UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES and SOCIAL SCIENCES

INSTITUTE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE

ADAPTING TO A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: TURKEY’S BORDER SECURITY

by

Mustafa ALTINPINAR

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Supervisor

Dr Adrian JAMES

2016
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Turkey’s Border Security

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Mustafa ALTINPINAR

2016
Dedicated to my lovely children Mert and Elif; and my wife Sule.
Declaration of Authorship

I, Mustafa Altinpinar, declare that whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award.
Preface

I wish to start by thanking to the Turkish Nation and the Interior Ministry for their support not just for this project but the support I received throughout my education life. This project would not have come true without the financial support of my nation and the ministry.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Adrian James, whose encouragement and enthusiasm for the project has been absolutely essential for the completion of this thesis. I am grateful for his support, help and patience as my supervisor, and it will never be forgotten. I would like to thank Mrs. Melody James for her review and valuable comments.

I would also like to thank all my colleagues and fellow PhD students at Portsmouth and Southampton Universities, for their advice and sharing the experiences and stresses of PhD life.

Finally, I would like to thank my mother, father and brothers for their support and encouragement. Above all, however, I would like to thank my wife Sule and my lovely children Elif and Mert, who, perhaps more than anyone, need to be thanked for having remarkable ‘endurance’ and their courage to move and live in a different country. It is no understatement to say that without them, this PhD thesis would simply not have been written or completed.
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List of Abbreviations

AP: Accession Partnership Strategy
DAESH: Dawlat al Islamiyah f'al-Iraq w Belaad al- Sham
ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity
ETTIS: European Security Trends and Threats in Society
EU: European Union
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
MAZLUMDER: Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPAA: National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis
NSC: National Security Council
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK: Kurdistan Worker's Party
PYD: Democratic Union Party
SAREM: Strategic Research and Study Centre
TUSIAD: Turkish Industry & Business Association
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
TSK: Turkish Military
Abstract
The security literature has witnessed growing attempts to re-conceptualize security outside of the traditional concern with interstate military conflict. However, the existing literature offers only limited explanations of this tendency and only focusses on new challenges and largely neglects to rethink how the new border security issues are actually governed in practice. These endeavours have brought about the need to re-conceptualise border security which was once taken as ‘a sub-set of national security’, an isolated phenomenon. The research was carried out from an interpretive perspective and used qualitative methods - including semi-structured interviews with a range of key actors in this context in Turkey and a case study conducted in Turkey’s capital Ankara and in Kilis, a province at Turkey’s Syrian border - to collect the research data. The data were analysed thematically using sector standard software. The research found that Turkey’s compartmental and archaic national security architecture and the national security approach built around it, currently pose the main threat to the state and society as the organizations and practices of security were shaped by the particular geopolitical and technical requirements of the Cold War. The need for transformation emerges as an outcome of conflicts between the key actors (state and society) and the resistance to each other’s claims for control. There is a compelling case for the reconceptualization of border security as a comprehensive approach that leads all the relevant public and private capabilities, organises all departments, transforms national security understanding and shapes the future security architecture; not simply as the discursive identification of new threats. The research also found that the most salient feature of the politics of a non-traditional border security concept lies in the willingness of the state to challenge the conception that security issues can be resolved only at the national level. It is recognised that would be an explicitly political act that has the potential to transform traditional understandings of state-hood.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Turkey faces myriad security threats, however, it lacks a clear and coherent view of the nature and priority of risks. Arguably, its compartmental and archaic national security architecture and the national security approach built around it pose the main threat to the state and society. The national security architecture is flawed in its design. It has remained structured around functions and services with separate budgets for defence, foreign affairs, intelligence and police. The departments that make up the security architecture have changed very little despite the end of the Cold War and the dramatic increase in terrorist attacks in Turkey.

With border security as its primary focus, this thesis underlines how old notions of national security produces today’s inefficiencies. It suggests that border security is not only a matter for the state and not just a subset of national security. On the contrary, border security should be understood as a comprehensive approach that leads all the relevant public and private capabilities, and organises all departments. The solutions to security problems are to be found in societies. The old notion of security may have suited the Cold War environment when Turkey faced predictable threats to its national survival directly from other countries’ armies. However, today’s complex and uncertain security environment demands a fundamental review of security perspective and its framework. Despite the resurgence of state-based threats; and intensifying wider state competition, the common, unifying, external threat of Soviet aggression has been replaced by the emergence of more powerful non-state actors engaged in terrorism, illegal immigration, trafficking and organised crime. They are dangers that are present, but not clear. They are unbounded in time, scope and resources. Above all, they are unpredictable.
Turkey is now faced with a set of security problems it cannot resolve. It could be argued that it has not learned enough from learning from the escalating incidents and deaths of the last three decades. In order to respond to the new security environment, Turkey’s security architecture must adapt, not just in terms of processes and structures but in the culture and politics of the ministers and civil servants who oversee and direct it.

Following dramatic increases in terrorist activities since June 2015 the President, the Prime Minister and other ministers have routinely asserted that “the government will not allow vandals to take over streets and disturb public order and security of the people”\(^1\). Despite some of the hopeful signs of a radical assessment and endeavours for a review of the current security system\(^2\), the state largely has missed a crucial opportunity to challenge the current assumptions about the meaning of defence and security in the very complex security environment of the post-Cold War era. The root of the problem lies in the framing of the review process. Reviewing the entire legal framework on the conduct of public demonstrations cannot be a solution. A priori, there is little evidence that the increase in legislation has made no real impact on security as there has been a shortage of effective security structure and effective administrators to run the services.

The key question underpinning the review process should be how to modify current popular conceptions of security. This research argues that a radical review of collective thinking about national security policy and practice should be underpinned by a focus on the security needs of the Turkish people; not on the state’s territorial security - a ‘human-centric’

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rather than a ‘state-centric’ approach. Therefore, the overarching aim of this project is to explain a new security agenda both in terms of policy and in the way it may answer the intellectual questions posed by scholars since the end of the Cold War. The research seeks to answer core questions: ‘How might Turkey increase the effectiveness of its border security arrangements?’ and ‘what further insights can the concept of societal security offer to help answer that first question? The research challenges the core assumptions underpinning national security in Turkey. This research argues that the concept of border security can serve a more vital role, in shaping the future security architecture. It seeks to apply the concept of ‘societal security’, whose main assertion is that people rather than the state should be the priority focus as referent object of security, and examines the practical implications of such an application. It is fair to say that societal security and hence identity have become central concerns of political attitudes and conflicts within this issue.

It is suggested that while Turkish governments have been struggling to cope with the challenges of new security environment by creating new units within governmental departments, and allocating more resources for agencies to expand, the new security environment urgently demands a more integrated and strategic approach.

Turkey has recently faced a changing range of threats, such as trafficking, organised crime and terrorism, of an unprecedented level of virulence, sophistication and variety. Since just before the 7th June 2016 election it was targeted by the world’s two most brutal terrorist organisations PKK and DAESH (IS). The determination and capability of such groups are greater than ever before and the potential consequences more serious. Their objectives are clear: disrupting society. Fighting against these groups requires more than just a strong border in militaristic terms. It requires a range of tools, applied in a coherent way.

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3 Daesh is essentially an Arabic acronym formed from the initial letters of the group's previous name in Arabic "al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham".
However, it does not mean that border arrangements are not important. It is right to consider how security organisations working at the border can be most efficiently and effectively structured. However, today ‘the border’ cannot be viewed as a purely geographical entity and ‘border security’ is much more than security at the border/boundary.

It has been argued that the erosion of the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus and tackle non territorial threats. That implies that state to state relations are no longer enough to provide security. This erosion has resulted from a ‘paradigm-producing change’ in the security field after the Cold War (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2000: 2). The old certainties were replaced by risks and threats not bounded by territory, and the emergence of new intellectual concerns such as identity issues. It is fair to say that states still continue to pursue what they call national security in an environment which is clearly different from the environment of earlier eras in which their structures were born. Therefore, this erosion is a push factor to replace the conception of territorial security with a more comprehensive approach: societal security.

Turkey, like many contemporary states across the world, has found itself in an environment in which traditional concerns of nationhood and state building are still important but it recognises that it must listen to voices that increasingly speak of cooperation, integration and identity. This new security environment in this uncertain and contradictory context of transformation must be understood for better security.

1.1. Security
Understanding of the transformation of the security environment has gained speed after the end of Cold War. Growing numbers of scholars from different backgrounds found realism’s state-centric and military focused approach to security to be useless as an analytical tool (Buzan, 1991; Waever et al., 1993; Gardner, 2005; Garnett, 1996; Buzan et al.
1998; Brown, 1998). After the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has been broadened to encompass a much wider range of issues and concerns. This intellectual transformation in security studies has focused on four interrelated issues. First, what should be the referent object of security? In the new security environment, the traditional state-centric focus of security studies is not relevant any more, given economic globalisation, rapid developments in technology and transportation, and hence the erosion of state sovereignty. In addition, threat groups from terrorists to organised criminals targeting society are in the main and the greatest risk. Consequently, attention has been paid to the security of societal groups and individuals rather than states. Second, what is the nature of threat? This implies that previous focus on military threats has been replaced by the economic, political, environmental, societal threats. Third, who is going to provide the security? Traditionally, it was the state itself. However, today it has broadened to include international organisations such as NATO, the UN, and OSCE; and more importantly society itself. Finally, with what instruments can you provide security? In the face of a more complex security context and the interrelated character of threats such as trafficking, terrorism and ethnic conflicts, and in the face of environmental disasters, the military instrument is no longer relevant (Garnett, 1996a; Nick Vaughan-William, 2009).

Endeavours to find more relevant answers to security matters have brought the issues of identity to the debate. The search for a relationship between identity and security is not new of course, but the new developments related to intra-state conflicts and vast migration have pushed the identity issues to the forefront in the security field. As Kaldor (2013) suggested while the ‘Old wars were fought for geo-political interests or for ideology (democracy or socialism), new wars are fought in the name of identity (ethnic, religious or tribal).’
1.2. Identity

Thinking about collective identity, in the end, takes us to notions of ‘we feeling’, or ‘us and them’, it leads to cleavages and solidarities simultaneously (Schlesinger, 1994: 321; Fest, 1994: 64). The end of the Cold War has had a significant impact on these new cleavages and solidarities because it operated as a curtain suppressing the search for new identities of the various societies within. It also has removed the obstacles for these societies in pursuit of a new identity in an increasingly mobile world. As a result, it has created unprecedented insecurities and uncertainties. The rapid developments in communication and transportation technology, and increasing cross-border economic activities have contributed to this process on an enormous scale.

While identity often was defined in national terms, characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, gender and so on have become salient. Ideological, ethnical and religious identities have begun to override the national identities. For example Tekin (2014: 232) describes the Gerdi tribe living in Hakkari, a Turkish province at the Turkey-Iraq border, and maintains that villagers feel a greater sense of belonging to Iraq than to Turkey. As a response to these kinds of cleavages, the search for integration has often generated new fears in communities. Traditional state building projects have become central once again in the post-Cold War world space where it is nearly impossible to determine the territorial boundaries which divide ‘us’ and ‘them’.

In the Middle East, the prevailing model of territoriality in the world has failed to create institutions that operate according to this model for two reasons. One reason is the tribal structures blocking the transition to territorial state organizations, and the second a strong and deep sectarian structure creating an alternative focus of loyalty. In the context of this fragmented structure came an enormous challenge to locate and maintain the borders. Therefore, providing security in ways which keep the ‘other’ out is impossible for a territorial state while there is a
powerful mobility based on kinship and religious relations etc. on both sides of the boundary.

1.3. Locating borders

Traditionally, military forces have been in charge of the surveillance of the borders and looking for ‘infiltrating enemies’ therefore, obsession with easily guarded land borders is the characteristic of current border thinking in Turkey. It was thought that the more deserted the borderline the easier it would be to establish surveillance across the territorial boundaries. However, securitisation of borders should no longer necessarily take place at the geopolitical or territorial boundaries. It can extend beyond the national territory while, simultaneously, it must deal with the security issues inside the territory.

In the context of border security it can be argued that inside/outside or internal/external divisions are hardly relevant anymore. While the realities of the new security environment continue to prevail, an intention to control a certain territory by traditional means is disputed. It potentially requires the military to perform police work while police feel obliged to extend their jurisdiction beyond the traditional domain. Such implications are pushing Turkey in a direction which is not very helpful to the management of current border problems because borders are no longer necessarily situated at the border (Balibar, 2002: 84). They are unfixed, mobile and diffused throughout within and outside the state.

Borders are no longer a line which determine the territorial authority’s ends. Rather, they are expanding in time and space. A series of examples suggest that today we are witnessing the ‘mobility’ of the actual border itself (Balibar, 2002). The development of transport, international trade and communications creates boundaries deep within the state territory, for instance, around international airports, and special customs or free economic zones. Therefore, the concept of border now embraces not only the area along the boundary, but internal regions. In parallel, the notion
of security has been expanded beyond the physical border itself and some territories beyond the border are to be securitized as if they were part of the national border. As a result, by de-territorializing the issue of security, the need for the protection of physical boundaries is undermined and this provokes the view that the dominant philosophy of security must be reviewed.

1.4. Outline of the chapters
Chapter 2 explores existing theoretical debates with regards to their methodological approaches, in order to provide a point of departure for this research project. A review of the literature will focus on perspectives and themes within contemporary security debates such as:

- The classical ideological cleavage in International Relations, between the two schools of realism and liberalism,
- Critical security studies as these state-centric concepts are analytically insufficient to capture the changing nature of security,
- In close relationship with them, the identity-security nexus will be examined. The chapter is concluded with a survey of the Turkish case and with gaps in the literature.

Chapter 3 presents the general design of the study, multiple data collection and analysis activity and methods used. The purpose of the chapter is to illustrate how and with what methods the research is executed. The broad aims of the study required the exploration of a wide range of factors, an appropriate research design and an applicable methodological approach. All these facts led to the adoption of a case study design and triangulation of diverse data sources. The chapter also elaborates and justifies the process of the research, data collection methods, analysis of data as well as the choice and use of above mentioned approaches and methods. Methodological problems and limitations encountered in the process of research are other significant points presented in the chapter.
Chapter 4 presents the conceptual debates and the framework of the study arising from them. It describes the shift in the security paradigm and the limitations of old notions of national security in the face of new security challenges in the last decades after the Cold War. It also explores in depth the new security paradigm with the guiding concept of societal security and its potential to bring efficiency to border security. The principle argument in this chapter is that border security is not an isolated phenomenon or a sub-set of national security, but is a comprehensive approach which is supposed to lead national security along with the all public and private capabilities; and organise relevant departments to achieve security.

Chapter 5 explores the concept of border security from the perspective of traditional national security and non-traditional societal security, in order to answer the following question: What are the effects of prevailing perspectives of state-centric national security and non-traditional societal security on current and future interpretations of border security. The answer provides a clear picture for readers and elucidates discussions at the analysis stage.

Chapter 6 sets out a clear vision of the current situation in Turkey in the border security field. It examines the institutional structure of the current border security framework, the implications and policy aspects of the current approaches in Turkey. The chapter comprises two main components based upon the notion that problems stemming from the institutional structure and the politics of security are two sides of the same coin.

Chapter 7 explores Turkey’s current response to border security challenges based on the findings from the primary research (mainly in-depth interviews). It assesses how security professionals view border issues and border security; and how well the Turkish state has responded to the risks and threats in recent years, outlining the significant successes and failures of its policies and decisions. It identifies a number
of areas as being of particular concern. They are grouped under the headings: coordination; institutional qualification; legal deficiencies; budget; civil governance; geography; kinship, and terror. It also pins down the current approach which is reflected in government documents.

Chapter 8 examines the case for a holistic approach to managing national security. Initially this will require a robust and comprehensive strategy to ensure the government is able to identify priorities in the new security environment, and explores the security sector's approach to border security. The concept of societal security was used to assess the current practices and tried to answer the research question: How might Turkey increase its border security? And going on from there: what insights the 'societal security concept' might offer in answer to this question?

The announcement that the government will put into action a national action plan to set up a professional border security unit before the end of 2016 is a step forwards but questions remain as to its likely impact on the security architecture given the current framework of border security. Therefore, this chapter also will examine the effectiveness of the government’s approach? It argues that departments and agencies within the national security architecture are not well equipped to achieve security in the face of challenges of the new security environment. The chapter speculates on reforms including the creation of a national security secretariat subsuming the Secretariat General of National Security Council.

Chapter 9 summarises the research aims, findings, and analysis and concludes by reflecting on the Turkish government can transform itself in response to the challenges identified in the thesis. The chapter ends with a number of recommendations for reforming the current national security framework.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

From the 1990s, Turkey has taken steps to give a new direction to its foreign and security policy towards its eastern neighbours, organising complex programmes of economic, cultural and governmental assistance on a much larger scale than in the past. At the turn of the century, Turkey also developed its bilateral relations with Middle Eastern countries. In addition to that, it commenced a radical policy of openness introducing the virtually visa-free treaties between itself and neighbouring countries. Taking into consideration Turkey’s substantial military capacity compared to its neighbours, all three of these initiatives now raise opportunities and policy issues in the context of border security in particular.

Despite attempts to conceptualise Turkey’s national security policy, border security policy is almost an unexplored issue. The very limited literature available discusses the transformation process in the frame of European integration. Although there are a growing number of studies explicitly concerned with the Europeanization of security institutions, it still lacks consistent and systematic concepts to account for the varying patterns of security understandings and institutional adjustments in the policy field.

In the reviewed literature on Turkey below, there is a clear trend to examine only the effective factors which are driving or triggering security reforms. However, examining positive effects alone, does not provide a useful tool for a better understanding of the new security environment of today’s world and what Turkey needs to change in the border security field to secure its future. This trend has also resulted in an inability to
appreciate properly the requirements of the EU in the border security field. It is clear that there is an urgent need to discuss security issues in line with the post-Cold War norms in the field, which the literature suggests is totally different from the past. This has been reflected within the field of Security Studies as pressure to redefine the concept of 'security'; as a result, several academics have discussed what is and what should be with regards to its referent object. While traditionalists favour the maintenance of the Cold War conception of security - defined in military and state-centric terms - the non-traditionalists have attempted to broaden and deepen the definition. These non-traditionalists argue that other issues, such as economic, environmental and social threats, pose serious risk to societies and individuals rather than states per se.

However, the analytical distinction between traditionalists and non-traditionalists does not mean that there is a consensus within each distinct group. Some realists, such as Stephen Walt, continue to emphasize their traditional preoccupation with military threats, while others, such as Barry Buzan and Mohammed Ayoob, agree that a broader definition of security is necessary. On the other hand, there is a disagreement between non-traditionalists (wideners and deepeners) such as Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998; Krause/Williams 1996. The wideners argue that the greatest threats to state survival may not be military, but environmental, social and economic. The deepeners, on the other hand, ask the question of whose security is being threatened as opposed to the state.

In many ways, critical, constructivist and post-structuralist approaches have also transformed border studies. This shift in the analytical and methodological perspective has led to an understanding in which borders have multiple meanings and functions, and the border concept cannot be reduced to a singular meaning. Thus, most importantly, this shift has led
to the admission of the approach that borders are processes and not fixed lines.

Today, borders are not placed at the territorial limits of the state, or at other traditional entry points such as train stations and airports. They are unfixed and mobile, diffused throughout, within and outside the state (see Rumford, 2006; Walters, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2008). They are, as Etienne Balibar has stated: ‘dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled’ (Balibar, 1998: 1).

Thus the notion of border security today is also radically different from the past because both the concept and the nature of security have undergone a profound transformation. The concept of the border of the state has been used to frame dominant notions of who and where the ‘enemy’ of the state might be. Although aspects of such thinking continue to invade security practices, the insights of this approach have been questioned over recent years, particularly so since the end of the Cold War. By de-territorializing the issue of security, the need for the protection of physical boundaries is also undermined. Therefore, this chapter will concentrate specifically on the recent conceptual changes to provide an analytical basis to examine how Turkey’s case conforms to or diverges from the post-Cold War concept of border security and discuss whether the current system is providing the required level of security.

2.1. Non Traditional versus Traditional Concept of Security

Traditional thinking about security has been dominated by the realist paradigm. The two seminal texts in that context are Hans Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations* (1948) and Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979). Together they constitute the two main strands of realism. On the one hand, Morgenthau's classical realism, which emphasizes ‘the importance of the states (Glasser, 2013: 15) which
have an inherent desire for territorial expansion. On the other, Waltz's neo-realism (also referred to as 'structural realism') emphasizes the structural dynamics of the system as key to understanding state behavior. The realist paradigm suggests that states are only interested in maintaining their sovereign control over their territory, and anarchic international systems provoke the states to arm races and war.

In a broader sense, realism is a theory which explains the power and power politics in international relations. ‘Realists, tend to see states as the key actors in the international system’ (Glaser, 2013: 14). A basic shared element of the realist paradigm, related to this research, is a clear demarcation between the domestic and international domains. The domestic sphere is defined by the boundaries of the sovereign state by which the state controls its territory. Outside the state, there is anarchy which means the absence of a central authority. In this harsh and unforgiving 'self-help' system, survival is the primary concern of all states. The ‘security dilemma’ is thus seen as a central and inescapable feature of international life (Jervis, 1981). In a multipolar system, states can most effectively find security through alliances and the effective operation of the balance of power. For realists, therefore, sovereignty is a key organizing principle of the international system; states are inevitably and rightly the referent object of security; and security can only be assured through power politics and military force.

Walt’s (1991) traditionalist perspective of security is firmly rooted in realism. Walt takes a position which is state-centric and restricts the 'security' to threats in the military realm. He equates security with peace and the prevention of conflict through military means such as deterrence policies. Walt argues that Security Studies

[...] may be defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force. It explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects
individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war (1991: 212).

Realist perspectives were increasingly challenged by neo-liberal institutionalism or liberal-institutionalism. This approach accepted many of the realist paradigm's assumptions (states as key, the anarchic nature of the international system), but rejected their conclusions. In particular, liberal-institutionalists emphasize the potential cooperation, both through multilateralism and institutional integration. ‘The national interest then transcends sovereignty and autonomy’ (Morgan 2013: 34). Their focus on the emergence of ‘complex Interdependence’ also led them to highlight the importance of the economic and political dimensions of the international system. While seeing the states as the most important actors, it also stressed the non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGO) international regimes and major private economic entities (Morgan 2013: 30). Thus it moves away from realism's focus on power politics and military force.

These discussions led to an important shift of academic thinking about security and a rethinking of many of the traditional and realist assumptions about security, with a growing emphasis on the importance of the non-military dimensions of security. However, as discussed before, assumptions such as state centrism remained unchanged. For example, Robert Keohane, a prominent figure in liberal institutionalism, has acknowledged that his approach ‘borrows as much from realism as from liberalism’ (1993: 272). The emergence of these ‘neo-neo’ discussions led to a dissatisfaction and created a third influential approach, ‘critical security studies’ (Krause and Williams 1997).

‘Critical security studies’ is a broad church, embracing elements of post-Marxism, feminism, peace studies and postmodernism, but does not identify with any one of them. Although they are conceptually different,
they share a common rejection of many of the basic assumptions of both realism and liberal-institutionalism. First, they reject the notion of 'anarchy' as a defining feature of international relations; second, they replace the state by either societal groups or individuals as the referent object of security; third, they emphasize the role of both non-state actors and the non-military dimension of security.

2.2. Changing Scope of Security

2.2.1. Broadening the Security paradigm

From the 1980s onwards, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars of international relations increasingly began to emphasize the need for a broader understanding of security. There has been a tendency among scholars (Buzan, 1991; Waever et al., 1993; Gardner, 2005; Garnett, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998) to develop a concept of security that brings up a range of 'non-traditional security issues'. Among the most discussed non-traditional security issues are terrorism, organized crime, migration, asylum seekers and environmental degradation which, they argue, create serious instabilities. Chalk (2001) identifies seven issues that are commonly associated with contemporary sources of transnational instability: internal war and conflict, terrorism, heroin and cocaine trade, piracy, the transnational diffusion of infectious disease, environmental degradation and unregulated mass population movements. They criticize the narrow definition of territorial security against military invasion, imposed by the Cold War conditions. They argue that it is misleading to confine security analysis to traditional military threats to the territorial integrity of states (Garnett, 1996a: 14), and that these traditional threats have not disappeared completely, but other non-military sources of threat have become more pressing (Nick Vaughan-William, 2009).

One of the most noticeable attempts to widen the security agenda has been provided by Barry Buzan and his colleagues (Buzan, 1991: Buzan et
al., 1998). They stress that the security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. In general, military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and state’s perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security is concerned with access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security is concerned with the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security is concerned with the maintenance of local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. Buzan’s work raises interesting and important questions about whether national and international security considerations can be compatible, and whether states, given the nature of the international system, are capable of thinking in more cooperative international and global terms (Baylis, 2014: 231).

In *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* however, Ole Waever argues that Buzan's previous five-dimensional approach had become ‘untenable’ as a present context for societal security. As a result, he proposed a reconceptualization of Buzan's previous theory; not as a five sector approach of state security, but as a duality of state and societal security (Waever et al. 1993:25). Societal security, here, is still kept as a sector of state security, but now it is also a referent object of security in its own right. Therefore, although the state is still a referent object for the military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors, 'society' is also a referent object for the societal sector. In other words, it combines state security, which is concerned with sovereignty, and societal security, which is concerned with identity.
On this issue, Klare and Thomas (1994) take a different perspective. They argue that the concept of security needs to be expanded because of a declining significance of geographical boundaries. They see state actors incapable to respond to global problems like environmental degradation and financial currency crises. Instead of focussing on domestic threats to state survival, they advocate a ‘world security’ concept that accounts for the global nature of contemporary problems. Their assumption is that all actors are influenced equally by global threats and that they are motivated to respond cooperatively to them. Similarly, Ayoob (1997: 130) brings a different perspective and argues that national security is a function of state building, which requires that a state possesses more than simply ‘security hardware’ (control of coercive force) but also ‘security software’ (legitimacy and integration). Ayoob argues that: ‘security or insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes’ (1997: 130). A central element for the question whether or not to broaden the notion of security is: whose security we are considering or what is the referent object of security? The limits of the traditional approaches show us that it is surely no longer the security of the state, but of some other object/s.

2.2.2. Deepening of Security: Whose security?
The 1990s have witnessed a series of intense and broad-ranging debates concerning the nature of security issues. These debates have questioned both existing definitions of security’s referent object, and how it can be studied. In other words, in addition to the debate on broadening the focus of security studies to include non-military issues, conventional thinking about security was also challenged by those who criticized the state-centric approach of neo-realists. As we have seen, state-centrism is one of the central tenets of realism. Mearsheimer argues that states are still
the main actors on the world stage and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, (2005: 139-140). This state-centric approach has been charged with neglecting the people. Munster suggests that, the privilege given to the state is inadequate to address problems of 'common' or 'human' security, which would need consideration on the level of the individual, sub-state groups or on the level of humanity as a whole (2005: 2).

As Jones asserts: ‘When one begins to focus on security referents other than the state, it becomes apparent that ‘existential’ threats to those referents - be they individuals, nations and so on - are far broader than those posed by military force.’ It means ‘deepening’ and ‘broadening’ are inseparable processes (1996: 209). For example, Brown argues that the state-centric lens ‘fails to illuminate many of the momentous developments occurring within, above, and across the jurisdictions of the nation-states that are creating dangerous incongruities in world politics and society’ (1998: 1). Brown also emphasizes that separate nation-states have become increasingly impotent in dealing (that is, through national laws and national institutions) with threats to security and safety on their own, he suggests ‘Sovereign national enclaves of security and order, fenced off from the "chaos" of the world at large, are becoming unviable’ (1998: 4). A striking example of this new reality is the cross border dimension of terrorism and counterterrorism. Since terrorism is facilitated by the new technologies of mobility and due to the fact that it appears to manifest itself in cross border networks, counterterrorism will be ineffective when it is conducted unilaterally through national agencies. The significant question here is about differences it creates which change the state-centric lens.

For critical security theorists, states are not only providers of security, they can also be a source of threat to their own people. According to this view: individuals should be the central concern rather than state. ‘This
has led to a greater attention being given to what has been called human security and has resulted in further broadening of the conception of security to include areas such as health security' (Baylis, 2014: 236). However, conceptualizing security in terms of ‘individual security’ or ‘global security’ has become more popular in the contemporary debate, Waever states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist’ (1995: 48). However, despite this he gives security of individuals’ importance as it has a potential to affect the whole of society, Waever puts ‘society’ at the centre of his concept beside the ‘state’ (1995: 67). The key objective for both state and society is survival. For the state, it is defined in terms of sovereignty, whereas for the society, it is defined in terms of identity. In other words, while a state cannot survive if it loses its sovereignty, society cannot survive when it loses its identity.

The broadening and deepening of the security agenda away from its traditional focus on state and military dimensions has led to a growing importance of identity in security studies. This increased significance of identity issues within security studies has led to an increasing awareness of the limitations of realist, structuralist accounts of international politics. Analysis of the structural distribution of power at systemic levels provides only a very limited and one dimensional understanding of the underlying political and societal dynamics of international security (Buzan 1991:368). Focusing on the military dimension of security or on the state as the referent object fails to capture the complexity of the new security environment. This is because security is intimately bound to societal identity and cohesion. In this context, Barry Buzan’s definition is particularly useful. He argues security ‘is about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile’ (Buzan, 1991: 432).
2.3. Realism and identity

The relationship of identity and culture within international relations has presented the greatest challenge to realist thinking on security. ‘This is because realist thinking has traditionally focused on material and systemic factors underpinning the security dilemma and the operation of the balance of power in anarchic systems’ (Hyde-Price and Aggestam 2000:238). As highlighted earlier, its two main streams are the structural, or neo-realist variant propounded by Waltz and Mearsheimer, and the classical realist tradition propounded by Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and Arnold Wolfers.

The response of neo-realists has taken three main forms. First, neo-realists like Mearsheimer (1995) have flatly denied the relevance of ideational factors, and reasserted the ontological primacy of material and systemic factors. Second, Waltz, for example, has simply argued that neo-realist theory can only seek to explain ‘certain big and important things’ about the international system, and therefore has to exclude factors such as domestic politics, culture or identity (1998). One of the primary examples of a neo-realist attempt to amend the limitations of the realist approach to security with material structures and relative power capabilities, is Walt’s influential work, The Origins of Alliances (1987).

Walt seeks to modify Waltz’s structural realist approach by suggesting that states safeguard not against power but rather against threats. Anarchy and the distribution power alone are not enough to predict which states will be identified as threats. Walt argues that threats derive from a combination of geostrategic and military factors and 'aggressive intentions', in other words, capabilities and intentions (1987: 22-6). Walt’s approach is clearly a major deviation from structural realism. However Barnett criticizes Walt that ‘[it] is the politics of identity rather than the logic of anarchy that often provides a better understanding of
which states are viewed as a potential or immediate threat to the state's security’ (Barnett 1996: 401).

A second example was Snyder’s approach. First, he suggested what he calls ‘structural modifiers’, and second, a focus on ‘relationships’. Structural modifiers are ‘system-wide influences that are structural in their inherent nature but not potent enough to warrant that designation’ (Snyder 1996: 169). These include norms (ideational factors), institutions and military technology. These structural modifiers mean that conflict and aggression are not intrinsic to the nature of international anarchy, and suggest that norms and institutions can profoundly alter the structural dynamics of international society. On the other hand, relationships ‘lie between structure and interaction’, providing ‘the situational context of behavior: the conflict, common interests, alignments and power relations that motivate and shape behavioral choice’ (Snyder 1996:172). Snyder maintains:

[Relationships] are the conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behavior. Likewise, the internal characteristics of states affect interaction largely through their effects on relationships. Relationships are more than a transmission belt for structural and unit effects, however; they also exert independent effects (Snyder 1996: 172).

Snyder’s comments are interesting because he establishes a link between realist views and constructivist approach, which – arguably – allows for the opposing factions to achieve a compromise.

2.3.1. Classical realism and identity

There are significant differences between Morgenthau and Waltz in their definition of power. According to Waltz, the elements of power are: ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence’ (Waltz, 1979: 131). For Morgenthau, the most important material aspect of power is armed
forces, but even more significant is a nation’s character, morale and quality of governance (Morgenthau, 1956: 186). This means that states with more or less same material capabilities but different identities might act differently. In this respect, Waltz’s approach is far closer to the traditional view. Neo-classical realists argue that the dominant factor shaping broad patterns of foreign policy over time is their material power capabilities in relation to the wider international system. According to them, therefore, this must be the starting-point of any analysis of international security. However, these neo-classical realists (Rose 1998; Schweller 2003 for example) also focus on the internal characteristics of the states interacting with international systems to shape state behavior. They argue that the impact of such power capabilities is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level (Hyde-Price and Aggestam 2000: 241). This suggests that the relative material capabilities, different structures and, identities of states are also determinant factors on actions of the states.

Classical realism recognizes the significance of shared values and universal standards of action for the operation of the balance of power, and their acknowledgement of a role for law and international organizations. As Ruggie has argued, ‘notwithstanding Morgenthau's emphasis on power as the driving force, he saw the world of international politics in socially textured terms’ (Ruggie 1998: 5). Thus, neo-classical realism’s conceptualization of the relationship between material and ideational factors is in the interest of the debates on security and identity and makes a significant contribution to the security-identity nexus.

2.4. Liberal Institutionalism and identity
There are different repercussions against the challenge of identity among liberal institutionalists. While some of the liberal-institutionalists view identity as pre-given and objectively determined, other cite the mutually
constitutive relationship between interests, identity and institutions, and the key role of institutions in creating ‘identity’ and ‘perception of interests’ (Hyde-Price and Aggestam, 2000: 242).

Keohane (1984: 61) views ‘international regimes’ as principles, norms, rules, procedures and orders about actions: ‘they imply obligations, even though these obligations are not enforceable through a hierarchical legal system’. He argues that ‘international regimes’ should be seen within the boundaries of issue-areas and since issue-areas depend on actor’s perceptions and behaviour, ‘their boundaries change gradually over time’. Complex relationships within the NATO, the EU, and the OSCE are structured and channelled by the principles and rules of the institutions. To support this claim Keohane and Nye (1989:55) argue that ‘a set of networks, norms, and institutions, once established, will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically to rearrange’. Keohane and Nye also argue that ‘in the long run, one may even see changes in how governments define their own self-interest in directions that conform to the rules of the regimes’ (1989:259). Thus, the long-term participation in international regimes has the potential to transform the participant actors’ identity because cooperation can lead to an internalized commitment to the practices of the regime.

Another area in which liberal-institutionalism has contributed to the security-identity nexus is in the area of peace theory and security communities. The theory of democratic peace stems from Immanuel Kant’s To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Michael Doyle based his theory on Kant’s ‘perpetual peace’. In his book, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (1983) Kant states that the spread of democracy makes the elimination of war possible (Doyle in Rasmussen, 2003: 21). The democratic peace thesis suggests that democracy and peace are linked. Democratic institutions play a crucial role in the development of a stable peace (1) because of their institutional impact on the policy-making
process, and (2) by changing the norms and values of the political actors concerned – that is, their identity (Hyde-Price and Aggestam, 2000: 243). ‘It is an extension of Liberalism’s inside-out approach and the belief that the nature of an international system[is] significantly shaped by the character of its members’ (Morgan: 2013: 34, 35). However, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and in the Middle East clearly demonstrate that democracies do not go to war only for self-defense purposes.

2.5. Critical security studies and identity

This approach has developed through its engagement with identity and cultural issues which traditional approaches have largely ignored. It is a broad church it has drawn scholars from a range of theoretical perspectives such as constructivism, post structuralism and post Marxism. Williams and Krause (1997b: x, xi) stress that ‘our appending of the term critical to security studies is meant to imply more an orientation toward the discipline than a precise theoretical label’. In particular, their approach has begun to question the referent object of security: who or what is to be secured. The traditional answer to this question is that the referent object is the state. For example, Ayoob (1997, 121-2) questions the nature of the state and argues the state in traditional security studies is that of the advanced, industrial north. So, security refers to protecting the state from external threats and people living within the territory are considered secure as long as the state is secure. This approach also considers security as more than just military security. One of the interesting contributions has been made by Booth (1997: 112) who suggests:

The argument has been that the meaning of studying security is not simply or necessarily created by changes out there in the world, but the changes – or lack of them – in here (who we think we are, and what we think we are doing).
In his defense of traditional security studies, Walt dismissed critical theory arguing its lack of theory and suggests ‘issues of war and peace are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’ (1991: 223). If identity is made a concern of security, then who judges ‘what counts as the parameters of collective identity, and by what criteria must judgments be made’ (McSweeney 1996:88). However, Hansen, by using the term ‘poststructuralist’, argues that ‘[it] offers important insights on the construction of the national-international dichotomy, the relationship between national identity and security politics, the discursive character of the concept of security, and the late modern transformation of security’ (1997: 369).

2.6. Copenhagen School: A balanced approach

Just after Critical Security Studies had come to the agenda Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde published *Security: A new framework for Analysis* (1998) which was designated the Copenhagen School, and is a mixture of Barry Buzan’s notion of sectorial analysis and Ole Waever’s concept of ‘securitization’. The school widens the definition of security by encompassing five different sectors: military, political, societal, economic and environmental security. Waever suggests that security is a speech act and examines how a specific matter becomes a security matter. Further suggesting that, the referent object can vary across the sectors and collective identities are the referent object of societal security. Although they both agree on the social construction of security the Copenhagen approach distances itself from Critical Security Studies. It contends that construction in the security realm is sufficiently stable over the long run that it can be treated as objective (Buzan et al. 1998: 34-5).

Although the approach will be examined in detail in the next chapter, it is useful to note here that Waever emphasises the duality of the state and societal security, and explains that while state security is about threats
to its sovereignty, societal security is about the threats to a society’s identity. Both Waever and Buzan contend that societies are fundamentally about identity. In Waever’s words, ‘society is about identity, about the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community’ (1993: 25).

2.7. Social Constructivism and Security Studies
Social Constructivism offers considerable insights for investigating the security identity nexus because it focuses on social relations and why identity, norms and culture matter. Although traditional approaches such as (realism and liberalism) focus largely on material elements to argue security matters, social constructivism stresses that the ideational factors as well as material factors construct the world around us and the meanings we give to it. This is a significant difference from realist and liberalist perspectives. For both of them state behavior is determined by the anarchic international system and the distribution of material capabilities in it. However, ‘Constructivism puts into context the actions, beliefs and interests of actors and understands that the world they inhabit has been created by them and impacts on them’ (Agius 2013: 88).
It argues security is socially constructed and identity is crucial because actors cannot act without an identity. ‘Identities give actors interests and those interests tell us something about how actors act/behave and the goals they pursue’ (Agius 2013: 88). Likewise, Frederking (2003: 365) argues that ‘global security arrangements include beliefs about the world (e.g. the nature of security), norms about social relationship (e.g. appropriateness of the use of force), and identities about self and [the] other (e.g. Enemy, rival, citizen, or friend)’.

2.8. Identity and the ‘Other’
In connection with identity ‘otherness’ is a significant concept in security studies. Many writers about identity issues draw attention to the critical role of ‘other’ in forming security identities. They have argued that
identity requires an ‘other’. Wendt, for example, distinguishes between different types of identity: corporate and social identity. Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic, self-realized identity of an actor. Social identity refers to ‘sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others’ (Wendt, 1994: 385). He later adds three more types of identities, ‘type’, ‘role’, ‘collective’ identities. Wendt (1999: 226) claims that ‘type’ identities do not rely on other states, ‘roles’ identities exist only in relation to others. He gives an example of the professor and student relationship. One cannot be a student without a teacher or vice versa. Collective identity is a mix of role and type identities where self and other become blurred (Wendt, 1999: 226).

With regard to the role of the ‘Other’ in forming security identities Hyde-Price and Aggestam point out the power of conflicts and argues: ‘Historical experience seems to suggest that the most influential and resilient forms of political identity are those generated through conflict – either real or imagined – with the ‘Other’, that is, with other political communities.’ (2000: 250). Philip Schlesinger (1994: 321, 325) argues that ‘the making of identities is an active process that involves inclusion and exclusion.’ To be ‘us’, we need those who are ‘not-us’. Similarly, Fest argues (1994: 64) that ‘every country needed an adversary, with the border and the rival just beyond: it was only these conditions that made each people refine its own identity.’ However, according to Hyde-Price and Aggestam (2000: 251, 252) this is not the case in the Nordic lands, where a sense of Scandinavian or Nordic identity has emerged which involves relations of difference, but which is not directed against each other as a hostile ‘other’. They also give an example of post-war Germany which was built around a self-understanding of itself as a liberal-democratic social market economy, committed to European integration and the forging of a stable peace order (Hyde-Price and Aggestam (2000: 252).
Most of the discussions above focus on the external environment and external rivals. Berger and Luckman (1991: 194) argue that ‘identity is formed by social processes’. Based on this idea, constructivists think that ‘the process [of] acquiring identity is interaction’ (Agius 2013: 91). Therefore, as opposed to the rationalist perspective, the behavior of the states should not be the result of external forces only. For example, Germany and France have historically been enemies, but, through their cooperation in the context of European integration, their relationship has evolved into a different one (Agius 2013: 91). Thus, one important lesson to learn from these discussions is how you define yourself in a significant security strategy indeed. One notable example to this was the research program on national roles, defined in terms of states’ self-defined role conceptions (Hyde-Price and Aggestam 2000: 253). Kalevi Holsti was one of the first who drew on sociological interpretations of role in order to suggest how perceptions may structure and guide foreign policy making. He argued that foreign policy makers are influenced by role conceptions which are a product of a nation’s traditions, history and national values along with the other factors (Holsti 1970: 245).

As Hudson and Vore argued:

National role conception is one of the few conceptual tools we have for the study of how society and culture serve as a context for a nation’s foreign policy. It allows one to bridge the conceptual gap between the general beliefs held in a society and the beliefs of foreign policy makers (1995: 226).

Role theory, thus, provides a useful tool for studying the impact of the identity conceptions on security policies.

2.9. Changing Perceptions: Where are the borders?

In many ways, critical, constructivist and post-structuralist approaches have also transformed border studies. The shift in the analytical and methodological perspective has led to an understanding in which borders
have multiple meanings and functions, and the border concept cannot be reduced to a singular meaning. And, thus most importantly, this shift has led to the acknowledgment of the approach that borders are processes and not fixed lines. In this context there are mainly two contesting arguments in the academic world: the first is ‘the claim that borders between states are a thing of the past’; the second is ‘the assertion that borders between states are here to stay’ (Nick Vaughan-William, 2009: 4). These are reviewed below.

The first discourse is mainly based on the consequences of economic globalisation. ‘The transformation of global production, involving the growth of multinational companies, a twenty-four-hour market and post-Fordist industries, has rendered the notion of a national economy obsolete’ (Brown, 2005: 167). Similarly, Strange (1999: 345-6) points out the inability ‘to govern and control the institutions and markets that create and trade the credit instruments essential to the real economy’ and argues that the modern, sovereign, territorially bordered state has failed. In the same vain, Agnew (2008: 7) also argues the ineffectiveness of ‘territorial limits’ and points out the ‘technological and geopolitical changes’ as reasons.

As a consequence of the recent changes discussed above, some other scholars also argue that the erosion of state borders over recent decades threatens the Westphalian state system which is territorially defined (Held and McGrew, 2002, p. 39 and Scholte, 2000, pp. 135–6). The emergence of the European Union, with its a ‘borderless area of freedom, security and justice’, could be cited as an example of this transformation.

By contrast, the second discourse maintains that national economies have been left intact if not actually strengthened by globalisation (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, 2002). According to this perspective, the modern state continues to remain the primary political entity in world politics
(Carlson et al., ‘Foreword’, 2006: 1, 2). Especially after the 11 September 2001 attacks, there have been challenges to the concept of globalisation and borderlessness which raised new arguments (Coward, 2005: 105, 34; Newman, 2006: 181). The events of 9/11 have once more brought a paradigm change in the study of borders and brought the more rigidly controlled borders on to the agenda. In the face of mounting American military aggression, and various reassertions of territorial sovereignty, some writers, argue that state borders are more important than ever (Starr, 2006: 3–10). Thus, contemporary studies are, once again, focusing on the implications of the border-closing process, particularly after the vast migration to Europe.

However, one can easily observe that these discourses are both based on a particular understanding of the concept of the border of the state which reflects modern geopolitical imaginary. A great many authors (including Balibar, 1998; Eyal Weizman, 2007; Achille Mbembe 2005; Nick Vaughan-William, 2009) bring the ‘conceptual transformation of state borders’ onto the agenda as a third way. Nick Vaughan-William (2009: 5) argues that the dynamics of today’s political practices which render the ‘present or absent discussion senseless’. The words of Balibar are very striking as they engender a different perspective:

> We are living in a conjecture of the vacillation of borders – both of their layout and function – that is at the same time a vacillation of the very notion of the border, which has become particularly equivocal (Balibar, 1998: 217).

The significance of Balibar’s argument is that the vacillation of borders does not mean their disappearance. Borders in today’s world are not where they are supposed to be according to the modern geopolitical imaginary. On the contrary and most importantly, for Balibar, borders are being ‘multiplied and reduced in their localisation, […] thinned out and doubled, […] no longer the shores of politics but […] the space of the political itself’ (Balibar, 1998: 220). Balibar’s words force the readers to think outside the modern geopolitical imaginary, to begin to comprehend
what is going on in global politics: ‘borders are no longer at the border, an institutionalised site that could be materialised on the ground and inscribed on the map, where one sovereignty ends and another begins’ (Balibar, 1998: 217-8).

In his call for re-conceptualising the borders, Balibar is not alone. Walker (1990: 180; 1993: 20,159,161; 2002: 343) has systematically questioned the inside/outside logic of the traditional concept of the border which the modern state rests on argues the issues in a similar way to Balibar. He argues that: ‘We have shifted rather quickly from the monstrous edifice of the Berlin Wall, perhaps the paradigm of a securitized territoriality, to a war on terrorism, and to forms of securitization, enacted anywhere’ (Walker, 2002: 17). Similarly, Mbembe (2005: 11-40) suggests that ‘it makes little sense to insist on distinctions between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ political realms, separated by clearly demarcated boundaries’. In the same vein, Weizmann (2007: 13) writes: ‘New and suggestive cartographic representations of today’s world [are] a departure from the traditional view of a world that consists of a series of more or less homogenous nation states separated by clear borders in a continuous spatial flow.’

However strong fences and walls do, for the ruling elites, create a manageable situation where the ‘us here’ and the ‘them there’ line of binary separation is easier to control (Newman, 2006: 150). Even the globalization purists would accept that the basic ordering of society requires categories and compartments, and that borders create order (see Albert et al., 2001; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002). Borders on this logic are instruments of the state and therefore symbolise state power and identity (Anderson, 1996: 1). This does not mean that state borders are necessarily simply lines of separation. Anderson criticizes the perspective that sees borders as ridged lines in space because political life is problematic to the extent that it is difficult to determine where one
jurisdiction ends and another begins. He argues that borders are not somehow part of a natural order of sovereign nation-states, but rather ‘different conceptions of the frontier as an institution which existed before the modern sovereign state, and other kinds will emerge after its demise’ (Anderson, 2004, p.319). As institutions’ borders are established by political decisions and regulated by law, they become visible in its traditional form of territory demarcation which symbolizes the organisational power of the state. However, for Anderson, borders are not only institutions, but they are also processes.

As processes, Anderson argues that borders have four dimensions. First, borders remain instruments of the state and are operated to their advantage (Anderson, 1996, p.2). Second, the state’s ability to control its borders enhances or impedes its policy-making capacities. Third, borders are markers of identity and form political and mythical beliefs about unity, heavily embedded in nationalism (Anderson, 1996, p.2), although Anderson has acknowledged that political identities can exist on micro as well as macro levels (Anderson, 2004, p.319). Finally, borders are a term of discourse and the meanings given to borders can change over time (Anderson, 1996, p.2). In his own words, Anderson argues:

What frontiers are, and what they represent is constantly being reconstituted by human beings who are regulated, influenced and limited by them. But these reconstructions are influenced by political change and the often unpredictable outcome of great conflicts, against a background of technological change (2004: 320).

New approaches, which are not directly concerned with where the border lies, but what the border means to different people experiencing the border, have brought new insights in border studies (see Newman and Paasi, 1998; van Houtum, 2000). Focusing on the process of bordering has created new possibilities in understanding how borders are constructed,
maintained, and reproduced. Thereby it has opened up new paths to produce tangible and meaningful border security strategies. Therefore, there is a tendency to concentrate on how people create their own borders through constructing their own ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ instead of the territorial dividing line, and such a tendency sees the border as a space in which these identity dynamics can play out. For example, Paasi (2005) is particularly interested in the relationships between borders/boundaries and identity construction. For him, ‘Boundaries are means of and media for organizing social spaces’ (Paasi, 2005: 28). Indeed, for Paasi, in a globalising world – a world of flows – borders are no longer material, at least in their traditional guise as material limits, as they are social processes and practices.

Analogous to Anderson, both Newman and Paasi argue that

\[\ldots\] borders and their meanings are historically contingent, and even if they are arbitrary lines between states they may also have deep symbolic, cultural, historical, and religious, often contested meanings for social communities. They manifest themselves in numerous social, political and cultural practices (Newman and Paasi, 1998: 188).

Borders, in this sense, are social constructs. The insights of van Houtum are representative of critical, post structural approaches to the study of borders. Van Houtum focuses on the ways in which borders order social space and produce difference. Van Houtum and van Naerssen, for example, have described bordering as ‘relating to practices of othering’ (2002: 125). For van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002: 134), processes of bordering, ordering and othering (constructing difference) are ‘intrinsically territorial’. Otherness, therefore, is a requirement of border construction and is constantly reproduced to maintain the stability of territorially demarcated society. Therefore, ‘overcoming borders’, van Houtum and Struver (2002: 142) argue, ‘is mainly about overcoming the socially constructed imaginations of belonging to a certain place and of
the need for a spatial fixity’. This spatial fixity represents the traditional views on border security.

2.10. The Case of Turkey
The existing limited literature on Turkey problematizes the state-centrism and the military’s unquestioned authority over security issues. Issues related to border security have been discussed in the framework of the EU accession process and related to mainly illegal migration.

In *Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey*, Icduygu and Keyman focus on migration to display the effects of globalization in framing security relations (2000). They take a position against state-centrism and see globalisation as the main driving force behind the necessity of rethinking security. They argue that ‘in the post-Cold War era identity, body and ecology issues are more important interstate relations when the greater dangers and contingencies are global in character’ (2000: 383). According to them ‘there is a need to go beyond the state-centric approach and analyse critically the link between globalization and security’ (2000: 383). They specifically point out the link between globalisation and security ‘as the nature of security cannot be captured within the limits of interstate relations’ (Icduygu and Keyman, 2000: 383). In their own words:

The focus and subject of security in the world have begun to shift from state to identity as a result of political turmoil, so-called ethnic wars, and fundamentalist attempts to return to the origin by eliminating in bloody ways what is regarded as the other(s). In addition, the processes of globalization give rise to societal affairs that are increasingly interconnected through information and communication technologies. The crisis Turkey faces in terms of migration thus comes as no surprise [...] it is in fact a crisis of state-centric logic that makes nation-states unable to create effective migration policies, especially with
respect to migration flows that stem from identity-based conflicts (2000: 385).

In other words, the national level of analysis is not enough to deal effectively with societal problems because of globalisation process. In this sense it is globalization that makes security a multidimensional form of relationship whose scope ranges from state to identity (Icduygu and Keyman, 2000: 388). ‘It introduces possibilities for new ethnic identities to bring their cultures to the centre’ (Icduygu and Keyman, 2000: 387). Icduygu and Keyman argue more specifically that ‘the migration regimes of nation-states (largely framed by the state-centric logic of the Cold War) are becoming problematic and ineffective as migration flows in a globalizing world are becoming multi-layered and not easily controlled by nation-states (2000:383). In their essay they give Turkey’s case as an example to prove the nation-state lacks an effective migration policy and treats migrants—especially those from the Southeast Asian and Middle East regions—as a security threat to its national integrity and territoriality. To support their claims specifically, they argue that Turkish officials were reluctant to see any flow of Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq because of the concern that such a flow could add momentum to the separatist Kurdish movement in the country. However, they report a figure of approximately 650,000 Iraqi refugees, mostly Kurds, who entered Turkey between 1980 and 1995. Indeed, in 1988 subsequent to the Halapja (Halepce) incidents, close to 60,000 ethnically Kurd Iraqis sought refuge in Turkey. This was followed by another 450,000 after the end of the first Gulf War. Indeed, this is in clear contradiction with their claim. Today with 2.7 million Syrian refugees (tens of thousands of whom are Kurds), Turkey clearly proves that it does not view migration as a national security threat.

To sum up, while Icduygu and Keyman view state centrisim as a problem they acknowledge that as a result of globalisation, the decline of territorial constraints does not mean the end of the state. Rather, it
means a qualitative change of governance. Migration issues are therefore now the issues of new public policies rather than of the control of borders and space (2000: 396).

A related line of state-centricism is pursued by Ferhat Tekin (2014) in his book: *Boundaries’ Sociology: Nation, State and Border landers*. He explored the Turkey-Iraq boundary and identified the nation-state as the main source of border problems. He suggested that the issue is a clear indication of the limits imposed arbitrarily where ethnic and state boundaries do not overlap with each other and where there is no possibility of overlapping. During the period of Ottoman Empire boundaries were porous and vague; and overlapping sovereignties were indefinable. With the establishment of Turkish Republic, both the concept of border and of sovereignty changed. Once the ‘Sevr syndrome’ was added also, the main priority in determining a Turkey-Iraq boundary became the security issue, the main cause of concern being that people living on both sides were ethnically Kurds. Hence, the humanitarian dimension was ignored (Tekin, 2014: 184).

Kemal Kirisci, in his research *Border Management and EU-Turkish Relations: Convergence or Deadlock*, stresses the military’s dominant presence in the field of border security. He discusses Turkey’s concerns with neighbours such as Iran, Iraq and Syria, and geographical conditions which make defence and border control difficult. He suggests this is further complicated because of the terrorist infiltrations by PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) that perpetuate acts of violence and terrorism within Turkey. Strikingly, as a consequence: ‘This often leads Turkey to give priority to border protection by the military rather than the management of the border by a civilian authority that the EU prefers’ (Kirisci, 2007: 3, 4). As a result, Kirisci argues that:

> Under these circumstances inevitability the priority becomes national defence in the narrowest sense of the word, such as
preventing infiltration and militarily confronting such infiltration, rather than broader issues of public security and control, such as intercepting illegal migration, detecting forged documents and pre-empting smuggling, as well as enforcement of law, especially the Schengen acquis, that is of more immediate concern to the EU (2007: 22).

His assessments are mainly based on the assumption that the harmonization of Turkey’s legislation with the EU acquis in these four important areas concerning ‘justice, freedom and security’ can reform Turkey’s border security framework and Turkey will benefit from it (Kirisci, 2007: 46, 47). However, there is no clear evidence with respect to both theoretical and empirical meaning.

Similarly, Dervis et al (2004), also highlight the geographic factors and the borders which became conduits for PKK terrorists operating out of neighbouring countries. As a result, those borders have been heavily militarised and a good part of the Syrian border is mined (2004: 26). They suggest that Turkey should continue with its efforts to put into place a professional border control administration in close cooperation with the EU, stating ‘Such initiatives would also constitute an important confidence-building measure, besides being mechanisms for the exchange of expertise and know-how’ (Dervis et al, 2004: 40). As discussed above this approach also lacks a clear theoretical and empirical basis indicating in what way Turkey benefits through EU membership in the field of border security.

In line with the other researchers, Altunisik examines the changing nature of the security environment in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War. She argues:

The Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 and the developments afterwards have presented a major challenge to the status quo in the region.
The weakening of Iraq as a result not only upset the distribution of power in Turkey’s neighbourhood, but also reopened the questions of borders in the region with particular emphasis on Kurdish aspirations (2007: 69).

She suggests that Turkey’s strategic culture has been dominated by the tradition of realpolitik which is a security-focused and state-centric foreign policy perspective (Altunisik, 2007: 70).

In his PhD thesis: The Impact of the EU Securitization Process on the Border Security Framework of Turkey “Towards the Emergence of a Border Security Actor?” Kaya also debates the issue in terms of the EU securitization process and uses the notion of ‘security actor’. He argues that the securitization process enables Turkey to be present in the international arena and ‘its enhancing capability through legal, administrative, external, and budgetary actions in the area of border security will also increase Turkey’s capability to become a border security actor’ (2012: 175). However, this approach is still highly state-centric and based on steps to gain operational control. It implies the achievement of ‘operational control’, over fixed borders and focuses on the threats to territorial boundaries, to provide security. Although he acknowledges the dramatic change in the role and capabilities of nation states due to the globalization process (Kaya, 2012: 175), he suggests an enhanced state to state relationship to meet the new security challenges.

Along with the discussions above, the existing literature on Turkey also questions the military’s authority over security issues. The military, which has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in the political system (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997: 151), considers itself the ultimate guardian of the democratic Republic, vis-à-vis internal (e.g. fundamentalism, separatism) and the external (e.g. foreign attack) threats (Hale, 1994: 80; Heper and Guney, 2000: 637), and of the secular. General Erguvenc defined the EU as ‘a solution to Turkey’s insecurity’ in a series of articles
(1999, 2000a, 2000b) and criticizes the security strategy for its over-reliance on the military without due regard for economic, political and societal costs (Erguvenc 1999: 46), he argues that Turkey no longer has the option of resolving conflicts with its neighbours through military means, given that the global community no longer condones such actions.

Similar to the views of Erguvenc, Ambassador Turkmen argues that joining the EU would eventually transform approaches to security in Turkey (2001: 61). They both stress that military dimensions of security should be considered in conjunction with other dimensions of security (Erguvenc 1999; Turkmen, 2001: 61). Thus, the issues related to border security have been discussed within the framework of the EU accession process and, in terms of internal security, related mainly to illegal migration. However, by drawing from ‘securitization theory’, Bilgin takes a different perspective on the issue and argues that: ‘Treating civil-military dynamics as the main concern, the literature fails to discuss the ‘politics of security’ (Bilgin 2007: 567). She further argues that ‘failing to enquire into the politics of deciding what constitutes a security problem would abandon the issues left on the security agenda to be governed by the statist and militarized understandings and practice’ (2007: 567-8). These discussions over the Turkish security culture illustrate that Turkey has responded to border security matters in the post-Cold War era in a way which can be described as a military-focused and state-centric national security perspective. It is military focused because there has always been military authority over the production of ‘security knowledge’ and national security policy.

2.11. Gaps in the Literature and Summary

It is fair to say that while most of the existing literature on non-traditional security revolves around the new threats and their referent objects: largely, it neglects to explore how new security issues are governed in practice in different contexts. The most striking gap in the
security literature which pertains to Turkey is that most of the studies are dominated by debates about Europeanization and therefore are limited because of their scope as much as their theoretical weaknesses - described here. Efforts to account for the dynamics of the new security environment are rare and the evidence that has been brought forward often is uneven and contested. What remains largely unexplored in Turkey however, is an understanding of border security in the context of the changing concepts of security and borders discussed in this thesis. Most analyses seem to ignore the relationship between the border security field and its socio-political and economic contexts. The literature also is limited in that primarily it relies on secondary documentary data rather than on empirical data.

Most importantly, a review of the literature reveals that one source of these weaknesses is that this literature does not provide a strong conceptual framework for institutional change that can travel across different contexts and issue areas. For a better understanding of the transformation process, in general, it is necessary to embrace the dynamics of the new security environment, changing security and border concepts. A specific theory such as ‘societal security’ might be a useful tool to understand the process better. Because understanding transformation requires ‘an understanding of the structure and dynamics of each change process’ (Olsen, 2002: 924). The new security environment has led to significant changes in domestic politics and continues to change both political structures (e.g., institutions) and policies. Constant transformation has become necessary to be able to keep pace with changing security risks. Thus, this study seeks to provide a conceptual framework of institutional change in the domestic realm and applies it to the transformation process of Turkish national security. More importantly, such a framework will enable us to test the whole system in such a way the imminent limits are illuminated.
The purpose of this chapter was to conduct a survey of different approaches and key themes of security particularly in post-Cold War Security Studies and International Relations literature. The discussions were organized and examined along a traditional versus non-traditional cleavage. The fundamental difference between these two perspectives is the state centric perspective which is limited to military security on the one hand, and society or individual as the referent object with a much broader range of threats on the other.

The discussions largely centred on whether the notion of ‘security’ should be broadened or not (Mearsheimer, 2005; McSweeney 1996; Wæver 1993; Booth 1997; Walt 1991). Traditional realists tended to argue that widening the security agenda risked making both scholarship and state policy incoherent. Others argue that the state-centric lens fails to understand many of the insecurities occurring within, above, and across the jurisdictions of the nation-states (Brown, 1998; Ayoob, 1997 Buzan, Waever, Wilde 1998; Wæver 1993).

The need to reconsider traditional approach stems from its limitations in meeting the requirements of new security challenges. These limitations mainly are: First, the privileged position of the military sector and the exclusion of other potential threats; thus, unless an environmental, economic or social problems interfere with the military sector, it does not take part in a state's security analysis. For example, the environmental problem of water shortage would only be considered a national security concern if a state threatened, or initiated, a military response against another state, in defence of its interests. Second, as its focus is clearly state-centric with the state as the referent object, it excludes sources of insecurity at the societal and individual level. Thus, it is unequipped against the intra-state threats such as identity conflicts. Even if a government posed an immediate and lethal threat to its citizens, this would not be considered a security threat within this perspective. As a
result, it is questionable if the traditional approach is the applicable to reality. As Mohammed Ayoob (1997) illustrates, traditional perspectives assume that the greatest threats to national security are external ones and thus, do not recognize intrastate conflict as being a source of insecurity, so that potential separatist movements do not qualify as a national security threat..

In the current security environment, the focus has shifted from the territorial security of the state to a broader and deeper security understanding. The use of only military means for addressing security threats and challenges is increasingly perceived to be ineffective. In other words, border security practices based on the modern political imaginary seem inadequate to provide solutions in today’s multi-dimensional security environment. The traditional model of border security is eroding, while new approaches continue to develop. Therefore, the notion of border security has been expanded beyond the defence of the physical border itself. By expanding a border mentality beyond the state territorial boundaries, the state has not undermined the domestic front but has strengthened, the notion of a secure border is enlarged to include the sources of external threats as well. Therefore, border security is not compromised but rather expanded with policies defending issues beyond the domestic front. Thus, de-territorializing security practices make fixed borders less meaningful than they once were.

However, this chapter does not argue that borders between states are obsolete or that the modern geopolitical imaginary does no longer matter in international relations. In other words, the strong emphasis on non-traditional border security does not mean that traditional military and economic border control tasks have disappeared. Clearly, as the violence in Ukraine and Syria illustrates, the traditional geopolitical conflict over territorial borders is still very much a part of contemporary political life. Similarly, for the vast majority of illegal immigrants, border checks
continue to be a practical obstacle to transnational mobility, and vast amounts of money are paid to smugglers to evade these state controls, sometimes at the expense of their lives. However, this research argues that the concept of a fixed border of a state and its conventional inside/outside ways of thinking, has, to a great extent, lost its appropriateness in today’s world. There is an urgent need to reconceptualise a proper model for border security.

The tremendous global changes in the security environment that have taken place since the early 1990s – including the end of the cold war and the new security risks driven by the revolution in transportation and communications technology – are forcing states and Turkey, in particular, to consider new ideas, distancing themselves from Cold-War conceptualisations of security, in a transformed world. The crucial role of the state in shaping security policies is challenged by the emergence of new risks and threats in today’s security environment; these risks and threats challenge national sovereignty and national security; under these circumstances, traditional means are not enough to deal with new threats that emerge on the global stage. Therefore, state capacity has to be reconsidered in the context of changing security notions.

Having considered the new threat environment and new security era, there is need for a new vision of security, more appropriate to the 21st century. This new perspective should combine the elements of the other visions, but break away from the traditional modes of thought formed in the past which are no longer relevant. This more relevant philosophy might help Turkey transform its system to meet today’s security challenges as well as the technological and cultural realities of the 21st century. Transformation should provide a new philosophy and the building blocks to adapt new concepts, to develop new capabilities and structures in line with changes in the security environment. Given the
complexity of risks to be addressed, border security requires an innovative comprehensive conceptual framework. An overall approach to address all of these issues can be found in the concept of 'societal security', while, at the same time, considering all border interactions as a holistic system from global to local. Such a system can help us to understand the position and role of border security in national security policies and thus help us to make political choices.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the formulation of a research design and methodology adopted to achieve the main goal of the study. After considering the aims of the study, the research question and the complex nature of the research topic, the researcher decided to adopt qualitative research techniques supported by semi-structured interviews as the most appropriate choice. This choice was also influenced by the paucity of research and documentation on the subject matter, it was therefore important to use primary source information to bring new perspectives to the debate.

In order to explain the methodological approaches, design and procedures of the study, the chapter is structured under five major themes. Firstly, the choice of the case study design is explained and justified, and triangulated through the addition of significant references from related literature. Then data sources and data collection activities are described and the use of selected interviews and documentary sources are justified. In the next section, the analysis processes of selected interviews and documentary sources are explained with reference to the applied models. Resolutions of the quality and reliability concerns of the research are presented in another section. The last section before the chapter summary refers to the challenges and limitations of the research.

3.1 Rationale

With the threat of this terrorism escalating and spilling across the border into the country, trafficking and migration is the top of the political agenda in Turkey. It is necessary to employ the full range of assets and
options available for the state to defeat or neutralize a growing national security threat to the security of its society and the sovereignty of the Turkish state.

This research aimed to explain the changing perception of border security and how these changes could be used to improve a border security framework in Turkey. It gave the researcher an opportunity to evaluate the current border security context to discover its strengths and weaknesses.

Despite an increased interest in border security issues, it is surprising that so little research has actually been conducted on the topic, specifically there is no research from the changing perspectives of security and border as discussed in the chapter 3. Very few studies have focused on how the EU membership process has affected current border security practices and those that do lack a theoretical basis. What remains unexplored, however, is a new border security understanding in the face of changing concepts of security and border. In addition, the relationship between the border security field and its socio-political and economic context is missing.

3.2 Research Aims and Research Question

Dunleavy (2003: 33) recommends that researchers frame their research around ‘an intellectual problem or a paradox’, focusing on a ‘set of phenomena that ask for an explanation... and for which [the researcher] can formulate an interesting and effective answer’. Ultimately, the question that this thesis set out to answer was simply: How might Turkey increase its border security? And going on from there what insights the ‘societal security concept’ might offer to this question?

The general and specific aims of the research were:
General aim

- To critically investigate, on the basis of a case study, the new security agenda both in terms of policy and the intellectual questions it has posed since the end of the Cold War.

Specific aims

- To evaluate the effectiveness of the variety of border security practices and methods being used.
- To determine the views of key policy makers and senior executives in the key border security agencies.
- To make reliable recommendations on how to improve border security in Turkey in line with contemporary norms.

3.3. Research Design

I am not a ‘value free researcher’. My experiences in police forces and in public administration have created, of course, some preconceptions, attitudes and beliefs and as a result, my views on the research topic differ from those of an ‘outsider’. These preconceptions and beliefs necessarily shaped the research and methods chosen. This insider status led to more rapid and more complete acceptance by the participants. Therefore, participants were more open with me as a researcher, which resulted in a greater depth to the data gathered. This, of course, might have raised questions about objectivity. However, complete objectivity is impossible and qualitative methodology is not completely precise because human beings do not always act logically or predictably (Holloway & Wheeler 2002:3). Adler and Adler (1987: 85) asserted that the distinction between researcher and participant has ‘traditionally existed more strongly in theory than in practice’ and that ‘objectification of the self has occurred in the analysis rather than the fieldwork’. For the aim of this research, after examining the objectives of the study and realizing the lack of previous study and published literature on border security in Turkey, a
qualitative, exploratory research design had been chosen, because it would conclusively describe the characteristics of the border security system under study. Examples that qualitative methods have been used successfully in this context are unavailable as there has almost been no research in this area. Hence, the lack of literature on Turkey’s border security framework compelled me to adopt an explorative approach. ‘Exploratory research tends to tackle new problems on which little or no previous research has been done’ (Brown, 2006: 43). So it was appropriate to best capture and understand the topic and the views of the key professionals in the decision-making process regarding border problems. It may also be used to explain current practice and to make judgments and also develop theories. For the purpose of this study, descriptive research was used to obtain a picture of key professional’s views of border and security in the border security field, as well as their views for improving the standards of the current system.

In addition, limited resources also necessitate a focus on a specific province, Kilis, at the Syrian border was selected to explore everyday border security as practiced in the field. Kilis was chosen because of its unique geographical location and diverse border problems, such as smuggling, terrorist activities and human trafficking. This constraint lent itself to the case study method, which allows the examination of a particular border in detail. Being confronted with exhaustive statements on the challenges that the state faced in implementing border security policy, in deciding on the case study of a single province I tried to provide a picture of the experiences and views of mainly security professionals from different posts and levels which were important for the formulation of policy and strategy in the security field. So rather than just focusing on facts, I tried to understand inside perspectives of the key people, which rendered my research ‘interpretive’. The exploratory nature of the research is also supported by the case study method. As Gerring (2004:}
349) argues, ‘case studies enjoy a natural advantage in research of an exploratory nature’. Lastly, the final purpose was to advance and contribute to a debate on an under researched issue.

3.3.1. Case Study

The case study was exploratory and aimed at uncovering the key issues concerning Turkey’s border security framework by focusing on understandings and perceptions of key professionals. At its simplest definition, a case study is ‘an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalise across a larger set of units’ (Gerring, 2004: 342; 2007: 20). Yin claims the ‘distinctive need for case study research arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena (1989: 14), then characterises the case study’s scope as an empirical inquiry which ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (1989: 23; 2009: 19).

The first aim of the study also incorporates the examination of the environment and factors that have been affecting securitization processes by implicating some casual mechanisms and patterns within relationships. According to Gerring (2004: 349) ‘investigation of such casual mechanisms is associated with the case study research design’. In-depth analysis of a single unit, according to the author, is quite useful in clarifying such casual mechanisms because the ‘style of evidence gathering – over-time and within-unit variation – is likely to provide clues into what connects a purported X to a particular Y’ (Gerring 2004: 349).

Secondly, and related to the secondary aims, exploring operative factors of current border practices in Turkey inevitably leads to the possibility of lesson learning for countries which have similar border problems to Turkey. What distinguishes the case study method from all other
methods according to the Gerring is its reliance on evidence drawn from a
single case and its attempt, at the same time, to illuminate features of a
broader set of cases (Gerring 2007: 29). Gerring also suggests 'It has been
demonstrated [that] the difference between a case study and a study is
rarely clear-cut. Indeed, the case study is probably best understood as an
ideal-type rather than a method with hard-and-fast rules' (2007: 345,
346). More clearly, he argues that it is quite difficult to study a single
unit which wouldn't function as a case study because in such research,
the researcher wishes to know both the particular and the general facts
about the unit. ‘Case studies usually perform a double function; they are
studies (of the unit itself) as well as case studies (of a broader class of
units)' (Gerring 2004: 352).

When we turn our attention to data collection and analysis, Yin (2009:18)
argues that a case study inquiry ‘copes with a technically distinctive
situation in which there will be many variables of interest; relies on
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a
triangulation and benefits from the prior development of theoretical
propositions to guide data collection and analysis’. Lastly, Yin (2009: 19)
states the case study is a form of neither exclusively qualitative nor
exclusively quantitative research. Gerring (2007a: 29) similarly argues
‘the number of observations employed by a case study may be either
small or large, and consequently may be evaluated in a qualitative or
quantitative fashion.’

Case study design is the most appropriate option for the aims and
rationale of this research which has many variables and relies on
multiple data sources. It requires triangulation of the data and peer
review to guide the collection and analysis of the data and to ensure the
validity and reliability of both this research and the recommendations
made here.
3.3.2. **Triangulation**

In social science, triangulation is defined as the mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast a light upon a topic (Olsen 2004: 3). Rothbauer (2008: 892) defines triangulation as a multi-method approach to data collection and data analysis. The basic idea underpinning the concept of triangulation according to the author is the phenomena under study can be understood best when approached with a variety or a combination of research methods. Bryman (2003: 1142) argues that triangulation refers to the use of more than one approach to the investigation of a research question in order to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings. Because much social research is founded on the use of a single research method, and as such may suffer from limitations related with that method or from the specific application of it, triangulation offers the prospect of improved assurance. With a parallel approach, Denzin (1989: 307) states that ‘by combining multiple observations, theories, methods and data sources, [researchers] can hope to overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single-methods, single-observer and single-theory studies’.

Another significant point about triangulation is the fact it is recognised as an important method of ensuring quality and validity of the research (Yin 2001; Bryman 2003; Patton 1990, 2002). Additionally, the term is usually referred to multi-method studies by researchers. Having a multi-method approach and three sources to gather data and three methods for analysing them, it is therefore appropriate to employ triangulation approach to the research. Denzin (1978, 1989) extended the idea of triangulation beyond its conventional association with research methods and designs by distinguishing four forms of triangulation. The research adopts the methodological triangulation of this classification, which is proposed as the most common of the meanings of the term by relevant literature.
In this case study, triangulation involved the collection and analysis of information from multiple sources, which includes in-depth interviews with officials and executives from different positions and academicians; a review of relevant primary and secondary documentary sources. Other benefits of the triangulation for the study is the validation of interview data with documentary sources, closing the gaps in the interview data and balancing the data sources as interviews contain more data about later periods while documentary sources involve earlier periods.

3.3.3. Peer Review
Internal reliability is established through triangulation, member checks, peer examination, and the reduction of bias. Peer review provided an external check of the researcher’s process and the reliability of her/his conclusions (Creswell, 2014: 202,203) In this case study, peer reviews were conducted by asking some experienced district governors who were PhD students at different Universities to read the researcher’s thesis and provide feedback on the analysis and recommendations. The intent here was to ensure that the researcher’s conclusions made sense and were consistent with the analysis of the data collected.

3.4. Data collection methods
According to Parahoo (1997:52, 325), a research instrument is ‘a tool used to collect data. An instrument is a tool designed to measure knowledge attitude and skills’. In this research, data were collected during the semi-structured elite interviews. Yin (2009: 102) proposes the interview as one of the most important sources of evidence in case studies. With a similar idea, the research employs semi-structured elite interviews as the major method for data collection. Obtaining data from participants with different experience prevents bias and thus increasing credibility of the information.
3.4.1. Background
I firstly would like to talk to people within the key agencies so that I can identify the main issues of current border security framework that are of concern to those agencies, and to determine their perspectives on border security. Secondly, I would like to collect relevant data from within the organisation, by interviewing members and taking written notes and reading some official reports. To achieve this, I would need access to members of the agencies in order to gather data relating to their perceptions to set up a framework to tackle with the problems they faced. Since this research adopted qualitative research technique, data would be obtained through semi-structured elite interviews. Semi-structured elite interviews have been presented as the major source of data for the study by several authors (Burnham et al. 2008: 231; Patton, 2002: 342; Pierce, 2008: 118, Yin 2009: 102). Brinkmann and Kvale (2015: 171) define elites as ‘persons who are leaders or experts in a community, usually in powerful positions.’ Pierce (2008, p. 119), considers some examples of elites to be ‘ministers, MPs, senior civil servants, business leaders, union leaders, etc.’

The goal of using interviews in this thesis is to attempt to provide a more complete picture of the changes that have occurred in the border security field over the period of post-Cold War. Moreover, they will be used to help qualitatively determine the effects of the border and its securitization on border communities. However, this is a method which requires the ability to draw interesting and meaningful results. Obtaining useful results depends on the ability to read and interpret the interviews (Piore, 2006: 145).
Although these interviews have proven to be very helpful for this research, they present methodological problems at the same time. When I decided on this research I planned first acquiring all the related data, and then conducting the interviews with questions based from analysis of the data. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, I could not find enough
data until after all the interviews had been completed. Furthermore, some of the key decision making actors such as defence and interior ministers that I had hoped to interview for this thesis refused to be interviewed. Fortunately, I could manage to conduct interviews with elites in all key agencies in the border security field who were extremely helpful and encouraging.

When this research topic was being explored I naturally thought of trying to interview some local people involved in illegal cross-border activities. I soon recognized the difficulties in setting up, conducting and having such interviews approved because of the nature of the topic. As there has been no legitimate authority at the other side of the border, it was also impossible to conduct interviews with Syrian border agencies.

Research respondents were chosen because of their close involvement in the decision making and implementation phases of border and/or national security. I interviewed a number of high ranking executives in Ankara from the military, police, coast guard, customs and gendarmerie. That included an interview with the Secretary General of National Security Council. I also interviewed the most senior officials (number of top officials including the governor and chief of staff from key border security agencies) in Kilis, a southern province of Turkey at the Syrian border. This also gave me the opportunity to carry out some field observations. This gave me an appreciation of the unique nature of the Turkey-Syrian border and the challenges border security agencies face in stopping illegal cross-border activities, when the border is often little more than a two-meter ditch or a line of razor wire.

The candour of most of the respondents was striking. A small number of individuals seemed uncomfortable about speaking openly and relied on bureaucratic rhetoric. This was something I considered when planning this research and I was not surprized that I witnessed it; it is perhaps
understandable in such an environment. Ultimately, I interviewed 27 respondents – all of whom were key actors in the fields of security and governance in Turkey. I am satisfied that was enough to reach saturation.

3.4.2. Interview Methods
For this research I used semi-structured interviews rather than structured or unstructured interviews. I chose the semi-structured interview style because I wanted to give the interview subjects latitude in their responses. To allow their words and experience to stand out, but at the same time ensure some structure to help move the interview forward in a consistent and systematic way. As Weiss (1994: 49) notes, allowing interview subjects to speak on their own terms, as long as it is near the topic of interest, will produce more robust data. Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) believe that semi structured interviews allow for a more natural conversation appropriate for qualitative research. This more conversational form can take the interview in unexpected places which may elicit valuable information (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2011:102).

Part of the reason I did not use highly structured interviews is because of the varying positions and locations of those interviewed. It would not be helpful to ask the same questions both military and customs or police as each has different story and perspective. These interviews were designed to reflect their practical experience of border security. The interviews ranged in length from 20 minutes to nearly two hours. All but one of the 27 interviews was done in person at the place of the interviewee’s work places. Data were collected using a tape recorder and transcripts were made. The interviews were conducted with a focus on a previously circulated list of key interview topics and questions drawn from the literature, and from some preliminary discussions with the professionals working in agencies responsible for border security.
In some cases, additional questions were asked to prompt subjects to address important points that were not eliciting adequate answers to the standard questions. Moreover, often for clarification, a response would necessitate another question that was not on the list. I generally asked the same questions to all those interviewed but often had to modify the questions depending on the position and location of the interview subject.

Participants were assured that their names, personal information would remain confidential, and would not be disclosed to anyone. With their consent and permission, I used the names and job title of four of the interviewees. Joining the interview and participating in the research was up to the participant on a voluntary basis. The data was kept confidential, as participants’ identifiable information was coded. The data were thus qualitative in nature, and the NVIVO software program appropriate for handling such data was used for organising and undertaking a detailed analysis.

3.4.3. Interview technique

The researcher used the following technique for interviews:

- The researcher conducted the interviews with the participants using an interview guide with semi-structured questions.
- The researcher maintained eye contact with the participants.
- The researcher started interviews with broad questions, such as “What is your opinion on Turkey’s current border security framework?”, and continued with more specific questions such as “How effective are the physical measures such as walls?”
- The researcher used a semi-structured interview guide, but the line of questioning and responses from participants maintained flexibility and consistency.
- The researcher asked if there were more comments at the end. This assisted in closure of the interview.
The following interviewees provided data on the border security framework of Turkey:

- Seyfullah Hacimuftuoglu, Governor, Secretary General of National Security Council and former Deputy Minister of Interior Ministry.
- Faruk Ozlu, Deputy Undersecretary of Defence Industries.
- Suleyman Tapsiz, governor of Kilis.
- Professor Dr Ali Karaosmanoglu, chairman of Defence Reform Board and Director of the Foreign Policy and Peace Research Centre of Ihsan Dogramaci Foundation.
- M01 – senior executive in Interior Ministry
- M02 – senior executive in Interior Ministry
- M03 – civil servant in Interior Ministry responsible for border issues
- M04 – civil servant in Interior Ministry responsible for border issues
- M05 – district governor worked responsible for a part of western border of Turkey.
- M06 – district governor
- M07 – district governor worked at Iraq and Iran borders of Turkey.
- M08 – district governor responsible for border gate and refugees.
- M09 – retired general worked in border security sector
- M10 – senior executive in Military.
- M11 – senior executive in Military.
- M12 – senior executive in Police Force.
- M13 – senior executive in Police Force, responsible for fight against terrorism.
- M14 – senior executive in Police Force
- M15 – high level executive in Police Force
- M17 – police officer working at a border gate
• M18 – senior executive in Customs
• M19 – senior executive in Customs
• M20 – senior executive in Customs
• M21 – senior executive in Cost Guard.
• M22 – senior executive in Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for security issues.
• M23 – senior executive in Secretariat- General of National Security Council

3.4.4. Archival Research

Yin (2003) suggests that archival research can be utilized in combination with other qualitative data methods thereby contributing to the construction of a case study. Burnham et al. (2008: 208) emphasise the importance of documentary and archival sources and propose that they ‘offer great opportunities for political scientists to develop novel accounts and interpretations of significant events’. Thus, in the project, the focus of archival research was on the primary and secondary documentary data related to border security framework in Turkey. The contents of cited official papers were examined during the process of this archival research. The author also used retrospective data enclosed in EU projects and legal regulations obtained from the Ministry of Interior, the Border Security Bureau. This method also shed light on the differences between discourses of the official papers and actual practices with regard to the topic of border security.

3.4.5. The Primary and Secondary Documentary Data

Many political scientists, according to Vromen (2010: 261), study existing documents or text in their research and most of these are ‘primary sources which are original documents produced by political actors ranging from executive, parliamentary or judicial arms of governments, policy-making agencies or non-governmental organisations’. However, Burnham et al. (2008: 212) argue, at the same time, ‘documents do not
speak for themselves but only acquire significant meaning when situated within a context set by vigorous analytical and methodological assumptions.’

I have used documents to support and validate the evidence provided by respondents. The role of documentary sources have mostly been kept in the background which helped understanding the context of the research and facilitating the analysis of the interviews results. If we distinguish between the two types of documentary sources, primary documentary data sources used in the research were obtained from mentioned organisations and/or their websites and they consist of textual data in the form of the EU Commission Progress Reports, the Accession Partnership Paper, the National Action Plan Towards the Implementation of Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy and the official reports of governorships.

Secondary documentary data sources, in the form of media records were obtained from major newspapers’ archives, organizational publications obtained from related organizations and think-tanks such as SETA and other literature pieces were obtained from major libraries both in the UK and Turkey.

**Table 1**: Type, Utility and Aims of Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Type of Data</th>
<th>Utility of Data</th>
<th>Aims to Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Structured Elite Interviews</td>
<td>Tape records of interviews with participants, their transcriptions and translations.</td>
<td>Provided in participants’ experiences, knowledge and interpretation with their own words, provided</td>
<td>Assisted in exploring practices, processes and forces that influenced current border security context of the country. Helped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Data Source Material and Documentary Evidence</td>
<td>evidence about the current border security understanding to understand reasons for the need of a new approach.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Records (Legislations, Regulations of state departments and projects implemented with the EU) Publications and reports of public services, governorships and the European Union.</td>
<td>Provided official and semi-official accounts about the context and the research questions. Facilitated the analysis of interview transcriptions. Assisted in discovering current contextual framework of the period, understanding and analysing factors shaping border security practices in Turkey.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary Data Source Material and Documentary Evidence</th>
<th>Provided background information and material which facilitated the analysis of the interview results. Assisted in discovering contextual background of the period and analysing some factors affecting border security framework of Turkey.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research produced and published by influential think tanks, Material from Media Sources, Material from other literature in the field.</td>
<td></td>
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3.5. Data Analysis

The research adopted a qualitative content analysis method with a ‘directed approach’ for analysing the data, in which ‘analysis starts with a theory or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1277). Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1281) argue that ‘the goal of a directed approach to content analysis is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory’. The technique I used was to re-read the interview transcripts several times; enough to be familiarised with the data, and then attempt to identify the key issues and the relations between them. Mason (2002: 149) argues that ‘an interpreting reading will involve you in constructing and or documenting a version of what you think the data mean or represent, or what you think you can infer from them.’

The next stage involved classification of the key issues in the data, noting the sources, how often they occur and coding by using the predetermined themes prepared in line with the conceptual model of the study. As classification was carried out, recoding or redefining the key issues was necessary. Eventually, by interpreting the respondent’s views on these issues and the relationships between them, it became possible to recognise clear patterns and emergent findings in the fieldwork.

3.5.1. Coding

This stage of the study is conducted with the use of NVivo-10 software program by coding major themes. Bernard and Ryan (2010: 76) argues that ‘thematic codes are the most common kinds of codes. There are the codes we use marking instances of themes in a set of data.’ Coding basically fulfils two functions: data management; and explore and interpret the data (Boeije 2010: 119). Burnham et al. (2008: 245) put it as, ‘the point of this task [coding] is to make a judgement about the data in the light of the theoretical framework. In line of these arguments, I used a selective coding method which helped to make connections
between the categories in order to make sense of what is happening in the field. This is also a part of analytical induction. Jorgensen (1989: 110) argues that ‘As you sort, sift, arrange, and rearrange the data and analytic labels and comments about them, it will be increasingly necessary to become more directly and explicitly involved in theory and theorizing.’

3.5.2. Clustering

Weiss (1998: 286) defines ‘clustering’ as ‘the procedure of putting and grouping similar things together.’ ‘Such a method is not only data driven but also allows a researcher to see patterns in large data sets with a large number of codes’ (Guest and Mclellan 2003: 195). Thus, the researcher also benefited from using a clustering method in order to examine the strength of the similarities between emergent categories by the help of the NVivo-10 software program. Patton (2002, p.442) argues ‘computers and software are tools that assist analysis. Software doesn't really analyse qualitative data’. Thus, clustering is used as an exploratory simplification tool for analysis and it helps simplify qualitative analysis.

3.5.3. Data Analysing Process

The data analysis process was the most challenging part of the research as responses of 27 interviewees were transcribed in a software program called NVivo-10. After coding all the data from interviews, I reached the first analytical results (initial findings) used for the research. After completing the first stage of coding of the data the researcher reached initial categories and then recoded these categories in order to provide for reliability and validity of the data results. To do so, the data was retested or recoded in order to prevent any possible biases from occurring over the course of the study.

To aid understanding, the researcher made use of visualizations of the emergent categories in accordance with their coding frequency. The
coding and visualization of emergent categories verified the qualitative analysis was based on a systematic data reduction process. I also used cluster analyses which provided me with an opportunity to see the similarities between emergent categories. As understood from the chosen analytical methods, including interviews and archival research, the data was triangulated from different resources as discussed before. Thus, the analysis benefited from the perceptions drawn from personal experiences and first-hand experiences, and the researcher used qualitative data to enrich and brighten the picture.

3.6. Quality of the research

This research reflects my personal position and while my views are shared by many others, they by no means shared by all. For the assessment of the research quality, this research would never aim to achieve concrete findings that were prevalent one time to another and one border to another because of the nature of the subject. It can change according to time and place, and every border display different characteristics. Even the same border can exhibit different characteristics from time to time. However, instead, this research aimed to reach a new philosophical perspective in evaluating border security framework and practices in Turkey on a new conceptual basis.

Regarding the judgement of the quality of documentary sources, Scott (1990: 19) argues that ‘Whether it is actually what it purports to be?’, and continues to argue that ‘credibility is closely related with authenticity and concerns the accuracy and sincerity of the author of the project’ (Scott, 1990: 22). To overcome this problem, Burnham et al. (2008: 210) recommend that the researcher needs to pay attention to the conditions under which the document was produced and the interests which may have affected the author. With regard to the genuineness of a document, primary documents consisting of the official reports, official archival documents should not have such a problem. Likewise, secondary
documentary data sources such as publications of some institutions are also unlikely to have an issue of authenticity. Other literature, on the other hand, mostly consists of scientific studies created within the academic system. On the other hand, the choice of a digital recording machine for the majority of interviews assured reliable data compared to the use of written notes of interviews.

In line with Burnham et al. triangulation approach is adopted and this provided a useful tool to cope with this diverse data from numerous data sources to validate each other. Triangulation can contribute both to the reliability (that is, the extent to which the application of the same research design produces the same result each time it is used under the same condition with the same subjects) and validity (that is, that the research leads to valid conclusions) of the case study.

I spent long hours in order to collect credible and relevant data and to achieve a valid and reliable outcome during the fieldwork, conducting interviews with police chiefs, high ranking military personnel, high ranking representatives from cost guard, gendarmerie, district governors, governors, deputy minister of National Defence Ministry and Secretary General of National Security Council: carrying out direct observations and examining documents and archive materials could be counted. Thus the case study’s ‘unique strength’ (Yin, 2003: 8), the ability to deal with a full range of evidence was demonstrated.

3.7. Research Challenges and Limitations

The thesis is predominantly theoretical, conceptual and contextual in its approach. This is both a strength and a weakness. While it is easy to observe traditional way of border security empirically as barriers, my focus in this thesis, however, has been the importance of other key actors’ interests and their power of reshape the border, such as society. Thus, the real challenge in that context was the ‘real-life’ aspect of the research.
Therefore, I used my inside knowledge acquired from long years in police force and governorship to collect data from a wide variety of sources. However, researching and making determination about trends in security sector is full of problems in terms of reaching information. To begin with, the data acquired from the government fails to measure the successes of border security framework because increased security measures at the border may cause a professionalization of illegal activities, by either scaring away of smaller operators or arresting less skilled individuals because of security enhancements. In addition, this can serve as a pushing factor towards more sophisticated techniques.

The second major challenge I encountered was that so little research had actually been conducted on the topic. After my first unfruitful attempts to collect literature pieces, I made a number of phone calls with professors, associate professors who were likely to give me the correct directions to find my way. However, it was really a disappointment. I was told that there was no research on Turkey's border security framework. Struggling with searching any data or literature, I discovered that very few studies had focused on how the EU membership process would affect the current border security practices, particularly with regard to migration issues. However, many of them were lack of conceptual basis and based on some personal assumptions. What remains unexplored, however, is the current border security understanding in the face of changing concepts of security and border.

The third major challenge was the wide scope of the research topic and complexity. The amount of data required for a comprehensive understanding went well beyond the researcher's anticipation and dispersed in the national security framework. The researcher tried to overcome this by objective selection and reduction of the material. As a result, you had to put information pieces together as a researcher. It was
not simple as it sounds because much of the information regarding border security was classified.

The selection and reach of interview respondents was among the significant challenges and overcome by the researcher's previous role in the Turkish bureaucracy. Another challenge was the difficulty to conduct interviews with ordinary local people who somehow had connections with illegal activities, but not professional criminals. The nature of the topic and their possible position against the law created an unsurmountable obstacle to conduct an interview with them. However, some of them made some valuable comments on the issue.

The other disappointment was my inability to interview the defence and interior ministers and deputy minister of interior ministry, as they have, by law, the main responsibility for border security. However, fortunately, deputy ministers of National Defence agreed to be interviewed in their place. Despite prior official approval, I also experienced difficulties in arranging interviews with some police chiefs who refused to be recorded or to answer questions directly. As I described earlier, I had considered this in my research design and their refusal does not in my view impact the validity or reliability of the research.

Conceptually and theoretically, the most prominent limitation of the research is to make a distinction between state and society. Modern states, today, are infiltrated by and integrated into multiple, overlapping networks of power and practice that extend into society within and beyond state boundaries and encompass a range of non-state actors (Held, 1995). A singular conception of the state security is therefore problematic. The state is integrated into society but simultaneously stands apart from it, and perhaps attains unity only as a referent object to be 'secured' at an ideological level (Ringmar, 1996). State security is therefore intimately connected to societal security or vice versa.
The second conceptual limitation was the definition of security as a concept. As Smith argues, there is ‘no neutral place to stand and pronounce on the meaning of the concept of security, all definitions are theory-dependent, and all definitions reflect normative commitments’ (Smith, 2005: 18). This can be applied equally to the framing of security in the project. However, the research reached the conceptual purpose of this thesis though which was to provide a starting point for future research. To this end future directions of research must be empirically informed and, in terms of non-traditional way of border security, analysis must rest on people doing their border work.

In the interests of clarity, the researcher has made a distinction between traditional and non-traditional methods for analytical purposes. The researcher considers non-traditional security as an opposite concept to traditional security concept which views individual states as the only referent object and military as means for protection. On the other hand, according to non-traditional concepts state is still the major concern but it is not necessarily the only referent object. Likewise, external military threat is no longer the major threat to national security. The aim of this analytical differentiation is to pull together some of the key themes and issues which are expected to contribute to this research, as the most dangerous threats are generated by the security identity nexus in the new security agenda.

3.8. Ethical Issues

I carried out the research in line with the Ethics Policy of the University of Portsmouth. As this chapter shows, I designed, reviewed and undertook the research in a way that ensured its integrity and quality. I started my fieldwork after ethical approval of University’s ethics committee. I gave all respondents an information sheet that provided them with the aim, purpose and intended use of the data. None of the
respondents was a member of what would usually be considered to be a vulnerable group. I ensured that there were no specific risks in relation to their participation in the research and none of the participants raised any concerns about the research and its use.

At first, all respondents were guaranteed anonymity and this was confirmed by an information sheet handed over to the participants. Four of them declared that I could use their open identity. All participation in the study was voluntary. At the beginning of each interview, all participants were reminded that they could withdraw at any time. They freely gave their consent and a consent form was signed which I then stored in a secure place. All participants were assigned a unique reference number and all their contributions to the thesis are attributed to that reference number. I have retained the recordings and transcriptions in an encoding database.

I conducted the research in a way that minimised harm or risk to the respondents. All interviews and focus groups were conducted in places and at times mutually agreed in advance. All respondents chose to be interviewed in their workplaces except for one. To the best of my knowledge no pressure was put on respondents either to participate in the research or to present their views in a particular way. I also ensured that there was no personal gain from this opportunity for the participants. I selected respondents for interview on the basis of their knowledge on border security. I applied purposive sampling techniques to ensure that all the main views from key agencies were represented in the study. I tried to ensure that the independence and impartiality of the research was clear. There were no conflicts of interest or partiality in the study though it was inevitable that my research was influenced by my own assumptions and beliefs as an insider.
3.9. Summary

This chapter described the research methodology. The principal aim of the research required a deep understanding of main factors affecting current border security framework and the casual relationships between these factors in the everyday practices. Taking into consideration the lack of research, the complexity and comprehensiveness of the topic and a need for an in-depth examination made a case study the most possible design selection for the research. The choice of a case study enabled a logical progress of the research with its variables, reliance on multiple data sources, a need for triangulation of the data coupled with an initial theoretical model to guide the collection and analysis of the data. Triangulation is employed in the research to provide validation of the findings and completion of any omissions and gaps.

To be able to conduct the research, data were collected through archival research and in depth-interviews with a purposive sample of research participants as a major source of data: the semi-structured elite interviews with high ranking personnel in key border security agencies and academicians. Whilst the data analysis was carried out in an objective and open-minded manner, it was inevitably, shaped by my own knowledge and experience in police organisation and deputy governor responsible for Sarp Border Gate, one of the busiest in Turkey.

In order to provide insightful evidence to determine the main problems and the solutions, participants were carefully selected from the ones who worked in the field in their career and had great knowledge and experience on the issue. Other sources of data have been the primary and secondary documents in the shape of legislations, official documents, official publications, international organisation documents, literature pieces, media materials. While elite interview transcriptions have been mainly used for the exploration of the research question and core analysis of discussion, documentary sources have been used for providing
background information, facilitating the analysis of interview results and filling some blanks left by the interviews. Elite interviews, on the other hand, are transcribed, translated to English and analysed with a qualitative approach.

Despite the appropriateness of the research strategy, design and methodological approaches the process proved to be challenging. The first major challenge was related to the lack of research on the topic. The second major challenge was the wide scope of the research topic and complexity. This problem was dealt with objective selection and reduction of the material.
CHAPTER 4

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

FROM NATIONAL (TERRITORIAL) SECURITY TO SOCIETAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, the defence of the nation has been viewed as the primary duty of the state, and has been understood as protection of territory. All around the world emperors, kings and heads of state concentrated on stopping outside attacks by enemies who were bent on seizing land, resources, or people. However, rapid developments in communication and transport technologies is blurring the distinction between the internal and external, and destabilising related concepts: sovereignty, territoriality and security. The old notion of border is fading away and the concept of security must be adapted to these changes. In this information age, simply securing the borders against attacks by another country's army is not adequate because ‘the principal focus of the new insecurity is society rather than the state’ (Waever et al 1993: 2). Thus, border security must be more than just defending territory or a narrow band. Too narrow a definition of ‘border security’ can lead to inappropriate policies that can risk the whole system. Such a definition, in fact, is based on narrow approaches to security.

During the Cold War era, security was overwhelmingly a matter of the state’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity. It identified military power as the primary tool in the maintenance of state’s sovereignty and national security. However, due to economic expansion, financial integration, spread of global investment and production, rapid developments in communication and transportation technologies traditional state-centric thinking has been increasingly challenged. That traditional approach to security was viewed as inadequate to defend new
security challenges and therefore since the late 1980s, security studies have witnessed a broadening and deepening process. It has moved away from merely military concerns and included economic, societal, political and environmental issues, focusing on people rather than the state (Sheehan, 2005: 44). In other words, military concerns have been replaced by the other types of threats in the hierarchy. Buzan argues that ‘increasing securitisation of two issues’ came to the agenda ‘that had traditionally been thought of as low politics: the international economy and the environment’. (1997: 7).

This paradigmatic shift has been identified as broadening and deepening of the security concept. Broadening security means that security cannot to be limited to military discourse but should instead incorporate the economic, the political, the environmental, and the societal domains which are both causes and effects of security. On the other hand, deepening is related to the referent object of security. It means that security issues which needed to be addressed cannot only be in reference to the state, but also to people, nongovernmental sectors and the international community. Critical theorists, therefore, needed to go ‘beyond realism’ (Shaw, 1994: 62).

This chapter concentrates on the evolution of the concept of security from its traditional ‘territorial’ base through to more ‘broadened’ and ‘deepened’ concepts and their impacts on border security in particular to meet the main objective of this project. The general aim is to explore the new security agenda both in terms of policy and intellectual questions it has posed since the end of the Cold War. It, thus, moves beyond the conventional ‘national’ paradigm, while exploring the concept of societal security, and in doing so, questions whether the traditional (national) concepts of security in the post-Cold War era are still relevant.

Most of the academic literature hitherto has dealt with national security issues from an international and realist point of view. This approach has consequently neglected the internal dynamics of state security dilemmas
as conventional state-centric (territorial or national) security allows only for an external location of a threat (Bishai, 2000: 161). Therefore, this chapter also studies the likely impact of societal security on state national security and border security policies. It focuses three main questions: How can society replace the state as a referent object? What is societal identity and how is it threatened? And, how can societies defend themselves against the threats? This chapter, thus, will discuss the application of the concept of societal security to border security. This application allows the argument that the most pressing threat to state national security is within the territory, not from the other side of the borders. There is in fact a strong argument that there is no traditional ‘other side of the border’ any more, therefore, we need a new paradigm.

The need for a new paradigm of security is associated with two sets of dynamics: first, societal security is needed in response to the complexity and the interconnectedness of both old and new security threats, from ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, and terrorism to economic and financial downturns. Such threats tend to acquire transboundary dimensions and move beyond traditional notions of security with its focus on external military aggressions alone. Second, the concept of societal security provides an inclusive approach with wide range of new opportunities to tackle such threats in an integrated manner. Contemporary security risks and threats cannot be tackled through conventional mechanisms alone. Instead, they require a new consensus that acknowledges the linkages and the interdependencies between society’s needs and national security. In other words, it provides us new tools to convert old mechanisms and create new ones.

Therefore, systematic and empirically grounded research on societal security will contribute to border security in a number of ways. First, ‘societal security based-border security strategies’ will enhance societal cohesion within each society and among societies in a global framework. Second, it will bring knowledge and data together that illuminates the interaction between the material dimensions of border security
(infrastructure, everyday security practices, etc.) and the perceptions of
society, to create greater security safeguards. Third, the research will
enable the development of security solutions that will avoid the deadlocks
and dilemmas of national security strategies based on territory.

4.1. Evolving Conceptions of National Security
Throughout the Cold War, under the influence of realist views security
was conceived as being coterminous with military security as against
other states’ military power (Booth, 2005: 2). Realism identifies military
power as the primary tool in the maintenance of a given state’s
sovereignty and national security. National security is referred to
territorial state and focuses mainly on the political and military sectors
(Buzan et al, 1998: 119). This undermines a proper understanding of
security ‘when security is moved out of the military sector’ (Sheehan,
2005: 6).

Since the 1980s and 1990s the world has witnessed a dual process in the
security studies. One aspect of this process is separation in three key
elements. First the referent object: the question of whose security is to be
guaranteed; second the spatial aspect: the extension from national to
regional, international and global security and third, the
conceptualization of risks and threats. However, we have witnessed a
duality of process simultaneous to the first, a separation has gradually
disappeared and meanings of internal and external, national and human,
military and economic, territorial and global security have merged into
an extended concept of security over the last fifty years (Daase, 2010: 27).

4.1.1. Referent Object of Security
Since the beginning of the Westphalian state system, the state
established itself as a guarantor for the safety of its citizens. Due to the
dominance of Realism, what characterized the traditional approach to
security was the focus on the state as the referent object of security. State
security can only be defined in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to the realist views, the international system is anarchic (lacking a supranational authority) and consists of sovereign states, each pursuing its own national interest and power in order to secure survival of the state. Since states are inherently insecure because of anarchy, they are compelled to ensure that they have enough power to fight against threats from other states in order to secure their sovereignty and territorial integrity and to deter others. Thus, the traditional realist views have placed the main emphasis on military threats, hence, also on military strength as the most reliable safeguard of ‘national security’. As a result, security in international relations was understood primarily as state security by the safeguarding of the nation’s territory and the defence of national borders in the face of other states. This security understanding was called ‘National Security’ by Hans Morgenthau (1954), John Herz (1950) and others. This realist understanding of security suggest that all states live in a self-help system and their first and foremost duty is to assure national survival, ‘In anarchy, security is the highest end’ (Waltz 1979: 126). Thus, there must be two key components to traditional security views: territory and sovereignty. However, where is nation then? Even though the term ‘national security’ was preferred, this might have been a misuse, because nations are not the same as states, except for a genuine nation states (Japan, for instance) where nation and state are almost coterminous (Buzan et al.1998, Waever et al. 1993). Therefore, what the Realists were really referring to was the security of the territorial presence.

The rising incapability of the traditional security approach to cope with new security threats, caused the world to witness some attempts to modify this security strategy, using the term ‘common security’, without any radical rejection of its focus on state security. The term was used in the Palme Commission’s 1982 report *Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival*. Its main message was that security under conditions of anarchy and high levels of armaments required ‘mutual restraint and proper
appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age [...] the pursuit of security can cause intensified competition and more tense political relations and, at the end of the day, a reduction in security for all concerned' (p. 138). Common Security was thus envisaged as a way of resolving the well-known ‘security dilemma’. However, the state remained the referent object of security and the focus remained on threats from other states, primarily military threats, against which a military defence was essential. Another extension of the state-centric concept of security was ‘Collective Security’, which was, in a sense, more radical than Common Security because it envisaged a transfer of powers from the state to supranational authorities. However, it did not address the fundamental problematic areas of traditional approach, instead it sought to dissuade attack through deterrence and it did not change anything about the referent object.

The reality that no national security apparatus on its own has the capacity to handle security issues calls for the cooperation of states. However, internationalisation of security did not solve the referent object problem. The term ‘international security’ still refers to inter-state cooperation in security issues. In other words, it does still take the state as the only referent object. However, it departs from the Realist assumptions by arguing that cooperation among security-seeking states is possible even in the absence of an overarching framework that could coerce states to keep their promises (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986). According to this approach institutions, conventions, regimes and organizations are seen as the principal tools for the multilateral preservation of international security (Martin 1992; Haftenforn et al, 1999).

Finally, the concept of global security goes beyond even international security. While international security still refers primarily to states, global security refers to human beings all over the world. ‘Global security often goes hand in hand with human security and integrates measures to protect the environment and the climate, to secure access to food and
clean water, and to end civil strife and violent conflict’ (Daase, 2010:31). These discussions were taken a step further by the concepts of human security and societal security. While human security take individuals as referent objects, societal security consider human collectivises as referents.

4.1.2. Spatial Aspect
This element focuses on the geographical scope of security. It deals with the geographical concerns that security should encompass. Traditional security policy can only be applied to a national level confined within the national boundaries because of anarchy and the self-help system. Waltz (1979: 109) defines it as ‘world-shaking problems cry for global solutions, but there is no global agency to provide them’. In other words, in anarchy, as there is no central authority, it is not possible to design security policies beyond the boundaries. National security therefore has remained confined to the security of the state and its territory. However, states began to develop new strategies to cope with the common security problems. In many regions of the world, security communities have emerged to overcome the narrow notion of national security (Adler and Barnett 1998).

By the end of the 1990s world leaders began to understand that more serious threats to national security could come from non-traditional sources, such as non-state actors and internal conflicts. Such an awareness has led to new concepts such as societal security and human security. ‘Societal security is closely related to, but nonetheless distinct from, political security, which is about the organisational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 119). One of the significant flaws of the old national security perspective is that it equates the state boundaries to the societal boundaries, and assumes that inside is homogenous while outside is different. The creation and consolidation
of an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ to the nation-state is crucial to its existence because it generates an identity by confining the insiders with boundaries.

The presumption of the territorial state borders overlapping with societal borders has not only led to disregard for some problems such as integration, but also to the creation of new insecurities for the system as a whole. Buzan et al. discuss that state boundaries may be different from society’s boundaries. They suggest that this difference creates different logics of security because state is based on fixed territory and formal membership, while ‘societal integration is a much more varied phenomenon - possibly occurring at both smaller and larger scales and sometimes even transcending the spatial dimension altogether’ (1998: 119). Thus, trying to put citizenship in place of societal identity simply might be considered as a flaw of the territorial understanding of security because identity is naturally a complex issue. This complexity is best described by Buzan et al. as:

Some self define their nation in terms of the people living in and loyal to the same state; others define theirs as an ethnic, organic community of language, blood and culture. In the former case, emotional attachment is to something nonorganic and more political, whereas in other cases - and sometimes among competing groups in the same case - the ethnic community of “the real X people” is contrasted with the more amorphous group of all those who happen to live on the territory (Buzan et al. 1998: 120).

4.1.3. Risks and Threats Aspects
Traditional territorial security threats were mainly perceived in military terms because the biggest security concerns for states are military attacks and the danger of being occupied. This concept of symmetrical threat became problematic when more de-territorialised threats have
come to the agenda. In times of great social and economic interdependence, threats emanate not necessarily from hostile actors and through military capabilities. Today, however, risks, not threats, dominate the discourse about security politics. The ‘clear and present danger’ of the Cold War has been replaced by unclear and future ‘risks and challenges’. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation and many other issues are discussed in terms of uncertainty and risk. What makes them similar is their relative indeterminateness (Daase, 2010: 33).

While Turkey had already been struggling against terrorism, the 9/11 attacks (and later Paris attacks) for Western countries highlighted an ongoing trend: states faced a range of asymmetric threats and challenges from non-state actors, willing and able to strike targets at home and abroad. The Paris and Ankara attacks proved that terrorists would attack not only embassies or military installations abroad, they could strike at the core of a society’s daily life. The Balkan wars of the 1990s had already demonstrated that non-state actors were a significant problem. Terrorists and paramilitary groups which were statistically weaker than conventional armies could massacre civilians and peacekeepers. Under these new conditions, conventional armies of peacekeepers could be thwarted by smaller, weaker and hence asymmetric elements. The 9/11 attacks showed that modern technology can make a small group capable of being highly lethal. A small group of well-organized terrorists could kill thousands of civilians. From the dramatic example of using an airplane as a bomb to exploding a homemade road side bombs, terrorist can use tools to impose large-scale damage and loss of life. Moreover, the Internet facilitates communication, enabling terrorists to spread grievances and their own interpretation of issues. Rather than worrying about state led invasion, many national governments are contending with de-territorialised threats from terrorist cells and networks. Thus, the post-Cold War innovation in thinking about
security has been the recognition that there are a variety of potential non-military threats to the state which surpass the monolithic military ones which once dominated the world. The differentiation in key dimensions discussed above set out the limitations of the old notion of national security as well.

4.2. The limitations of traditional notion of national security

National security was often equated with the territorial state security and hence security of the regime in power. The principles of the Westphalia state system privilege existing states, regardless of their nature, and disallow any interference into domestic affairs in spite of the murders committed within the territory. To a certain extent the UN have tried to interfere with the “domestic affairs” to modify international systems with an amended set of rules as incidents inevitably affected other countries such as the Iraq war and Syria later. In the 1992 Agenda for Peace, the then UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali introduced the following formulation:

The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed: its theory was never matched by reality

This situation is described as ‘new world order’. A ‘new world order’ would, however, no longer be based on sovereign states with impermeable borders, but would be a truly global one in which ‘international politics’ is replaced by ‘domestic politics on a global scale’ (J.A. & Jim Falk, 1992).

In his book People, States, and Fear, Buzan points out the limitations of realist security discourse, its state-centric orientation and the predominance of military power as an instrument of state policy in the international context. Buzan, in opposition to the realist thesis, argues that people are affected by threats in areas other than military ones, such
as in political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors. He maintains that individuals, states, and the international system all play significant roles, and all facets of life including economic, societal and environmental ones must be regarded as being as important as military and political ones. Traditional security thinking focuses on military issues and the use of force. This undermines a proper understanding of security ‘when security is moved out of the military sector’ (Sheehan, 2005: 6). Thus, with regards to security, despite an important role played by the state, it is nevertheless not a sufficient actor. This was pointed out specifically, in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP):

[... ] it has been related to nation-states more than people. ... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. [...]With the dark shadows of the Cold War receding, one can see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.

Buzan (1991: 18, 19) argues with regard to interstate relations that the traditional conceptsunderpinning national security studies are increasingly irrelevant, especially in the post-Cold War era. He emphasizes the notion of a societal security dilemma in terms of ethnicity, nationalism and religious identities and suggests that the dangers that societal insecurities pose to a state’s stability are more serious than external threats which are mostly the regular armed forces of other states. They are more dangerous because traditional national security is not equipped to deal with them because of its flaws and limitations. These are:

1. Traditional national security understanding equates the state boundaries to the society’s boundaries, and assume that inside is homogenous while outside is different. The presumption of the territorial state borders overlapping the society’s borders has not only led to ignore some problems such as integration, but also create new insecurities for the system as a whole.
2. In anarchy, as there is no central authority, it is not possible to design true security policies beyond the boundaries. National security therefore has remained confined to the security of the state and its territory.

3. The privileged position of the military sector and other potential threats are excluded; thus, unless an environmental, economic or social problem interferes with the military sector, it does not take part in a state's security analysis. For example, the environmental problem of water shortage would only be considered a national security concern if a state threatened, or initiated, a military response against another state, in defence of its interests.

4. As its focus is clearly state-centric as the referent object, it excludes sources of insecurity at the societal and individual level. Thus, it is unequipped against the intra-state threats such as ethnic conflicts. Even if a government posed an immediate and lethal threat to its citizens, this would not be considered a security threat within this perspective.

5. Closely related to the previous point, the traditional perspective assumes that the greatest threats to national security are external ones and thus, does not recognize intrastate conflict as being a source of insecurity, so that potential separatist movements do not qualify as a national security threat (Ayoob, 1997). When a state somehow takes it as a national security threat it inevitably uses military force to suppress the secessionist movement.

In the current security environment, the focus has shifted from territorial security of the state to broader and deeper security understandings. Using only military means for addressing security threats and challenges is increasingly perceived to be ineffective. Therefore, security practices based on a modern political imaginary seem inadequate to provide solutions today’s multi-dimensional security environment.
4.3. Societal Security: Entrusting security to society

4.3.1. What is ‘Societal Security’?

Societal security has emerged as a conceptual approach which was motivated by developments after the end of the Cold War, particularly with the end of the Soviet Union. The term ‘societal security’ was first used by Barry Buzan in the book *People, States and Fear* (Buzan: 1991). It was then just one of the five sectors in his five-dimensional approach to security theory, along with military, political, economic, and environmental security. Here, however, all of Buzan’s dimensions, including the societal one, were still sectors of state security. Society was just one sector where the state could be threatened. However, in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* Ole Waever (1993) argues that Buzan’s previous five-dimensional approach had become ‘untenable’ as a present context for societal security. As a result, he proposed a reconceptualization of Buzan’s previous theory: not as a five sector approach of state security, but as a duality of state and societal security. Societal security, here, is still kept as a sector of state security, but now it is also a referent object of security in its own right. Therefore, although the state is still a referent object for the military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors, ‘society’ is also a referent object for the societal sector.

Waever et al. (1993) discussed that ‘nation’ and ‘state’ do not mean the same thing in a majority of countries around the world and that ‘national security’ is becoming an increasingly irrelevant framework for developments in the new security environment. Accordingly, the assumption that state and society are synonymous is a key factor which flaws the notion of national security. They suggested a new term ‘societal security’ instead of state-centred national security and gave importance to the insecurities of societies understood as national, ethnic, or religious communities. Waever defines societal security, thus,

In the contemporary international system,
societal security concerns the ability of a
society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and against possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association and religious and national identity and custom. Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms (Waever et al. 1993: 23).

This definition indicates a radical shift from territorial state (national) security to society as the referent object. The most prominent element of national security is that ‘the focus has been on the political and institutional unit—the state—and accordingly on the military and political sectors’ (Buzan, Waever, Vilde, 1998: 119). According to Bilgin (2003: 210) in the national security framework ‘the tension between the security needs and interests of the state and of the society is resolved by assuming that the state, the society, and the nation are one and the same.’

However, post-Cold War developments such as the ethnic separatism and cleansing in Yugoslavia and the emergence of domestic resistance to the expansion of the European Union have demonstrated that the security needs and interests of the state and society do not always coincide (Bilgin 2003: 210). It is clear that such insecurities are unexpected by the traditional national security concept. To take it a step further, this national security approach may create insecurity and destroy what it intends to protect, which is the state itself as it is based on the assumption that state and the nation are the same. However, ‘only rarely are state and societal boundaries conterminous’ (Buzan, Waever, Vilde, 1998: 119). If nation is different from state, we need a different security concept as they are understood to have different logic of security. This situation forces societal security onto the agenda as a key concept because ‘state is based on territory and formal membership, whereas societal integration is a much more varied phenomenon—possibly occurring smaller and larger scales and sometimes even transcending the spatial dimension altogether’ (Buzan, Waever, Vilde, 119).
Traditionally, national security has had a territorial focus and the main emphasis has been to protect national boundaries and state institutions with priority given to the defence of territory, this is thought to be an ‘insufficient to guarantee people’s security’ (Commission on Human Security, 2003). However, a state is grounded on societies. The present state can vanish, but as seen throughout history, society continues to exist. In other words, we can have a society without a state, but no state can exist without a society. Societal security is thus something different from national security. Societal security, thus, has to ensure the functioning of society to enable it to reproduce itself, thereby enabling the population to organize their lives regardless of the form of government and national boundaries. As a collective phenomenon, societal security is ‘not the sum of the security of smaller social groups...not the security of individual parts, nor is it the sum of the security of parts’ (Waever et al. 1993: 20, 26). In addition societal security comprises not only the material aspects of life such as physical protection, shelter, food and subsistence, but also depends on complex moral and social aspects such as confidence, trust, belonging, and loyalty. All of these elements ultimately contribute to the way of life and the well-being of a group of people which is called society. In other words, assuring societal security means not only physical protection from any man made or natural disasters but also it depends heavily on the cultural and even moral facilities of people.

The key to this reconceptualization is again ‘survival’. However, this time, it refers to society’s survival instead of state survival. Societal insecurity exists when communities define a development as a threat to their survival as a society. The logic is that if a society loses its identity, it will not survive as a society. Thus, the key organising element for the societal security concept is identity. The concept could also be understood as ‘identity security’ (Buzan, Waever, Vilde, 1998: 119). Some authors equate societal security with the security of society at the level of the nation-state at large (ETTIS, 2012: 8, 10). This is a reflection of a state-
centred concept of security which ignores the significant fluidity and overlaps between contemporary societies. However, the term ‘society’ comprises different sub-societies, which may extend jurisdictional boundaries. By introducing this fluidity to debates on security, ‘societal security’ complements and strengthens the notions of state security. In other words: societal security is not just security of society, but rather security of societies.

4.3.2. What is ‘society’ in the concept?
Society is defined by Giddens (1985: 164 [in Waever 1993: 21]): ‘a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity’. Buzan, Waever, Vilde (1998: 119) define society suggesting that ‘Society is about identity, self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community.’ Societies, according to Waever’s notion, differ from other social groups ‘in having a high degree of social inertia, values and ‘institutions’ in the wider sense’ (Waever et al. 1993, 21). Buzan, Waever and Vilde, (1998: 120) argue that their use of ‘societal’ is also different from ‘state population which is vague’ and ‘nation’ by giving the example of Sudan, thus, the ‘Sudanese population is that population contained by Sudanese state but which is composed of many societal units (e.g. Arab and black African)’. They argue that they use the term societal for identified communities. By ‘society’ is meant not only the physical gathering of individuals, but also their “meaningful existence” (Waever et al. 1993: 20). This definition substantiates Parson’s approach, ‘A society must constitute a societal community that has an adequate level of integration or solidarity and a distinctive membership status’ (1969: 19). Among the many explanations, the conception of societal security comes closest to the notion of society as ‘the community of people living in a particular country or region and having shared customs, laws, and organisations’. Thus, ‘Societal security is about large, self-sustaining identity groups what these are empirically varies in both time and place’ (Buzan, Waever, Vilde, 1998: 119).
4.3.3. Society and Nation

For traditional thinking, state borders have been commonly conceptualised as being fundamentally attached to ‘territorially defined societies’ providing a tangible ‘society-defining’ function. Here the border is directly experienced through border control and embodied in the concept of a ‘container model of society’ (Beck, Bonss, and Lau, 2003: 1).

In security analysis, society mostly is expressed as ‘nations’ or other ethno-political communities modelling on the nation-idea – whether this be at the level of Europe, nation or national minorities (Waever et al. 1993: 27). Waever et al. take the term ‘nation’ as modern because ‘older national sentiments had no major political importance, they were not the source of political authority’ (1993: 28).

Historically in Europe as elsewhere the source of authority was hereditary, not national. After the French revolution the legitimate source of political authority was changed, it was handed over from king to ‘nation’. Smith (1991: 14) defines nation as ‘a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’. This means that national identity is based on ethnic and cultural similarity. ‘The national identity is about a special way of being alike to a degree where time-crossing identification is particularly strongly felt’ (Waever et al. 1993: 40).

In close relation to nation, Waever et al. (1993: 35) points out the distinction between Western and Eastern types of nationalism. The importance of this distinction is the focus of the political frame (the state). They argue that whereas western nationalism is innate within existing state frameworks and therefore has a given population which fits the territory, eastern nationalism has to frame people somewhere other than in the (non-existing) state. There had to be a pre-political reality to point to, a reference to a people that existed although it did not have a
state, and the argument then ended up as one about culture, about ethnic identity’ (Waever et al, 1993: 36). Anderson (2004: 319) also suggests that borders are not a natural part of sovereign nation-states, but rather that ‘different conceptions of the frontier as an institution existed before the modern sovereign state, and other kinds will emerge after its demise’. This definitional attempt is useful in explaining why state and society may not be the same and why societal security is about identity security.

4.3.4. Referent object of societal security

Ole Waever and Barry Buzan have proposed society as the referent object and have sought to explore the implications of this new approach (see Waever et al. 1993, Buzan et al. 1998). By defining society as the referent object of security, they have shifted the concept of security away from its traditional focus on state. In addition to suggesting a new referent object of security, it also implies a new agency for providing security. That is, Waever asserts that society has a sustainable existence independent of the state (Waever et al. 1993: 23). This clearly suggests that society is not just the passive object (to be protected) of security but also an active producer of security that protects alongside a number of other state institutions.

Buzan theorises that a threat to society is whatever might put its ‘we’ identity at risk (Waever et al. 1993: 42). As societal security is about ‘we’, consideration should be given to its variability according to time and place. Someone who identifies himself as ethnically situated in a given country might identify himself in a different way based on citizenship of that country or a religious group. Historically identification was often limited to family or clan or religious groups, such loyalties to religious groups are still operative throughout the world, today ‘the most important referent objects in [the] societal sector are tribes, clans, nations, (and nation like ethnic units, which others call minorities), civilizations, religions, and race’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 123).
Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community, these identities are distinct from, although often entangled with, the explicitly political organisations concerned with government (Buzan et al. 1998:119). Societal security relates to large, self-sustaining identity groups; what these are empirically varies in both time and place (Buzan et al. 1998:119). In contemporary Europe, these groups are mainly national, but in other regions religious or racial groups have more relevance. Thus, the concept could also be understood as ‘identity security’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 119, 120). Differentiation between the security of groups in society and the security of society as a whole then come into question, Waever et al. suggest that their study

[…] will deal with both kinds of security, but mostly the second. [small group’s security and individual security is important] because threats to individual and small group security can in the case of powerful actors trigger strong reactions with effects on other groups and potentially society at large or even other societies or states in the international system. Thus we must have an interest in security at all the lower levels (Waever et al. 1993: 20).

4.3.5. Threats to societal security

A societal identity can be threatened in many ways which in turn threaten its ability to reproduce itself. In other words, society feels threatened when its ‘we’ feeling or identity is put into danger. For example, ‘if the institutions that reproduce language and culture are forbidden to operate, then identity cannot be transmitted effectively from one generation to the next’ (Waever et al. 1993:43). In the societal sector, the main threats come from competing identities and migration. Buzan et al. (1998: 121) discuss the threats mainly under three categories: migration, horizontal competition, vertical competition. Consideration should be given to the notion that the societal security agenda differs according to time and place. However, migration, horizontal and vertical
competition are understood to be the most common threats to societal security.

*Migration* manifests as a rapid change in a society which was subjected to an influx of others. Intra-state conflicts and a huge gap in quality of life creates strong incentives for international migration. As a result of this influx, the host society’s identity was threatened because ‘it will not be what it used to be’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 121). Changing composition of the population creates fears over its identity which often becomes a political issue. The degree of the fear depends on the adaptive capacity of the society. For example, former UKIP leader Nigel Farage discussing immigration said:

> These figures show the continuing failure of the Government to get a grip on immigration into this country. The results of this increase in population can be felt in communities up and down the country as public services struggle to cope with the increase in demand.\(^4\)

He further commented ‘We must be mad to take this risk with the cohesion of our societies.’\(^5\) Some governments might also use migration as a weapon to suppress other identities like Stalin’s Soviet Union or Israel in the West Bank. ‘It should not, however, be forgotten that threats can strengthen the identities at which they are aimed. Attempts to suppress an identity may work, but equally they may reinforce the intensity with which the group coheres’ (Waever et al. 1993: 43).

*Horizontal competition* represents dominant cultural and linguistic influence. Examples of this, seen throughout the world, are the diffusion of English/American words, fast food, fashion and other western practices. This diffusion creates changes in the way of life of a society and these changes are perceived as a threat to identity. ‘Economic and technological developments may well carry such threats, not only undermining one identity but giving support to a competing one’ (Waever

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et al. 1993: 44). Societies instinctively resist the pressure of change, however the dynamic character of identity allows them to adopt some changes as a result of contemporary circumstances, although complaints about Americanisation and Westernisation changing societal identities are prevalent.

Vertical competition is illustrated by an integration project such as the EU or a secessionist project. People feel threatened by the imposition of wider or narrower identities. ‘Threats from competing identities arise when identities are mutually exclusive: one cannot be simultaneously both a Christian and a Muslim, or both a Greek and a Turk’ (Waever et al. 1993: 44). Yugoslavia is a good example where groups are pushed towards both a wider or a narrower identity and its consequences. This does not mean that all the societal identities are competitive. It is possible to be a European and English or British or all of them.

For Turkey, societal security is mostly about nation and ethnic groups and related to vertical competition between nation state and ethnic groups. Long-term PKK terror which consists strong secessionist elements has undermined societal cohesion to a certain degree. This is also mainly a consequence of the historical conditions of Middle East.

In the Middle East ‘there is a constellation of states in which nations do not always fit into state boundaries’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 132). There are stateless minorities and ‘overarching identities’ such as Islamic and Arabic that play important roles for security issues (Buzan et al. 1998: 132). As seen in the current Syria and Yemen examples, vertical competition such as the Shia–Sunni conflict has been the most important factor. Both can be seen as threats, while both can be found helpful for mobilising people. In the Middle East,

despite the dominant rhetorics, the unifying Arabism and Islamism, the region is actually less integrated, more conflictual, and more a balance-of-power system than Europe: [and] the region has a stronger perception of external threat of Western orchestrated conspiracies,
threats of divide and rule, cultural and economic imperialism, exterminism against Muslims in the Gulf and in Bosnia and the like (Buzan et al. 1998: 133).

It is a historical reality that Western led territorial fragmentation in the region after the Ottoman Empire has been the main factor fuelling border problems and the antagonism between societies over territory and religion because of kinship groups and nuanced religious difference. Buzan (1998) argues that the state’s territorial integrity can be threatened by internal separatist movements which may seek independence or reunion with other states. He emphasises that ‘such states may be threatened by separatism’. As a result, multi-ethnic states are more likely to face intra-societal conflicts. Mary Kaldor’s (1999) views on the changing nature of intra-societal conflicts. Mary Kaldor’s (1999) views on the changing nature of war also support this claim. She defines old war as being conflict over territory and sovereignty and usually as conflict between states while new wars generally are a matter of fragmentation or integration, and a matter of the homogenisation or diversification of society. Kaldor (1999) argues that ‘The political goals of the new wars are about the claim to power on the basis of seemingly traditional identities - nation, tribe, religion’ (1999, 69). Kaldor (1999) clarifies that the new wars are not ideological conflicts, but are in fact conflicts of identity.

4.4. Typical societal responses to perceived threats

As discussed above, the nature of threats differ from traditional notions of security in a number of ways. Evidently, state and non-state actors can be a threat to societal security and therefore threats to states are not merely external. Even the state itself can be a threat to a society, if societal security is undermined by governments and state institutions in the name of national security. In other words, if the state fails to
reconcile the relationship between itself and its society/societies, conflict and confrontation are likely to occur.

If a society recognises that its identity is threatened, it may react either passively and culturally or militantly and coercively in order to defend itself. Both these methods can consequently deepen and strengthen the defended societal identity within the community and can lead to ethnic suppression or civil war. The two major societal actors related to this process are: ethno-national identities and religious identities. These two factors are most likely to produce violent conflicts within a society.

O. Waever (1993: 191) suggests that ‘for threatened societies, one obvious line of defensive responses is to strengthen societal identity. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure that society reproduces itself effectively’. The society, therefore, defends its identity against a dominant rival by holding onto its own culture, its indigenous myths and symbols. In other words, they create a cultural form of nationalism, aimed at strengthening the internal identity of the ethnic minority. It refers to language, religion, culture, and history as its main means.

It is suggested that national security policy may negatively contribute (not the sole cause) to ethnic conflicts. Tension between the state and its societal sub-groups undermines, for instance, the territorial integrity and political autonomy of the state, as well as the identity of those societal sub-groups. As previously argued, states survive by maintaining their sovereignty and society survives by maintaining its identity. As a result, societal groups may defend their identity by militarising their members. In other words, societal confrontations destabilise the political security and undermine the legitimacy of the state. In explaining how states can be threatened by societal insecurity, Waever (1993: 49) articulates the way in which societal insecurity can weaken and threaten the functioning of the mechanisms of a government, and indeed can hinder its related ideologies which ‘give governments and states their legitimacy.’
4.5. The societal security dilemma

The *security dilemma* describes a situation where the actions of one state, in trying to increase its security, causes a perception of insecurity to other states and prompts a reaction from the second state in the effort to balance this perception (Roe, 2013: 185). The key to this concept is uncertainty. Consequently, an escalation of arms and other means, by both actors to fill the gap between the perception of the lack of security and the resources to reduce the threat perceived and a worst case scenario is created.

*The societal security dilemma* describes a situation where the actions of one society, in trying to strengthen its identity, causes a reaction in a second, which, in the end, weakens the identity of the first (Roe, 2013: 186). In other words, it is a problem where one group's security spells insecurity for the others.

Many writers describe ethnic (political) nationalism in rather malign terms, often characterized in this regard with the annexation of territories and the disintegration of states. By contrast, cultural nationalism is often seen as more benign, as it tends to work within existing state structures. The goal of cultural nationalists is to amend the current order and not overturn it: it is more status quo than revisionist (Roe, 2013: 185, 186).

However, for the societal security dilemma, ambiguity is linked with the two sides of nationalism, ethnic (political) and cultural as the line between two strategies is very thin. Hutchinson (1994: 125) discusses that cultural nationalist projects may sometimes employ ethnic nationalist strategies in order to secure their goals. In those circumstances, cultural nationalism might be conflated with political nationalism (Roe, 2013: 186).
4.6. Criticisms of societal security

The concept is not without its flaws. One of the arguments directed at the societal security approach is that Waever et al. tend to take society and identity as pre-given categories, rather than as inter subjectively constituted. McSweeney (1996: 81-83) believes that national identity cannot be taken as an objective fact and thus studied its implications for conflicts or security. The core of McSweeney’s criticism is that the reading of identity is too objectivist. McSweeney believes that identity is not a factual situation of a society; it is rather a process of negation between people and interest groups. He also asserts that societal security defines society as having a single identity, and that this presents a risk, that of supporting the rise of intolerant identities that, in fact, can make inter-ethnic conflict more likely (1996, 88-93).

Paul Roe, similarly, maintains that ‘the problem lies in whether identity, and thus society itself can be seen as either an object or a process; that is whether identity is something solid and constant or whether it is something fluid and changing’ (1999, 183). Thus, the societal security paradigm is charged with creating an imagined and excessively holistic identity for society, the same way that traditional security studies had created a monolithic type for the state. Also, their distinction between society and social groups is not clear (Adrian Hyde-Price, 200: 28). Pinar Bilgin (2003: 212) also criticises the concept of societal security by arguing that ‘clashes over identity are not the cause but the outcome of a process through which conflicts over economic and political interests are reframed and presented in terms of identity.’

One of the most common criticisms of the concept of societal security is that it is ‘unmanageably broad’. Walt (1991: 213) argues that broadening the concept of non-military security may result in perceiving issues such as poverty, pollution, drug abuse, child abuse, and diseases as a threat to security. He adds ‘Defining the field in this way would destroy its
intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems’.

However, in spite of these strong drawbacks, societal security offers a useful analytical tool to solve the limitations of state-centric traditional security concept. First, it gives a powerful insight into security problems in general and border security problems in particular after the end of the Cold War. It highlights the issues of identity problems which are neglected by the territorial security. Second, it gives us a useful tool to analyse reactions against national security and integration policies because ‘reactions to integration in the sphere of identity can easily become strong enough to halt, and possibly reverse, even a well-established process of integration’ (Waever et al. 1993: 186). Hence, it helps us to identify major problems. Third, shifting the referent object from state to society makes a qualitative difference and has emphasized that ‘there is another social and collective focus in security analysis additional to the state’ (Waever et al. 1993: 186).

4.7. Summary

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the nature of conflicts occurring throughout the world brought societal security concerns to the forefront of the international security agenda. In fact, many modern societies are multi-ethnic and multi-religious. The presence of kinship relations across the borders of two or more countries that identify themselves with their ethnic ties in formally opposing states increases the likelihood of interstate conflict and societal insecurity, such as the war in the former Yugoslavia. Societal security should be brought to the forefront of security studies as it provides a way of thinking about security issues in which the referent object is not the state, but societies.

This chapter has argued that the concept of societal security is critical in examining a significant range of threats that cannot be understood through the old realist state-centric/military-centric national security
perspective. Societal security suggests that identity groups are concerned with survival through preserving their identity, whilst states seek to maintain their sovereignty. This leads to a dilemma in which traditional security concepts fail to appropriately address the sub-state security problems (Smith, 2000, 83). Moreover, an increase in state security might lead to an increase in the insecurity of certain societal groups. From the point of view of the state, however, ‘any defence of societal identity by the groups may be perceived as a threat to the state’s legitimacy, sovereignty, and such groups can also be construed as “harbouring secessionist goals”’ (Roe, 1999, 199).

Whilst traditional thinking, based on realism, advocates the state as a mere referent object of security, this study, argues that such a view is too narrow and inadequate in answering the question of identity and the societal security dilemma. Smith in criticizing the realist’s security views argues that ‘the state is no longer the only or core actor, and as a result it is less privileged than before’ (2000: 77). Roe argues that, ‘societal security is particularly effective for understanding the security concerns of multi-ethnic states: the relation between the regime (majority group) and the country’s minority groups’ (2007: 179). So ‘reducing contradictions between the state and societal security is thus a precondition for successful ‘national’ security policy’ (Waever, 1993: 57).

Societal insecurities occur when a society feels its identity to be targeted and endangered. In sum, when people’s identity and their state’s ideology do not coincide, people react so as to defend themselves. Any attempt to increase the security of a nation by the state, inevitably increases the insecurity of the state. It is clear that societal security is a significant and complimentary factor for state security, not an obstacle. If society is secure within a particular state, other important elements such as territory, state apparatus will be secure. Societal security and state security can sometimes be at odds, and weak states which are unable to mobilise their own power may pose a considerable security risk to their
societies because they would be more vulnerable to penetration by outside actors.

In short, today's cross-border risks and threats are largely targeting societies and defending against them requires a more holistic understanding of security. A delicate web of values, connections, and infrastructure characterizes societies today. Striking out against this form of connection means trying to destroy societies. Border security includes not only preventing an attack, physical protection of assets, and consequence management, but also security for the identity of those societies that it is supposed to protect. One step further, it is expected to shape the environment within which it operates. In other words, border security must be embedded in a larger notion of 'societal security'. This approach can create a more useful context for border security and lead to a transformation of whole system.
CHAPTER 5

NATIONAL SECURITY AND SOCIETAL SECURITY - IMPLICATIONS FOR RETHINKING BORDER SECURITY

FROM TRADITIONAL TO NON-TRADITIONAL BORDER SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

With the pace of reconceptualising security over the past decades, border security issues have become increasingly important and need to be adequately addressed both in practical and academic terms within security studies. Given that the nature and scope of new threats border security can no longer be considered a domestic issue or an internal security matter. The cross-border nature of new threats affects all countries throughout the world. However, the two different face of security are still operative, both national and state security on the one hand, and societal and identity security on the other.

Therefore, this chapter aims to examine the concept of border security from the perspective of traditional national security and non-traditional societal security, in order to answer the following question: What are the effects of prevailing perspectives of state-centric national security and non-traditional societal security on current and future interpretations of border security. The answer provides a clear picture for readers and elucidates discussions at the analysis stage.

Bearing in mind the discussions in previous chapter (conceptual framework), this paper will first examine the traditional border security concept and its limitations will be analysed. Following that, non-traditional border security approaches will be laid out, including the new modes of border security practice. Finally, interpretations of border security from the perspective of societal security will be analysed.
5.1. Traditional concepts of border security

In a common understanding of the term, the concept of the border of the state refers to ‘external’, ‘interstate’ or ‘international’ borders that delimit and delineate states as independent entities in the state system (Anderson, 1996; Prescott, 1987). William Walters (2006:193) defines border as a continuous line demarcating the territory and sovereign authority of the state, enclosing its domain. It corresponds most closely with the historical spatiality of political power (Walters, 2006) which Agnew calls the ‘field of forces’: a geopolitical world of ‘rigidly defined territorial units in which each state can gain power only at the expense of the others and each has total control over its own territory’ (1999: 504). Borders here are primarily understood as empirical and physically tangible manifestations of political territorial units, whereby the geopolitical borderline serves to contain state sovereignty and jurisdiction (Prescott, 1965). Borders, based on this paradigm, become visible lines in space.

Indeed, the concept of the border of the state frames dominant notions of who and where the ‘enemy’ of the state is (Nick Vaughan-William, 2009: 3). Because ‘realist and neo-realist perspectives understand security in terms of the history of the defence and/or transgression of states’ borders’ (Linklater and MacMillan, 1995: 12). Due to the relative dominance of realist and neo-realist approaches in security studies, with their emphasis on state survival in an anarchical self-help system, other states were viewed as the sources of threat to the key element of national security and boundaries were viewed as the likely means of overcoming that threat. In other words, they operate like a barrier. Therefore the notion of border is traditionally militarized and the traditional understanding of the role of state boundaries in national security is based on the prevention of military threat. As Andreas (2003: 81) suggests ‘early geopolitical thinking stressed the centrality of territorial
competition and acquisition’ and Kolossov affirms that ‘border areas become militarised zones with a special regime, where the highest priority is the fighting efficiency of military units ready to repulse the aggression of a potential enemy’ (2012: 622). In other words, borders are strategic lines to be defended, they are highly militarized because of their deterrent functions against possible military attacks by other states. In the realist assessment border ‘... territorial security is about fundamentally interstate rather than transnational relations’ (Adreas, 2003: 81). As a result, the main focus of security studies is the phenomenon of war (Walt, 1991: 212). Eventually, this perspective creates an understanding of border as a fixed, front line designed to stop the penetration of undesirable individuals, goods and information. It is a means of the greatest possible control over any transboundary flows (Kolossov, 2012: 622). Strikingly, in this sense, Kolossov (2012: 622) claims that border zones are economically undeveloped ‘because of deliberate limitations on investment in certain branches’ and there are attempts ‘to subordinate all social life to military needs’ to forestall possible future security problems.

In a deeper analysis; the most distinguishing feature of traditional border security is based on ‘a state-centric territorial defence’ which is the foundation of the modern Westphalian state system which Agnew (1998) has called the ‘modern geopolitical imagination’. According to Agnew (1998: 51), the ‘state-centric account of spatiality’ is characterised by three geographical assumptions: first, ‘states have exclusive sovereign power over their territories’; second, ‘domestic and foreign are separate and distinct realms’; and third, the ‘boundaries of a state define the boundaries of 'society'.’ Ó Tuathail further suggests that ‘Modern geopolitics, according to this logic, is a discursive formation, which privileges sovereign states, bordered realms and distinct territorially delimited societies’ (1998: 17). It implies that traditional border security aims at the securitisation of the state in general rather than society.
The perceptions of this traditional thinking undoubtedly continue to impinge on security practices today. The Russian invasion of the Ukraine and annexation of the Crimea demonstrates that borders are still contested militarily to alter interstate boundaries. However, this has been questioned over recent years, particularly since the end of the Cold War, even though one can still see the components of such understandings which influence today’s security objectives, such as building walls and fences at the borders to counteract vast migration. Although it is fair to say that in the post September 11th security environment ‘transnational law evaders rather than interstate military invaders increasingly drive state border security priorities’ (Adreas, 2003: 82) and the traditional function of borders has become much less important than in the past (Adreas, 2003: 81).

### 5.2. Concepts of Non-traditional Border Security

The term ‘non-traditional security’ is used as an opposite concept to traditional security in this chapter and study. A non-traditional security concept has primarily three key features: first and foremost, it rejects the geographically fixed, fortified boundaries to stop threats; second, the referent object of security is not only the state itself, but sometimes can be other objects, like society/societies; third, it does not emphasize traditional military challenges as threats but other types of threats and from non-military sectors.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the view of borders has dramatically changed and scholars began to pursue postmodern intellectual discourses on the topic. The concept of postmodern is understood here as a tendency, which questions the Westphalian state system. The postmodern is a post-Westphalian world where states are no longer as sovereign as they once were, where transnational actors and forces are problematizing domestic/foreign borders, and where
transnational media and networks are creating a “global society” (Ó Tuathail 1998: 17). Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998: 3,8) posit that in the Cold War era border security was classified exclusively as a sub-set of national security and failed to consider the state boundary in its broader associated fields of social and cultural influences. Especially, in the context of border security, this new orientation underlines how the geopolitical thinking of the past produces today’s inefficiencies. This inefficiency was targeted specifically, in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP):

it has been related to nation-states more than people. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. [...] With the dark shadows of the Cold War receding, one can see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.

The UN, here, clearly suggests that state-centric world political system and traditional rationale of security systems are not adequate to guarantee meaningful security, while highlighting that ordinary people’s daily concerns should be paramount. As Dalby suggests ‘It also implies that both the causes of insecurity and the possible solutions to security problems are to be found only by including actors and institutions beyond the ambit of the state system’ (1998: 322). Kolossov (2012: 624) supports this idea and proposes ‘boundary security is now a matter not only of the state. It must take into account the interests of local and international organisations and actors’, so that non-state actors, specifically ordinary people have come to the agenda as a referent object, which creates a qualitative difference inevitably.

As pointed out by John Agnew, the collapse of the dialectical politics of the Cold War era led to a consciousness of a ‘global visualization’ where people can see themselves as a common unit free from the divisive nature of the Cold War polarities between democracy and communism (Ó
Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 21). In other words, the post-Cold War political environment raised consciousness of the greater inter-connections between nation-states through trans-boundary flows in what was to be known as globalization. ‘In contrast to a modern geopolitical imagination dominated by state-centric spatiality (bordered, sovereign, territorially delimited states), the postmodern geopolitical imagination grapples with borderlessness, state failure, and deterritorialisation’. (Ó Tuathail 1998: 17). However, there are discussions on the meaning and scope of postmodern thoughts. Newman (1998: 4) argues that the changing function of boundaries does not mean a ‘borderless’ world. He suggests that although some elements of state sovereignty transferred to supranational bodies it does not mean the end of territorial sovereignty in traditional sense (Newman1998: 6). ‘It would be more in line with postmodern reasoning to describe the boundary changes underway as “de-borderings”...what this term suggests is that we currently witness a continuing functional differentiation on a worldwide scale, with an ensuing incongruence of functional boundaries that cease to overlap on one line (the territorial state's boundary)” (Albert 2007: 62, 63). Thus, it may be more accurate to say that the importance of territoriality is shifting rather than simply diminishing (Andreas, 2000: 3).

However, post-Cold War risks are no longer territorially defined clear threats; ‘rather post-Cold War risks have become amorphous and pervasive dangers’ (Ó Tuathail 1998: 21, 22, 28). With the start of globalization, transnational threats are more potent than ever as they are ‘amorphous and decentralized, mobile and shifting webs’ that benefit from the same technological advancements in transportation and communication as societies do (Ó Tuathail 1998: 21, 22, 28). Andreas (2003: 78) called these threats ‘clandestine transnational actors’ (CTAs), defined as non-state actors who operate across national borders in violation of state laws and who attempt to evade law enforcement efforts. As a result, ‘National security has become a problematic of global
security’ (Ó Tuathail 1998: 21, 22, 28). Under the pressures of cross-border threats, this shift led to an expansion in the notion of border. Hudson (1998: 95, 96) describes it as ‘extra-territoriality’ and he suggests that under the protection and universality principles of International Law, a state may legitimately ‘claim jurisdiction’ on activities beyond its borders if it were ‘universally viewed as harmful and illegitimate’. This provides a basis for expanding the notions of ‘internal security’ outward, and thus under such a paradigm, security that is traditionally applied only at border checkpoints can be legitimately applied to foreign threats.

Indeed, the idea behind this new orientation is that it is impossible to cope with new challenges solely by the use of military, police, or paramilitary forces. ‘Even the most powerful armies of the world cannot adequately counteract illegal migration, international terrorism, the traffic in drugs and weapons, the risk of epidemics, trans-boundary pollution, or global environmental disaster’ (Kolossov 2012: 623). Ó Tuathail (1998: 28) classifies these threats as: 1) de-territorialised threats which were modified traditional national security threats, so-called 'hard' threats involving weapons and violence posed by transnational networks of terrorists and cyber-criminals, or threats posed by proliferating weapons of mass destruction and 2) 'global dangers' comprised 'softer' less traditional national security threats posed by global environmental problems (access to scarce resources, population pressures and environmental stress), international migration and violent ethnic nationalism. Under the pressure of these threats ‘Cold-war institutions have attempted to re-invent themselves by creating new bureaucracies, pluralising their understanding of security and developing discourses like ‘de-territorialised threats’ and ‘global dangers’ in response to late twentieth century world’ (Ó Tuathail 1998: 28). To highlight the shift from military based border security concepts, Andreas coins a new term, ‘police borders’ and argues that police borders are increasingly
important while military and economic borders are much less prominent than in the past (2003: 109).

Therefore, as discussed above, many experts are now convinced that attempts to provide security by traditional methods, for example by strengthening the barrier functions of boundaries, are inefficient. In line with this reality, cold-war institutions have tried to re-structure themselves by creating new bureaucracies, new legislation and new types of border control.

5.3. Locating border security

Border control and legislation as measures for securitising borders here differs in some aspects from traditional boundary security due to the changing nature of borders. This change is best captured in Balibar’s (2004: 1) words:

The term border is extremely rich in significations [...] The borders of new socio-political entities, in which an attempt is being made to preserve all the functions of the sovereignty of the state, are no longer entirely situated at the outer limit of territories; they are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled— for example, in cosmopolitan cities.

This might be a direct result of the nature of border security issues such as terrorism, vast migration, organised crime and contagious diseases control. All these issues require cross border solutions because of their impact beyond the boundaries of a single society, Balibar (2002: 84) uses the term ‘heterogeneity of the borders’ referring to their nature, implying that borders are becoming more diffuse in the sense that they no longer constitute the sites within nation-states in which politics, culture and socioeconomics coincide. Borders are no longer necessarily situated at the border. More importantly for Balibar the traditional relationships between the state and its supposed territory and (national) identity is
changing under the conditions of globalization, leading not to a borderless world, but a world in which borders are increasingly reflexive. As Balibar suggests ‘Borders are both multiplied and reduced in their localisation and their function...they are being thinned out and doubled, becoming border zones, regions, or where one can reside and live.’ (1998: 220).

These membrane-like borders are not necessarily confined to the territorial limits of the state, or even at other traditional points of entry such as train stations and airports (membranes are typically described as flexible as well as porous): they are unfixed and mobile, diffused throughout, within and outside the state (Rumford, 2006; Walters, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2008). They are, as Etienne Balibar has stated, ‘...dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled (2004: 1). Thus, strikingly, mobility is not simply in terms of immigrants or other goods and people crossing the border, but the actual border itself.

On this logic, the process of bordering becomes a kind of mobility management business that is located throughout and beyond the state, where securitisation and protection does not categorically mean ‘closing the door’ but rather continued, and indeed, increased focus on mobility, categorisation and thus control’ (Cooper 2012: 51).

Indicative of this, Andreas (2003: 78), for example, suggests simply ‘more intensive border law enforcement is accompanying the de-militarization and economic liberalization of borders’. In other words, ‘a fundamental shift to policing has caused a reconfiguration of the border and while it is becoming less militarised, it is becoming more a site of stringent law enforcement’ (2003: 78). According to Andreas the new goal of policing across the border is to ‘selectively deny territorial access’ (2003: 78).

According to Andreas the reconfiguration of border security involves:

- creating new and more restrictive laws;
- constructing a more expansive policing and
surveillance apparatus that increasingly reaches beyond physical borderlines; promoting greater cross-border police cooperation and use of neighbours as buffer zones; deploying more sophisticated detection technologies and information systems; redefining law enforcement concerns as security concerns; and converting war-fighting agencies, technologies, and strategies to carry out crime fighting missions (Andreas, 2003: 107).

Andreas, here, clearly indicates that border security is not just a law enforcement issue or a military issue because securitization of border does not necessarily take place at the edge of the territory in the new security environment and this engenders a necessity of converting traditional agencies into organizations which can deal with new threats. While security strategies are adapted to the new security environment, security's spatial, political, and institutional arenas should also be reviewed, in alignment with the interests, strategies, and ideologies of key actors, thereby further transforming state apparatus. Three thought-provoking models illustrate the changing spatiality of securitization of borders: remote control, citizen-surveillance and juxtaposed borders.

A strategy, which is at the same time privatisation of border control in a sense, often called 'remote control' (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2000), requires truck drivers to repeatedly check their cargo for illegal immigrants using increasingly sophisticated methods commonly found at traditional border sites (Walters, 2006: 194), long before reaching and crossing the UK borders. Nick Vaughan-Williams’s conceptualisation of the ‘citizen detective’ is another example in that citizens themselves can be said to be undertaking border security practices, such as downloading pictures of wanted suspects onto mobile phones, or being provided with phone numbers to ring if a suspected or suspicious person is identified (Vaughan-Williams, 2008: 63). In similar vein, supermarket checkout staff are being trained by MI5 to recognise terrorist activities. Strikingly, this example indicates that ‘the supermarket checkout now resembles a border crossing or transit point where personal possessions, goods and
identities are routinely scrutinised’ (Rumford, 2008: 1), so that the techniques and practices regularly employed at the border are being introduced to the supermarket. ‘The supermarket checkout has come to resemble a border: a border in the midst of society’ (Rumford, 2008: 1). The third model is the UK’s strategy known as juxtaposed borders. This entails the UK having a border control presence in Brussels and Paris, and at the same time the French have a border control presence at St Pancras Eurostar terminal in London (Rumford, 2008: 2). ‘Juxtaposed controls in France and Belgium have contributed to a 70 per cent reduction in unfounded asylum claims since 2002.’ (Home Office, 2007).

There are two significant lessons to learn from these examples. First, securitisation of borders should no longer necessarily take place at the geopolitical or territorial boundary line or zone. Second, in connection with this, a new form of statehood has emerged. This is important because, while traditional security concerns give prominent importance to state borders, non-traditional security concepts tend to traverse these borders through a re-bordering process. From the non-traditional point of view, the most prominent characteristic is to transport particular issues from the national level to a variety of new spatial and territorial arenas and in doing so, transform traditional forms of state mechanism.

This is different from simple internationalisation of security issues based on state territory. Bigo (2001), for example, demonstrates how internal and external security is increasingly conflated through the extension of internal policing practices beyond state borders and the domestic deployment of the military. It means dealing with non-traditional security issues requires governance to be shifted beyond territorial borders and at the same time thinking about the role of non-state institutions and changing those of established institutions of the state so that non-traditional border security does not simply mean adding new threats to a list of security concerns for states whose fundamental nature remains unchanged. Rather, by virtue of its cross-border nature, it requires a process of state transformation.
The relationship between security policies and their socio-political and economic context is important here. When shaping, security policy professionals who exercise state power should consider the changing mind-set of statehood and the interests of society including the resistance points. Consequently, this strategy will help to remove potential conflicts between state and society across borders and it will serve to rationalize and legitimize the traditional methods of security systems based on fixed borders.

The examples demonstrate that the assumption that borders are to be found at the edges of a state territory has shifted away from the external borders and those borders are becoming dispersed throughout society and anywhere outside the country. Therefore, securitisation of borders should no longer necessarily take place at the geopolitical or territorial boundary line or zone. The border has become diffuse and mobile and lost its traditional spatiality. Particularly within the dominant discourse around the concept of re-bordering (or the formation of new borders) which better provides an example of new strategies of securitization. Success and effectiveness of border security strategy relies on this re-bordering of borders, compatible with the mobility logic and different from the strict geopolitical sense. However, this means that territoriality undergoes a constant processes of ‘de and re-territorialisation’, but they are still state borders. The question here is whether this dynamic process (de/re-territorialisation) is an adequate solution for contemporary security problems.

5.4. Society, border and border security

The diffusion of borders throughout society has become a key theme in border studies in recent times. The idea that borders are diffused throughout society, engenders a strong correlation between the principles of societal security and border security, particularly in the context of borders where people living on both sides share cultural, ethnic and
religious ties, especially in cases where national borders are required to be both open for business and closed to terrorists and traffickers. In this context, Konrad and Nicoll’s idea of ‘a zone of interaction’ is a good example: ‘a zone of interaction where people on one side of the border share values, beliefs, emotions and expectations with people on the other side of the border’ (2008: 32). By emphasizing the connectivity of borders, this notion is thereby helping to shift the discussion of borders away from traditional state-centric approach. More importantly perhaps in the present context they emphasize that locals do not necessarily see borders in the same way as state institutions. For example, Sibley (1995) understands borders as societal and notes that groups use borders symbolically to further their own ends (e.g. securing socio-spatial/ethnic homogeneity). This then signifies that ‘Bordering is a practical activity, enacted by ordinary people as well as (nation) states, to make sense of and ‘do work’ in the world’ (Cooper and Perkins, 2012: 57).

For Donnan and Wilson, people ‘impose their own border meanings within the borderland’, and borders are both ‘meaning-making’ and ‘meaning-carrying’ entities, forming an integral part of cultural landscapes (Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 4). Indeed, van Schendel (2005) argues that the study of borderlands should be less state-centric, because borderlands are spaces of interest in their own right. Therefore there is a change, away from concentrating on the territorial dividing line of traditional understanding, to the way in which people experience borders through constructing their own ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’, and such a move views the border as a space in which these identity dynamics can play out. In this way a useful focus on the social construction of borders allows us to explore alternative ways to produce security strategies. In these terms the importance of van Schendel’s work on borderlands cannot be underestimated. van Schendel argues that ‘borders not only join what is different but also divide what is similar’ (2005a: 44). Borderland here is described as a ‘zone or region within which lies an international border’, more importantly, a borderland society is ‘a social and cultural system
straddling that border’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 44). van Schendel is particularly interested in illicit (cross border) trade in the context of borderlands and in terms of this chapter, there are some very useful insights that can be extracted. To sum up in his own words:

For border landers, the state scale is not overarching and does not encompass the more ‘local’ scales of community, family, the household or the body. On the contrary, to them it is the state that, in many ways, represents the local and the confining, seeking to restrict the spatiality of border lander’s everyday relations. Scales that most heart landers experience as neatly nested within the state scale – face-to-face relations of production, marketing networks, or community identities – are experienced very differently by border landers. In their case, these scales are often less ‘local’ than the state; they breech the confines of that scale, spill over its limits, escape its mediating pretensions, and therefore set the scene for a specific borderland politics of scale (van Schendel, 2005b: 49).

It is essential to point out here that, for van Schendel, scale politics specifically involves the inability of the state scale to prevent clandestine (unauthorised) cross border activity. The state scale, in other words, is unable to achieve complete hegemony because it is constantly being challenged by the restructuring/rescaling capabilities of border landers, or as van Schendel (2005b: 55) described it ‘everyday trans-nationality’. In the context of the India/Bangladesh borderland, van Schendel gives a few examples such as an arms smuggler who uses the pronoun ‘we’ to simultaneously refer to fellow Indian citizens, to other cross-border smugglers, and to a regional religious category.

The significant question here is why sovereign state law enforcement regulations include tough border security measures but no solutions to the flow of people and goods. The answer lies in van Schendel’s suggestion that issues of legality and illegality should not take the state as the point of departure (2005b). He makes a distinction between what
states consider to be legitimate (legal) and what people involved in transnational networks consider to be legitimate. Van Schendel stresses that there is a clear line between illicitness and laws of state, ‘state definitions of what is illicit are situational’ (2005b: 7). He also argues that understanding the nature, pattern, forms and meanings of illegal transnational activities remains far from adequate because of variety of reasons from the difficulties of conducting research and more importantly ‘the difficulty of thinking outside the conceptual and material grasp of the modern state’ (2005b: 8). What we are particularly interested here is the movement across state borders and its impact in relation to the territorial security concept. As van Schendel points out:

Individuals and social groups that systematically contest or bypass state controls do not simply flout the letter of the law; with repeated transgressions over time, they bring into question the legitimacy of the state itself by questioning the state’s ability to control its own territory (van Schendel, 2005b: 14).

He describes ‘the transnational criminal activities’ as forms of social practise that intersect two or more regulatory spaces and violate at least one normative or legal rule (van Schendel, 2005b: 15). He also posits that something considered illegal in a formal sense [by state] may not be considered illicit by the population or even by the law enforcement community, by giving the example of Qat (kat) leaves in Yemen and the Netherlands decriminalisation the possession of marijuana (2005b: 18), van Schendel continues:

Legal restrictions often come up against socially sanctioned practises, and while this may have the effect of driving these practises into the sphere of formal criminality, it does not eliminate them nor does it necessarily force them into hiding. Likewise, the absence of the law does not imply that all is permissible (2005b: 18).

The discussion above clearly demonstrates that the political limits of the state do not always overlap geographic limits, even within the state
territory political limits may not reach the geographic limits. ‘The political and geographic limits of sovereignty imply the presence of competing authorities, whether other states or non-state ideological affiliations, and thereby constitute foundational crises of authority’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 23). As a result, if the state fails to understand these unique interactions and intersections occurring in the borderland it will reinforce the securitization of the borders and undoubtedly cause conflicts with society. In addition, neighbouring states may have different views on illegality. What is considered illegal on one side of the border may be considered legal or not strategically significant on the other. This situation also leads to increasing mobility across the borders of the state, for example cross-border shopping and cross border gambling.

To sum up, the ongoing struggle between border enforcement agencies and border crossers emerge due to different understandings of legitimacy. Breaking a law may not have the same illegitimate implications for different communities. Therefore, de/re-territorialisation of security without fully comprehending the interests of the various societies of the borderland is destined to fail.

For border problems such as illegal immigration, terrorism and trafficking there are a wide range of administrative solutions such as hard border controls, more criteria for entry, forward defences within the neighbourhood territory, setting up buffer zones or creating economic development policies for people to stay in their countries. However, successful policy for example to stop hundreds of people dying in the Mediterranean is hard to find. Territoriality may be reinforced by processes of ‘de and re-territorialisation of borders, but they may predominantly be state borders nevertheless. Thus, a wide range of factors such as rapid developments in transportation, increasing cross-border economic activities, kinship, religious and ethnic ties has promoted new security strategies. ‘This tactic does not remove the state from security analysis, but it does shift it off centre stage: it puts more ‘national’ back into national security’ (Waever et al. 1993: 196). It
signifies border security is more than boundary protection and not ‘a subset of national security’ any more. It directly relates to how society experiences the border.

5.5. Clash of borders and the efficiency of security strategies
Territorial states and international boundaries are recent phenomena. It was during the late Middle ages that the concepts of sovereignty, ‘the notion that each state commands a monopoly of legitimate power within its own domain’ and of territory, ‘the delineation of that domain around self-enclosed, mutually exclusive borders’, merged to create the modern territorial state (Brenner et al. 2003: 2). In 1648 the Treaty of Westphalia, by recognising the territorial sovereignty of 300 states in Europe, marked the consolidation of the concept of the state as we know it today (Taylor, 2000: 158). State borders were seen as a barrier against assaults from outside and they symbolize territoriality. The contemporary realities of interdependence and territorial security, along with debates over the meaning and limits of national sovereignty and security have made the management of borders an increasingly contested concept in recent years. In terms of security, border notions express different meanings to the state and to society.

With close links to territorial (national) security, borders are a means of building a nation-state and sustaining national unity with the additional benefit of safeguarding the state from external threats. Borders have been seen as the markers of the state and ‘the spatial strategy of territoriality –the attempt by states to claim complete authority and control over social life in a given territory- produces borders and makes them crucial markers of success and limitation of strategy’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 46). This, indeed, clearly implies that the success of the old notion of territorial security might become its weakness at the same time.

As discussed above, national security, referring to territorial security and border control, is the main means of restricting territorial access.
Borders, as John Agnew has reminded us, are integral to the making of the nation-state (2008). Political spaces, and the borders which contain them, used to be given a prominent importance by the institutions of the nation state because the indivisibility of national territory and maintenance of visible borders are two of the most significant markers of sovereignty. John Agnew’s notion of the ‘territorial trap’ is extremely useful in trying to understand the different assumptions that are rooted in our understanding of the modern nation-state. These assumptions can also constitute the weaknesses of territorial state security. He distinguishes three key assumptions. The first is that the modern nation state is a clearly bounded territorial space. Secondly and consequently, ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs are two entirely different realms. Finally, the assumption that boundaries of the state equate to boundaries of society (Agnew, 1994: 53). However, after the Cold War, the ‘lazy assumption’ (borrowed from van Schendel) of state and society as territorially conterminous has been undermined. The boundaries of society (identity) are different and are determined by language, religion, race, and culture, in contrast modern state boundaries were and are constituted by territory. A border, therefore, is simply taken to be a marker of difference but not impenetrable division. However, a society’s borders may represent a fluidity and diffusion beyond state borders.

This differentiation impacts greatly on security strategies and even on the definition of security. In deconstruction examining the geographical borders of a territorial state, the borders of the state constitute ‘us’ and ‘them’ and thus military is deployed to protect these borders from those outside, not like ‘us’. However, as we often see in the Middle East and the rest of the world, ‘them’ may not be ‘them’ from a societal perspective. This flaw of traditional territorial security is central when growing numbers of groups begin to express their identities politically and make political demands on the state. As a result, conflicts become inevitable.

On the other hand, equating state boundaries to societal boundaries assumes that inside is homogenous and outside is different. The creation
and consolidation of an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ to the nation-state is crucial to its existence. It generates an identity that bounds the concept of this socio-spatial entity together. Nevins (2002: 158) explains how ‘boundaries, emanating from both ideal and material processes, are an outgrowth and simultaneously a producer of nationalism, state power, and the ability of the state and the nation to shape our collective consciousness, and thus practices’.

With the end of the Cold War, however, this inside/outside dichotomy lost its importance. Bishai gives two reasons for that:

Territorial boundaries can never contain completely pure ‘national’ identities for two important reasons. One is that the flow of people across the earth’s surface in all directions has never ceased and is unlikely to ever completely to do so. The other, even more imperative, reason is that regardless of common language, religion, culture or other identity markers, members of a group can never maintain identical perspectives, and ideological separations will always exist (2000: 159)

Just as Agnew (1994: 63) has argued: ‘massive international migrations, the emergence of middle level or world-regional 'superpowers' (e.g. India), and the de-territorialisation of the communications media combine to limit the confinement of ‘Others' in spatial reservations.’ However, as Bishai, (2000: 159) suggests ‘if human collectivities are destined to contain multiple identities, then security, defined as ‘keeping the other out’, becomes an impossibility’ and further, focusing on borders to keep others out for security inevitably creates insecurity. The state borders, in other words, could never keep out the external because the outside world is already inside at the same time. ‘The statist presumption of security through territoriality allows only for an external location for threat. This presumption allowed the state to operate as the describer and provider of both security and identity, for majority’ (Bishai, 2000: 161). However, when group identity and security is created by the state, the system may
create privileges for the most powerful groups who hold the political power. As a result, other ethno-cultural groups can feel threatened because the group which can best use the state power will merge its understanding of national identity and security with the state itself. Inevitably, this can create significant threats, such as secessionist movements, which are a primary threat to state security.

'The primary reason that secession has been seen as both the saviour of the threatened minority group and the bane of sovereign states is the deeply rooted belief that territory is necessary for security' (Bishai, 2000: 167, 168). The reason behind this assumption is explained best by Agnew as:

Security is only possible for a tightly defined spatial unit endowed with sovereignty. Hence, politics, in the sense of the pursuit of justice and virtue, could exist only within territorial boundaries. Outside is danger, realpolitik, and the use of force. Security is then, by definition, the defence of a particular spatial sovereignty and the politics within it (Agnew: 1994: 62).

However, the concept of secession cannot be presented as a solution to a conflict or a democratic right because political identity is again attached to territory as discussed above. By redrawing territorial boundaries, building walls and creating 'others' to define themselves, secessionist groups become privileged and create underprivileged identities in their new territory. To create another territorial state cannot protect people who cannot protect themselves. State borders are based on exclusion rather than inclusion. The erection of border walls and fences only polarises the differences and enhances the antagonism against the people on the other side. This kind of border logic is misleading because state borders are incapable of keeping others on the other side. We then fall into what Agnew refers to as the 'territorial trap'.

However, this does not have to be the case. As Agnew (1994: 53) crucially argues:
Systems of rule or political organization need not be either territorial, where geographical boundaries define the scope of membership in a polity a priori (for example, in kinship or clan systems space is occupied as an extension of group membership rather than residence within a territory defining group membership as in territorial states), or fixed territorially (as with nomads)... even when rule is territorial and fixed, territory does not necessarily entail the practices of total mutual exclusion which the dominant understanding of the territorial state attributes to it (Agnew:1994:54).

Since the territorial security framework has proven incapable of providing security in today’s highly mobilised world, there is a need for a new basis for security that does not depend only upon territoriality. Such a new security framework will be both statist and anti-statist. It will be statist because it will promote ‘secured identities’ without secessionist claims; and it will be anti-statist because it will not depend on a rigid territorial sovereignty for the state. For that reason societal security gives us a useful tool as it represents a reconceptualization of a duality of state and societal security. It can also help to develop some insight into the contemporary security problems connected to territoriality. Although societies are sometimes closely linked the state, they have independent influence in security matters. While societal security sometimes overlaps with the traditional concerns of state security, it can also be considered in its own right.

5.6. Summary
Although there is still a prevalent tendency to see borders from the territorial perspective of the state, societal security offers the opportunity to shift the emphasis in border studies in some important ways. First, and the most important shift is the changing spatiality of borders which is a key feature of contemporary border security practises. It is crucial to recognise that borders are not necessarily at the nation-state frontiers. For example, the EU is active in establishing and shifting borders in and
outside Europe; and indeed defining where Europe's border is located. The patrols carried out by Frontex, off the coast of Africa operationalise a border which is different from traditional territorial border. The ‘Frontex border’ is a new sort of flexible border, deployed whenever and wherever it is needed and works to constitute the EU border similar to Balibar’s construct, that is borders can be found ‘wherever selective controls are to be found’ (Balibar, 2002: 84, 85). The inside/outside distinction has lost its importance and looking out from the watchtower to the other side to look for the enemy will no longer be a valid strategy. Borders now are mobile, dispersed throughout society wherever they are needed; they are a far from the static territorial borders which are viewed necessary for national and territorial identity. However, fluid, diffuse borders do not necessarily exclude traditional forms of borders and their security, and new security strategies should beware of dilution through dissemination and polarisation by societal groups that in turn has the potential to criminalise entire groups.

The connective nature of the border zones, in terms of society’s ability to provide security, engender the need for recognition of the constitutive nature of borders in economic, social and political life and hence this redefinition will provide useful tools to shape the security environment. Borders are not necessarily always working in the service of the state. In the logic of territorial security, borders are seen as a number of securitised defence lines. However, borders do not always conform to this model when people engage in ‘local’ bordering activity designed to regulate mobility over the border fences. Securing borders, therefore, is now less about securing lines, and not even the transformation or shifting of lines. Indeed, securing borders now requires much more emphasis on how people experience the borders.
CHAPTER 6

FROM FEAR OF LOSS OF TERRITORY TO FEAR OF CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to existing research by creating a clear picture of the current border security framework in Turkey in the reader’s mind. The chapter comprises two main components. The first, discusses organisational structures which the researcher has determined is part of the problem. The second will focus on the politics of security in Turkey to give the reader a clear insight to this crucial aspect because it constitutes a major component of this complex problem.

This will provide some useful tools while discussing the traditional and contemporary philosophy of border security norms, because Turkish policy choices with respect to the external borders are directly related to its national security structure and national security policy. The focus will then move to the external and domestic dynamics affecting Turkey's national security choices.

Turkey has difficulties in providing border security as it is a country which has long mountainous land borders on the east and south west and has large borders with several countries with unstable regimes such as Iraq and Syria. Internal conflicts, financial difficulties and undemocratic behaviours have led many people from neighbouring countries to come to Turkey in search of a better life. It also has long coasts (6530 km) which constitute sea borders to the South, North and West. Turkey represents a crossroads between the Middle East, Asia and Europe and this geographical location requires a strong border control and safeguarding organization. Turkey has a total of 2,949 km. of land borders and a rugged land configuration. Borders in the east and southeast lie on mountains constituting 65per cent of its land borders in mountainous
regions. In addition some border regions suffer from severe climatic conditions where harsh, winters may last up to six months.

Turkey is also strategically on several routes for illegal immigration so that people try to reach the EU by passing through Turkey. As a result, Turkey is faced with a number of risks and threats such as terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, weapons of mass destruction, and a range of unlawful actions by transnational organized criminals.

In recent years, illegal border crossings, mostly in the form of multinational organized crime (smuggling, trafficking and terrorism etc.), have created serious difficulties not only for Turkey but also for European border management systems. Illegal immigrants are smuggled into Turkey and also Europe either across unregulated land, sea or air borders or through regulated security check points using counterfeit/stolen passports or as concealed cargoes. Turkey is affected by these illegal activities due to its position as a ‘bridge’ between east and west. Turkey's borders are currently protected by the military at the land borders, the General Directorate of Security is responsible for the entry and exit of the persons at border gates, the Undersecretariat of Customs is responsible for the entry and exit of the goods at border gates, and surveillance duties at maritime borders (between the border gates) are performed by the Coast Guard Command.

In line with the EU membership processes the Strategy Paper for the Protection of the External Borders in Turkey was adopted in 2003. This Strategy Paper recommended that a single authority should be responsible for the security of the borders under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, which would take over the border control functions currently performed by the Turkish military and semi-military structures. The new authority will be in charge of all border protection duties in Turkey and specially trained, professional law-enforcement units will perform all functions, in line with EU standards (National Action Plan, p.20). The purpose of the Action Plan was to form the basis
for institutional reforms and legislative regulations, in order to establish a single civilian, non-military, professional body responsible for performing all border control and surveillance tasks at the borders. In accordance with the Action Plan, Turkey decided, prior to the establishment of a non-military and professional Border Guard Organization, to further strengthen the technical and administrative capacities of agencies and institutions responsible for the control of the borders, to be in line with the EU Member States practices. Turkey is now creating a new Border Security Department for European Union integration and this department will be responsible for border security. In order to map out Turkey’s border security policy, it is necessary to scrutinise the Turkish National Security concept because there is no separate border security strategy. Border security issues are dispersed within the concept of National Security. This provides an opportunity for the reader to better understand the criticisms in the following sections which discuss the external and domestic dynamics affecting Turkey’s transformation process.

6.1. The existing border security framework in Turkey
Currently in Turkish law, the authority in charge of border security is the Ministry of Interior. The Interior Ministry performs this duty with the help of governors and district governors. Whilst performing this task, a number of organisations were set up alongside governors to ensure border security. The military is responsible for the protection and surveillance of land and sea borders, and Police and Customs are responsible for the check and control of passengers and goods at border gates. At the airports, the authority for border security lies under the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for security operations. According to the Additional Article 1 of the 5442 Law for Provincial Administration, the Ministry fulfils this task via local authorities, police forces, private security forces and related public and private institutions
and organizations. The Coast Guard Command have law enforcement powers although it is a military organization. However, the Land Forces General Command which is responsible for the protection of the land borders has no law enforcement authority. The criminals apprehended by the Land Forces units are immediately delivered to the Gendarmerie or Police units for necessary proceedings.

6.1.1. Institutional Framework

According to Turkish Law, the overall supervision of border security is exercised by the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of the Interior performs these functions through the deputy governors assigned by the Governors according to ‘Provincial Administration Law’. The District Governors, who are responsible for co-ordination among the various agencies working at the borders and border gates, are the 1st degree border authorities, and the Governors are the 2nd degree border authorities. Checking of goods and people at the border gates are carried out separately by border protection agencies.

The present system for Border Management consists of several fully autonomous Border Agencies, some are of a military character such as Land Forces and the Coast Guard; and others are civilian.

Border management and controls are currently carried out by the following agencies:

- General Directorate of Security (Police Forces), (duties related to the entry and exit of persons at border gates)
- Under-Secretariat of Customs (duties related to the entry and exit of goods at border gates)
- Land Forces General Command (duties related to the border surveillance at land borders)
- Coast Guard Command (duties related to surveillance of maritime borders, no responsibility at border gates)
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (duties related to veterinary and phytosanitary inspections at border gates)
Ministry of Health (duties related to human inspections at border gates)

There are currently no links between the databases of the different border services. Information exchange occurs on an ad-hoc basis and is not institutionalized. Cross-border exchange of information between some of the border agencies and their counterparts is also carried out on ad-hoc basis, as there are currently no laid down formal procedures.

6.1.2. General Directorate of Security (Police Forces)
The Turkish Police, which is in charge of checks on people at the Border Gates perform the following duties:

- carrying out exit and entry checks, including registration;
- checking of visas and travel documents;
- detecting forged/counterfeit travel documents and taking such steps as inadmissibility and initiation of judicial proceedings;
- deportation procedures;
- receiving of asylum applications;
- Other security measures when dealing with the smuggling of human beings, as well as performing general law enforcement functions.

6.1.3. The Land Forces General Command
The 3497 Law of Protection and Security of Land Borders designates the Turkish Land Forces as the responsible authority for the task of the protection and security of land borders. The main duties at the land borders are fighting against smuggling, undertaking checks and control of forbidden military zones, performing tasks related to illegal entries and immigration, and handing over detainees to local law enforcement authorities. However, The Land Forces General Command, which is
responsible for the protection of about 91 per cent of the land borders, has no law enforcement authority.

The principal responsibility of the TSK (Turkish military) at the borders is reconnaissance and surveillance of the neighbouring country within the framework of national defence. However, while the TSK units do their job related to border security they are in a position to assist the Ministry of Interior in border protection, for example by apprehending and handing over criminals to the local civilian authorities in the borderlands.

Of specific note, the Gendarmerie, which is a military institution, but reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, used to conduct duties related to border surveillance in the areas, where other agencies are not able to act because of specific geographical and/or political conditions (mainly at the border with Iraq). The Gendarmerie has completely transferred its responsibility over these borders latter to the Turkish Land Forces; thus, removing a duality over the protection and security of land borders of the country.

6.1.4. The Coast Guard Command

The Coast Guard Command is the principal agency for the enforcement of the provisions of all national laws with regard to the maritime zones. The Coast Guard fulfils its missions along the sea borders of 6,530 kilometers. The main duties of the Coast Guard are

- to protect and ensure the security of the coastal and territorial waters,
- to prevent and detect all kinds of smuggling carried out at sea,
- to observe and control the operational status of navigational aids,
- to perform search and rescue missions within the search and rescue area at sea,
- to assist other security forces to detect crimes different from those mentioned above, which originate on land and continue out at sea,
to intervene in such crimes when required, and to deliver the
detained criminals to the authorized bodies (Public Prosecutors
and/or Gendarmerie and Police).
The significant point here is that the Coast Guard Command has no
responsibilities at the sea border gates and only operates as a law
enforcement agency within its own area of responsibility, under the
auspices of the Ministry of the Interior.

6.1.5. Customs
It is noteworthy that the Undersecretariat of Customs reports to the
Prime Ministry although the Interior Ministry is the primary border
authority. The competence of the Customs at the border gates include:

- control of entry and exit of goods, passengers and all types of
  vehicles and vessels;
- carrying out investigations in regard to all kinds of smuggling
  (including drugs, firearms and cultural property) as an
  Enforcement Unit;
- taking these cases to judicial proceedings;
- preventing infringements of Intellectual Property Rights;
- Assisting the other Law Enforcement Bodies in the prevention of
  human smuggling and cash control.

The Customs is also empowered to secure and control the land border
gate areas and to combat trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials
across the borders.

6.1.6. Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the import of plant and
plant products, as well as animals and animal origin food products.

The steps for the import inspection are as follows:

- Application to Quarantine Service
- Documentary check
- Identity check
- Phytosanitary inspection (visual inspection or lab test)
In the case of rejection at the entry point, non-complying consignments are returned or destroyed and a notification form is sent to the exporting country.

6.1.7. Ministry of Health
While the General Directorate of Primary Health Care Services controls issues concerning human health in relation to land borders, the General Directorate of Border and Coastal Health undertakes the same task in relation to sea borders.

6.2. Attempts for organizational change and the EU impact
Justice, freedom and security are significant and sensitive subjects of the enlargement process. Matters such as border security constitute the main criteria which member countries have to meet. After membership to the EU (if granted), as Turkey’s eastern borders will be the external eastern borders of the Union, the implementation of border management constitutes an important requirement.

Turkey has been struggling to be a member of the EU for a long time. Turkey’s relationship with the EU dates back to 1959. The critical turning point was the Helsinki European Council summit in December 1999 which granted Turkey candidate status. Relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) entered a new stage in October 2005 when the decision to start accession negotiations was finally taken. Among the long list of chapters that Turkey has to negotiate is the chapter on ‘justice, freedom and security’. This is a chapter deals with a wide range of issues arising from the removal of internal frontiers within the European Union, issues ranging from the Schengen visa regime to the evolving common asylum and immigration policy as well as to efforts at enhancing police and judicial cooperation among EU member countries.
The importance of these issues within the EU has rapidly increased and dominated the agenda of the European Union for the last decade because of the rise of international terrorism and the attacks on Madrid and London. Immigration related issues had already been at the top of the agenda for domestic politics in a number of EU member countries, and have now also become associated with issues of terrorism and security.

In this respect Turkey is central to the EU’s efforts to develop and implement a common immigration policy because of its critical geographical location, in terms of immigration related issues, and its unstable neighbours. In addition, Turkey has large numbers of its nationals that would constitute immigrant communities within the European Union. There is an apprehension about the potential arrival of large number of immigrants from Turkey and about their integration within the Union.

Amongst the bitter debates, the EU adopted its first Accession Partnership Strategy (AP) followed by the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) accepted by the Turkish government. The APs were afterwards renewed in 2003, 2006 and 2008. The AP laid out the political reforms that Turkey needed to adopt to meet the Copenhagen political criteria to start accession negotiations as well as the harmonization that Turkey would need to achieve in a wide range of policy areas including ‘freedom, security and justice’. It is under this section that the EU lays out the task that Turkey has to complete in respect to aligning Turkish practice with the EU Acquis. To achieve compliance with EU regulations and practices, Turkey set up a Task Force for Asylum, Migration and Protection of External Borders under the coordination of the Ministry of Interior in 2002. This was composed of representatives from the Coast Guard, the Gendarmerie, the Military, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Undersecretary of Customs and the Secretariat General for European Union Affairs. In fulfilling this task, The Task Force set out, with the help of the Office of European Commission in Ankara, the Strategy Paper

For Turkey, the so-called twinning projects play a fundamental role to align its legislation and structure with the EU. Some of those are ‘Support for the development of an Action Plan to implement Turkey’s integrated border management strategy’ (TR02-JH-02); ‘Support for the development of an Action Plan to implement Turkey’s asylum and migration strategy’ (TR02-JH03); Visa Policy and Practice’ (TR03-JH-05); Strengthening the Institutions in the Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings’ (TR03-JH-03). The projects commonly named as ‘twinnings’ are instruments for targeted administrative cooperation to assist candidate countries to strengthen their administrative and judicial capacity and to implement the EU framework within their national systems. They have been practised as the cornerstone of the joint effort by the European Union (European Commission and member states) and the candidate countries to foster institution-building. These projects are in turn expected to lead to the adoption of Action Plans that lay out the administrative, infrastructural and legislative steps that Turkey aims to take in order to adopt the EU Acquis.

Enhancement of its border security capability is a significant necessity for any country, but it is especially important for Turkey with regards to the EU accession process because if Turkey is accepted as a member state, then Turkish Borders will form the Union’s Eastern border. Based on Article 8 of the Additional Protocol of the Amsterdam Agreement, candidate countries are expected to have the capacity to apply the Schengen Agreement before becoming a member of the EU, in order to be able to execute the provisions of the Agreement after a possible membership. Therefore, Turkey must adopt the provisions of the Schengen Agreement during its membership process and take the necessary precautions with regards to the protection and security of its borders. Accordingly, Turkey is aiming to form a system of integrated border management, which includes reforms for intra-institutional, inter-
institutional, and international cooperation in order to facilitate trade and traffic across its borders. The Strategy Paper underlined that the EU Acquis and the Tampere Council Summit decisions 'foresees all border control to be conducted by a civilian and specialised organization under a single authority' (p.16, 17) and advocated for Turkey the creation of a new body, within the Ministry of the Interior, for all border protection issues composed of non-military, professional law enforcement officials. The strategy equally identified the key legislative and institutional amendments, as well as the infrastructure and training programs, considered as proper alignment with the Schengen Acquis. The Paper also foresaw a twinning project that would culminate in an Action Plan and even gave a name for the specialised organization as the 'Directorate General of Border Security'.

Subsequently, the twinning project was put into place in July 2004 to provide support for the development of an Action Plan to implement Turkey’s integrated border management strategy. The Project aimed at completing an Action plan setting out the legislative alignment, institutional reforms, training and physical infrastructure and equipment necessary to implement the border management strategy. The Project would also identify the investments that would be needed to put this strategy into place to improve the operational capacity for the management of borders as well as familiarize Turkish officials with the EU Acquis. However, despite some important steps such as setting up the Directorate General of Migration Management, it did not go as planned.

In its 2015 Progress Report for Turkey, the European Commission states that in the area of external borders and Schengen ‘Turkey did not make steps towards the establishment of an integrated border management system and a single border civilian agency. Coordination and cooperation among existing border management agencies needs to be improved’ (2015: 70). In the following paragraph the EU commission points out that:
Despite some steps, land borders continue to be managed by land forces, detachments composed mainly of conscripts with limited training and led by officials who are not encouraged to specialise in border management. There are no agreed rules and operating procedures for individual border authorities undertaking risk analysis. Border management authorities should be staffed by professionals who are not subject to rotation (2015: 71).

6.3. Turkey’s border security policy

It should be made clear that there is no separate border security doctrine in Turkey. Instead, strategies are embedded into the national security policy and a generic document which is formally known as the national military defence concept. The specifics of national security policy are revealed only to a few designated people in the shape of a ‘national security policy document’ (the Red Book), which is updated regularly to reflect changes in the domestic and global security environment. Due to its classified nature, this document becomes accessible only through erratic leaks to the media. This has led the researcher to investigate the issue in a broader framework of National Security. Before going into the politics of national security it is necessary to elucidate some aspects of border security policy of Turkey for context. As a starting point, it can be argued that although in a new era which engenders a broadening and deepening of many aspects of the security field, state-centric discourses remain very powerful, whilst new forms of insecurity, violence and conflicts are becoming more destructive and uncontrollable.

There are currently three significant challenges in terms of Turkey’s border security. Firstly, Turkey sits at a critical geographical location in terms of immigration related issues. Large numbers of people from Turkey’s close perimeter are trying to make it to Turkey and the EU as asylum seekers and illegal migrants. The instability, violence and economic problems in the region (the Middle East) worsen this situation.
Secondly, there are a number of terrorist organisations that have emerged in the turmoil of the Middle East. As a result of that Turkey has become a neighbour of a number of terrorist organisation such as DAESH (the so called Islamic State), and PYD (a branch of PKK operating in Syria). This makes the movement of people from this region even more sensitive due to the links between terrorist organisations and illegal immigration. Thirdly, Turkey’s borders with this region are situated in very sizeable and difficult terrain to manage and control. This is further complicated by the fact that Turkey has its own concerns in respect of the defence and protection of these borders, especially the ones with Iraq and Syria. Both historically and currently these borders are subject to infiltrations of PKK terrorists (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party).

Under these circumstances, inevitably, the priority becomes national defence in the narrowest sense of the word, such as preventing infiltration and militarily confronting such infiltration, rather than broader issues of security. In other words, this situation leads Turkey to give priority to border protection in the sense of defence by the military rather than border security as a comprehensive concept integrating all the assets and capabilities the new security environment requires. Until the Syrian crisis Turkey had adopted a more flexible border policy. With the AK Party’s (the Justice and Development Party) coming to power, this more flexible border policy had replaced the traditional border understanding built around the nation state (Yesiltas, 2015: 15). Yesiltas argues that during the period of the ruling AK Party, a zero problem policy, including abolishing visas with neighbouring countries, transformed the conventional threat and protection approach centered on traditional border understanding. Accordingly, ‘border was redefined to pave the way to social mobility by articulating common history discourse and by removing obstacles that limit the socio-political and economic relation between neighbouring countries’ (2015: 16).

Under the influence of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who previously served as an AKP advisor and then Foreign Minister for many
years, Turkey began to pursue an active policy aimed at fostering economic relations between itself and its neighbours. Turkey is aware of the necessity to foster the linkages between political stability, economic welfare and cultural harmony in order to attain sustainable security. On its website, the Turkish Foreign Ministry stresses that:

the rise of Turkey to such a prominent position is also a consequence of Turkey’s solid stance that vigorously seeks legitimacy and of the belief that its own security and stability can only be achieved through the security and stability of the region. Behind this stance lies intensive efforts and major initiatives intended for the creation of an environment of sustainable peace, security and tranquility in the region and beyond.\(^6\)

In this period a number of joint ministerial committees meeting with neighbouring countries (as in Syria for example) were held and border interaction became a top priority (Yesiltas, 2015: 16). However, Arab Spring\(^7\) and Syrian conflict has created a number of serious border security problems such as the increasing activities of terrorist organisations and mass migration flows.

There is no doubt that the most dramatic development in recent years regarding border security has been the Syrian civil war. It has led to hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the country to save their lives. Hundred thousands of people were killed and most of these were civilians. The Syrian crisis has affected many neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq. Turkey has so far received more than 2.5 million Syrians within its borders and this has cost Turkey over 8 billion US dollars so far with the sum increasing as the conflict


\(^7\) Arab Spring refers to the democratic uprisings that arose independently and spread across the Arab world in 2011. The movement originated in Tunisia in December 2010 and quickly took hold in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.
continues.8 Turkey provides the Syrians with lodging, food, healthcare, security, education and religious services in tent cities and container cities mostly in Southern part of Turkey.

Despite the success of Turkish foreign policy over the last decade in opening new markets and expanding its reach into the Middle East through a policy of ‘zero problems with neighbours’, the Arab Spring movements, and particularly the crisis in Syria, has forced Ankara to confront the new realities of the region. There were no options for Turkish policy makers, except to intervene in the face of the Syrian crises due to vast flow of people and increasing terrorist activities across the shared border. This meant putting aside the traditional Turkish foreign policy which was conservative and inward-focused. However, the hesitation of western allies to overthrow President Assad has led to serious repercussions for Turkey. The lack of authority has created a suitable base for terrorists to flourish and Turkey has been under attack by two brutal terrorist organization DAESH9 (IS) and PKK.

As a result, Turkey began to follow a ‘zero tolerance policy’ (Ozturk, 2015) in order to eliminate security risks stemming from Syria border. To conduct this policy, a greater number of military personnel were deployed to the Syrian border.

In fact, 50% of the 40,000 military personnel currently serving in all the border of Turkey are now at Syrian border. On the other hand, to prevent their participation in the terrorist organization IS, a series of physical measures are also implemented. In this context, on the border, 365 kilometers trenches were dug, 70 kilometer embankment was made, 160 kilometer razor wire was rolled, 13 kilometer wall was built, 22 kilometers accordion barrier was built, and 145 kilometer wire barriers was renovated. In order to improve the operational


9 See the website for the acronym: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27994277
performance of the border patrol units and the capacity of reconnaissance activities 270 kilometer section of the border was lit and, 1,280 kilometer road have been modified. (Ozturk, 2015)  

On the other hand, the high probability of a new surge of refugees from Syria compels Turkey, preferably with international backing, to establish a buffer zone and the no-fly zone on Syrian territory to guarantee the security of its own southern border as well as the welfare of civilians fleeing the conflict. Closing the Syrian border does not seem an option. If Turkey permanently closed its border, this might result in a major humanitarian crisis on the Syrian side, which would require an international response. In short, with the Russian intervention, the consequences of the conflict in Syria for Turkey’s own security interests along their shared border are threatening, and the civil war there is spiraling into a broader regional conflict.

It is clear that Turkey’s border security framework is not successful enough to cope with the enormous risks and threats it has faced and it has become apparent that old ways of doing things do not work anymore. In spite of the compelling conditions for a new security environment, somethings have remained the same while somethings have changed. For example, the militaristic character of the border security framework has not yet changed. The question arises as to why Turkey insists on using the military to bring security to its people despite the changing nature of security. The financial cost the implication? Although a part of the answer, it is most likely that political cost outweighs this. Understanding the practice of security politics and effective factors will conceivably provide answers or at least shed a light on the current situation regarding Turkey’s border security framework; and more importantly provide a better understanding for the foundations of the fear of change.

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6.4. From Fear of Loss of Territory to Fear of Change

Bilgin discusses that the traditional security discourse in Turkey has had two major components: ‘a fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory; and an assumption of ‘geographical determinism’ (Bilgin 2005:187). With regards to the former, its origins lie deep in Ottoman history, the Sevr Treaty in 1920 which marked the beginning of the partition of, and the ultimate annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. Because of this historical legacy, ‘fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory’ has manifested itself in Turkey’s struggle with the PKK and in the discussions on application to join the EU. The second major component of the traditional security discourse has been the assumption of geographical determinism. In the preface to the White Paper, Sabahattin Çakmakoglu (then Minister of National Defence) explains the significance of this geographical position by noting that ‘Turkey is located in the centre of a region full of instabilities and uncertainties, such as the Middle East, Caucasus and the Balkans, where the balances are in a process of change’. The assumption of geographical determinism shapes not only Turkey’s security policies, but also its political processes in general. For example, in response to calls for democratization, Bulent Ecevit (then Prime Minister) maintained that ‘Turkey’s special geographical conditions require a special type of democracy’ (Aydınlı & Taxman 2001: 385).

With reference to Agnew 1998; Agnew & Corbridge 1995; Dalby 1991; Ó Tuathail 1996, Bilgin (2005: 194) argues that ‘the assumption of geographical determinism, which such statements are built upon, glosses over the essentially political character of conceptualizing security, formulating security policies and practicing security’. In other words, this approach takes the ‘political’ out of geopolitics. Conceptualizing security, however, is a political process:
Treating geographical features as determinants of security policy is a political act in itself. This, in turn, is symptomatic of the unacknowledged and unquestioned assumption that geography overrides political processes in shaping not only security policies, but politics in general (Bilgin 2005: 194).

Bilgin’s arguments are consistent with the current situation in the border security field because whenever the need for change is expressed, objections are based on the difficulties of geographical conditions to justify the current system. However, of course, the assumption of geographical determinism is not the only factor shaping Turkey’s security policies. To contextualize the current situation, it is necessary to go through the external and internal influential factors respectively.

6.5. External Factors

At the turn of the century, the world community witnessed two significant milestones in the field of security. These were: firstly, the end of the cold war which has brought about new, multidimensional and unpredictable challenges like regional conflicts and civil war in Bosnia. Secondly, the events of 11 September, 2001. These two very important events ‘really affected the foundations of international relations, international organizations, as well as the strategies that dealt (till then) with the concepts of ‘threat’ and ‘security’ (SAREM 2004, 9–20).

During the Cold War, threats from both sides were handled by superpowers in order to prevent a nuclear conflict. Thus, since the superpowers of each camp determined the course of policies, single states or regional powers did not need to have a self-contained security policy. This might have seemed an easy and cheap way to begin with, however there was a bigger price to pay later. Eventually, the end of the Cold War has led to regional security issues coming to the forefront as the influence of the superpowers either decreased or disappeared in addressing security issues or conflicts. In this period Turkey began to recognise the
new and unpredictable security risks in the Middle East, the Balkans and Southern Caucasus, such as ethnic/intrastate conflicts, migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, illicit trade of arms and drugs, and energy issues.

Governments and international organizations have inevitably initiated a transformation process to be able to respond to this new and challenging environment by adopting new strategic concepts and developing new capabilities.

In the region, the activities for NATO’s preservation of the Euro-Atlantic ties and for attaining a flexible character in its military structure, the attempts of the European allies for assuming a more visible role in the defense field and the subjects of the development in the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), have become prominent as the significant dimensions of the transformation process being experienced (White Paper, Part One, Section One 2000)

In May 2002 foreign ministers of NATO reached a conclusion that the security threats of this century should be confronted whenever necessary, beyond the borders of NATO. At the Reykjavik meeting it was decided that ‘to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time and achieve their objectives’ (NATO, 2002). Simultaneously, the EU, in accepting a new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and initiating its enlargement process, sought to be an effective security actor (Güney 2004, 17, 20).

It is inevitable that Turkey is affected by these regional security problems because of its unique geographical situation and its long-standing relationship with the West. Thus, it sought to enhance its influence, to pursue its interests and in this process it prioritized multilateralism and acting within alliances in its foreign policy and military strategy. In this regard Turkey’s White Paper says:
To contribute with military forces to international organizations, alliances and related states in accordance with the national security and foreign policy of Turkey; continuation of providing cooperation, technical assistance and training related to military subjects constitute the basis of Turkey's collective security concept (White Paper, Part Four, Section One, 2000).

After the fall of the Soviet Union followed by the Arab Spring, several ethnic and intrastate conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus emerged challenging international peace and security. These conflicts provided a convenient environment for cross-border security threats such as terrorism, human trafficking, illicit trade of arms and drugs, illegal immigration, refugees and environmental issues. Therefore, new policies were adopted; for example peace operations mandated by the United Nations and undertaken by either the UN or regional organizations assumed importance and addressed these challenges. Turkey participated in various UN, NATO and EU-led missions.

Historically, Turkey had adopted a foreign policy upholding the norms of territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, towards particularly the Middle East. However, Turkey had to revise its policy towards Middle Eastern issues with the 1991 Gulf War. It became increasingly difficult for Turkey to pursue this policy in the face of constantly shifting environment in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War (Altunsik, 2004: 213). In this new period, the September 11 attacks and later Madrid and London bombings accelerated efforts for the evolution of the new strategies. NATO remained the most important actor for Turkey’s defence policy after the Cold War, because of Turkey’s geographical closeness to the conflict areas. The fall of the Soviet Union may have removed the nuclear threat, but at the same time it created many other issues that led to instability. Furthermore, these issues required more than maintaining ultimate material capabilities. Thus, while Turkey considers NATO as a guarantor with a nuclear option, it aims to pursue an active policy in its region, to prevent or alleviate the
adverse effects of instability in the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and the Middle East.

The European Security Strategy document and NATO’s two strategic concepts could be considered as evidence of these efforts. In these documents, ‘terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failed/failing states’ have been redefined as the new security threats of twenty-first century’ (Guney 2004: 17, 20). However, there is disagreement on how to fight against these new and unpredictable threats. Over the last few years, the EU has preferred to remain indifferent to what has been happening in the Middle East, despite the air bombardment against DAESH to address issues such as terrorism and illegal immigration. We have recently witnessed the new use of air forces in the form of what is described as ‘pre-emptive strikes’. However, it is clear that this new strategy is far from being pre-emptive.

6.5.1. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001

The international community and certainly the United States responded to the events of 9/11 by redefining urgent threats and devised policy options to address them. In the rush of waging the “war against terror”, multilateralism in decision-making and implementation was mainly ignored and unilateral responses gained prominence against urgent threats; military measures were prioritized over diplomacy in security policy. Immediately after the events of 9/11, the international community united in extending support to the United States for the operation in Afghanistan. As a member of NATO, Turkey took the command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, first between June 2002 and February 2003 (ISAF II) and later between February and August 2005 (ISAF VII) for a total of 14 months in 3 years. The developments and the new international security environment after 9/11 as well as the foreign and security policy of the United States had severe impacts on Turkey. Taking the side of the United States made Turkey
the target of two terrorist attacks in November 2003 in Istanbul. Moreover, the post-war conflict in Iraq affected Turkish economic and domestic security due to terrorist infiltrations from Iraq’s north, and decreasing levels of economic activity. The new security environment, in Turkey’s neighbourhood, particularly in Iraq and Syria, and its impacts on Turkey’s security have recently become more important bringing about a skeptical attitude in Turkey towards the West in general and the westernization process in particular. This new attitude is particularly remarkable because westernization had been seen as a security project throughout the Turkish Republic’s history.

6.6. The Implications of the New Security Environment
The policy emphasizing Turkey’s increasing involvement in the old Ottoman space, particularly the Middle East has been called ‘neo-Ottomanism’.

Although Turkey’s strategic culture has evolved towards more activism in the post-Cold War era, such an activism in the case of the Middle East to a large extent continued to define not as Ankara’s own design, but as a reluctant involvement forced upon Turkey by the circumstances (Altunisik, 2004: 214). Altunisik’s position on the issue discussed above because of the complexity of the Middle East, finds support amongst the Turkish establishment, for example, Turkey had to redefine a range of policies culminating in the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern part of Iraq which was once described as a threat, a red line. Nowadays, Kurdish Regional Government is one of Turkey’s allies. It is fair to say that policies in the Middle East have mostly been determined by circumstances.

In the new security conditions of the post-Cold War era, Turkey’s status of a flank country in the frontline has changed and Turkey has become an
open target of the new security threats mainly emanating from its neighbours. According to NATO’s MC-161 Document,

> There are 16 regions which are determined by the Alliance as ‘unstable’ and ‘risky’ and unfortunately 13 of them are around Turkey. Similarly, the 16 potential crisis regions that are considered to be affecting European security by the EU are also in the vicinity of Turkey (Mat, 2003: 100).

That is why Turkey and the surrounding region have gained a critical importance in the current security strategies of the West. Apart from the conventional ones the new threats are unpredictable, multidimensional and hence more dangerous. Turkey, realizing the new conditions of the security environment, has decided to make important changes in its defence policy. The new threats to Ankara have been declared as weapons of mass destruction, religious fundamentalism, drugs, terrorism, political and economic instability and regional/ethnic conflicts (Sheffer 2005: 38). In the wake of these threat perceptions, Ankara’s military strategy in the ‘2000 Defence White Paper of Turkey is redefined as deterrence, military contributions to crisis management and intervention, forward defence and collective security’ (Sheffer 2005: 32). Interestingly, ‘Both of these ideas were then the extensions of the current NATO and American strategic vocabulary’ (Sheffer 2005: 31).

In order to meet the requirements of the new security environment, like other Western countries and leading international organizations (for example NATO and the EU), Turkey has decided to upgrade its military capabilities. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkish General Staff, whose goal was to realize a Turkish Armed Forces transformation, consistent with the new Turkish defence policy, took very important measures to realize this military transformation, such as; 50,000 strong rapid response force had been developed, 5-6 battalions ready for immediate and long range deployment and a submarine deployable over 15000 miles. The main aim of transforming the Turkish Armed Forces was to create a modern but at the same time smaller force with high
deployability and high fire power. The country’s culture and history has played an important role in these transformation efforts to keep up with peace-keeping operations from Bosnia to the Sudan.

6.7. Breaking up

In a broader perspective, the westernization process in Turkey was set into motion as a security strategy aiming at guaranteeing the survival of the newly born Turkish Republic (Karaosmanoglu, 2000). However, changing conditions after the end of Cold War made it difficult for Turkey to view the westernization process as a legitimate security strategy. As Oguzlu (2007) points out the changing security conceptualization of the United States, and the growing Western demands from Turkey to redefine its security identity and interests in accordance with the emerging security rationale in the West forced Turkey to review the westernization process as a legitimate security strategy.

After the 9/11 attacks, western governments developed a strategy based upon promoting democracy in the broader Middle East. They believed that there was a direct correlation between the quality of security feeling in the West and the way states are run in the so-called developing world (Asmus; Diamond; Leonard, 2005: 7, 21). ‘In this emerging understanding, security in the West would be best achieved if the so-called weak and failed states in non-western geographies were transformed into liberal democracies and governed more effectively’ (Oguzlu, 2007: 54) to prevent their support of international terrorism as a threat to the West.

In fact, in spite of the position that merging its security with the West was fundamental to Turkey’s security in the first years of the Cold War, the collapse of Soviet Union created difficulties in Turkey’s relations with the USA, and pressurised Turkish leadership to seek ties with the East and with the Arab countries. In this context, according to Oguzlu there are three reasons for the considerable deterioration in the security relationship between the West and Turkey. First, the security elites,
mainly in the military bureaucracy, considered the steps that Turkey would have to take in order to join the EU as threatening. They thought that fighting against two major threats, the terrorist organization PKK and the rise of political Islam, may have been affected in a negative way. Second, the EU began to view Turkey at worst as a Middle Eastern country, and at best as a buffer zone insulating the European zone of peace from the zones of danger around Europe (2007: 51, 52). Turkey’s potential membership was considered to be a threat to the EU’s security mainly because Turkey was too populous, too different, too poor and too close to the Hobbesian security environment of the Middle East’ (Oguzlu, 2007: 52). Third, differentiation of security priorities such as the terrorist organization PKK were creating disaffection between Turkey and the United States. Remarkably in the fight against DAES (IS), PYD (a branch of PKK operating in Syria) has become an ally of the West despite the fact that the PKK’s name is still formally on the terrorist organizations list.

However, for example Iraq clearly demonstrated the negative consequences of an externally imposed democratization process. It has produced not only chaos and anarchy inside Iraq but also instability in the whole region (M.Hakan Yavuz, & Nihat Ali Özcan, 2006). In the end, as US-led initiatives were implemented in a rush, without the liberal roots of democratic culture taking hold first, the outcome became the opposite of what was expected (Zakaria, 2007). It seems that the US-led Iraq war represents a breaking point in the relationship between Turkey and the West. The weakening of Iraq, as a result, not only upset the distribution of power in Turkey’s region, but also reopened the questions of borders with particular emphasis on Kurdish aspirations (Altunisik, 2004: 213). Udum (2007: 12) argued that while the United States was reluctant to fight against the PKK, which shelters in Iraq’s north, it also prevented Turkey from carrying out a unilateral cross-border military operation to address its security concerns. There were two reasons for that: First, the rejection of the March 1st motion in 2003 which would
allow US troops to use Turkish territory for a northern front in Iraq, caused disappointment on the part of the United States, but also dependency on the Kurdish groups in the north. ‘Top United States officials commented that had the Turkish front been used, the Sunni Iraqi insurgency in Iraq would not have been as strong, and hence a smaller number of American lives would have been lost’ (Eligür, 2006: 3) Second, the United States wanted to avoid disturbing the relative stability in the north by Turkey’s military operation, because it would lead to the total failure of the US operation in Iraq. In the 1990s, Turkey often carried out cross-border military operations against PKK in northern Iraq and the U.S. seemed supporting Turkey for these operations. Some analysts argue that after the rejection of the bill, the U.S. was forced to ally with the Kurds in northern Iraq, as a result of which Turkey seems to have lost some leverage with respect to carrying out cross border operations (see Eligur, 2006: 3).The EU authorities also warned Turkey against the negative consequences on the accession negotiations of any Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq. The EU’s attitude on these issues clearly demonstrates that the security conceptualizations of the long term allies do not converge with each other anymore.

The establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq and the continuing US pressures on Turkey to find a political settlement to the PKK terrorism simultaneously caused anxieties in Ankara.

Given that what the PKK leader, Ocalan, understands by politicization is the transformation of Turkey into a democratic republic where ethnic Turks and Kurds would be constitutionally recognized as the two constituent nations, the calls for liberal-democratization do not strike a sympathetic chord at this particular moment in Ankara (Oguzlu, 2007: 55).

The crisis in Syria, between forces loyal to the Syrian government and those that oppose it, which began on March 15, 2011 has accelerated
these anxieties. Protesters want the President to resign. The Syrian army is fighting the opposition and this has led to millions of people fleeing the country to save their lives. The US government has recently asked the Turkish government to support PYD (an arm of terrorist PKK operating in Northern Syria) against another terrorist organization, DAESH, fighting to hold a Syrian town named Ayn-El Arab. Given the implications of the conflict in Syria for Turkey’s own security interests along its shared border, Turkey’s border security dilemma is spiraling into a broader regional conflict. Turkey has been cautiously monitoring the situation in Syria and has been active in the humanitarian relief efforts, committing itself to international action to end the conflict.

Relations with allies and regional policies in the field of security are shaped by several variables ranging from military, political and economic interests, to regional and social concerns. Turkey is well aware that memberships of international organizations and cooperation in order to cope with the new security challenges and new security threats require multilateral efforts and more than military measures. However, the indifference of Western partners to its priorities has forced Turkey to balance between its own need to be active and the different threat perception of the west in the region.

6.8. Domestic Dynamics
In April 1997, regressive Islamism (irtica) and Kurdish separatist terrorism were identified as major threats to Turkey’s security. At the end of the 1990s, Turkey was targeted by Hezbollah terror together with that of the PKK, and as a result, has had to broaden its security agenda. This broadening took place in a new security environment with its new challenges. After the 1999 decision of the EU (which gives Turkey candidate status), a public debate on Turkey’s definition of ‘national security’ began. This debate took place between the Eurosceptic and pro-EU actors and focused on the security implications of some of the reforms
demanded by the EU. While neither of the two groups openly oppose Turkey joining the EU, the Euro sceptics formulate their drawbacks by using ‘security-speak’ when voicing their concerns. For example, the following words of Professor Erol Manisali:

> If it [the EU] is going to take over the market, diminish the national industry, govern the bureaucracy from Brussels, make demands contrary to my national interest on Cyprus, the European Army, PKK and Armenian issues, and refuse to admit Turkey unless these demands are met, I would say ‘Yes, it is in my favor if the EU lets me in’ but add that ‘it is trying to divide up Turkey and make me dependent and is putting forward these conditions so as not to admit Turkey’ (2002: 64–65).

Manisali identified the problems likely to be caused by the adoption of EU norms, including an erosion of the Turkish state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and maintained that if Turkey carries on making the reforms demanded by the EU, ‘in 15 years’ time, not even the Turkish Armed Forces would be able to lift a finger’ (2002:65). The implication was that the Turkish military’s ability to cope with internal and external threats to security would be curbed. On the other hand, the pro-EU actors have long taken a position that stresses the economic and political dimensions with a tendency to neglect the security dimension (Bilgin 2005: 77). Two separate but interrelated developments have changed this tendency.

The first was Mesut Yılmaz’s (then deputy Prime Minister and Minister responsible for Turkey–EU relations) public challenge to the Euro sceptics on the issue of national security. Speaking at the Congress of the Motherland Party in August 2001, Yılmaz maintained that the key precondition for change is to re-determine the scope and boundaries of the national security concept. Turkey’s integration into the EU is delayed by the ‘national security syndrome’ that thwarted changes in Turkey’s Constitution and other reforms demanded by the EU. According to
Yılmaz, the problem was not only that Turkey’s conceptualization of ‘national security’ was far too broad compared to its EU counterparts, it was also that in Turkey ‘national security’ was defined behind closed doors. Mesut Yılmaz maintained that: ‘[National security] is an issue that concerns everyone in Turkey, therefore it should be discussed not only by the political parties, but by the public as well’. The main assumption Yilmaz pointed out was that the consensus among the elites was that national security is far too important and delicate an issue to be discussed outside National Security Council meetings. The Turkish General Staff maintained a strong reaction stating that ‘it was more appropriate to discuss issues, which is about the prosperity and happiness of people, on platforms which are not tainted with political interests’ (Bilgin 2005:191).

Yilmaz’s words have found support among the media and some non-governmental actors such as the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD) and the Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (MAZLUMDER). However, not all non-governmental actors agreed. Chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Trade (ATO) Sinan Aygun and the Board of Directors of the Federation of Turkish Labor Unions (Türk-İş) both issued statements in support of the General Staff’s stance. These positions have not changed much for a number of reasons but the most prominent was that ‘the civil society in Turkey is a product of the ‘national security project’ of the state establishment and, therefore, does not always constitute an escape from prevailing understandings of security’ (Bilgin 2007: 556).

The second development was the emergence of a group of pro-EU actors who sought to use ‘security speak’ when discussing the issue of Turkey’s membership of the EU (Bilgin, 2005: 199). She argues that although

The state of civil society in Turkey is a product of the national security project of the state establishment [...] some societal actors claimed

‘security-speak’ and presented EU membership as a possible solution to myriad security problems, which, in turn, made the post-1999 transformation possible (Bilgin, 2007: 557).

She points out to the success of the strategy ‘as it challenged the state establishment’s monopoly over “security-speak” and de-centred existing security problems through identifying new ones’ (Bilgin 2007: 556).

6.9. Critics of National Security Strategy: How does the Turkish example differ from contemporary trends?

Turkey’s security strategy has been mainly criticized for its over-reliance on military defence. Erguvenc (1999: 46) maintained that national security in the twenty-first century should be defined as ‘sustaining freedom and development in a ruthlessly competitive environment’. This could not be done by relying on the military instrument alone; it has to be achieved by producing the educated human capacity and the civilian infrastructure to compete in the global arena. The problem, according to Erguvenc, was that further investment in the military sector diverted valuable resources away from education and research. Erguvenc (1999: 48, 49) continued to discuss that further investment in the military sector could potentially prevent Turkey from achieving national security. Turkey’s challenge, according to him, was that although recent developments have meant that the military instrument has lost its primacy in Turkey’s security policy-making, traditional strategic arguments have not yet lost their relevance.

Ambassador (Ret.) Ilter Turkmen is another pro-EU actor who has expressed the need for a fresh approach to Turkey’s foreign and security relations, Turkmen’s broader point was that the defence budget would eventually have to undergo a cutback because ‘it is not economically feasible to sustain the current level of defense expenditure’ (2001: 61). He argued that joining the EU would eventually transform Turkey’s
strategic culture and enhance its security by helping solve the Turkey-Greek and Cyprus conflicts.

There is a consensus in scholarly literature on Turkey’s problems regarding National Security: it is the broad ‘size’ of its security agenda and the solution is to be found in restricting the framing of issues as security problems. However, the problem goes beyond the ‘size’ of the security agenda or the number of the threats. It is rooted in prevalent understandings and practices of ‘national security’ and its relationship to ‘politics’ (Bilgin 2007). The definition of national security, as defined in Turkey’s constitution, is more or less in line with many other states. What is particularly problematic are the ways in which the national security policy document is prepared and put into effect. The military is naturally the most dominant factor of the process of preparation of the national security document and the lack of interest in security issues by civilians flaws both the process and output. ‘Over the years, and particularly since the 1980 coup, the military’s active involvement in the formulation of the national security policy document has translated into a security agenda that reflects the military’s threat perceptions’ (Bilgin 2007: 563).

Turkmen, just like General Erguvenc, stressed that military dimensions of security should be considered in conjunction with other dimensions of security, and argued that there were more insecurities affecting Turkey’s future than the state establishment chose to stress, and these insecurities could be addressed through being admitted to European integration.

In recent years, Turkey has developed certain strategic mission concepts that go beyond its economic and political reach. This has been done in a context shaped by the tendency to see the region and the world as an arena of incessant conflict. Although there exist many conflicts and instability in the region surrounding Turkey, not all of these constitute
a direct threat to Turkey’s security (Turkmen, 2001: 61).

We have to accept that the main dynamic behind these discussions is the end of Cold War era. Clearly, the end of the Cold War brought about a fundamental changes in security understanding. Whereas security during the Cold War was exclusively defined in hard military terms, now security widens its scope including economic and social issues, regime type, civil disorder, terrorism, communal conflict along ethnic and religious lines, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, wars of secession, and environmental disasters. It is widely accepted that ‘the nature of war’ has changed related to the changing nature of security environment.

Turkey’s fight with the terrorist organization PKK for the last thirty years conforms to this global trend that intra-state conflicts have replaced inter-state wars as the main sources of insecurity. However, contrary to the global trends, Turkey has not been able to read the changes in the security environment and its idea of security has remained fixed on that traditional understanding of the problem. According to Cizre it is about Turkey’s democracy deficit.

With regard to the military’s dominant presence, Cizre (2003: 217) points out a major difference between the ways security and defence have been understood in the West and Turkey and argued that ‘in the former case the security doctrine is rarely applied to internal security’. The main reason for that, according to him is that:

Military doctrine in Western democracies recognizes that national security is not an area that should be monopolized by military considerations. The best guarantee against the danger of military subordinating other national objectives to national security is the tradition in the West of maintaining a clear distinction between military and police roles using the latter to respond to internal threats while restricting the role of the military to external defense (Cizre 2003: 217,218).
Cizre (2003) maintains that national security understanding in Turkey has provided a free entry into policy making for the military. This is made possible by letting the national security concept influence codification of laws pertaining to internal security, anti-terrorism, and maintenance of public order, criminalizing certain political activities, constraining public debate and expanding military jurisdiction over civilians’ (Cizre 2003:217,218). As a result, in the August 2001 meeting of the MGK, where the constitutional amendments, in line with the EU membership requirements (known technically as the Acquis), were on its agenda, the MGK meeting ended up with a resolution containing a warning that the amendments should be “matured,” meaning that the proposed amendments should be further amended and refined in line with the objections of the MGK.

6.10. Summary
The recent events experienced after Arab Spring have posed enormous challenges for Turkey's border security framework. In this period, Turkey has chosen to take a series of military measures which are mostly physical measures to safeguard its security. Turkey's current border security framework is fractured and far from coping with new security risks and threats in the region. The restructuring process including the establishment of a new Border Security Unit under the Ministry of the Interior has not been completed so far and will not be in the foreseeable future.

Turkey's border security framework has a fragmented structure in many ways. Each individual agency in the field is different from each other in terms of staffing, appointment, training, the chain of command, and budget. More importantly, as a result, they are semi-or fully independent from one another. Thus, this situation brings about a fragmented
administrative structure, conflicts and a sense of competition among the agencies.

In addition, the political instability in the Middle East, new forms of terrorism, the institutional and legal infrastructure deficiencies, the lack of bureaucratic authority and responsibility, the harsh climate and geographical conditions can be listed as major problems.

In the face of regional turmoil, Turkey has done little to consolidate its border security structure. Instead, Turkey has chosen to shore up its borders with walls and fences. The primary cause behind this choice was that traditional militaristic approach to security which is still thought relevant despite recent developments. The challenges Turkey has experienced in reforming its current security system go beyond the ‘size’ of its security agenda and are rooted in prevalent understandings of ‘security’ (Bilgin, 2007: 567). Treating the civil-military dynamics and the ‘size of the security agenda’ as the main concern, engenders a failure to discuss the ‘politics of security’. It is also implicated in by the prevalent and unquestioned assumption of ‘geographical determinism’ feeding the old notions of national security understanding.

On the other hand, based on the discussions above, it is difficult to be optimistic about the future of Turkey’s long lasting western alliance in the coming years. The EU’s and the US’ attitudes on Turkey’s delicate security issues, such as the terrorist organisation PKK, or attitudes regarding instabilities in the Turkish region clearly demonstrate that the security conceptualizations of the parties do not always converge with each other and will not be free of crises in the coming years. For example, the US administration is vehemently against Turkey’s current Syrian policy. The US government has recently asked the Turkish government to support PYD (an arm of terrorist PKK operating in Northern Syria) against another terrorist organisation, DAESH (IS), fighting to hold a Syrian town named Ayn- El Arab.
CHAPTER 7

RESEARCH FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

To support the findings of the research, in this chapter, an analysis of how border and border security have been defined by security professionals in the field will be discussed in order to highlight not only how the issue is understood, but also the ways in which borders create exclusion. Hence, the reader will first find the common problematic areas and possible suggestions of the professionals to solve these problems from their different positions in the border security field. This is important because, by conducting interviews with a variety of security professionals, the researcher has tried to understand not only the practical problems and solutions in the border security field but also their perspectives to assess possible future implications. The researcher then
assesses the extent to which the National Strategy Paper (which is supposed to transform Turkey’s border security framework) will make any meaningful changes to Turkey’s security. This will illustrate for the reader the foundation of why Turkey’s current border security framework is a security problem.

This chapter initially presents the findings from the interviews and later findings from archival research. Respondents identified a number of areas as being of particular concern. They are grouped under the headings of: coordination; institutional qualification; legal deficiencies; budget; civil governance; geography; kinship, and terror.

**Coordination is defined as:** the organization of the different elements of a complex body or activity so as to enable them to work together effectively

**External coordination is defined as:** working together with other states, governments and state institutions.

**Institutional qualification is defined as:** problems regarding the lack of professional structures regarding border security. This includes lacking enough experience while performing border security duties, including the use of conscripts for securing borders rather than relying on law enforcement structures.

**Legal deficiencies are defined as:** problems regarding the lack of laws, regulations, decrees, directives, and circulars in the area of border security.

**Civil governance is defined as:** challenging points regarding the doubts and question marks in establishing a civil body for border security as an alternative to the strong presence of military.

**Geography is defined as:** problems regarding geographical challenges such as rugged, mountainous terrain and harsh climate conditions, as well as unstable neighbourhood and historical conflicts.

**Budget is defined as:** finance problems regarding establishing a single and professional border security unit.
Terror is defined as: problems regarding mostly the activities of terrorist organisation PKK.

Kinship is defined as: problems or consequences attributed to the divided communities when the border lines was drawn.

7.1. Respondents’ concerns about border security

The relative significance assigned to these topics is explained in Figure 3.1

First, 19 out of 27 interviewees see the current border system as fragmented and lacking an integrated approach in terms of cooperation and coordination mechanisms as well as professional structures. Respondents said that there was a common perception that coordination between the different institutions involved in border security in Turkey is not sufficient. This leads to inefficiency and ineffectiveness whilst performing their duties as well as in the use of resources.

A striking example was given by M01, a senior official from the Interior Ministry who said that:

In the event of an international meeting regarding border security issues, only one person comes to the meeting as a representative of that organisation responsible
for border security issues such as protecting land, sea borders, border gates, passport control and so on. To be able to discuss these issues with him, we sit [at] the table, ten people representing ten different organisations against that one person. Everybody’s business, no-one’s business!

M18, a high-ranking Customs official argued that:

There are some contradictions about who will do a certain job. Sometimes, another law enforcement organisation might take action to do that certain job which is, in fact, under the responsibility of Customs...in specific areas requiring collaboration, [often there are] controversies and as a result, arguments may emerge.

The reluctance of security agencies to cooperate or share information is a significant problem for state security, as each agency tries to protect its own turf and tries to grasp any success for its own organisation. With regard to this crucial issue Deputy Undersecretary in National Defence Ministry Faruk Ozlu (now minister of Science, Industry and Technology) said, ‘Each one is a castle and they do not appreciate each other. They do not share information properly’. Thus, authorities that hold specific data are anxious to retain control over that data. Therefore, rivalry between security agencies competing to collect information and exclude other actors flaws the whole system because it is evident that data exchange increases the state’s power. In the same vein, M21, a high ranking military officer from the coast guard command questioned ‘why have you not appointed a contact person from Coast Guard in the Interior Ministry’. Similarly, Suleyman Tapsiz, Governor of Kilis (a province at Turkey’s Syrian border) said ‘even for the simplest things, even such things regarding providing finance, you have to resort to many different work of places to sort it out’.

Most strikingly an interviewee suggested that the lack of authority held by governors is the reason for lack of coordination and said:
For example you found out that some terrorists had violated your borders at the ‘Esendere border gate’ at Iranian border. It was [reported] that [the] terrorists are disguised as ordinary travellers. Regarding this problem, there are some measures to take by land forces, gendarmerie, police and customs. Although the governors and district governors are in [a] coordinator position, they are not powerful enough. Why? Because [the] military does not report to governors...if I were a commander of a border brigade, [the] governor and district governor [would come] second after my own commander and if they ordered [me] to open the gates I [would] not, because my own commander is required to [give me the] order.

In this respect, it is important to remember that district governors and governors are responsible for borders in the first and second degree by law respectively. However, they have no power over the military despite being responsible by law.

As demonstrated in figure 3.1, most of the interviewees perceived the current state of border structures in Turkey as flawed. One of the main reasons suggested for this perception is that the current system is shaped and formed by militarist views including military threats, defending or attacking perspective rather than acknowledging border security as a law enforcement issue. The other one is that the military is responsible for the protection of land borders and mainly relies on conscripts.

To be more specific, as argued by M10, Turkey has

A militarist approach on the issue (border security). In military schools we are provided with a totally warlike education including dying and killing. After school, at the borders, we [meet] other administrative and judicial authorities that we have to collaborate [with]; we have direct relations with people. However, we have not been educated for this kind of job. We sit down and read books then.

M10 continued to argue that
Smugglers have been there for their life time, born and grown up there. He possibly learned it [smuggling] in his mother’s womb. However, 75-80% of our border brigades consist of conscripts performing their duties temporarily for their compulsory military service, the rest perhaps 25% are professional. Conscripts are doing that job there for only eight, nine, maybe ten months.

The context here is that as there is no special branch of border security in military these 25% of professionals might quite possibly be reassigned to a totally different post to perform different jobs other than border security throughout their careers, therefore the conscripts have little or no experienced professional support.

To support this claim a senior police officer M14 argued:

As conscripts serve for only one year, you have to teach all the things to new recruits over and over again. Unless you become professional, this vicious cycle will go on. I have some reservations personally that you can benefit from such a system.

M04 from the Interior Ministry has supported this view by saying

It does not matter that you have tanks, heavy, armoured weaponry while fighting against illegal immigration, and smuggling or smugglers. The current structure does not allow efficiency and effectiveness in using hi-tech thermal cameras and other technology that we buy for border surveillance.

Thus, for policy development border security issues must be analysed in context using the knowledge of the law enforcement agencies, their strategies and practices, as these are determinant factors in understanding how to tackle of the security issues.

M05, an experienced district governor on border issues, has taken a different approach and said:

Military authorities are not law enforcement agencies. They do not have enough knowledge on such international criminal organisations
and do not have records of such organisations. The military has no mission to know who the criminals are, which criminal organisation they belong to, how they organise in Istanbul and they do not have appropriate structure[s] for this kind of job. When they apprehend criminals they deliver them to the police or gendarmerie. However the police and the gendarmerie are also incompetent and see border crimes as an ordinary, daily part of their job. This situation and lack of coordination encourages the international criminal organisations.

Thus, institutional incompetence is not just about the military, as discussed above, some interviewees think that the police, the gendarmerie and the customs protection are also lacking in the qualifications and experience required for protecting the borders. M18, a high ranking official from customs confessed, ‘we are a law enforcement agency but we do not have enough equipment and education 100%. This area is different and requires long experience and education at the same time.’

Legal gaps were also mainly considered a major problematic area by the interviewees. While talking about the legal gaps they highlighted the military’s lack of law enforcement authority in the forbidden military zones and security areas at the border zones, and argued this legislation was not enough to combat border crimes. According to law no. 2565, first degree and second degree forbidden military zones are set up to prevent smuggling and the acts which constitute offences. The first degree forbidden military zones cover from zero point to up to 30 -600 m and second degree starts from the first degree forbidden military zones to 5-10 km. Legal proceedings are different in each zones and it has no legislative authority in border areas outside the border strip and customs gates.
In a specific illustration of a glaring legal gap, and a significant indicator of the traditional security concept which always looks outside for the enemy, M10 from the military argued:

If the movement is from inside to outside, land forces have no authority to apprehend, detain or ask for an ID. In 2003 and 2007 the Council of Ministers had narrowed the first degree forbidden military zones at the borders of Georgia, Armenia, Nahcivan, Greece, Bulgaria, Syria to 30-100m.

A retired general M09 contributed that ‘when terrorists and illegal immigrants enter from the first degree and flee to the second degree, the engagement rules are changing and the gendarmerie is required to deal with it.’ In the face of this chaos, jurisdiction is impossible to determine.

The lack of a central authority responsible for defining and enforcing standards is also one of the most important problems of Turkey’s border security framework. District governor M07 summarized by saying ‘how, in what way and by whom the borders will be protected has not been specified’, adding ‘in customs areas there is conflicting legislation.’ Police chief M15 argued strikingly that ‘we try to sell the duties to each other.’ Governor Tapsiz, summarized the situation and said:

The presence of multiple authorities in the area creates chaos and confusion. Due to this fragmented structure, some of the jobs to do might remain undone. While one of the authorities says ‘it is your responsibility’ other says ‘no, it is not mine, it is another institution’. This situation prevents decision making either on time or to be practical. If there was one authority responsible for border security, it would enable us to make speedy decisions and conduct fast operations.

When it comes to the sea borders, the position is not very different. M21 from the Coast Guard argued that:

The biggest problem here is the restriction of your power to the sea as a law enforcement authority and not to be able to conduct duties
on the land. Current legislation requires us to deliver apprehended persons and evidence to the police or the gendarmerie in cases where the crime starts on the land. Even if you coordinate you cannot manage to go to the very end. Which is more logical? To prosecute a crime by one authority or three different authorities?

Thus, it seems that legislation gaps and coordination problems create a cause and outcome situation.

M21 continued

There is also a problem of transferring international agreements to national law. After parliament’s ratification decision, there is no answer to how this legislation is put into effect, how the police, the gendarmerie or the coast guard is going to enforce it, no details.

According to the Turkish constitution, when an international agreement has been ratified, it becomes an internal part of the national legal system and can directly be enforced.

To support the claims above, M08, the district governor responsible for a border gate said ‘governors have very limited power over the duties regarding security issues at the border gates.’ In this respect, a new authority for border security should logically be based on law enforcement, which in turn requires adopting a more civilian approach. In other words, Turkey’s current traditional, military style approach to border security should be replaced by a civilian perspective.

As M05 argued ‘if you were like Switzerland, a country with no border threats from neighbouring countries, you might not have had to set up a system based on military’, Governor Tapsiz supported the idea and said: ‘Turkey is in a unique position in the midst of a fire circle’. A high ranking police chief M13 argued ‘problems stemming from geography make it difficult to control all our borders.’ In this vein, M11 from the military gave an example: ‘Anatolia corresponds to a swarthy horse. If
you do not ride it properly, it will throw you off. That is why this geography requires military power'.

In addition to discussions above, some interviewees pointed out the lack of civil governance in the security sector including the border security area. M01 argued that

There is no proper coordination between the military and governors as first and second degree border authorities. However, coordination is not enough, there should be some kind of relationship beyond coordination. Basically, a country's security vision and future articulation should not be left to security bureaucracy only. Determining security policy is completely a civil job.

In contrast to this view, a retired general M09 said: 'I wish civilians would control all the things and military would return to its own job'. Interestingly, M22 from Ministry of Foreign Affairs said 'if you ask me civilian or military? It does not matter. How it is protected and to whom the account is given is important.'

One recurrent and important subject that interviewees particularly highlighted was the finance problem. It is important because finance problems have the potential to influence the direction of the transformation. M15 summarized:

Ultimately, when you withdraw the military from border protection, in case of setting up a new body, you need to establish an organisation larger than the police, because it requires a huge number of personnel. The military somehow conduct this job with the help of battalions and squads. If you counted up the number of people who are doing this job, a tremendous number would surface.

M14 said: 'this is a really expensive job and not easy'. M12, a high ranking police chief in decision making, said: 'if it was taken over by a civilian body, how many personnel it would need and how much would it cost to budget... it is hard to say.' M13 from the police anti-terrorist
department pointed to Turkey’s mountainous south east where most of the terrorist activities has occurred and said ‘there are problems stemming from geography and it is hard to take measures in a strict sense. It is too high cost.’

Terrorist infiltration to Turkish territory from the mountainous southeast border is seen as the main element that problematizes the transformation process. M18 argued that

There might have been some setbacks, problems or needs to meet with regards to the military. Until they are sorted out, at least under current conditions [terrorist activities of the PKK], I am of the opinion that the military should continue to protect borders. As I said, until conditions at both western and eastern borders are equalized, I do not think it will create positive results if another institution takes over border protection from the military.

A top official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M22 said: ‘at some certain points, you are obliged to the military, I do not know anybody that can use artillery when ISIS militants come’. District governor M05 supported the idea and said: ‘the dilemma that Turkey has faced is: how can you conduct liberal policies under the influence of internal and external threats.’

The rise of regional conflicts in the 1990s and the lack of central authority have facilitated the movement of terrorists across borders. The recent military actions in Iraq, Libya and Syria have left a large path without border controls. Terrorists can separate into smaller groups and regroup in adjoining territories, rebuilding their financial resources through the drug trade and securing unrestricted access to a large range of countries lacking adequate border security.

However, to prevent terrorist activities requires multifaceted strategies. Enhancing physical controls is only part of the strategy. Likewise, the movement of the terrorists is only one component of the terrorist activities. They need materials, transport, arms and the raw components
for bomb making. Therefore, they need necessary links to other crime groups as they seek to move their cargos. In addition, terrorist organisations require financing to maintain terrorist cells and run their actions. According to the police authorities, the activity which most often funds terrorist activities is the drug trade. Thus, the control of potential terrorists, materials and the sources of terrorist financing are all needed if one is to successfully fight against terrorism. In addition, terrorism is important but only one factor in a complexity of border security issues. It does not seem fair to put such burden on the back of the military which does not have an appropriate structure and knowledge to accomplish the job.

The implementation of an effective fight against terrorism requires major structural changes in the border security area including new forms of training, institutional change and greater reliance on intelligence. Often those serving on the border are conscripts and together with law enforcement personnel, they do not have the education or the experience to understand and react to the problems that they face on the border.

Some interviewees pointed out the kinship links among people living in the south and south-eastern border zone. District governor M07 argued:

> When the border was drawn, relatives had been divided. Think of Nusaybin [a border town at the Syrian border], they had divided the town in two parts including the villages. The relationship between the two sides are strong and this is being utilised for smuggling. I saw many examples of it related to human smuggling, weapon smuggling and drug trafficking. We captured hundreds of weapons, drugs and other goods as well as suicide bombers.

M14 extended the argument and said ‘once you fortified your borders, you would face some accusations that you divide relatives and the mass of people and disrupt the relationship between these people. Politicians may have some reservations in their minds just because of this issue’. M22
took the argument forward, pointed out the instability in Syria and argued

After DAESH, smuggling has increased with help of the tribes. There has always been the phenomenon of smuggling at the Syrian border and it is just because of divided families. Big families and tribes in the middle-east do not accept these boundaries.

These historically divided communities make it difficult to sustain the traditional understanding of fortified borders, these have led to the emergence of ‘the other’. In this respect, it should be asked, what is ‘the other’ for Turkey? Taking kinship at the borders into consideration, it is not viable for Turkey to sustain the current border security practices, the practice of traditional security thinking must be left behind because current border security practice excludes the other, and at the same time excludes the possibility of alternative politics. It is equally important not to overlook that these kinship relations provide a strong cover for organised criminals. When law enforcement authorities wage war against organised criminal groups, they simultaneously wage a war against the local people. And of course this may have serious consequences including manipulation by the terrorist organisation PKK.

In addition, a large number of interviewees (including civilians) viewed the geographical situation of Turkey as a determinant factor in the current border security framework with regard to the strong military presence. To sum up, Turkey is situated in a very important geographic zone where it has long borders with unstable countries and therefore Turkey is at the crossroads of illegal flows of goods and people and subjected to terrorist attacks. Mountainous areas at the border zone make it easier for terrorists, smugglers and illegal immigrants to penetrate into the country. According to the interviewees, as a result of these penetrations, no other institution other than the military can protect the borders properly.
7.2. Interviewees’ solutions for identified problems

The interviewees mainly view Institutional or administrative measures, such as setting up a professional body and better infrastructure, as necessary to secure the territory. M01:

What I would like to recommend is transformation of the ministry of the interior into a homeland security ministry because in our region, security will be the main priority for many years ahead. The Americans have a say related to border security: there would be no trade where there is no security. Hence, for a secure and peaceful community, you need to create a secured environment first and it needs to start from the boundaries of the country. Thus, national security starts from territorial borders.

What is striking here is the pointed connection between border security and national security. According to M01 national security starts from territorial boundaries. Almost all the interviewees’ recommendations converge at the point that fixed and reinforced borders of walls and fences are essential to stop the illegal flows. M10: ‘To protect borders, I would first build all of the roads. Second, in relation to stop and prevention, I would put a wall, fence or something at the borders’. M22: ‘in terms of the fight against terrorism, I am in favour of enhancing physical protection measures at the boundaries. The PKK or any other terrorist organisation can be stopped by a set of physical protection measures. Hence, these measures should be taken throughout the territorial boundaries in a similar effective manner.’

The sole exception is Faruk Ozlu, Deputy Undersecretary of Undersecretariat for Defence Industries. He says:

High stone walls are out of date, no need to talk about it. We cannot declare our neighbours as enemies even though we may have some problems with them. They are our friends. My desire is to protect our boundaries by technology such as high-tech surveillance systems, radar systems and drones. You
cannot build high walls on the Iraqi border. As the geographical conditions are very different throughout the borders, there should be a technology based border protection system.

Alternatively, M15 points out the corrupt personnel and recommends a surveillance system for them instead of the territorial boundaries which is quite thought provoking and insightful.

M11 brought a different approach to the issue and said:

Turkey’s aim is to be a virtuous power. You can be a global power but being a virtuous power is different. It is about power, rule of law, equality, and justice. In doing so, you can stop the threat in an effective way. Thus, the important thing is to be present where the source of the threat is with your virtuous power to be able to stop it in advance. Hence, moving on from there, stopping threats in a soft and humanitarian way.

With connection to setting up a new body, Faruk Ozlu suggested an integrated approach beginning from territorial borders and said:

People go across borders to the Gendarmerie area and from there to city centres, police areas. Hence, I would create a fully integrated and operational body that is able to follow illegal crossings. I am in favour of an integrated system from boundaries to city centres, separate from the military because it is for defence. Deputy Ministry of Homeland Security is more suitable.

However, M21 has some reservations on the issue of a new organisation. He says:

Setting up a body to coordinate the border management is a right direction, however, it should not mean closing the coast guard, or taking some from the gendarmerie, some from the police, throw into a pool and say we set up a new organisation. How could a body possibly stand against three different types of blood? As the coast guard, we have an institutional culture different from the police and the gendarmerie, even naval forces. Thus, there
should be a coordination body in which all the parties are represented, just like FRONTEX. I would establish a new body which enables us to share data. In addition, this process [border protection] requires international collaboration. States cannot cope with it on their own. We should go to the source.

In the same vein, M08 suggested: ‘it takes too long to set up a new institutionalised and effective body in the field. I would rather make some adjustments instead of changing the whole system.’ M05 had a different view on the coordination body. He said: ‘Turkey cannot establish a ‘UK border agency’ like organisation as the dynamics and location are different. Turkey still has threats against state and its territorial indivisibility’.

This traditional territory based security understanding is widespread among the interviewees and based on state sovereignty. M22 best represents this idea by pointing out the political limits: ‘You are required to go to the source of the threat, but it should be in your sovereign territory. Your sovereignty begins from territorial boundaries.’ Indeed, as understood from this assessment, the main difficulty is not being able to think outside the conceptual and material grip of the modern state.

Governor Suleyman Tapsiz:

My recommendation is to make the gendarmerie a totally civil authority and connect it to the Ministry of Interior in every meaning, and give the duty of border protection to the Gendarmerie. Before the Land Forces, the gendarmerie used to be responsible for border protection. As an organisation it has some natural advantages such as close connection with other law enforcement authorities and border authorities. A second option is to set up a new body.

Interviewees’ reservations on a civil professional body responsible for border security are mainly about the terrorist activities of the PKK and geographical conditions particularly in the south eastern part of Turkey. For example, M13 said ‘I have some hesitation on whether a civil body
can provide security in the south eastern sector. However, a civil authority must decide on the security issues.’

To sum up, professionals discussing border security in Turkey tend to focus on the anti-terrorist elements of ‘internal security’ because of the consequences of PKK terrorism. Discussions have been continuing around reinforcing territorial borders by means of walls and fences and high-tech surveillance systems to prevent terrorist attacks within Turkey and reduce vulnerability to terrorism. Civil and military elites are less receptive to radical breaks with traditional thinking and are far more inclined to support efforts to protect the homeland by fixed borders, and far less concerned with the context of Turkey’s own national experience of terror.

In addition, as is clear from the main stream media rhetoric about ‘broken borders’, by referring specifically to the south and south-east borders, traditional images of the borders of the state still exercise a major influence on the territorial security of the state. Even though airports, for example, may well be major sites for the arrival of possible terrorists, the most popular idea is that of they are penetrating land and sea borders by running or by boat. This powerful image of the secure border as a guardian of state security in recent years has led to a security fence just like those around one’s garden. Of course, this is totally misleading because the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks have involved local citizens.

In terms of terrorism and smuggling, the continuing experiences of Turkey have proved that current understandings focus on the actor rather than the activity. Due to this tendency physical barriers such as concrete walls and fences gain importance and success is measured by the number of terrorists killed. In addition, and more importantly, too much focus on such physical infrastructure makes the south eastern borders ungoverned areas because it is not possible to keep same
standards throughout the borders due to the harsh geographical conditions.

The broader picture of high-tech surveillance systems and ‘smart border’ initiatives have had many supporters and will continue to do so. In spite of the extreme cost of maintenance, new systems and technologies have proliferated as countries increasingly seek to monitor and control the flow of people and goods across national boundaries. There is a wide range of innovative technology which provides increasingly sensitive and sophisticated solutions. However, before setting up such solutions, it is imperative that more attention be given to better implementation and the increased effectiveness of such technology. Most importantly, it should stimulate policymaking to encompass that technology and it should not let the acquisition of tools drive policy rather than the other way around. The result could be a collection of impressive technologic assets, but a distinct and damaging lack of strategic coherence. The acquisition of these technological assets tend to fall outside the jurisdiction of political decision makers, however their consequences can cause political fallout. Surveillance technology installed without a detailed awareness of the local risk environment is unlikely to fulfil expectations and could create new and unforeseen security risks. On the other hand, by reinforcing surveillance over a specific groups, even if the state is able to consolidate its hold over its territory, can create feelings of insecurity by causing revolts, hunger strikes and so on, by the people excluded or under surveillance.

It is important that lessons are learned from past experiences which proved that reinforcing fixed border strategies are destined to fail. Fragmentation and division of security agencies and resources has not worked therefore one of the Turkey’s priorities should be an oversight of whole mechanism, before an institutional and technological restructure in the border security field. In other words, border security needs to be seen and contemplated not as a separate and independent issue, but
should be a comprehensive framework closely associated with the broader debate concerning national security.

7.3. How Do Interview Findings Describe the Current Parameters?

There is a strong tendency among the interviewees to reaffirm old explanations by integrating some new aspects into them. However, a new border security understanding implies that territoriality as an organizing principle of the border security is no longer viable.

Border security understanding in Turkey is based on geography, border lines, border trespass and the connection between territory and sovereignty of the nation state. Borders are perceived as a concrete and tangible phenomena in the landscape by almost all the interviewees. Border security is reduced to an inviolability of the territorial borders and hence strategy is set up to stop undesirable outsiders at the borders. As a result of this typically Cold War strategy, concrete walls and fences come to the agenda as a recurrent solution. The sacrosanct character of the borders are emphasized at every military border base with the motto, ‘boundary is my honour’. However, border security is different from boundary protection. The latter means the protection of a line or narrow zone while the former has a deeper meaning, rejecting fixed border understandings and the state as the sole bordering actor.

Having considered the mind-set of interviewees with regard to border security, it is difficult to posit that Cold War thinking in the area of border security has diminished. The new developments in the area of security have not considerably influenced Turkey’s security understanding. Therefore, setting an agenda or determining the priorities or policies is still influenced by traditional thinking and is shaped, to a significant extent, by territorial protection, and military preferences and interests. The practical and mental traditions and
practices prevent the seeing and imagining of ‘border’ in a different way and impede understanding of the scale of the problem.

Almost all of the interviewees see the border as a fixed line and this attitude flaws not only its fight against PKK terrorism and trafficking but also Turkey’s national security as a whole. Their views on border security call for barriers such as walls and fences to keep the undesirables out. It follows then that, due to this territorial mentality, the physical barrier is reinforcing the state’s external borders, which is the primary means of being protected from outside threats. Therefore, the implied solution is to eliminate the threats with the help of fortified borders. The source of threats are always perceived to be outside. Hence, a common rhetoric that borders are vulnerable and needs to be fortified and protected against terrorists and smugglers is widespread. However, as we have become aware of the risks and threats of the new security environment, fortifying borders with walls or fences is not a solution, but a problem. While today’s risks and threats require collaboration, border fences and concrete walls create others as well as constitute an impediment to being aware of what is going on the other side. In other words, there is no other side in today’s world.

It was, therefore, important to review the opinions of experts who are working in the field and those dealing with the transformation of the Turkish border security system to ensure cognisance of the current and future implications of contemporary risks and threats. Thus, interview findings in the present study are important to shed light on the evolution of the current Turkish border security system and its future prospects with regards to the European Union integration process.
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the number of references made by interviewees who believe that the military should play a pivotal role in the evolving border security framework of Turkey is clearly high as is the number of those suggested fortified borders for better protection. Thus, it can be argued that interviewees have highlighted the importance of Cold War era parameters in Turkey’s current border security understanding. It is in this sense that the territory based ‘state-centric’ label can be applied. It is important, here, to clarify the ‘state-centric’ label in this discussion of Turkey’s border security policy. Traditionally, state-centrism has referred to an exclusive focus on state-based military threats to the security of the state. As M09 argued: ‘the defence of homeland starts from the border, so the military at the border not only protect the border, but set off the defence from that front. In case of a danger or threat, the defence line starts from zero point.’ Of course that zero point would be a boundary. Similarly, police chief M16 argued that ‘the point of border security is, in fact, security of the borders.’

However, security thinking has moved beyond traditional definitions to cover a range of non-state, non-military, local, regional and cross-border security threats and future risks. Nevertheless, these are still viewed through the lens of military security as threats to the security of the state according to the great majority of interviewee comments, which is significant. This is a consequence mainly stemming from confusion of the difference between the meanings of ‘defence’ and of ‘security’. Most of the
interviewees did not have clear visions of military defence and of security as a civil approach, as M22 argued ‘if it requires weapons to protect your borders, you will set up an armed unit. If then, what difference functionally? Can you name an armed unit as civilian?’

There is another difficulty about the military presence at the borders were a civil, professional body to take over the job. Most of the interviewees do not think it an option that military and a professional body responsible for border security can coexist at the border whilst conducting different duties. As M05 argued:

> When you charge the military with external security, you cannot isolate them from the borders. In other words, it is natural. For example, you cannot tell the police go away or do not stop by, once you hand over a duty of public order. Why cannot Turkey set up a border agency just like in UK? Because the dynamics and geographical location are different. Turkey still has some threats against its state and territorial unity.

The most important exception from this state centric philosophy exemplified in the words of the Secretary General of National Security Council. Secretary General Hacimuftuoglu argued that

> Our constitutional order is state, country and society respectively. All our vows and rituals begin with the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, territorial integrity, and indivisibility of the country and the maintenance of peace and security of the society. In other words, first state, second country and last society. However, providing happiness to society is only possible if you put people first. Accordingly, the order should be society, country and state.
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the respective size of rectangles in Graph 3, the EU influence or EU projects have very few positive visible results on Turkey’s border security capabilities. Most interviewees think that it has a negative influence rather than a positive. M04 argued:

The EU’s securitisation policy has had a negative influence on Turkey as it is not a member state yet. After the EU’s efforts to enhance the level of security at the borders, some illegal immigrants have begun to see Turkey as a target country.

M22, similarly, argued:

The EU cannot stop foreign fighters coming towards us to go to fight along with terrorist organisations. It means the EU’s system does not work. Thus, under these circumstances, how applicable its recommendations are to Turkey is a question mark.

M21 pointed out the positive effects of the European Union policies and argued ‘the EU projects such as risk analysis projects and providing Turkey with coast guard boats help Turkey to enhance its capacity in the border security area. However, it is only for its own good.’

Having considered the interpretations of professionals, it is clear that border security is now accepted as an isolated phenomenon and a sub-set of national security which is focused on territorial boundaries for protection. Most of the interviewees demand the reinforcement of the barrier role of the state borders against terrorists in the name of border security even if everybody knows that it is impossible to seal the borders.
completely. Hence, Turkey is at a place which is a product of cold war thinking which fails to recognize the requirements of the new security environment.

Today security can no longer be conceived of as protection behind borders. And although a number of implementations throughout the world maintain the vision of a fortified border, border security is no longer related to a territory. You cannot keep this traditional form of border security framework because threats today are not typically territorial. The conceptions of borders and security are changing. Turkey has to take a broader approach and change its position. Current border security systems, based on Cold War thinking, restricts Turkey’s capacity to enhance its influence beyond its borders and it appears that this is the only way to tackle security problems in the new world.

7.4. Findings obtained from archival research

The Strategy Paper for the Protection of the External Borders in Turkey was adopted in 2003. This Strategy Paper recommended that a single authority should be responsible for the security of the borders under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, which would take over the border control function currently performed by the Turkish military. The new authority will be in charge of all border protection duties in Turkey and especially trained, professional law-enforcement units will perform all functions, in line with EU standards.

The Directorate of the IBM Project Implementation was established in 2004 and is responsible for the planning and preparation of the EU projects within the scope of IBM. This Directorate, in collaboration with a French-UK Consortium, were tasked with implementing the Twinning Project ‘Support for the Development of an Action Plan to Implement Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy’. The IBM Action Plan was subsequently approved by the Prime Minister in 2006. The purpose of the Action Plan was to form the base for the institutional reforms and
the legislative regulations in order to establish a single civilian, non-military, professional body responsible for performing all border control and surveillance tasks at the borders. In accordance with the Action Plan, Turkey decided to implement the ‘border police system’ gradually (2006: 21) and prior to the establishment of a non-military and professional Border Guard Organization, to further strengthen the technical and administrative capacities of agencies and institutions responsible for the control of the borders (2006: 53). This is confusing because there should be no need to strengthen current agencies if a new body is going to be set up.

In 2008, the Directorate of the IBM Project Implementation was replaced by a newly established Development and Implementation Bureau for Border Management Legislation and Administrative Capacity (the Bureau), within the Ministry of the Interior. The Bureau’s responsibility is to carry out studies for the legislative and administrative structure of IBM, to prepare an assessment and needs analysis on IBM, to implement IBM projects and to work on the establishment of a new Border Security Unit. Additionally, the External Border Task Force (the Task Force) comprising of representatives of the agencies was established to work out the Draft Road Map on IBM for 2010-2014. Later the Bureau has been converted to a department and carry on business at the disposal of General Directorate of Province Administration within the Interior Ministry.

The new single authority responsible for the security of the borders is planned to be affiliated to the Ministry of the Interior. Interior Minister Efkan Ala later confirmed this and said ‘there are plans to establish a professional armed border security department aimed at placing the country's borders under civilian control in line with EU standards.’\(^\text{12}\)

However, as discussed in the interview findings even the civilians in the decision making mechanism in the field still hold militaristic views on

border security. They share exactly the same mind-set with the military. So what the contribution of ‘civilian control’ will be is a big question mark. In addition, certain major issues, such as personnel requirements and delivering the appropriate training for the staff working for the new authority, should be addressed well before the materialisation of the transfer. It takes time as Interior Minister Ala pointed out and in the absence of the appropriate approach the current border security understandings remain in place.

It is thought that setting up a new agency will eliminate the coordination problems which are the primary concern among policy makers. However, it is clear that it is not a solution. The drafting of new Border Security Agency Law is just an initial step, although the existing legislation in Turkey needs to be reviewed and amended in order to facilitate the establishment of an effective mechanism in line with the IBM Action Plan including coordination and communication procedures between the existing agencies, orientation and approach should be reviewed first.

According to Turkish Law, the overall supervision of Border Management is exercised by the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior performs these functions through the deputy governors assigned by the Governors. The District Governors, who are responsible for co-ordination among the various agencies working at the borders and Border Gates, are the 1st degree border authorities, and the Governors are the 2nd degree border authorities. However, there are no formalized procedures or standardized instructions for inter-agency cooperation and information exchange. Co-operation between the border management agencies at central and regional level takes place through Provincial Governors/Deputy Governors and Local Administrators, according to ‘Provincial Administration Law’, which sets the communication and information exchange procedures. However, this legislation falls short for

appropriate information exchange and direct horizontal cooperation both at local and central level. There are currently no links between the databases of the different border services. Information exchange occurs on an ad-hoc basis and is not institutionalized.

The present system for Border Management consists of several fully autonomous agencies each with their own budgets and mainly under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry. Some are of a military character such as the Land Forces, without law enforcement power, and the Coast Guard, a law enforcement agency, which is formally under the Ministry of the Interior, and others are civilian such as Customs. However, in reality the Ministry of the Interior has no jurisdiction on these agencies in terms of human resources, budget and any policy making. For example, governors and district governors as 1st and 2nd degree border authorities have no administrative power over Land Forces, inevitably creating a huge gap in terms of coordination and efficiency. In other words, these agencies ostensibly report to the Interior Ministry, while the Interior Ministry ostensibly holds executive power over them. It should be noted that Customs is exempted from integration by the national action plan. As a result, coordination is in reality a pretence.

In parallel with the interview findings there is strong emphasis on geographic structure as a problem in the plan (2006: 15, 21, 51). The plan took the geographical situation of Turkey as determinant factor for the strong military presence. Mountainous areas at the border zone necessitate that the military continue to conduct protection of land borders ‘in highly critical regions’ (2006:54), namely the east and south east sectors. Moreover, political instability in the neighbouring countries is considered an important complication for border security (2006: 16). The likelihood of a great financial burden is also cited in the action plan.

\*\*\* See the article 13 of Law 3497. The 3497 Law of Protection and Security of Land Borders designates the Turkish Land Forces as the responsible authority for the task of the protection and security of land borders.\*\*\*
and considered an excuse to ‘gradually implement a border police system’ (2006: 21).

In its 2015 Progress Report for Turkey, the European Commission states that ‘Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. There was some progress in the past year, in a difficult environment’ (p. 68). The Schengen and external borders Commission says that ‘Turkey did not make steps towards the establishment of an integrated border management system and a single border civilian agency. Coordination and cooperation among existing border management agencies needs to be improved.’ (p. 70, 71). The report also suggests enhancing information exchange and operational cooperation with Member States’ immigration liaison officers deployed in Turkey. Of note, the cross-border exchange of information between some of the border agencies and their counterparts is still carried out on ad-hoc basis, as there are currently no laid down formal procedures. Although projected in the National Strategy Plan, Joint Centres are not yet in place, due again to a lack of appropriate legislation.

Land borders are assessed as problematic in the report: ‘land borders continue to be managed by land forces detachments composed mainly by conscripts with limited training and led by officials who are not encouraged to specialise on border management.' (p. 71). It also suggests that border management authorities should be staffed by professionals who are not subject to rotation.

The Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has announced the Action Plan of 2016 of 64th Government. It consists a wide range of reforms to be implemented including reforms of border security. On page 41 the Prime Minister pledges to set up a professional border security agency under the authority of the Interior Ministry in line with the EU Acquis. Based on Article 8 of the Additional Protocol of the Amsterdam Agreement,

candidate countries are expected to have the capacity to apply the Schengen Agreement before becoming a member of the EU, in order to be able to execute the provisions of the Agreement after a possible membership. The plan states that agencies responsible for border protection will be syndicated. The deadline was declared as 15 December 2016.

It is clear that the existence of more than one agency, which is responsible for passport and goods checks at border crossings, and for supervising the sea and land borders of the country makes inter-agency coordination rather difficult. Furthermore, IBM is not only about coordination, it also requires the rebuilding of infrastructure such as physical barriers, and equipping border forces with thermal and video cameras, radars, sensors, satellite monitoring, and unmanned air vehicles. All of these measures are targeting the protection of a boundary line which is no longer the primary signifier. However, it is not clear whether uniting all the agencies can bring the expected solution. And the question here is: is Turkey prioritizing the most significant and appropriate steps?

The documents cited above bear evidence that border security was a high priority for Turkey. Turkey recognizes the possible consequences of IBM in its security context and has devoted significant government resources to the issue. These documents also trace the development of the implementation of IBM at a policy level. Finally, they make it clear that Turkey was committed to addressing border issues within the context of Turkey’s national security policy.

In sum, the core of the findings from primary and secondary resources above imply that current border security strategies are meant to deter the entry of illegal or threatening people and goods. As a result of the old notion of deterrence logic, an obsession with easily guarded boundaries

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has become the characteristic of current border security thinking. Therefore, achieving operational control over boundaries and the threats they present becomes more of an issue. Turkey still takes border security as a sub-set of national security; and the current organization and practices of border security were shaped by the particular geopolitical and technical requirements of the Cold War. As a result of that, border security’s itself becomes a security problem and produces insecurity for both society and the state. Therefore, Turkey must effect a new paradigm.

CHAPTER 8
ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Defending against cross-border risks and threats requires a more radical and holistic approach to security. Therefore, the core purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it will argue that the current border security framework and its practices create exclusions and therefore increases the danger to national security. In other words, this chapter will analyse the current securitisation of the state border and the ability of the security agencies to protect national (state) security. Furthermore, while traditional understandings of security focus upon the protection and integrity of a sovereign territory against the outside enemies, this thesis will suggest that insecurity is prevalent within the Turkish territory and the mechanisms that are used to ‘secure’ can actually create insecurity. Thus looking at the other side for enemies behind reinforced border lines does not work out. Secondly, the chapter will argue that border security
should not be taken as a sub-set of national security but a comprehensive framework that can lead and transform the old notion of national security. The new security environment invalidates the analyses of border security as an isolated phenomenon. In other words, border security needs to be seen and contemplated not as a separate and independent issue, but as a comprehensive framework closely associated with the broader debate concerning national security.

Finally, the chapter will discuss how the concept of societal security could be considered as a means of better security for Turkey. In other words, border security must be embedded in a larger notion of ‘societal security.’ Today, security depends not only on territorial integrity, but also on securing the delicate web of values, connections, and infrastructure which characterizes a society. Therefore, while we try to improve border security, and hence national security, we must not break the central elements of societal security because securing borders is less about securing lines or narrow zones and more about transformation or shifting of lines and we have to put more emphasis on how people experience the borders or interpret them. This approach can create a more useful context for border security and lead to a transformation of the current national security system.

Therefore, based on the conceptual debates the researcher will discuss possible answers for two core questions primarily: How might Turkey increase its border security? And what insights ‘Societal Security’ might offer to this question. Secondarily, the researcher will discuss: whether current border security practices in Turkey do provide security for both state and society, or quite the opposite and is the transformation strategy an added value to the existing framework, in terms of efficiency and enhancement of security, in the security field?

In the modern era we have witnessed two key interrelated conceptual transformations: first, mobility of the borders and second the changing nature of security. Security is no longer an issue which can be solely
defined in terms of the security of a state, it also, and increasingly, concerns identity and therefore society. The notion of security has also been expanded beyond the physical border itself and by deterritorializing the issue of security the need for the protection of physical boundaries is undermined. As a result of this rationale, some territories beyond the border need to be securitized as if they were part of the national border. In other words, securitisation of borders should no longer necessarily take place at the geopolitical or territorial boundary line or zone.

However, Turkey’s security understanding is highly traditional and based on territorial defense. As a result of that an obsession with easily guarded land borders is the characteristic of current border thinking in Turkey. In addition the state is seen as the sole actor who implements bordering practices at the edges of state territory. However, there are other actors who are powerful and capable of bordering along with the state, such as society, the private sector, even cross-border illegal groups. The State’s bordering practices do not always correspond with societies and this creates contradictions and conflicts between society and the state. To stop these conflicts, the state applies complete closure strategies which deepen the contradictions because a traditional territorial security concept does not allow security professionals think about alternative ways to counter the challenges of the new security environment.
Turkey’s 9479 km long boundary is subjected to a historical burden and still gives rise to passionate feelings, both positive and negative. Today, contrary to popular belief, our common borders are less of a problem and more of an opportunity. Positive and mutual opportunities come not only through the likely economic benefits or the increased trade, but also through more encounters and meetings between people. These kinds of encounters will hopefully help us to gain a better understanding of not only our neighbours, but of ourselves as well – and the history behind, and the future ahead of our long common borders.

In this chapter the desperate pressure for change in the new security environment will be examined first and closely related, the impact of the changing conditions on the security agencies will be scrutinised. Finally the chapter will pursue the arguments and recommendations regarding measures which Turkey could implement to increase security, based on the conceptual framework of this thesis.
8.1. Why is it essential to change?
The current organization and practices of border security were shaped by the particular geopolitical and technical requirements of the Cold War and hence are more fitted to its relatively stable climate. Clearly, the change in the security environment and the nature of the ‘new’ threats has created some major difficulties for traditional approaches to border security. In order to better understand these difficulties, this section first looks at the ‘old’ conception of problems and how they were dealt with; and then focuses on the nature of the ‘new’ challenges. However, it does not mean that the discontinuities between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments are as clear-cut as the separation between ‘old’ and ‘new’ implies.

8.1.1. The Old: Certain and predictable
The clear and straightforward parameters of the Cold War threat can be designated as a sense of certainty and calculability. It implies that to identify the level of threat, the material capabilities such as number of the aircrafts and tanks or potential of the enemy along with its intention, were analysed and compared to one’s own power level. This understanding of security only allows the external location of threats. With good information and analysis the location of threats was possible. The monitoring and surveillance of the enemy, resulted in the targeted movement of people and supplies, changes in aircraft deployments and increases in communications. In addition, there was a belief that it was possible to defeat the threat and achieve security through deterrence which means becoming a risk for the enemy in a sense.

This old security thinking is territory-based, externally directed, military-dominated, and state centric. To defend its territory, the state reinforces the fixed external borders as its main tool for protection. These barrier like borders operate like anti-flow apparatus and target the protection of a narrow line. Border security is seen as an isolated
phenomenon or a sub-set of national security. However, borders and territory, and the security practices organised around them are very much in question in a world of turbulent financial flows, instantaneous telecommunications, and cross-border and intra-border dangers. In addition, this logic of exclusion always includes the risk of potential conflict as well as a barrier that prevents us seeing the other side properly. Above all, the developments after the Cold War have demonstrated that states are less capable of providing security on their own. Although they have resorted to military alliances or collective security organizations to cope with threats of a military nature, today's security challenges are different in nature and require more than traditional means. An increasingly mobile world with its dislocated identities and blurred boundaries does not easily allow territory-based solutions.

The end of the Cold War brought about not only the end of a relatively stable bipolar world order but also the end of the predictability of threats. The new security environment is dominated by threats whose characteristics are complex, uncertain and difficult to locate in the geographical sense. Revolutions in technology, changing demographics because of ethnic conflicts, and global economic activities are driving forces behind this transformation. These forces have created a more connected world than ever seen in the past. However, such a connected world has become increasingly vulnerable to challenges and uncertainties which are unpredictable in nature and geopolitics.

Turkey is not immune to these changes of course. However, it has not yet managed to adapt its systems to intervene effectively in the security problems of the new security environment. Recent terrorist activities, even in the capital, with hundreds of killings in the streets of the country by these attacks, are strong indicators of Turkey's position in the face of this change. Many of today's principal analytic problems arise from continued reliance on analytic tools, methodologies, and processes that were appropriate to the static and hierarchical nature of the Soviet threat.
during the Cold War’ (Cooper, 2005: 23). As the organizations and practices of security were shaped by the particular geopolitical and technical requirements of the Cold War, there is a constantly increasing pressure on the whole system.

**8.1.2. The new: uncertain and unpredictable**

We have witnessed the emergence of a new world and a new security landscape. The breakdown of the bipolar world order led to a collapse of previous assumptions and perspectives. Whilst, in the past, most threats came from outside, mostly from other states, today, intra-state security risks and threats relating to non-state actors have increasingly occupied the minds of policy makers. In the new security landscape, open economies and open societies have improved economic welfare but have also made it difficult to provide security. As economies globalize and societies are fused and split up at the same time by transnational migration, the relationship based on territory between nation, state, society, and economy crumbles and the modern territorial system itself is being transformed. This transformation has two key interrelated consequences in common: a changing understanding of security including the new risks and threats; and the changing nature of sovereignty.

The security risks and threats such as terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cybercrime, or illegal migration, are cross-border and intra-border that originate within or beyond states, and involve non-state actors that have a clear tendency to use violence and weapons. They are within and without borders and are unpredictable. With the help of advanced technology, ‘International borders are becoming so porous that they no longer fulfil their historical role as barriers to the movement of goods, ideas, and people, and as markers of the extent and power of the state’ (Wilson & Donnan 1998: 1). As a result, control of territory is no longer the most important priority.

The main consequence emerging from the new security environment is the changing ‘referent object of security’ as the marker of the new world.
The state is no longer seen as the primary object of security though it is still an important one. The emergent new security threats are generally aimed at society in the first instance and threaten the social contract instead of the state’s ability to govern. Restricting the definition of security to the traditional meaning with territorial protection of the state would inevitably exclude threats to the social fabric of the society. Thus, threats can no longer be disaggregated into the capabilities and intentions of oppositional states; primacy can no longer be attributed to the state as either agent or object (Snyder 1991). In addition, the capacity of the modern state as provider of security in the eyes of its citizens is weakened. As a result, society has come to the agenda as a security provider alongside the state.

The concept of state sovereignty has also been transformed by the rapid developments in communication and transportation technology. As UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (1992) formulated: ‘The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed: its theory was never matched by reality.’ Hence, borders cannot be seen as simple lines where one sovereignty ends and another starts. More importantly, border security can no longer be based on a fixed line on a map. An understanding of this reconceptualisation would help to overcome the traditional distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ security concerns, which are becoming increasingly blurred.

As a result of those dramatic changes after the end of Cold War, the scope of border security has expanded to a critical point which is crucial for national security. Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998: 3,8) posit that ‘the Cold War has classified border security exclusively as a sub-set of national security and failed to consider the state boundary in its broader associated fields of social and cultural influences.’ Therefore, all these transformations force a reconsideration of the concept of border security, its link with the notion of defence, and the role which armies can play with regard to other sectors of security (military, civil, economic, environmental, internal or societal). In other words, securing borders, is
now less about securing lines, on the contrary border security is a comprehensive framework to coordinate and determine all assets to achieve security.

Although the traditional way of security thinking is challenged by the new security environment, it is clear from the interviews that in Turkey it is very much alive as the determinant concept. This results in a blocking of the consideration of alternative ways to deal with border security issues effectively, hence its border security understanding and the security structure’s itself becomes a security problem.

Just like Moises Naim suggested in the case of drug smugglers, ‘borders are a boon for traffickers and a nightmare for law-enforcement agencies’ (Naim, 2005, 62–3), because of the lack of cooperation. While policing remains national, ‘traffickers are most effective when operating across borders — which makes them in many ways better suited to today’s world’ (Naim, 2005, 63). Coordination is necessarily minimal in the traditional view of security, because it is limited to periods of war when national territory is attacked by external enemies. Claiming coordination at other times is just a sham. However, we are in a constant war with terrorists, organised criminals, traffickers and other challenges disrupting societies’ very daily life. Therefore, Turkey should construct a new paradigm which enables it to find a way to lower the fences and walls and to give a chance to change in line with the contemporary norms of border security.

Despite the general tendency towards traditional thinking, there is a growing section of the security community that has realized that the changing context has significant consequences for strategic methods of achieving security. Sometimes policy makers and high ranking officials emphasize the new risks and threats. For instance, the commander of Land Forces Akar (now Chief of General Staff) said: ‘In today’s security environment the range of threats has expanded. While Turkey's geostrategic position provides countless opportunities and possibilities for
our country, it also accumulates many uncertainties, risks and threats within.\textsuperscript{17} However, even though the techniques of alternative analysis have been around for many years, they have not yet led to proper organizational and behavioural reforms in the Turkish security sector.

On a conceptual basis, the need for change stems from the limitations of the traditional approach. These limitations mainly are: the privileged position of the military sector and the fact that other potential threats are excluded; and thus, unless an environmental, economic or social problem disrupts the military sector, it does not become part of a state's security analysis. For example, an environmental disaster would not be considered a national security concern unless the state’s interests were threatened. Another limitation is that the traditional perspective assumes that the greatest threats to national security are external ones and thus, does not recognize intrastate conflict as being a source of insecurity, so the potential separatist movements do not qualify as a national security threat (Ayoob, 1997). Even if the state somehow views it as a national security threat it inevitably uses military force to suppress the secessionist movement.

In short, border, space, and security must be relieved of the burdens of the Cold War in order to have a possibility for a change (Booth, 1998). In this context, to stop the area of border security from being a nightmare of border security agencies, there is a major challenge that need to be addressed. Decision makers must change their border perception and determine whether border security practices will be extended outwards and simultaneously pulled together at home.

\textbf{8.1.3 Mobility of the boundaries}

In the context of spatiality, according to the traditional view, borderlines symbolize ‘the difference’ between ‘we’ and ‘other’, inside and outside; and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{17}  \url{http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/orgeneral-akar-ates-cemberinin-ortasindaviz-her-an-harbe-hazir-olmalyiz-27379265}}
a tool for states to survive. As it focuses on the state, the border is understood as a constituent of stability and sovereignty which enables state to organise the political space to maintain its political order. As the threat is somewhere outside, walls are heightened for protection because borders have long been associated with the military defence of the national territory against external aggression of neighbouring armies. In this respect, it seems that nothing much has changed with regards to Turkey’s border security framework after the end of Cold War. The security border keeps excluding the other, and the possibility of alternative politics is denied (Latinen 2001). However, in a world full of uncertainties, border security issues are interlinked and it is hard to locate the source of insecurity because ‘Post-Cold War risks are no longer adequately represented and stabilised as territorial threats from recognizable enemies; rather post-Cold War risks have become amorphous and pervasive dangers’ (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 28).

Having considered the interviewee’s approach to border security and the findings of the archival research, the internal/external dichotomy is common and border security is seen as a part of internal security as emphasised by governor Tapsız: ‘border security is definitely a part of internal security.’ However, what will Turkey do if internal security is not only from the ‘inside’, if it goes beyond the border and if the inside challenger is coming from outside? It is hard to say which is internal and which is external because of the changing nature of risks and threats. As a result of this dramatic change, police, customs, gendarmes, intelligence agencies and the army are now fighting against same enemies: terrorists and their supporting countries, organized crime and drugs trafficking, human trafficking, illegal immigration and ethnic conflicts which are directly linked to the terrorist organisations.

For a long time the military forces have been in charge of the surveillance of the borders and looking for ‘infiltrating enemies’. During the 1990s at

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18 [http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ibps/vol6_2/Laitinen.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ibps/vol6_2/Laitinen.htm), accessed August 2015
the height of the fight against terrorism it was thought that the more deserted the borderline, the easier it will be to do surveillance across the east and the south-east boundaries of Turkey and as a result, some villagers were forced to migrate deep into the country. However, terrorists were already inside, not only in the rural areas but also the suburbs of cities. It implies that border security extends beyond organisational concerns of territorial defence which the agencies in the field in Turkey focus upon.

A series of examples suggest that today we are witnessing a “delocalization” of the border. Borders are no longer a line which determine the territorial authority’s ends. Rather, they are expanding in time and space. The development of transport, international trade and communications create boundaries deep within the state territory, for instance, around international airports, and special customs or free economic zones. The transformation is not limited to entry points, as Balibar stated ‘they are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled— for example, in cosmopolitan cities.’ (2004: 1). Therefore, the concept of border now embraces not only the area along the boundary, but internal regions.

In parallel with the conceptual transformation above, although border security activities were previously concentrated in this specific place, it is argued that currently there is a disaggregation of border functions away from the border (Bigo, 2002: 77; Salter, 2004: 76). This is evident in the case of the UK and the EU security policies embodied in the form of ‘remote control’, ‘citizen-surveillance’ and ‘juxtaposed borders’ focusing on the ‘pre-emptive’ character of new border security. In the past, borders were places where people were inspected while crossing. Now, different forms of pre-assessment methods are used by states to decide on admissibility before travellers depart their country of origin. And some state agencies are now deployed and work beyond their territories.
It implies that border security cannot be reduced to the national territory and securitisation of borders should no longer necessarily take place at the geopolitical or territorial boundary line or zone. It can extend *beyond the national territory* while it must deal with the security issues inside the territory. As Bigo (2000:187) argues:

> Security checks are no longer necessarily done at the border on a systematic and egalitarian basis, but can be carried out further downstream, within the territory, within the border zone or even upstream with police collaboration in the home country of the immigrants, through visa-granting systems and through readmission agreements.

There are some lessons to learn from this extension in time and space. First, borders are no longer necessarily situated at the border (Balibar, 2002: 84). They are unfixed and mobile, diffused throughout, within and outside the state. As we have seen in the ‘citizen detective’ concept in chapter 3, citizens themselves are undertaking bordering practices, such as downloading pictures of wanted suspects onto mobile phones, or being provided with phone numbers to ring if a suspected or suspicious person is identified (Vaughan-Williams, 2008: 63). In similar vein, when supermarket checkout staff are trained by MI5 to recognise terrorist activities, ‘the supermarket checkout now resembles a border crossing or transit point in the midst of society’ (Rumford, 2008: 1). Thus, strikingly, mobility is not just about criminals, migrants or other goods crossing the border, but the actual border itself.

Second, closely connected with the first, the notion of security has been expanded beyond the physical border itself and by deterritorializing the issue of security, the need for protection of the physical boundaries is undermined. As a result of this rationale, some territories beyond the border need to be securitized as if they were part of the national border. The question whether the source of a threat is inside or outside is therefore becoming irrelevant.
However, an obsession with easily guarded land borders is the characteristic of current border thinking in Turkey. Border security is thought of in terms of a narrow zone, the border is, for Turkish personnel, a place of work. For these agencies, the concept of border security is securitization of a closed territory which should be protected by the help of insuperable borders. Their vision of security seems to be influenced by the old Cold War thinking and at the same time lacks means against the terrorists, traffickers and the flow of immigrants.

As it is clear from the mainstream media rhetoric about ‘broken borders’, referring specifically to Turkey’s south and south-east borders, the traditional image of the borders of the state still exercises a major influence on the territorial security of the state. This powerful image of the secure border as a guardian of state security led to a security fence just like a prison wall. In this respect, Turkey ‘intensified its security measures with the construction of bazooka-proof walls on the Turkish-Syrian border.’ However, with regard to Turkey’s border security practises, it represents a paradox, indeed. There is a dual process of opening national borders based mainly on Turkey’s new foreign policy and the creation of new security walls because of instabilities in Syria and Iraq. When Turkey adopts an open border policy and wants to define a new paradigm to resolve the insecurity created by the conflicts in the Middle East, the scope of security is expanding, however, it narrows when you build a wall at the border to stop unintended consequences.

The construction of a concrete wall not only symbolises the barrier function of the border but it also prevents us from seeing what is taking place on the other side of the border. As such, the other side becomes invisible and unknown, and obscures the opportunity to act within the environment and shape it. In addition, the removal of the wall or the fence does not only symbolize the coming together of peoples or groups which were previously prevented from being in contact with each other,

but also changes our perception of the border from a barrier to an interface, and from a no-man’s land to a transition zone.

The realities of the new security environment prevail, and the intention to control a certain territory by traditional means has very much been challenged, therefore, the dominant ideology of security must be reviewed. In the context of border security, inside/outside or internal/external divisions can hardly be relevant any longer. Such implications are moving Turkey in a direction which does not encourage strategies to manage the current border problems and leaves the military doing police work.

8.2. What kind of border security is in the making?

Turkey has been struggling to create a new border security department in line with the European Union integration process and this department will be responsible for border security. For this purpose, the Strategy Paper for the Protection of External Borders was issued on April 14, 2003. Parallel with the Strategy paper a National Action Plan was prepared to reform the border security framework. Recently, the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has announced in the Action Plan of 2016 that government will set up a professional border security agency under the authority of the Interior Ministry in line with the EU Acquis.20 However, there is a question as to the kind of border security Turkey is creating. It is a version of the old geographical security vision of the Cold War era. Ultimately, the question is: Can a predominantly traditional border security framework play a productive and leading role in national security? The National Action Plan and the Strategy Paper will be scrutinised in this section to shed light on this ambivalence.

The Strategy Paper for the Protection of External Borders in Turkey emphasizes ‘preventive’ and ‘deterrent’ activities to combat trafficking

and illegal crossing and the security of border gates and borders. The terminology (prevent, deter) used by the strategy document is militaristic and focus is on the border lines and zones to make them visible and thereby deterrent. The footprints of this conceptualisation were visible at every stage during the interviews.

The National Action plan was adopted in 2006 to reform Turkey’s border security framework. The purpose of the Action Plan was to form the basis for institutional reforms and legislative regulations in order to establish a single civilian, non-military, professional body responsible for performing all border control and surveillance tasks at the borders. In accordance with the Action Plan, Turkey decided, prior to the establishment of a non-military and professional Border Guard Organization, to further strengthen technical and administrative capacities of agencies and institutions responsible for the control of the borders to be in line with the EU Member States practices. In the plan ‘Border Security’ is defined as ‘[...] all active and passive measures taken at land, sea, and air borders to prevent all types of illegal crossings’ (2006: 12). This definition and the following descriptions demonstrate that border security is discussed in the document as security of border line or border zone.

Throughout, the plan emphasises how difficult it is to control Turkey’s eastern borders because of geographical features, climate and instabilities in neighbouring countries — a strong indicator of a traditional security understanding. According to the plan, these special conditions require a special perspective. More importantly, the document validates an unwillingness to change citing geographic structure, harsh climate and the cost. For example due to the mountainously steep land borders ‘the physical barrier system cannot be put in place, thus these regions must be monitored and controlled by satellite systems’ which is beyond the financial capability of Turkey (2006: 15). Along with the other factors, financial cost is referred as an excuse to drag the feet.
In fact, mountainous areas and harsh climate conditions and the cost of the investment are realities in Turkey, however, the interesting thing here is that policy-makers act as if fortified borders are the only choice to provide security. Indeed, the state prevents us from imagining any other possible security space (Walker 1990). In other words, traditional thinking is creating barriers to thinking about alternative solutions. In addition, the plan points out the neighbouring countries in the east and southeast as a challenge, as they do not consider border security as an important issue. It implies how difficult it is to coordinate with other states. In fact, it is an indicator of how Turkey is dependent on state to state relationships to sustain security.

The languages of ‘control’ and ‘protection’ are the reflection of old security understandings which take the border as a line and border security as the security of this narrow line. Geographic and climatic conditions are emphasized often because the conventional border security understandings require fences, walls, more personnel and more guns to control the flows. In other words, visibility and hence deterrence cannot be provided due to the geographic conditions. It is fair to say that it is not easy in such geographic conditions to conduct duties. The question here is ‘is visibility a necessity?’ Putting aside terrorism, can illegal immigrants who cross the borders at the expense of their own and their loved ones’ lives, as often seen in the Mediterranean recently, be deterred? In today’s highly mobile world it is hard to establish a connection between providing security and border crossing.

In this respect, therefore, starting restructuring from the western borders is suggested by the plan (2006: 50). From traditional point of view, it is an obligation because building walls and fences and protecting them is impossible at Turkey’s south-east borders (Iraq borders) because of highly seep geography and harsh climate. This suggestion implies that eastern borders are more important than western borders mainly due to the terrorist activities. However, the idea of mobility defined by flows and networks downplays the importance of territorial bordering and the
political priorities which are based on some borders being more important than others. In addition, in the face of eastern and south-eastern borders, western borders promulgate nothing in terms of border security problems. Even using traditional territorial border security logic, the direction of the flows are from east to west. Hence, taking measures at the western borders means nothing and leaves it too late to face threats. The plan also emphasizes that ‘in critical regions (east and south-east) the army (land forces) will continue to assume border protection tasks on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior, until the conditions are suitable for such a transfer’ (2006: 54). It is not clear what ‘on behalf of’ means and there is a vague time schedule to transfer the duties to the Interior Ministry. On page 56, the period needed to transfer the duties is envisaged as a ‘reasonable transition period.’

As a solution, the National Action Plan suggests that all these conditions (geographic structure, climate, terrorist activities) make it necessary to continue with existing practice on the east and south-east land borders for a while (2006: 72). In other words, it implies that nothing will change on the eastern borders in particular, and hence the whole system will remain unchanged in general. It constitutes an irony because the national action plan is supposed to change Turkey’s border security framework. Thus, Turkey’s border security framework will continue to be a security problem and produce insecurity for society.

The plan suggests that the EU takes two key points very seriously. First, human trafficking; second, a single professional authority to be responsible for border management (2006: 16, 17). It seems that to be able to expand its external governance networks successfully the EU has to rely on compatible administrative structures and expertise in the partner countries. Hence, the EU authorities are looking for a single counterpart to negotiate illegal migration issues as this has long been the most important problem for the EU and it prioritises its interests accordingly. However, the plan suggest that border protection and control duties in Turkey are not limited to illegal immigration and
identifying asylum seekers. Along with those problems, terrorist activities are the main objectives of ‘border protection.’ It implies that Turkey’s borders are different from the EU borders not only in terms of geographic structure but also in terms of border problems. The asymmetry of interests between Turkey and the EU does flaw cooperation in the border security field (Albert, Jacobson, Lapid, 2001: 31).

In addition, strikingly, the plan exempts Customs from integration as a result of institutional competition. This competition is fed by the feeling of anxiety of losing power. It suggests that its duties cover the control of goods and vehicles similar to customs organisations in Europe. However, it is impossible to separate illegal flows of goods and vehicles from illegal flows of people. It is undeniable that illegal flows of people and goods feed off each other. Thus, it seems that the National Action Plan does not modify the security understandings of Customs. As the whole focus is on the transport of goods, there is little place for questions of the drug traffickers or infiltrations of organised crime and terrorists. In addition, the border is viewed in the plan, as a place of work. Hence, border is defined in terms of a zone which may be infiltrated by illegal goods.

Anxieties based on losing power or recognised position are common among the agencies in the field, it is essential to address this in order to engender a successful transformation. One important element fuelling this anxiety is the responsibility which has been given to the Ministry of the Interior. Unfortunately, other organisations who have responsibilities in the border security field see the Interior Ministry as a rival and they feel they are losing authority to their rival and this results in a natural resistance to the reform efforts.

8.3. Changing Roles and Institutional Anxieties in the Field
The dividing line, which has long been porous, between the forces in charge of security within the territory (police and gendarmerie) and those
responsible for defending the territory itself (military), is now becoming more and more uncertain. Although the changes that are afoot have reached organisational consciousness, it seems that the Cold War-way of doing things still dominates the thoughts of people and the institutional practices in the current security framework.

Turkey is attempting to deal with new global challenges using Cold War institutions which are destined to fail due to the changing nature of the new security environment. However, the requirements of today’s security environment is not an option that one can choose or reject. They cannot be dealt under the old institutionalised standards. The uncertainties of the new age have a deep impact on the organisations and agencies in the security field, such as the military, the police, the gendarmerie and customs which find themselves positioned in the interface between these two worlds, old and new or traditional and non-traditional. During the interviews, it was clear that these bodies consider the challenges of this uncertain age as an attack on their professional identity, and they are anxious about their future. Along with these anxieties, some such as the police, consider these transformation processes an opportunity to occupy a larger and higher position amongst the agencies which specialise in security. As a result of this intention, the police set up an institution in the Police Academy to specialise in border security. Similarly, military is in the process of making special border units, which some view as professionalization21.

The police consider that it has been prepared for decades for these kinds of missions in border security. The gendarmerie, with its military status, considers itself a master in both a civilian and a military context and pretends knowing not to transform its opponent into an enemy like their colleagues in the army. The military considers that it possesses an advantage over other institutions due to its defence role and power in its soldiers and use of military means. Even some civilians agree that the

military are well adapted to low intensity conflicts, whose extent exceeds the regular bounds of national police actions and thus, it is more able to respond than the other institutions.

Although these agencies have expatiating discourse on the cross-border dimension of the ‘new threats’, and on their specific knowledge, they are, in fact, marginal in this new age. They are marginal because security today, with its multidimensional nature, is more than defence and law enforcement (enforcing the criminal laws in their jurisdiction). Their discourse belongs to a former era with their institutional arenas and institutional structure in the face of the new security environment because these institutions have a defence perspective on territorial spatiality they do not embrace the new security perspectives. Indeed, law-enforcement policy makers typically focus on domestic crimes, while defence implies the fight against aggression of an enemy. This philosophy is a determinant factor on their structure and practices. However, they do not see that this has the effect of marginalising them in today’s fast changing environment. This is why, to a certain extent, their mission mentality allows them to be present where the police dare not to intervene in a crisis situation, and where the military do not want to, or do not know how to intervene the opponent to control it without killing the enemy.  

To their way of thinking, the concept of border security is that of a closed narrow territory protected by insuperable border walls and fences. They favour a border security analysis encompassing cross border networks, securitization and the monitoring of territorial borders. Their vision of security seems trapped by the territoriality. They think that security at the borders is necessarily cross-border and is ensured by the international collaboration of the security agencies. However, traditional alliance mechanisms or state to state relationships are inadequate to the

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challenge of globally operating criminal networks. This type of perspective is based on the traditional concepts of territory, national sovereignty and objective threats to collective security.

On the other hand, there is a clear contradiction that traditional security agencies themselves, such as police and gendarmerie, are more concerned with what is going on beyond the national territory. They are getting more interested in security beyond the border and that is leading to a greater focus inside the border. Thus, it implies that border security as a concept is inconsistent with the traditional activities of the national police, as it widens its geographical sphere of activities. If border security extends beyond the national territory, why insist on maintaining traditional activities of the police and gendarmerie to bring about security? Is it because it is the only tool available?

The military also no longer know what their duties are. What should the military be used for? They are returning to the national territory, deep in the cities and emphasising the role of ‘internal security’, despite the fact that the role of the military was for a long time defined as the protection of the borders against the external enemies. However, now we question the place of borders. What will the military’s role if the borders are not at the edge of state territory any more. What if the main threats largely stem from inside the territory such as identity conflicts deep inside the cities? How can one expect the military trained for killing external enemies to police its own society? If the military functions similarly to the police are the military necessary or vice versa? These are painful questions with practical consequences.

Unfortunately, all of the agencies above have a vision which is structured around the concepts of the physical borders of the state, territorial security and military defence. Indeed, none of these agencies, alone or altogether, even with perfect coordination, have the structural capability to cope with the challenges of today’s security environment which is not about guns, high-tech surveillance systems, liaison officers, risk analysis
units and so on, but is about a deeper understanding of what is going on in the field of border security. This is about the changing way of statehood. As discussed earlier in chapters 2 and 3, traditional approaches to security are based on ‘total defence’ and focus on mobilising society’s whole resources to support the military in case of a traditional conflict with a foreign enemy. Today’s challenge is the reverse: instead of mobilizing civil society to support the military in the face of external attack, the military is now one element to be mobilized as part of an overall response to major societal insecurities, including terrorism.

During the Cold War, determining threats and risks was the monopoly of an establishment community of defence intellectuals, mainly professionals from the military. However, the monopoly of Cold War professionals over ‘national security’ has been profoundly challenged. It is virtually impossible for Cold War institutions to conceptualise today’s security problems by using only the conceptual imagination provided by traditional understanding because threats are not territorial any more.

It is important to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of border security because military intervention in a complex global security environment characterized by asymmetric risks, actors with technological power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels which can generate significant negative repercussions. Military action could lead to unintended outcomes that create more risk and insecurity. In fact, as Williams argues, ‘the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision inevitably leads to a loss of control’ (Williams, 2012: 64.). It contains a serious risk criminalising the whole society and damaging the cohesion among the people.

Equally important, ‘Long term preoccupation with domestic threats not only corrupts and politicises the armed forces, but can also skew their training and attitude in ways that ill-suited them for external conflict’
(Waever et al. 1993: 48). Furthermore, Weaver et al. point out other repercussions:

If societies are at odds with the state that contain them, then mass participation strategies of territorial defence become dangerous to implement. As the Yugoslav case illustrates all too vividly, arming and training a dissident population to meet external threats is an invitation to civil war when the sources of societal insecurity are within the state itself (Waever et al. 1993: 48).

In summary, security is today less about national security only. The activities of traditional security agencies have expanded beyond the borders and no longer respect sovereign borders. State borders are challenged by freedom of movement of goods, ideas, and people; and thus inside and outside are merging. Once freedom of movement has been accepted, the construct of traditional security is no longer adequate. Traditional guidelines and beliefs concerning tasks and missions have more or less disappeared. The old notion of border lines and so the lines of the inside and the outside in security practices are fading away. Internal and external security discourses dissolve in the account of the ‘enemy within’. As a result, there emerges a significant pressure on the traditional security organisations. To ease this pressure Turkey must adapt the war-fighting agencies (military) and crime-fighting agencies (police and gendarmerie). A reworking of old perspectives is primarily required which is precisely the aim of this project.

8.4. What should or should not Turkey do? The insights ‘Societal Security’ might offer to this question.

Debates over border security in Turkey have been closely linked to the reliability and capability of the security institutions, particularly intelligence agencies. Therefore, this debate should be embedded in a broader debate over national security, and the capacity of the government
to implement the administrative measures necessary to secure Turkish borders against terrorists, illegal migrants, smugglers and other organised criminal elements. The policy debates have so far been entered on two rationales. First, a country that could not determine who had entered its territory could not be said to control its borders: a key dimension of sovereignty. Second, legal provisions that lack the administrative capacity to ‘deter’ or prevent organised criminals and are constantly under discussion. Besides, the threat of terrorist elements of the PKK and their scattered sympathisers in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria led to the reinforcement of militaristic solutions.

Fortunately, very few countries have experienced the kinds of terrorist incidents that have shaken Turkey. In this context, the application of Waever's two-dimensional concept of societal security to Turkey reveals the complexity of current border security matters such as terrorism, smuggling and the inherent contradictions between the interests of the state in relation to society. There are, broadly speaking, three key dimensions in the application of this concept. First, for the Turkish state, terrorist movements have been posing a security threat to the maintenance of existing boundaries. Second, the survival of a 'Turkish society' based on a common history, culture and tradition has also been threatened by the potential separation. Third, on the logic of societal security, there is no single Kurdish society. It consists of at least two different societies with diametrically opposed identities: one nationalist and the other separatist. While, on the one hand, from the perspective of separatists: the Turkish state continues to stifle, and thereby threaten, the development of Kurdish identity, on the other hand, a great majority of Kurdish people are in favour of Turkish society against the claims of sovereignty for the entire south-east region. In other words, they have

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23 “A recent survey conducted by the market research company Objective Research Centre (ORC) has revealed that 78.9 percent of Turkey’s Kurdish population is against a proposed "self-governance" or decentralized system which would offer an element of regional autonomy to Turkey's Kurds, as proposed by the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and PKK terrorist organization.” [http://www.dailysabah.com/kurdish-](http://www.dailysabah.com/kurdish-).
become divided into two ideologically rival camps, and each side looks at the other with suspicion.

Along with the key dimensions above, Turkey’s border security strategies should be evaluated in terms of two crucial aspects: Firstly, Turkey’s national borders are increasingly mobile and diffused throughout society because of socio-economic conditions at the border zones; and thus such borders are not fixed in the way territorial borders are, rather they have been lessened due to the new foreign policy and kinship relations especially in south-east part of Turkey. Thus, Turkey’s borders are dissolved in a sense because ‘These boundaries were products of a platform which disregard economic needs, the labor movement and market relations as well as ruling out the ethnic and religious structure.’ (Tekin 2014: 33). Secondly, due to a paradigm shift in foreign policy and the movements based on kinship networks especially across the east and south east boundaries there have been more encounters and meetings between people. As a result, new spaces have emerged. The creation of new spaces has brought new opportunities along to shape the security environment. So, Turkey should be centrally concerned with the construction of new spaces. Only in this way Turkey can deploy its own solutions to the security challenges.

Turkish politicians have had to find new roles as leaders of a state which differs from the previous ones in terms of its foreign and security policy (see chapter 5). Turkish foreign and security policy used to adopt a realist conception of international relations based on the idea that the state can rely only on self-help in an anarchic environment. Consequently, any foreign policy choice should take the preservation of national security and territorial integrity into consideration. However, the dramatic changes of the early 1990s created significant imperatives for Turkey, re-defining its identity and its role in the Middle East. The relations with other countries in the region are of crucial importance to the redefinition of this

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new identity. Indeed, it is not wrong to claim that the search for security is in fact the search for identity or vice versa. There is also a strong correlation between interests and identities, and so the process of defining a new foreign policy is inevitably connected with the quest for a new security identity.

The tremendous global changes that have taken place since the early 1990s – including the end of the cold war which had limited Turkey to security relationships with the EU and the USA and the acceleration of the globalisation process driven by the revolution in transportation and communications technology – have led Turkey to discuss visions of its own future in a transformed world.

Finding itself partly outside Western alliance after the end of the Cold War has impelled Turkey to search for new security policies in pursuit of a new identity. The Turkish people and state elites have traditionally had mixed feelings about the West because of the events during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The new identity was formulated by Prime Minister Davutoglu as ‘central country’ and the main framework of Turkish foreign policy has changed. Turkey’s aims were: 1) granting national and regional stability through a balance between security and democracy; 2) elevating its own position as regional power and relevant international intermediary; 3) protecting and promoting Turkish economic interests in the world in the face of the changes and challenges of the global economy (Davutoglu, 2012).

Turkey’s new security and foreign policy has created significant developments. ‘Especially in recent years Turkey, who interacts with its neighbors and with the closed environment by reviving religious, cultural, and historical ties and by activating the Ottoman heritage, has conducted a new border policy.’ (Tekin 2014: 107). Due to the shift of paradigm in relations with neighbours and the abolition of visas has led to emerging new spaces. The new visa policy has enhanced Turkey’s links
with the rest of Middle East. For an individual, Turkish national borders may not be the most difficult to cross. Thus while on the one hand, Turkey’s borders, in particular with the countries in the Middle East, were unmounted as being a part of security, it has now entered a new period of socio-political and economic interaction (Yesiltas, 2015: 17). In the course of these developments (open border policy, abolishing visas) re\textsuperscript{(de)-bordering} takes place but Turkey does not lose its specific boundaries. It has also become obvious that these new borders do not necessarily overlap along territorial lines. As a result, these developments open up new spaces which enables new forms of cohesion and new forms of organisational solidarity can and do emerge. In addition, the patterns of movement, trade and exchange that characterize illegal traffic in the south-eastern part of Turkey have been long standing and built on ethnic-kinship networks that have been in existence for centuries. People living across the eastern and south-eastern borders benefit from the advantages of two territorial systems of regulations and avoid their disadvantages. Different market regulations offer cheaper goods, trade and capital for local people.

However, the newly emerging spaces are not sufficiently understood in terms of their dynamics and potential. Most importantly, these newly emerging spaces cannot be reduced to the interrelationship of previously existing places or accumulations of societies in a certain space. Indeed, trans-border flows create new horizontal spaces connecting the territories. Therefore, these changes in the configuration of spaces and borders have created an urgent need for a unique form of security governance which is not based on territory. So, rather than being primarily concerned with setting up the new institutional structures (which are important of course), Turkey should be centrally concerned with the construction of new spaces. Only in this way Turkey can deploy its own solutions to border security problems.

My view was that too much emphasis had been placed on the enemy (terrorists, smugglers, illegal immigrants) and not enough on the
population and understanding the environment. It is surprising how little was understood about the people who inhabited the border areas. Therefore, it is necessary to understand first, for example, the importance of illegal trading in the lives of local people because the state can only maintain order not through law but through obedience (De Caroli, 2007: 56). What meanings do they attach to it and what identities do they build around it? Tekin (2014: 218) points out that in each case of Turkey’s boundaries, speaking and writing on security and terror is a very familiar situation. On the other hand, there is no reference to these cities, towns and villages’ social, cultural, economic and historic ties with the other side. In Tekin’s book, for example, an old man’s words from Derecik town reflect the perspective:

We are relatives of the villagers on the other side, from the same tribe. There was no boundary before 80, 90 years here. British came and divided us for their own interests. Some of us stayed this side (Turkey), some stayed other side (Iraq). However, we have not lost our ties to each other. We see ourselves more closer to those on the other side in comparison to Hakkari or Yuksekova (Tekin 2014: 232).

It is clear that, for local people, the state perspective is not overarching and it does not respect their perspective. ‘Sometimes boundaries drawn on the land may not be fully equivalent to those in the human mind or culture. In this case, geographical borders are substantially ineffective but insomuch as that is hurtful.’ (Tekin 2014: 13). He adds that ‘Boundary [Tukey-Iraq] divided the Gerdi tribe in two. However, this did not ever cause them see each other primarily as citizens of two nation-states.’ (Tekin 2014: 241). Therefore, cross border ethnic and cultural affinities should be considered by the evolving border security regimes of Turkey. For the people living across the borders, the question of sovereignty is not necessarily, or yet, identical to control at the border.

24 Hakkari is a province of Turkey and Yuksekova is a town in that province, both are located at the south east edge of Turkey at cross section of Turkey, Iraq and Iran border.
In addition, when we discuss the de-bordering of local economies which is being associated with the situation in south-east part of Turkey, we should discuss the de-bordering of societies as well. Thus, it is clear that the increasing multidimensional interaction along the borders, despite the border barriers (as commonly seen in the south-east part of Turkey) is necessary for the social and economic development of the local people. ‘These activities are also made not only for commercial purposes. Most of the people living in the Derecik region obtain a large part of the goods they need (food, clothing, fuel, construction, etc.) in this way’ (Tekin, 2014: 230).

However, some of the markets have been defined as illegal and the trade flows are criminalised and punished by the state. ‘Whereas smuggling [in the example of Hakkari province] exist[ed] before boundaries were drawn up and did not disappear after borders; and it was an economic necessity which was not taken into account’ (Tekin, 2014: 197). As a result, people are reacting to the ‘top-down’ imposition of state borders because the patterns of movement, trade and exchange that characterize illegal traffic in the south-eastern part of Turkey is often long standing and built on ethnic-kinship networks that have been in existence for centuries.

Evidence of how local people react when a state decides to escalate border surveillance to disrupt an illegal flow is discussed by various commentators, Van Schendel gives an example of the US military engagement with Colombian drug traffickers where drugs were classified as a ‘national security threat’ and reaches a conclusion that ‘it did not deter drug importations but it did powerfully influence the location, methods and organisation of drug smuggling’ (2005b: 53). Similarly, Besikci suggested that mining the borders led to a situation that benefited only sovereign elites because of their close relationship with bureaucracy (1992:272, cited in Tekin 2014: 200). It means even mines did not stop smuggling. In addition, this may create a very suitable base for terrorists to act, just like the southeast border of Turkey. Focusing too much on territorial borders has led to a feeling of being neglected in
favour of state amongst those insiders living in borderlands. This negative feeling is then strengthened by the manipulation of terrorists.

Military personnel tasked with border protection often come face to face with smugglers and local people because of kinship relations. In line with the research findings and by attributing a so-called official report, columnist Ozturk (2015) cites that:

> With the manipulation of the terrorist organisation PKK, people in the villages where the smuggling is the main source of income, resist the military personnel, block the roads, attack them with stones and molotov cocktails, and cause serious injuries. They try to prevent the law enforcement activities of state agents when military personnel try to arrest or catch the suspects. They hinder the state agents from getting the evidence at the scene.  

Most notably, the terrorist organisation PKK, intentionally manipulates situations to try to create a perception that legal law enforcement practices are illegal and oppress local people. ‘Even the basic military supply facilities are reflected as oppressing operations in the social media’ (Ozturk, 2015). During the interviews in the field this researcher clearly saw that this strategy works. Military personnel are daunted, weary and dispirited as this kind of warfare is not what they are trained for. A significant result, is that it brings the legitimacy of the state itself into dispute by questioning the state’s ability to control its own territory. The erosion of state authority heralds the emergence of new authority structures and the growing importance of other forms of governance such as the declaration of so called self-governance and PKK courts.

If the state does not develop true strategies in accordance with the realities of the new security environment, complete closure strategies or higher levels of surveillance will continue. In response to these Cold War

strategies, illegal organisations will strengthen their organisational and technological capabilities to keep the borders porous. ‘Often, this means not only the emergence of more complex, better armed, and more violent organisations – as well as their deeper entrenchment in borderland society on either side of the border’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 54). Thus, the state should be careful about its strategies and their consequences when attempting the regulation of borders because

Such state regulation turns borderland societies into landscapes of control and fear, without necessarily achieving its goal of blocking illegal entry. If measures are draconian enough they can stop cross-border flows at least for a while, but few states have been able, or willing to go to such length (van Schendel, 2005b: 53).

It is important also to consider that the permeability of borders is forever changing. The power of neighbouring states may contribute to its permeability and the relationship between them is always in flux. At the border, changing interstate relations and migration policies combining with the demands of local people for cheaper goods or labour can produce a complexity, and strategies and continuing need for modification. For example in the most problematic south-east border of Turkey, basic economic activity was based on the sheep trade until 1980s. Sheep are usually taken from the Turkish side, and tea, kerosene, dress fabrics, shoes, etc. were brought in return. However, today trade is not based on swap but cash. The other change is that there are no goods from the Turkish side sold on the other side, however, almost all goods come from the other side. The main ones are petrol products (gasoline and diesel), tea, tobacco, rice, dress fabrics and small electronic artefacts (Tekin, 2014: 229). According to Tekin, from the mid1990s, public welfare has increased because of the state permission for cross-border trade and obtaining autonomy for Kurds on the other side (Tekin 2014: 229). This should have created a suitable ground for trade and increased in their welfare.
While socio-cultural and socio-economic relations are very strong on the both sides of border, if the state’s bordering practices determine local people's relatives as ‘the other’, it may inevitably makes its own society ‘the other’. As a result of that, the secessionist movements are reinforced and ultimately a section of society is pushed towards the ranks of the terrorist organisations.

New ways to tell people clearly that secession cannot be a solution to a conflict or cannot be considered as a democratic right must be found because political identity is still intertwined with territory. By redrawing territorial boundaries, building walls and creating ‘others’ to define themselves, secessionist groups become privileged and create underprivileged identities in their new territory which has been clearly stated by a newly elected MP of HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party, a pro-separatist political party). Speaking in an election celebration held on 7th June 2015, MP Lawyer Burcu Çelik Özkan has targeted the temporary and voluntary village guards protecting their families against terrorist attacks and said: ‘you are going to be forced out of this land’, a strong indicator that those temporary and voluntary village guards (around 65 thousand in number) and their families are ‘the other’ in the secessionist movement in Turkey along with the Turks. Besides, it is a clear reality that a great majority of Kurdish people, who represent ‘the other’, are in favour of Turkish society against the claims of sovereignty for the entire south-east region.

Indeed, to create another territorial state cannot protect people who cannot protect themselves. State borders are based on exclusion rather than inclusion. The erection of border walls and fences only polarises the

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28 Temporary and voluntary village guards are paramilitaries. Originally they were set up and funded by the Turkish state in the mid-1980s. Their stated purpose was to act as a local militia in towns and villages, protecting against attacks of PKK. The rationale behind the set up of the system was that it would be helpful to the Turkish military to have an additional force of people who knew the region, and the language in order to assist in military operations against the PKK.

differences and enhances the antagonism of the people on the other side. This kind of border logic is misleading because communities are destined to contain multiple identities and state borders are incapable of keeping others at the other side, and so may fall into what Agnew refers to as the ‘territorial trap’.

Obsession with easily guarded land borders is a major characteristic of current border thinking in Turkey. As long as the state’s practices focus on the issue of territorial bordering, they will be ignored by the people who live in the borderlands as their cognitive spatiality and border notion does not coincide with that of the state. They are going to actively sustain cross border ethnic and family networks: religious communities, marketing and trade routes and even political connections. As a result, clashes are created between state agents and local people and these could cause unexpected results. In addition, a heavily guarded border can easily be infiltrated by illegal flows as border guards can easily be tempted to profit from cross border trade. For example, in Izmir, a western province, a Turkish gendarmerie commander has been arrested for taking bribes to turn a blind eye to the smuggling of migrants seeking to land on the EU coast, according to a local media report\(^{30}\). The question here is why do people just ignore the state bordering regulations? Reasons are various.

First, the difference in the perception of what is legitimate and what is not, for example as a part of this case study during this researcher’s visit to Kilis, a south-eastern province once known as the capital city of smuggling, it became apparent that smuggling cigarettes and fuel is really the most important source of income in the town. The villagers do not see anything wrong with it and it is a matter of survival. ‘We do not call it smuggling,’ said one man. ‘It is trade’. In parallel, Tekin also points out that except for officials or military authorities nobody designates diesel or gasoline as smuggled (or illegitimate), instead it is designated as

'Iranian gasoline' or 'Iranian diesel' (Tekin 2014: 203). It implies that there is a clear distinction between illicitness and the laws of state. They are not overlapping conceptions. There is clear difference between what states consider to be illicit and what people understand from illicit.

Second, for these villagers, ethnic and family ties supersede political boundaries. ‘Half my family is on the Syrian side,’ said one villager. People living across both sides of the border share the same lives, memories and kinship with the people involved in illegal flows. Their experiences throughout their personal history makes it impossible for them to understand modern state territoriality and the notion of state border. ‘For them, the world of states is problematic and so is the idea that the interest of “national community of citizens” should take precedence over all others. They cannot restrict their imagination to the territory of a single state’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 54). Loyalty is increasingly given to religion, social groups, and political communities other than the nation-state (Williams 2007). ‘Hence, these boundaries (Iraq-Turkey) cut and aggregate not only the material (commercial) and tribal ties but also the religious and spiritual ties’ (Tekin, 2014: 216).

Therefore, tangible and meaningful borders can only be constructed and maintained through a bottom-up approach. This philosophy renders the state only one of the actors capable of bordering. Rumford’s idea of “borderwork” (2008: 6) is a useful example to understand how non-state actors actually do borders as well. Rumford (2008) argues that citizens and indeed non-citizens are commonly observed to be able to utilize borders to their own advantage – drug smugglers, tourists, as well as affirming borders via nationalist tendencies. In other words, ‘Citizens, as well as states have the ability to shape bordering and re-bordering’ (Rumford 2006: 165). Therefore, the important point here is that non-state actors, for example, citizens/non-citizens, NGO’s, and entrepreneurs, are also able to take part in tangible and meaningful bordering activities along with the state. Rumford (2008: 4) also points out the importance of the local cultures found in borderlands (the
territory on both sides of a border) and discusses that ‘local cultures can either work to reinforce state-defining borders or they can work to subvert them.’ Rumford (2008: 6) terms this situation as ‘everyday fear’.

An increased perception of threats such as illegal immigrants, terrorists, climate change, epidemics, crime and violence on the street and so on may lead to a view that traditional nation state borders are struggling, and indeed failing, to provide security. As a result, citizens create their own borders within their own communities. In other words, ‘citizens are taking matters into their own hands and attempting to create an experience of security which they no longer look to the state to provide’ (Rumford, 2008: 6). Just as in the example of the significant news from Hakkari, a province at the south-east edge of Turkey, about people who demonstrated that they were fed up with PKK terrorists; ‘citizens living in the area reacted strongly to the terrorists building barricades in the streets, chased them with stones and sticks.’ Tekin, likewise, points out increasing rivalry between local people (Gerdi and Herki tribes) and the PKK because of loyalties to Barzani’s KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party). He suggested that clashes between the state and the PKK militarized the borderland and this situation affects the relationships between Barzanis and Kurds in Turkey in general; and Gerdi and Herki tribes in particular (2014: 224). As a result, these tribes chose to become village guard to be able to protect their territory.

Equally important, Rumford (2008) suggests that “borderwork” rarely takes place at the territorial periphery of states, but rather is more likely to be dispersed throughout society, becoming, for many, an everyday practice. This is highly valid for Turkey as a vast majority of its citizens from borderlands migrated to bigger cities such as Istanbul and they maintain their strong kinship relations. Tekin (2014: 203) suggested that in the 1990s smuggled diesel was mainly sold in western cities of Turkey.

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and increasing advertising of cheap diesel across Turkey was a direct consequence of these kinship relations.

Confirming the discussions above Donnan and Wilson (1999: 53) suggest that local cultures are not necessarily passive entities. Rumford (2008:4) argues that ‘local cultures may extend beyond the state boundary (for historical reasons, or because of shared ethnicity, for example)’. He puts forward the expression of ‘people power’ to point out the de/rebordering process of global civil society, ‘Transnational networking which is at the heart of global civil society is bound to provide greater opportunities for eroding or remaking borders’ (2008: 7). Here, certain global civil society actors seek to reinforce borders or create new ones, while other actors seek to abolish (state) borders altogether, such as ‘No Borders’ or ‘Brides without Borders’. Thus, borderwork shows the ability of citizens and non-state actors to construct, maintain and dismantle borders, and become an authority in the process. In short, these arguments indicate that state is no longer the only security provider and society can be a security provider in its own right; and equally important, contrary to traditional approach, societal security is not wandering off to look for a threat inside or outside the territory, instead it should aim to shape it.

In the context of Turkey, we are well aware that national boundaries are rather impotent in the face of terrorists, drug smugglers and traffickers or indeed preventing members of a community from leaving despite their high-tech, highly securitised nature. People particularly in the east and south-east are able to transform the meaning of the state’s border through crossing and re-crossing for the purposes of shopping, smuggling or visiting relatives, but they have no ability to determine the location of the border in the geographical meaning. A traditional approach to security has led to a state monopolization of bordering practices at the territorial borders and a militaristic dimension has had primary focus. This understanding has also led to an assessment of borders as fortified lines against today’s networked threats from outside. As a reflection,
fencing, building walls and high-tech surveillance systems are the most common state bordering practices in Turkey.

The structures that were built for safeguarding Turkey’s national security during the Cold War were based on the idea of total defence. Borders used to be the main means of defence. At the time, this was the overall concept of how the country’s coordinated resources could best be mobilized to meet the threat of total war. However, the Cold War ended long ago and Turkey is now trying to cope with new security challenges in some of the world’s most dangerous geography. Taking into consideration the conditions of the new security environment, Turkish border authorities should seriously consider changing border practice in the following ways.

First, border security is not an isolated phenomenon or a sub-set of a national security strategy. On the contrary, border security is a comprehensive framework for leading national security. The job is too huge to be the responsibility of any individual institution but requires a network model because ‘it takes networks to fight networks’ (Arquilla and Rondfelt, 1996: 81). For example, the UK border agency has an international presence based on the hub and spoke model, with about 80 decision-making hubs and 250 visa application centres (Bourne, 2014: 264). Qualitatively, fighting against today’s risks and threats is beyond one institution and also the Ministry of the Interior which is in charge at the moment. Therefore, giving the responsibility to the Interior Ministry should be assessed in terms of two aspects: the institutional capacity of the Ministry and the risk of turning the border security problem into an internal security problem not compatible with the realities of the new security environment.

Under current conditions it is clear from the interviews and from the researcher’s personal experiences that the Ministry of the Interior does not have the purview to cope with such a huge job. There are two reasons for that: first, it creates resistance among the other organisations as
discussed above (the section of institutional anxieties); second, the professionals see the borders as narrow lines and border security as the securitization of that narrow area. The most advanced view identified within the Ministry is that border security is an internal security matter that is a process of fortifying the borders by any means such as walls and fences as well as surveillance technology.

Second, borders are often seen as spatial fixtures, lines in the landscape, separators of societies, passive and pre-given places on which events take place. However, with the new concepts challenging state territoriality, borders have taken on new shapes. ‘In short, borders must be understood as dynamic sites of transnational reconfiguration’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 46). Thus, border security strategies based on spatially rooted, solid and durable entities such as walls and fences fixed to landscape inevitably create weakness in the face of illegal flows which are highly mobile and unpredictable, often managing to find new routes. Hence, fighting against illegal flows of people and goods cannot be pinned down geographically. But some countries such as the USA still demand the reinforcement of the barrier role of the state borders against terrorists in the name of border security even though it is known that it is impossible to seal the borders completely.32 In addition, an important note to Turkey’s security problems ‘the Northern Syria Corridor’ in the process of being built at the hands of the PYD (the branch of PKK)33 with the help of the USA, will cut Turkey’s ties with neighbours and the wider Middle East. If Turkey continues to build concrete walls, erect razor fences, plant mine fields and dig ditches as has been done for some time it will inevitably create the same impact without fulfilling its expected duty.

Third, border security cannot be taken as passive and reactive in the face of contemporary threats that are highly mobile and unpredictable. Reactive border security strategies based on spatially fixed landscape

inevitably creates weakness against today’s risks and threats. Instead, new methods should be employed while taking the societal security dimension into consideration. However, Turkey should be careful about the kind of pre-emptive international violence which takes the form of intrusive, authoritarianism, based on large numbers of personnel and weapons as this cannot be a solution, for example militarily damaging the boats that the EU is planning to use to cope with illegal immigration or gunning down the mules which have been used for smuggling in Sirnak, a south-east province at Turkey’s Iraqi border.

This authoritative image of a modern state fighting against organised criminal networks from terrorism to smugglers is too simplistic and isolated to provide solutions. It creates more illegal behaviour. For example, one villager says ‘The army killed my mules and I will not leave my children to starve. Even if they kill all my mules, I will buy others, and I will keep smuggling’.34 Securing borders, therefore, is now less about securing lines, and not even about the transformation or shifting of lines. Securing borders, indeed, is about giving much more emphasis on how people experience the borders.

The State should carefully consider that its own border security practises might provide a useful means for terrorists to undermine societal cohesion and hence state security. For success in the face of terrorism it is important to gain a better understanding about how the mechanism works. It is the fact that today ‘New wars are fought in the name of identity (ethnic, religious or tribal)... [And] identity politics is constructed through war. Thus political mobilisation around identity is the aim of war rather than an instrument of war, as was the case in ‘old wars” (Kaldor, 2013)35. Therefore, the success of the fight against terrorism should not be measured by body count. Body count as a corrupt measurement of success by numbers of terrorists killed must be

34 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-32554496
discarded. Influencing the population should be the target and the ultimate prize. Turkey should embed ‘influence’ into all of its thinking, planning and execution. As security expert Mete Yarar significantly states: ‘This country does not lose land but we are losing something even more important than land, it is our emotional ties to each other.’36 Thus, the point is, as Bigo (2001: 136) argued: ‘Management of territories is disappearing in favour of management of people.’

Fourth, border security professionals should change their target thinking in the face of cross border illegal networks. There is big difference between them from the standpoint of target. Cross border criminal organisations do not aim at the border itself but deep inside the national heartland beyond. For them, border is just a staging post. However, border enforcement authorities’ primary concern is the border itself.

Fifth, security professionals should rethink on the state as primary borderer and the state territorial borders as primary borders due to their barrier-like and divisionary nature. Indeed, borders are everywhere beyond or within the country diffused deep into society with non-state actors from society to the private sector, such as private insurance, private companies providing cyber security and risk assessment systems, also implementing bordering in their own right. Thus, the whole country can be thought of as a borderland, a zone of transition and mobility without territorial fixity. The most crucial thing here is law enforcement authorities should avoid criminalisation of the entire population in the face of enforcement practices, identity checks and so on.

Finally, externalization of border security practices primarily requires risk analysis. They operate on the basis of collecting, analysing and acting on information from a range of sources such as data on economic transactions, surveillance and biometric data (Bigo 2001, Vaughan-Williams 2009). However, intelligence collection and risk analysis work is

a serious burden which should be conducted inside and outside the country. For this kind of task, it is necessary to deploy various sorts of liaison personnel from police, customs and immigration officers and delegates to international/regional organisations. At the same time the conduct of secret operations to intercept organised criminals outside the country require an organisation that will work globally: and a massive managerial capacity and staff to coordinate strategies, policies and activities.

What this long list above provides is evidence that border security cannot be done by one institution. Therefore, while setting up a professional, civil body responsible for border security, as the EU demands, is important, it is not enough to cope with all the issues above. Turkey has to have a more holistic and radical approach. Considering border security as a separate area of action and anticipating that having a civil, professional body will solve the problem is being naive and can only add to the coordination problem, and worsen the situation.

Turkey faces a different range of threats from organised crime to terrorism with an unprecedented level of virulence, sophistication and variety. The determination and capability of such groups are greater than ever before and the potential consequences are more serious. After the brutal terrorist attacks in Paris a BBC correspondent asks 'how do you protect every bar and restaurant'? This is the kind of security question which reflects a territorial mentality. It suggests a necessity to secure external boundaries for protection. This thinking leaves restaurants, bars and concert halls and so on insecure because you cannot treat every place with fences and insuperable walls, and put some guards in front. This traditional security perspective is based on a focus on the enemy outside, instead of activity.

37 Interior Minister Ala said there are plans to establish a professional armed border security department aimed to place the control of the country's borders under civilian control in line with EU standards.  
38 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34816071
The objective is clear: freedom from the fear of threats and pressures of any criminal groups in the daily life of society, whether illegal migration, organised crime, terrorism, or attacks on the tax base. The scale of the task is considerable. Achieving this objective requires more than just a fortified border. It requires a range of tools, applied in a coherent way. It is actually about how the state can be most efficiently and effectively structured. This is significant because, while traditional security concerns give prominent importance to the state borders, a non-traditional security concept tends to traverse these borders through a re-bordering process. From the non-traditional point of view, the most prominent characteristic is to transport particular issues from a national level to a variety of new spatial and territorial arenas and in doing so, transform the traditional form of state machineries. This is different from simply internationalisation of security issues based on state territory. While security strategies are adapted to the new security environment, security’s spatial, political, and institutional arenas are also supposed to be reviewed in alignment with the interests, strategies, and ideologies of key actors, thereby further transforming state machineries. It means dealing with non-traditional security issues it requires their governance to be shifted beyond territorial borders and it requires thinking outside the established institutions of the state because security today is not just defence or law enforcement.

Therefore, the challenge to border security, for Turkey, in this century demands a far more radical and holistic approach than has been suggested so far. Such an approach has the potential to transform how a state manages national security and it could bring together separate parts of the system. In addition, reorganising the security sector around a revised concept of national security will force departments and agencies to adapt to new structures and working cultures. This also would be helpful to remove the rivalry among the contesting institutions and present a valuable opportunity to shape the whole system. However, the government does not think of border security as a comprehensive
framework to lead the national security. Security policies are not determined by the nature of the challenges, but by the nature of the tools available.

Now, especially after the end of Cold War, as a traditional external security agency, the military is looking inside the borders in search of an enemy from outside. They talk about ‘cross-border threats’ and are in search of new tactics to cope with them. Law enforcement agencies such as police forces, the gendarmerie and customs are in pursuit of criminals beyond the borders and talk about the external links of terrorists and traffickers. Police, customs, gendarmerie, the army and intelligence agencies all share the same enemies. They have been playing in the same field for some time. This *convergence* of duties of security agencies related to new threats and risks can be considered the main justification for a new structure based on new thinking different from the past. Thus, consideration of border security issues determines a necessity for new thinking about security issues in general. Turkey must reorganise the whole security architecture on the basis that border security is a comprehensive framework to coordinate and steer national security.

### 8.5. The Need for Structural Reform: Does current security architecture fit the purpose?

After the 7th June 2015 election Turkey witnessed a high volume of statements from ministers over the issue of ‘public order’ against the increasing terrorist activities across the country. This was followed by new legislation broadening police powers. It is clear from the experiences that the increase in legislation has made no impact on security as there has been an inadequate, ineffective security structure and ineffective administrators to run the services which ultimately provide the overall result. The capability of the current structure is questioned by a number of academicians and by media firestorms demanding public reassurance after each terrorist attack has occurred.
To provide effectiveness, columnist A. Selvi wrote, with reference to the Prime Minister that:

The Prime Minister had created a unit of security reporting directly to him. In the new government, three separate structures will be built in the form of “mini-cabinet” for economy, security and reforms. Prime Minister, now aims to transfer the achievements in security to the economy and reforms. This is a new system. The important point here is that the Prime Minister brings both military and civilian bureaucrats together.39

Indeed, this is not a new system. These are temporary measures which detract from a real solution. It seems the Prime Minister detects that there is something wrong. However, the Turkish government lacks a clear and coherent view of the nature and priority of the risks that the national security architecture has produced. The national security architecture is flawed in its design. The security governance remains structured around functions and services with separate budgets for defence, foreign affairs, intelligence, gendarmerie and police forces and so on. These departments that make up the security architecture have changed very little in the past decades. This situation is a significant consequence of a classic bureaucratic and organisational laziness, where policy is not determined by the nature of the challenge, but by the nature of the tools available.

Things changed but things also stayed very much the same. Turkey still stands for the old ways of providing security and its current security architecture may have suited the security environment of the Cold War where threats are territorial and predictable. However, today’s complex and uncertain security environment demands a fundamental review of how a national security structure is organised. This is especially crucial if government wants to respond to terrorist attacks effectively. Therefore, one of the main arguments of this thesis is that the new concept of border

security can serve a vital pivotal role, as a principle for organising a national security architecture. Its core argument is that whilst the Turkish government has been able to struggle with creating new units within departments, merge teams and allocate more resources for agencies to expand, the present and future security environment urgently demands a more integrated and strategic approach. Long-term success requires a more inclusive, open and holistic approach to national security.

The government’s approach can mostly be explained by the fact that its perceptions tend to be at odds with the real nature of the risk. Immediately after the Ankara bombings, it was reported by the press that Prime Minister Davutoglu called for a security summit, questioned the bureaucrats and demanded an overview on the security concept. Although it is an encouraging sign, it is still not clear that the need for a radical change has been understood properly.

The national security architecture has not adapted to the new security environment yet. Turkey could not demonstrate a comprehensive systematic approach to learning from the deaths of the last three decades. Existing practices of the security notion and existing institutions remain powerfully conditioned by the concept of territorial security of the nation state that has dominated the security field for a long time. The current security structures and processes were designed for a world that was more stable and simple than at present, the Cold War era.

Ministers and high ranking officials in the security field sometimes recognise the complexity of the current security environment such as Minister Omer Celik who said:

> Indeed, the basic principle is the abolition of asymmetric threats threatening the security of the people. Now the possibility of war with other states has weakened. Asymmetric threat groups have emerged. National security policy should also be extended against the vandals

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40 http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/abdulkadirselvi/basbakanin-aciklamadigi-eylem-neydi-2022373
occupying the streets, who spoiled the people’s daily life along with the known ones.\footnote{http://www.sabah.com.tr/vazarlar/muderrisoglu/2014/11/08/devletin-guvenligi-mihalkin-guvenligimi, last accessed October 2015.}

The words of president Erdogan summarize the situation very well and set out the current picture:

> The closing doors against the face of hundreds of millions of Syrians and Iraqis just struggling to survive and getting hold of life will exacerbate the problem. The way to security and peace, is going through owning and embracing them, not to kick refugees, not to stab and submerge boats filled with people and being a deaf ear to the cries. Everyone needs to see that we could not stay out of trouble by hiding behind barbed wires and high walls. Likewise, we have to accept that islamophobia, racist and xenophobic reactions will deepen the problem more profoundly.\footnote{http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/erdogan-sadece-kendi-guvenligimizi-koruyoruz-2346733, last accessed December 2015.}

However, they have not yet been able to respond to it properly. There might be some important reasons for this. The first is that the government might not want to take the risk to change the status quo and want to maintain stability in their term. Otherwise there is a political price to pay. To avoid this price, they prefer to ignore the best strategy.

Governments customarily seek to reduce a problem to its constituent parts\footnote{http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/01/04/terorle-mucadelede-master-plani (master plan against terrorism) last accessed in January 2016.} and in some cases this method causes more problems along the way. In today’s complex and interconnected security environment, societal insecurities, terror, narcotics, trafficking and illegal migration cannot be separated from each other. This is partly explained by the need for simple explanations to understand and solve the problem. ‘It is a typical reflex of the public administration in Turkey to turn to packaged solutions without thinking of drastic measures against major social events’ (Muderrisoglu, 2015)\footnote{http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/muderrisoglu/2015/11/21/kuresel-terorun-hedef-aldigi-din-islam, last accessed November 2015.}. However, above all, this is a dangerous
tendency which prevents us from seeing the real picture and from understanding the actual scale of the problem.

This is further worsened by the assumption that national security is a sacrosanct area and the issues relating to it should remain a subject for a small group of individuals in the field. The common perception is that individuals working in the area of national security have an expertise over the other civil servants or members of public. Therefore, it has been rare to question the national security architecture, whether it is fit for purpose and what reforms may be necessary. Recent reviews of the capacity of the security architecture have largely resulted in more personnel and extra resources for the security agencies rather than necessary reform in light of the new security environment.

The constitution and other legislation provides a high-level statements on the conduct of National Security, however, these statements have not been turned into a detailed working strategy including relevant departments. This means there is no single mechanism in the Prime Ministry, or anywhere else, whose role, responsibility and accountability is predetermined. For example, the duties of the Secretariat-General of the NSC are described as only ‘To provide secretariat services to the National Security Council’. It has no mandate to coordinate and ensure effective implementation of council of ministers decisions. Departments are still focused on their own policies and their own ways of doing things. It is not yet evident that senior level officials in the Military, Ministries and other departments genuinely accept the need for change and take responsibility for making that change.

Turkish Law No. 2945 describes the duties of the National Security Council as follows: ‘[…] advisory decisions on issues concerning the identification, formulation, and implementation of the national security policy of the State, and formulate opinion on ensuring the necessary coordination’. However there is no explanation how the NSC is going to do it. There is no clear legislation and institutional framework to ensure
coherence between departments; no mandate for the Secretariat General of National Security Council or any institutional body to provide this coordination and leadership.

Within the current system, the main responsibility belongs to the council of ministers. The Prime Minister may assign a Deputy Prime Minister with the task of coordinating and monitoring the implementation of these advisory decisions, but there is no mechanism that will support him to do the job. There is no office in the Prime Ministry that is capable of supporting the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. This results in a failure of understanding of the real scale of the problem. Thus, the lack of leadership and accountability in the security field greatly weakens the ability of governments to respond to the security challenges.

One of the most serious criticisms levelled at the Turkish government is the lack of capability to provide security and the failures of intelligence following increasing terrorist attacks. Even the terrorists attacks in Ankara and Istanbul, which killed hundreds of people, was a clear indicator for the desperate need for a permanent unit to coordinate security services. Just after the bombing a list of 21 suspects was reported by the press and shortly later it was found that one of two suicide bombers was on that list. It clearly shows that contrary to the common belief that we have too little information, we have too much. The problem is about classifying and analysing the information we already have. However, it does not mean that every threat can be thwarted because we live in an age of uncertainty and unpredictability. Turkey needs to build partnerships with all domestic and external departments, academics, think tanks, NGOs and the private sector, in order to create a clearer picture of the new security environment. It needs a maestro to help reshape the inter-relationships of relevant departments and create a national capability for coherent action for better security.
8.5.1. Societal Security as a Tool

Today’s world offers a radically different landscape in terms of national security than the previous period of Cold War. The underlying factor is the lack of a clearly articulated account of what national security is and the value it creates for individuals and society in general. There is no shared framework for high ranking military personnel and civil servants as well as politicians to contemplate the long-term strategic targets that are required for national security. Abdulkadir Selvi, a well-known columnist with his links to government, wrote that President Erdogan said that “the responsibility for the nation’s security rests with society as much as state institutions”45. Despite the fact that this is a very significant statement which reflects the core dynamics of the new security environment, it has still not been evident that the requirements of these statements is properly understood. If the national security structure is going to change effectively it must be understood in the context of its external and internal dimensions. Societal security has the potential to transform the way Turkey manages national security.

Since the territorial security framework has proven incapable of providing security in contemporary mobilised world, there is a need for new perspective which does not depend only on territoriality. Such a new approach will be both statist and anti-statist. It will be statist because it will promote ‘secured identities’ without secessionist claims; and it will be anti-statist because it will not depend on a rigid territorial sovereignty for the state. Therefore, societal security proffers a useful tool to develop some insight into contemporary security problems connected to territoriality. Although societies are sometimes closely linked to the state, they have independent influence in security matters. While societal security sometimes overlaps with the traditional concerns of state security, it can sometimes be considered in its own right.

45 http://www.yenisafak.com/veri/adil/abdulkadirselvi/cumhurbaskan-kanaat-onderlerivde-ne-konustu-2022529
Societal security as a tool offers new operational objectives for national security policy such as increased legitimacy alongside conventional goals. Notionally, it guarantees, that the actions of state are more likely to meet the expectations of the citizens. It should ensure that departments and agencies can be trusted, more accountable and, at least in principle, capable of preventing problems. Most importantly, this produces new forms of data and evidence that decision-makers and the public alike can use to validate their decisions/beliefs. In this new information-rich paradigm, the old security structure inevitably will have to give way to better security. In short, lessening the contradictions between the state and societal security, which as Waever (1993: 57) argued is a precondition for successful ‘national security policy’.

The basic structure of security in Turkey has remained strangely stable despite the period of dramatic and rapid change in the security environment after the Cold War. Turkey has attempted to respond to the emerging complexities of the new security environment with traditional structures and failed. The new security environment demands a different approach and new thinking on how national security governance is designed and how it operates. However, Turkey’s national security architecture remains closed to experimentation and reform. Instead, Turkey still seems to be in favour of tinkering with the current system without applying a more critical approach to adapting the national security architecture to the requirements of the new security climate. In sum,

If society rather than the state is made the central focus of security analysis, then a new policy agenda and a new set of casual dynamics come clearly into view. This tactic does not remove the state from security analysis, but it does shift it off centre stage: it puts more ‘national’ back into national security (Waever et al. 1993: 196).

Turkey can transform its national security structure in response to the new security challenges on the basis of two essential principles:
a transformation of the national security architecture based on the principles of societal security

a system-based holistic approach to national security which allows not only security agencies but also private sector, NGOs and wider public to join the decision making process and see overall structure and cycles in the system, rather than specific events.

In the light of the principles above, the role of a national security strategy should be:

- to integrate all the means available in order to shape the environment: and anticipate and ready to respond to security risks and threats to the society.

In order to achieve this enormous role, the main reform should be adapting the role of the Prime Ministry. This implies bringing some strategic departments to the centre. This approach might be fiercely contested by some senior civil servants and military. However, what is quite clear is that the Prime Minister’s Office has executive responsibility, but no directive power and capability to look at the way in which the whole structure is working. The current national security structure operates in a system for which departmental ministers, permanent secretaries and director generals have executive responsibility. Counterintuitively, the Prime Minister’s Office has no control over those ministers, secretaries and so on.

8.5.2. The first Step

The development of a new national security strategy for Turkey has the potential to transform the traditional approach to national security. The first step to ensure a strategic approach to national security should be the creation of a national security secretariat based in the Prime Minister’s
Office. A national security secretariat must have the authority and enough resources to develop, direct and evaluate national security policies from the centre. To avoid the overlapping policies and institutions the current Secretariat General of National Security Council could be revised and strengthened. This would be a major step forward for government and would be seen as a threat to the power and authority of individual departments. However a coherent approach to national security and border security is a must for Turkey.

Arguably, this change would deliver positive results. First, the National Security Strategy would be under the direction of the prime minister and council of ministers, together with key departments and agencies in the field. In other words, legislation and reality would not contradict any more. In doing so, the new secretariat would not only evaluate and coordinate but also will direct and lead the security process. It would collapse walls between departments and agencies, providing opportunities for new ways of sharing information across the system which would naturally build trust in society, arguably, the most valuable role of a newly created national security secretariat would be its role in measuring and evaluating the performance of the national security architecture and existing policies. For example, on behalf of the prime minister and council of ministers, with support from relevant departments, it could be tasked with evaluating the every single department’s approach to terrorism.

In summary; Turkey’s national security architecture has proved incapable in the new security environment. Traditional notions of ‘defence’ are becoming increasingly redundant in today’s security environment because the current structure narrows the area of government and disrupts the government’s capability to govern. This archaic and compartmentalised system also acts as a barrier to

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46 There has been an ongoing discussions and work within the parliament for while to amend the Turkish constitution to create a stronger presidency. If happens, it then requires to give the national security secretariat under the disposal of president.
collaborative endeavours across the security field. Coordination is minimal, because it is limited to periods of war when national territory is attacked by external enemies. Claiming coordination at other times is just a sham. However, Turkey is in a constant war with terrorists, traffickers and other organised criminals.

In addition, the government does not view its border security as a comprehensive approach that will lead the national security policy. Instead it is seen as a sub-set of the National Security Strategy. However, the new security environment invalidates the analysis of border security as an isolated phenomenon. This mentality cannot create security for society and the state. Instead it creates insecurity and threatens the state itself. To adapt security strategies to the new security environment requires qualitative changes in security’s spatial, political, and institutional arenas; and more attention to the interests, strategies, and ideologies of key actors. In other words, new risks and threats require their governance to be shifted beyond territorial borders and the established institutions of the state. Change is inevitable.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

OVERTURNING TRADITION

INTRODUCTION

Recent terrorist attacks have proved once more that Turkey is not immune to international or domestic terrorism. The Ankara bombing that killed more than 100 people was a defining moment in Turkey's history. Nothing illustrates the need to restore the border security framework than these attacks. After 7th June 2015 election, the extreme ferocity and impact of terrorist attacks forced Turkey to address these very real and grave threats to its national security. Terrorists are no longer in the hinterlands. They are deep inside Turkey’s cities threatening the land and the society that occupies it. It is clear from the security literature that the primary responsibility of any national government is to protect its society. Turkey's response to these attacks was to make considerable efforts to protect Turkish society.

One of the aims of this thesis was to demonstrate how Turkey’s response revealed that it needed to overhaul its national security strategy. The thesis has shown that a central feature of Turkey's response to border security issues was a focus on the security of the external boundaries. As a result, the primary policy response has been to fortify the boundaries by any means just as it always has done. However, traditional notions of ‘defence’ are becoming increasingly irrelevant in modernity. Security policies are not determined by the nature of the challenges, but by the nature of the tools available. This approach cannot create security for society. Instead it creates insecurity and threatens the state itself.

This research argues that a ‘radical’ review of collective thinking about border security policy is essential for the security needs of the Turkish people; a ‘human-centric’ rather than a ‘state-centric’ approach. Hence,
the general aim of this project was twofold: first, to explore the new security agenda both in terms of policy and intellectual questions as they have developed since the end of the Cold War; and second, to critically investigate, on the basis of a case study, how societal security concept could be implemented as a tool to strengthen the current border security framework in Turkey. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, was to provide a conceptually novel starting point for future reviews and research.

The question of security cannot be explained any more by national security discourse and even less by the traditional defence mentality. Security has reached beyond the traditional defence domain to include the economic, political, ecological, and societal sectors. Security is enlarged in a way that Buzan and Waever have tried to conceptualize with the notion of societal security. However, one will have seen here that old habits die hard and two different faces of security are still operative, national and state security on the one hand, and societal and identity security on the other hand.

An obsession with easily guarded land borders is characteristic of current border thinking in Turkey, a strong indication of the continuing dominance of the conventional national security perspective. Although it is increasingly redundant, it restricts thinking about alternative political, social, and economic possibilities. Turkey needs to change the way in which it thinks about borders to be able to create more effective alternative border security strategies. In short, Turkey needs to stop seeing its borders as fixed lines at the edges of the state territory which need to be defended against unwelcome visitors.

9.1. Traditional border security concepts

In this approach, physical boundaries are closely related to the notion of national security and the use of force by the state apparatus to ensure it. Accordingly, the role of state boundaries in national security is based,
first, on the prevention of military threat. Thus, as noted above, border areas become militarised and no-man zones with a special regime, where the highest priority is the fighting efficiency of military units ready to repulse the aggression of a potential enemy. This approach takes border security as security of boundaries, an isolated phenomenon and a sub-set of national security targeting the protection of a narrow line.

Securitisation of a border zone means the largest possible control over any cross-boundary flows. From this perspective, a boundary is understood as a front line destined to stop the penetration in depth of the state territory by undesirable individuals, goods, information, etc. This barrier like borders operate like an anti-flow apparatus. The control of transboundary flows is easier if there are fewer inhabitants in the border zone and if economic activity there is weaker. Therefore, these zones sometimes became economically backward. All social life is subordinated to military needs.

State institutions use boundaries to foresee and forestall any possible problems. Because old notions of national security inherently locate the threats externally. Accordingly these threats such as military aggression are clear and certain. It takes the border as a security fence which aims to secure the state in general rather than society, which is supposed to be a major task of the state. The assumption is that the security interests of border regions are similar to those of the state as a whole.

9.2. Non-traditional border security concepts

First of all, the objective is to find a delicate balance among the needs of border security, the development of cross-boundary cooperation, and the interests of the state and societies living in borderlands. Therefore, societal security comes to the agenda along with the state security.

The perception of threats to national security is also changing. Threats of a militaristic character from other states are replaced by other threats from non-state actors. Therefore, the external location of threats is also
replaced by the threats already inside the state (such as ethnic conflicts, trafficking and terrorism). This concept assumes that it is impossible to cope with new challenges solely using military, police, or paramilitary forces. Even the most powerful armies of the world cannot adequately counteract illegal migration, international terrorism, the traffic in drugs and weapons, epidemics, global environmental disaster and organised crime. The change in the nature of threat is best captured in an Italian police officer’s words fighting against Sicilian Mafia. He says: ‘They [mafia] know they can’t kill people as they used to, so now the whole system has evolved into an intricate web of interests that entangles politics, finance and the very structure of Sicilian society.’

In a highly mobile world, the attempts to keep growing transboundary flows under control by the same old methods, as in strengthening the barrier functions of boundaries, are not only inefficient but objectively harmful to society and the economy. On the contrary, only close cooperation with neighbours, based on mutual trust, demilitarisation of border areas and open boundaries, can bring positive results. According to the non-traditional approach to border security, governments should contribute to the development of cross-boundary cooperation at the local level. Governments can no longer ignore the specific interests of border areas or create obstacles to their cooperation. Therefore, the notion of security acquires a considerable new dimension.

A systematic approach to border security has been developed. This approach requires border security to be defended throughout the territory of the country, and outside the territory, not only at the borders. The struggle against terrorists, illegal immigration and drug trafficking cannot be reduced to defensive measures at the border. This is important because, while traditional security understanding give prominent importance to the state borders, non-traditional security concept tend to traverse these borders through re-bordering process. The state boundary

is now not merely the line marking of the limits of the state territory and territorial waters. The concept of ‘border space’ now embraces not only the area along the boundary, but internal and external regions. The rapid developments in transport, international trade and communication technology has created new borders deep within the state territory, for instance, around international airports, and special customs or free economic zones.

Border security is now a matter not only of the state. It must take into account the interests of local and international organisations and actors. A new view of border security involves not just an attempt to foresee or forestall all eventual situations which is an impossibility due to the unpredictable nature of threats, but the readiness to react to any challenge promptly and in an appropriate and flexible way. Finally, border security is not an isolated phenomenon or a sub-set of national security, however, it is a comprehensive approach to lead national security and organise all the assets.

9.3. Summary of the research findings
Turkey has been preoccupied with the issue of border security for a long time. In the modern era, to prevent an even greater crisis at the border, there were immediate and ongoing discussions between high ranking officials. Both Prime Minister Davutoglu and President Erdogan also recognized that the border had to remain open to vast migration from Syria in order to address the humanitarian crisis. Simultaneously, the government made significant financial investments and a variety of legislative changes in order to respond to the negative impacts. However, Turkey’s response to the recent terrorist attacks highlighted the tendency of the administrative elites in decision-making position to view national security issues in predominantly military terms. This was evident from various efforts taken at the highest levels of the security bureaucracy to secure the border such as building concrete walls.
The first significant finding of the research was that, the interviewee’s approaches to sort out the border security problems, albeit in different ways and in different measures, tend to over-privilege the simplistic and unhelpful, and still based on the prevalent idea that borders are first and foremost wholly divisionary or ‘barrier-like’. Likewise, in different ways, they also tend to over-privilege the state as being the primary borderer and the state territorial borders as primary borders. Thus, if border security is understood as a reflective process, it is fair to say that security including border security field in Turkey, is still state-centric and territorial based whose main means to stop the enemy is reinforced border lines. As a result, the internal/external dichotomy is common and border security is seen as a part of internal security.

There was an unfortunate tendency to unthinkingly adopt militaristic perspective as conceptual and categorical givens. During the interviews i have seen that deterrence logic is common element in the mind sets of the interviewees. They think that visibility (high walls and border fences) make outsiders aware of punishment when they intend to violate the border. In other words, if a border is not visible, it fails to materialize its purpose. The, borders often are seen as “fixed entities’ at the edge of a sovereign state, as a line in the landscape, separator of societies, the passive and pre-given ground on which events take place. However, with the new concepts challenging state territoriality, borders have taken on new shapes. “In short, borders must be understood as dynamic sites of transnational reconfiguration” (van Schendel, 2005b: 46). Thus, border security strategies based on spatially rooted, solid and durable entities fixed to landscape inevitably create weakness as illegal flows, on the other hand, are highly mobile and unpredictable, and they often manage to find new routes.

Border security is presented as passive, vulnerable and reactive. This defensive attitude creates vulnerability in the face of contemporary threats. The story of building watch houses against smuggling is very striking and a well-known example. Watch houses built against
smugglers in the east and south east of Turkey became vulnerable to terrorist attacks later because these watch houses were built in stream beds as smugglers used often. After terrorist attacks these watch houses has moved to the summits of hills for protection but it did not stop casualties.

There is big difference in the target perception between security agencies and cross-border illegal groups. Cross border criminal organisations do not aim at the borders itself but deep inside the national heartland beyond. For them, border is just a staging post. However, border enforcement authorities’ primary concern is the border itself.

Focusing too much on territorial borders has led to those insiders living in borderlands feeling neglected in favour of state among. This negative feeling is strengthened by the manipulation of terrorists. For the local people, ethnic and family ties supersede political boundaries. The increasing multidimensional interaction along the borders, despite the border barriers (as seen at the south-east part of Turkey commonly) is necessary for the social and economic development of the local people, which has been in existence for centuries. However, some of the markets have been defined as illegal and the trade flows are criminalised and punished by the state. However, there is a clear distinction between illicitness and laws of state. They are not overlapping conceptions. As a result, people are reacting to the ‘top-down’ imposition of state borders and it creates more illegality. Securing borders, therefore, is now less about securing lines. Securing borders, indeed, is giving much more emphasis on how people experience the borders.

Although Turkey became preoccupied with the issue of border security for a long time it seems that it could not demonstrate a comprehensive systematic approach to learning from deaths for the last three decades. The government still does not think border security as a comprehensive framework to lead national security policy and to organise relevant departments and agencies. Instead it consider border security as a sub-
set of national security. However, the new security environment invalidates the analyses of border security as an isolated phenomenon.

Finally, above all, the most significant finding of the research was the fact that Turkey’s new foreign policy (open border policy, abolishing visas) opens up new spaces which enables new forms of cohesion and new forms to organize solidarity can and do emerge. Indeed, trans-border flows creates new horizontal spaces connecting the territories. Therefore, these changes in the configuration of spaces and borders have created an urgent need for a unique form of security governance which is not based on territorial protection mentality. So, rather than being primarily concerned with setting up new the institutional structures (which is important of course), Turkey should be centrally concerned with the construction of new spaces. In other words, to secure the society and the state, security strategies must be based on social space rather than geographic space. Only by this way Turkey can deploy its own solutions to the border security problems.

However, Turkey’s current security architecture may have suited the security environment of the Cold War. This national security architecture is incapable in the face of new security environment. This archaic and compartmentalised system acts as a barrier to collaborative endeavours across the security field. Coordination is necessarily minimal, because it is limited to the periods of war when national territory is attacked by external enemies. Claiming coordination at other times is just a pretence. This situation strikingly indicates the classic bureaucratic and organisational laziness, where policy is not determined by the nature of the challenge, but by the nature of the tools available.

9.4. Outside traditional views
The main argument of the thesis was to discuss that Turkey’s border security framework produces insecurity not only for Turkish society but also for state itself. This argument is consisted of two analytical
elements. Firstly, Turkey’s current border security approach creates a society of exclusions through its Cold War-inherent protection mechanisms, and how this exclusionary nature has the potential to produce insecurity for some. Secondly, the difficulty in determining where the border is, what constitutes the border and where the securitization of the border should take place after the developments in the post-Cold War era and Turkey’s changing foreign and security policy has created new horizontal spaces connecting the territories?

In a geographical sense, borders were traditionally understood ‘as constituting the physical and highly visible lines of separation between political, social and economic space’ (Newman 2006: 144). Only in the last few decades has it been recognised that the significance of borders lies not in its physical actuality but in the bordering process that produce them and the institutions that manage them. In Newman’s (2006: 149) words: ‘Demarcation is not simply the drawing of a line on a map or the construction of a fence in the physical landscape. It is the process through which borders are constructed and the categories of difference and separation.’ Hence, bordering is the main factor in border studies. By consolidating and securing borders the state institutions that manage boundaries do bordering to bring the territory under control.

Besides, we have seen that security studies are struggling to emancipate themselves from the dominance of the traditional views based on realism. Critical approaches on the Westphalian state system have made the limitations of territory-based approach clear and opened up new ways to new strategies. After all, the assumption of that the state and the society are the same entities has become irrelevant and so do the security strategies based on the same assumption.

As the security studies are moving beyond the state centric paradigm, the question is what to put its place. The old notion of national security far from convincing and far from producing practical solutions to the contemporary security problems. It does not offer real solutions for the
demand of people who expect that their state will protect them against cross-border threats in their daily life. Although it still exists, systematic control of the territory has been doomed to be marginalised because crossing of the border is not only territorial. Trying to stop cross border activities based on kinship and religious ties; and identity mixed marriage in the south and east part has been creating resentment and more illegality. Border security, thus, rejects the clear distinctions or borders between inside and outside, state and society, sovereignty and identity.

In order to be more effective in this new world, states need to question their definitions of what is legal and illegal, and what is inside and outside. As the state strategy of territorial security has become irrelevant in the age of mobility, we are faced with the fact that conventional border notion has become irrelevant. ‘For example, states that challenge flows by defining them as ‘illegal’ create more barricaded and violent borders as well as more sophisticated, albeit outlawed, organisations to keep flows going’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 59). Therefore, law enforcement methods of border authorities, involving the primary use of geographic space to control illegal flows should change. This way of border security strategy (simply reactive) is far from providing security for the state and its territory, as well as its society. In other words, the practices put in place to bring security actually bring insecurity because it produces more illegality.

This principle is also a valid approach for migration issues, which is top on the agenda these days. In his award winning book *Illegality Inc. Clandestine migration and the business of bordering Europe*. Ruben Anderson (2014) argues that the industries set up to control migration actually lead migrants to take greater risks along more dangerous routes. As more and more money spent in an attempt to regulate movement, these industries only create more illegal behaviour. Generally speaking illegal flows (migrants or any other movements across the boundaries) are subjected an anti-mobility mechanism containing walls, fences,
patrols to catch them and turn back where they come. Indeed, this regime of control is out of control. Solutions for illegal migration creates more illegal behaviour and exacerbate what it seek to prevent as it criminalises all the migrants.

In addition, the discourses on border security are often state-centric and one-sided. These discourses tend to ignore the fact that it is consumer demand that fuels the illegal trans-border flows. Often, the state itself deems some goods undesirable by heavily taxing them and some goods become contraband as a result of state action. This is a striking contradiction between security discourses and policies because while states struggle for insuperable borders, it was, in reality, state action that borders are porous because of.

The trans-border security arrangements in a form of state to state relationship would not bring solution unless they take into consideration societies’ sense of security and justice. Indeed, those arrangements are a part of reterritorialization which is a new form of territory and reterritorialized security strategies can only be successful by combining state security and societal security together because they are not overlapping arenas. Thus, trans-border arrangements devised for security of territory can only work by paying enough attention to the security of societies as societal concerns have a direct impact on the shape and legitimacy of security policies. We are well aware that society is not a passive entity and it has the ability to do bordering, as well as states. Along with the state, citizens and non-state actors also have power to construct, maintain and dismantle borders, and become authority in the process. It means state is not the sole actor of bordering process. The boundary between private and public has also changed and hence, statehood has changed. Therefore, Turkey should focus on the changed structure of the modern state system and changing nature of the statehood. As an important note here, by referring to Poulantzas and Jessop, Hameiri and Jones (2013: 467) defining state ‘not merely as a set of institutions, agencies, and actors, but primarily as a social relation and
expression of power'. They suggest that state power shape the use of state apparatus and struggle among coalitions of social and political forces determine the emergence of particular state forms and institutions and explain the way they function.

Today, border security cannot be reduced to security at the borders or a true national security strategy cannot be based on physical protection of borders because borders have no capacity to protect territory of the state. By the help of technology, the new security environment has destabilised the border between the internal and external in such a way that there is no connection between border crossing and security. So, border security is more than security at the border, and its design and implementation are influenced not only by the reality of threats and security needs but also by how such threats are perceived, categorised and integrated into a larger securitisation discourse. The old security structure and analysis therefore inevitably will give way to a much wider and proper approach in the future.

Societal security, therefore, as a tool offers new operational objectives, alongside conventional goals, for security departments. It ensures that departments and agencies need to be trusted, accountable and capable of preventing problems. And most importantly, this inevitably provides new forms of data and evidence into decision-making processes beside the views of the public itself. As a result, it naturally increases legitimacy by guaranteeing that the actions of state are more likely to meet the expectations of the citizens. Ultimately, it will result in the societal cohesion within society by bringing knowledge and data together on the interaction between the material dimensions of border security (infrastructure, everyday security practices, etc.) and the perception of society, as one of the greatest safeguard of security. Thus, it will be able to develop security solutions that avoid the deadlocks and dilemmas of national security strategies based on territory.
However, Turkey’s border security understanding is based heavily on geography; and hence borders, border trespass and the connection between territory and sovereignty of the nation state. National security is reduced to inviolability of the territorial borders and hence strategy is set up to stop undesirable outsiders at the borders. As a result of this strategy inherited from Cold War, concrete walls and fences as solutions come to agenda like an anti-flow mechanism in turn. The sacrosanct character of the borders are emphasized every military border base, ‘frontier is my honour’. As a result highly visible borders are always on the agenda as a deterrent factor against illegal flows from outside. Were they able to deter? Not, so far! Do they need to visible then? Some officials offered high-tech surveillance systems as a solution with reference to mountainous borders during the case study. However, the use of technological tools to secure the borders would not work because it contributes to insecurity feeling as it maintains the differences between ‘us and them’, thereby sustaining a society of exclusions.

These exclusions may result in enforcing secessionist movements because of the wrong belief that territory is necessary for security. This state centric logic of security has driven some identities to seek sovereign statehood as the only means of securing their identity and maintaining their difference. However, erecting new borders is not a solution because new state borders do not keep difference out or in. So, to secure the society and the state, security strategies must be based on social space rather than geographic space. This logic is the only option to meet the security needs of cultural groups within the state. This is not only about nation’s survival but also state survival as state and society’s survival are connected. If it is not handled correctly it will remove the base for everything else, because then we will not be here as ‘us’.

The abolition of visas for citizens of neighbouring and several other countries has been an important step, especially for people with fewer opportunities. Criminals have anyway already found their own ways to travel across borders. The step was important for the region on its path
towards more wealth for borderland people and rest of the country. People are in need of better life, but those who abuse the system are often the representatives of small numbers. In the long run, Turkey has to assure that the border security system is fair and efficient. At the same time it has to promote the sense of solidarity for people, assure them protection and share their burden.

If Turkey can change the views of seeing our common borders as source of problem, it may then see the unique opportunities. Positive and mutual opportunities come not only through the likely economic benefits or the increased trade discussed above, but also through more encounters and meetings between people. These kinds of encounters have constructed new spatialities and by doing so created opportunities to shape the security environment.

Indeed, the prevalent idea of disadvantages stemming from unstable periphery has also been a push factor for moving away from the idea that Turkey can cope with the border security problems by fortifying the territorial borders. The history proved that this idea has been unsuccessful in preventing the border security problems exacerbated by the unstable periphery. In the face of the increasing threats from terrorists and political instabilities in Iraq, Syria, in the whole Middle East, which do not seem to be sorted out in the foreseeable future, suggest that the militarisation of border control will likely increase. Therefore, a systematic, high-profile effort to transform border security is more necessary, more desirable and now perhaps more possible after Syrian crisis.

Understanding the nature, shape, methods and meanings of illegal transnational activities remains far from adequate because of the lack of scientific a research and more importantly the difficulty of thinking outside the conceptual grasp of the modern state. Shifting attention to society from state has some practical implementations in the end. It will allow us to find out more not only about producers and consumers of
illegal goods, but also transporters, people from children to adults occasionally engaged on a daily wage, to professional truckers. Second, it allows security professionals to make true connections between not only overlapping illegal flows such as smuggling and terrorism, but also between different types of illegal flows. Hence, the system can differentiate between a tea or sugar self-smuggler because of tax on the items and an arm traffickers. Finally, it opens the doors for better understanding of the link between organised criminal networks around the border and lead to provide information about what motivate local people to violate the state border on a daily basis. It would inevitably provide a valuable perspective to shape the security environment.

To summarize, border politics inevitably focus on the issue of bordering. Three types of bordering can be viewed mainly across Turkey’s borders, particularly the east and south-east borders. First, society’s bordering based on pre-border kinship and religious ties which were disrupted by the formation of state territorial borders. Second, state territorial bordering to mark its sovereignty and to control its territory. Third, ‘border induced’ bordering practises that ‘spring up because of the borders existence’ (van Schendel2005b: 57) such as cross border shopping, gambling etc. These practices can be differentiated by the security professionals and may be tolerated by the state and hence make them legal.

Security strategies and security institutions based on state geographic space (territory) are not relevant any more. They mainly pay attention on what enters to the territory but not what leaves it. They must be changed because this strategy itself is a security problem and far from providing security in the face of cross-border criminal networks. Organised criminal networks have strong advantages against Turkey’s bulky law enforcement authorities in the border security field. First of all, they are organised on the base of profit which is very tempted. They are flexible and highly mobile no matter where they are spatially. With the help of information and transport technology, they can mislead security
authorities and undermine the state territoriality. Manipulating kinship relations give them enormous opportunities for access to a detailed knowledge of topography and social fields to provide persons to navigate them across the border safely.

Therefore, there is need for a new vision of security, a more appropriate one to this century, which combines elements of the other visions but which breaks away from the tough traditional understanding formed in the past which is no longer relevant. This security philosophy would be one that tries to meet the challenges of the new security environment and the technological and cultural realities of this century. A systematic approach to border security could guide an integration of border security and national security.

There are some practical steps to be taken without wasting time, however, border security cannot be a responsibility of any individual institution, and a new perspective should be developed which encompasses whole national security structure. The challenge to border security in this century demands a far more radical approach than has been suggested so far. Such an approach has the potential to transform how state manages national security and it could bring together separate parts of the system. Equally important, reorganising security sector around a revised concept of national security will force departments and agencies to adapt to new structures and working cultures. This also would be helpful to remove the rivalry among the contesting institutions and give a valuable opportunity to shape the whole system.

Coordination was the most problematic element indicated by the security professionals. In the traditional view of security, coordination is necessarily minimal because it is limited to periods of crisis when national territory is attacked by foreign forces. Claiming coordination at other times is just a pretence. Therefore, setting up a new body will add one more agency to a number of agencies that needs to be coordinated and hence worsen it because border security issues are so complex for any
single institution to handle on its own. In order to create significant changes, Turkey needs to have more holistic and comprehensive perspective of how to perceive the security. Focusing on societal insecurities can help security professionals to break the state-centred mind and may allow new perspectives. A new perspective based on societal security can lead and re-structure the national security in a way complementing and strengthening each other. It clearly implies to put “more ‘national’ back into national security” (Waever et al. 1993: 196).

What we need for a better governance of the transformation process in general is to embrace dynamics of the new security environment, changing security and border concepts. The concept of ‘societal security’ might be a useful tool to understand the process. Thus, the real and permanent solution would be restructuring the whole national security architecture in line with the requirements of the new security environment. In a broader perspective, if border security is understood as a reflective process, which includes the primacy of security of the people and communities instead of states; if the goal of overall security politics became sustainable security which takes into account different dimensions, then, border security understanding would not be a security problem anymore. In practice, Turkey would be able to move from traditional hard border zone to a border of co-operation and interaction. She must therefore question the philosophy of the security which reflects on the everyday practises, and finally, discuss alternative security politics.

9.5. Principle aims for the future and recommendations
This project underlined two key principles on which an effective system of border security should be based:

- Move beyond the pre-active and be there to shape the security environment. The most effective way of addressing risks to Turkey is to identify and address them in the source before those risks
turn out to threats. This will help ease pressure on the borders and security organisations.

- Target activity in the first place instead of enemies. Border security needs to target activity to achieve its objectives and minimise tension on the borders. Border security activities should be directed at those movements and in those locations where they pose the highest risk, while legitimate movements should be facilitated. This is the only way to achieve flexibility and efficiency because government’s open border policy and kinship relations cause high volumes of movements of goods and people across the borders. The convergence of controls at entry points will quite likely create inefficiency for control and real difficulties for legitimate movements.

The challenge in achieving security will deepen in the future. The threats from organised crime to terrorism will intensify in the future and become increasingly sophisticated. An effective response to these challenges means going beyond the cooperative work between traditional security agencies that have been out of date, and requires re-structuring the security architecture and strategic leadership. This will eliminate contradictions or tensions between policies, programs or interventions, which will result in more efficient deployment of resources through the elimination of duplication. It will also eliminate the contradiction between society and state. It will result in more effective services as a result of clearer identification of the nature of problems, improved integration, the overcoming of fragmentation and involvement of the community. There can be benefits in terms of increased understanding and trust not only between societies and state, but also between agencies, which can lead to willingness to take risks, enhanced potential for innovation and improved outcomes. It inevitably will create capacity to resolve policy problems.

**Recommendation 1:** There is no border security doctrine or strategy. To set a firm base, a single overarching border security strategy is required
that takes account of the full range of national security structure. Turkey could no longer rely on the aging national security structure. That strategy has to be based on a perspective that alters the narrow conception of national defence to a broader understanding of security. It also needs to set out the principles how security can best be provided inside and outside the country.

**Recommendation 2:** A border security strategy could have the potential to transform the way governments’ and state departments’ approach to the issues of national security but the development of a strategy must be comprehensive and supported across the political and bureaucratic spectrum and by the wider public.

**Recommendation 3:** Societal Security should become the conceptual framework for security services and national security framework in general. It would promote redefining law enforcement concerns as security concerns and hence converting law enforcement agencies (police, gendarmerie, and customs). It would also promote converting war-fighting agencies (military) and strategies to carry out their duties.

**Recommendation 4:** Successful implementation of any strategy requires ministerial leadership. At present, departmental units in government have little or no ministerial leadership. This leadership must be consistent with the direction and purpose among all the assets and reflect the philosophy of the new security environment. Therefore, it should be supported by a governance structure. Within the current system, the best way to achieve these requirements is revising and strengthening the Secretariat General of National Security Council as ‘Secretariat General of National Security’ under the authority of the Prime Ministry. In line with the new strategy, the establishment of its priorities and monitoring the performance can be achieved by the help of this secretariat.

**Recommendation 5:** Given the changing nature and diversity of the risks, the government should legislate to establish a new security agency that will take on the work of Land Forces in terms of border security and
partly the work of other law enforcement authorities. It is a must for Turkey because dealing with new security risks requires their governance to be shifted beyond territorial borders and at the same time thinking outside the established institutions of the state. This new organisation should not be an Interior Ministry agency because it will turn the border security to be an internal security issue.

However, the relationship between the new organisation and other law enforcement agencies (police, gendarmerie and customs) will be a critical one. Traditional law enforcement agencies will continue their routine work while the new agency will carry out its role anywhere inside and outside the country, and play a crucial role in tackling most serious challenges from terrorism to organize crime. Therefore, equipping new agency with an appropriate range of powers over the other agencies will be important. There should be a code which enables the new agency override the other individual security agencies to conduct its duty.

Turkey is now at a place where the history has repeated itself. How the demilitarization of the police and the differentiation between the two universes was forced by the historical conditions, resulting in the police had left the army, a new institutional transformation is necessary to that extent.

**Recommendation 6:** When we think about the wide range of border security issues, it is clear that such a huge work requires a new organisation and a single command and control structure responsible for the management and deployment of staff and resources. This also brings along the accountability. Today security and foreign affairs are intimately connected and inseparable. The nature of the security issues force the new organisation act as a kind of ministry of foreign affairs. Coordination is not enough to fight against the risks and threats. Integration is key. Therefore, those two functions should be merged and new ministry can take on both jobs and can be named as the Ministry of Security and Foreign Affairs.
**Recommendation 7:** There will be a need for clarification of ministerial and departmental roles on national security issues after setting up the new Ministry. This will also help the new national security secretariat monitoring the individual performances later on.

**Recommendation 8:** A spokesperson for national security should be assigned based in the new national security secretariat. Enough resources and professional assistance should be provided for spokesperson. This will help to overcome contradictory statements from different departments which is crucial for public relation issues.

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