Making foreign women the mother of our nation: the exclusion and assimilation of immigrant women in Taiwan
Isabelle Cheng Asian Ethnicity, 2013

Abstract
Citizenship awarding is politicised. Conceiving female marriage migration as a national threat, Taiwan’s citizenship legislation is consciously designed and purposefully utilised to achieve exclusion and assimilation. Driven by a nationalistic impetus, it shows how Taiwan imagines itself as a modern, prosperous and homogenous nation and projects upon the immigrant outsiders as a threat to its self-identity. Examined through immigrant women’s lived experiences, this citizenship legislation is biased by gender, class and ethnicity. The implementation of the legislation is not only an example of symbolic politics but also banal nationalism realised at grassroots level in the private domain. Immigrant women’s lived experiences show that exclusion and assimilation stemmed from banal nationalism is not just an operation of symbolic politics but is also enmeshed with their everyday life.

Keywords: marriage migration; exclusion; runaway; citizenship; gender; ethnicity; class; racialised classism; ethnic nationalism; banal nationalism

Introduction
The relationship between the state and naturalised citizens is analogous to marriage, family or club membership. Each of these metaphors departs from a set of presumptions about the origin and strength of nationhood. The marriage metaphor implies mutual commitment; the family metaphor stresses primordial ties deriving from birth; club membership is underlined by mutual consent based on reciprocal gains. What if a naturalised citizen is an immigrant whose citizenship is granted based on their being the wife or mother of a local citizen, and as such all three sets of presumptions of the metaphors are being evoked?

This is the unique situation married immigrant women find themselves in. Together with South Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, Taiwan has become a major destination for female marriage migration in East Asia. From 1987 to 2010, a total of 399,552 women from Mainland China and five Southeast Asian countries have been granted residency in Taiwan because of their marriage to local citizens. Discounting citizenship awarded to Chinese migrants, from 1982 to 2011, amongst a total of 100,127 foreign men and women who were awarded with ROC citizenship, 97% of them acquired it on the spouse status. Amongst these foreign spouses who obtained citizenship, 99% of them were women. Naturalisation via marriage with local citizens has become the most common cause of conferring citizenship, and the
great majority of the citizens of foreign ethnicity are women from Southeast Asia. Thus, it is not only a metaphor but also an issue of legality that their acquirement of citizenship is most likely hinged on marital status and biological reproduction. Their reproduction, citizenship and diverse ethnicity will no doubt have far-reaching impacts on Taiwan’s imagination of its nationhood. On the other hand, the issue of identification with both the natal and host countries will reveal itself whilst they put down their roots in a foreign country.

These are the universal questions confronting migrants around the world in the countries where they depart from and where they reside. Nevertheless, as argued by Be’langer et al. that Taiwan is a homogenous nation, the island’s experiences in permitting citizenship illustrates how it deals with difference that is defined by gender, class and ethnicity, and, at the same time, maintains its national pride that leans heavily on prosperity. Grounded on the lived experiences of Filipino and Vietnamese immigrants, this paper will demonstrate that the club membership metaphor is misleading. Contrary to the indicated mutual benefit, the club membership metaphor glosses over the state’s exclusion and assimilation that are the price paid by immigrant outsiders for being accepted as formal members of the host nation.

Undesirable others: poor women from underdeveloped countries who don’t speak Chinese

In official pronouncements, Southeast Asian immigrant women are included as members of the nation via motherhood. For example, the Understanding Taiwan textbook for secondary school students embraces the spouses of transnational marriage and their children as constituent members of the society. However, behind the official embracing gesture is exclusion from the national community, and the exclusionary boundary is built by the discrimination undercut by ethnicity, class and gender. In terms of ethnicity, Southeast Asian women on the whole are essentialised in accordance with their nationality. English proficiency is said to be their advantage; a bonus to employ them for domestic work is to also have them as English-language tutors for the employer’s children. Vietnamese women are said to be filial daughters, virtuous wives, good mothers, subservient and diligent workers, as well as dangerous mistresses. In terms of gender, a boundary of modernity is constructed between local women and Southeast Asian women. As the embodiment of Taiwan’s modernisation, contemporary Taiwanese women are better educated, have higher labour participation, and make autonomous decisions about their marriage. In contrast, twisted by a class bias, it is believed that Southeast Asian women are needed because their Taiwanese husbands, universally being old, disabled, rural, or on a low income, lose out in the marriage squeeze. Migrating from poorly-developed countries, they are believed to be traditional, poor, rural and under-educated. Thus, their consent to a commodified marriage is interpreted as an escape from poverty. This classism is also blended with gender bias in the sense that advertisements for brokered marriages capitalised upon slogans that indicated their poverty, such as ‘virgins guaranteed’ and ‘marry one get one for free if run away within a year’. This strengthens the stigma that immigrant women engaging in sex work are either human trafficking victims or loose women who desert their homes (‘runaway’) because of an unsatisfactory marriage, including suffering domestic abuse. The plight of immigrant women prompted the US State
Department to blacklist Taiwan in 2005 and 2006 for its ineffectiveness in clamping down on human trafficking.\textsuperscript{14} This is seen as tarnishing Taiwan’s self-proclamation of being a human rights protection champion, a label associated with advanced civilisation.\textsuperscript{15}

The intertwined biases of gender, ethnicity and class converge in Southeast Asian women’s reproduction and performing motherhood.\textsuperscript{16} Typical of the ‘people as power’ and eugenicist discourses,\textsuperscript{17} their lower education and inability in the Chinese language give rise to anxieties about their incapable motherhood, which was imagined to set off a chain reaction, from producing low achieving children to weakening national competitiveness and ending up with threatening prosperity.\textsuperscript{18} In other words, \textit{we} and \textit{they} are demarcated by Taiwan’s ‘haves’ and Southeast Asia’s ‘have nots’. Known as an ‘economic miracle’ and treasured as central to Taiwan’s self-pride, prosperity has become a key element of the islanders’ identity.\textsuperscript{19} Enwrapped in a developmental mentality that sees economic development as national priority, incapable motherhood is pinpointed by the National Security Council as a \textit{national threat} to the sustainability of Taiwan’s prosperity.\textsuperscript{20} Known for their ‘single-mindedness’ of pursuing development,\textsuperscript{21} the economic planning bureaucrats proposed to recruit ‘professional migrants’ or ‘white-collar migrants’ and this would balance out this ‘quality’ deficit.\textsuperscript{22}

Literature review: the known biased exclusion and the unknown transition to citizenship

The above summarisation of Southeast Asian immigrant women clearly shows that they are seen as \textit{essentially different} from the host nation as a whole and the local women in particular. They are regarded as \textit{undesirable others} on the opposite side of the boundary of modernity, civilisation and prosperity, key components of Taiwan’s self-identity. Taiwan, as a Han-dominant and Chinese-speaking nation, is imagined as being under siege by their foreign ethnicity defined by their inferiority, backwardness and unfamiliarity with the (allegedly ‘more advanced’) culture of Taiwan. A message shouted from behind the boundary is that that their settlement creates problems that are rooted in their \textit{personal} peculiarity rather than structural impediment.\textsuperscript{23} If excluding them, the cost of accommodating them is the erosion of Taiwan’s self-identity of superiority. However, achievable or not, the intention of exclusion is checked by the fact that Southeast Asian women are the largest source of citizens of foreign ethnicity. How would the host state deal with the difference between \textit{them} and \textit{us}? Translated into law-making, this question is asking with what kind of legal tools the state can pursue the following interlocking goals: on the one hand, preventing \textit{unwanted outsiders} from crossing the geographical border, and, at the same time, reshaping the \textit{undesirable others} who have already been within and amongst us into an accepted form? How does this pursuit embed the underlining biases of gender, class and ethnicity in the legal tools? On the other hand, under this dual exclusion-assimilation scheme, how do immigrant women perceive and react to the boundary of modernity, civilisation and prosperity? In what kind of occasions will they experience the duality of exclusion and assimilation in their everyday life? How do they interpret their positioning in the host nation that treats them as \textit{ethnic others}? By asking these questions both from top-down and bottom-up perspectives, this paper is not only concerned about the formulation of the value-loaded citizenship legislation, but also about the interaction between the host state and the immigrant outsiders.
However, this crucial interaction between the nation-state and ethnic women is yet to be fully explored. There is a rich literature on the impact of the state’s schemes on the immigrants’ wellbeing. They discuss how immigrant women’s rights are impaired by discriminative legislation, how the discriminative legislation is strengthened by maintaining the household registration system, and how the application of multiculturalism restricts immigrant women to performers of exotic cultures rather than autonomous agents striving for self-interest.24 There is also sufficient literature alluding to the state’s schemes of constructing and maintaining the boundary between the locals and the outsiders. Examining the Nationality Act that was reformed in 2000, Chen reveals the embedded patriarchal ideology in the requirement for citizenship eligibility, including renouncing the previous nationality and obtaining Chinese language ability.25 The exclusion of Chinese immigrant women is given particular attention. Focusing on Taiwan’s citizenship regime governing the migration between Taiwan and China, Tseng and Wu argue that this regime is defined by the mutual hostility between the two sides.26 In a similar vein, Friedman argues that Chinese immigrant women in Taiwan are constituted as security threats and this constitution redefines the basis for Taiwan’s national inclusion.27 Comparing the exclusion of Chinese and Southeast Asian women, Chao asserts that excluding Chinese is different from discriminating against Southeast Asians — the former is rooted in the anxieties that Taiwan’s sovereignty is internationally challenged.28 The exclusion of Chinese women is identified by Tsai and Be´langer et al. as a case of ethnic nationalism, and the underlined drive of the nationalistic exclusion is an anti-Chinese complex. They state that this ethnic nationalism also applies to Southeast Asian women.29 However, they do not allude to the fact that Southeast Asian women are irrelevant to the anti-Chinese complex and Taiwan-China hostility. An attempt of identifying the driving force of the nationalistic discrimination against Southeast Asian women is offered by Lee’s definition of modernity in economic terms. She argues that the attainment of modernity is central to Taiwan’s national pride, whereas the lack of modernity is the root of Vietnam’s sense of national humiliation.30 Developing from this class-based examination, the foundation of the nationalistic discrimination of Southeast Asian women is further elucidated by Tseng and Komiya’s proposition of ‘racialised classism’, a conflation of class and race that categorises foreigners by their class background and hence their relative positioning to the locals in the national community.31 Viewed through the lens of racialised classism, not all ethnic others are deemed incompatible outsiders; only those from Southeast Asia, such as migrant workers and immigrant wives, are seen as inferior by nature.32 As a contrast, English-speaking white men and women can easily convert their linguistic capital into symbolic prestige and socio-economic advantages in Taiwan. Although their advantages are constrained by their class, nationality, race/ethnicity and gender, they are nonetheless regarded by the locals as superior others, a posture characterised as ‘positive racism’ by Lan.33

In sum, there is no shortage of literature respectively examining the state’s schemes and the impact of these schemes on immigrants’ wellbeing. Nevertheless, there is still a critical deficiency that centres on the immigrants’ transition to citizens. First of all, these studies show how the biases of gender, ethnicity and class, on their own, or in combination, result in the state’s exclusionary and discriminative schemes with which to deal with the marked difference. However, there is a lack of thorough investigation as to how these biases are adopted as legal provisions of citizenship.
awarding that legally, formally and symbolically announces the nominal acceptance of the undesirable others to become members of the national community. Secondly, there is a lack of a temporal perspective with which to understand immigrant women’s migration experiences as a process. That is, not only are they wives and mothers to the host state, they also continue to be emigrant daughters maintaining transnational ties with their parents in their natal country. Each of these gendered roles interacts with the host state in their legal transition to become citizens. The biases of gender, class and ethnicity alone or in full intervenes at different stage of this transition. Thirdly, there is a lack of perceiving the immigrants as citizens. As a result, it remains largely unknown how the statutory power of the citizenship legislation is experienced, interpreted, and critiqued by the immigrants whose wellbeing is affected by these written regulations. Also unknown is how state power affects their private relationship with family members in Taiwan and in the natal country, and how these private relationships may in turn affect their subjective understanding of their position in the host nation.

Addressing these discrepancies, this paper thus explores the following questions: 1. How is the citizenship legislation, undercut by gender, ethnicity and class, designed to assimilate immigrants of differing ethnicity who are wives and mothers of local citizens? 2. How do immigrant women, as wives, mothers and daughters-in-law, react to the legislation, and how do they interpret their relationship with the state and its agents? By raising these fundamental questions, this paper is in line with Faist in the view that citizenship legislation provides legal tools for the host state to pursue the dual goals of exclusion and assimilation. Although European experiences seem to delink citizenship with the nation-state, and put a question mark on arguing that accommodating immigrants is a self-conscious and deliberate choice, Taiwan’s accommodation of settlement-seeking immigrant women rekindles the validity of this line of investigation. The evolution of Taiwan’s citizenship legislation defies the assertion that not all regulatory schemes are created with the accommodation of immigrants in mind. The real challenge is using the means with which to realise the intention of regulating the accommodation in a specific way. This paper illuminates the dilemma that, in spite of the undesirability, it is imperative for the host state to formulate an assimilation scheme with which to safeguard its self-identity as an advanced homogenous and prosperous civilisation.

Research methods: in-depth interview, participant observation

Considering that the differentiated citizenship legislation governing Chinese immigration is epistemologically inseparable from the Taiwan-China antagonism context, this paper does not cover Chinese migration but exclusively focuses on the lived experiences of Filipino and Vietnamese women. A major reason for this comparison is to highlight the impact of ethnicity in terms of language on the interaction between the state and the immigrants. In their distinctive linguistic endowment, Filipino women distinguish themselves from the locals by their English-speaking ability, whereas Vietnamese women are known in public discourse for their facility in the Chinese language. This contrast has rich ethnic implications in their interaction with the Chinese-speaking host nation (see below).

Aiming to present qualitative findings rather than seeking quantitative representativeness, this paper is grounded in the results of in-depth interviews, participant observations and analysis of official documents. Through personal
referral by matchmakers, teachers, in-laws, neighbours, church clergy, civil servants, and a foreign missionary, there was a total of 13 Filipino and 26 Vietnamese women participating in this research during March to June 2009 and January 2010 (see Table 1 and Table 2 for their personal backgrounds). Taking into account the urban-rural divide, interviewees were recruited in urban Taipei and Tainan, as well as at seaside fishing villages on the northeast coast and agricultural villages in central and southern Taiwan. To understand how Chinese language class is composed and delivered, participant observation was conducted on 23 sessions at evening Chinese language classes at primary schools in Taipei and Kaoshiung. Except for one class in Taipei which included one Japanese man and two Filipino Chinese men, all classes were participated in by Southeast Asian women, some of whom also brought their children to the class. Lasting from one to two hours, the majority of the interviews were audio-recorded one-to-one meetings, plus five group interviews (numbers of participants ranging from two to four). For the interviewees’ comfort and convenience, meetings took place in their homes, and at Chinese language classes, workplaces, restaurants, and church. Some interviewees were accompanied by their children and husbands at home-based interviews. Two Taiwanese husbands had wife-beating records, which prompted their Filipino wives to seek divorce or return to the Philippines. At their request, interviews were conducted in English with the Filipino women, although they mixed words and phrases fluently in Mandarin and the Taiwanese dialect. Mandarin was used for interviewing Vietnamese women. All of the interviewees (including their husbands) were given pseudonyms for the purpose of protecting their privacy and delineating the research findings. Owing to my inability to speak Tagalog, Visaya (spoken in Cebu), and Vietnamese languages, and lacking funding for interpretation, apart from English, Mandarin was the only language of communication available with which to facilitate the interviews. Conversing in a foreign language no doubt affects the depth and quantity of the interviewees’ narration. This is an acknowledged restriction on the fieldwork findings. Another group of primary source materials are government policy papers, research reports, press releases, and the legislative initiatives compiled in the

<table>
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<th>Status</th>
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Notes: all date are collected in 2009 and 2010. Yr/age ¼ years of residency in Taiwan/interviewees’ ages; MS ¼ marriage status; M ¼ married; D ¼ divorced; W ¼ widowed; No. of C ¼ number of children; HCMC ¼ Ho Chi Minh City; C ¼ citizen; R ¼ resident; PR ¼ Permanent Resident; PS ¼ primary school; JHS ¼ junior high school; SHS ¼ senior high school.
Legislative Yuan Gazette. They are the pointers of the intentions and policy goals behind the law-making procedures.

Citizenship legislation: disciplining the wife and making her a capable mother for the nation

Citizenship is internally inclusive and externally exclusive. It is inclusive because it is the legal status that transforms immigrant outsiders to become members of the national community. Paradoxically, this inclusion is achieved via filtering the people, or the characteristics of the people, that are deemed as incompatible with the self-identity of the host nation. This filtering mechanism is found in citizenship legislation that scrutinises immigrants’ requests for inclusion and assimilates them to become like us. Out of political and security concerns, Taiwan was largely isolated from international migration during the Cold War era and was mainly an emigrant society. As a result, the state was relatively inexperienced in homing foreigners who aimed to settle permanently. In the legal system, there was no migration legislation per se but laws and administrative decrees for border control. By reforming this

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**Table 2. Personal background of Vietnamese interviewees.**

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border control regime into the Immigration Act (henceforth TIA) in 1999 and amending the Nationality Act (henceforth TNA) in 2000, citizenship legislation—a set of laws and regulations governing citizenship conferment and authorising citizenship rights—was brought into being. The legislation was gradually reshaped in the past decade in order to carry out the dual exclusion-assimilation scheme. Preoccupied with the runaway scenario, the legislation is gendered in order to discipline immigrant women into becoming chaste wives. Feared for the potential strain on public finances inflicted by immigrant paupers, a class bias is written into the law by the requirement of proving financial adequacy. Haunted by the imagined population quality slump and hence threatened prosperity, the intertwined gender-ethnicity bias is embodied by the requirement of proving Chinese language proficiency so that immigrant women can become our mothers and their reproduction and motherhood can be in good service for the host nation. The nationalistic demand of full loyalty is realised by the prerequisite of renouncing the previous nationality.

Before moving on to the next section, however, it is necessary to point out that the Immigration Act and the Nationality Act are written in a gender-neutral language that applies to foreign wives as well as foreign husbands with the spouse status. Nevertheless, government documents show that, to a large extent, legal provisions are tailored for ‘troubleshooting’ of issues generated by the feminised marriage migration. Therefore, this paper replaces the gender-neutral term ‘foreign spouses’ with ‘immigrant women’ to sharpen the intertwined biases.

*Disciplining immigrant women to become chaste wives*

The first step of gendering the legislation is to make immigrant women’s residency in Taiwan entirely premised on marriage (Art. 23, TIA). To prevent marriage from being abused for illegal employment or human trafficking, the Immigration Act stipulates that if the marriage is *factually* proven to be fraudulent, the residency permit shall be withdrawn (Art. 24, TIA). The authenticity of a marriage is investigated via a formal interview when an immigrant woman applies for her entry visa or renewing her residency permit (Art. 65, TIA). As all foreign residents are required to register their residential address with the government (Art. 31, TIA), and immigrant wives are most likely to be registered at their husband’s residential address, whether an immigrant wife resides at the said address or not is taken as an indication of the authenticity of her marriage. The dissolution of a marriage (divorce or husband’s death) also leads to the withdrawal of a residency permit, followed by deportation (Art. 31, TIA). Nevertheless, exceptions premised on motherhood are available. An immigrant woman is allowed to stay if she meets the following conditions: (1) She suffers physical or mental abuse from her husband, and has been issued with a court protection order; (2) She has won the custody of her child(ren) upon divorce; (3) Her divorce is the result of domestic abuse and she has juvenile child(ren) who have household registration (read: legitimately born in wedlock); (4) Her departure poses a ‘grave and irreversible’ damage to her children (Art. 31, TIA). Should immigrant women wish to secure an unconditional domicile, they may either apply for Permanent Residency (PR) or citizenship rendered by naturalisation. As naturalisation is an indispensable stage leading to citizenship, it legitimises the state’s scrutiny of the qualification of the candidate. Legal tools for this scrutiny are rendered by the Nationality Act, in which a set of prerequisites for naturalisation
eligibility is erected. They include, amongst others, financial adequacy, assimilation, and a singular loyalty to Taiwan (Art. 3 and 9, TNA). Not only do they reflect the inbuilt biases of gender, class and ethnicity, the demand of receiving a singular loyalty manifests the nationalistic underpinning of this legal transition from being an outsider to a citizen.

Relieving the burden of accommodating poor immigrants

The requirement of proving financial adequacy (Art. 3, TNA) demonstrates the class bias towards immigrant women. They are seen as economically unproductive and dependent because of their presumed lower level of education and their childrearing responsibility. To prevent them from becoming a burden on the public finances, in 2004 this requirement was translated into a specific amount of incomes or savings (Art. 7, the Enforcement Rules of the Nationality Act, henceforth the TNA Enforcement Rules). This requirement was strongly criticised for ignoring the living conditions of transnational couples and setting a price on citizenship. In late 2008, the amount-specific regulation was dropped. Instead, any documentation of personal finance was interpreted as proof for financial adequacy. In addition, the property of the husband and parents-in-law was also included as proof (Art. 7, the TNA Enforcement Rules). Although this reduces the immediate financial pressure on immigrant women, it also means that the responsibility of supporting immigrant women is partly shifted to husbands and in-laws and strengthens the household as an economic unit.

Assimilating the ethnic others and making them capable mothers

Requiring the inferior ethnic others to adopt the Chinese language is one of the handy means for assimilation, whereby the homogeneity and cohesion of the national culture can be safeguarded. To a Chinese-speaking nation, the otherness of Southeast Asian women is epitomised by their inability in the Chinese language. Compounded by racialised classism, the otherness of poor Southeast Asians is seen as their inferiority. This, as well as their presumed lower level of education, is flagged up as the root of the questionable quality of their motherhood. Therefore, proficiency in the Chinese language is also underlined as the remedy to improve their mothering capability such that Taiwan’s economic ‘miracle’ can last. From 2005 onwards, it became a legal prerequisite that naturalisation applicants were required to present proof of their Chinese language ability or knowledge of the local way of life (Art. 3, TNA; Art.8, the TNA Enforcement Rules). Although this regulation is universally applied to all naturalisation applicants, the government expressly stated in the draft bill that this requirement was directed at Southeast Asian women – it was meant to enhance the ability of immigrant mothers to care for and educate their children.

Renouncing the previous nationality: submitting a singular loyalty

The last requirement examined by this paper is the requirement of renouncing the previous nationality (Art. 9, TNA). This is the host state’s demand imposed on immigrant outsiders to formally submit their singular and exclusive loyalty. There used to be a belief that citizenship of a nation-state and political loyalty to that state
should be congruent. However, as an example of ‘internal globalisation’, the recent recognition of the transnational ties of immigrants has gradually brought about the acceptance of dual citizenship in some European countries.\textsuperscript{46} As a contrast, this requirement signifies Taiwan’s nationalistic yearning. Although the requirement of renunciation universally applies to all applicants, when it applies to immigrant wives, it is a reinstatement of a woman’s ‘dependent nationality’.\textsuperscript{47} That is, ‘the status of the husband governs that of the wife’.\textsuperscript{48} To maintain the ‘unity of the family’, a woman adopts her husband’s nationality so as to ensure that there is no legal conflict and insecurity within the family. The ‘unity of family’ thus paves the foundation for the unity of the nation, as patriarchal ideology holds that a woman who marries a foreign husband has chosen to leave her national group and becomes a member of her husband’s national group. The deprivation of immigrant wives’ previous nationality therefore safeguards the integrity of her husband’s nation, and this gendered nationalistic yearning is seen as a natural and necessary consequence of her marriage.\textsuperscript{49}

The final gate-keeping: gendering the household registration application

However, an unusual element of Taiwan’s citizenship legislation is that citizenship is not automatically awarded upon naturalisation. The last stage is to obtain permission for permanent domicile, technically known as obtaining household registration (Art.10, TIA). It has been argued that household registration is the gateway to the substantive rights conferred on citizens.\textsuperscript{50} It is yet to be stressed that this gate-keeping is once again gendered in nature and premised on the authenticity of marriage and motherhood. That is, if the marriage of a naturalised foreign wife comes to an end, the government has the power to cancel her residency permit (Art. 11, TIA). If her marriage is proven to be fraudulent, her application for household registration will be denied. If she encounters divorce or the death of her husband, she may apply on the spouse status if she meets the following conditions: (1) She has juvenile child(ren) born of this marriage; (2) She is capable of exercising guardianship for the children (Art. 10, TIA).\textsuperscript{51} The rationale for these exceptions, shown in a government press release that specifically referred to immigrant women, is that divorced or widowed women who are responsible for the wellbeing of their children have performed motherhood duties well, and their performance shows their ‘sincerity’ in seeking integration into the host nation.\textsuperscript{52} In other words, permission to be naturalised on the spouse status is a reward for her qualified motherhood performance.

The above analysis demonstrates how the legislation is biased by gender, ethnicity and class. Being inferior ethnic others with imposed sexual implication, immigrant wives are tied into the runaway scenario. The state’s anxieties towards runaways are enacted by its agents, including (male and female) consular and immigration officers and the police force. The former imagine themselves undertaking a ‘mission’ to prevent the ‘contamination’ or degradation of the nation.\textsuperscript{53} At visa application interviews, they confronted Vietnamese women with condescending questions or comments, such as ‘Vietnamese women are afraid of being maltreated. You Vietnamese run away. Why do you still want to go [to Taiwan]?, or ‘Taiwanese husbands turned out to be poor, so Vietnamese women ran away back to Vietnam’. They lectured Taiwanese husbands on remittance issues: ‘A regular monthly allowance to your wife is reasonable. The promise should be kept so that she won’t
want to work [outside of the home]. Less contact with the outside world means less exposure to fellow immigrants’ competition of larger remittance or the malicious influences which dupe them into sex work. They also preached to Taiwanese husbands on eugenic matters regarding when an immigrant wife should be pregnant (interviews with Nguyen Minh Nguyet, 29 March 2009, Chinshan; Ho Huyen Anh, 28 January 2010, Pingtung; Tran Phuong Thao, 9 April 2009, Hsinhe; La Ngoc Thu, 26 March 2009, Taipei; Wu Chi-kuang, 29 January 2010, Pingtung). As for the police force, their differentiated behaviours towards English-speaking white Westerners and Southeast Asian migrants falls within the above-mentioned concepts of positive racism and racialised classism. That is, police officers appear humble and courteous towards white Westerners, but become rude and impatient with the demeanour of scornful colonial masters towards Southeast Asian migrants.\(^{54}\)

To sum up, the citizenship legislation, as well as the state’s agents, are biased by gender, ethnicity and class in order to discipline and assimilate immigrant women who are deemed incompatible with the modern, prosperous and homogenous Taiwan. Only when immigrant women are modulated to become chaste wives, capable mothers and loyal citizens are they accepted by the host nation. After analysing the legislation from a top-down perspective, this paper now turns to present from a bottom-up viewpoint as to how Filipino and Vietnamese immigrants respond to the scheme in their lived experiences as wives, mothers and citizens.

Challenging the boundary by everyday experiences

**Chastity: a shared interest between the husband and the state**

As discussed above, an immigrant wife’s right to reside in Taiwan is subject to the investigation of the authenticity of her marriage. However, the biased agents of state may not adhere to their mandated power. This is what was encountered by Ellie – when her marriage was threatened by her husband’s affair, the local police force failed to execute their power to protect her marriage. This very inaction endangered her right to reside in Taiwan. Although Ellie and her husband were constantly short of money, her husband had an affair with a Taiwanese woman, who later moved into their crumbling house. Ellie was subject to the pair’s physical abuse. Ellie’s Filipino friends had faith in the police and encouraged her to report the case. Reacting to Ellie’s tip-off, in the middle of the night, police officers came and caught her husband and his Taiwanese mistress sleeping together. Nevertheless, the police dissuaded Ellie from bringing the case to court because they had no ‘photo evidence of the accused adultery’ and she ‘couldn’t afford the cost of a law suit, anyway’.\(^{55}\) During our conversation, Ellie asked why she deserved such injustice, and the straightforward answer she gave to me was ‘because I was a poor Filipino woman’. That is, she was aware that being Filipino nearly equally being poor, and both were the source of the discrimination that she endured. This episode reveals that there is a double standard embedded within the legislation. That is, the state holds the immigrant wife unilaterally accountable for sustaining the marriage, but relieves the responsibility of the husband citizen to maintain the marriage. The chastity of immigrant women thus becomes a shared interest between the state and the husband. A legal tool to protect this interest, or to prevent runaways, is to monitor whether immigrant wives reside at their husbands’ address.\(^{56}\) This is exactly how Chung Min-he, Ngo Thi Cuc’s husband, understood the necessity of actively informing the government the whereabouts of immigrant wives, because ‘I know absolutely my wife will not run."
away, but people may have doubts about what exactly the wives are up to’ (9 April 2009, Taichung).

Unaffordable citizenship
Suffering from her husband’s affair and the injustice on the part of Taiwan’s police force, Ellie considered returning to the Philippines with her teenage son. But she was persuaded by her Filipino friends that she should stay in Taiwan for her son’s wellbeing. Citizenship would secure her residency in Taiwan. However, having a poorly-paid and irregular job at a piggery, and being unaware of the abolishment of amount-specific earning requirement, Ellie’s understanding of citizenship eligibility was: ‘If you want to have [it], you must earn money’ (29 January 2010, Pingtung). Without a steady income, she was disqualified for citizenship eligibility under the previous legislation. For her, the financial requirements made citizenship an unaffordable status. Ellie’s experiences illustrate the limbo created by the demand of financial sufficiency on immigrant women’s personal wellbeing and family life.

Preventing ‘runaway’: maintaining the boundary inside the private home
As mentioned above, the collaborative efforts between the state and husbands/in-laws of preventing ‘runaway’ may lead to deprivation of waged employment outside of the home. Hoa’ng Minh Suong pointed out that Vietnamese women who were not allowed to work outside of the home might end up ‘cooking and attending to children of the extended family for many years’ (2 June 2009, Chinsilan). At the same time, their Taiwanese sisters-in-law had waged employment and enjoyed virtually free childcare. The boundary between us and them is thus erected right inside the home – modernised Taiwanese women pursue waged employment in the labour market, whereas immigrant women are confined to homemaking. More importantly, this boundary is purposefully maintained by the in-laws in order to reap their free labour. Behind this boundary, the role of immigrant women as wives, mothers and carers are blended into one for their unpaid reproductive labour.

Chinese-speaking: practising ethnic nationalism at home
Embedded in the requirement of Chinese language proficiency is the nationalistic drive of assimilation. Immigrant women are regarded as the instrument for transmitting the national culture and ensuring homogeneity because of their motherhood duties. The lived experiences of Filipino and Vietnamese women reveal that the pressure of assimilation does not only come from the state but is also generated from their in-laws within the family. Enacting a patriarchal ideology, Taiwanese parents-in-law tend to see immigrant women’s children as exclusively Taiwanese, and their immigrant daughters-in-law are expected to raise the Taiwanese grandchildren in a way that conforms to local norms. Demanding they speak Chinese and discouraging them from speaking their own languages is a way to ensure such conformity. In this sense, ethnic nationalism is practised at a grassroots level and realised in the private family domain. Assimilation by linguistic adaptation for the sake of childrearing thus becomes a shared interest between the in-laws and the state.
If assimilation is achieved in this way, it negates the mother-child intimacy and restricts the transmission of immigrant mothers’ cultures to their children. To adapt to the local linguistic environment, Filipino interviewees developed a linguistic division of labour. At home, they preferred to speak English (as well as Tagalog) to their children and husband (the children mostly replying in Mandarin); outside of the home, they spoke Mandarin or Taiwanese to members of the general public. In contrast, Vietnamese interviewees on the whole achieved a higher proficiency in the Chinese language. Ho Minh Mai’s husband argued that this was out of necessity, as there was no other alternative for Vietnamese wives to communicate with the locals. However, for Filipino women, speaking English is not only for practical communication but also to assert their self-identity. As Andrea pointed out, ‘In the Philippines there are also people who can’t speak English because they didn’t go to school’ (27 January 2010, Pingtung). Associated with modernity in the Philippines, English-speaking marks the boundary between the educated and the uneducated, and in Taiwan it remains such a boundary marker for them. However, although the public sphere people of Taiwan associates English-speaking with competitiveness, English-speaking in the private home was not appreciated by Taiwanese in-laws for the fear of being excluded or bad-mouthed. The rejection of the Vietnamese language for the same reason is also experienced by Vietnamese immigrants. The rejection of immigrant women’s languages takes a high toll on the mother-child intimacy, which is vividly conveyed by Pham Thi Phuong. Trying to calm her crying baby son, Phuong wished to sing a nursery rhyme but she did not know any in Chinese. She could not sing a Vietnamese rhyme either, because her in-laws had discouraged her from speaking Vietnamese. Deprived of the spontaneous emotive expression and the autonomy of singing soothing and comforting rhymes, Phuong was muted and could do nothing except cradle her son in her arms.

Children attending school is the point where the pressure of assimilation further diminishes the mother-child intimacy. Bounded by the gender norms, immigrant mothers are responsible for looking after the academic performance of their children and are required to communicate with the school. Mostly lacking Chinese reading comprehension, immigrant mothers signed their children’s communication logbooks without sufficiently understanding the content. Thus, Annabelle told her daughter that she had to ‘look after herself’ because her mother was unable to help. Even when Annabelle’s cultural heritage was the subject of her daughter’s schoolwork, her frustration at being unable to help was ironically deepened. Constrained by her Chinese language ability, Annabelle could not explain in Chinese to her daughter her own cultural inheritance. The frustration of performing motherhood in a foreign language is well explained by Nguyen Thi Minh Thu, a multi-lingual speaker who used to be a high school teacher in Vietnam and who was studying for a postgraduate degree in Taiwan:

Taiwan has paid a high price for the social issues brought by us. Our children will affect Taiwan’s national competitiveness. This isn’t because my children are born to be inferior, it’s because I wasn’t educated here and I couldn’t give them the same help as a local mother can. When my son was in pre-school his teacher asked to see me. I was very sensitive, and I asked my husband whether other parents were going to be interviewed. It turned out it was only me because the school thought they needed to help a ‘disadvantaged’ family. I asked myself: ‘Am I really so helpless?’ A Vietnamese sister (friend) told me she didn’t supervise her son’s homework because her son said, ‘You don’t know the answers, auntie knows the answers’. Her son gave all of the photos taken at school to his aunt and his aunt went to his school for parents’ meetings. My Vietnamese sister cried
and care for their children. In other words, their belonging is perceived as formalising their commitment to patrilocality. Renouncing the original nationality is thus conceptualised as a war of belonging. Confronted with the tangled issue of assimilation and motherhood, Hồ Minh Mai, another interviewee who had pursued postgraduate studies in Taiwan, adopted a linguistic division similar to Filipino mothers’ practices, but her strategy was pronounced in her strong advocacy of normative multiculturalism. That is, she respects the mainstream Taiwanese culture as a member of the society; at the same time, she calls for the society to respect her right of maintaining her Vietnamese culture and identity. Translating this into linguistic practices, she articulated that as a member of Taiwanese society, she and other Vietnamese women ought to speak Chinese in public. However, as mothers, they have the right to speak the Vietnamese language to their children, and this right should be respected. For her, it is not an assimilation issue that Vietnamese immigrants are expected to speak local languages in public. Instead, it is an issue of necessity for communication, acculturation and employment, which may positively contribute to their self-achievement. It becomes an assimilation pressure when it intrudes upon the private domain of mother-child intimacy and denies the room for cultural transmission from immigrant mothers to her mixed-heritage children. In this sense, speaking Vietnamese to her children is a right for herself, as well as for her children, so that their Vietnamese inheritance can be preserved within her family. For her, only when such multicultural practice is realised can Taiwan be counted as a civilised state that respects the different cultural of the immigrants.

Citizenship: a tug-of-war of belonging

As discussed above, requiring an immigrant woman to renounce her original nationality in exchange for citizenship is the manifestation of the host state’s nationalistic demand of a singular and exclusive loyalty. On top of the assimilation stemming from linguistic adaptation, this assures the cohesion of the host nation and guarantees the congruence of the membership of the national community and political polity. However, immigrant women’s experiences of living a transnational life testify that the patriarchal value embedded in the principle of ‘unity of family’ overlooks their other roles and duties.

The requirement of residing at their husband’s address is a legal enforcement of the gender norms of patrilocality; that is, women live with husbands after marriage. Ironically, when patrilocality is practised across the state border, it facilitates marriage migration and makes the two inseparable from each other. Internalising patrilocality, immigrant women see these norms as their wifely duties. In this light, applying for citizenship is perceived as formalising their commitment to patrilocality and care for their children. In other words, their belonging is mediated by their gendered duties. Renouncing the original nationality is thus conceptualised as a private act between the wife and her husband, and between a mother and her children. In the meantime, immigrant women are also transnational daughters to their parents and their caring duties are maintained through transnational ties, partly
because achieving betterment for parents is a strong motivation for marriage migration. Simultaneously fulfilling the duties of wife, mother and daughter creates a tug-of-war situation. At one end, are their wifely and motherly duties towards their husband and children in Taiwan. At the opposite end, are their daughterly duties towards their parents in Vietnam or the Philippines. In this tug-of-war, Taiwan and the natal country are conceptualised as the places resided by the real flesh-and-blood human beings whose well-being and interests they care about. This conflicting sense of belonging that is derived from the conflicting roles and duties is exemplified by Pham Thi Phuong’s self-positioning between Vietnam and Taiwan:

My family over there won’t be with me forever. I belong to here since I marry to here. Vietnam is where my mum and dad live. I’ll live here (Taiwan) forever after having a child. Had I not had a child, it might not be the case… I’m feeling very sad. Vietnam is where I was born and where my parents brought me up. I did it (renunciation) for my son. I could live here without citizenship, but I did it for him. (21 March 2009, Nantou)

Phuong’s narratives visualise the tug-of-war situation whereby immigrant women reprioritise their motherly duties over daughterly duties. Fulfilling the expected motherhood duties is the fundamental driver for seeking citizenship. Knop points out that national identity is relational and an individual’s attachment to the nation is affected by or mediated through real ties with real human beings including parents, children, spouses and loved ones. Immigrant women’s tug-of-war experiences show that while they may appear subjected to the state’s patriarchal demand of singular and exclusive loyalty, they internalise the gender norms of patriarchy and motherhood as the key constituents of their sense of belonging. Their transnational ties and the challenge of fulfilment of their duties illuminate that it is an illusion to conceptualise national belonging as a lineal and exclusive attachment between atomised individuals and the collectivity. On the contrary, the sense of national belonging is tangibly substantiated by relationships with real human beings such as family members rather than by imagined link with unknown and faceless members of the general public.

Conclusion
Grounded on immigrant women’s lived experiences, this paper underlines the inbuilt dilemma of Taiwan’s citizenship legislation for pursuing exclusion and assimilation at the same time. The analysis of the citizenship legislation demonstrates that the state’s scrutiny – excluding the undesirable and reshaping the incompatible of immigrant women – is a political process driven by ethnic nationalism, which is derived from essentialising the difference by gender, ethnicity and class. This essentialised difference is a boundary between people of Taiwan and immigrant women from outside. Behind the boundary (conceptually overlapped with the state border), Taiwan asserts its self-identity as a modern, civilised, prosperous and homogeneous nation. Pushed to the opposite side of the boundary of modernity, prosperity and culture of Taiwan, immigrant women from Southeast Asia are othered by their undesired poverty and backwardness, and, under the spell of racialised classism, this otherness is defined as inferiority. Yuval-Davis and Anthias have argued elsewhere that women are ethnic boundary markers. This paper shows that this boundary is particularly embodied by the contrast between the autonomous Taiwanese women and submissive
immigrant women. This contrast and the mind-set of treating Taiwan’s superiority as self-evident makes the exclusion-assimilation scheme an enterprise of banal nationalism.64

However, the imagined crisis of being inundated by undesired immigration and the sense of pressing urgency of reining in this inundation breathes life into banality. The self-evident superiority is spelled out behind the legal provisions to maintain the boundary. Unlike European experiences whereby citizenship may be delinked with the nation-state, the citizenship legislation of Taiwan is purposefully designed to cope with essentialised difference. Authorised by law to authenticate immigrants’ marriages, verify their residential addresses, ensure their financial independence, require them to speak Chinese, and finally demand them to submit full loyalty, the state aims to ensure conformity and safeguard homogeneity. This is particularly evident in utilising immigrant women’s motherhood as an instrument for maintaining homogeneity and prosperity.

Immigrant women’s lived experiences show that exclusion and assimilation stemmed from banal nationalism is not just an operation of symbolic politics but is also enmeshed with their everyday life. Gender, ethnic and class biases embedded within banal nationalism are felt in their migration process—from the point of being interviewed for entry clearance to the stage of acquiring eligibility for naturalisation and citizenship. Immigrant women’s narratives reveal the double standard of the patriarchal state for their unilateral responsibility of maintaining marriage. The class-biased preconditions of financial independence impedes their fulfilment of motherhood duties. The runaway paranoid attitude confines them to be homemakers rather than breadwinners. The pressure of assimilation constrains the mother-child intimacy and impedes immigrant mothers passing down their cultural inheritance. However, some immigrant women raised a demand for practicing multiculturalism in the use of language. Unlike Nguyen Thi Minh Thu, who did not question the ‘motherhood as instrument’ discourse, Ho Minh Mai defends the right to speak own language between immigrant mothers and their mixed-ethnicity children. At the same time, she identifies the positive utility of acquiring Chinese language ability for integration and employability. In these everyday aspects of the private domain, not only does the state (as well as its agents) enact elements of banal nationalism, but the husband and in-laws also have shared interests with the state. Ethnic nationalism practised at a grassroots level as such further proves the banality of the overwhelming nationalistic mentality.

As stated at the beginning of this paper, it is not just an analogy but a legal matter in that immigrant women’s citizenship is conferred by marriage and reproduction. As outsiders, their link with the host state is not an imagined marriage or family relationship, as a primordialist approach would allude to with regards to the emergence of a nation. It is through marriage and motherhood that marriage immigrant women establish a link with the real flesh-and-blood people of the host nation. It is also through the link with real human beings that their transnational ties with the home nation are sustained. Transnationalism has been postulated as a contender to the exclusiveness of the nation-state and an advocate for dual citizenship. Immigrant women’s reflection upon their tug-of-war situation for renouncing the previous nationality is a case in point to illuminate the fallacy of reducing national identity to an imagined link between atomised individuals with an abstract collective entity.

By examining the interaction between the host state and immigrant women in the case of citizenship legislation, this paper delineates Taiwan’s self-projection in
opposition to its appropriation of immigrant women. Given that Taiwan, South Korea and Japan receive similar streams of female marriage migration from Southeast Asian countries, and they share common features in their citizenship legislation, the findings of this paper can be foundation for a further regional comparison.

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Notes
3. Two thirds of the immigrant wives (272,670) are from Mainland China, whereas the other third are from Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia, numbering 83,999, 26,551, 6,468, 5,561 and 4,303 respectively. The official statistics of Chinese migration began in 1987. From then to 2010, a total of 285,158 Mainland Chinese men and women who are spouses of local citizens resided in Taiwan. The great majority of them (95.6%) are women, and 30% of these Chinese wives (84,205) have acquired citizenship, in contrast to the small number of 1,859 Chinese husbands who acquired citizenship. See MoI, “Acquirement of ROC Nationality by Cause”; NIA, “Numbers of Foreign Spouses and Mainland Spouses.”
6. NICT, Understanding Taiwan, 19–21.
8. Lan, “They Have Money.”
14. US Department of State, 2005 Country Reports.
15. MOFA, “Preventing Transnational Human Trafficking.”
16. Fan, “A Study of Reproduction”. Two most infamous examples of politicians’ racist slurs of immigrant women’s reproduction are an education official openly calling on immigrant women to refrain from ‘producing too many babies’ (China Times, July 13, 2006), and a lawmaker claiming that Vietnamese women carry residues of Agent Orange and are ‘prone to give birth to deformed infants’, thus they should be denied birth allowances (Broadcasting Corporation of China News, March 31, 2006; United Daily News, April 1, 2006).


19. Wang, “From ‘Farming Daughters’ to ‘Virgin Brides’.”


23. Piper, “International Marriage in Japan.”

24. Hsia, “Prospects and Impasse of Multicultural Citizenship”; Chao, “Household Registration.”


27. Friedman, “Marital Immigration and Graduated Citizenship.”

28. Chao, “Imagined Modernities”; “Household Registration.”


31. Tseng and Komiya, Classism, 100.

32. Lan, “Migrant Women’s Bodies as Boundary Markers,” 643, 851.


34. Ito, “Crafting Migrant Women’s Citizenship”; Be’langer et al., “Ethnic Diversity and Statistics in East Asia.”


36. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship; Sassen, Losing Control; Yuval-Davis, “Belonging and the Politics of Belonging”; Freeman, “Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies.”

37. Freeman, “Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies.”

38. Cheng, “The Becoming of Immigrants.”

39. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, 21

40. Selya, Development and Demographic Change, 308; Tseng, “Beyond ‘Little Taipei’.”

41. It was either a monthly salary that was twice as high as the official minimum wage, or yearly savings that were 24 times the official minimum wage.


43. Such proof can be obtained by two different means. One is to attend publicly-funded language/orientation courses or to enrol at any formal educational institution. The other is to pass the Test of Basic Language Abilities and Knowledge of Rights and Duties of Naturalised Citizens. The latter is similar to the integration test required of foreign spouses of Dutch nationals and the Life in the UK and English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) tests required of applicants for permanent residency and naturalisation in the UK (de Hart, “The Unity of the Family?” 196; Home Office, Life in the United Kingdom).

44. EY, A Draft Bill of Some Amendments.

45. In fact, there exists a double standard within the Nationality Act, which implicitly tolerates home born citizens acquiring other nationalities (Tseng, An Analysis of the Immigration Act, 31; CY, An Investigation Report). Politicians included, some ROC citizens pursued a second nationality for multiple purposes: a safety valve against the possibility of war between Taiwan and China, a convenience to facilitate business travel around the world, as access to social welfare of other countries, and a chance of having a better life and a higher quality of education for their children (Tseng, “The Mobility of
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