities none of them, save for the capacity to engage stakeholders, indicate how an institution interacts with others within the security sector. The UNDP methodology addresses institutional arrangements as a core issue of capacity. It states “institutional arrangements refer to the policies, procedures and processes that countries have in place to legislate, plan and manage the execution of development, rule of law, measure change and such other functions of state” (UNDP, 2008, p.11). However, beyond acknowledging this issue, the methodology does not establish guidelines on how to assess institutional arrangements.

A credible system, which assists the monitoring and evaluating (M&E) of project progress, is required to ensure that the SSR process remains true to its objectives. It needs to assist policymakers and practitioners to marshal resources and expertise to best effect. Chapter Three noted that the use of the logical framework concept of M&E, at present the favoured method of measuring SSR programmes, lacks the flexibility needed to accurately measure the effectiveness of complex security reform activities.

Apart from the ‘logframe’ approach to M&E, there are other result-based management methodologies that can be explored by SSR implementing organisations. M&E systems relevant to SSR have been identified by Fitz-Gerald & Jackson, (2008, p.6). These methodologies include a “balanced scorecard” approach that is seen as a practical tool for SSR measurement. Shalamanov & Nikolova (2005) note that this method “…is a balanced system of indices for effectiveness and has been widely accepted in the management of small, medium and large organisations from [both] the private and public sector.”
The European Commission’s guide to analysing and addressing governance in security sector operations utilises principle-agent theory (PAT) in assessing institutional arrangements. The Commission identifies governance as a priority based “upon fundamental principles such as participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability. Promoting these principles helps… to consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights” (Commission of the European Communities, 2008, p.5). Further, SSR assists sustainability in sector development and aid effectiveness. Based on PAT, the Commission lays out four governance mechanisms that dictate relations: hierarchical governance; patrimonial governance; market-based governance, and network governance (Commission of the European Communities, 2008, pp.43-47). These are divided into formal (patrimonial and market) and informal (patrimonial and network) governance mechanisms that are also arranged vertically (hierarchical and patrimonial) and horizontally (market and network). Although the European Commission does employ PAT terminology, the mechanisms are not challenged and thus programme design recommendations lack specificity.

A model is required that concentrates on the principles driving the framework used, as opposed to focusing on the minutiae of measurement as earlier SSR M&E models tended to do. There is a need to overcome concerns regarding the choice of appropriate indicators and the tendency to confuse indicators with objectives. Notably, more recent M&E models take the military’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) approach as the basis of their measurement criteria. Based on indicators utilised by the military, measurement criteria are developed for functional areas (for example, political, rule of law, human rights and good governance). Civilian and military actors then can work towards goals based on appropriate analytical inputs. In February 2008, UNDP Kosovo developed an M&E system for its 3SD project, which uses indicators in support of impact assessments similar to the CIMIC approach (UNDP, 2008). Nevertheless, the lack of strategic planning, the need for involvement by local actors and the unreliability of the evaluation of SSR programmes remain problems to overcome.
9.5. A Way Forward

Every SSR scenario is different; what works well in one setting may not work in another. It could be argued, therefore, that strategic planning is wasteful and each SSR intervention should be designed *in situ* and be prepared to adapt. This approach, it is suggested, would be a naïve and wasteful way to attempt SSR, even though there are illustrations that this is exactly how SSR programmes have been undertaken in the past. In the last five years, however, there have been attempts to regularise the approach to SSR or, at least, quantify how activities in the field should be structured. Sadly, in many instances, IGO attempts to set strategy and then apply it in the field have been ill defined.

Martin and Sayigh (2009, pp.2-6) have noted, using Iraq as their example, that the transformation of the security sector involves reform that is often reflective of the society at large. Moreover, changing the core objectives of security organisations will necessarily alter the organisations themselves and their position in society. Therefore, the substantial modification of interior ministries is in itself a sovereign matter. In post-conflict societies the common political frameworks are largely broken, meaning that a re-alignment of political power is a highly sensitive issue to all concerned. When a society lacks agreement on fundamental issues such as the functions and responsibilities of the security sector, political deadlock may forestall attempts at SSR.

A further issue is the need to revise donor policy and practice in SSR programmes. Without the reform of donor attitudes and practise, investment may prove counter-productive. The most difficult subject is that of donor coordination, because it restricts the freedom of donors to act as they see fit. A more horizontal approach is required, where provision of security and justice is seen from the point of view of the citizen.

There is an urgent need for the rudiments of SSR intervention to be agreed by the international community. The lack of consistency in ordering SSR mandates, whether by the UN, NATO or on a bilateral basis, has led to an absence of clarity, efficiency and effectiveness on the ground. More positive and inclusive action must
be taken, at international level, to reach a common understanding of SSR and its implementation. Moller (2008, pp. 11-12) suggests that there must be a move from the theoretical to the practical. Little research, he contends, is undertaken on what actually works in security reform. The differences in priorities at the local level and in the minds of international planners are stark. Local imperatives have been ignored or judged inconsequential. In addition, SSR programmes often have been designed and implemented in isolation from other international initiatives and the resultant domain similarity has led to rivalry and competition.

In the case of Kosovo, the SSDAT made a detailed study of the requirement for the ISSR. It also attempted to ensure that the political climate was appropriate for the intervention. In the initial stages of the planning cycle both the local and international communities confirmed their support for the process and there were indications that funding would be readily available from the donor community. (8) However, as related in earlier chapters, much of the strategic planning for the programme was soon to become redundant as confusion, competition and rivalry delayed and distorted the process. SSDAT’s carefully calculated timelines were rapidly overtaken by infighting and confusion. Thus the realities of political and institutional agendas were to pervert the orderly progression of the ISSR programme methodology.

A lesson, therefore, to be taken from the Kosovo experience, is that consideration must be given to other activities within the host state and the wider international donor community. The issues of time and space; can the programme be completed in the desired timeframe or will other activities or issues disrupt it, are vital to the outcome. Not enough attention was given in Kosovo to other activities; indeed, it came as a surprise to the ISSR Secretariat to discover that a number of analogous projects were being undertaken alongside ISSR, some sponsored by the same organisations that were funding their programme. (9)

There also were strains at the lower level of engagement. In Chapter Four the triggers for, and possible solutions to, inter-personal rivalry were discussed. However, it must be acknowledged that, within any human interaction, this impediment to progress can seldom be eradicated. It is only by the careful selection
of staff and by effective line management that the influence of negative inter-personal relationships may be combated. As Chapter Seven illustrated, the ISSR programme was by no means immune from the problems that inter-personal discord can bring.

The Kosovo experience demonstrated that assurances of support from local leadership are not enough. Local actors must have an active role in the design of the SSR concept and the methodology to be employed on the ground. Wherever possible host state civil servants and military officers should be part of both the scoping and implementation teams. If this expertise is deficient in the local community, capacity building by appointing suitable local candidates in ‘shadow roles’ to international experts should be undertaken as a firm objective of a SSR programme. It is essential, however, that these ‘shadows’ be returned to government posts, for an agreed period of time, as soon as the SSR programme is completed. (10)

It has been noted that the ISSR programme suffered from a lack of M&E procedures, which could adequately measure the impact of the programme. To date, most performance frameworks have existed either solely at practitioner level, or have been developed retrospectively as an assessment tool to measure programme effect. Monitoring and evaluating the performance of an SSR programme is central to the evaluation of its sustainability and achievement of the wider strategic objectives. More research is necessary to develop a credible M&E system that is flexible enough to cater for the complexities of holistic SSR programmes.

Intra-and inter-organisational rivalry and competition are more difficult obstacles to overcome. However, there are ways of surmounting these problems that might have the supplementary advantage of adding robustness to the whole SSR process. The method of planning and executing an SSR programme should be undertaken in two distinct but interlinked phases. The first phase should be a scoping and planning mission where the suitability and acceptability of the programme is explored and the methodology for implementation designed. The second phase takes the design and put it into practice. It might be argued that this is what is happening already; in the case of the ISSR, SSDAT undertook a scoping study and UNDP implemented the design. However, as we have seen, there was a lack of cohesion between the findings and recommendations of the SSDAT Scoping Study and
implementation in the field. In part, the problems of inter-organisational rivalry started with SSDAT that, as a group jointly funded by the UK MOD, DFID and FCO, found itself at the centre of a struggle for primacy between the individual departments of state. (11)

The scoping and detailed planning for a SSR mission should be undertaken by a private body rather than an IO, IGO or government department. It is further recommended that this body should come from the academic community where expertise in the myriad of disciplines of a holistic SSR programme can be found. These skills already exist in a number of universities and some principal NGOs and can, no doubt, be found or fostered in others.

In the absence of an agreed delineation of the security sector, the planning body should make recommendations to both the international supporting body and the host state as to which functional areas should fall within the intended SSR programme. At this point funding can be attracted from the donor community, as it will be possible to judge the scope of the SSR and the merits of its aims and objectives. As has been suggested earlier in this Chapter, the planning phase should pay close attention to local requirements and ideally should incorporate local expertise into the planning structure. The Scoping and Planning Report should be co-signed by the President or Prime Minister of the host state indicating full endorsement and acceptance of the programme and its methodology. However, the overarching argument for removing the scoping and planning phase from the jurisdiction of IGOs or IOs is that it greatly reduces the potential for inter- and intra-organisational rivalry and increases the breadth of expertise that can be brought to bear in the vital planning stages.

A more systematic approach, than heretofore undertaken, to the design and implementation of a SSR intervention should be developed in order to reduce the negative impact of confusion, competition and rivalry on the execution of the programme. Table 9.2 below illustrates the factors that impact on the development of a SSR programme, based on the experiences of the Kosovo ISSR:
The interconnection of activities at the red box level will ensure that the planning of the SSR activity is acceptable to all concerned and is a practical undertaking. By interlocking the scoping and planning function with the approval of both the international and local communities, the requirement to create a firm foundation for the intervention is met. At the green level, the activities move into the implementation phase where, again, interlocking requirements are designed to ensure that the programme can be launched with the expectation of inter-organisational and local cooperation and coordination. Finally, at the purple level, the practical requirements for the SSR programme come into play, with a measurement system designed to ensure that programme aims and objectives are met to the satisfaction of local and international actors and of donor states.

It is recommended that SSR field programmes be initiated by an IO or IGO (perhaps to be known as the Initiating Authority), which can attract and account for donor funding (12). The Initiating Authority should, in consultation with the host nation, co-opt local expertise as part of the mission management team. Having
agreed the feasibility and methodology for the SSR programme the Initiating Authority should appoint an Implementing Team. The Implementing Team should not come from the Initiating Authority or a partner IO or IGO but from a suitable third source. Martin and Sayigh (2009, p.3) believe that those best to undertake SSR activities are technical experts:

“The systems and processes involved in [SSR] are very complex, and as such unsuitable for amateur involvement…The type of people who are needed for such large scale projects are not general practitioners, they are the consultants who work with similar sized organisations, both government and business...In some senses developing security institutions after conflict has much in common with private sector management consultancy… This is a highly technical activity, and the same level of technical expertise is required in security sector development.”

It has been noted in Chapter Four that the private sector is well aware of the financial costs of internal and external competition and rivalry and devotes funds for research into ways of reducing its effect. In addition, the private sector (including academia) is less risk adverse that the public sector, IOs and IGOs. Ashdown (2007, pp.169-170) observes that IGOs, particularly the UN, avoid risk in peacemaking and peacekeeping. There is also a tendency for IGOs to interfere in the day-to-day running of field operations that, in turn, leads to micro-management within the mission. It is suggested therefore that the private sector may have attributes lacking in IGOs that can be applied to the furtherance of SSR implementation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
<th>PUBLIC SECTOR (IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective:</strong> Financial Return:</td>
<td><strong>Objective:</strong> Stability, economic regeneration, social cohesion:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Therefore:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a). Tolerance to risk is high as there must be risk to give adequate financial return.</td>
<td>a). Tolerance to risk is low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b). There is an expectation of a degree of project failure therefore it is guarded against.</td>
<td>b). It is difficult to calculate success therefore little to be gained from aiming for it.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c). There is no stigma in failure therefore it holds less fear and greater risks can be taken.</td>
<td>c). Primary objective is to avoid risk and organisational exposure therefore a conservative approach is used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Therefore:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a). M&amp;E is detailed and sophisticated because of the risk-taking culture and financial imperatives.</td>
<td>a). M&amp;E criteria are vague and implementation inconsistent given the risk adverse culture and need to protect organisational reputations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b). Demand for knowledge is high because of the need to understand the risk/market, which in turn engenders M&amp;E against strict criteria.</td>
<td>b). Understanding of the environment is minimal with weak monitoring against complicated targets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 9.3: Comparison of the motivation and outcomes of Private and Public Sector Organisations in Post Conflict Situations.
To overcome the lack of professionally qualified SSR staff, the DPKO Rule of Law and Security Institutions Office have built a database of 30 SSR expert practitioners for use in UN programmes. However, it remains to be seen if this initiative will transcend the intra-organisational divisions within the UN system described earlier in the thesis. Notwithstanding the UN’s attempt to consolidate and coordinate its SSR efforts, the application of SSR practice does not remain the sole preserve of that organisation.

Despite efforts to improve the quality of SSR field practitioners the recruitment and retention of suitable experts remains problematic. Webster & Walker (2009, p. 35) assert that:

“the system is only as good as the people who steer and staff it. Recruiting, training and retaining the right leadership, at all levels of the operational chain, are the most vital prerequisites of a successful operational structure.”

This has yet to be achieved in the structure of SSR field operations.

As noted in earlier chapters, private companies, NGOs and academic institutions, with varying degrees of success, have undertaken SSR implementation. The rationale for recommending a third party is that where private company or academic reputations and funding are at stake there is a greater likelihood of an effective and efficient performance than with ad hoc teams put together from a database.

9.6. Proposals for Further Research

Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2002-3, sought to encourage a concept of holistic democracy which encompassed Roosevelt’s beliefs of freedom from want and freedom from fear. He also urged the end of “dysfunctional definitions of security” (2003, p.3). Vieira de Mello believed that inter and intra-state stability were founded on the tenets of human security and that respect for human rights was essential to the promotion of the rule of law, the creation of a stable society and the regulation of state behaviour (Powers, 2008, pp. 358-359). SSR seeks to advance these goals but can do so only if all those involved in its implementation are working together and have clearly defined and measurable aims and objectives.
The foundation for this thesis is that, based on the Kosovo case study, although the international community shares the desire to ensure an efficient security sector in post-conflict or transitional states, confusion, competition and rivalry between the actors, at all levels, have served to undermine such programmes. SSR activities remain confused and often are contradictory. The research undertaken for this thesis has considered a single case study and, although there is empirical evidence of similar problems occurring in other SSR programmes, more research is needed to understand the nature and influence of confusion, rivalry and competition in SSR interventions. Clearly confusion, rivalry and competition are not confined just to the security field. They exist in all human activity and, perhaps, this explains why their impact on SSR has not been analysed in any depth. It may be that theorists and practitioners accept the confusion and competition nexus as unavoidable aggravations. It is proposed that ignoring the problem is counterproductive. By acknowledging that the confusion, rivalry and competition exist and by seeking measures to counteract their effects, the environment for applying SSR can be greatly improved.

In common with all taught academic programmes, the limitations of time, funding and resources have served to restrict the scope of the research for the thesis; nevertheless it has demonstrated the stated hypothesis. It has identified and explained the destabilising effects of confusion, inter-organisational competition and interpersonal rivalry. The research has revealed a number of instances of theoretical and policy confusion and multi-levelled rivalry and competition, which affected the application of the Kosovo ISSR programme. It has exposed the lack of local political ownership, which detracted from the validity of the process. Other authors have pointed to similar defects in the policy and practice of SSR but none have traced their links, by dint of field research, to the underlying influences of inter- and intra-organisational competition and the presence of inter-personal rivalry. Nor have the studies of rivalry and competition in developmental psychology, social psychology, sociology, administrative and political science been linked to the study of post-conflict SSR processes.

Further research is necessary to explicate the impact of confusion, competition and rivalry on the theory and practice of SSR. This work has shown that there is prima facie evidence that intra-organisational competition, the desire for autonomy
and the presence of inter-personal rivalry have been powerful stimulants to confusion in SSR. There would be benefit in continuing research into inter- and intra-institutional competition, particularly to theories relevant to the structural and actor-driven causes of rivalry. This should be multi-disciplinary research, which takes account of the social, behavioural, physiological and political sciences.

In terms of SSR application in the field, the thesis suggests that there exists a tendency to competition within and among IOs and IGOs. It has pointed to confusion over the basic definitions of security and SSR, itself a product of a lack of cooperation and coordination between organisations. There is a tendency for IGOs to focus on pressing issues, often in areas, which are most familiar to the organisation. The thesis has illustrated the presence of inter-personal rivalry that has diluted the work towards the attaining SSR objectives. It has shown that international espousal of local ownership tends to be desultory in application, routinely being placed below the agendas of IGOs and member states. It has recognised that implementing IGOs have yet to find a reliable way of measuring SSR programme outcomes to the satisfaction of both the donor and local communities. Finally, it has recommended greater involvement by the private sector, academic institutions and NGOs in the planning and execution of SSR programmes to assist in countering many of these deficiencies.

In order to better understand the experiences described in this thesis there is merit in reviewing the disposition and progress of other SSR programmes. Targeted study of both multi- and bi-lateral SSR projects would serve to identify the incident of confusion and divergence, as products of competition and rivalry. In addition, further research on the barriers to local ownership should be undertaken in order to find ways to ensure that SSR provides a solid platform for sustainable security in post-conflict and transitional states. It is also recommended that further research be undertaken to ascertain which formed bodies, in the private sector, academic and NGO fields, have the ability to implement complex SSR programmes.

As a result of the deficiencies in the planning and practice of SSR and the resultant lack of success of high cost and politically sensitive programmes, many donors have been reluctant to lend political and financial support to such reform
endeavours. Nevertheless, as Ashdown (2008) comments, “The lesson is not to never to do it again, the lesson is to learn to do it better”.
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2. Documents and Reports

2.1. United Nations Organisation


2.2. **Council of the European Union**


2.3. **European Commission**


2.4. The European Union


2.5. *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*


2.6. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe


2.7. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development


2.7. The United Kingdom


2.9. United States of America


2.10. **International Crisis Group**


2.11. Other Documents


Annex A: Interviews, Notes and Other Enquiries

Introduction:

1. Three conditions are required for an IGO to exist; independent political communities, rules agreed within those communities which profess to regulate their relations with each other and a formal structure to implement and enforce those rules (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004, p.1). The definition of an IGO, used in this thesis is, that, “intergovernmental organisations are permanent bodies that states create to address matters entrusted to them and which result from international agreement among states” (Archer, 2001, pp.31-36). However, if the broader term ‘international organisation’ (IO) is considered it can be said to include both IGOs and also international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), defined by the UN Economic and Social Council as any international organisation not created by means of an intergovernmental agreement (ESOSOC, 1968, Part III).

Chapter Three:

1. A Senior UK Military Officer. Interviewed on 03 November 2007, Pristina, Kosovo.
2. The Webster Collegiate Dictionary classifies competition, conflict, emulation, strife, striving, tug-of-war, and warfare as synonyms for rivalry.

Chapter Four:

1. Inkster (2009) suggests that we are moving from a ‘multi-polar structure’ to a ‘non-polar structure’ where the world is longer be policed by the US and is policed by nobody. Meanwhile China waits in the wings deciding
if it wants a global role. The UK National Security Strategy recognises this shift, and acknowledges that, “at the state level, we are witnessing a massive and historic shift in power from the Atlantic seaboard to Asia and the Pacific” (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2009, p.28).

2. Argjentina Grazhdani, East-West Management Institute, Kosovo. Taken from an interview on 17 June 2004. RTK Television, Kosovo.

Chapter Five:

4. A NATO Military Officer serving with KFOR. Interview on 10 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo.
5. A British Army Officer serving in the NATO International Staff Division. Interview on 03 October 2007. Pristina, Kosovo.
6. The clearing house concept aims at creating a framework by which Member States can, on a voluntary basis, exchange information on their contributions to UN operations and co-ordinate these national contributions. Such a clearing house process would not modify modalities for national decision making and national participation in a UN operation, or affect existing bilateral arrangements with the UN DPKO. Such participation remains a national decision and is managed in accordance with UN Force Generation procedures (Council of the European Union, 2004, p.3).

Chapter Six:

1. A Kosovo Assembly Member of ethnic Albanian origin. Interviewed on 3 November 2007. Pristina, Kosovo.
Chapter Seven:


3. Rod Evans, SSDAT. Interviewed on 24 November 2007, Shrivenham, United Kingdom.

4. UNMIK Official. Interviewed on 04 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo.

5. UNMIK Official. Interviewed on 29 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo.


8. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


32. UNMIK Official. Interviewed on 04 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo.


34. Former ISSR Secretariat member, Interviewed on 05 November 2007.


36. Both individuals achieved their aims; the Colonel was posted to the International Staff College in Rome and his Deputy was appointed to the new SSR team in DPKO, New York.


42. A senior PISG member. Interviewed on 02 October 2007. Pristina, Kosovo.

43. The Italics are mine. The animosity of the Kosovo Government towards UNMIK and, to their eyes, its reluctance to give up power continued into 2008 and beyond.

44. View based on a series of interviews with an UNMIK Official on 04 October 2007, a senior diplomat on 30 October 2007 and with an
UNMIK political adviser on 04 November 2007. All interviews took place in Pristina, Kosovo.


47. KFOR Military Officer. Interviewed on 10 October 2007. Pristina, Kosovo.


49. Personal conversation between the author and General Valotto at the General’s End of Tour Parade at the KPC Headquarters on 17 August 2006.


52. Mark Posten, Head of the DFID Office, Interviewed on 8 November 2006, Pristina, Kosovo.


54. Ibid.

55. Discussion with the author at the UACES 37th Annual Conference & 12th Research Conference, 4th September 2007, Portsmouth UK.


60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. The quote is attributed to then National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, in the spring of 2003, during the transatlantic disagreement over Iraq. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters in March 2003, "You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe."

64. A Military Officer holding an International Staff position in Pristina. Interview on 10 November 2007.


68. Ibid.


74. Senior UNOSEK Official. Interviewed on 02 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo.


77. Interview with a British Military Officer. 03 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo.


82. Brigadier General Blease. Interviewed on 02 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo.


Chapter Eight:


3. Member of the Kosovo Prime Ministers’ staff. Interviewed on 3 October 2007, Pristina, Kosovo.


15. Serbian Politician, Interviewed on 02 November 2007, Mitrovica, Kosovo. After independence was declared the Serbian members of the KPS continued to work in Serbian areas but refused to be paid from Kosova Government central funds. Their salaries were covered from the Serbian Municipalities’ budget.
16. This attitude continued after the declaration of independence, with the Kosovo Serbs refusing to deal with the EU representatives in Kosovo. The Belgrade government also dismissed the UN Secretary-Generals’ proposal to downsize UNMIK and allow the EU to be deployed under a UN legal umbrella. (Sekularac, 2008).


19. Conversation with Alex Standish, UNDP Kosovo on 08 April 2009.


Chapter Nine:


8. Rod Evans, SSDAT. Interviewed on 24 November 2007, Shrivenham, United Kingdom.


10. The author was told by the Deputy Defence Minister of Croatia that a major human resource retention problem for his Ministry was that civil servants and military officers, who had gained experience by working alongside international counterparts, frequently accepted better paid positions in the private sector. (Discussion in Naples on 13th February 2008). None of the occupants of ISSR ‘shadow’ posts subsequently took up employment with the Government of Kosova.


12. This suggestion may cause difficulties within the UN system. The officials in the newly created DPKO SSR Team are seeking to have UN Integrated Missions take responsibility for SSR activity although they have no mechanism for accounting for the donor contributions that would fund such interventions. They are considering funding SSR activity from UN Trust Fund budgets. This has put pressure on the UNDP who are keen to protect their lien on their Rule of Law and Justice funding streams (Dr. Michael von Tangen Page, Interviewed on 25 November 2007. London, UK).

QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN THE RESEARCH

INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANTS OUTLINE QUESTIONNAIRE

Name: 
Organisation: 
Link to ISSR: 
Date of Interview: 

QUESTIONS

1. What was your role in the ISSR process (if any)?

2. Were you a member of the ISSR Steering Committee?

3. Were you a member of the Core Consultancy Group?

4. Please describe how the ISSR process impacted on your Organisation, both from a positive and a negative point of view? (i.e. Was the process seen as a useful tool which was accepted by the Organisation)

5. Does your Organisation/ Government have a SSR policy? (i.e. Where does the Organisation stand on SSR as an instrument in post-conflict stabilisation?)

6. If your Organisation has a SSR policy is it in accord with the processes undertaken by the ISSR Secretariat in 2006? (i.e. Does the Organisation favour the traditional or holistic approach to SSR?)

7. Were there any disagreements within your organisation over the ISSR process? (Intra-institutional rivalry?)

8. Where there any disagreements between your organisation and others over the ISSR process? (Inter-institutional competition?)

9. Can you describe the attitude of your colleagues/collaborators to the process? Was it positive or negative? (Was there internal disagreement at the working level on the ISSR process and how did it impact on the Organisational attitudes).

10. Do you believe that the timing of the ISSR was correct? (Explore the matter of UNNY / UNDP Kosovo delays)
11. Given its proximity to the UNOSEK final status talks, was the ISSR process helpful? *(This question should draw out any concerns over the ISSR hindering the Final Status processes)*

12. Do you believe that it was correct to lodge the ISSR process with the UNDP? *(Inter-institutional competition?)*

13. If not, where do you believe SSR in Kosovo should lie; with the:
   a. UNMIK
   b. KFOR
   c. PISG
   d. Bilateral Arrangement
*(This question should build upon the answers given at Q8 and 12 above and give further indications on inter-institutional/organisational relations).*

**KOSOVO PARTICIPANTS OUTLINE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Name:
Organisation:
Link to ISSR:
Date of Interview:

**QUESTIONS**

1. What was your role in the ISSR process (if any)?

2. Were you a member of the ISSR Steering Committee?

3. Were you a member of the Core Consultancy Group?

4. Please describe how the ISSR process impacted on your Organisation, both from a positive and a negative point of view? *(i.e. Was the process excepted by the Ministry/Assembly/Party as a useful tool for security reform in Kosovo)*

5. Were there any disagreements within your organisation over the ISSR process?
   *(Intra-institutional rivalry?)*

6. Where there any disagreements between your organisation and others over the ISSR process? *(Inter-institutional competition?)*.

7. Can you describe the attitude of your colleagues/collaborators to the process? Was it positive or negative? *(Explore the feelings over transfer of competencies from the UN to the PISG)*
8. Do you believe that the ISSR process was sufficiently orientated to the situation in Kosovo? (i.e. Did it sufficiently take note of local perceptions and aspirations?)

9. Do you believe that the ISSR process was sufficiently sensitive to local needs and ownership? (i.e. Was this perceived as just another internationally imposed solution?)

10. Do you believe that the timing of the ISSR was correct? (This question should draw out a number of responses as to the delays in transferring security competencies, addressing the problem of final status and the matter of UNNY / UNDP Kosovo delays and their affect on local ownership of the process)

11. Given its proximity to the UNOSEK final status talks, was the ISSR process helpful? (This question should draw out any concerns over the ISSR hindering the Final Status processes)

12. Do you believe that it was correct to lodge the ISSR process with the UNDP? (Again this question explores the judgments about local ownership and the perceptions of domination of the security sector by the International Community)

13. If not, where do you believe SSR in Kosovo should lie; with the:
   e. UNMIK
   f. KFOR
   g. PISG
   h. Bilateral Arrangement
   (This question should build upon the answers given at Q9 and 12 above and give further indications on inter-institutional/organisational relations)
## List of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ahtisaari, Martti</td>
<td>UN Special Envoy for Kosovo</td>
<td>IC(t)</td>
<td>20/11/07</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Ariaj, Rame</td>
<td>Security Adviser to the Prime Minister</td>
<td>LG(n)</td>
<td>03/10/07</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Blease, Brig. Gen. Dennis</td>
<td>NATO Adviser, UNOSEK</td>
<td>IC(n)</td>
<td>03/10/07</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Çeku, Agim</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Kosovo</td>
<td>LG(n)</td>
<td>02/10/07</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Cooper, Isabella</td>
<td>Media Adviser, ISSR</td>
<td>II(r)</td>
<td>25/02/08</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Di Stefano, Marko</td>
<td>Political Adviser to DCOM KFOR.</td>
<td>IK(r)</td>
<td>27/02/08</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dugolli, Illir</td>
<td>Dep. Director, KIPRED</td>
<td>LN(n)</td>
<td>29/10/07</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Earhart, Brig. Gen. Doug</td>
<td>Cmdr MNTF (E) (2006/7).</td>
<td>IK(n)</td>
<td>28/10/07</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Elgersma, Steffen</td>
<td>Political Adviser to UNOSEK</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Evans, Rod</td>
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<td>Fejza, Ejup</td>
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<td>LG(n)</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Gallucci, Dr. Gerard</td>
<td>Regional Administrator, Mitrovica</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Gashi, Colonel Xhavit</td>
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<td>LK(n)</td>
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<td>Gashi, Ibrahim</td>
<td>University of Pristina</td>
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<td>Goosstry, Chris</td>
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<td>Gorani-Gashi, Visari</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Guardians, Ignasi</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
<td>IC(r)</td>
<td>27/11/07</td>
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<td>Harxhi, Edith</td>
<td>Office for Public Safety, Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>SRSG Kosovo (2004/6).</td>
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<td>Livingston, Alistair</td>
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<td>Resident. Rep. UNDP Kosovo</td>
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<td>Programme Analyst, UNDP Kosovo</td>
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<td>Naim Maljoku</td>
<td>President, Security Committee Kosovo Assembly</td>
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<td>Defence Attaché, US Office, Pristina</td>
<td>IC(n)</td>
<td>01/10/07</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Posten, Mark</td>
<td>Head of DFID Kosovo</td>
<td>IC(n)</td>
<td>02/11/07</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


| 35 | Robertsson, Joakim | 3SD Capacity Building Adviser, UNDP | IP(r) | 11/10/07 | 21/02/08 |
| 36 | Rossin, Larry | PDSRSRG, UNMIK (2004/6, 2008) | IU(n) | 28/02/08 |
| 37 | Ruairi O’Connell | Dep. Head of Mission, British Office, Pristina | IC(n) | 30/10/07 |
| 38 | Selimi, Lt. Gen. Sylejman | COMKPC | LK(n) | 30/10/07 |
| 39 | Smit, Caroline | BCRU, UNDP, New York | IC(t) | 03/11/07 |
| 40 | Srahström, Torbjörn | Pers. Rep. of EU High Representative | IE(n) | 13/10/07 |
| 41 | Spahui, Ardjan | Governance Adviser, OPS | LG(r) | 27/02/08 |
| 42 | Standish, Alex | Communications Advisor 3SD | IC(n) | 13/12/07 |
| 43 | Stinson, Dana | Strategic Drafter, ISSR | IF(n) | 29/12/07 |
| 44 | Surroi, Veton | Leader, ORA Party | LG(n) | 12/10/07 |
| 45 | Tolaj, Valon | AAK Party | LG(n) | 18/10/07 |
| 46 | Vazquez, Helena | Director, SEESAC Kosovo | IC(n) | 09/11/07 |
| 47 | Vetting, Kim | Democracy Expert, OSCE | IO(r) | 15/10/07 | 26/10/07 |
| 48 | Von Tangen Page, Michael | Security Sector Adviser, ISSR | IF(n) | 24/11/07 | 05/02/08 |
| 49 | Warren, Michael | Programme Analyst, UNDP Kosovo | IP(n) | 10/10/07 | 26/10/07 |
| 50 | Watson, Graham | Member of the European Parliament | IC(r) | 27/11/07 |
| 51 | Wokalek, Karl | Head of the German Mission, Kosovo | IC(n) | 03/10/07 |
| 52 | Wolf, Brig. Gen. William | Chief of Staff, KFOR | IK(n) | 28/10/07 |
| 53 | A.N. Other | Serbian National Council of Kosovo and Metohije | LS(n) | 01/11/07 |
| 54 | A.N. Other | Police & Justice, UNMIK | IU(n) | 29/10/07 |
| 55 | A.N. Other | Adviser to DFID | IA(n) | 12/02/08 (t) |
| 56 | A.N. Other | Ministry of Justice | LG(n) | 05/11/07 |
| 57 | A.N. Other | Member of KFOR | LG(n) | 10/10/07 |
| 58 | A.N. Other | UNMIK Official | IC(n) | 04/10/07 |
| 59 | A.N. Other | Municipality, Zabim Potok | LS(n) | 21/11/07 |
| 60 | A.N. Other | Serbian Socialist Party (SPS), Mitrovica | LK(n) | 12/10/07 |

**CODES:**
- **II** | ISSR Staff
- **IO** | OSCE
- **IP** | UNDP Staff
- **IC** | International Community
- **IK** | KFOR
- **IU** | UNMIK
- **IA** | International Agency
- **(t)** | Telephone Interview
- **(r)** | Tape Recorded Interview
- **IE** | EU
- **IN** | International NGO
- **LG** | PISG
- **LK** | KPC
- **LN** | Local NGO
- **LS** | Local Serbian
- **(n)** | Transcribed Interview
### Human Security in Major Reports of International Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Human Security Now 2003 Commission on Human Security | The Commission on Human Security clarified the concept of human security while retaining its people - centred focus, and it’s concentration on threats from both poverty and violence.  
• The Report defined the objective of human security as “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.”  
• Human security is realised by joint strategies of protection - crafting institutions that protect and advance human security - and empowerment - enabling people to act on their own behalf. |
| Millennium Report The United Nations Kofi A. Annan 2000 | Human security in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment - these are the interrelated building blocks of human - and therefore national security. |
| Responsibility to Protect 2002 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty | Human security means the security of people - their physical safety, their economic and social well - being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. |
| World Development Report The World Bank 200/2001 | Today, security comprises two interrelated concepts: the state’s role in protecting its borders from external threats and its role in ensuring ‘human security’ for its citizens under the broader umbrella of human rights - meaning that every person is entitled to be freedom of oppression, violence, hunger, poverty and disease and to live in an clean and healthy environment. |

### Human Security in Nations and NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Human Security is a people - centred approach to foreign policy which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety or lives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project | Human security is achieved when and where individuals and communities  
• Have the options necessary to end, mitigate, or adapt to threats to their human, environmental and social rights;  
• Actively participate in attaining these options; and  
• Have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options. |
| Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999 | Human Security comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity....and strengthens efforts to confront these threats. |

Adapted from Alkire,(2001), p.48.
KOSOVO ISSR PUBLIC OUTREACH COMMUNICATIONS

(1) An ISSR Billboard: 73 boards, in Albanian, English and Serbian, were erected throughout Kosovo’s towns and on major highways.

(2) The ISSR Television Debates, “Forum on Security”, were 10 one hour programmes, broadcast in Albanian and Serbian, with a live audience and telephone call-in ran throughout the review process.
(3) Stage and Music personalities featured in television spots talking about what security meant to them and urging citizens to give ISSR their views on security.

(4) The ISSR Bus toured Kosovo acting as a mobile studio and post office to allow citizens to record, either publicly or confidentially, their views on the security challenges in the province.