Foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain

(1945-1975)

Tobias Reckling

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Portsmouth.

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Abstract
This thesis will examine the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain from 1945 until 1975. After the end of the Second World War, the Franco regime was internationally isolated as a result of its ties with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. However, the dictatorship returned to the international stage during the 1950s and managed to survive on the margins of the Cold War world order until the death of Franco in 1975. Throughout these 30 years and while never loosening its dictatorial control over Spain, the Franco regime continuously tried to improve its international position and image beyond mere toleration. Foreign correspondents were working at the centre of this balancing act.

Against this backdrop, this thesis has two central aims. First, it will examine the regime’s policy towards the foreign press. The thesis will show that the Francoist authorities never fully accepted the foreign press corps’ work within Spain and tried to exercise control over the foreign press corps until the end of the regime. Throughout the regime’s internal and external development, however, the Francoist authorities adapted the means they employed. At the same time, conflicting interests and strategies within the Franco regime shaped its policy towards the foreign press. This thesis will further show that conflicts with correspondents partially had their roots in the importance of the foreign press, distributed within Spain, for the Spanish public in general and the political opposition in particular.

Second, this thesis will examine the foreign press corps itself. The presence of correspondents in Spain reflected the international media interest and the Franco regime’s changing international perception. As this thesis will further show, the composition of the foreign press corps also reflected the right-wing dictatorship’s ideological orientation and changing foreign relations.

Through the examination of the foreign press corps, this thesis will break new ground in the understanding of the Franco regime. It will do so based on archival research in Spain, Germany, France, and Great Britain as well as interviews with former correspondents. The thesis applies a mixed-method approach, combining concepts and methods from historical research and the social sciences. As such, it will also contribute from a methodological perspective to current research on foreign correspondence.
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Declaration

Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award.
List of Abbreviations

Agence France-Presse: AFP
Archivo Central del Ministerio de la Presidencia, Madrid: ACMP
Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Madrid: AMAE
Archivo Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, Madrid: AFNFF
Archivo General de la Administración: AGA
Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior, Madrid: AGMI
Asociación de Corresponsales de la Prensa Iberoamericana: ACPI
Agrupación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera: ACPE
Associated Press: AP
BBC Written Archive: BBC WA
Boletín Oficial del Estado: BOE
Bundesarchiv (Koblenz): BA
Centre des Archives Diplomatiques (Nantes): CADN
Club Internacional de Prensa: CIP
Comisiones Obreras: CC.OO
Deutsche Presse-Agentur: dpa
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas: CSIC
Dirección General de Prensa (Directorate General for the Press): DG for the Press
European Communities: EC
European Economic Community: EEC
Industriegewerkschaft Metall: IG Metall
Ministerio de Información y Turismo: MIT
National Archives, London: NA
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei: NSDAP
New York Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division: NYPL MAD
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Oficina de Información Diplomática</td>
<td>OID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partido Comunista de España</td>
<td>PCE</td>
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<td>Partido Socialista Interior</td>
<td>PSI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
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<td>Partido Socialista Popular</td>
<td>PSP</td>
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<td>Polítisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes</td>
<td>PAAA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radiotelevisione Italiana</td>
<td>RAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
<td>SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unión General de Trabajadores</td>
<td>UGT</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
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<td>United Press</td>
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<td>United Press International</td>
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<td>Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular</td>
<td>VSEP</td>
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I am grateful to the former correspondents who have shared, sometimes for hours and repeatedly, their experience in Francoist Spain with me. The accounts of their life and working conditions under the Franco regime were of crucial importance for this thesis.

I thank my parents, my grandmother and my brother for their encouragement and support. I thank my friends and above all Tim for bringing me back to a life outside of this thesis from time to time. My greatest debt, however, is to Agathe for her patience and support throughout the work on this thesis and for being there in good and in difficult times.

Finally, I am also thankful for the funding I received from the Centre for European and International Studies Research, University of Portsmouth, the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, the German Academic Exchange Service, the German Historical Society, the Society for the Study of French History, and the Association for Cotemporary Iberian Studies.
Dedication

To my parents.
Conventions

Throughout this thesis the term Germany is to be used for the Federal Republic of Germany and the western zones of occupation before 1949.

Dissemination

Publications

Books and Edited Volumes


Articles and Book Chapters


Presentations

———, and Jurek Sehrt. „Geteilte Erinnerungen. Die Musealisierung des spanischen Bürgerkrieges“ (Geschichte in der Vitrine. Sammlung und Ausstellung von Nationalgeschichten im Vergleich, Workshop at the University of Potsdam, 8-9 May 2014)

———, and Jurek Sehrt. „Whose perspective? Spain’s contemporary history on display in historical museums“ (National Museums in a Changing Europe, Conference at the European University, 12-14 December 2012)

———, and Jurek Sehrt. “Negociando la memoria de la democratización. Representación museística de la Transición Española” (Annual Conference of the Asociación de Historia Contemporánea, University of Granada, 12-15 September 2012)

———. “From dictatorship to democracy: Foreign correspondents in Franco's Spain until the Spanish transition” (Annual Conference of Association for Contemporary Iberian Studies, 4 – 6 September 2012)

———. “European public communication and Spain’s transition to democracy” (Towards a European Society? Transgressing Disciplinary Boundaries in European Studies Research, Conference at the University of Portsmouth, 28-30 June 2012)

———. “Europe and Franco’s Last Victims: Executions in Spain and the construction of a European Public Sphere during the 1970s” (Public Sphere, Ideology, Transformation of Power, Conference at the University of Vienna, 24-25 November 2011)

———. „Er ist zwar Marxist, aber ein ehrlicher Mann“. Spanien in europäischen Medien, 1975-82” (Presentation at Postgraduate Colloquium of the Sonderforschungsbereich 640 Repräsentationen Sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel, Humboldt University, 10 November 2011)
Introduction

In 1976, not one year after the death of Franco, José Mario Armero published the first study on the foreign press corps during the Spanish Civil War.¹ Armero, by then the president of the private Spanish news agency Europa Press and with good contacts in the foreign press, presented his book in Madrid’s Club Internacional de Prensa (International Press Club, CIP). The Francoist authorities had founded the CIP at the beginning of the 1960s as a meeting place for foreign correspondents with Spanish journalists. Among the correspondents present at Armero’s book presentation were some who had personally covered the Spanish Civil War and still continued to report from Spain.² The image that foreign correspondents created during the Spanish Civil War, in Amero’s opinion, had had a lasting impact on the international perception of Spain. It was in this context that the hundreds of foreign journalists who came to Madrid to cover the death of Franco reported on the end of the Franco regime.³

Spain’s image at the time of the death of Franco was my initial research interest which eventually led to this thesis on foreign correspondents during the Franco regime. In the course of the preliminary research, I met a number of former correspondents in Madrid who had covered both the Franco regime and the transition to democracy. While listening to these correspondents’ anecdotes about living and working in Spain, the distinct nature of this ‘foreign beat’ became clear on more than one occasion. At the same time, it also became clear that while Francoist Spain was no hot spot for international media, it was also no no-man’s-land either. Throughout the life of the Franco regime, foreign correspondents worked within a complex system between control, dependence and acceptance, and they continued to shape from within Spain the foreign perception of the Franco regime. But under what legal and institutional structure did these correspondents work in Spain? How was the foreign press corps composed? What were the practical working conditions of the correspondents in Spain? Did the work of the correspondents have an impact on the Spanish public? How did the Franco regime attempt to influence and control the foreign correspondents within its borders? This thesis addresses these questions by examining different aspects of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain for the first time. In particular,

¹ José M. Armero, España fue noticia: Corresponsales extranjeros en la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: Sedmay Ediciones, 1976).
² ABC, “El libro «España fue noticia» presentado en el Club de Prensa,” 3 June 1976, 96 [unsigned].
³ Armero, España fue noticia, 13.
this thesis focuses on the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain from the end of the Second World War until the death of Franco in 1975.

The Franco regime was a unique placement for foreign journalists in a number of ways. The right-wing dictatorship remained throughout its existence an anomaly in the European post-war order. It never fully regained access to Western political relations. This became clearly visible in its unsuccessful attempts to join the European Economic Community (EEC) at the beginning of the 1960s; its pariah status was too strong to be allowed into the evolving community of European democracies. At the same time, however, the Franco regime managed to survive for almost 40 years. After its international ostracism due to its ties with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy following the defeat of the Axis powers, Spain gradually returned to the international stage during the 1950s. In the context of the Cold War, the Franco regime’s fierce anti-communism helped regain international acceptance.

Spain’s survival on the political margins of the Cold War world order was both accompanied and secured by the Franco regime’s continuous attempts to influence and improve Spain’s international perception beyond mere toleration. Besides its anti-communism, the Franco regime actively used international PR campaigns, culture and tourism to both strengthen Spain’s economy and improve its international image. Researchers such as Neal Rosendorf but also Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Carolin Fischer, have examined the use of soft diplomacy by the Franco regime.\(^4\) This striving for international acceptance by democratic societies was a constant balancing act with the dictatorship’s firm hold on power. With the slogan ‘Spain is different’, this discrepancy was even reflected in the regime’s own external tourist campaigns.\(^5\)

While researchers have only just started to examine the Franco regime’s foreign propaganda, this thesis moves away from their perspective by focusing on the foreign correspondents within Spain. Foreign correspondents were working in the centre of the Franco regime’s desire to gain international acceptance and the retention of internal control. As central and the most direct communicators of opinions and images, foreign


correspondents were crucial actors in the creation and shaping of foreign opinion on the regime. Accepting them and their work became a necessity for the regime’s foreign policy after the end of the Second World War.

The Franco regime, however, never gave up its dictatorial control over Spain. This also applied to the 1960s, when Manuel Fraga Iribarne, as new Minister of Information and Tourism and responsible for both the domestic and foreign press, was charged with the task to ‘clean up the repressive image of the dictatorship’. Despite limited reforms, the Francoist regime continued to repress the political opposition and to control and censor Spanish media. During the last years of the Franco regime, the intensity of this repression intensified still more.

This unbroken claim to dictatorial control resulted in a dilemma in its relations with the foreign press corps. Correspondents’ reports could undermine the regime’s actively pursued improvement of its foreign perception. Despite the necessary acceptance of the foreign press corps in Spain, the Francoist authorities reacted by continuously trying to extend their influence over foreign journalists. This resulted in a permanent balancing act between the dictatorship’s internal control and its wider objective of international acceptance. This thesis will examine the regime’s policy, which resulted from this tension, and its impact on the correspondents’ working conditions against the background of the regime’s internal development and its external relations. Therefore, the thesis will contribute to knowledge about the interconnectedness of the Franco regime’s internal and external policy.

At the same time, and while this thesis will not explicitly examine the foreign perception of the regime, the analysis of the foreign press corps within Spain nevertheless adds to its understanding. The thesis will analyse the changing composition of the foreign press corps against the background of the development of the Franco regime’s external relations. On this basis, the thesis will provide insights into the changing media interest in Spain that the Franco regime actively tried to improve.

The Franco regime’s relations to the foreign press corps, however, cannot only be seen against the background of its external relations and its attempts to control and influence Spain’s foreign perception. Foreign correspondents were important communicators for the

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Spanish political opposition. Outside of Spain, correspondents gave through their media a voice to the growing political opposition. However, the Franco regime allowed the distribution of foreign media within Spain after 1945. In the context of the controlled and censored Spanish media landscape, foreign media thereby became an important source of information for the Spanish public and a means of communication for the Spanish opposition. By examining this specific aspect, therefore, the thesis will shed light on the importance of foreign media and correspondents within Spain.

By examining the foreign press corps, this thesis will break new ground on the understanding of the Franco regime’s external and internal policies. By combining source-based historical analysis with methods from the social sciences, it also intends to contribute to the historical understanding of foreign correspondence both methodologically and as a subject of study.

**Literature Review**

Researchers interested in the foreign press in Spain, have so far concentrated on one of the two central media events in Spain’s history in the twentieth century: the war correspondents during the Spanish Civil War and, more recently and far less intensively, the foreign press corps during Spanish transition to democracy. Following Armero’s pioneering book and further studies, the role of the Spanish Civil War correspondents has recently been analysed by the historian Paul Preston and communication researcher David Deacon. In fact, the Spanish Civil War is widely seen as one of the moments that gave birth to modern

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war correspondence. For this thesis, this research is of some relevance with respect to the background of some Civil War correspondents, who remained or returned to Spain later on.

The research on the foreign press corps during the Spanish transition is just starting to develop out of a recent and growing interest in the international perception of the end of the Franco regime. This rather late interest in both the international perception of the transition and the foreign press corps during the regime change is somewhat surprising. After all, a leading historian of Spain’s international relations, Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares, pointed to the ‘relevant role’ that the foreign press corps played during the Spanish regime change as early as 2004. Most notably, a forthcoming comparative book on the perception of the Spanish transition in Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, and the US in a research project lead by the communication historian, Jaume Guillamet Lloveras, also discusses - though only briefly and based on limited archival evidence - the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. Besides these contributions, former correspondents


William Chislett and Walter Haubrich have published articles on their experiences during the Spanish transition. Haubrich mainly concentrates on his own work for the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. Chislett, although also highlighting his work for the British *The Times*, aims at examining the foreign press corps in Spain from a more general perspective.

What has been written about the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain so far has almost exclusively been produced either by correspondents themselves, resulting in texts which are useful sources for academic analysis, or by actors from the political opposition. The correspondents Benjamin Welles and Édouard de Blaye wrote general books on the Franco regime, in which they also briefly discuss the regime’s policy towards the foreign press, while Haubrich discusses the subject in a brief article. Of particular importance as a source is also the history of the Spanish press until 1966 by the correspondent Henry F. Schulte. Central proponents of the political opposition such as the communist Marcelino Camacho Abad, the socialist Enrique Tierno Galván and the monarchist José María de Areilza y Martínez de Rodas, all stress in their memoirs the importance of the foreign press corps for their struggle against the Franco regime.

Besides Schulte’s pioneering book, it was only after the end of the dictatorship that (mainly Spanish) researchers were able to further contribute to the understanding of the Franco regime’s press policy. The foreign press corps, however, receives very little attention in these studies. In 1986, the former Spanish journalist turned academic Felipe Maraña Marcos, published under his better known pseudonym Felipe Sahagún, a methodologically innovative history of Spanish foreign correspondence and access to international

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information in Spain. In this context, Sahagún also briefly discusses the importance of the foreign press and in particular international broadcasters as a source of information in Francoist Spain. The foreign press corps itself is not included in Sahagún’s book. However, in his original doctoral thesis from 1985, on which his book was based, Sahagún also briefly examined the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. While mainly descriptive and, due to the limited access to archival material at the time, primarily based on personal interviews, Sahagún’s excursion into the world of foreign correspondence during the Franco regime nevertheless remains a pioneering contribution.

Sahagún’s short chapter in his unpublished doctoral thesis went largely unnoticed by later research. A telling reflection of this is Jeroen Oskam’s 1991 article on the Franco regime’s press policy as a research subject. While discussing the state of research at the beginning of the 1990s, Oskam does not mention the foreign press as a possible subject of study at all. Instead, the developing historiography of the press and press policy during the Franco regime adopted an almost exclusively national perspective, although brief references to foreign correspondents and the regime’s policy towards the foreign press corps can be found in a number of studies. This applies, for instance, to the influential studies by Justino Sinova from 1989 and Carlos Barrera from 1995. Sinova studies the development of the Francoist press policy until 1951, including a brief mention of the adaptation of the regime’s policy towards the foreign press. Barrera, who put a particular focus on journalists, briefly highlights the importance of regime critical Spanish journalists as sources of information for foreign correspondents, though without citing further evidence. Within this area of research, Elisa Chuliá dedicates the most attention to the foreign press in her book from 2001. While in principle an examination of the Franco regime’s policy towards the Spanish press, Chuliá’s study briefly highlights the importance of foreign correspondents as communicators for the political opposition based on memoirs and autobiographies. Furthermore, and in contrast to previous research, Chuliá also, like

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22 Ibid., 230-232.
26 Carlos Barrera, Periodismo y franquismo: De la censura a la apertura, Política, cultura y sociedad (Barcelona: Ediciones Internacionales Universitarias, 1995).
27 Sinova, La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51).
28 Barrera, Periodismo y franquismo, 138.
29 Chuliá, El poder y la palabra.
Sahagún but without referring to his research, briefly discusses the importance of the foreign press as a source of information within Spain. Chuliá’s arguments nevertheless remain superficial, with no discussion of the actual constitution of the press corps in Spain and very little information on the regime’s policy towards foreign correspondents.

Following Chuliá and Sahagún, the importance of the foreign press as source of information within Spain has received very little further attention and has contributed nothing to the wider understanding of the foreign press corps. So far, no in-depth examination of the perception of foreign media in Francoist Spain exists and very little research on the special case of the Spanish programmes of international broadcasters has been conducted. However, the latter mainly examines the particular cases of the Spanish programmes of Communist broadcasters from Eastern Europe and foreign broadcasts in Catalan. The importance of the Spanish programmes of the two most important Western broadcasters for Spain, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio Paris, have only recently begun to receive the attention of researchers. The University of Alicante has started a project on the influential Spanish programme of Radio Paris. The existing research on the BBC’s Spanish Service, however, has only examined the time up to the end of the Second World War. The research on the further development of the BBC’s foreign language broadcasts to Europe pays no attention to the broadcaster’s Spanish programme.

Like the historiography of the Francoist press policy and the limited research on the importance of foreign media within Spain, existing studies on the Franco regime’s foreign perception have so far also ignored the foreign press corps in Spain. In fact, the examination of the regime’s foreign perception itself is a rather new area of research. Early studies include, in particular, Ute Waffenschmidt’s 1989 examination of the coverage of

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32 Ibid., 217–18.
34 Universidad de Alicante, “Proyecto de la Universidad de Alicante para la reconstrucción de nuestra historia por medio de material sonoro principalmente radiofónico, centrado en los años del franquismo y la transición democrática” (accessed 20 March 2016).
37 Ute Waffenschmidt, Spanische Kontraste: Zum Verhältnis von Zeitgeschichte und Fernsehen in der Auslandsberichterstattung des ZDF (Frankfurt am Main, New York: P. Lang, 1989).
Francoist Spain and the Spanish transition by the German public broadcaster Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) and Aline Angoustures’ unpublished 1987 doctoral thesis and a later article on the French media perception of the Franco regime. While Angoustures fully concentrates on a media analysis, Waffenschmidt briefly examines the working conditions of the correspondents in late Francoist Spain. Her observations, however, were not only limited to the very small number of German TV correspondents but also primarily based on interviews.

Besides these early studies, researchers have only started to publish further on the international perception of the Franco regime since around 2000. Moisés Prieto López and Javier Muñoz Soro, for instance, have studied the perception of military trials and executions during the Franco regime in Switzerland and Italy respectively. While Birgit Aschmann analyses the perception of the early Franco regime in Germany, Misael Arturo López Zapico examines the late Franco regime’s perception by The New York Times. However, comparative studies, such as Rafael Núñez Florencio’s attempt at an overview of the regime’s international perception, still remain rare and leave a large gap in current research on the Franco regime. At the same time, these works are mostly media studies with little to no attention given to media actors.

The existing literature on foreign media and the Franco regime therefore contributes little to the better understanding of the foreign press corps in Spain. Instead, it has mainly been the research on the Franco regime’s international and bilateral relations that has shed light on the foreign press corps so far. This applies to Aschmann’s study on the German-

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Spanish relations between 1945 and 1963 as well as Walter Lehmann’s more recent examination of German-Spanish relations during the 1950s. Although mainly concerned with the political, economic, social and cultural relations between Spain and Germany, both authors and Lehmann in particular, also discuss the media perception of the Franco regime in Germany and the German press corps in Francoist Spain. Aschmann and Lehmann thus relate the background of some German correspondents in Nazi Germany with their sympathies for the Franco regime, which also became visible in their journalistic output. Aschmann and Lehmann particularly focus on the German correspondent Heinz Barth, who was highly influential in the German public’s perception of Spain during the 1950s. In these studies, however, the examination of the German correspondents is only one aspect of a multi-faceted examination of Spanish-German relations. The analysis of the German press corps, therefore, is not put into the larger context of the general composition of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain and the regime’s policy towards the foreign press in general. Nevertheless, Aschmann’s and Lehmann’s analysis based on archival sources has made an exceptionally important contribution to research in this area.

In his 2014 study on the Franco regime’s soft diplomacy towards the US, Rosendorf also examined the Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign press corps. In his book, Rosendorf analyses in particular the Franco regime’s US public relations strategies, including the regime’s relations with US correspondents in Francoist Spain. Against this background, Rosendorf primarily argues that while the regime initially followed a strict policy towards the foreign press, this rapidly changed with its attempts to improve its foreign image during the 1950s and 1960s.

However, Rosendorf’s discussion of the foreign press corps remains quite superficial for a number of reasons. First, the regime’s policy towards the foreign press corps for Rosendorf is only one aspect among many in the discussion of the regime’s PR strategy and not the main focus of his research. Second, like Aschmann, Rosendorf also concentrates on a specific nationality of correspondent, in this case US journalists. Third, and most crucially from the point of view of an historian, Rosendorf’s examination of the foreign press corps is exclusively based on newspaper articles and Schulte’s above mentioned book. His

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47 Rosendorf, *Franco Sells Spain to America*, 93-94.
general conclusion about the regime’s policy towards the foreign press, therefore, has limited empirical basis. Moreover and strongly connected to this shortcoming, this thesis will also show that his arguments concerning the regime’s press policy are misguided.

Besides Rosendorf, Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Carolin Fischer also further contribute to the understanding of Franco regime’s international PR strategy. By applying the concept of nation branding, in their forthcoming article they mainly examine the use of Spain’s promotion as a tourist destination as an attempt to improve the Franco regime’s international image. In this context, the authors highlight the regime’s relations to foreign journalists. However, Gienow-Hecht and Fischer concentrate on travel and tourism journalists and do not discuss the foreign press corps in general.

Against this background, this thesis will therefore fill an important gap in current research on Francoist Spain. At the same time, the examination of the foreign press corps in the Franco regime can also contribute an important case study to the limited historical research on foreign correspondents in general. In contrast to studies on war correspondents, such as the Spanish Civil War correspondents, historical research on foreign correspondence in general is still rare. Recently, and in the context of the rising interest in transnational dimensions of contemporary European history, however, historians have started to pay greater attention to foreign correspondents as important transnational actors. An example of this changing research focus is, for instance, a 2008 edited volume on journalists as political actors in British-German relations since the late nineteenth century by Frank Bölsh and Domionik Geppert. Other (mainly German) researchers have followed Bölsh’s and Geppert’s approach in more recent studies on the political agency of correspondents in various contemporary historical contexts. In her doctoral thesis, Antje Robrecht, who also contributed to Bölsh’s and Geppert’s edited volume, examines foreign correspondents as ‘diplomats in shirtsleeves’ in British-German post-war relations. In 2014, Norman Domeier and Jörn Happel published a special issue devoted to the interaction of correspondents with politics from 1900 to 1970.

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48 Gienow-Hecht and Fischer, “Was ist und wozu braucht man «Nation Branding»?”.
49 Frank Bölsh and Dominik Geppert, eds., Journalists as political actors: Transfers and interactions between Britain and Germany since the late 19th Century, Beiträge zur England-Forschung 59 (Augsburg: Wißner, 2008).
Within this current line of research, a young generation of historians have concentrated on foreign correspondence in dictatorial regimes. In his published MA thesis, Martin Herzer has examined the foreign press corps in Nazi Germany. In their doctoral thesis and further publications, Julia Metger and Dina Fainberg have investigated the foreign press corps in the Soviet Union. While Metger concentrates on the West German press corps, Fainberg examines US correspondents in the Soviet Union and Soviet correspondents in the US. Based on extensive archival research and interviews with former correspondents, these researchers go beyond mere case studies of political agency of particular correspondents. They examine in great depth the working conditions as well as the state control of the foreign press corps in the Soviet Union and, in the case of Fainberg, in the US. These studies have not only contributed to a greater understanding of foreign correspondence. Additionally, they have moved beyond the conceptualization of foreign correspondents as semi-political protagonists in particular historical contexts. From a more general perspective, this thesis will connect to this current research trend and contribute to the understanding of foreign correspondence in the twentieth century in general and in dictatorial regimes in particular.

Concepts, approaches, and methods

This study will examine the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain by drawing on a multi-method and multi-perspective approach. By applying concepts and methods from neighbouring disciplines, this study will not only provide an in-depth understanding of the foreign press corps in Spain, the correspondents working conditions and the Franco regime’s policy towards foreign correspondents but will also connect the historical research

52 Martin Herzer, Auslandskorrespondenten und auswärtige Pressepolitik im Dritten Reich, Medien in Geschichte und Gegenwart 27 (Köln: Böhlau, 2012).
on foreign correspondents to research by social scientists and communication researchers in particular. The empirical basis of this thesis is based on multi-archival and multinational research, personal interviews with correspondents and other additional material - as outlined in the following section on sources.

Since this study is dedicated to foreign correspondents, first and foremost a working definition and conceptualization of this particular group of actors is in order. Historians have mainly concentrated on the political agency of correspondents. In part at least, this may have been caused by the correspondents’ tendency of (according to the communication researcher Kevin Williams) ‘playing up their role in world events’. The examination of the political agency and impact of correspondents is important and will be considered in this thesis. It would be misleading, however, to use such a conceptualization as a general starting point for the analysis of an entire press corps. The concentration on political aspects of the correspondents’ work excessively highlights particular actors in particular circumstances. In order to gain a more general understanding of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain - by borrowing a concept from anthropology - correspondents will be understood here as transnational cultural brokers between their beat abroad and their home audience. This conceptualization stresses the main task of correspondents, the interpretation and ‘translation’ of what is going on in their host country. By putting stronger emphasis on the transnational nature of correspondents, this understanding follows conceptualizations by communication researchers like Williams who understands a correspondent as a ‘cultural intermediary between the story and the audience’.

This thesis will therefore primarily examine correspondents as transnational media professionals, working under particular conditions within the specific logic and constraints of foreign news reporting. The focus on the journalistic profession directly leads to Boyd-Berrett’s oft-quoted definition of three basic types of correspondents: staff correspondents, who work abroad on a permanent basis for one media only; general reporters who go abroad for a short time in order to cover particular stories; and stringers who work on a semi-fixed freelance basis for a small number of regular costumers or sell their stories to the highest

57 Williams, *International Journalism*, 94.
bidder.\textsuperscript{58} Because of the focus on the development of the foreign press corps, this thesis will mainly concentrate on staff correspondents and stringers, however.

On the basis of this conceptualization of foreign correspondents, the thesis will examine the foreign press corps from five perspectives. First, and of central importance is the analysis of the legal and institutional framework under which the foreign correspondents were working, and the Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign press. Not only does this approach provide basic insights into the working conditions of the foreign press corps. It also leads to an understanding of the changing attitudes and policies of the regime towards the foreign press. In this context, the thesis will also discuss the diplomatic implications of the regime’s policy towards the foreign press. The thesis examines these institutional and legal settings as well as the regime’s actual policy, using a historical-narrative approach based mainly on the analysis of archival sources. The examination of diplomatic implications additionally relies on research in archives in Germany, Great Britain, and France, the three most important Western European countries with close links to Spain, the regime, and the opposition, and with relatively broad reporting of Spain in the media. Additionally, these sources are supplemented with an oral history approach with interviews conducted with former correspondents. In this way, the thesis will provide a more in-depth understanding of the practical workings of the Francoist institutions, but also of the correspondents’ personnel experience with and perspective on the Franco regime.

Strongly connected to the above is the second perspective, which examines three organizations for foreign correspondents. Even before the foundation of the previously mentioned CIP, the Francoist authorities allowed the creation of two associations for foreign correspondents from the end of the 1950s. The examination of these organizations and their relations to the Franco regime, primarily based on interviews and archival material, will allow for further insights into the Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign press. At the same time, it will also allow for conclusions on the correspondent’s attitudes towards the regime.

The third perspective examines, through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches and against the background of insights from communication sciences, the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain as media representatives. In particular, the thesis examines the changing size of the foreign press corps as well as its constitution in terms of

nationality and type of media (television and radio, print media, and news agencies). This quantitative approach not only provides an understanding of the constitution of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain, but communication scientists such as Yoel Cohen have also shown that the size of foreign press corps can be used as a strong indicator for the understanding of the general level of international media interest.

By following this approach, the examination of the changing size of the foreign press corps, therefore, not only provides the basis for the further examination of its constitution but also allows conclusions about the, thus far poorly examined, general international media interest in Francoist Spain and its change throughout the analysed time period.

In order to explain changes in the presence or non-presence of correspondents, this quantitative study will be supplemented on a second level by a qualitative examination of particular national groups of foreign journalists. Cohen mainly argues that ‘elitism’ and ‘proximity’ are central explanatory factors for understanding the global placement of staff correspondents abroad. Cohen refers to ‘elitism’ as the strong foreign press corps in Europe and the US. ‘Proximity’ is determined by practically every kind of bi-national relation, ‘whether expressed in geographical, political, economic or cultural terms’. By using these analytical insights, the thesis will discuss the changing presence and non-presence of particular groups of correspondents against the background of Spain’s international relations based on relevant research and archival material.

While Cohen’s explanations have resulted from examining the global distribution of correspondents, other researchers like David E. Morrison and Howard Tumber have arrived at further insights for a particular case study. Based on their examination of the foreign press corps in London during the 1980s, Morrison and Tumber argue that internal media logic is also a central factor for the explanation of the presence of correspondents. London, for instance, served as a basis for the covering the rest of Europe for some correspondents. Even more important during the Cold War was Vienna, which was ‘used to “sweep” Eastern Europe’. The thesis will show that this media perspective also has some explanatory


60 Cohen, “Foreign press corps as an indicator of international news interest,” 89.


62 Ibid., 451.

63 Ibid.
power for the examination of the foreign press corps in Spain - Madrid, although far less important as a news centre, nevertheless served as a base for coverage of Portugal and the Maghreb region.

The focus on the media logic behind the presence of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain marks the starting point for the fourth perspective on what the communication researcher Williams has termed the ‘occupational world’ of the foreign press corps: the internal structure of the press corps and their practical working conditions. Besides the approaches of Williams as well as Morrison and Tumber, this exploration into the world of foreign correspondents will be based on a path-breaking study by the anthropologist Ulf Hannerz.

Though from different academic perspectives, these researchers aimed at an analytical understanding of foreign correspondence, which also makes their approach valuable for the systematic analysis of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. Hannerz in particular established useful analytical categories for the understanding of foreign press corps. Due to the different set of data available, these approaches have to be adapted to the constraints of an historical analysis. Morrison and Tumber, for instance, based their research on a survey. Like the anthropologist Hannerz, he carried out site visits at the correspondents’ offices and followed them during their daily working routines. None of these methods can be employed by historians. Nevertheless, their approaches and, in particular, the analytical categories developed by Hannerz, are helpful tools for the understanding of foreign press corps in historical perspective.

A first analytical approach inspired by these studies is the examination of the correspondents’ careers. This also includes the previously mentioned accreditation status of correspondents as staff or stringers, their time of accreditation in Spain and typical career paths into journalism. In this way, an in-depth understanding of the constitution and development of the foreign press corps in Spain becomes possible. The importance of this approach, however, for the particular case of Francoist Spain goes beyond the mere understanding of the constitution of the foreign press corps from an occupational point of view. The accreditation as staff correspondent, for instance, in Francoist Spain came not only with a number of privileges, which made it highly attractive even for semi-

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64 Williams, International journalism, 93.
66 Ibid., 71-75.
professionals. Also, the Francoist authorities granted the accreditation status as full-time staff correspondents at different times with varying ease. The examination of the accreditation status, therefore, also allows for conclusions on the regime’s changing policy towards the press corps as well as a better understanding of the changing size of the press corps.

Furthermore, the examination of the duration of correspondents’ placement in Francoist Spain, also allows for a number of insights. Hannerz, as well as Morrison and Tumber and Williams, have highlighted the duration of correspondents’ placements, which is driven by individual choices and the policy of particular media, as crucial for the understanding of the occupational world of correspondents. For the distinction between correspondents who stay for a long period of time at the same spot and others who move from one country to another throughout their careers, Hannerz uses the model terms ‘spiralists’ and ‘long-timers’. The reasons behind the length of the time period which foreign correspondents spend in the same location, were and are, of course, manifold. Personal reasons are naturally of central importance in this context. Correspondents might get married and start a family while on the ‘beat’. Also of particular importance, however, are the policies of the media the correspondents are working for as well as the conditions in the respective host countries. Hannerz presents the basic difference between long-timers and spiralists from the foreign editors’ point of view. Foreign editors often balance the obvious advantages of knowledge, personal networks and, perhaps most importantly, language skills, which come along with long-term placements, against the disadvantage of the possibility of their correspondents ‘going stale’: ‘The correspondent […] start taking things in their surroundings for granted, instead of seeing stories in them. They get bored when they have to do basically the same story the second, third, or umpteenth time.’ In order to avoid this, editors might find it necessary to continuously rotate their correspondents in order to get a new perspective on things with fresh eyes.

The investigation of the duration of postings, however, not only allows for conclusions about the correspondents’ particular careers but the thesis will also show that local knowledge was crucial in Francoist Spain, not least for the establishment of local networks. Therefore, this thesis will quantitatively examine the general accreditation times of all

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67 Ibid., 82-86; Morrison and Tumber, The foreign correspondent: date-line London, 461-462.
68 Hannerz, Foreign News, 82-86.
69 Ibid., 85.
correspondents officially accredited in Spain followed by a detailed discussion of particular correspondents.

This perspective on the occupational world of the foreign press corps includes the examination of general sociological aspects, in particular gender and nationality. When researchers examine the gender of correspondents, they usually confirm that foreign correspondence was, and to a certain extent still is, the domain of men. In this respect, Spain was no different despite some notable exceptions. However, by examining women correspondents in Francoist Spain, further conclusions about the inner constitution of the foreign press corps become possible. This applies in particular to the surprising number of correspondent couples.

Regarding nationality, Hannerz and communication researchers like John Maxwell Hamilton and Denis Wu, have highlighted the continued importance of hiring what has been termed foreign foreign correspondents: correspondents of a ‘nationality’ other than their media. For the press corps in Francoist Spain, this perspective is useful in order to shed light on political emigrants working as correspondents as well as a small number of stringers who worked for various media from different countries. This approach is more important for the discussion of a particular sub-group of Spanish foreign correspondents. The thesis will show that these Spanish journalists were of great importance within the foreign press corps due to their personal contacts and intimate knowledge of the Franco regime. The same applies to a certain extent to what is known in journalistic terms as local hands, in this case, Spaniards who supported foreign news offices and correspondents as secretaries, translators, local guides and so on.

The focus on Spaniards as either colleagues or employees for and within the foreign press corps directly relates to the working conditions and routines of correspondents. Based again on the observations made by Hannerz, Morrison and Tumber and Williams as well as Christopher Tulloch’s investigation of Spanish foreign correspondence, the thesis will systematically examine the working conditions and routines of foreign journalists under the Franco regime. The primary focus will be on the core work of correspondents, the gathering

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72 Hannerz, Foreign News, 152-54.
73 Williams, International journalism.
74 Christopher D. Tulloch, Corresponsales en el extranjero: Mito y realidad (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2004).
of information. Based on the interviews conducted, the thesis will discuss access to and the importance and use of particular sources such as the domestic press and personal contacts.

Under the conditions of the Franco dictatorship, access to reliable information for correspondents was far more difficult than in democratic regimes. While classical information sources such as official press conferences and the Spanish press were, as the thesis will show, of limited value, the interviews conducted for this thesis revealed that other strategies of newsgathering gained in importance. This applies especially to personal contacts and the exchange of information among correspondents. However, little academic attention has been dedicated so far to this ‘evolution of cooperation’, to use the title of the famous book by Robert Axelrod, among correspondents in dictatorships. Only Hannerz briefly mentions - but does not discuss further - the increased importance of the exchange of information among correspondents in his examination of correspondent’s work in China. The thesis will fill this gap through the application of an analysis of the social networks among correspondents in order to examine the importance of this exchange of information.

In contrast to historical research, where social network analysis is used more as a concept than a method, the thesis applies social network analysis as a method and not as a catch-all phrase. Methodologically, I have employed an adapted approach often used for the examination of expert networks. I presented the interviewed correspondents with what social scientists call a full population: a table with the names of all accredited staff correspondents. Since all of the interviewed correspondents were accredited during the last years of the Franco regime, I used a complete list with all 180 accredited staff correspondents from 1975. In a second step, the correspondents were asked to rank the importance of their colleagues in terms of informational exchange with numbers reaching from ‘0’ for no importance at all, to ‘10’ for highly important. Finally, the interpretation of the findings was accompanied by additional qualitative results derived from the interviews.

The conducted interviews are also of fundamental importance for the fifth perspective of this thesis, which is concerned with the political role of correspondents and the impact of their work within Spain. As we have seen above, historical studies have so far mainly concentrated on the political role of correspondents. While this study explicitly moves away

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76 In his examination of the foreign press corps in Beijing, Hannerz also briefly discusses the correspondent’s increased willingness to share information. Hannerz, *Foreign News*, 157-158.
from this limited approach, it nevertheless proves useful to examine particular aspects of the correspondents’ work in Francoist Spain. By following this approach, this thesis will show that parts of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain had an important function as transnational communicators for the political opposition under the Franco regime. They made information accessible abroad which (due to the control by the Francoist authorities) was unprintable within Spain. In this way, correspondents also became particularly important contacts for journalists who were critical of Franco. This thesis will examine this political function of correspondents as transnational communicators based on interviews with correspondents and Spanish journalists as well as autobiographies and other writings by central actors of the political opposition.

The political importance of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain went beyond the mere publication of information abroad, however. As has been outlined, and in contrast to communist countries in Eastern Europe, the foreign press was, in principle, freely available in Francoist Spain. Against this background, the thesis examines the general distribution and access to foreign media as well as the regime’s attempts to control it. On this basis and by directly studying the function of parts of the foreign press corps as communicators for the political opposition, this discussion will focus in particular on the dissemination of information critical of the regime. The thesis will not only discuss the distribution of print media, but also of international broadcasters and the under-examined Spanish programme of the BBC in particular. With this approach, the thesis follows political scientists such as Lutz Holger Kern, who have examined the impact of foreign media for the particular case of East Germany.78

Interviews with both foreign correspondents and Spanish journalists are therefore an important source for this thesis. This approach, however, is of particular relevance to the analysis of social networks but also comes with some problems and flaws. First, while I was able to identify all correspondents by name through accreditation lists, some were already deceased and I was also unable to interview all of those who were still alive. Taking into consideration the number of 180 fully accredited staff correspondents in 1975 and my limited resources, it was a challenging task to find these correspondents almost 40 years after the end of the Franco regime. With this in mind, it was not the aim of my research project to cover the full spectrum of the foreign press corps with these interviews. Instead,

the interviews served two central aims: first, reconstructing the occupational world of correspondents in Francoist Spain; second, accompanying archival material with the personal experiences and perspectives of the correspondents. As a result, I aimed at interviewing a representative number of correspondents and succeeded in conducting 22 face-to-face interviews and one Skype interview.

A second issue with conducting interviews with correspondents lay in the fact that most, though not all, of the correspondents interviewed were working for German media. This reflects the method I used in order to establish contacts with correspondents, practical conditions, and the fact that, as will be shown, German correspondents constituted the strongest group within the foreign press corps. Methodologically, I used an approach similar to what is known as ‘snowball-sampling’ to qualitative researchers in the social sciences.\(^7^9\) This method, which social scientists frequently apply to the examination of expert networks,\(^8^0\) is also used in order to locate individuals who are hard to find. In other terms, I started with locating a small number of correspondents and was then referred from one correspondent to another by obtaining the necessary contact details. This approach also had a considerably positive impact on the willingness of the correspondents to be interviewed. The same approach was used in order to examine the exchange of information with Spanish colleagues by interviewing a small number of Spanish journalists to whom I was referred by former correspondents. With respect to the foreign press corps, it turned out that many of the German correspondents remained in touch with each other after their retirement. Furthermore, it also became clear that a considerable number of retired German correspondents remained in Spain and quite often in Madrid. A considerable number of correspondents therefore could be interviewed, in some cases more than once, during research stays in the Spanish capital. I also conducted further personal interviews in Germany.

A third issue stemmed from the methodological approach of interviews with former journalists itself. Leaving the obvious problem of failing memory aside, the method of going through the list of the 180 correspondents accredited in 1975 proved tiresome for the often elderly interviewees. Indeed, only half of the interviewed correspondents were actually willing to go through all the names and usually went through the list and just named


some other correspondents with whom they maintained especially close relations. Furthermore, not all interviewed correspondents responded equally well to the question of evaluating the importance of other particular correspondents for their work as correspondents. Often, they evaluated their personal relationship or simply awarded some ‘points’ out of retrospective courtesy. Despite these limitations, the approach, together with additional information derived from the interviews, proved to be very valuable for the examination of the informational exchange among correspondents in Francoist Spain and for the understanding of the correspondent’s work in Spain in general.

The interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews in order to gather information on various aspects of the correspondents’ work in Francoist Spain. These aspects included the regime’s attitude towards the correspondents, the correspondents’ perspectives on the Franco regime, their contacts to the Francoist opposition, their general working conditions as well as particular events with special importance for the relationship between the regime and the foreign press, such as the Burgos trials at the end of 1970. I intentionally tried to avoid general discussions about the Franco regime’s development. This was not the subject of this thesis and would have been more important in the context of a media analysis. At the same time, the retrospective reasoning and remembering of events which took place more than 40 years ago by observers like journalists, corrupted by the knowledge of the final outcome and later reading of its analysis, is itself of little value. In his influential book, The Black Swan, Nassim Nicholas Taleb has shown that retrospective rationalising of, at the time, unforeseeable events is very widespread.81 The interview results also have to be considered with particular care for another reason. While none of the interviewed journalists, for instance, admitted to have accepted any kind of bribes by the regime, the dangers of being placed in Francoist Spain were sometimes overestimated by singling out particular events. At the same time, the contacts to the political opposition (and their importance) as well as the generally claimed highly critical attitude towards the Franco regime seemed, in some cases, overestimated.

Nevertheless, the interviews with former correspondents as well as Spanish journalists proved highly valuable for this thesis. The interviews not only complemented the archival research, but also made the investigation of the ‘occupational world’ of correspondent’s in Francoist Spain possible in the first place.

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Structure

The first two chapters of the thesis will examine the foreign press corps from an institutional perspective, beginning with the Franco regime’s institutions and legal framework for the foreign press (Chapter 1). The development of the regime’s institutions and laws for correspondents is examined against the background of the Franco regime’s political evolution. Following this focus on the regime, Chapter 2 concentrates on different organisations for and by foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain.

The next two chapters put the focus of the foreign press corps itself, beginning with an examination of the presence of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain (Chapter 3). First, the chapter quantitatively examines the coming, staying and going of foreign correspondents in Spain by taking into account the type and geographical origins of the represented media. Second, it discusses the changing numerical presence of correspondents against the background of the Franco regime’s international political, economic and societal relations. Following this analysis, Chapter 4 focuses on the examination of the occupational world of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. In this context, the chapter examines the constitution of the foreign press corps from a professional perspective as well as the correspondents’ career paths and working routines.

The final two chapters are dedicated to political aspects of the work of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain and the regime’s policy towards the foreign correspondents. Chapter 5 examines the general access to foreign media within Spain and the Franco regime’s attempts to control this access. At the same time, the chapter also discusses the particular importance of the foreign press for Spanish society in general and the political opposition in particular. The last chapter of the thesis discusses the Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign press including the regime’s attempts to control and influence foreign correspondents. The examination of the regime’s institutions and laws for the foreign press corps and its policy towards foreign correspondents will therefore constitute the frame for this examination of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain.

Sources

In order to examine the foreign press corps in Spain from different perspectives, I had to utilize a variety of source material. The thesis is based on multi-national and multi-archival research. In addition, I conducted 22 interviews with former correspondents and four
interviews with Spanish journalists and ‘local hands’. Moreover, I used additional material such as officially published accreditation lists and publications by former correspondents.

A number of Spanish archives including, most importantly, the Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), were at the centre of the research. The AGA centrally holds the documentation on the Francoist administration, including the Ministry of Information and Tourism, which was the Francoist institution responsible for the foreign press. Further thorough archival research was conducted in the archives of the Spanish Foreign Ministry, the Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (AMAE), which was of particular importance for understanding of political role of correspondents. Due to the Spanish regulation for the protection of personal data, which allows access only with the explicit consent of the person in question or 25 years after his or her death, some documents in both archives only could be obtained with personal authorizations of the interviewed correspondents or their bereaved family members.

These authorizations were also of particular importance for access to archival material in the archives of the Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior (AGMI) and the Archivo Central del Ministerio de la Presidencia (ACMP). The former holds police records which are valuable sources for understanding the surveillance of foreign correspondents. While very few such reports could be found, the extensive documentation on the Le Monde correspondent José Antonio Novais, which could be obtained with the authorization of his son, was of particular importance.

Through the ACMP, a number of accreditations of former correspondents, which often contained additional material, were accessed, although only after lengthy negotiations. While most of the accreditations of correspondents are kept in the AGA, those of journalists who remained in Spain after the dissolution of the Ministry of Information and Tourism during the Spanish transition were transferred to the new institutions responsible for the foreign press. Eventually, in 1979 this became the Secretary of State for Information, one of the secretaries directly subordinated to the Ministry of the Presidency. These documents are still located in the basement of the secretary’s institutional successor, the Secretary of State for Communication and are not directly accessible. Upon request, drawing on the personal authorisations of foreign correspondents, a number of these extremely useful accreditations were transferred to the ACMP and could be examined there. Furthermore,

82 On the debate about this regulation, see Junta directiva de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea, El acceso a los archivos y la investigación histórica, 19 February 2011, https://www.ahiston.org/documentos.html (accessed 12 March 2016).
the extremely helpful employees of the Secretary of State for Communication also had the
courtesy to pass the books in which all correspondents ever accredited during the Franco
regime were registered, on to this archive. Although these registers were discontinued in
1981, they were at that time still in the possession of the Secretary of State for
Communication.

Besides these archives of state institutions, archival material was also accessed in a number
of other archives and institutions. These included the Archivo Fundación Nacional
Francisco Franco (AFNFF), and, in order to examine the relations of the foreign press
corps with the Spanish opposition, the archives of the Fundación Francisco Largo
Caballero (FFLC) and the Fundación Pablo Iglesias (FPI) as well as the Archivo Histórico
del Partido Comunista de España (AHPC). While some valuable documents could be
obtained through the AFNFF, the access to the latter did not yield many relevant results.
The same also applied to the visits to the still existing correspondents’ organizations in
Madrid and their institutional successors. While helpful material such as yearbooks could
be obtained primarily through the CIP, its archive vanished some years ago. Despite these
disappointments regarding access or accessible sources, the material examined in the other
Spanish archives, the information and additional material obtained through interviews
proved to be sufficient in order to examine the correspondent’s institutions and their
relations with the political opposition.

The research conducted in Spanish archives was accompanied by research in German,
British, and French archives. It was the aim of this multi-national approach to investigate
the possible political agency of correspondents and its impact on the Franco regime’s
diplomatic relations. Therefore, the focus was on the archival material of the respective
foreign ministries. In France, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques in Nantes (CADN), in
Great Britain, the National Archives (NA), which holds the Foreign Office, and in
Germany, the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA) in Berlin as well as the
Bundesarchiv (BA) in Coblenz.

I deliberately excluded from this multi-archival research the archives of particular media.
This exclusion was for two main reasons. First, the focus of this thesis is on the foreign

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83 In 2013, the former president of the Club Internacional de Prensa, the Argentinian journalist Armando
Ruben Puente, held a speech on the history of the Agrupacion de Corresponsales Extranjeros. In his talk,
he frequently quoted from documents. While copies of some of these documents could be found in Spanish
archives, neither the Club Internacional de Prensa nor the predecessors of correspondent’s association, the
Asociación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera and the Círculo de Corresponsales Extranjeros, are in
the possession of any archival material. Puente, today an amateur historian whom I also personally met for
an interview, denied the possession of any original documents.
press corps as a whole and not on the correspondents of one or several particular media. Second, and more importantly, very few media actually have proper archives to begin with. Nevertheless, there were two exceptions. In Britain, the BBC Written Archive (BBCWA) was consulted. The major international broadcaster the BBC, throughout the Franco regime produced programmes in Spanish including foreign news summaries on Spain. Furthermore, the BBC also conducted polls among its Spanish audience. The documents examined in the BBCWA were therefore valuable sources for the discussion of the access and perception of foreign news by the Spanish public.

The other exception was documents on the The New York Times mission in Francoist Spain, which are held in the New York Public Library (NYPL). Archival research in Spain has shown that the relations with the highly critical correspondents of the liberal The New York Times were particularly problematic for the Francoist regime. While personal access to the NYPL was not possible due to lack of financial resources, more than 500 pages of documents on The New York Times’ office in Madrid could be ordered from distance.

Besides the limitation to these two media archives, both Spanish and foreign media will be used as sources throughout this thesis. The respective articles were mostly found during the archival research in Spain. For the discussion of particular circumstances, the digital archives of newspapers and magazines, mainly of the French newspaper Le Monde and the Spanish newspaper ABC, were also consulted.

Finally, a small number of copies were ordered from the Newsberry Library (NL) in Chicago since, during the course of my research, I accidentally discovered that the NL holds the papers of Richard S. Mowrer, who was the longest-serving correspondent in Francoist Spain.
1. Administering the foreign press in Francoist Spain

This chapter will analyse the institutional and legal framework in Spain regarding the foreign press and correspondents between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Franco regime. The chapter will explore which state institutions dealt with foreign correspondents, how their competences were divided and what their position was within the regime as a whole. This chapter will also set out the changing legal conditions under which foreign correspondents worked. The chapter will demonstrate how changes in the institutional and legal framework reflected those in the regime as a whole as well as, to some extent, in Spain’s international relations.

As was the case for the Francoist regime in general, the institutions and laws for foreign correspondents also had their roots in the Spanish Civil War. A brief sketch of the evolution of the Francoist institutional arrangement up until 1945 will therefore form the starting point of this chapter. The aim of this short overview is, however, not to introduce the origins of the institutional structure of the Francoist state, which emerged after the Spanish Civil War, as a whole. Instead, a short examination of this period is of central importance to understand the distribution of competences regarding the foreign press and the institutional conflicts which resulted from this allocation of responsibilities.

From the Civil War to the end of the Second World War

The institutional foundations of the Francoist regime can be traced back to the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). Already, shortly after the uprising against the Second Republic which began on 17 July 1936, provisional institutions were created at the headquarters of the Rebel troops in Salamanca in order to ‘administer the embryonic state’ which took

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85 Researchers use various terms for the two opposing camps in the Spanish Civil War; Rebels, Nationalists and Francoists for the one side and Republicans and Loyalists for the other. The commonly used term, Nationalists, however, was coined by the military forces of the uprising themselves for propaganda purposes. The continued use of this term can therefore be considered as problematic. This thesis, therefore, will exclusively use the term Rebels for one side and Republicans for the other. This thesis therefore follows recent research such as Julián Casanova’s and Carlos Gil Andrés’ 2014 history of Spain in the twentieth century: Casanova and Gil Andrés, Twentieth-century Spain, 159-182.

On the propagandistic use of the term Nationalists during the Spanish Civil War, see, for example, Alejandro Pizarroso Quintero, “La Guerra Civil española, un hito en la historia de la propaganda,” El Argonauta español, no. 2 (2005), 2.

shape in the conquered territories. One year later, on 19 April 1937, the fragmented camp of Franco’s political followers – and especially the Falange and the monarchist groups – were united by decree in a new single party named the Traditionalist Spanish Falange of the Committees of the National Syndicalist Offensive – ‘a very clumsy title reflecting its eclectic composition’87. Once victory over the Republic seemed likely, a more stable and fully functional – but still provisional – state apparatus was set up in January 1938 as an ‘alternative to the Republican state’88. Although still at war, this first government, of which Franco was officially appointed head of the state, constituted a fully functional administration including a National Spanish State Tourist Department.89

Following the end of the Civil War in 1939, this first government formed the basis for the creation of the Nuevo Estado (New State) in Spain. These, and the following institutional and legal reforms during the so-called ‘first Francoism’90 period from 1939 until 1945, must be seen against the background of the shifting balance of power within the heterogeneous camp of Franco’s followers, grouped in different political ‘families’, and the international context of the time.

The institutions and legal framework for the foreign press and correspondents were set up in this context. The treatment of the press in general and the foreign press in particular, however, became of special importance for both sides during the Spanish Civil War, both inside and outside of Spain.91 The great importance of the foreign perception of the Spanish

88 Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, Las Políticas de la victoria: La consolidación del nuevo estado franquista (1938-1953) (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000), 11. [Throughout this thesis, and if not otherwise stated, all quotations originally in Spanish, German or French have been translated by Tobias Reckling.]

In recent years especially, other researchers have followed Southworth’s approach by examining both Republican and Rebel international propaganda. See, for example, Alejandro Pizarroso Quintero, “Intervención extranjera y propaganda. La propaganda exterior de las dos Españas,” Historia y Comunicación Social, no. 6 (2001); Alejandro Quintero Pizarroso, “La Guerra Civil española, un hito en la historia de la propaganda,” El Argonauta español, no. 2 (2005); Robert Stradling, Your children will be next: Bombing and propaganda in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2008); The Spanish historian, Antonio César Moreno Cantano, primarily based on his unpublished PhD thesis, has strongly contributed to the understanding of Rebel propaganda during the Spanish Civil War and the international propaganda of the early Franco regime during the Second World War. See, for example, Antonio C. Moreno Cantano, “Unidad de destino en lo universal: Falange y la propaganda exterior (1936-1945),” Studia historica. Historia contemporánea, no. 24 (2006); Antonio C. Moreno Cantano, “Los
Civil War had its causes in the nature of the conflict itself and the international setting in which it took place. Although it must be considered in its origins as a fundamentally internal conflict, ‘foreign powers dictated both the course and the outcome of the Civil War’\(^92\). This external influence found its most direct expression in the conflicting international politics of (non-)intervention. While the Western powers followed the international Non-Intervention Agreement, which was signed in August 1936, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany soon unofficially supported the course of the Rebels. This ‘gave the Spanish crisis a decisive importance in the diplomatic scene preceding the Second World War and led to passionate debate which convulsed European and international public opinion of the time’\(^93\).

For the opponents in the Civil War, the importance of international support resulted in the need to extend the conflict to the field of international propaganda.\(^94\) The Republican government, which continued to hope for a policy change in the Western democracies until the end,\(^95\) lobbied intensely for lifting the non-intervention policy and giving international support for its cause. The Rebels on the other hand initially regarded foreign and domestic propaganda as less important as they anticipated a rapid victory.\(^96\) But as the war turned out to be more protracted than expected they also developed coordinated propagandistic measures. In order to secure the status quo of the international non-intervention policy, the Rebels’ propaganda aimed at legitimising the coup d’état against the Republic by framing the military rebellion for international audiences as a heroic Catholic and anti-communist crusade against the supposedly communist-controlled and atheistic Republican government. At the same time, atrocities by the Republican forces were highly exaggerated or even falsified. The attempted propagandistic framing of the bombing of the Basque town of Guernica by the German Legion Condor as having been conducted by the Republican

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forces is a striking example of this external propaganda. The propagandistic exploitation of the siege of the Alcázar of Toledo by Republican forces is another.

Thus, the establishment of institutions within the Rebel zone responsible for the press in general and the foreign press in particular became a necessity early on. Justino Sinova and Moreno Cantano have identified three phases for the general development of these press institutions between 1936 and 1945. During the first phase (August 1936 to January 1938) and against the background of the Spanish Civil War, the military had a predominant role in matters concerning the press and propaganda. The first institution for the control of the press was already formed one month after the beginning of the Civil War in August 1936 with the creation of a Press Cabinet in the Junta for National Defence. In January 1937 – and following some intermediate reforms – all responsibilities over the control of press and propaganda in the Rebel camp were transferred to a new institution in Salamanca, the Delegation of the State for Press and Propaganda.

While these institutions were mainly concerned with the domestic press and propagandistic matters, a separate military institution practiced the official control of the foreign press and correspondents in the Rebel zone, the Press Office of the Quarter of General Franco headed by Luis Antonio Bolín. Under its supervision, the actual control of the foreign correspondents in the various Rebel territories was in the hands of officials dressed in uniforms, the so-called Press Officials. They strictly controlled all matters concerning the foreign press. After coming to Spain, the correspondents had to choose between the accreditation in the Republican or in the Rebel territories. In the Rebels’ camp, the accreditation of foreign correspondents was subject to political-ideological considerations concerning their attitude towards the Rebels’ cause. Furthermore, the Rebel authorities

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97 Southworth, Guernica! Guernica!
99 Against the background of the subject of this thesis and the introductory character of this chapter, the following paragraphs will concentrate on developments in the Rebel zone as the breeding ground for the Franco regime. For an overview of the external propaganda of the Second Republic during the Civil War, see, for example, Pizarrosso Quintero, Intervención extranjera y propaganda. La propaganda exterior de las dos Españas; Hugo García, “La propaganda exterior de la República durante la Guerra Civil. Origen, éxitos y miserias de los servicios de París,” Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez. Nouvelle série, 39-1 (2009).
100 Sinova, La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51), 83-84.
101 Moreno Cantano, Los servicios de Prensa extranjera en el primer franquismo (1936-1945), 17-18.
102 Sinova, La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51), 84-85.; Moreno Cantano, Los servicios de Prensa extranjera en el primer franquismo (1936-1945), 17.
103 Sinova, La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51), 88.
104 Moreno Cantano, Los servicios de Prensa extranjera en el primer franquismo (1936-1945), 38.
105 Sinova, La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51), 92.
subjected the correspondents to an intensive control. With the exception of the correspondents from the Axis powers, Nazi Germany and Italy, all correspondents had to submit their despatches for authorization. The censorship of the despatches and telegrams of foreign correspondents remained intact until 1945. The control of the foreign correspondents during the Civil War also included intimidation, punishment and imprisonment in cases of assumed misbehaviour. Preston has researched a number of such cases of repression against correspondents by the Rebels. In 1936, for instance, the Rebel authorities imprisoned the British correspondent Denis Weaver, who had an accreditation from the Republican forces. While travelling the front line together with other journalists, Rebel forces arrested, mishandled and imprisoned the group. After a few days in prison, the Rebel authorities expelled the journalists to France.106

In the course of the war and in the face of the increasing number of foreign correspondents coming to Spain, access to new accreditations became more restricted.107 From 1937 onwards, the Rebel institutions started to collect material in personal files on all correspondents who were accredited in Rebel Spain. These personal files were later passed on to the successor institutions responsible for foreign correspondents after the war.108

This control of the foreign press within Spain was accompanied by active propaganda efforts outside of Spain. For this purpose, the Rebels set up a number of new official representations and made use of sympathisers in the existing embassies of the Republic.109 At the same time, however, the Carlist and Falangist supporters of the Rebel camp as well as the pro-Franco Lliga Catalana had initially set up their own press institutions and also promoted the Rebel’s uprising outside of Spain independent of the military.110 With the creation of the new single party FET y de las JONS in April 1937, the separate propaganda activities of the Carlists and the Falange were unified under the leadership of the latter.111

The merger of these previously separate institutions marked the first consolidation of the competences over foreign press and propaganda during the Civil War.112 In a second phase, the control over the foreign press was institutionalized within the first Francoist government

106 Preston, *We saw Spain die*, 161-162.
107 Moreno Cantano, *Los servicios de Prensa extranjera en el primer franquismo (1936-1945)*, 43.
109 Pizarroso Quintero estimates that approximately only 10% of the diplomatic staff remained loyal to the Republic. See Pizarroso Quintero, “Intervención extranjera y propaganda. La propaganda exterior de las dos Españas,” 63.
112 Ibid., 25.
formed in January 1938. Within the new governmental structure, the competences for press and propaganda were passed to the Ministry of the Interior in August 1938.\textsuperscript{113} At the same time, and against the background of the new regime’s ideological and political proximity to Nazi Germany and Italy, the pro-fascist Falange - within the \textit{FET y de las JONS} - gained further control over propaganda and the press. In terms of personal politics, the dominant role of the Falange manifested itself in the appointment of Ramón Serrano Súñer, a Falangist and Franco’s brother-in-law, as minister. While Spain was still at war, Serrano Súñer also issued a new and very restrictive press law for Franco’s New State. The press law from 1938 remained intact until 1966 though it was changed several times by decree. This press law, formulated in coherence with the pro-fascist ideology of the Falange and highly influenced by Portuguese regulations,\textsuperscript{114} did not yet contain specific regulations for the foreign correspondents. The Ministry of the Interior only issued such regulations in February 1941. Although mainly directed at Spanish journalists abroad, the new regulations also limited the possibilities of employment for foreign media.\textsuperscript{115} While the decree declared that Spanish nationals could not become accredited as correspondents for foreign news agencies within Spain, it did not, however, regulate the employment for other foreign media.

From May 1941 to July 1945, the institutional control of the domestic and foreign press underwent another reorganization. On the one hand, all competences were passed to a newly created institution, the quasi-ministerial Vice Secretary for Popular Education (VSEP).\textsuperscript{116} Inspired by similar institutions in the Axis powers like Nazi Germany’s Reich Propaganda Ministry,\textsuperscript{117} the control over press and propaganda was now passed on to the Spanish fascist party and the VSEP became ‘a “ministry” in the hands of the Falange’.\textsuperscript{118} Within the four National Delegations of the VSEP, the Section for Foreign Press was situated in the National Delegation for the Press. Internally, the Section for Foreign Press was structured into four departments, which closely reflected its responsibilities: Agencies,

\textsuperscript{113} Sinova, \textit{La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51)}, 93-94. The Ministry of the Interior was merged with the so-called \textit{Ministerio de Gobernación} in the same year and under the name of the latter. Following current research, the thesis will further refer to this ministry as Ministry of the Interior. See for example Casanova and Gil Andrés, \textit{Twentieth-century Spain}, 233.

\textsuperscript{114} Moreno Cantano, \textit{Los servicios de Prensa extranjera en el primer franquismo (1936-1945)}, 27-28.

\textsuperscript{115} Boletín Oficial del Estado (henceforth BOE), Orden de 26 de febrero de 1941, por la que se dan normas sobre el ejercicio de corresponsalías de Prensa Extranjera en España, no. 65, 6 March 1941, 1581.


\textsuperscript{118} Bermejo Sánchez, “La Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular (1941-1945),” 73.
Correspondents, Censorship and Translation. The Agencies department was mainly responsible for contact with and administration of the press attachés in the Spanish embassies abroad. Correspondents, the second sub-department, was the central administrative institution for all matters concerning the foreign correspondents – from the accreditation of correspondents to the collection of information on specific journalists. From 1942 until 1945, the Correspondents department also distributed the newsletter Memorandum, edited by the National Delegation for the Press, in order to inform the correspondents about the ‘official version of the situation in Spain’\footnote{Moreno Cantano, *Los servicios de Prensa extranjera en el primer franquismo (1936-1945)*, 202.}. The last two departments, Translation and Censorship, were responsible for the monitoring of the foreign press and the control of its distribution within Spain.

The control over the foreign press in general and foreign correspondents in particular became the subject of an intense struggle over competences among Francoist institutions, especially the VSEP and the Foreign Ministry. On the one hand, the conflict evolved around the VSEP’s attempts to gain control over the press attachés in Spain’s foreign embassies, which formally came under the authority of the Foreign Ministry. On the other hand, Serrano Súñer, who became Foreign Minister in 1941, repeatedly attempted to transfer his previous competences over the press and especially over the foreign press and correspondents from the VSEP to the Foreign Ministry. The proposed reorganization of the control of the international press matters, however, eventually failed, not least due to Serrano Súñer’s dismissal as Foreign Minister already in 1942.\footnote{Moreno Cantano, “El control de la prensa extranjera en España y Alemania durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial,” 315.}

The struggle over competences between the two institutions continued but centred on the coverage of international affairs in the Spanish press. Following the course of the Second World War and the decline of the Axis powers, the Falange and the VSEP continuously lost influence. Especially since 1943, and with Spain’s official return from non-belligerence to neutrality in October, out of strategic considerations and enforced by the Allies’ embargo, the pro-axis propaganda in the Spanish press was increasingly seen as problematic. Besides the continuing rollback of the influence of the Falange, the VSEP nevertheless remained in charge of all matters concerning the control of the domestic and foreign press. In terms of the foreign press, Franco’s strategic change in attitude also affected the foreign correspondents stationed in Madrid. From 1944 onwards, the VSEP

\footnote{Moreno Cantano, *Los servicios de Prensa extranjera en el primer franquismo (1936-1945)*, 262-267; Sinova, *La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51)*, 106.}
also subjected the despatches of the German correspondents to censorship and terminated the correspondents’ - until then unrestricted - possibilities to use telephone and telegraphic facilities.\textsuperscript{122}

**International isolation, 1945-1951**

The end of the Second World War fundamentally changed Spain’s international position. The regime’s former proximity to the Axis powers – Spain’s ‘Axis stigma’\textsuperscript{123}, as David W. Pike has termed it - became a heavy burden for Spain’s international perception. In order to secure the regime’s survival in the new world order, Franco initiated what has been termed a ‘policy of gesture’\textsuperscript{124}. While the regime’s propagandists camouflaged fascist elements, they simultaneously highlighted Spain’s Catholicism and anti-communism ‘for foreign consumption’\textsuperscript{125}. On the level of the regime’s domestic policy, this attempt resulted in a further disempowerment of the *FET y de las JONS*, which became known as the National Movement.\textsuperscript{126} Nevertheless, the single party was not dissolved ‘and no rival political organizations would be tolerated’\textsuperscript{127}.

In terms of the regime’s attitude towards the international community, the foreign propaganda and the change of attitude of the domestic press reflected the new situation. With respect to the foreign press, the special concern with the international perception of the regime resulted in a rather abrupt practical ‘gesture’: the censorship of foreign correspondents was ended in April 1945.\textsuperscript{128} The political decision behind this step, which was taken by the Foreign Ministry instead of the formally responsible VSEP, reflected the changed situation.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{122} Moreno Cantano, “Los servicios de Prensa extranjera en el primer franquismo (1936-1945),” 312.

\textsuperscript{123} David W. Pike, “Franco and the Axis stigma,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 3 (1982). More than 25 years after this article, Pike published a book under the same title in which he examines in greater depth – on the basis of previously inaccessible sources – the Franco regime’s political and economic relations with the Axis powers: David W. Pike, *Franco and the Axis stigma* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).


\textsuperscript{126} Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923-1977* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 401. It was, however, not before 1970 that *Falange Español Tradicionalista y de las JONS* was officially replaced with the name *Moviimiento Nacional*. See ibid., 451.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 401.

\textsuperscript{128} Sinova, *La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51)*, 149-150.

\textsuperscript{129} Archivo General de la Administración (henceforth AGA), (03) 049.001, 21.1232, Folder 174: National Delegate for the Press to Director of the company Transradio Española, 21 April 1945.
Fully accredited correspondents could thereafter send their despatches from any of the public so-called Telegraph Offices. This was a considerable practical improvement for the correspondents since before this new regulation they always had to send their despatches from the facilities of the VSEP.\textsuperscript{130} For some of the correspondents who arrived later on in Spain, the non-existence of censorship was an unexpected situation. The New York Times correspondent Benjamin Welles, who came to Spain during the 1950s, for instance, noted: ‘Paradoxically, the foreign correspondent is free of censorship. In my six years’ experience, not a word I wrote was subject to censorship […]’\textsuperscript{131}

In addition to the relaxed control over the foreign press corps, the regime also included the distribution of foreign press in its ‘politics of gestures’ in order to improve its international perception. In contrast to the previous years, during which the Francoist authorities did not allow the distribution of any foreign media other than those of the Axis Powers and Portugal within Spain, they fundamentally revised this policy in the first half of 1945. In June 1945, the Franco regime allowed the distribution of all British newspapers with the exception of the Daily Worker, the newspaper of the Communist Party of Great Britain.\textsuperscript{132} French and publications from other countries soon followed (further discussed in Chapter 5).\textsuperscript{133}

These legal changes were accompanied by more general institutional reforms following a fundamental governmental crisis in July 1945. This crisis was caused both by the external situation and internal demands for the re-installation of the Spanish monarchy.\textsuperscript{134} As a consequence, Franco dissolved the Spanish government. In the new government, he strongly increased the importance of Catholics at the expense of Falangists.\textsuperscript{135} Shortly thereafter, the Falange-controlled VSEP, as the central institution responsible for the control of the domestic and foreign press and important source of influence of the Falange, was dissolved entirely. The competences of the VSEP were transferred to the newly founded Ministry of National Education under the Catholic José Ibáñez Martín. Although a governmental decree announced this institutional reform already in July 1945, it was only implemented in January 1946.

\textsuperscript{130} AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.1232, Folder 174: National Delegate for the Press to Director of the Eastern Telegraph Company Ltd, 27 April 1945.
\textsuperscript{131} Welles, Spain. The gentle Anarchy, 92.
\textsuperscript{132} Moreno Cantano, Los servicios de Prensa extranjera en el primer franquismo (1936-1945), 333.
\textsuperscript{133} AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.1232, Folder 189: Press attaché at the French Embassy in Madrid to the National Delegate for the Press, 5 December 1945.
\textsuperscript{134} See Javier Tusell, Franco y los católicos: La política interior española entre 1945 y 1957 (Madrid: Alianza, 1984), 52-55.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
The new ministry organized all competences concerned with domestic and foreign propaganda as well as the press through the creation of specialized Directorate Generals under the so-called Sub-secretary of National Education. The Directorate General for Propaganda was responsible for foreign propaganda and the censorship of foreign books. The former included, among others, the publication Noticiero Español, of the Directorate General for Propaganda, also produced since 1946 in an English (Spanish Newsreel) and French (Nouvelles d’Espagne) version.  

The competences for the foreign press in Spain were bundled within the Directorate General for the Press (DG for the Press) in the Section for Foreign Press under leadership of the journalist Juan Servert. The internal structure of the Section for Foreign Press, as well as its responsibilities, closely followed that of the VSEP. This organizational continuity was also reflected in the personnel of the new organization to a certain extent. Within the Section for Foreign Press, for instance, the censorship of the foreign publications remained in the hands of Evald and Juan Altín Stamberg. Both German-speaking brothers had already worked as translators for the Francoist institutions during the Spanish Civil War and continued to do so in the VSEP.  

Sinova points out that the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Alberto Martín Artajo, was behind this institutional reform. Artajo was ‘one of the outstanding figures of political Catholicism at home’ and a powerful advocate of ‘eradicating all external signs which could identify Franco’s Spain with the world war’ in order to improve Spain’s international standing after 1945. For the new minister, the domestic and foreign press in particular became important strategic means to this end. Artajo, therefore, became strongly interested in the competences formally held by the Ministry of National Education. Thus, conflicts between the foreign ministry and the now reformed institution responsible for the domestic control of the press continued.  

Artajo made his intentions clear early on. Almost parallel to the creation of the Ministry of National Education, the Foreign Minister tried to initiate a liberalization of the Spanish  

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137 Moreno Cantano, El control de la prensa extranjera en España y Alemania durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, 318. See also ABC, “Necrologicas: Don Juan Altín Stamberg,” 10 January 1957, 31 [unsigned].  
138 Sinova, La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51), 114.  
140 Tusell, Franco y los católicos, 55.
press law from 1938.\textsuperscript{141} Although he did not succeed with this, the Foreign Minister nevertheless secured his personal influence over press policy by installing as under-secretary of the new Ministry of National Education (Luis Ortiz) and the head of its DG for the Press (Tomás Cerro Corrochano) ‘men of his confidence’\textsuperscript{142}. Besides this informal influence over the new ministry’s press policy, Artajo also strengthened the Foreign Ministry’s direct competences in this field. As Juan Manuel Frenández Fernández-Cuesta has shown, the creation of a specialized sub-unit within the Foreign Ministry became of central importance in this context: the Office for Diplomatic Information (OID).\textsuperscript{143} Created in December 1945, the OID was officially designed to collect information on international affairs of interest for the Foreign Ministry and its diplomats.\textsuperscript{144} In practice, the OID became primarily an instrument ‘of counter-propaganda, in defence of the external image of Spain’\textsuperscript{145} and the improvement of the regime’s international reputation.

One of the main duties of the OID was the supply of Spain’s diplomatic representations with a steady flow of material in order to counter-act negative news reports on the Franco regime. At the same time, the OID was also in charge of the central collection of information on foreign publications, media and journalists abroad, which the Spanish embassies provided. Against the background of Artajo’s attempt to improve the regime’s foreign image, the OID furthermore assumed responsibilities over the foreign correspondents in Spain. This resulted in a rather ambiguous distribution of competences on this matter between the Foreign Ministry’s OID and the Ministry of National Education’s DG for the Press and especially its Section for Foreign Press. Indeed, a retrospective OID report on the administration of the foreign press in Spain from 1953 shows that, with the solemn exception of the accreditation of the foreign correspondents, all direct contacts with foreign journalists in the years after 1945 were one of the core responsibilities of the OID.\textsuperscript{146} In this way, the powerful new Foreign Minister Artajo eventually decided the competence battle over the foreign press corps for the Foreign

\begin{footnotes}
\item[141] See Sinova, \textit{La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51)}, 118-21.
\item[142] Sinova, \textit{La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51)}, 115. See also Tusell, \textit{Franco y los católicos}, 188.
\item[144] BOE, Ley de 31 de Diciembre de 1945 sobre organización de los Servicios del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, no. 2, Art. 19, 2 January 1946, 87.
\item[145] Fernández Fernández-Cuesta, “La información al servicio de la política exterior,” 143.
\item[146] AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.02416, Folder 7: Servicios de la Oficina de Información Diplomática del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores en conexión con la Dirección General de Prensa del Ministerio de Información. [Undated. The document refers to Ministry of Information and Tourism, which was created in 1951. Against this background and further documents in this folder, it can be dated to the years 1952-1953.]
\end{footnotes}
Ministry. This victory, as will be shown later on, remained only temporarily, however. It reflected not least the strong influence of the Foreign Ministry in the Franco regime’s post-war attempts to improve its foreign image.

The Foreign Ministry’s successful striving for competences over the foreign press after 1945 also became visible regarding the press attachés in the Spanish embassies. As outlined above, the control over the press attachés had already been a source of conflict between the VSEP and the Foreign Ministry during the Second World War. The problematic situation of the press attachés becomes clear in a correspondence between the Spanish press attaché in Lisbon with the, by then, still in charge, National Delegate for the Press of the VSEP from the beginning of 1945. Faced with the need to adapt to the structure of the embassy, which was under the Foreign Ministry’s authority, and the parallel responsibility to follow the instructions of his actual employee, the VSEP, the press attaché of the Spanish embassy in Lisbon had asked his superior for an official clarification of his duties. The response by the National Delegate for the Press was not very helpful but rather contributed to the press attaché’s complicated situation. Nevertheless, it does facilitate the understanding of the press attachés’ duties from the point of view of the VSEP. The National Delegate for the Press highlighted that while the press attaché had to work within the Spanish embassy, he was not a diplomat, although he should act like one; his fields of activity are not those of diplomatic circles, but those of journalists, in which […] he should live like a journalist himself […] of the country where he is based, although with great sympathy for the country he represents.¹⁴⁷

Explanations regarding the press attachés’ duties vis-à-vis journalists are especially interesting. The DG for the Press outlined, that the work of the press attaché did not primarily consist of the mere collection of information. Instead, he was to make the Spanish point of view known among the journalists of his host country. Good personal relations with journalists, therefore, were one of his central obligations, because ‘when one has won a friend, one does not sell him’¹⁴⁸.

In the context of the dissolution of the VSEP and Artajo gaining power, the Foreign Ministry once more tried to bring the press attachés fully under its control too. However, as the retrospective OID report from 1953 shows, instead of a clear solution, the situation became even more complicated. The Ministry of National Education was clearly unwilling

¹⁴⁷ AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.1232, Folder 190: Delegado Nacional de Prensa to Agregado de Prensa at the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon, 14 March 1945.
¹⁴⁸ Ibid.
to give up its competences over the press attachés. While the DG for the Press therefore remained responsible for the press attachés, the Foreign Ministry’s OID reacted by installing within some embassies its own so-called press delegates. The situation that the press attaché in Lisbon complained about in 1945, therefore, remained fundamentally unchanged.

The regime’s attempts to improve its international image after the defeat of the Axis powers, reflected in its policy towards the foreign press corps, were hardly successful, however. Despite all efforts, the Allies continued to treat the Franco regime ‘as a relic of Fascist Europe’\(^\text{149}\). The Allied hostility towards the Franco regime resulted, in March 1946, in a joint condemnation of the Franco regime by Great Britain, France and the US. In December of the same year, the UN eventually banned the Spanish government as ‘fascist, unrepresentative and morally repugnant’\(^\text{150}\). Consequently, Western states withdrew their ambassadors from Madrid. As Javier Tusell points out, this action had ‘little impact in practical terms since Franco’s Spain was already virtually isolated’\(^\text{151}\).

However, the regime survived and from the end of the 1940s onwards, its situation started to improve again. Although resulting less from Artajo’s initiatives and much more from the changing geopolitical situation and the beginning of the Cold War, Spain returned – although slowly and never fully – to the international community. The conflict between the US and the Soviet Union by the 1950s turned into ‘a battle of global alliance[s] and of political ideas’\(^\text{152}\). The revision of the US’s stance towards the strongly anti-communist and strategically important Spain seemed to be a suitable compromise in these changing circumstances.\(^\text{153}\) The changing US attitude eventually contributed to the termination of the UN resolution in 1950 and the return of ambassadors to Madrid. At the same time, Spain was also accepted into international organizations like the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization based in Rome.\(^\text{154}\)


\(^{150}\) Preston, Franco’s Foreign Policy 1939-53, 14.


\(^{154}\) Tusell, *Spain: From dictatorship to democracy*, 82.
Against the background of this fast changing international context, the regime’s treatment of the foreign press corps within Spain once more became the subject of debate. In contrast to the previous changes, which were initiated by the Spanish administration, by now the correspondents themselves asked for reforms in the regime’s informational policy towards the foreign press. Thus, Henry F. Buckley, the correspondent of the British news agency Reuters, asked for a more liberal information policy on the part of the regime in March 1950. Buckley had already covered the Spanish Civil War. Thereafter, he had written the book *Life and Death of the Second Republic*, according to Preston a ‘unique account of Spanish politics throughout the entire life of the Second Republic’. At the time, he was probably one of the best known and informed correspondents in Spain. Buckley’s request, however, not only reflected Spain’s changing international situation, but also the changed internal administrative structure for how to deal with the correspondents. The journalist directed his demand exclusively to the OID, and the respective report did not mention the DG for the Press at all. Seemingly, Artajo was successful with his attempt to move all direct contacts with the correspondents to the Foreign Ministry.

Artajo continued to press for further reforms by directly connecting the issue of the information for foreign correspondents with his quest for the liberalization of the domestic press. For Sinova, Artajo’s insistence on the relaxation of the regime’s press policy thereby was also a reflection of his unsuccessful but continuing insistence on general liberalization of the Spanish press law. Liberalizing information policy regarding foreign correspondents seemed more promising and less damaging to his eroding power base. In 1951, he pointed out to Franco personally that the negative attitude of the foreign press at least partly resulted from the strict censorship of the domestic press. This resulted simply from foreign correspondents’ tendency to publish censored information within Spain: ‘As soon as it has been published in Spain, it is of no interest anymore for abroad’.

However, Artajo not only tried to improve Spain’s international image through liberal reforms, but also through indirect and less provocative means of control over the reports on Spain published by correspondents. In the second half of the 1940s, the Foreign Ministry

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157 Preston, *We saw Spain die*, 401.
158 See Preston’s biographical account on Buckley in ibid., 401-412.
159 Sinova, *La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51)*, 121.
160 Quoted in: ibid.
introduced a new ‘additional visa application form for journalists’¹⁶¹, which correspondents had to submit to the respective Spanish embassies. In this form, the correspondents were obliged to provide information on their professional background. But the form also included a paragraph, which stated that although ‘correspondents are not subject to censorship while in Spain’, the Spanish embassy requested ‘a letter from your publisher stating their willingness to print the Embassy’s correction to errors of fact which might appear in your published articles.’¹⁶² The available evidence suggests, however, that this remained a fruitless and half-hearted attempt to force foreign publishers to print corrections. When confronted with a complaint about the regulation by *The New York Times*, the press attaché in the Spanish embassy in Washington was eager to downplay the issue. He argued that the form should not be understood as a means of control, but as some kind of ‘welcome courtesy’ and that ‘to make it a condition sine qua non in granting visas to the journalists, is not the intention of my government.’¹⁶³ In fact, the press attaché even explicitly highlighted that ‘there has been, to the best of my knowledge, not a single case where the American correspondents have been refused visas for Spain for not having submitted the letter of their publishers […]’.¹⁶⁴ The Francoist authorities seemingly dropped the form entirely shortly thereafter and the total absence of any further discussions about this matter. Like this minor attempt to regain control over the foreign press, Artajo’s plans for a reform of the general press policy also remained unsuccessful. The regime faced another government crisis in 1951, which resulted in the dismissal of the existing government and the formation of a new one. In the context of Spain’s improved international situation, Franco re-balanced the internal power structure by including Falangists once more in the government.¹⁶⁵ In this way, he put an end to the increasingly isolated Foreign Minister’s attempts to liberalize the Spanish press policy: ‘The answer of Franco to Artajo was, in any case, negative’¹⁶⁶.

¹⁶² Ibid.
¹⁶⁴ Ibid.
¹⁶⁵ See, for example, Tusell, *Spain: From dictatorship to democracy*, 120.
¹⁶⁶ Sinova, *La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51)*, 122.
The Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1951-1962

The years up to 1951 were marked by the regime’s strive for survival in a hostile international context. This slowly started to change from the beginning of the 1950s. Following the lifting of the UN ban and the return of Western ambassadors, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) accepted Spain as a member in 1952. Subsequently, the year 1953 marked the real turning point for the Franco regime’s international relations. In this year, Spain not only signed a Concordat with the Vatican, which was important for its propaganda, but also, more importantly, the Madrid Agreements with the US. In exchange for granting the of US military bases in Spain, the Franco regime received military and economic aid. Aside from urgently needed economic help, what was crucial for the Franco regime was, according to Boris N. Liedtke, ‘the fact that through these agreements Spain was welcomed back to the international community’\textsuperscript{167}. Other Western powers signed military cooperation agreements with Spain as well, while further credits were given to Spanish industry. This return of Spain into the international community culminated when Spain was admitted to the UN as a full member in 1955 – a ‘glorious moment’\textsuperscript{168} for the Franco regime.

After the initial rapprochement between Spain and the US in 1951 and before the further improvement in the regime’s external relations, Franco initiated the internal stabilization and consolidation of the regime.\textsuperscript{169} In the context of the existing government’s inability to handle social unrest in Barcelona and against the background of the more relaxed international situation, Franco reshuffled the government. As we have seen above, Franco partly revised the ‘cosmetic change’\textsuperscript{170} of the post-war years by bringing Falangists back into high-ranking positions.

The changed political equilibrium was also reflected in the creation of a new ministry in 1951, which was to become the solely responsible institution for all matters concerning the control of foreign and domestic press until the end of the Franco regime: the Ministry of Information and Tourism (MIT). With Arias-Salgado, who from 1941-45 had already been head of the Vice-Secretary for Popular Education, a Falangist became the new minister. The same applies for Juan Aparicio López as the new head of the DG for the Press, who


\textsuperscript{168} Angel Viñas, “Una política exterior para conseguir la absolución,” \emph{Ayer} 68, no. 4 (2007): 114.

\textsuperscript{169} Tusell, \emph{Spain: From dictatorship to democracy}, 63; Stanley G. Payne, \emph{The Franco regime, 1936-1975} (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 416.

\textsuperscript{170} Tusell, \emph{Spain: From dictatorship to democracy}, 58.
had already held an identical position in the VSEP. This return of Falangists from the pro-fascist period during the Second World War was ‘a change in the internal politics of the regime, which would have been hardly acceptable at the end of the World War’\textsuperscript{171}. Within the new government, this shift of power was only partly balanced by the appointment of the more liberal Catholic Joaquín Ruiz Giménez as new Minister of Education.

The creation of the new ministry was officially justified by the rapidly growing amount of administrative work in connection with the press, theatre, cinema and radio.\textsuperscript{172} Francisco Sevillano Calero points out that the creation of the MIT must be seen against the background of the growing resistance against the more liberal press policy of the Catholics Ibáñez Martín and Artajo.\textsuperscript{173} The Falangist control over the MIT, therefore, was a strong corrective to these developments. In this sense, the government reshuffle and the creation of the MIT marked the failure of Artajo’s attempts to liberalize the Spanish press policy.

In terms of its scope and responsibilities, the MIT took over all competences for the press, theatre, cinema, radio. It also became responsible for censorship previously located at the Ministry of National Education, and tourism which was moved over from the Ministry of the Interior. Its creation reflected not only the institutional concentration and specialization of the regime’s press policy; instead, it also marked a change in the focus of the regime’s press policy. While its institutional predecessor after 1945 explicitly concentrated on Spain’s domestic situation, the MIT had more broadly defined aims. In fact, the MIT’s founding decree explicitly highlighted the ministry’s international orientation:

> From the point of view of the state, information is one of the public services with the most profound and delicate content, and which should be subjected to the obligation to promote the public welfare in order to form healthy criteria for public opinion and to diffuse the most authentic image of our homeland and its situation, both at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{174}

In terms of its administrative structure, the MIT had a similar organization like its predecessors in DGs.\textsuperscript{175} Consequently, the Section for Foreign Press was situated within the DG for the Press. The Section for Foreign Press remained structured into four sub-

\textsuperscript{171} Francisco Sevillano Calero, \textit{Propaganda y medios de comunicación en el franquismo (1936-1951)} (Alicante: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Alicante, 1998), 147.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.,148.

\textsuperscript{174} BOE, Decreto de 15 de febrero de 1952, orgánico del Miniserio de Información y Turismo, no. 55, 24 February 1952, 851.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 851-852.
departments with altogether 22 employees in 1952: Censorship, Correspondents, Newsletters and Press Attachés.\(^{176}\)

The accreditation of new correspondents and the renewal or decline of existing accreditations remained one of the main duties of the Section for Foreign Press. Similar to its predecessor, these functions were administered in a specialized sub-department, which was considered in an internal MIT report as being of ‘extraordinary importance’\(^{177}\). The Section for Foreign Press also inherited the personal files on correspondents, which the VSEP had already started to compile during the Second World War. The new department continued the centralized collection of information on the correspondents accredited in Spain until the end of the Franco regime.

Apart from these continuities in the structure of the Section for Foreign Press, the new ministry also implemented noticeable reforms. This applied in particular to the information policy towards the foreign press corps. Following the signing of the Madrid agreements with the US in 1953, an information bureau was founded a year later within the Section for Foreign Press with the aim to ‘provide the foreign correspondents with informational material’ both in terms of current events and ‘national life’ in general\(^{178}\). In administrative terms, this new bureau acquired the status of new sub-department of the Section for Foreign Press.

The decision to extend the competences of the Section for Foreign Press beyond mere administrative tasks must be seen both against the background of Spain’s changing international situation and the Franco regime’s internal restructuring. One the one hand, the improvements in official information policy towards the foreign correspondents represented the late implementation of Artajo’s earlier suggestions. On the other hand, the creation of the information bureau was most likely an attempt by the Falange-controlled new ministry to re-claim some of the competences over the foreign press, which the Foreign Ministry’s OID had previously taken over. This seems a plausible interpretation against the background of the timing of the installation of the new information service. Indeed, the previously quoted OID report on the division of the competences concerning the foreign press corps highlighted that, until then, all matters concerning direct contact with

\(^{176}\) AGA (03) 049.001, 21.02416, Folder 161: Untitled report on the structure of the Section for Foreign Press, 6 March 1952.

\(^{177}\) Ibid.

\(^{178}\) AGA (03) 049.21, 64.969, Folder Helga Lindscheidt: Delegado Nacional de Prensa to Helga Lindscheidt, 3 March 1954.
correspondents ‘have been in the hands of the Office for Diplomatic Information’\textsuperscript{179} and should remain so in the future mainly for practical reasons. The report can be dated to the years 1952-1953 and therefore shortly after the creation of the MIT but before the installation of the information bureau in 1954. Faced with the creation of the MIT, therefore, the OID tried to remain in charge over the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. Against the background of the creation of the information bureau in the MIT, this informal attempt to come to an agreement on this matter proved largely unsuccessful, however. Instead, the MIT and the Foreign Ministry established a double-competency in terms of direct contact with and official information for the foreign correspondents. A report from 1955, which estimates roughly ten informational queries by correspondents every day, shows that the Section for Foreign Press indeed put considerable effort into keeping up with its administrative rival\textsuperscript{180}.

Besides these organizational changes, the MIT’s reclaiming of authority over the foreign press also became visible in investments in its technical equipment. Until 1954, the MIT was using equipment such as telegraphic machines for the reception of reports by news agencies. These machines were totally outdated because the Section for Foreign Press still used Morse receivers. Seemingly frustrated with the situation, the Director General for the Press outlined in a report that no Western, but only East European news agencies like the Soviet \textit{TASS} and the Yugoslavian \textit{Tanjug} still used such technology.\textsuperscript{181} The updated service for the monitoring of foreign new agencies was installed within the Section for Foreign Press’ sub-department for the editing of newsletters and reports.\textsuperscript{182} The central responsibility of this sub-department was collection, translation and evaluation of news published about Spain abroad. The sub-department published the results of these analyses in daily news bulletins for the Minister of Information and Tourism and weekly summaries for cabinet meetings. In contrast to previous regulations, these reports also included information on the publications of the large communities of Spanish exiles that had left Spain after the end of the Spanish Civil War.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{179} AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.02416, Folder 7: Servicios de la Oficina de Información Diplomática del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores en conexión con la Dirección General de Prensa del Ministerio de Información, [undated].


\textsuperscript{181} AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.04533, Folder 39: Director General de Prensa to Ministro de Información y Turismo, 4. March 1954.


\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
The third sub-department of the Section for Foreign Press, Censorship, remained unchanged in terms of its duties and competences and in charge of the censorship and the authorization of imported foreign publications.\(^{184}\) Remarkably, this also applied to its personnel to a certain extent. The Stamberg brothers, who had already worked as censors in the VSEP and the Ministry for National Education, continued to work in the sub-department\(^ {185}\) once again under their old and new boss Juan Aparicio as Director General for the Press.

Besides the administrative and personnel similarities, the practical work of the Censorship department had by the 1950s become considerably more complicated. The increased authorization of foreign publications for distribution in Spain had a fundamental impact on the daily workload of the Spanish censors. At the same time, the coordination of the distribution of the foreign press in the Spanish regions became a pressing matter. Indeed, in the beginning of the decade the OID had complained (although with respect to press censorship in general) that while ‘the service in Madrid is quite well set up, it was by contrast extremely defective in the provinces’\(^{186}\). The MIT soon attempted to cope with this problem by improving the coordination between the centre in Madrid and the ministry’s so-called Provincial Delegates in the Spanish regions. This attempt was reflected in new guidelines for the distribution of foreign press, which the MIT issued in 1954. The guidelines clarified that only the central Section for Foreign Press had the competence to authorize the import of new publications. Furthermore, the Provincial Delegates also had to follow the daily lists of authorized and non-authorized foreign publications distributed by the centre in Madrid.\(^ {187}\) Nevertheless, for publications in principle authorized but not included in the daily censorship lists, the decision about distribution or non-distribution remained with the Provincial Delegates.

The fourth sub-department of the Section of Foreign Press was in charge of the press attachés at the Spanish embassies abroad. When the MIT took over the competences over the press attachés, the previous compromises with the Foreign Ministry had led to an even more complicated situation of the press attachés, which needed a swift resolution. This

\(^{184}\) Ibid.
\(^{185}\) AGA (03) 049.001, 21.02416, Folder 161:Untitled report on the structure of the Sección de Prensa Extranjera, 6 March 1952.
\(^{186}\) Ibid.
\(^{187}\) AGA, (03) 49.002, 12.693, Folder 44: Procedimiento que sigue en la autorización de entrada en España y circulación y venta de publicaciones periódicas extranjeras, 4 June 1958. Although this circular letter by the Section for Foreign Press to all Provincial Delegates of the MIT was sent out in 1958, it refers to an order from 20 April 1954, shortly after the respective report by the OID.
became clear from the already quoted OID report from the beginning of the 1950s.\textsuperscript{188} The OID outlined that while attachés of the MIT were stationed in some embassies, others had press delegates which were installed and employed by the OID and who had no direct obligations to the MIT. Finally, in some cases, these two were even the same person and therefore came under the competence of both the MIT and the Foreign Ministry. Against this background, the OID presented a proposal, which was eventually adopted and implemented and seemingly resulted in a strengthening of the MITs competences. While the OID was to give up their own press personnel in the embassies, the Ministry of Information and Tourism was to become the only institution that could appoint press attachés. These ‘attachés or counsellors for press and diplomatic information’\textsuperscript{189} were to have the double function of reporting to the OID and the MIT, however. At the same time, they were also supposed to fulfil tasks within the embassies and provide the ambassadors with relevant information. While the new solution put an end to the double appointment of press personnel at the embassies, the press attachés nevertheless became responsible to both the Foreign Ministry and the OID. Finally, within the MIT the competences over press attachés were also divided: while the administrative control of the press attachés lay with one of the so-called Central Services of the MIT,\textsuperscript{190} the Section for Foreign Press’ sub-department remained responsible for all direct contacts with the press attachés.\textsuperscript{191}

In contrast to the previous institutions, the Ministry of Information and Tourism created a final institutional setting for all matters concerned with the domestic and foreign press in 1951. This institutional re-structuring was accompanied by a reform of the legal framework for the foreign press corps. In 1954, the MIT issued new accreditation guidelines. This was the first reform of the existing regulations for foreign correspondents, which the Francoist authorities had issued during the Spanish Civil War. The new regulations distinguished between three types of foreign correspondents: full-time staff correspondents fell into the category Foreign Correspondents and stringers were termed Foreign Contributors. The last category was for foreign journalists only visiting or passing through Spain.\textsuperscript{192} The press cards for the first two types of correspondents were issued by the Section for Foreign Press

\textsuperscript{188} AGA, (03) 049.001,03, 21.02416, Folder 7: Servicios de la Oficina de Información Diplomática del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores en conexión con la Dirección General de Prensa del Ministerio de Información, [undated].
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{190} BOE, Decreto de 15 de febrero de 1952, orgánico del Ministerio de Información y Turismo, no. 55, 24 February 1952, 851-852.
\textsuperscript{191} AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.02416, Folder 161: AGA (03) 049.001, 21.02416, Folder 161: Untitled report on the structure of the Sección de Prensa Extranjera, 6 March 1952.
\textsuperscript{192} BOE, Orden de 31 de mayo de 1955 por la que se establecen las condiciones para ejercer la actividad de Corresponsal Extranjero en España, no. 168, 17 June 1955, 3635.
for one to six months and could be renewed without limitation. Visiting correspondents received press cards for one month only.

With respect to the foreign press, the creation of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, therefore, resulted in the stabilization and professionalization of the institutional and legal structure. The MIT officials accompanied these institutional reforms with the attempt to extend their competences beyond the mere administration of the press corps. The creation of the Information Bureau within the Section for Foreign Press reflected this development. At the same time, as the thesis will examine in detail in the following chapters, the MIT also tried to improve relations with the foreign correspondents. The rapprochement between the Spanish authorities and the foreign press corps included in particular the foundation of an international press club and the official approval for the creation of correspondents’ associations in Spain. These developments took place in the context of Spain’s return to the international community and the internal strengthening of the new ministry’s competences over the foreign press after the dominant role of the Foreign Ministry during the 1940s.

The internal situation of the Franco regime fundamentally changed towards the end of the 1950s. A government reshuffle in 1957 brought the so-called technocrats into government. This well-educated elite, many of them members of the influential Catholic organization Opus Dei, initiated, through the First Stabilization Plan in 1959, Spain’s rapid economic recovery in the 1960s.

While Arias-Salgado remained Minister of Information and Tourism in the new government, the Falangist Aparicio was dismissed as Director General for the Press. After a brief period which saw Juan Beneyto Pérez at the top of the DG for the Press, Arias-Salgado eventually gave this post to a ‘devoted admirer of Franco’, Adolfo Muñoz Alonso.

The governmental reshuffle also had an impact on the regime’s relations with the foreign press. The replacement of Artajo as Foreign Minister with Fernando María de Castiella Maiz instigated these changes. Castiella was very much concerned about Spain’s international image as an obstacle to the further improvement of Spain’s international relations. In order to cope with this problem, Castiella initiated a reform and modernization

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of the OID as a ‘central instrument in order to arm and disarm campaigns of international opinion’ 196. Beside the improvement of the OID’s technical equipment, Castiella also transferred more competences and specialized personnel to the OID. 197 Castiella’s interest in Spain’s international image led to an ‘immediate clash with the one responsible for the Information, Arias Salagado’. 198 As Rosa María Pardo Sanz highlights, although without providing evidence, the Ministry of Information and Tourism’s attitude towards the foreign press acquired particular importance in this context. 199 The resulting conflicts, as the following chapter will show, mostly centred on Arias-Salgado’s policy towards the foreign press. They were only resolved with the minister’s replacement with Manuel Fraga Iribarne in 1962.

**Manuel Fraga 1962-69: Between control and liberalization**

Since its return to the international stage and in particular during the course of its economic recovery since the end of the 1950s, the Francoist regime steadily improved its international image. One of Castiella’s initiatives reflected this growing confidence in Spain’s international standing. The Foreign Minister moved the Franco regime’s foreign policy focus increasingly from the US towards Europe, especially in February 1962 when Spain lodged its application for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). While this move reflected ‘the regime’s growing interest in international acceptance’ 200, its failure also provided strong proof of the limits of this strategy. The application was not only opposed by European socialist parties and left-wing organizations. 201 The Franco regime was also ‘badly hit’ 202 by a meeting of opposition groups from within and outside of Spain in Munich in June 1962 under the patronage of the European Movement. The political groups participating in this meeting ranged from the moderate opposition like monarchists and Catholics, to Basque and Catalan nationalists, Spanish socialists and Republicans. Within Spain, the meeting resulted in a massive press campaign against the so-called

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197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
201 Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the process of European integration, 1957-85*, 62-64.
202 Tusell, *Spain: From dictatorship to democracy*, 144.
Munich Conspiracy. On the international level, the meeting ‘dramatically increased the unpopularity of the Franco regime in Europe’\textsuperscript{203}.

Against this background, the regime tried to ‘give the impression of political evolution’\textsuperscript{204} with another government reshuffle in 1962. Arias-Salgado was dismissed together with six other ministers. At the top of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga Iribarne was supposed to be the new liberal face of the regime. Born in 1922, Fraga belonged to the first generation of the regime’s political elite, which had not gained its merits in the Spanish Civil War. Instead, he was an ambitious academic with a doctorate in Law, who had joined the state administration in 1951. Shortly after his appointment as new head of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, he began to establish himself as a reformer both at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{205} This included the almost entire dismissal of Arias-Salgado’s staff.\textsuperscript{206} The director of the Catholic Spanish news agency \textit{Logos}, Manuel Jiménez Quílez, became the new head of the DG for the Press.\textsuperscript{207}

Fraga became one of the most prominent advocates of the regime’s ‘\textit{apertura}’ (opening) during the 1960s, a careful attempt to cope with the social and economic changes in Spain by implementing reforms. Nevertheless, Fraga, who ‘had carefully dissociated himself from anti-regime positions’\textsuperscript{208} earlier on, by no means promoted a general political liberalization. Instead, his insistence on reforms was rather a pragmatic necessity in order to ensure the survival of the Franco regime.

Prompted by the need to facilitate Spain’s economic growth and tourism as a major income source, the MIT under Fraga made considerable efforts to improve Spain’s image abroad. Indeed, the transformation of Spain into a destination for mass tourism became one of Fraga’s main achievements.\textsuperscript{209} As a result, for Fraga relations with the foreign press were of particular importance or, as the director of the private Spanish news agency \textit{Europa Press} put it, ‘Fraga was obsessed with the foreign press’\textsuperscript{210}. This obsession mostly manifested itself in Fraga’s policy towards the foreign press, in close cooperation with Castiella. In contrast to Salgado, this policy was based on close cooperation with the

\textsuperscript{203} Crespo MacLennan, \textit{Spain and the process of European integration, 1957-85}, 69.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{206} Welles, \textit{Spain. The gentle Anarchy}, 98.
\textsuperscript{207} Chuliá, \textit{El poder y la palabra}, 111.
\textsuperscript{208} Payne, \textit{The Franco regime, 1936-1975}, 505.
\textsuperscript{209} See for example Pack, \textit{Tourism and dictatorship}, 105-135.
\textsuperscript{210} Club Internacional de Prensa, ed., \textit{Libro de Plata} (Madrid, 1988), 13.
Foreign Minister, with whom Fraga maintained good relations.211 While Chapter 6 will examine this policy change towards the foreign press in detail, Fraga’s striving for the improvement of Spain’s international image was soon reflected in legal and institutional reforms. This was especially true of the creation of the International Press Club in Madrid a few months after Fraga’s appointment to be discussed in the next chapter.

Despite Fraga’s liberal image, his institutional and legal reforms rather reflected the attempt to improve the MIT’s performance in terms of the control and monitoring of the foreign press. This also applied to the press attachés, to which Fraga directed his first reforms. The new minister started with the reorganization and centralization of the competences over the press attachés, which he bundled in to the department Foreign Service.212 Although this department had existed since the foundation of the MIT, it was originally only responsible for the administration of the press attachés. The Section for Foreign Press had all other competences like the collection and evaluation of the information provided by the press attachés. Through this centralization of competences in Foreign Services, Fraga facilitated cooperation with the OID.

Shortly after this centralization, the new minister also tightened the control over the press attachés themselves. Fraga ordered by ministerial decree the absolute incompatibility of any kind of journalistic publication by press attachés with their professional duties.213 This decision was caused by the publication of a number of articles by the Spanish press attaché in London in the first half of 1963.214 Other than this, Fraga’s attempt to improve the MIT’s control over the foreign press was most clearly reflected in the creation of a new department with the ministry, the so-called Liaison Office.215 The MIT justified the need for the creation of this new department with:

> the continuing increase of the relations of this Ministry with other departments of the Spanish administration as well as various foreign centres of information

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211 Rosendorf, *Franco Sells Spain to America*, 83.
212 BOE, Decreto 2297/1962, de 8 de septiembre, por el que se reorganizan los Servicios Centrales del Ministerio de Información y Turismo, no. 14 September 1962, 13050.
213 AGA, (03) 049.003, 17.211, Folder 162: Head of the Section for Foreign Press to Director General of the Press, 8 May 1963.
214 Ibid.
and the necessity to canalise specific aspects of this information via one single coordinative centre [...].\textsuperscript{216}

The Liaison Office had two major functions. First, a specific subdivision within the Liaison Office, a ‘department for the investigation of communism and other subversive activities’\textsuperscript{217}, was responsible for the collection, analysis, translation and distribution of information. Following an undated report\textsuperscript{218} from around 1975-77 and a brief academic analysis of the function of the Liaison Office,\textsuperscript{219} this ‘information’ consisted of the following: first, information about the internal social and political situation in Spain with respect to religion, students, the workers’ movement, general subversive actions and propaganda as well as general clandestine activities; second, collection of information related to Spain from foreign radio stations and news agencies of communist origin as well as with an importance for Western Europe; third, selection of the general information received by the Ministry of Information and Tourism; and fourth, general information on public order.

Thus, one of the central tasks of the Liaison Office was monitoring the numerous communist broadcasts towards Spain such as the programmes of \textit{Radio Moscow}, \textit{Radio Prague} and \textit{Radio Budapest}. The programmes of these radio stations were produced by Spanish exiles. These broadcasts in fact became an important source of employment for Spanish communist refugees in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{220} Many of these radio stations not only broadcast in Spanish, but also, at least for a time, in regional languages like Catalan.\textsuperscript{221} Best known among these communist radio broadcasts was \textit{Radio España Independiente} of the Spanish Communist Party. According to its own slogan it was ‘the only Spanish broadcaster not censored by Franco’.\textsuperscript{222} Popularly known as \textit{La Pirenaica} because it was believed to be broadcasting from the French Pyrenees, the broadcaster had been founded in Moscow in

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\item \textsuperscript{216} BOE, Orden de 26 de noviembre de 1962 por la que se crea en el Ministerio de Información y Turismo una Oficina de Enlace, no. 292, 6 December 1962.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{218} AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09020, Folder 11: Untitled report on Gabinete de Enlace [undated]. The report was dated, first, on the basis of the following documentation in this folder and, second, on the fact that it is called Gabinete de Enlace, which the Oficina de Enlace was renamed as in 1974.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{220} For Poland, Szylvia Pethő has calculated in her PhD thesis that almost 15\% of the Communist Spanish refugees worked for the Spanish broadcaster \textit{Radio Varsovia} during the mid-1950s. Pethő, \textit{El exilio de comunistas españoles en los países socialistas de Europa Centro-Oriental entre 1946 y 1955}, 76.
\item \textsuperscript{221} See Niqui, “Chronology of international radio in the Catalan language in the 20th century”.
\item \textsuperscript{222} Armand Balsebre and Rosario Fontova, “Radio España Independiente, La Pirenaica: The Voice of the Victims of the Franco Regime,” \textit{Sociology Study} 4, no. 10 (2014), 859.
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1941. In 1955, it moved to Bucharest, from where it broadcasted throughout the entire existence of the Franco regime until 1977.\textsuperscript{223}

Besides the surveillance of these Communist broadcasters, the Liaison Office monitored the Spanish programmes of Western international broadcasters and in particular the BBC and Radio Paris (discussed in Chapter 5) as well as practically all foreign news agencies.\textsuperscript{224} In addition to this information, the Liaison Office received the reports on the foreign media coverage of Spain from the Section for Foreign Press and the Spanish press attachés. Furthermore, the new department also had its own external collaborators, some of them based at Spanish embassies abroad who were mainly responsible for delivering information on specific matters. Since its foundation in 1962, the Liaison Office therefore became the central government institution within the Spanish administration for the collection of information on the foreign press.

The Liaison Office stored the collected information in its own archive, including a wide-ranging selection of personal dossiers. More importantly, however, the Liaison Office’s second central task was from the beginning the analysis of relevant material and the issuing of daily newsletters for other administrative bodies. These newsletters were distributed among the Francoist administration in a number of issues with varying degrees of confidentiality and content. In the mid-1970s, the Liaison Office distributed 42 highly restricted newsletters on the general political and social situation within Spain, 30 ‘very restricted’ daily reports with translations of the original texts of foreign radio and news agencies and 84 newsletters with a general analysis of the foreign radios and news agencies.\textsuperscript{225} Finally, the MIT’s Liaison Office also distributed a selection of other information received by the inter-ministerial Liaison Offices and other official bodies. The Liaison Office distributed further information.

The internal structure of the Liaison Office reflected its intermediate function as an information service for the Spanish administration. Alongside the aforementioned department for investigation, the MIT Liaison Office was also home to a Council of Liaison, consisting of 14 representatives from other ministries and administrative bodies. The Council met weekly in order to ‘study and coordinate specific informational material’\textsuperscript{226}.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., 859.
\textsuperscript{224} Villanueva Toledo et. al., “El Gabinete de Enlace,” 8.
\textsuperscript{225} AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09020, Folder 11: Untitled report on Gabinete de Enlace [undated].
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid.
Within his first year in office, Fraga not only re-structured the administration of the Spanish press attachés, but also founded an International Press Club. Most importantly, he created a central department for the evaluation and distribution of foreign news reports on the Franco regime. Fraga’s subsequent reform of the accreditation guidelines for foreign correspondents continued this development. In the context of a general reform of the regulations for Spanish journalists, the MIT published new regulations for the accreditation of foreign correspondents in 1963. These guidelines established new terms for the accreditation of correspondents such as Special Envoys for visiting journalists. Instead, and more importantly, the new regulations were clearly separated between two types of staff correspondents, the so-called chief correspondents and editor correspondents. Chief correspondents were foreign journalists who either reported on ‘all aspects of Spanish life’ or worked for specialized publications such as fashion or sports magazines. Editor correspondents only wrote on particular aspects such as economics for more general media or worked under the supervision of chief correspondents. The latter mostly applied to news agency staff. Finally, stringers could also qualify as editor correspondents. With the changed classification of correspondents, the regulations also adapted the duration of the accreditations. Press cards for chief correspondents now were valid for one year instead of six months, for editor correspondents six months and for the special correspondents two months. This new definition of accreditation types reflected the MIT’s attempt to gain a better understanding of the constitution of the foreign press corps in Spain. As chapter four will show, the reform of the accreditation guidelines was also a reaction to the growing numbers of correspondents coming to Spain since the beginning of the 1960s.

Shortly before the drafting of these new guidelines for the accreditation of foreign correspondents in Spain, the MIT also renewed the regulations for Spaniards working as foreign correspondents. Previously, when they were only few in number, the Section for Foreign Press had granted accreditations to Spanish nationals without many problems. This practice was of particular importance for news agencies, which frequently employed Spaniards in the Spanish offices. However, under Salgado and shortly before Fraga’s appointment, the MIT tried to tighten the regulations for the accreditation of Spanish

227 See Chuliá, El poder y la palabra, 185.
228 BOE, Orden de 7 febrero de 1963 por la que se dictan normas sobre acreditación de corresponsales extranjeros en España, no. 45, 21 February 1963, 2968-2969.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
nationals. From then on, the MIT only allowed Spaniards who registered in advance with the DG for the Press’ Official Register for (Spanish) Journalists to work for foreign media as correspondents.\footnote{Ibid.} Under Fraga, this regulation became part of the new accreditation guidelines.\footnote{BOE, Orden de 7 febrero de 1963 por la que se dictan normas sobre acreditación de corresponsales extranjeros en España, no. 45, 21 February 1963, 2968-2969.} Therefore, the MIT established an official instrument to which it could refer in order to decline applications by Spaniards as foreign correspondents. Simply rejecting applications without a proper justification did not seem opportune in order to avoid provoking foreign media. Chapter 6 will demonstrate that the MIT actually revised the accreditation guidelines against the background of the highly critical reports, which the Spaniard José Antonio Novais was writing at the time for the French newspaper 

Le Monde.

The MIT’s attempt to formalize the accreditation of correspondents without giving up the final decision-making powers was strongly reflected in Article 8 of the new accreditation guidelines:

As an exception and based on the personality of the person in question and the merits of his informational work, foreigners living in Spain can be accredited as chief correspondents or editor correspondents, whether journalist professionals or not, which do meet in the opinion of the Director General for the Press […] these criteria.\footnote{Ibid.}

Who was or was not accredited as a foreign correspondent thus remained to some extent an individual and potentially arbitrary decision by the DG for the Press. Indeed, the MIT accredited almost 20 foreign journalists who mostly supported the regime as honorary correspondents until the end of the 1960s.\footnote{Archivo Central del Ministerio de la Presidencia (henceforth ACMP), Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 1.}

These new regulations only remained valid for 3 years, however. In 1966, Fraga eventually realised a project which had occupied him since his appointment and in which Artajo had unsuccessfully tried to implement 20 years earlier: the replacement of the general press law from 1938 with a new one. The central outcome of the new law was abandoning censorship of all Spanish publications, which had been in practice since the Spanish Civil War. Although other means of censorship still remained intact and were applied, the end of the control of media reports before their publications nevertheless fundamentally changed the Spanish media landscape.\footnote{Academics have examined the new press law in numerous studies. See for example FJ Davara Torrego, “Los periódicos españoles en el tardo franquismo: consecuencias de la nueva ley de prensa,” Comunicación} 236
Partly in contrast to this limited liberalization for the Spanish press, the new law also included a short part on the accreditation of foreign correspondents. The most noticeable change induced by this new reform was, however, not concerned with the accreditation of new, but the cancellation of existing accreditations: ‘The Ministry of Information and Tourism can cancel the accreditation of correspondents whose information is wrong or proven to be tendentious’. Chapter 6 will show that this new regulation did not fundamentally change the actual practice of the regime. The Francoist authorities cancelled accreditations of correspondents it disliked throughout the existence of the regime. Nevertheless, the MIT and its predecessors expelled correspondents on an ad-hoc basis before 1966. The new guidelines put this practice on a regular legal basis.

In addition to this new regulation, the MIT also reformed the accreditation guidelines for correspondents in a decree from 1966 and an additional order from 1967. Now the MIT reversed the former distinction between chief correspondents and editor-correspondents. In the context of rising numbers of correspondents coming to Spain during the 1960s, the distinction had proven to be impractical. Instead, the new guidelines once more separated between full-time, freelancers and special correspondents. A new practical measure was the creation of an official register for all foreign correspondents accredited in Spain. The regulations for the accreditation of Spaniards as correspondents and for the nomination of honorary correspondents remained unchanged.

Besides these specifications, the new accreditation guidelines included a new passage which granted fully accredited staff correspondents ‘benefits, authorizations and permissions […] [which are] necessary for the execution of their informative activities’. This was the first time that any kind of ‘benefits’ were mentioned in the accreditation guidelines. Neither the available archival evidence nor the interviews allow for conclusions as to whether or not the MIT had granted ‘benefits’ to correspondents before. At least since this reform, however, Fraga tried to improve the relations with the foreign press corps with a number of privileges for fully accredited correspondents. The MIT continued this practice until the end of the regime. A list from 1974 included special prices for sending telegraphs.

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237 BOE, Ley 14/1966, de 18 de marzo, de Prensa e Imprenta, no. 67, 19 March 1966, 3314.
238 BOE, Decreto 744/1966, de 31 de marzo, por el que se regula la acreditación e inscripción de Corresponsales de medios informativos extranjeros en España, no. 80, 4 April 1966, 3958-3959.
239 BOE, Orden de 29 de marzo de 1967 por la que se regula la acreditación de colaboradores de prensa extranjera, no. 91, 17 April 1967, 5063.
240 BOE, Decreto 744/1966, de 31 de marzo, por el que se regula la acreditación e inscripción de Corresponsales de medios informativos extranjeros en España, no. 80, 4 April 1966, 3958.
discounts for 1st class train tickets, state-owned restaurants and hotels as well as the right to purchase 200 litres of gasoline per month at a reduced price. The correspondents thereby received similar privileges like foreign diplomats in Spain. Manfred von Conta, the Spain correspondent for the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung from 1969 until 1972, highlighted that the most crucial benefit available to correspondents was the exemption from import taxes:

The most important [privilege] was the right to import or buy free of taxes any car of your choice – that’s why [the correspondent] Walter Haubrich and I myself drove around in so called “Volksporsches”, a car I would never have had a chance to own when paying import-taxes.

During the second half of the 1960s, however, not only the legal administration of the Spanish press underwent fundamental changes. In fact, shortly after Fraga’s successful modification of the old press law, a new basic law, the so-called Organic Law, was passed in 1967. Although liberal elements within the regime as well as the growing societal opposition hoped for a general liberalization of the institutional and legal structure of the regime, the Organic Law in fact cemented the status quo. Officially, the regime presented the Organic Law as a step towards a somewhat unclearly defined organic democracy. In conjunction with the already existing basic laws, the Organic Law, however, primarily finalized the legal codification of the regime’s institutional apparatus. As Stanley Payne argues by taking into account the hopes for greater liberalization, which Fraga’s press law had stirred up: ‘He [Franco] fully realized that it was one thing to liberalize policy and quite another to liberalize the basic structure of the authoritarian system, which would then rapidly erode altogether’.

Although no more than a footnote in comparison to the general political developments of the second half of the 1960s, Fraga’s new regulations for the accreditation of the foreign correspondents in Spain nevertheless has to be seen in this context. While modernizing and updating the existing legal structure, the regime also legally codified its competences to be able to expel any correspondent from Spain at any time.

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241 Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (henceforth AMAE), 12184, Folder 14, Corresponsales Extranjeros en España, 18 December 1974, 2-3.
242 Ibid.
243 ‘Volksporsche’ (people’s Porsche) was a common nickname for the Porsche 914, which was produced between 1969 and 1976. The name had its origin in the cooperation of the companies Porsche and Volkswagen, which produced the model and merchandised it as VW-Porsche.
244 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling, 2 February 2013.
The last step towards preparing for the regime’s survival after Franco’s expected death was taken two years later when the Law of Succession was passed. Bypassing the actual heir to the Spanish crown, Franco named Juan Carlos, the son of Don Juan de Borbón, as his successor and future head of state.

**The decay of the regime, 1969-1975**

Researchers have used a variety of terms for the last years of the Franco dictatorship: ‘twilight of the regime’,246 ‘death of the regime’,247 or the ‘crisis and agony of the dictatorship’.248 These terms commonly highlight the contrast between the economic and social changes, which took place in Spain in the 1960s, and the regime’s inability to implement fundamental liberal reforms. Researchers usually date the beginning of this last phase of the Franco dictatorship with the government reshuffle in 1969. Only three months after the declaration of Juan Carlos as Franco’s successor, the Matesa affair shattered the Spanish government.249 The affair evolved around financial irregularities in connection with the company Matesa that received immense press coverage and ‘brought existing political tensions to a head.’250 While Franco always used government reshuffles as an instrument for keeping the complicated power structure in balance, the outcome of the 1969 reshuffle was different. Instead of reflecting the heterogeneous camp of Franco’s supporters, the new government became known as the ‘mono-colour government’. Practically the entire government had links in one way or another to the Opus Dei or the camp of political Catholicism, dedicated to secure the survival of the regime. In terms of political power, the reaffirmed vice-president and Francoist hardliner Luis Carrero Blanco came to represent the ‘continuation of the regime’. The re-shuffle also included the Ministry of Information and Tourism, where the ‘ultra-right-wing Catholic’251 Alfredo Sánchez Bella replaced Manuel Fraga.

Fraga’s dismissal did not come as a surprise. Indeed, the hardliner Carrero Blanco welcomed the Matesa affair to dismiss a number of ministers including Fraga. Elisa Chuliá has pointed out that by the end of the 1960s the Ministry of Information and Tourism had

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246 Ibid., 543.
248 Borja d. Riquer, *Historia de España*, Historia de España en el siglo XX 9 (Barcelona, Madrid: Crítica; Marcial Pons, 2010), 685.
250 Tusell, *Spain: From dictatorship to democracy*, 220.
turned into an institution that was very much criticized both by the hardliners of the regime and the reform-orientated ‘aperturistas’. While for the former, the liberalization of the press law went too far, the latter criticized it as not going far enough – and ‘Fraga had tried to reach an equidistant path between the two, without satisfying either’\(^{252}\). Furthermore, the partial liberalization of the press law increased open criticism of the regime, which came from media close to the Falange and monarchist groups. Carrero Blanco, as the powerful advocate of a non-reformist line, used the Matesa affair, which Francoist hardliners framed as a press problem, to push for the replacement of Fraga by somebody who was more capable of keeping the press in line.\(^{253}\) At the same time, Carrero Blanco himself took an increasing interest in the regime’s press policy. The government reshuffle thus marked the end of the brief and limited period of the regime’s ‘opening’.

The following chapters will show that the new Minister of Information and Tourism, whom some correspondents perceived as ‘pure fascist’\(^{254}\), also tried to intensify the control over the foreign press corps. Sánchez Bella left the institutional and legal framework created by his predecessor mostly untouched. Nevertheless, the MIT also implemented a limited number of modifications to the existing regulations. But these modifications did not reflect any particular policy change by the new minister, but rather the Franco regime’s changing foreign relations by creating new regulations for the accreditation of foreign correspondents from communist countries. Previously, the strictly anti-communist regime did not allow the accreditation of any correspondents from communist countries. This changed during the last years of the regime in the context of Spain’s own (economic) ‘Ostpolitik’, or policy towards Eastern Europe. The Franco regime had already established economic contacts with Poland at the end of the 1950s and further economic agreements followed throughout the 1960s.\(^{255}\) By 1973 and in the context of the lifting of the West German Hallstein doctrine, Spain even established diplomatic contacts with the East German Democratic Republic.\(^{256}\) The general normalization of diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe only took place after the death of Franco, however. Nevertheless, the economic rapprochement of Spain and Eastern Europe resulted in an exchange of correspondents on a strictly reciprocal basis. In 1970, for instance, the Spanish news agency *EFE* and the Soviet news

\(^{252}\) Chuliá, *El poder y la palabra*, 177.

\(^{253}\) Ibid., 174.

\(^{254}\) Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling, 10 May 2011, Madrid.


agency TASS signed an agreement for the exchange of correspondents (further discussed in Chapter 3).

In principle, correspondents from communist media were subject to the same regulations as any other foreign correspondent in Spain. However, the MIT also established a number of specific rules for these journalists, which were mainly concerned with the correspondents’ mobility. In practice, the Francoist authorities only allowed correspondents from communist countries to move within a radius of 40 kilometres from the centre of Madrid with the exception of trips to some surrounding destinations on specified routes.\(^\text{257}\)

The Section for Foreign Press had to approve any travel beyond that circle at least 48 hours in advance.

In the context of the arrival of the first TASS correspondents in Madrid, the Francoist authorities implemented these regulations based on their conviction that ‘in many cases, the work of the correspondents extends beyond their professional occupation and crosses into the work of the secret services’\(^\text{258}\). Thus, Spanish policy was, as Dina Fainberg has shown, not so different from the treatment of Soviet correspondents in the US. Soviet journalists in Washington had to reside within a 40-mile radius of the White House.\(^\text{259}\) At the same time, the Francoist authorities established the travel restrictions for correspondents from communist countries simply as a reaction to similar restrictions for Western correspondents in the Soviet Union.\(^\text{260}\) Therefore, the MIT put not only the accreditation, but also the treatment of this new group of correspondents on a strictly reciprocal basis.

Alongside the evolving relations with communist Eastern Europe, in 1970 the Spanish dictatorship finally succeeded in fundamentally improving its relations with the European Communities (EC) by signing a preferential agreement.\(^\text{261}\) A further important success of the regime’s foreign policy was Spain’s participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki from 1973 to 1975. The presence in Helsinki not only facilitated the further rapprochement with the Soviet Union, it also culminated in Spain’s

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\(^{257}\) AGA, (03) 107.002, 42.09052, Folder 12: Sección de Prensa Extranjera to TASS correspondent Anatoli Medvenko, 2 August 1976; AMAE, 12184, Folder 14: Corresponsales Extranjeros en España, 18 February 1974.

\(^{258}\) Ibid. Interestingly, the KGB was not directly mentioned in this context. Instead, the report refers to the CIA as well as the alleged employment of many German correspondents by the German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst).

\(^{259}\) Fainberg, “Unmasking the wolf in sheep’s clothing,” 13.

\(^{260}\) AMAE, 12184, Folder 14: Corresponsales Extranjeros en España, 18 February 1974.

signing of the Helsinki Final Act as the last international success of the disintegrating
regime in 1975.  

These successes on the international stage and societal changes within Spain contrasted
sharply with the regime’s unwillingness and inability to initiate political reforms. Instead,
faced with growing political opposition, the regime tried to stay in control through
increased repression. This became most visible in a number of trials against alleged and
namely the Burgos trial against ETA members in 1970 and the execution of the Catalan
anarchist Salvador Puig Antich in 1973, which also had a profoundly negative impact on
the regime’s international image during the first half of the 1970s (further discussed in
Chapter 5).

The harsher political repression was also reflected in the regime’s press policies. The
closing of the critical newspaper Madrid by the MIT in 1973 became symbolic for the
inability of the political apparatus to reform. This measure, however, backfired on the
Minister of Information and Tourism. The closure of Madrid, which was tied to more liberal
and pro-democratic sections of the Opus Dei, resulted in strong internal and external
protests. In order to calm down the public, Carrero Blanco replaced Sánchez Bella with
Fernando Liñán y Zofío. The new Minister of Information and Tourism did not remain in
office long enough to implement any fundamental changes. Following the assassination of
Carrero Blanco by ETA in December 1973, his successor as president of the Council of
Ministers, Carlos Arias Navarro, replaced Liñán y Zofío shortly thereafter. One of the main
reasons for his dismissal was his inability to control the press following the ETA attack. In
December 1973, Arias Navarro replaced him with Pío Cabanillas Gallas. In contrast to
Sánchez Bella, Cabanillas intended to relax the situation with a more liberal press policy.

Regarding the MIT, the last years of the Franco regime were not only characterized by
fluctuation at the top of the ministry. Instead, while neither Sánchez Bella nor Cabanillas
changed the regulations for the accreditation of correspondents, both implemented a
number of organizational changes in the administration of the foreign press corps. At the

262 Vanessa Núñez Peñas and Francisco J. Rodrigo Luelmo, “Las relaciones de España con los organismos
regionales europeos en perspectiva comparada: Comunidad Europea y CSCE,” CIRCUNSTANCIA: REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS SOCIALES DEL INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO DE INVESTIGACIÓN ORTEGA Y GASSET, no. 25 (2011); Francisco J.
Rodrigo Luelmo, “De la «gloria» de Helsinki al aislamiento final. La política exterior de España en los
últimos meses del franquismo,” in NIEVES HORIZONTES DEL PASADO: CULTURAS POLÍTICAS, IDENTIDADES Y FORMAS
DE REPRESENTACIÓN, ed. Angeles Barrio Alonso, Jorge d. Hoyos Puente and Rebeca Saavedra Arias
(Santander: Publican, 2011).
263 On the newspaper Madrid see Carlos Barrera, EL DIARIO MADRID: REALIDAD Y SÍMBOLO DE UNA ÉPOCA, 2nd
264 Chuliá, El poder y la palabra, 179-181.
same time, the implementation of these organizational changes also reflected the general uncertainty about how to cope with the press in general during these years. Sánchez Bella began with an institutional promotion of the Section for Foreign Press into a Sub-Directorate General of the DG for the Press in 1973. A few months later, Cabanillas created a new DG for the Legal Regime of the Press in the beginning of 1974. This new DG took over all administrative functions ‘in relations with the press, news agencies and informational professionals’. It replaced the old DG for the Press, which was downgraded to one of the new institution’s Sub-Directorate Generals. At the same time, the Sub-Directorate General for Foreign Press also became one of three Sub-DGs of the new institution. In organizational terms, therefore, Cabanillas not only clearly separated the administration of the foreign press from the administration of the national press but put the two Sub-DGs on the same level.

This new administrative set-up was rather short-lived, however. Already in February 1974, Cabanillas transferred all ‘relations with the foreign correspondents accredited in Spain’ to the Foreign Service, which had been renamed the Cabinet for Foreign Service in February 1974. While the Cabinet for Foreign Service also remained responsible for the press attachés and the contacts with the Foreign Ministry, Cabanillas strengthened the unit’s role as the MIT’s central service responsible for foreign relations. Following this centralization of competences in the Cabinet for Foreign Service, the Sub-DG for Foreign Press, which had only been created shortly before, was dissolved again. Instead, Cabanillas once more created a Section for Foreign Press as a sub-department in February 1974. In terms of the general administrative structure, Cabanillas therefore largely re-established the previous set-up.

Nevertheless, this return to the old structure did not apply for the division of competences over the foreign press. While the Section for Foreign Press was, as before, responsible for the control and distribution of the foreign press in Spain as well as for the accreditation of the foreign correspondents, it was to fulfil these tasks ‘without interfering with the

265 BOE, Decreto 2509/1973, de 11 de octubre, por el que se reorganizan determinadas Servicios del Ministerio de Información y Turismo, no 246, 13 October 1973, 19813-19815.
266 BOE, Decreto 28/1974, de 11 de enero, por el que se modifica el de 11 de octubre de 1973 por el que se reorganizan determinados Servicios del Departamento, no. 11, 12 January 1974, 685-686.
267 BOE, DECRETO 179/1974, de 1 de Febrero, por el que se reorganizan determinados Servicios del Ministerio de Información y Turismo, no. 30, 4 February 1974, 2111.
268 Ibid.
269 BOE, 4578 - Orden por la que se establece la estructura orgánica de la Dirección General de Régimen Jurídico de la Prensa, no. 53, 2 March 1974, 4309-4310.
competence granted to the Cabinet for Foreign Services. Cabanillas therefore downgraded the Section for Foreign Press to a purely administrative unit, which was reflected in the department’s reduction to only two sub-units. All ‘informational relations with the foreign correspondents accredited in Spain and foreign media’ remained with the Cabinet for Foreign Service. The enhanced status of the Cabinet for Foreign Service also became visible in its new internal structure. Altogether, the Cabinet consisted of three specialized sub-sections: Foreign Information, Communication Media, and Administration. The first sub-section was responsible for the contact and supervision of the official Information Offices (the press attachés at the embassies) and the MIT’s Tourism Offices. The section for Communication Media, structured into the sub-departments Journalists and Press, Radio and Television took over the responsibilities over foreign correspondents and media.

This administrative structure as well as Fraga’s regulations for the accreditation of correspondents remained unchanged throughout the last years of the dictatorship. However, in contrast to Sánechez Bella, Cabanillas implemented a far more liberal policy towards both the domestic and the foreign press. The following chapters will show that he not only noticeably relaxed the censorship of foreign media and the control of foreign correspondents. Instead, the Minister of Information and Tourism also allowed the increased independence of the foreign correspondents’ institutions from state control. However, this more liberal stance towards the control of the foreign press earned Cabanillas the increasing criticism by Francoist hardliners, who began to push for his dismissal. The Falangist ex-Minister José Antonio Girón de Velasco, for instance, complained during the Portuguese Carnation revolution that Spaniards could ‘find in the newsstands of Spain, with the necessary official authorization, foreign newspapers which ridicule the famous and respectable figure of Francisco Franco, or which offend the Regime of the 18th of July’.

Eventually, the Francoist hardliners succeeded and Cabanillas’ liberal attitude towards censorship led to his dismissal at the end of 1974. León Herrera Esteban, who had already served under Manuel Fraga as DG for the Press became the new Minister of Information and Tourism. In Herrera Esteban’s own words, with Cabanillas the ‘flag of aperturista’ had left the MIT. However, not unlike his predecessors, the new minister did not remain in

270 Ibid.
271 Ibid.
273 Quoted in ibid. ‘Regimen of the 18th of July’ refers to the beginning of the Spanish Civil War with the Nationalist uprising against the Second Republic on the night of 17 to 18 July 1936.
274 Quoted in ibid., 181.
his post for long. Following the death of Franco on 20th November 1975, Herrera Esteban was replaced in December 1975.

The introduction to this thesis already briefly highlighted that sections of the Spanish press, as a ‘parliament of paper’, played a central role in the transition to democracy. However, due to the character of the transition as a negotiated process between the reform-orientated elites of the old regime and the political opposition, it took until 1977 before the Spanish authorities ended the censorship of the press. In the same year, the Ministry of Information and Tourism was dissolved and all competences for the domestic and foreign press were passed to the newly created Ministry of Culture and its ministry’s Sub-Directorate for Communication Media. Two years later, in 1979, these competences were transferred once more to the State Secretary for Information within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Until 1977, however, the administrative structure of the control of the domestic and foreign press remained intact. This included, despite temporary interruptions in this politically tumultuous time, the Liaison Office and its monitoring of foreign media as well as Cabinet for Foreign Service. The regulations for the accreditation even remained functional thereafter and were only changed by the Socialist government elected in 1982 – including the deletion of the notorious paragraph allowing for the cancellation of accreditations.

Conclusions

The examination of the evolution of the Francoist legal and administrative structure for the foreign press allows a number of intermediate observations. On the most superficial level, the chapter has shown that this structure evolved in the context of general reforms of the administration of the press within Spain. This applies in particular to the full administrative reorganization following the creation of the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1951. At the same time, however, the chapter has also demonstrated that the legal and

275 The seat of Spanish government was and is located close to Madrid’s university quarter. Because of the frequent student protests during the Spanish transition, the Liaison Office frequently had to suspend the daily transports of sensitive material such as confidential newsletters to Moncloa. In principle, however, the service continued until the dissolution existence of the MIT in 1977. AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09020, Folder 2: Report by Liasion Office, 1 September 1977.
administrative structure for the foreign press was in part reformed outside of this general pattern. The Francoist regime’s foreign policy was a crucial factor in this context. The impact of the international situation on the regime’s administration of the foreign press first became visible in the aftermath of the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945. Faced with what for Spain was an increasingly hostile international situation, the Francoist authorities tried to improve its international image. For the foreign correspondents, this resulted in a sudden end of the previous censorship of their despatches. Spain’s rapprochement with communist Eastern Europe from the end of the 1960s was similarly accompanied by legal reforms for the new group of correspondents, who were now accredited in the Franco regime.

While reacting to Spain’s international relations, the regime’s administration of the foreign press was also subject to intense internal competence struggles within the regime. Formally, the administration of the foreign press was the domain of the institutions responsible for the domestic press throughout the Francoist regime. Despite variations, which depended to some extent on who was in charge, the domestic institutions generally followed a rather restrictive policy towards the foreign press. At the same time, however, the Spanish Foreign Ministry had a vital interest in the improvement of Spain’s international reputation. This not only led to pressure by the foreign ministry to change the regime’s administration of the foreign press. Foreign Minister Artajo even attempted to transfer all competences over the foreign press to the Foreign Ministry in the beginning of the 1950s. While this attempt failed, the Foreign Ministry and in particular its specialised Office for Diplomatic Information became and remained a central institution for the foreign press in Francoist Spain.

Finally, the chapter has also shown that despite all administrative changes analysed here, the legal and administrative structure for the foreign press remained remarkably stable in key respects. This is especially true, despite all struggles with the Foreign Ministry, for the continued administration of the foreign press by a specialized sub-department. The set-up of this Section for Foreign Press within the general administration of the Spanish press remained intact across fundamental ministerial reforms such as the creation of the MIT in 1951. At the same time, not only the department itself, but also its officials changed remarkably little, especially until the 1950s.

Against the background of these findings and the outlined general development of the Francoist regime, the next chapter will examine another group of institutions with central importance for the foreign press corps: organizations for correspondents. The Francoist
authorities both initiated organizations for correspondents and tolerated the creation of independent organizations by foreign journalists. The chapter will examine how these organizations reflected the general development of the regime and its policy towards the foreign press corps.
2. Representing Foreign Correspondents in Francoist Spain: Organizations of Journalists

When the Francoist forces came to power at the end of the Civil War, the new rulers dissolved the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents (Asociación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera, ACPE), the only existing organization for foreign correspondents in Spain. It took until the 1950s before the Francoist authorities granted permission for the creation of a new organization for foreign correspondents. At the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the Ministry of Information and Tourism permitted the formation of two such associations for foreign correspondents as well as a International Press Club (Club Internacional de Prensa, CIP) in Madrid.

This chapter will analyse the conditions for the creation of the different press organizations for foreign correspondents in Spain and will examine the relations between the journalists’ organizations and the Franco regime in particular. The chapter argues that the Franco regime initially treated any form of association for foreign correspondents with great suspicion. This only changed, – and even then very slowly - with Spain’s return to the international stage. However, even after the creation of the journalists’ organizations, the MIT kept tight control over such groups and especially over the CIP. Towards the end of the regime, this approach increasingly led to conflicts between foreign journalists and Spanish officials.

By examining the evolution of these organizations, this chapter will shed light on a particular aspect of the regime’s relations with the foreign press. At the same time, it provides insights into the importance of the journalists’ organizations for the work of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain.

The Agrupación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera

Before the Spanish Civil War, foreign correspondents in Madrid were organized in the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents (1923 onwards). Long-term president of the association was Julio Álvarez del Vayo y Olloqui, the well-known Spanish journalist, foreign correspondent, diplomat, active member of the Spanish socialists and, with interruptions, Foreign Minister of the Second Republic during the Spanish Civil War.278

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This association also continued to exist throughout the Civil War, though it only functioned in a rudimentary way. The total absence of any reference to the association in the existing research on foreign correspondents during the Civil War gives the impression that it was of little importance for journalists then.  

Following the victory of the Francoist troops, and in line with the new regimes restrictive policy towards the foreign press at the time, the new authorities closed the association shortly after the end of the Civil War. Serrano Suñer, the man at the top of the highly restrictive VSEP, also dismissed a 1941 initiative by the remaining correspondents to reinstate the association. The closedown of the ACPE also reflected the regime’s highly restrictive attitude towards any kind of associations. As Pamela Radcliffe highlights, ‘consistent with the “totalitarian” discourse of the regime [at the time], formal associations were largely limited to those integrated into the vertical hierarchy of the Church or the Movimiento.’ The Francoist authorities only made a few exceptions for associations linked to the regime. In contrast to the ACPE, for instance, the Francoist authorities had already reorganized the Press Association of Madrid (Asociación de la Prensa de Madrid, APM) for Spanish journalists during the Civil War, with Franco as its honorary president and Serrano Suñer as its vice-president.

The Franco regime’s attitude towards the creation of an association for correspondents, however, changed in the context of the ‘politics of gesture’ after the Second World War. To the new government, the creation of some kind of organization for foreign correspondents seemed a useful tool to improve Spain’s international image. The initiative resulted in the half-hearted foundation of a press club for correspondents in 1945.

However, while this and later press clubs for correspondents were basically state-controlled organizations, any kind of association of journalists by definition had to be autonomous and self-organized institutions. The Francoist authorities were just as reluctant to allow such an association come into being as the correspondents were to accept a state-controlled organization for themselves. The conflict became obvious at the beginning of the 1950s.

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279 Preston, We saw Spain die; Deacon, “Elective and experiential affinities: British and American foreign correspondents and the Spanish Civil War”; Armero, España fue noticia.
280 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.356, Folder César A. Gullino, Nota biográfica del Sr. César A. Gullino [undated].
281 Juan Beneyto Pérez, “La política de comunicación en España durante el franquismo,” Revista de estudios políticos, no. 11 (1979), 169.
283 Sinova, La censura de prensa durante el franquismo (1936-51), 93.
284 Junta Directiva de la Asociación de la Prensa, Memoria: de su actuación en zona liberada y en el Año de la Victoria 1939 (Madrid: Asociación de la Prensa, 1940), no. 1, 3-4.
when the Foreign Ministry under Artajo tried to create a new association for foreign journalists. The Foreign Ministry’s OID gauged the prospects of this plan and the attitude of the foreign correspondents towards it. An OID report from March 1950 came to the conclusion, however, that the correspondents would consider ‘an intervention [from the Spanish government] too official and would not accept it […]’\textsuperscript{285} The official involvement was not the only reason for the correspondents to oppose the idea, however. In addition, the British and American journalists actually preferred the creation of their own association, which would exclude correspondents of other nationalities.\textsuperscript{286} As a result of the limited enthusiasm for its idea, the OID representative came to the conclusion in 1950 that ‘it is necessary that the idea [to create an association] ripens and at the moment I think it would [be] counterproductive to talk about material offers such as a locality for the constitution of the Association for Foreign Press.’\textsuperscript{287}

It took until 1957 before the time finally seemed ripe for the creation of an association for foreign correspondents. A group of foreign correspondents overcame its internal divisions and submitted a formal application for the foundation of an \textit{Agrupación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera} to the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1957.\textsuperscript{288} The slight, but difficult to translate, difference in the title of the new ‘agrupación’ characterized it as less formal and was therefore a compromise with the still strict Francoist policy. The short-term head of the DG for the Press Juan Benyeto supported the project.\textsuperscript{289} At the beginning of 1958, the Francoist authorities officially registered the new association.\textsuperscript{290}

The MIT accepted this proposal in the context of the preceding governmental reshuffle and the regime’s improved international situation. For the correspondents, these changed circumstances created fertile ground for the formation of a self-controlled association. The personalities of the proponents of the plan were important too. The statutes of the association, submitted together with the proposal, were signed by the correspondents Cesare Gullino of the Italian news agency ANSA, the correspondent for \textit{The Times}, William Stuttard, and the correspondent for the \textit{The North American News Alliance}, Ralph Forte.

\textsuperscript{285} AFNFF, 1877, Report from OID to Foreign Ministry, 25 March 1950.
\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{288} AGA, (03), 52.00301, Folder 1: Agrupación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera – Estatutos [undated] [Against the background of the following reports and communication of the DG for the Press with other departments, the bylaws of the ACPE can be dated in August 1957]
\textsuperscript{289} AGA, (03), 52.00301, Folder 1: Director General de Prensa to Director General de Seguridad, 7 August 1957. See also Beneyto Pérez, “La política de comunicación en España durante el franquismo,” 169.
\textsuperscript{290} AGA, (03), 52.00301, Folder 1: Dirección General de Seguridad to Director General de Política Interior, 1 February 1958.
These three journalists had been in Spain at least since the 1940s and, in the case of Stuttard and Gullino, had even covered the Spanish Civil War. Moreover, these correspondents maintained particularly good relations with the Franco regime. This applied, above all, to the Italian Gullino.

Following posts as correspondent for various Italian newspapers, Gullino had lived in Spain since 1919. There, Gullino first worked for the newspaper Corriere della Sera before switching to the news agency Stefani, for which he also covered the Spanish Civil War. From 1932 until its dissolution in 1940, Gullino also was the secretary and, during the Civil War, the president of the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents. After the end of the Civil War, Gullino remained in Spain and continued his journalistic activities. Following the closure of Stefani in 1945, he worked for the Italian news agency ANSA and for some time also for the Italian broadcaster RAI until his death in 1969. Due to his long and uninterrupted accreditation, the MIT considered Gullino as ‘the mentor of almost all Italian colleagues who come to Madrid as correspondents or special envoys’.

Researchers have highlighted that Gullino maintained close ties to the Fascist regime in Italy. Stanley Payne, who interviewed Gullino in Madrid during the 1950s, describes him as a “Fascist agent” for Mussolini and Preston argues that the journalist ‘had originally been sent to Spain’ by the Italian dictator. While no further evidence of these claims could be found, Gullino certainly sympathized with the Franco regime. The MIT valued his ‘deeply rooted sympathy for the country and his respect for the regime’ and awarded him with an honorary accreditation in 1967.

The MIT held a similarly sympathetic view towards Ralph Forte. Between 1940 and 1956, Forte worked for the US news agency United Press (UP) in Madrid. Thereafter, he was accredited for both The North American News Alliance and the US publication, The News. The MIT valued in particular Forte’s ‘always correct’ reporting for UP, which reflected his ‘great friendship with Spain’. For his service to the Franco regime, the

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290 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.356, Folder Cesare Gullino: Untitled report on Cesare Gullino [undated]. This MIT report only states that Gullino came as a student to Spain.
291 Ibid.
292 Payne, Falange, a history of Spanish fascism, 70.
293 Preston, We saw Spain die, 415.
294 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.356, Folder Cesare Gullino: Biographical Report [undated].
295 Ibid.
296 ACMP, Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 53.
297 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Untitled report on Ralph Forte, 30 May 1966 [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.]
298 Ibid.
Spanish authorities even decorated the correspondent with the prestigious *Encomienda de Isabel la Católica* in 1954. In 1967, Forte also received an honorary accreditation. William ‘Guillermo’ Stuttard, finally, had been correspondent for the British *Morning Post* during the Second Republic. Throughout the Spanish Civil War, Stuttard was one of the few correspondents who reported both from the Republican and Rebel zones. The Francoist authorities valued what they regarded as his ‘truthful’ reports. After the end of the Civil War, Stuttard remained in Spain and started to work for *The Times* in 1940 and also, from the mid-1950s, for the *Evening Standard*.

The sympathetic attitude of these correspondents towards the regime certainly facilitated the recreation of the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents. According to the association’s bylaws, it was created in order to ‘facilitate the journalistic mission of its members, to intensify their relations among each other as well as with Spanish colleagues, professional corporations, official entities […].’ The ACPE was headed by a president chairing a board of directors composed of eight foreign correspondents. As specified in 1959, this board of directors was ideally supposed to consist of four representatives from news agencies and four individual correspondents. The entire board of directors was to be composed as internationally as possible and therefore should not include more than two members of the same nationality. The members of the association elected both the board of directors and the president of the ACPE annually. The president could be re-elected without any specific limitations. In practical terms, the ACPE was also to represent the interests of the foreign correspondents towards the Francoist authorities, including cases of denied or cancelled accreditations (further discussed in Chapter 6). Although it did so only occasionally, the DG for the Press used the ACPE to gather information on the professional background of particular correspondents.

However, the Spanish authorities had no direct means of control over the internal structure or the composition of the ACPE’s board of directors. Furthermore, the ACPE also remained largely independent from official sources for its funding. While initially situated in the

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300 Ibid.
302 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.386, Folder William Stuttard: Untitled report on William Stuttard [undated]
303 Ibid.
304 AGA, (03), 52.00301, Folder 1: Agrupación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera – Estatutos [undated].
305 Ibid.
306 Ibid.
building of the news agency ANSA, the ACPE exclusively depended on membership fees. At the start of 1962, however, it moved into the building of the newly created International Press Club, which the Ministry of Information and Tourism owned and maintained. Nevertheless, the membership fees remained the ACPE’s central source of income.

While the MIT accepted the creation of the ACPE, the constitution of the association’s membership soon resulted in debates with the Francoist authorities. The ACPE had two types of membership, full and associate. Accredited staff correspondents could become full members, while stringers were only eligible for an associate membership. While these regulations followed the MIT’s regulations for the accreditation of correspondents, this was not the case for two further specifications. The original proposal for the bylaws of the ACPE also considered the journalists’ foreign, non-Spanish nationality as one of the preconditions for membership (Art. 3). Furthermore, the board of directors was also supposed to have the right to refuse applications for membership on the grounds of the lack of professional qualifications of applicants (Art. 2), independent of their official accreditation status.

In any case, the DG for the Press, Juan Benyetó, disagreed with both of the proposed articles, 2 and 3. From his point of view, the DG for the Press’ Section for Foreign Press was responsible for checking the professional status of foreign correspondents. The MIT also did not yet perceive the nationality of the foreign correspondent as problematic during the 1950s. Accordingly, Benyeto pointed out that Spaniards could be correspondents for foreign media and the ACPE therefore should not refuse them. Nevertheless, and despite the presidency of the Spaniard Álvarez del Vayo over the ACPE predecessor, the new association insisted on the implementation of both articles and the MIT eventually accepted the independent management of its membership. Later on, the MIT itself actually adopted a more restrictive approach towards Spanish correspondents.

The ACPE, therefore, accepted prominent Spanish correspondents, such as the *Le Monde* correspondent José Antonio Novais Tomé, as associate members only. The ACPE’s attitude towards the inclusion of Spanish foreign correspondents started to change under the presidency of the French correspondent Édouard de Blaye in 1970, however. De Blaye was highly critical of Franco and the MIT considered him as ‘anti-regime’, ‘provocative in his anti-Spanish statements’, and a ‘classical Marxist correspondent’.

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307 Ibid. Art. 1.
308 AGA, (03), 52.00301, Folder 1: Director General de Prensa to Director General de Política Interior, 9 October 1957.
309 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.975, Folder Édouard de Blaye: Informe: Éduardo de Blaye, 31 October 1975 [MIT, unsigned].
correspondent not only publicized his criticism of the Franco regime in newspaper articles and radio broadcasts for the French broadcaster RTL, but also in a 1974 book on the regime.\textsuperscript{310} As president of the ACPE, he repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to change the regulations in favour of the inclusion of Spaniards and especially of the strongly anti-Franco Novais as a full member.\textsuperscript{311} It took until 1972, however, before the ACPE’s regulations were reformed by de Blaye’s successor as president, the correspondent of the French news agency Agence France-Presse (AFP), Jean Louis Arnaud. At this time, the Spaniard Novais not only became a full member, but even became a member of the ACPE’s board of directors.\textsuperscript{312} During and after the Spanish transition, Novais became vice-president\textsuperscript{313} and secretary of the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents.\textsuperscript{314}

The Asociación de Corresponsales de la Prensa Iberoamericana

In 1961, while Arias-Salgado was still Minister of Information and Tourism, foreign correspondents in Spain created another association, which had no direct predecessor in pre-Civil War Spain: the Association of Ibero-American Press Correspondents (Asociación de Corresponsales de la Prensa Iberoamericana, ACPI).\textsuperscript{315} In contrast to the ACPE, which was open to all nationalities except Spaniards, the ACPI was more exclusive. The association was created in order to ‘bring together all correspondents and part-time correspondents who are collecting information in Spain for the press, radio and television of the American continent’.\textsuperscript{316}

Despite the focus on correspondents for Latin American media, the ACPI also accepted journalists merely based on their nationality. The long-term president of the ACPI, the former Cuban diplomat José R. Chelala López, for instance, worked most of the time for the Swiss-based publication Common Market Business Reports.\textsuperscript{317} Another long-term

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{311} AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.975, Folder Édouard de Blaye: Informe: Éduardo de Blaye, 31 October 1975 [MIT, unsigned].
\item \textsuperscript{312} Club Internacional de Prensa, ed., 	extit{El Club Internacional de Prensa 1962-1972} (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1973), 75.
\item \textsuperscript{313} AGA, (09) 009.005, 52.14735, Untitled letter by Tito Drago as president and José Antonio Novais as vice-president of the Asociación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera to Secretaría de Estado para la Información, 15 December 1980.
\item \textsuperscript{315} ABC, “Asociación de Corresponsales de la Prensa Iberoamericana,” 25 March 1961, 56 [unsigned].
\item \textsuperscript{316} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{317} José R. Chelala López, interview by Tobias Reckling, 25 February 2013, Madrid.
\end{itemize}
member of the ACPI’s board of directors, Francisco Somoggi de Perlac, was a correspondent for various Arabic newspapers and news agencies. At the same time, the ACPE did not actually exclude Latin American correspondents from membership. The Argentine journalist Armando Puente, a correspondent for AFP and later for other French and Argentinian publications, became a member of the ACPE and even the president of the International Press Club (1971-72). Furthermore, the correspondent of the news agency United Press International (UPI) Antonio Navarro, due to his Latin American origin, was a member of both the board of directors of the ACPE and ACPI in the early 1970s.

Nevertheless, the ACPI had a clear geographical focus. It also differed from the ACPE in terms of its creation. While the ACPE was initiated by correspondents, the ACPI was founded by two correspondents, Henry Cervantes and Rafael Miralles Bravo, with the support of the Francoist authorities and in particular, the Service for Foreign Relations of the National Delegation of Syndicates. Miralles became the first president of the new association. This official support for the association was reflected in its formal status as ‘asociación’ instead of ‘agrupación’ still three years before the reform of the regime’s policy with the Law of Associations from 1964. As in the case of the APM, therefore, the Francoists made for the ACPI an exception to its generally restrictive attitude towards association.

The Cuban Miralles had an eventful past. He had first come to Spain in the beginning of the 1930s and, as a dedicated socialist, fought against the Rebels in the Spanish Civil War. Following Franco’s victory, Miralles flew back to Cuba, where he became active in the Cuban communist movement. After initially making a living as journalist, Miralles became press attaché in the Cuban embassy in Moscow in 1944. His experience in the Soviet capital had a profound impact on his political views and he left as a fierce anti-communist. After

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322 Radcliff, “Associations and the Social Origins of the Transition during the Late Franco Regime,” 146-51.
a brief stay in Mexico, he returned to Spain as correspondent for the Mexican news agency *Plus Ultra* in 1948 and ‘dedicated himself to anti-communist propaganda’. Besides his journalistic work, Miralles also worked for the syndicate’s Foreign Service and thus facilitated the support for the foundation of the ACPI.

Although not directly employed by it, Cervantes also maintained close ties with the Francoist institution. Furthermore, Cervantes was an avid supporter of the Franco regime. He had studied medicine in the US and remained there for some years after the end of his studies. In order to counterbalance anti-Francoist publications by Republican exiles, Cervantes, who considered himself ‘the only US-American Falangist’, co-founded the strongly pro-Franco Spanish language newspaper *Diario de Nueva York* in 1948. In 1956, he returned to Spain and initially became the correspondent for the *Diario de Nueva York*. However, following a change in the pro-Franco attitude of the newspaper and its later fusion with *La Prensa* in 1962, Cervantes engaged in remarkable journalistic activities in Spain in order to make a living. Besides taking on the correspondence for another New York-based Spanish newspaper (*El Mundo*), he founded the *Inter-American Press Agency*, which distributed news on Spain in the US, including a journal for English speaking tourists in Spain.

Besides the ACPI founders’ links to the Franco regime, the foundation of the new organization also reflected the Franco regime’s special relations with Latin America. After 1945, faced with international isolation, the Franco regime actively sought to strengthen its relations with Latin America based on Spain’s historical and cultural ties with the region. With these ‘politics of substitution’ towards Latin America, the Franco regime hoped to improve its international prestige and, in more practical terms, collect votes in the UN.

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324 Diccionario Biográfico del Socialismo Español, “Miralles Bravo, Rafael”.
326 Ibid.
330 Ibid.
Indeed, three Latin American countries - El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and most importantly, Argentina, were among the few nations which had maintained diplomatic relations with Spain after the Franco regime’s international ostracism. Argentina, whose dictator Juan Domingo Perón Sosa found exile in Spain during the 1960s, also supported Spain economically at the end of the 1940s. Spain also continued its close relations to Latin America after the end of her international isolation. Under Foreign Minister Castiella during the 1960s, the Franco regime tried to strengthen its influence in the region through the promotion of the Spanish authoritarian model for economic development.332

Ideologically, these special relations were based on the concept of *Hispanidad*, which was to create ‘an indestructible spiritual community, bond of spirit and blood between the people on both shores of the Atlantic’333. The Franco regime and in particular the Institute for Hispanic Culture, promoted this ‘spiritual community’ through cultural policy directed at Latin America. Thus, Latin American correspondents were invited to Spain, newsletters, journals and informational brochures were produced for the Latin American market, and from 1951 onwards a specialized course for Latin American journalists was created in the recently founded Official School of Journalism. While the Spanish public broadcaster produced programmes for Latin America,334 the Spanish news agency *EFE* became an important intermediary for the distribution of international news in Latin America and vice versa335. In the beginning of the 1970s, the MIT even created the annual Miguel de Cervantes Award for the published article that best reflected ‘the common values of the Hispanic world’336. The MIT almost exclusively awarded the prize to Latin American correspondents in Spain. As Chapter 3 will show, these special relations with Latin America were also reflected in the large Latin American press corps in Francoist Spain.

The creation of a specialized association for Latin American correspondents with official support has to be seen against the background of this general policy. This was also reflected in the ACPI’s official mission. Besides its function as a meeting point for Latin American journalists, the ACPI was also designed to promote ‘a better and closer rapprochement

332 See ibid.
334 Lorenzo D. Gómez-Escalonilla in „*La política exterior de España en el siglo XX,“ 144.
336 BOE, Orden de 24 de enero de 1972 por la que se crea el Premio Hispanoamericano de Prensa Miguelde Cervantes y se convoca el correspondiente al año 1971, no. 31, 5 February 1972, 2160.
between Spain and the press of the New World’ by helping to produce a ‘better documentation about the Spanish life and its reflection’\(^{337}\) in the South American press.

For a particular group among its members, those from Cuba, this political function went beyond the promotion of good relations between Spain and Latin America. Following Castro’s revolution, the anti-communist Franco regime became the destination of choice for a number of Cubans who started to work as correspondents. During the 1960s, for instance, the Cuban ex-ambassador to Puerto Rico and China, Rosendo Canto Hernández, repeatedly used the ACPI for press conferences on the ‘situation of Cuba’ and the ‘unity of Cuban exiles’\(^{338}\). Canto, who the MIT described as ‘very attached to the North Americans and, on the other side, to the Spanish regime’\(^{339}\), was accredited in Spain as founder and director of the publication Acción Cubana. The bi-monthly journal was, in its own words, the ‘only newspaper edited in Europe opposed to the communist Cuban government’\(^{340}\). Other Cuban ACPI members included the founder and president of the association, Rafael Miralles Bravo\(^{341}\). In fact, Miralles even used Acción Cubana in order to publish information on the ACPI’s activities.\(^{342}\)

Because of this ideological proximity to the regime and the political activities of some of its members, Western correspondents viewed the ACPI with suspicion. For the former president of the ACPE, Walter Haubrich of the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, for instance, the distinction between the two associations was therefore not geographical, but professional.\(^{343}\)

**Towards a Club Internacional de Prensa**

In his analysis of Francoist Spain’s cultural diplomacy towards the US, historian Neal Rosendorf stresses that it was one of the first acts by Manuel Fraga after his appointment as Minister of Information and Tourism to establish the International Press Club.\(^{344}\) This press club opened in 1962, and Rosendorf is certainly right in interpreting its establishment

\(^{337}\) *ABC*, Asociación de Corresponsales de la Prensa Iberoamericana.
\(^{338}\) AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.775, Folder Rosendo Canto Hernández: Untitled Invitation to press conference in the ACPI, 2 April 1963.
\(^{340}\) AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.775, Folder Rosendo Canto Hernández, Copy of Acción Cubana from 6 December 1962, 1.
\(^{341}\) Ibid. 4
\(^{342}\) Ibid. 2.
\(^{343}\) Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 14 July 2012, Madrid.
\(^{344}\) Rosendorf, *Franco Sells Spain to America*, 94.
as an attempt to improve the regime’s relations with the foreign press corps. This initiative was neither originally the idea of Fraga nor the first attempt to set up such an institution in Madrid, however. In fact, as will be shown in the following, the Francoist authorities had already created similar institutions from the end of the Second World War onwards.

Following the defeat of the Axis powers, the VSEP not only tried to improve relations with the foreign correspondents by ending censorship, but also by initiating a press club in May 1945. This new institution was supposed to bring together ‘writers, journalists and artists’ from different countries, as the VSEP’s National Delegate for the Press, Juan Aparicio, described the initiative in a letter to the US embassy. Aparicio had already developed this idea in previous correspondence with the press attaché in Lisbon, Javier Martínez de Bedoya. While this correspondence from the beginning of 1945 was mainly concerned with the duties of the Spanish press attachés, Aparicio also outlined the necessity of a new policy towards the foreign press. He highlighted inter alia that a ‘club’ was missing in Spain, ‘where the foreign correspondents can have easy access to […] information about Spain, from a Spanish point of view’.

In the context of the changed international situation after 1945, the VSEP worked hard to set this press club up, hence Aparicio’s attempt to promote the plan in his contacts with the US embassy. The eventual opening of the club in July 1945 took place after the VSEP’s dissolution and under the responsibility of the new Ministry of Popular Education, however. The club was officially created on Piñar 5, a street in the centre of Madrid, within walking distance from the US embassy. The club was named after the 19th century Catalan priest, publicist and philosopher Jaime Balmes y Urpiá, who strongly defended Spain’s Catholic mission as making it distinctive compared to the rest of Europe.

In terms of its scope, the so-called Jaime Balmes Circle was created as a club for ‘journalism, art and literature’ with the specific aim to increase the ‘social and cultural’ contacts between Spanish and foreign journalists in a ‘professional and friendly’ atmosphere. The creation of the Jaime Balmes Circle as part of the regime’s

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345 AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.1232, Folder 189: Delegado Nacional de Prensa to US Embassy in Madrid, 29 May 1945.
346 AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.1232, Folder 190: Delegado Nacional de Prensa to Agregado de Prensa at the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon, 14 March 1945.
348 AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.1231, Folder 74: Sección de Prensa Extranjera to Editorial Nacional, 23 October 1945.
349 BOE, Orden de 27 agosto 1945 por la se crea el Circulo de Periodismo “Jaime Balmes,” no. 245, 2 September 1945, 1546.
attempts to improve its image after 1945 was reflected in the Ministry of Popular Education’s active promotion of the club’s foundation among the foreign diplomatic representations in Madrid.\footnote{See For example AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.1232, Folder 189: Delegado Nacional de Prensa to British Embassy in Madrid, 11 January 1945.} In terms of its internal structure, the Jaime Balmes Circle was predominantly an institution of the Ministry of Popular Education. The ministry’s DG for the Press himself headed the club’s board of directors, and the under-secretary of the ministry was the honorary president.\footnote{“El Círculo Jaime Balmes,” \textit{Gaceta de la prensa Española}, no. 38 (1945), 1656-1657 [unsigned].} The board of directors also had full control over the club’s membership. In a first stage, it directly appointed the members. Later on, however, interested journalists also could apply for membership.

In the context of Spain’s international isolation after 1946, however, the government-controlled Jaime Balmes Circle was met with little interest by the foreign press corps in Spain. As a result, the government tried to revitalize the club in 1952. In the context of Spain beginning to return into the international community, a group of foreign correspondents and the alumni association of the Official School for Journalism inaugurated within the still existing Jaime Balmes Circle a new Jaime Balmes Press Club.\footnote{“Se ha inaugurado en Madrid el Club de Prensa Jaime Balmes,” \textit{Gaceta de la prensa Española}, no. 48 (1952), 48 [unsigned].} Created with the approval and support of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, this new initiative to create a press club should be seen as an attempt by the new ministry to improve relations with the foreign press. At the same time, it also can be considered as compensation for the unsuccessful attempt (discussed above) by the OID to create an association for foreign correspondents in the same year.

Indeed, in contrast to the cultural orientation of its predecessor, the new Jaime Balmes Press Club was explicitly orientated towards both Spanish and foreign journalists.\footnote{Ibid.} In order to promote the new institution, it also received, at least initially, considerable attention from the Francoist authorities. Thus, Spanish officials attended the club’s inauguration. The Minister of Information and Tourism, the Minister of Education, as well as the representatives of practically all relevant DGs (press, radio, propaganda, tourism etc.) and various directors of Spanish newspapers and press agencies, came to the opening.\footnote{Ibid.} Francoist officials also gave various press conferences and attended other events in the club throughout the following years.
In contrast to the earlier press club, the MIT also granted correspondents a more active role in the club’s organizational structure. The new board of directors was now constituted without direct involvement of MIT officials. Headed by the director of the Spanish newspaper *Madrid*, Juan Pujol Martínez, as president, three vice-presidents were appointed: one foreign correspondent, one representative of the national press and one representative of the Official Journalism School’s alumni association. On the part of the foreign correspondents, the director of the US news agency *UPI* and later co-founder of the ACPE, Ralph Forte, was appointed as one these three vice-presidents while other correspondents became official advisers. In April 1953, a separate section for foreign correspondents was even founded within the press club, although this remained a short-lived initiative.

The organization nevertheless remained an institution of the MIT. The MIT owned the building, where the club was situated, and financed the club and its activities. Nevertheless, the new Jaime Balmes Press Club was a remarkable early experiment by the Francoist authorities with the self-organization of journalists. Throughout the following years, the MIT did actually leave the functioning and administration of the Jaime Balmes Press Club to its members. The experiment with self-organization remained short-lived, however. Only three years after the club’s foundation, in 1955, the MIT and its DG for the Press tightened its control over the press club once more. A new executive committee for the press club’s umbrella organization, the still existing Jaime Balmes Circle, was established and totally dominated by representatives of the MIT. Representatives of the existing organizations within the Circle, like the press club, were ‘freely selected’ by the Director General for the Press as further members of the executive committee. This new board of directors inter alia was responsible for accepting new associations and clubs within the Circle. Most importantly, the clubs within the Jaime Balmes Circle were also obliged to include within their board of directors one representative of the MIT. Finally, the MIT

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356 “Designación de directiva del Club de Prensa,” *Gaceta de la prensa Española*, no. 59 (1953), 40 [unsigned].
357 “Sección de corresponsales extranjeros: el Club de Prensa,” *Gaceta de la prensa Española*, no. 52 (1953), 46 [unsigned].
358 Following the announcement of creation of the Section for Foreign Correspondents within the press club in the *Gaceta de la prensa Española* in 1953, this official publication of the DG for the Press does not mention this new section during the following years.
359 BOE, Orden de 11 enero 1955 por la que se dictan normas para la administracion y regimen del Circulo de Periodismo “Jaime Balmes,” no. 21, 21 January 1955, 426.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
further increased its control over the press club through a new administrative committee, which was responsible for the more practical day-to-day administration of the Circle. The Director General for the Press headed the committee while Spanish officials mainly constituted its board. The associations within the Circle were only represented by one delegate each.\footnote{Ibid. The other board members were: Secretary General of the DG for the Press, Director and the Sub-director of the Official School for Journalism and an official of the DG for the Press as secretary.} These new regulations, therefore, ended the short period of the press club’s de facto self-organization.

It seems clear that the press institution also was not a particular success, hence Fraga’s initiative to once more revitalize the idea of a press club only five months after his appointment in 1962. Formally still within the Jaime Balmes Circle, the new International Press Club was inaugurated in the same building used by its predecessors, Piñar 5, on 15 November 1962. In contrast to the older press clubs, however, Fraga’s new institution became more successful and remained functional throughout the existence of the Franco regime. In fact, the CIP still exists in Madrid today.\footnote{See website of the Club Internacional de Prensa: http://www.clubinterprensa.org/ (accessed 20 March 2016).}

Fraga’s new institution, however, did not only differ from the previous approaches in terms of its longevity and stability; rather, the CIP was far more explicitly created for foreign correspondents. Accordingly, Fraga highlighted the institution’s purpose in his opening speech for the inauguration of the club:

\[\ldots\] I understand that the International Press Club fills an important function by putting into contact those whose mission it is to inform all newspapers of the world about Spanish life, by getting them to know their Spanish colleagues, by offering them occasions to socialize with Spanish officials who are entrusted precisely with attending to foreign journalists. And all of this in an environment of cordiality and personal relation very different from the one derived from the mere dealing with any administration.\footnote{AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.608, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Discurso del Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Información y Turismo en la apertura del Club Internacional de Prensa. Fraga’s speech was reprinted in Spanish newspapers. See, for example, La Vanguardia Española, “Apertura del Club Internacional de Prensa: Discurso del ministro de Información y Turismo,” 16 November 1962, 7.}

The first article of the CIP’s bylaws further specified the club’s purpose as a ‘centre for meetings, relations, information and work’\footnote{Ministerio de Información y Turismo, Club internacional de prensa (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1963), 7.} for the foreign press. At the same time and without further specifying the parallel functions of the correspondents’ associations, the
CIP could communicate with the Spanish authorities in cases where ‘[…] support, help and cooperation can facilitate the task of the foreign correspondents in Spain.’

The membership regulations of the club reflected this new approach. While the CIP welcomed all foreign correspondents as its members, Spanish journalists could only become members if they were either members of the board of directors of the Spanish Journalist Association or the directors of Spanish newspapers, radio and TV stations. Furthermore, press attachés from the foreign embassies in Madrid, the heads of the press offices of Spanish ministries and official institutions were also accepted. Only if the board of directors of the new club wished to do so could other persons falling outside of these categories become members.

In line with this focus on foreign correspondents, the MIT granted foreign journalists a central influence in the CIP’s board of directors. Seven- or one half - of the members of the CIP’s board of directors were foreign correspondents. The board of directors of the ACPE and the ACPI each nominated three correspondents, while the seventh journalist was not supposed to be a member of any of the two organizations and was elected by the foreign press corps in Madrid. A further three members on the CIP’s board were Spanish journalists nominated by the Press Association of Madrid. The remaining four members came from Francoist institutions, namely the MIT’s DG for the press (two), the OID (one) and the Institute for Hispanic Culture (one).

While the MIT thus granted the foreign correspondents a central role in the governing the club, Fraga was unwilling to give up all control over the newly founded organization. In the end, the CIP remained a facility owned and financed by the MIT. This was explicitly highlighted in the last paragraph of the CIP’s bylaws, which reserved the right for the Ministry of Information and Tourism to use the facilities of the CIP for any of its own informational purposes ‘in extraordinary cases’. Furthermore, through the CIP’s board of directors the Francoist authorities could directly control the club’s activities. In the end, half of the board were none-correspondents with either direct or close ties to the regime. In practical terms, this gave the regime a decisive role in the management of the club and in particular in the annual election of its presidents by a simple majority of the board. Nevertheless, as a further reflection of the CIP’s aim, the president of the club always had

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367 Ibid.
368 Ibid., 8.
369 Ibid., 7.
370 Ibid., 8.
to be a foreign correspondent. Although not explicitly specified in the bylaws of the CIP, it became common practice that the president was always a member of the ACPE, while the vice-president was a member of the ACPI and the secretary general a Spanish journalist and member of the APM.

The Francoist authorities did not only exercise direct influence on the CIP’s board of directors through its particular composition; they could also count on the support of some foreign correspondents, especially from Latin America. This is especially true for Jose Chelala López, who was vice-president of CIP from 1964 to 1972.

As a result, parts of the foreign press corps in Spain saw the CIP with mixed feelings. Journalists critical of Franco were keenly aware and suspicious of the Francoist authorities’ involvement in the CIP. Thus, Harry Debelius, who worked as a stringer for British and US media before becoming accredited as staff correspondent for UPI and the US broadcaster ABC during the 1960s, and then Spain correspondent for The Times, retrospectively wrote about the general attitude among the correspondents towards the new press club:

in this epoch, one did accept well the [foundation of the CIP] since it were other times, although it was clear – and we were aware about this – that certain people could not be taken there. But it was a place to come together on which we counted from then on.

Obviously, by referring to ‘certain people’, Debelius meant those critical of the regime, who did not consider the CIP as a suitable place to meet. The German correspondents Manfred von Conta (Süddeutsche Zeitung) and Walter Haubrich (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), who was the president of the CIP from 1973-80, both considered the CIP as an institution created for the control of the foreign press in Spain. At the same time, von Conta also highlighted what he regarded as a fundamental difference between the CIP and the ACPE: ‘Contrary to the CIP, which I understood as a tool to control or influence our independence, the Agrupación de Corresponsales was an organization to express and protect our collective professional interests.’ Spanish journalists also shared this

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371 Ibid.
373 Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1965, 1469.
374 Ministerio de Información y Turismo, Club internacional de prensa (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1966), 54.
375 Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1970, 293.
376 Club Internacional de Prensa, Libro de Plata, 13.
377 Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011, Madrid; Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling.
378 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling.
assessment of the CIP. The long-term president of the private Spanish news agency *Europa Press*, José Mario Armero, for instance, wrote about the foundation of the CIP: ‘He [Fraga] had much information about was written abroad. I think that this [the CIP] was an operation in order to control it’.  

Indeed, the foundation of the CIP must be seen in the context of Fraga’s general administrative reforms and policy approach (discussed in Chapter 6), which he used to improve Spain’s international image. Nevertheless, despite the suspicion of the correspondents, the CIP became an accepted place to meet for foreign and Spanish journalists. This was not least due to generous subsidies, with which the CIP was supported by the DG for the Press and which it in part invested in very affordable prices of the CIP’s own restaurant which became popular among the correspondents.

Fraga invested substantial time in working with the CIP. In 1965 alone, the Minister of Information and Tourism gave eight press conferences there. Other high-ranking Spanish officials from the Commissioner General of the Development Plan to the Vice-Secretary of the Movement and the Mayor of Madrid frequently answered the questions of correspondents in the CIP. As Chapter 6 will show, these frequent press conferences by Francoist officials marked a significant change in the regime’s attitude towards the foreign press and the CIP had an important function in this development.

Following Fraga’s dismissal in 1969 however, the MIT’s attitude to the CIP changed noticeably. Under the new minister, Alfredo Sánchez Bella, the Francoist authorities became far less willing to confront the foreign press. From a professional point of view, the CIP thus became less important for the foreign press corps. The German correspondent Walter Haubrich, who started to work in Spain in 1968, for instance, recalls that the CIP increasingly turned into a place for social reunions only:

> in the opinion of the majority of the members of the Association [of Foreign Correspondents], the events in the Club during this time had little to do with the professional work of the journalists: events like fashion shows, social reunions and presentations of commercial products which had nothing to do with press work.

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380 See for example Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling; Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling, 13 July 2012; Madrid. Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011.
382 Club Internacional de Prensa, *Libro de Plata*, 16-17.
The CIP’s decreasing professional value contributed to a growing dissatisfaction of a new generation of correspondents like Haubrich and others, who were less willing to accept the continued official control over the press club. The resulting conflict broke out for the first time in the context of the election of the German correspondent Karl Tichmann as president of the CIP in 1970. Tichmann was one of many German correspondents with a professional past in Nazi Germany, who had remained in Spain after 1945. He had come to Spain in order to cover the Spanish Civil War from the Rebel territories for the official news agency of Nazi Germany, the *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro*. During the Second World War, Tichmann worked for the press office of the German embassy in Madrid.\(^{383}\) After the defeat of the Axis powers, the German journalist made his living as a correspondent for various German media.\(^{384}\)

Tichmann supported the Franco regime and the Francoist authorities had already supported his presidency of the CIP in 1963-64.\(^{385}\) By 1970, however, the situation had changed and Tichmann’s second election as president was strongly opposed by parts of the foreign press corps. As the representative of the OID reported, British and American correspondents in particular not only questioned Tichmann’s professionalism - considering him an ‘occasional journalist’ - but also saw in Tichmann’s election an attempt by the Francoist authorities to strengthen their influence over the CIP since the German journalist was considered ‘much more controllable than any Anglo-Saxon correspondents’.\(^{386}\)

The growing tension between the foreign press corps and the MIT became even more virulent during an almost parallel visit of the members of the CIP’s board of directors to the minister Sánchez Bella. The new minister strongly complained about the bad image of the new government in the foreign press. Indeed, Sánchez Bella even directly threatened the CIP delegation with the suspension of the CIP if he could not ‘observe a favourable reaction among the foreign correspondents’.\(^{387}\) The correspondents on the board of directors reacted in a similar way as to the election of Tichmann. Instead of giving in to the minister’s demands, they openly considered the possibility of ‘making the Club

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\(^{383}\) AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.387, Folder Karl Tichmann: Report by Brigada Político Social on Karl Tichmann, 7 March 1944.


\(^{386}\) AGA, (03) 49.23, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Oficina de Información Diplomática to Subsecretario de Información y Turismo, 11 March 1970.

\(^{387}\) Ibid.
independent from all official connections.\textsuperscript{388} For the moment, however, they choose less drastic measures to show their dissatisfaction both with the MIT’s attitude towards the CIP and the lack of willingness on the part of the Francoist official to participate in press conferences. The correspondents on the board of directors instead invited representatives of the political opposition.\textsuperscript{389}

This episode was symptomatic of Sánchez Bella’s attitude towards the foreign press and the growing resistance of parts of the foreign press corps towards the MIT’s involvement. It also sheds light on the once more growing conflict between the MIT and the Foreign Ministry at the time regarding policy towards the foreign press. Indeed, the OID representative in the CIP strongly argued that a correction of the MIT’s position towards the CIP was urgently necessary in order to avoid a further worsening of relations with the foreign press.\textsuperscript{390} Eventually, the MIT gave in. The DG for the Press followed the OID’s recommendation by officially apologizing to the CIP’s board of directors in the name of the Minister for Information and Tourism. In fact, the DG for the Press reaffirmed ‘the total support of the Ministry of Information and Tourism for the Club’.\textsuperscript{391} This support was subsequently reflected in the sudden willingness of several ministers to give press conferences at the CIP.

Although the MIT’s apology calmed the situation for the time being, it did not bring a permanent solution to the underlying problems regarding either the general professional orientation of the CIP or its control by the Francoist authorities. Both issues came back on the agenda in 1973. In the last months of Sánchez Bella’s term in office, the CIP’s board of directors, with the support of the OID, elected Haubrich, who was highly critical of the Franco regime, as its new president.\textsuperscript{392} Shortly afterwards, the new president initiated the creation of a commission, exclusively composed of members of the ACPE, to discuss and suggest means for the ‘renewal and reorganization’\textsuperscript{393} of the CIP. The commission submitted its recommendations to the DG for the Press shortly afterwards. In sum, the CIP’s commission suggested three key measures: the strengthening of the influence of the ACPE over the activities of the CIP, the general focus of the club towards the needs of journalists,

\textsuperscript{388} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{389} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{390} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{391} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{392} Club Internacional de Prensa, \textit{Libro de Plata}, 47. See also Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011.
\textsuperscript{393} Ministerio de Información y Turismo, \textit{Club internacional de prensa} (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1966), 17.
and most importantly, limiting the influence of the Spanish authorities over the club’s activities. 394

With the support of the OID and against the background of the appointment of the more liberal Cabanillas as Minister for Information and Tourism 1974, the correspondents succeeded with their key demand, to establish the CIP’s independence from any official control, before the death of Franco in 1975.395 In May 1975, the MIT formally accepted that the president of the ACPE, elected by the association’s members, would automatically become president of the CIP.396 While the representatives of the Francoist institutions remained members of the CIP’s board of directors, they lost all influence on the appointment of the club’s president. The CIP, therefore, became ‘totally controlled by the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents’.397 In practice, the course of events in 1975 made the actual implementation of the new regulation less important. Following the death of Franco in November 1975, Harry Debelius became the president of the ACPE, while Walter Haubrich remained the CIP’s president throughout the transition to democracy until 1980.398

The MIT’s concession to the demands made by the ACPE commission resulted from the conclusion that while it should be ‘considered useful to maintain […] the patronage over […] [the CIP], it seems necessary to continue rethinking this […], to have an adequate and useful revitalization of the Club’.399 This willingness to give in to the foreign correspondents in order to revitalize the CIP was also reflected in the MIT’s reaction to the second central demand by the ACPE commission: the increase of professional (in addition to social and other) activities in the CIP.

At the time, the CIP continued to be used mainly for social, cultural and commercial activities. Largely inactive in journalistic matters, the representative of the Institute for Hispanic Culture on the CIP’s board of directors, for instance, saw his main role in using the CIP for exhibitions for Spanish painters and other cultural events.400 Furthermore, some

394 AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Subdirector General de Prensa Extranjera to Director General de Prensa, 24 May 1973.
395 Club Internacional de Prensa, Libro de Plata, 18.
396 Ibid.
397 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.9043, Folder 6: Dirección General de Seguridad/ Jefatura de Información to Ministerio de Información y Turismo/ Oficina de Enlace, 17 May 1975.
398 Ibid.
399 AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Jefe del Gabinete del Servicio Exterior to Subsecretario de Información y Turismo, 2 May 1975.
400 AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Junta de Gobierno del Club Internacional de Prensa, 10 October 1974.
Latin American stringers in particular, who also had other business interests in Spain, used the CIP for the presentation of products.\textsuperscript{401} Against this background, the ACPE commission included in its suggestions for the reform of the CIP the demand that club should only be used for events of professional interest. In order to guarantee the professional value, only the journalistic member organizations (APM, ACPE and ACPI), not individuals, should have the right to organize events in the CIP.\textsuperscript{402} In the meantime, Haubrich assured the CIP’s board of directors that ‘all measures have been taken in order to guarantee that none of the activities realized in the club can involve hidden commercial aims’\textsuperscript{403}. Haubrich accompanied this restriction of non-professional activities with the demand for more press conferences by government officials in the CIP.\textsuperscript{404} The MIT’s representative on the board of directors supported these demands by concluding that the current ‘absence of the foreign correspondents [in the CIP] [resulted] […] from a general lack of attention by the Ministry of Information and Tourism’\textsuperscript{405}. He supported this point by highlighting that ‘in the Club they are longing for the activities which were carried in the time of Fraga’\textsuperscript{406}.

In order to find a lasting solution for the CIP, the MIT took the unusual step of studying international press clubs in other European countries, in particular those in Italy and Belgium.\textsuperscript{407} Shortly before the dismissal of Cabanillas as Minister for Information and Tourism, this resulted in a new willingness to try new and unusually liberal means in order to come to terms with the expectations of the foreign press corps and to improve the functioning of the CIP. The MIT’s Cabinet for Foreign Service concluded that ‘with all the risks involved it is unquestionably the case that calling for a General Assembly – ordinary or extraordinary – would increase the interest of members in the life of an association’\textsuperscript{408}.

\textsuperscript{401} See Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.

\textsuperscript{402} AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Subdirector General de Prensa to Director General de Prensa, 24 May 1973.

\textsuperscript{403} AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Untitled report on a meeting of the board of directors of Club Internacional de Prensa, 2 December 1974.

\textsuperscript{404} AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Consejero de Información to Director General del Gabinete Servicio Exterior, 10 October 1974.

\textsuperscript{405} AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Untitled handwritten note by the MIT’s representative on the board of directors of the Club Internacional de Prensa [undated]

\textsuperscript{406} AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Gabinete del Exterior, Análisis de la situación actual del Club Internacional de Prensa, y surgencias para su revitalización [Although this report is undated, its author directly refers in its first paragraph to a ‘last meeting’ with the board of directors of the Club Internacional de Prensa on 9 October 1974. This report, therefore, was most likely written shortly after.]

\textsuperscript{407} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{408} Ibid.
Despite his generally more restrictive attitude, Cabanillas’ successor Herrera, who became Minister of Information and Tourism in the end of 1974, also accepted the need to loosen the control over the CIP. A General Assembly was introduced in 1975. Furthermore, the MIT’s Cabinet for Foreign Services followed the correspondents’ demands and suggested a noticeable increase of press conferences by Francoist officials. These press conferences were not going to be accessible to all members of the CIP but only fully accredited staff correspondents. In this way, the Cabinet for Foreign Service complied with another key demand by the correspondents for professionalizing the CIP.

Throughout the first half of the 1970s, therefore, the nature of the CIP changed fundamentally. While the influence of the Francoist authorities on the CIP’s internal affairs was rolled back, the members of the Association for Foreign Press became the central actors in the management of the CIP. Nevertheless, the CIP still formally remained an institution of the Ministry of Information and Tourism. Finally, the last articles of the CIP’s bylaws, which granted the MIT the right to use the club for its own purposes, remained unchanged.

In fact, the formal right to shut down the CIP saw the last clash between the correspondents in the CIP and the Francoist authorities shortly after the death of Franco on 20 November 1975. The correspondents, in particular Haubrich, had planned to invite the leader of the still illegal Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) and later Prime Minister after 1982, Felipe González, to give a press conference at the CIP. The MIT saw this plan as an open provocation, which it was in fact intended as, and closed the CIP down for five days with the official justification that its personnel was needed elsewhere. This false pretext resulted in international reports about the ‘prohibition for one of the socialist leaders of the opposition to speak before the foreign press’ as a ‘first important example of press restrictions under the reign of Juan Carlos I.’ For the president of the CIP it was clear that the closure of the club was an “initiative in order to ensure that they do not hold the conference before the ceremonies” for the coronation of Juan Carlos I. as new head of the state planned for 22 November 1975. In practical terms,

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409 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.9043, Folder 6: Dirección General de Seguridad/ Jefatura de Información to Ministerio de Información y Turismo/ Oficina de Enlace, 17 May 1975.
410 Ibid.
411 AGA, (03) 049.023, 68.808, Folder Club Internacional de Prensa: Junta de Gobierno del Club Internacional de Prensa, 10 October 1974.
412 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.9043, Folder 3: UPI report by Arthur Hermann, 26 November 1975.
413 Ibid.
however, the intervention of the MIT had little impact. The correspondents simply moved the press conference with González to the Palace Hotel across the street.414

This intervention remained the last attempt by the Spanish government to control the CIP. Nevertheless, it still took until 1979/80 for the internal organization of the CIP to be formally adapted to the changed political situation. The changes then implemented by the new authority responsible for the foreign press and formal owner of the CIP, the State Secretary for Information, strongly reflected the previous debates. The ACPE, respectively its board of directors, from then on became directly responsible for the CIP and its ‘reorganization’ as well as for its ‘democratic and professional’415 future functioning. Shortly thereafter, the ACPE drafted new bylaws for the CIP,416 which were approved in July 1980.417 The new bylaws formally ended all state influence on the CIP’s board of directors and the State Secretary for Information was only to appoint an administrative Secretary. Instead, the ACPE became the central institution for the control of the board. The president, the vice-president and seven board members had to be full members of the CIP and of the ACPE, while three seats were reserved for associate members of the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents. All of these seats were filled by the board of directors of the ACPE, which was elected by secret ballot among its members. Spanish journalists and Spanish officials with direct links to the press such as the heads of governmental press departments were represented on the CIP’s board of directors with two members each. Thus, the professional foreign correspondents gained full control over the CIP.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown that the foundation and functioning of organizations for foreign correspondents was a highly political issue in Francoist Spain, as should be expected in cases of authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the chapter has also shown that the

414 Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011.
415 AGA, (09) 009.005, 52.14736: Proyecto de Acuerdo entre la Secretaría de Estado para la Información y la Asociación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera [undated]. The signing of this agreement in 1979 was dated both in a later yearbook of the Club Internacional de Prensa as well as by the president of the ACPE at the time, Juan José Dragoevich (better known as Tito Drago). See Juan José Dragoevich (Tito Drago), interview by Tobias Reckling, 13 February 2012, Madrid; Club Internacional de Prensa, Libro de Plata, 18.
416 AGA, (09) 009.005, 52.14736: Proyecto de Acuerdo entre la Secretaría de Estado para la Información y la Asociación de Corresponsales de Prensa Extranjera [undated]
417 Club Internacional de Prensa, Libro de Plata, 20.
examination of the organizations for foreign correspondents allows for insights into the changing attitude of the Franco regime towards the foreign press after 1945.

Initially, the Francoist authorities were highly reluctant to accept any kind of organization for correspondents and closed down the existing association for foreign correspondents shortly after the end of the Civil War. Following the defeat of the Axis powers, the regime started to change its attitude in the context of its attempts to improve its image abroad. However, the Franco regime was not willing to accept any kind of self-organization by correspondents. The press clubs for the foreign press created during the 1940s and early 1950s, therefore, were fully state-controlled institutions. These clubs proved to be unattractive to foreign correspondents, who did not accept official control. At the same time, the Franco regime did not initiate these clubs as exclusively professional organizations but also as cultural institutions.

Following the end of Spain’s international isolation and governmental reforms, the attitude of the Francoist authorities changed during the second half of the 1950s. This resulted in the re-foundation of an ACPE in 1957, initiated and controlled exclusively by foreign correspondents. The association’s founders’ sympathies for the regime helped them gain the Ministry of Information and Tourism’s approval. Personal ties and attitudes towards the Franco regime were even more important for the foundation of the second association for foreign correspondents, the ACPI, at the beginning of the 1960s. Its creation reflected the regime’s alleged special relationship with Latin America and in part served a foreign policy purpose. This special relationship was also reflected in the official support the founders of the association received from the Franco regime. The correspondents from Western democracies, who were predominantly organized in the ACPE, considered the ACPI as an association of limited professional integrity.

While both associations were self-controlled in principle, this did not apply to the CIP founded by Manuel Fraga in 1962. Although more directly orientated towards the foreign press corps, the Francoist authorities maintained control over the internal functioning of the press club through its representatives in the club’s board of directors. The creation of the press club was a reflection of Fraga’s attempts to improve Spain’s image abroad. This rationale was also reflected in the frequency, with which Francoist officials gave press conferences in the CIP throughout the 1960s. However, following Fraga’s dismissal as Minister of Information and Tourism in 1969, his successor, Sánchez Bella, adopted a more restrictive attitude towards the foreign press. This
resulted in decreasing official attention for the CIP. Instead, the club became increasingly used for cultural and commercial activities, which fundamentally undermined its professional value for foreign correspondents. At the same time, parts of the foreign press corps, especially the members of the ACPE started to resist the official control over the CIP’s activities. Both developments resulted in conflicts between the foreign press corps and the Ministry of Information and Tourism at the start of the 1970s. The Foreign Ministry partly supported the correspondent’s strive for greater independence in order to avoid a worsening of the regime’s relations with the foreign press. In this way, the conflict about the CIP also reflected the conflict of competences regarding the foreign press between the MIT and the Foreign Ministry (discussed in Chapter 1). The conflicts between the journalists’ organizations fit into a general development in Spain. Radcliff has argued that associations became vital for the growing resistance against the Franco regime since the 1960s and thereby became instrumental for the ‘citizen movement’ during the Spanish transition.418 Although the CIP and the ACPE were very particular organizations and the correspondents were in a strong position for negotiations, their growing resistance against the MIT, therefore, nevertheless reflected a general development. In contrast to the Spanish opposition, however, the foreign correspondents could already resolve their conflicts with the regime before the transition to democracy. Under the more liberal leadership of Cabanillas, the MIT eventually gave in to the demands of the foreign correspondents. It was only just before the death of Franco that the CIP finally reached full independence from state control in the organization of its internal affairs.

3. Foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain

During the Civil War, Spain was a hotspot for international media. Approximately 1000 correspondents covered the events in Spain at one time or another between 1936 and 1939.\textsuperscript{419} In contrast, the dictatorship established at the end of the war had far less appeal for the international press corps. The Franco regime not only established a very restrictive policy towards foreign correspondents but also the international media interest was drawn onto the battlefields of the Second World War after 1939. Even before the UN politically ostracized Spain in 1946, therefore, the Franco regime was already isolated in terms of international media interest. By 1945, only 13 full-time correspondents and stringers were accredited for international news agencies in Spain. Major international agencies like \textit{Reuters} maintained only a minimal service with two accredited staff correspondents.\textsuperscript{420}

Although some former Spain correspondents like Buckley returned to Madrid after their postings during the Second World War,\textsuperscript{421} the international media interest in Franco’s Spain remained limited. This only started to change with Spain’s gradual return onto the international stage from the beginning of the 1950s. Against this background, this chapter will examine the development of the foreign press corps in Spain from the 1950s until the death of Franco in 1975. By examining the presence of foreign correspondents using both a quantitative and qualitative approach, this chapter will not only provide an understanding of the changing constitution of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. Rather, the study of the size and composition of foreign press corps allows for further insights. First, building on work by researchers like Cohen, the chapter examines the numerical presence of correspondents in Spain until 1975 as a general indicator for international media interest in Francoist Spain.\textsuperscript{422} The chapter will analyse the numbers of correspondents as well as the media for which they worked (TV and radio, print media, and news agencies).

Second, the chapter will examine the geographical origin of the journalists and the media for which they were accredited. Thus, the chapter will demonstrate that the Franco regime’s active striving for international recognition as well as its changing international position

\textsuperscript{419} Armero, \textit{España fue noticia}, 409-436. Preston points out that Armero’s ‘list is defective in many ways, not the least in the omission of many correspondents known to have been in Spain, but is indicative in numbers’. However, Preston does not provide a more accurate statistic and Armero’s list therefore remains the most comprehensive list of foreign correspondents in the Spanish Civil War available. Nevertheless, also Preston points out that Armero’s list is “indicative of its numbers”. Preston, \textit{We saw Spain die}, 445 [Note 26].

\textsuperscript{420} See Dirección General de Prensa, ed., \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1945-46} (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 1946), 909.

\textsuperscript{421} See Preston, \textit{We saw Spain die}, 412.

\textsuperscript{422} Cohen, “Foreign press corps as an indicator of international news interest”. 
after 1950 was reflected in the composition of the foreign press corps in Madrid. With this perspective, the chapter builds on and develops insights by communication researchers, who have examined the geographical distribution of foreign correspondents as a reflection of particular bilateral relations. This perspective proves to be particularly valuable for the understanding of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. The chapter will show that the composition of the foreign press corps reflected Spain’s cultural and historical ties as well as its changing political and economic relations. In particular, the consequences of the Spanish Civil War as well as Francoist Spain’s former ties with the Axis Powers will be shown to have had a direct impact on the foreign press corps.

Foreign Correspondents in Franco’s Spain 1945-1975: An Overview

The previous chapter outlined that the Franco regime tried to improve and professionalize its relations with the foreign press corps after 1945. This applied in particular to the newly founded MIT from the beginning of the 1950s. However, the MIT not only reformed the administration of the foreign press corps, but also directed its reforms at a growing number of correspondents who were coming to Spain at the end of the Franco regime’s international isolation. On the eve of Spain’s return into the international community in 1953/54, the MIT had already accredited 24 correspondents for foreign news agencies. Following the end of the UN ban on the Franco regime in 1955, this number rose to 34 correspondents a year later. In 1955, the MIT, in its Anuario de la Prensa Española, published not only the names of the accredited journalists for foreign news agencies as usual, but also a full list of all accredited foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain. While in itself a reflection of the MIT’s growing attention for the foreign press corps, this and the annual lists that followed also provide the basis for a detailed examination of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain from the mid-1950s.

The growing number of correspondents for news agencies reflected a growing presence of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain more generally by the mid-1950s. Figure 1 shows that 96 full-time staff correspondents and 61 part-time journalists were accredited in 1955. Throughout the following two decades, the size of the foreign press corps continued to develop in parallel with Spain’s improving political and also economic situation. In 1960, shortly after the regime had laid the ground for the subsequent economic boom with the

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424 See Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1955-1956, 207-211.
implementation of the Plan for Economic Stabilization, the MIT could count 131 correspondents and 68 accredited part-time journalists in its ranks, almost 200 accredited correspondents in total.\textsuperscript{425} Compared with the mid-1950s, this was a remarkable increase of foreign correspondents by 27\% within only five years.

While Spain was still no hot spot for international news at the beginning of the 1960s, it was no no-man’s land either. Foreign correspondents accredited in Spain at the time noticed this development. Benjamin Welles, Spain correspondents for \textit{The New York Times} from 1956 to 1962, for instance, stressed that Spain is not really news. However, interest is growing. […] yet for the average news editor, Spain only becomes news when the regime is menaced by strikes, by political disorders, by natural disasters, or by rumours of Franco’s ill health.\textsuperscript{426}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Foreign Correspondents in Spain, 1955-75\textsuperscript{427}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{426} Welles, \textit{Spain, The gentle Anarchy}, 92.
\textsuperscript{427} This and the following Figures 2-8 are primarily based on the analysis of the accreditation lists published in the \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española}. Despite its name, the DG for the Press did not publish these \textit{Anuarios} yearly, but only in the years 1956, 1961, 1965, and 1970. See Dirección General de Prensa, \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1955-1956}, 207-211; Dirección General de Prensa, \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1960-1961}, 385-390; Dirección General de Prensa, \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1965}, 1458-1472; Dirección General de Prensa, \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1970}, 291-299. The analysis of the press corps in 1975, when the DG for the Press did not publish its yearbook, is based on AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 3: Sección de Prensa Extranjera, Corresponsales de prensa extranjera acreditados en España 1975 [undated]. These information were complemented by ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros – Jefes [no signature]; ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Colaboradores de Prensa Extranjera [no archival signature]. The different accreditation types in 1965 resulted from the changed accreditation guidelines in 1963 (discussed in Chapter 1).
When Manuel Fraga became Minister of Information and Tourism, he actively tried to strengthen this growing media interest. Thus, the MIT organized programmes for tourism journalists in order to promote Spain as a destination for Western European and American holidaymakers. However, while Fraga’s tourist campaign was a success, it had little impact on the total number of accredited correspondents. Instead, as Figure 1 shows, the overall size of the foreign press corps remained stable until the mid-1960s and even slightly decreased thereafter. Nevertheless, this general figure is partially misleading. In fact, while the overall number of accreditations remained stable and even decreased after 1960, the composition of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain profoundly changed.

Figure 2 shows that these changes applied first and foremost to the types of media that correspondents were accredited to in Francoist Spain. In the 1950s, practically the entire foreign press corps worked either for print media or for news agencies. In fact, the correspondents for print media, with 75%, represented the vast majority of all accredited correspondents in 1955, while foreign television and radio stations had practically no correspondents in Spain. This situation started to change during the 1960s. Together with the accreditation of more correspondents for news agencies and print media, twelve journalists for TV and radio were accredited by 1965. Compared with 1955, this represented an increase of 500%.

### Figure 2: Media with correspondents in Spain and correspondents accredited per media, 1955-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Correspondents 1955</th>
<th>Correspondents 1965</th>
<th>Correspondents 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TV and Radio</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Print media</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Agencies</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

428 See Gienow-Hecht and Fischer, “Was ist und wozu braucht man «Nation Branding»?“.
430 Based on the same sources as Figure 1.
The tendency towards a further diversification of the foreign press corps intensified throughout the last years of the regime, not just in total numbers but also proportionally. While remaining the most important group of correspondents, the presence of print journalists noticeably decreased from the end of the 1960s. In fact, compared with 1965, the number of foreign print journalists dropped by 20 in 1975 and again reached the level of the 1950s. At the same time, foreign and especially German TV and radio broadcasters not only continued to send further correspondents to Spain (16 in total in 1975) but foreign broadcasters also started to open fully staffed offices in Madrid. While in the mid-1960s twelve accredited journalists were working for twelve different broadcasters, the German public broadcaster ZDF alone employed four journalists in Madrid by 1975. Indeed, ZDF was one of the first foreign TV stations to open a permanent bureau in Spain. Around the same time, the second German public broadcaster ARD accredited Horst Hano as its first correspondent in Madrid.

This increased presence of TV correspondents in Madrid naturally reflected the general expansion of television. Nevertheless, the opening of fully staffed bureaus marked a considerable financial commitment for foreign broadcasters and thus reflected a growing media interest. As we see in Figure 1, the number of accredited staff correspondents actually remained stable after 1960. The changing numbers in 1965, the result of the previously discussed introduction of two categories of staff correspondents, do not contradict this observation. At the same time, Figure 1 also shows that the overall decrease in accredited correspondents after 1965 was mainly caused by the departure of accredited part-time journalists. This development was not the result of a lack of international media interest in Spain. Instead, it was the result of the changing accreditation policy by the Francoist authorities during the 1960s.

The previous chapter briefly discussed that the accreditation as staff correspondents came with a number of benefits. While the MIT intended for this policy to improve the relations with foreign correspondents, it had the unintended consequence of making the accreditation status of staff correspondents highly attractive. Manfred von Conta, correspondent of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, vividly remembered the consequences:

431 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 3: Sección de Prensa Extranjera, Corresponsales de prensa extranjera acreditados en España 1975 [undated].
These privileges made it very desirable to be registered as a foreign correspondent, a fact that seduced non-professionals living in Spain for many other reasons than journalistic activities to look in the countries of their origin for any kind of periodical publication that could be talked into signing an application for accreditation. Even the smallest or most humble periodical that never would have dreamt of financially maintaining a correspondent in Madrid would serve. Magazines for knitting fashions or culinaria from provincial France could be represented in Madrid by special “Correspondents” and even the seriousness of the representative of the widely unknown “Hamburger Brief” could have been doubted.434

The Francoist authorities facilitated the misuse of the accreditation status. In the regime’s striving for international acceptance, the Section for Foreign Press was very gracious in granting and renewing the accreditations for a considerable number of individuals with doubtful professional credentials.

Under Manuel Fraga, this practice was initially continued. In fact, the reform of the accreditation laws under Fraga in 1963, which ended the status of part-time journalists and instead introduced the new categories of chief correspondents and editors, both formally staff correspondents, opened the door to more abuse of the accreditation status. Fraga further increased the overall number of officially accredited correspondents by granting 18 exceptional honorary accreditations altogether.435 As the previous chapter has argued with regard to the founders of the ACPI, the MIT granted this accreditation status mainly for journalistic support of the Franco regime. The Franco regime’s accreditation policy, therefore, partly accounts for the growing number of correspondents during the first half of the 1960s overall.

By the mid-1960s, the growing number of correspondents brought the Section for Foreign Press of the MIT to the limits of its working capacity and the head of the section asked for additional staff.436 Against this background, the MIT seemingly started to question the actual value of its accreditation policy. The re-introduction of the former categories of staff correspondents and part-time correspondents with the reform of the accreditation guidelines in 1966 and 1967 outlined in the previous chapter reflected this policy change. More importantly, in contrast to the previous years, the Section for Foreign Press started to apply

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434 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling.
436 AGA, (03) 0049.004, 21.755, Jefe Sección de Prensa Extranjera to Director General de Prensa, 30 April 1964.
the accreditation guidelines with greater rigour after 1967. Although an official order to effect this policy change could not be found in the archives, numerous identical reports point to a thorough inquiry into the actual professionalism of the accredited correspondents. Based on this information, the Section for Foreign Press re-evaluated the submissions for the yearly renewal of the accreditation of staff correspondents. The Francoist officials declined or downgraded a considerable number of these applications to the status of part-time journalist, which came without any economic benefits.

The Section for Foreign Press implemented this new policy with a remarkable thoroughness and declined even the applications of correspondents who were very much in favour of the regime (and of their beneficial status as full-time correspondents). The Austrian Harold Weinzetl, for instance, was already accredited as a staff correspondent from 1953 before the Francoist officials declined the renewal of his accreditation because he was unable to present any recent journalistic work. The submitted manuscript ‘A peculiar Dictator – Franco’, in which Weinzetl described Spain as a peaceful quasi-democracy, was not enough to convince the Section of Foreign Press of his journalistic professionalism. In contrast to previous years, Weinzetl’s other forms of service for the Franco regime, which he outlined thoroughly, did not help. During the Civil War, Weinzetl had been the Austrian observer and head of the press office of the Non-Intervention Committee in London – a function which, in his own words, gave ‘help and support to the Rebel’s cause’. After the end of the Civil War, Weinzetl was an important actor in the Nazi party organization in Madrid. Following the defeat of the Axis Powers, Weinzetl remained in Spain and was accredited in the 1950s for the Austrian newspaper of the conservative Austrian People’s Party, Volksblatt. Furthermore, Weinzetl was the president of the Austrian Association in Madrid, which did ‘everything possible for the formation of the mutual friendship and understanding between Spain and Austria’.

Although Weinzetl produced practically no journalistic work, these merits secured the yearly renewal of his accreditation. By 1967, however, the Section for Foreign Press declined his application. Weinzetl refused the offered accreditation as a part-time journalist.

438 AGA, (03) 0049.021, 58.390, Folder Harold Weinzetl: Harold Weinzetl to Director General de Prensa, [undated]
439 See David A. Messenger, Hunting Nazis in Franco’s Spain (Baton Rogue: Louisiana State University Press, 2014), 84.
441 AGA, (03) 0049.021, 58.390, Folder Harold Weinzetl: Harold Weinzetl to Director General de Prensa, [undated].
since this status came with no economic benefits. Other ‘correspondents’, who were not able to gain an accreditation as staff-correspondents, did the same.

Under Fraga, the ideological aspects of accreditations had become less important for receiving an accreditation as a full-time correspondent than actual journalistic professionalism. The decline of the overall number of mainly part-time accreditations between 1965 and 1970, therefore, was partly caused by the policy change for the accreditations of full-time correspondents and not by a declining international media interest.

This examination of the changing size of the foreign press corps gives a broad impression of the general development of international media interest in Francoist Spain. Examining the geographical distribution of the media with correspondents in Spain, this chapter will provide further insights into both the development of international media interest in Spain and the changing composition of the foreign press corps.

Figure 3 shows that the examination of the geographical distribution of the media with correspondents in Spain leaves an unambiguous picture. European correspondents represented approximately half of all foreign correspondents accredited in Francoist Spain at any one time. The rest of the foreign press corps were composed almost exclusively and in equal parts by journalists working for US and Latin American media. While this general distribution remained roughly stable from the 1950s, some changes stand out. Figure 3 shows that mostly European part-time journalist left after the change of the accreditation policy in 1967. Thereafter, however, the presence of European correspondents increased again and by 1975 reached the level of the beginning of the 1960s. US correspondents noticeably increased to 50 correspondents by 1965, but continuously dropped thereafter and the US media only had 32 accredited correspondents in Spain by 1975. The Latin American press corps also steadily grew throughout the 1960s. In fact, Latin American correspondents were the only group which did not decline in numbers in 1970s. In 1975, the Francoist authorities had accredited practically the same number of Latin American journalists as in 1955.
This changing proportional composition of the foreign press corps is not surprising. It reflects Spain’s societal, political, economic and cultural relations, which resulted in increased public and media attention for Spain in certain regions of the world. Spain’s geographical location in Europe, the leading political role of the US as well as their large international media market and Spain’s traditional links with Latin America, which intensified during the Franco era, are key explanatory factors. At the same time, some Western media also used Spain as the basis for their correspondents to cover neighbouring countries and regions, especially Portugal and the Maghreb. The Swiss correspondent Arnold Hottinger, for instance, covered the Arab world for the newspaper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* from 1961 before coming to Madrid in 1968. From Spain, Hottinger continued to travel to and report from the Arab world. Until 1978, The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* also relied for reports on the Maghreb and Portugal from their Spain correspondents. To a certain extent, therefore, Madrid was a ‘news centre’ for Portugal

![Foreign Media in Spain 1955-75: Geographical Regions](image.png)

**Figure 3: Foreign Media in Spain 1955-75: Geographical Regions**

442 Based on the same sources as Figure 1.
and the Maghreb similar to that of Vienna for Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The impact of this function as ‘news centre’ on the size of the foreign press corps is impossible to measure, however. It can only be assumed that Spain’s geographical location might have been an additional factor for some media to place a correspondent in Madrid. In the following, therefore, this chapter will concentrate on the connection between Spain’s foreign relations and the presence of foreign correspondents. It turns out that the international political context, as well as Spain’s historical ties, was of particular importance in accounting for the composition of the foreign press corps during the right-wing Franco dictatorship.

**US correspondents in Francoist Spain**

The historian Javier Tusell Gómez has written about the relationship between US-Spanish political relations and the perception of the Franco regime by the American public: ‘As far as the Americans were concerned, Franco’s Spain was a far off land whose development was not a subject on which for the most part the general public was kept informed since its only importance for the United States was strategic.’

Indeed, there is no question about the strategic interest behind the US’ policy towards Spain. During the last months of the Second World War and after, the Democratic US Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and his successor Harry S. Truman made no secret of their hostility towards the Franco regime. With the outbreak of the Cold War, the situation changed. Spain’s strategic importance for the US military and the reliability of a stable anti-communist regime in Spain pushed previous ideological concerns aside. After Truman re-established diplomatic relations with Spain in 1950, his Republican successor Eisenhower completed this policy change. The outcome of this Spanish–US rapprochement was the Pacts of Madrid in 1953, which granted Spain economic help in exchange for military bases on Spanish soil. US credits had a

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446 Tusell, Spain: From dictatorship to democracy, 114.
448 On the policy change towards Spain by the Truman-administration see Mark S. Byrnes, “«Overruled and Worn Down»: Truman Sends an Ambassador to Spain,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1999), 263-279.
449 See Lorenzo Delgado, “¿El "amigo americano"? España y Estados Unidos durante el franquismo,” Studia historica. Historia contemporánea, no. 21 (2003), 243-244. See also Boris N. Liedtke, “Compromising with the Dictatorship: U.S.–Spanish Relations in the Late 1940s and Early 1950s”.

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fundamental impact on the Spanish economy. More important, however, was the political acceptance of Spain by the US, which opened the way out of international isolation for the Franco regime. In exchange for serving US military and strategic interests, Spain received the boost in international reputation that the regime had longed for which culminated in Eisenhower’s visit to Madrid in 1959. The ‘American friend’ also remained thereafter as the key orientation point of Spain’s foreign policy throughout the existence of the dictatorship.\textsuperscript{450} The US became ‘a stakeholder in the political stability of Spain’\textsuperscript{451}. At the same time, the US also secured an important position for Spain’s economy. In the mid-1950s, almost 20% of Spanish imports came from the US,\textsuperscript{452} while Spain sent 10% of her exports with the US.\textsuperscript{453}

The second part of Tusell’s observation is in need of revision, however. Spain was certainly not a priority for the US media. Major US media like The Washington Post\textsuperscript{454} and the Los Angeles Times\textsuperscript{455} never, or only briefly, had full-time correspondents in Spain before 1975. However, as Figure 3 shows, the Franco regime was not a ‘far off land’ without any interest for the American public either. The number of correspondents present in Spain since the mid-1950s suggests that the American public received regular news on the Franco regime. In the 1950s, the major US news agencies Associated Press (AP) and UP (respectively UPI after its merger with International News Service in 1958) already had the largest offices in Madrid.\textsuperscript{456} Furthermore, major publications such as The New York Times maintained an office in Madrid throughout the entire Franco period, as did the news magazine Time. Other major publications, such as Newsweek and the Chicago Tribune, also had permanent correspondents in Madrid since the 1950s.\textsuperscript{457} Furthermore, a small number of American radio stations were already represented in Spain during the 1950s.\textsuperscript{458} The major broadcasters CBS and NBC had staff correspondents in Spain.\textsuperscript{459} Particularly active was the

\textsuperscript{450} Delgado, “¿El “amigo americano”? España y Estados Unidos durante el franquismo”.
\textsuperscript{452} Albert Carreras et al., eds., Estadísticas históricas de España: Siglos XIX-XX, 2nd ed. (Bilbao: Fundación BBVA, 2005), 622.
\textsuperscript{453} Ibid., 616.
\textsuperscript{454} The later Pulitzer Prize winner Loren Jenkins briefly was accredited in 1969/70 for both Newsweek and the Washington Post. See AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.361, Folder Loren Jenkins: Accreditation Loren Jenkins. The Washington Post sent special correspondents to cover the Spanish transition. It did not employ a staff correspondent before 1982, when Tom Burns Marañón started to work for the newspaper. See Tom Burns Marañón, interview by Tobias Reckling, 18 July 2012, Madrid.
\textsuperscript{455} Jacques R. Leslie Jr, became the first correspondent for the Los Angeles Times in December 1975. See AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.969, Folder Jacques R. Leslie Jr., Accreditation Jacques R. Leslie Jr.
\textsuperscript{456} See Harnett and Ferguson, Unipress, United Press International covering the 20th century, 177.
\textsuperscript{457} Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1955-1956, 207-211.
\textsuperscript{458} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{459} Ibid., 208.
long-time CBS correspondent Edmund Gress, who also worked for Newsweek until 1970.\textsuperscript{460} Other US media without staff correspondents in Spain nevertheless received reports from a considerable number of stringers among the American correspondents (further discussed in Chapter 4).

As this chapter has already shown, the US media interest increased considerably during the 1960s. By 1965, the presence of US journalists reached a peak of 50 accredited correspondents. In contrast to the previous decade, however, this development did not take place in the context of improved political relations between Spain and the US. On the contrary, although the strategic partnership between Spain and the US remained intact, diplomatic relations considerably cooled down considerably under Eisenhower’s Democratic successor, Kennedy.\textsuperscript{461} Economically, however, relations between Spain and the US remained strong. Between 1961 and 1965, 18% of Spain’s imports came from the US.\textsuperscript{462} Besides the US’ economic interest, however, the chapter will argue that the increased presence of US correspondents as a reflection of US media interest was the result of a successful rebranding of Spain’s image in the US.

By the end of the Second World War, the American public did not perceive Spain as some far-off land thanks to the reports of a still small number of correspondents. Instead, Americans were very well aware of the Franco regime’s existence, but less because its liaison with the Axis Powers than the public memory of the Spanish Civil War. The researcher Allen Guttmann, in his pioneering study of the impact of the Spanish Civil War on the American public, has concluded that ‘no public event of the years between 1919 and 1939 – excepting the Great Depression itself – moved Americans as did this Spanish conflict’\textsuperscript{463}. While the liberal American public strongly supported the Republic, mainly Catholic groups defended the cause of the Rebels. Preston has shown that this conflict was in some cases even taking place between editors (or newspaper owners) in the US and their correspondents in Spain.\textsuperscript{464} After 1939, the Civil War remained, so the title of Guttmann’s book, a ‘wound in the heart’\textsuperscript{465} of liberal democratic America. Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade kept the memory of their role in the civil war alive through

\textsuperscript{460} AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Untitled report on Edmund Gress, 30 May 1966 [unsigned].
\textsuperscript{462} Carreras et al., Estadísticas históricas de España, 622.
\textsuperscript{464} See Preston, We saw Spain die, 21-22. The strongly anti-Republican Chicago Daily Tribune, for instance, fired its correspondent Jay Allen ‘because his articles provoked so much sympathy for the Republic’. Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{465} Guttmann, The Wound in the Heart. America and the Spanish Civil War.
commemorative activities, starting directly after the war. The success of Hemingway’s 1940 Civil War novel, *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, was both a reflection of and contribution to the lasting impact the Civil War had on the American public.

The image of the Civil War as a heroic battle against the evil Fascists, transmitted by famous American correspondents like Hemingway, John Dos Passos and others, had a lasting impact on generations of American journalists. This becomes visible, for instance, in the memoirs of Malcolm M. Browne, born in 1931. Browne came to Spain as a special correspondent in 1975 in order to cover Franco’s death. Although without any direct experience of the Spanish Civil War, he came to Spain with strong feelings about the origins of the Franco regime:

[… ] one of the best wars of the twentieth century. A lot of Americans who thought they hated war […] saw Spain as a true contest between good and evil: the satanic fascists on one side and the defenders of liberty on the other. […] He [Franco], of course, was the archetypical bad guy; he was the head of the Falangists. He managed to extinguish by rather dirty means his enemies in Spain, and after he succeeded in 1939, he massacred anybody who had opposed him.

In order to counteract this perception of the Franco regime, the Spanish authorities initiated after 1945, what Neal Rosendorf described as, a ‘massive, quarter-century effort to fundamentally recast Spain’s reputation in the US’. Since the beginning, the Francoist authorities also directed these efforts towards US correspondents in Spain. The most prominent measure was Franco’s interview with AP correspondent DeWitt Mackenzie in 1945, in which the Spanish dictator praised an imagined Spanish-American friendship. The initiatives to create a press club for correspondents also need to be seen in this context. The Francoist authorities set up the *Circulo Jaime Balmes* close to the US embassy in Madrid and the National Delegate for the Press, Juan Aparicio, immediately informed the embassy about the planned initiative in order to show the regime’s new openness. Also noteworthy was an initiative by the MIT at the beginning of the 1950s. The MIT included in its relaunched publication, *Gaceta de la Prensa*, a new section for Spanish media professionals entitled *How are the foreign correspondents working*. This section portrayed

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468 Rosendorf, *Franco Sells Spain to America*, 3.
469 Ibid., 2-3.
470 AGA (03) 049.001; 21.1232, Folder 189: Delegado Nacional de Prensa to US Embassy in Madrid, 29 May 1945.
foreign correspondents in Spain and started with the correspondent of *The New York Times*, Sam Pope Brewer.\(^{471}\)

Following the end of Spain’s ostracization, attempts to improve Spain’s international image were intensified. Rosendorf has shown that the Franco regime used a number of parallel strategies in order to rebrand the image of the Francoist dictatorship and ultimately increase Spain’s diplomatic soft power. These strategies included PR campaigns in the US as well as the successful promotion of Spain as a location for Hollywood production and a centre of international fashion.\(^{472}\) Of special importance was the promotion of Spain as a destination for American tourists as a means to improve Spain’s image. Manuel Fraga intensified these efforts during the 1960s.\(^{473}\) Fraga’s massive external PR campaigns, like the $7 Million Spanish Pavilion at the 1964-65 New York World’s Fair, marked the climax of the ‘Franco regime’s comprehensive program of reputational outreach to the US’.\(^{474}\)

The changing US press corps in Spain reflected the success of these campaigns during the 1960s with regard to both the growing numbers of correspondents and the media they represented. Indeed, the accreditation of correspondents for fashion, travel and life-style magazines was the main cause of the overall growth of the US press corps. One of the most illustrious among these new correspondents was *Vogue* correspondent Aline Griffith,\(^{475}\) who after her marriage to a Spanish aristocrat, became better known as the Countess of Romanones. Griffith had had a previous career as a spy for the US in Madrid high society during the Second World War. Later on, Griffith became a well-known socialite and was to publish a series of books on her (highly exaggerated) adventures under titles such as *The Spy Wore Red*, *The Spy Went Dancing* and *The Spy Wore Silk*.\(^{476}\)

The most prominent case among the accredited US tourism correspondents was Temple Fielding, the most successful US travel writer of his time.\(^{477}\) Fielding already had a base in

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\(^{471}\) *Gaceta de la prensa Española*, “Cómo trabajan los corresponsales de la prensa extranjera en España: Sam Pope Brewer,” no. 45 (1951), 83-84.


\(^{474}\) Rosendorf, *Franco Sells Spain to America*, 155.


\(^{476}\) Nigel West, *Historical dictionary of sexspionage*, Historical dictionaries of intelligence and counterintelligence 8 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 326.

\(^{477}\) Rosendorf, *Franco Sells Spain to America*, 33-38.
Mallorca since the beginning of the 1950s before being accredited at the end of the 1950s for the influential *Hall Syndicate*. Far more influential than his newspaper columns was, however, the regularly updated bestseller, *Fielding’s Travel Guide to Europe*. Rosendorf shows that Fielding did his best in these guides to sell Spain as a holiday destination for wealthy US holiday makers:

> If you are Mr. William X. Jones, the typical American vacationer, political matters will never cross your path. Spain is under a dictatorship, with some of the trimmings, but you can go exactly where you wish, do exactly what you choose, and say exactly what you feel about the government or anything else. There are no shadows to frighten you, as in Yugoslavia or Vienna or in the Soviet Satellites.\(^{478}\)

For his sympathy towards the Franco regime, the MIT thanked Fielding with an honorary accreditation as correspondent after 1966.\(^{479}\) A rather peculiar case among the travel journalists in Spain was the correspondent of the widely read *Holiday Magazine*, for which the famous British novelist, poet and Classical scholar Robert Graves was accredited from 1959 to 1977.\(^{480}\) Graves, who also lived on Mallorca, had little interest in travel writing. Among the very few pieces Graves contributed to the magazine was, for instance, an account of his personal psychedelic experiences with mushrooms.\(^{481}\) Nevertheless, the *Holiday Magazine* also contributed to Spain’s promotion as an international tourist destination and published in 1960 a well-meaning travel guide on Spain\(^{482}\). The prominent Graves was at the same time of propagandistic importance for the regime and also received an accreditation as honorary correspondent in 1967.\(^{483}\)

The increased accreditation for fashion and travel journalists, however, does not fully explain the rising number of US correspondents during the 1960s. Instead, another sub-group of US correspondents contributed to this development: journalists for Spanish language US media. The MIT accredited twelve correspondents for US Spanish language

\(^{478}\) Quote from *Fielding’s Travel Guide to Europe* in Rosendorf, “Be El Caudillo's Guest: The Franco Regime’s Quest for Rehabilitation and Dollars after World War II via the Promotion of U.S. Tourism to Spain,” 36.

\(^{479}\) ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Colaboradores de Prensa Extranjera, 1 [no archival signature].

\(^{480}\) ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Colaboradores de Prensa Extranjera, 85 [no archival signature].


\(^{483}\) ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 1 [no archival signature].
publications in Spain between 1960 and 1970. As we saw in the previous chapter, Enrique ‘Henry’ Cervantes became the Spain correspondent of the pro-Francoist New York based newspaper *El Diario de Nueva York* in 1961. *El Diario de Nueva York* was at the time only one of many Spanish language publications in the US. Robert Brand counted approximately 160 Spanish language magazines and newspapers in the US at the end of the 1940s. Most of these media addressed the communities of immigrants from Latin America and Cuba, who constituted the vast majority of the Spanish speaking immigration into the US. Since the beginning of the 20th century, a considerable number of Spaniards — more than 70,000 between 1911 and 1920 - had crossed the Atlantic. After the Spanish Civil War, Republican exiles also went to the US. These exiles soon continued their fight against the Franco regime in existing and newly founded publications. The New York based newspaper *España Libre*, published until 1977, became the most influential and long-lived among these publications.

In contrast to the pro-Franco *El Diario de Nueva York*, which Cervantes co-founded as a counterweight to *España Libre*, it was politically impossible for these anti-Franco publications to officially employ correspondents in Spain. Nevertheless, the Spanish media market in the US was large enough to serve as a source of income for a considerable number of correspondents. Mostly Latin American journalists who were already in Spain, found a new or additional source of income in this way. The Ecuadorian long-time vice-president of the ACPI, Antonio Alomia Larrea, for instance, wrote for *La Opinión*, a major Spanish newspaper from Los Angeles. Besides Latin Americans, a third of accredited correspondents for Spanish language US media were Cuban emigrants in Spain. The Cuban Raul Miguel Rivero worked for the conservative, pro-Franco and strictly anti-communist Cuban newspaper *Diario de la Marina*, which Cuban exiles in the US published in Miami after Castro’s revolution. While Rivero only came to Spain after Castro’s revolution, the

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489 ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros – Jefes, 55 [no archival signature]. During the Spanish Civil War, the *Diario de la Marina* was among the Cuban newspapers the most supportive of the Rebels. See Consuelo N. Orovio, *Cuba, otro escenario de lucha: la guerra civil y el exilio republicano español* (Editorial CSIC-CSIC Press, 1988), 26.
Cuban Joaquin Aristigueta had already worked for the Cuban newspaper *Prensa Libre* since 1950. Following the Cuban revolution, Aristigueta remained in Spain and started to write for a number of Spanish-language US newspapers like *Popular* (Miami), *America Libre* and *La Prensa* (both Los Angeles). The Spanish authorities welcomed the impact of these pro-Franco Cuban exiles on the Spanish community in the US. Like other Cuban exiles, Rivero and Aristigueta received honorary accreditations from the MIT.

**European correspondents**

As Figure 3 has shown, journalists for European media represented the majority of all accredited correspondents in Spain between 1955 and 1975. Only in 1970, once the stricter application of the accreditation guidelines and the subsequent non-accreditation of European stringers had taken place, did a temporary decrease of the European share of the entire press corps to 46% occur. But five years later this number had risen again to 57%.

On the most general level, the strong presence of European correspondents confirms the hypothesis that economic relations and geographical proximity are crucial factors in explaining the size of foreign press corps. Despite the differences in political systems, Spain was a European country. Although the Franco regime in political terms was never fully re-accepted, Spain nevertheless considerably improved and tightened its economic ties with European countries in particular. In fact, despite the unquestionable political and strategic importance of the US for Spain, the orientation towards Western Europe became the ‘true obsession’ of Spain’s foreign policy under Fernando Castiella during the 1960s. Europe and EEC member states in particular were the most important partners for the booming Spanish economy during the 1960s. At the beginning of the 1960s, more than 60% of Spain’s exports went to Western Europe. With the signing of the preferential trade agreement with the EEC in 1970, these economic relations were further improved. Furthermore, during the 1960s Europe became the most important market for Spain’s tourist industry, which at the same time improved Spain’s economic and societal relations

490 *Gaceta de la Prensa Española*, “Cómo trabajan los corresponsales extranjeros en España: Joaquin Aristigueta,” no. 55 (1952), 60-62 [unsigned].
491 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.768, Folder Joaquin Aristigueta, Accreditation Joaquin Aristigueta.
492 ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 102, 55 [no archival signature].
494 Ibid.
495 Carreras et al., *Estadísticas históricas de España*, 622.
with Western Europe still further. Almost 12 million European holidaymakers gained a
first-hand experience of Francoist Spain in 1965 alone.\footnote{Rafael Esteve Secall and Rafael Fuentes García, \textit{Economía, historia e instituciones del turismo en España}, Colección "economía y empresa" (Madrid: Ed. Pirámide, 2000), 135. See also Pack, \textit{Tourism and dictatorship}, 91.} At the same time, the 1960s saw
an exodus of Spanish migrant workers. Between 1960 and 1967 almost 2 million Spaniards,
mostly as migrant workers, left for Switzerland, France and Germany but also to the

These general observations of the Franco regime’s geographical proximity, economic and
and societal relations can serve as a partial explanation of the European media interest in
Spain. This applies in particular to the general increase of some European press corps since
the mid-1960s, namely British, German, French and Dutch correspondents. The collective
experience on Spanish beaches for millions of Europeans as well as the presence of Spanish
migrant workers in many European countries seemingly increased public interest.

Furthermore, correspondents who came to Spain at the end of the 1960s and the beginning
of the 1970s also pointed out that the general public attitude towards Spain had changed
during the 1960s and with it the interest in the Franco regime. The left-wing ‘revolts of
generations’\footnote{Dan Stone, \textit{Goodbye to all that? A history of Europe since 1945} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 113.} across Europe in 1968 had stirred a growing discontent with the right-wing Franco dictatorship. A number of correspondents indeed pointed out that the societal
changes had an impact on the perception of and interest in Spain.\footnote{See for example Rolf Görtz, interview by Tobias Reckling, 4 January 2012, Marl; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling; Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling.}
The massive international media coverage and protests surrounding the Burgos trials in 1970s, the
execution of Salvador Puig Antich in 1973 and the execution of five ETA members in 1975
were a reflection of the growing public discontent with the Franco regime.

However, the detailed examination of the European press corps in Figure 4 also shows a
number of irregularities. The media of the largest European countries with the greatest
importance for the Spanish economy - Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy - had the
most correspondents in Spain in total. But Figure 4 shows that media from these four
countries were represented by correspondents in Francoist Spain to very differing degrees. Most obvious was the strong presence of German correspondents, which accounted for
between a fourth and a third of the entire foreign press corps from 1955 and 1975. Italian correspondents were, with the exception of a rapid and only temporary increase in the mid-1960s, less numerous. Furthermore, while the presence of French correspondents remained more or less stable, the presence of British correspondents strongly increased after 1965 to 24 correspondents in 1975.

Figure 4: European Correspondents in Spain, 1955-75

Spain’s foreign trade also cannot explain this unevenness or the general composition of the press corps. Between 1961 and 1965, Spain traded approximately 15.5% of its exports and 8.5% of its imports with Great Britain, followed by Germany (13.6% exports, 11.8% imports), France (9.9% exports and 10.7% imports), Italy (7.4% exports and 3.7% imports) and Belgium (6.7% exports and 4.9% imports). While Spain’s foreign trade correlates to a certain extent with the presence of British, French and, except for 1965, Italian correspondents, it does not account for the disproportionately strong German press corps. Switzerland only comes in sixth and Portugal in eighth. Tourism, as a strong pillar

500 Based on same sources as Figure 1.
501 Carreras et al., Estadísticas históricas de España, 615-616, 622-623.
502 Carreras et al., Estadísticas históricas de España, 615-616, 622-623.
of the Spanish economy, cannot account for the composition of the entire foreign press corps either. Throughout the entire examined time period, French tourists, often coming with day visas to northern Spain, were by far the most numerous. In 1965 alone, almost 6.5 million - and thereby more than half of all officially registered tourists coming to Spain - were French. German and British tourists, by far the largest groups besides the French, roughly accounted for one million tourist visits each in 1965.\textsuperscript{503}

Furthermore, the concentration on the total number of correspondents is also partly misleading when the presence of correspondents in Spain is put in relation to the population of the home countries. In fact, Swiss media had proportionally the strongest representation in Spain in 1965, followed by Germany, Portugal, Belgium and, temporarily, Italy. Great Britain was in seventh and France only in ninth.\textsuperscript{504} German correspondents, therefore, were not only in total numbers, but also in proportion to the relatively large German population, strongly represented in Francoist Spain. The relatively weak presence of French correspondents is also remarkable. French tourists not only came to Spain in great numbers, but Spaniards also in France. Before the Spanish migrant working workers, approximately 450.000 Republican refugees had crossed the Spanish French border after the Spanish Civil War. Of these exiles, 250.000 remained in France and it thereby became the European centre of the Spanish exile.\textsuperscript{505} This was not reflected in a particular strong presence of French correspondents. However, Chapter 5 will show that the accredited French correspondents in Spain were of crucial importance nevertheless and that parts of the French media reported intensively from the Franco regime.

Against the background of the, at that time, still rather small number of correspondents in Francoist Spain, not only the case of French correspondents shows that these statistical observations only have a limited validity. This becomes further evident in the case of the relatively large number of Swiss correspondents, which Moisés Prieto López also points out in his study on Swiss-Spanish relations from 1969 until 1982.\textsuperscript{506} Indeed, with its


\textsuperscript{504} This and the following calculations are based on population data from: Eurostat, “Population change – Demographic balance and crude rates at national level,” http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data/database (accessed 21 March 2016).

\textsuperscript{505} Natacha Lillo, “El asociacionismo español y los exiliados republicanos en Francia: entre el activismo y la respuesta del Estado franquista (1945–1975),” Historia Social, no. 70 (2011), 175.

approximately 5.5 million inhabitants, Switzerland also had strong relations with Spain in other respects, too. Only French and British tourists entered Spain in proportionally greater numbers in 1965, and more than 120,000 Spanish migrants lived in Switzerland 1970. At the same time, Switzerland also had relatively strong economic ties with Spain as the destination for 3% of Spain’s exports and supplier of 2.6% of Spain’s imports from 1961-65. Prieto highlights that these economic interests and the positive attitude of parts of the Swiss economic elite contributed to a rather favorable image of Spain in the Swiss press. However, Prieto also shows how critical media coverage intensified during the last years of the Franco regime. At the same time, the Burgos trials were accompanied in Switzerland, like elsewhere, with public protests.

Nevertheless, the small number of Swiss correspondents should not be overestimated in their importance. In fact, the Swiss press corps had a rather particular composition. In 1965, half of the Swiss correspondents were working for specialised business media which increased to six out of seven accredited Swiss correspondents by 1970. This was only a partial reflection of the Swiss economic interest in Spain. Instead, the accreditation of correspondents for media such as Common Market Business Reports from Geneva, which were directed to an international audience, was also a reflection of Switzerland’s general importance for the internal business community. The correspondents working for these media in Spain, none of whom actually had Swiss nationality, also mirrored this international focus. Common Market Business Reports, for instance, worked with Chelala López as well as another Cuban exile as correspondents in Spain. Furthermore, Swiss news media also received their reports from a diverse group of correspondents, which included a considerable number of German journalists such as Sieglinde Herrmann. Since the beginning of the 1960s in Spain, Herrmann was officially accredited for German media and the Swiss newspaper Der Bund. In practice, however, Herrmann was working as a freelancer for a number of German and Swiss newspaper on a pay-per-article basis. In

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508 Carreras et al., Estadísticas históricas de España, 615-616, 622-623
512 AGA, (03) 049.021, 65.968, Folder José R. Chelala López: Accreditation José R. Chelala López.
513 ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Accreditation Sieglinde Herrmann [no archival signature].
514 Ibid. See also Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.
fact, the only major Swiss newspaper which continuously had full-time staff correspondents in Spain, was the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. Until the end of the 1960s and before his replacement with the aforementioned Arnold Hottinger, the correspondent Silvio Schädler reported for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* from Madrid.\(^5\)

This brief examination of the Swiss press corps shows that the relatively small number of correspondents in Spain does not necessarily lead to valid arguments on particular national interests in Spain. At the same time, Figure 4 and the observations above also show that neither foreign trade nor the population of the respective home countries are sufficient categories for the examination of European press corps in Francoist Spain. Among the large groups of correspondents, the variables can only explain the presence of French and British correspondents. In fact, the British press corps in particular developed parallel to the continuously rising number of British tourists in Spain, from a mere 300,000 in 1960 to 1.8 million in 1969.\(^5\) For other groups of correspondents, however, these criteria do not provide sufficient understanding. Instead, this chapter will argue in the following pages that Spain’s historical relations as well as the Franco regime’s ideological orientation are crucial for the understanding of the European press corps. Most obviously, this applied to the – in total numbers small but proportionally strong – presence of correspondents from the other Iberian dictatorship; the Salazar regime in Portugal. Both regimes had the same fate of existing and surviving on the political margins of Western Europe. In terms of bilateral relations, the two dictatorships maintained a close, but complicated relationship.

Even before the end of the Civil War, the two dictatorships had signed, in 1939, a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. In the following years, the two regimes made plans to form an Iberian Bloc. During Spain’s international isolation, Salazar remained one of the few and most important supporters of the Franco regime.\(^5\) During the 1950s, relations remained close and (unfulfilled) plans were made to establish a common Iberian market, although Portugal remained of marginal economic importance for the Franco regime. At the beginning of the 1960s, the two regimes attempted to coordinate the mutual media reporting of each other with the explicit aim of avoiding any negative press reports about

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\(^5\) ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 43 [no archival signature].


each other.\textsuperscript{518} The impact of these plans on the press, however, remained marginal to non-existent. The Spanish press-attaché in Lisbon identified the traditional anti-Spanish sentiments among parts of the Portuguese establishment early on as a possible obstacle to these plans\textsuperscript{519}. Furthermore, this failure must also be seen against the background of the worsening of bilateral relations between Spain and Portugal since the mid-1960s because of Spain’s lack of support for Portugal’s colonial policy.\textsuperscript{520}

The Portuguese press corps in Spain reflected this complicated relationship and became, to a certain extent, the battlefield of the tensions between the two countries. While relatively small in total numbers and with the noticeable exception of the news agency ANI,\textsuperscript{521} Portuguese media maintained throughout the existence of the Franco regime correspondents in its neighbouring country. Most notable among them were Alberto de Oliveira and Victor Homen Almeida. The Francoist authorities considered Oliveira, who had worked since the 1940s for a number of Portuguese newspapers and the national Portuguese broadcaster \textit{Emissora Nacional de Radiodifusão}, explicitly as ‘our friend’\textsuperscript{522}. This friendship was reflected in Oliveira’s election as president of the CIP in 1966, with the (at the time) still necessary support by the Francoist authorities.\textsuperscript{523} Around the same time, the other Portuguese journalist, Victor Homen Almeida, who had worked since the beginning of the 1950s for the economics paper \textit{O Comercio do Porto}, was accredited by the MIT as Honorary Correspondent.\textsuperscript{524}

While both Almeida and de Oliveira were long-term supporters of the Franco regime, in the context of the rising tensions between Spain and Portugal, more critical Portuguese journalists came to Spain during the 1960s. Among them, the journalist Vasco Cardoso Cortes repeatedly caused tensions between the two countries. Cortes was accredited in 1966 like de Oliveira for \textit{Emissora Nacional de Radiodifusão}, but also wrote for a number of


\textsuperscript{519} Ibid., 91.

\textsuperscript{520} Ibid., 96-98.


\textsuperscript{522} AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.775, Folder Vasco Cardoso Cortes: Agregado de Prensa at Spanish Embassy in Lisbon to Director General de Prensa, 4 October 1967.


\textsuperscript{524} ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 1 [no archival signature].

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newspapers. Cardoso’s reports on, for instance, Spain’s economic problems led to complaints by the Spanish press attaché in Lisbon to Portuguese officials. Even de Oliveira complained to the editors of Emissora Nacional de Radiodifusão, which had also broadcasted Cardoso’s critical reports. The Portuguese officials showed little willingness to become active in this matter and simply suggested that Spain should advise its Portuguese correspondents to publish similarly critical reports. Following further critical reports on Spain, the Spanish press attaché in Lisbon concluded that ‘this press has instructions not to compromise too much with the Franco regime’. Although the relations between the Franco regime and Portugal improved after 1968 because of the replacement of Salazar with the Spain-friendly Marcelo Caetano, this remained a short-lived development. Following the Carnation Revolution in 1974, the Portuguese press became highly critical towards the Franco regime and the Francoist authorities very suspicious of Portuguese correspondents.

The strong presence of Portuguese correspondents – which was in proportion to the country’s population - was, therefore, a reflection of the complex bilateral relations between the two dictatorships. To some extent, the same can be said about the most noticeable feature of the European press corps in Francoist Spain: the strong presence of German correspondents. The strong presence of German correspondents was only a partial reflection of the actual ties between Spain and Germany. It also reflected the former closeness between Franco’s Spain and Nazi Germany by turning the Francoist dictatorship into a preferred destination for former Nazis who made a living as correspondents.

The majority of German correspondents were staff-correspondents. In contrast to many Latin American correspondents, the German press corps consisted to a large extent of professional journalists officially recognized by the Francoist authorities. Furthermore, German correspondents also represented more media than their colleagues in Spain. In 1955, for instance, the 23 accredited German correspondents were working for 23 different
media.\textsuperscript{531} The eleven British journalists accredited in Spain at the same time only represented eight media; and the 28 American correspondents only 20 different media. This striking difference mainly resulted from the size of the bureaus of the respective news agencies. The major international British news agency Reuters and its US competitors on the global market AP and UPI employed at least three journalists each in Spain during the 1950s.\textsuperscript{532} The German news agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa), however, only had one correspondent in Madrid in 1955.\textsuperscript{533} This situation did not change much during the following two decades: while no more than two (and often only one) correspondents were working at the same time for dpa in Madrid, Reuters had by 1975 a staff of five journalists. Hans Rahm, the head was, besides his secretary, at the same time the only employee of dpa in Madrid, covering the last phase of the regime single-handedly.\textsuperscript{534}

Against the background of this differing employment structure, the strong presence of German correspondents seems even more remarkable. The bilateral relations only serve as a partial explanation. The chapter has already shown that, although Germany was of considerable economic importance for Spain, the relations with Great Britain and France were more important. However, the Christian Democrat-led governments between 1949 and 1966 also maintained mutually beneficial diplomatic relations with Spain, as Birgit Aschmann and Carlos Sanz Díaz have shown.\textsuperscript{535} While Spain supported German interests by arguing for a continued exclusion of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from the UN,\textsuperscript{536} the German government supported the closer economic association of Spain with the EEC.\textsuperscript{537} Nevertheless, the relations with Spain for Germany remained of second order. In fact, the Adenauer administration was careful not to provoke the Allies with too friendly a relationship with the right-wing Franco dictatorship, which might have triggered

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{531} Lehmann, whose examination of the German-Spanish relations during the 1950s is exclusively based on German sources, therefore strongly underestimates by stating that '14 German respectively German speaking correspondents' were accredited in Madrid in the mid-1950. Cf. Lehmann, \textit{Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren}, 89 [note 305].
\item \textsuperscript{532} Dirección General de Prensa, \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española}, 1955-1956, 207-211.
\item \textsuperscript{533} Ibid., 208.
\item \textsuperscript{534} Rahm was accredited in 1969. See ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros – Jefes, 16 [no archival signature]. On the dpa office in Madrid see also Elisabeth Guth, interview by Tobias Reckling, 18 July 2012, Madrid. Guth replaced Rahm as dpa bureau chief in the beginning of 1976.
\item \textsuperscript{535} Aschmann, \textit{"Treue Freunde ..."}, Carlos Sanz Díaz, \textit{España y la República Federal de Alemania (1949-1966): Política, economía y emigración, entre la guerra fría y la distensión}, (Dissertation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid).
\item \textsuperscript{536} Aschmann, \textit{"Treue Freunde ..."}, 448. See also Sanz Díaz, \textit{España y la República Federal de Alemania (1949-1966)}, 523-531; Díaz, España y la cuestión alemana bajo el franquismo, 1945-1973. Entre la doctrina Hallstein y el comienzo de la "Ostpolitik".
\item \textsuperscript{537} See Birgit Aschmann, “The Reliable Ally: Germany Supports Spain's European Integration Efforts, 1957-67,” \textit{Journal of European Integration History} 7, no. 1 (2001).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
memories of previous Spanish-German collaboration during the Civil War.\textsuperscript{538} After 1966, with the Social Democrats first as partners in grand coalition and then as governing party from 1969 to 1982, the official attitude towards the Franco regime became more distant. In fact, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and its Friedrich Ebert Foundation supported the Spanish opposition and the socialists especially from the second half of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{539} At the same time, SPD connected trade union Industrial Union of Metalworkers' (Industriegewerkschaft Metall, IG Metall) and its functionary Hans Matthöfer not only tightened their relations with Spanish trade unions but also, much to the annoyance of the Francoist authorities, initiated political educational programmes for Spanish migrant workers, including broadcasts and their own print media.\textsuperscript{540}

The economic and political ties between Spain and Germany, resulting in strong media interest in the Franco regime, cannot explain the continuously strong presence of German correspondents. Furthermore, while the comparatively strong German media landscape with its many regional newspapers provided more employment possibilities for correspondents, it only developed slowly after 1945. In occupied Germany, the Allies closed down the existing German media market due to its role in Nazi propaganda. Thereafter, the Allies licensed, besides the publication of its own newspapers, only selected new German publications by journalists and publishers who had passed the requirements of the Allied denazification policy. This policy ended in the course of the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.\textsuperscript{541} In the following years, both new media as well as

\textsuperscript{538} Aschmann, "Treue Freunde ...?", 451-452.


\textsuperscript{541} See for example Wolfram Schrag, \textit{Medienlandschaft Deutschland} (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007), 114-121. For a chronology of the re-construction of the German media market after 1945 see also
pre-existing publications were slowly (re-)established. However, and as Figure 4 shows, by 1955 more than a fourth of all European correspondents and twice as many as British journalists were working for German media in Spain.

This strong early presence of German correspondents for the still young German media market is even more remarkable when actual acceptions are taken into account. Major German newspapers with a national distribution, which could indicate a strong public interest such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung or Die Welt, did not have full time-correspondents in Spain before the 1960s. While these major newspapers, therefore, did not see the need for full-time correspondents in Spain, the Francoist authorities granted acceptions to many German correspondents for minor publications during the 1950s and early 1960s. These included many local and regional papers like the Aachener Nachrichten and the Rhein-Zeitung, but also publications which would never normally have afforded a full-time correspondent in Spain. The hunting magazine Wild und Hund and a journal for sanitary engineering are only two examples of newspapers with correspondents in Francoist Spain.\(^{542}\)

Neither German-Spanish relations nor a strong public interest in Germany, therefore, substantially helps to explain the presence of numerous German correspondents in Spain. Instead, the explanation lies in the German press corps itself and the biographical background of many correspondents. After the Second World War, numerous German (and Austrian) Nazis found refuge in Spain.\(^{543}\) The Allies, who were well aware of Spain’s importance for fleeing Nazis, from 1944-58 even ran a specialized programme under the name of Operation Safehaven in order to roll back any German influence in third countries like the right-wing Franco regime, which might have served as a breeding ground for new Nazi activities.\(^{544}\) However, for the sake of the Realpolitik of the gradual re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Spain from the beginning of the 1950s, the Allies revoked the

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\(^{542}\) Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1955-1956, 207-211.

\(^{543}\) Carlos Collado Seidel, Angst vor dem "Vierten Reich": Die Alliierten und die Ausschaltung des deutschen Einflusses in Spanien 1944-58 (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2001), 159-165.


previously imposed travel restrictions between Spain and Germany in 1948 and the list of 104 Nazi ‘hard core cases’ still wanted for repatriation became meaningless.

This exodus of former Nazis to the right-wing Franco dictatorship explains the strong presence of German correspondents. Indeed, cases like the journalist Weinzetl during the 1950s were not an exception but rather common among German correspondents who had a professional past in Nazi Germany and found a livelihood as correspondents in Spain. In fact, the search for employment by Nazis in Spain not only explains the presence of many correspondents for German media but also sheds light on the relatively numerous presence of seven Austrian correspondents in Madrid in the 1950s, including Weinzetl.

Some of these correspondents already had a journalistic career in Nazi Germany and had previous experience in Spain. Once back in Spain, they could therefore re-activate pre-existing networks both in Spain and in German newsrooms, where in spite of the Allied policy many journalists with a Nazi past continued their careers. The journalist Heinz Barth, for instance, was already a correspondent for the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in Rome before reporting from Spain from 1939-44. Following the end of the Second World War, Barth returned to Madrid in 1947. His personal networks soon secured him employment in the information service of the Falange. In 1948, he regained, with the support from the OID, once more an accreditation as correspondent for a number of German news outlets and a newspaper from South Tyrol. Another example is Barth’s colleague Werner Schulz, who also had been covering the Spanish Civil War from the Rebel territories and had remained thereafter in Madrid as part of Nazi Germany’s press corps in Spain. In the beginning of the 1950s, Schulz became accredited for a number of local German newspapers. The most significant case among not only the correspondents but the

547 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Accreditation Heinz Barth.
548 Barth’s application for an accreditation was accompanied by a letter of recommendation to the Head of the Section for Foreign Press by an high-ranking member of the OID, Luis Maria de Lojendio, who knew ‘Barth for a long time’. AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Luis Maria de Lojendio to Jefe Sección Prensa Extranjera, 19 October 1948.
549 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.383, Folder Werner Schulz: Werner Schulz to Jefe Sección de Prensa Extranjera, 25 May 1951.
Nazi refugees in Spain in general was the liberator of Mussolini after his capture by the Italian Resistance in 1943, Otto Skorzeny.\textsuperscript{550}

During the 1950s, Skorzeny became a well-known personality in Madrid high-society and a frequent topic of portraits in both Spanish and foreign media.\textsuperscript{551} Initially, Skorzeny attempted to re-activate contacts with the German military and to establish himself as a representative for German companies.\textsuperscript{552} In 1958, the former \textit{SS-Standartenführer} (colonel) also was accredited as foreign correspondent for the small local newspaper \textit{Altenaer Kreisblatt} and, from 1966, for the extreme right-wing \textit{Deutsche Wochenzeitung}.\textsuperscript{553} Despite his limited journalistic output, Skorzeny was seemingly interested in maintaining his accreditation status (and the privileges that came with it) and informed the MIT about the rare occasions when he actually published something.\textsuperscript{554} Indeed, despite the fact that the MIT was well aware of Skorzeny’s limited journalistic output,\textsuperscript{555} the Francoist authorities renewed his accreditation annually until his death in 1975.\textsuperscript{556}

The accreditation of these - often only semi-professional - former Nazis as correspondents, however, was not only a reflection of the Franco regime’s accreditation policy or political contacts of these journalists but also of the journalists’ highly sympathetic attitude towards the Franco regime. In the case of semi-professionals like Skorzeny, whose rare publications the Spanish press attaché in Bonn considered ‘objective and favourable’\textsuperscript{557}, these sympathies had practically no impact on the German public. For active correspondents like Barth and Schulz, however, the case was different. Aschmann and Lehmann have shown in their studies on Spanish-German relations, that these correspondents had a fundamental

\textsuperscript{550} The three others were the former head of the Vichy government Pierre Laval; Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, head of Vichy’s Jewish policy; the founder of the Belgian right-wing Rexism-movement and highest ranking foreign member of the \textit{Waffen-SS}, Léon Degrelle. Of these, only Laval was deported in 1945 deported due to international pressure, Degrelle, Darquier de Pellepoix and Skorzeny remained in Spain. Messenger, Beyond War Crimes: Denazification, ‘Obnoxious’ Germans and US Policy in Franco’s Spain after the Second World War: 464.

\textsuperscript{551} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Otto Skorzeny: Copy of portrait of Skorzeny in the Argentinian newspaper \textit{Clarín}, 5 March 1961.

\textsuperscript{552} Aschmann, "\textit{Treue Freunde} ...?", 146-157.

\textsuperscript{553} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Otto Skorzeny: Accreditation Otto Skorzeny.

\textsuperscript{554} See for example AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Otto Skorzeny: Otto Skorzeny to Jefe Sección Prensa Extranjera, 8 March 1967. Skorzeny attached his article on the visit of the former German chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Madrid in the \textit{Deutsche Wochenzeitung} from February 1967.

\textsuperscript{555} See for example AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Otto Skorzeny: Untitled report by Agregado de Prensa at Spanish Embassy in Bonn, 7 February 1967.

\textsuperscript{556} See for example AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Otto Skorzeny: Accreditation Otto Skorzeny.

\textsuperscript{557} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Otto Skorzeny: Untitled report by Agregado de Prensa at the Spanish Embassy in Bonn, 7 February 1967.
impact on the Franco regime’s image in parts of the German press in the 1950s and early 1960s.\textsuperscript{558}

Following his initial accreditation for a local German newspaper, Schulz became the correspondents for the major German newspaper \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung} around 1960.\textsuperscript{559} Furthermore, he also established a so-called \textit{Bauchladen} (sales tray) of newspapers from Germany and Austria, to which he sold his articles on a freelance-basis during the 1960s. The Spanish authorities very much welcomed the wide distribution of Schulz’s articles, which generally gave a favourable impression of Spain. Indeed, for the Spanish press attaché in Bonn Schulz produced ‘the most desirable and pleasant news of our politics and our country’.\textsuperscript{560}

No less favourable but far more widely distributed and thereby influential were the articles of Barth for a large number of German media. In fact, the ‘news company’\textsuperscript{561} Barth practically established a ‘monopoly in the formation of opinion and information about Spain’\textsuperscript{562} in Germany during the 1950s and early 1960s. In fact, both Aschmann and Lehmann even underestimate the distribution of Barth’s articles by counting only nine German newspapers for which Barth was working, often under different pseudonyms.\textsuperscript{563} Instead, the German correspondent submitted a list of altogether 28 different publications, news agencies and radio stations to the MIT in 1951, for which he claimed to be reporting for at one point of another. Besides numerous German media, this list also included Austrian and Swiss media and even a Danish newspaper. Barth’s list was also not a misleading claim either. The Spanish press attaché in Germany counted 20 German newspapers alone, which had published Barth’s articles in the month of October 1955.\textsuperscript{564}

For the Francoist authorities, Barth’s journalistic influence and his ‘ambition to influence

\textsuperscript{558} Lehmann, \textit{Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren}, 83-89; Aschmann, "Treue Freunde ...", 143-144.

\textsuperscript{559} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Otto Skorzeny: Untitled report by Agregado de Prensa at Spanish Embassy in Bonn, 7 February 1967.

\textsuperscript{560} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Werner Schulz: Agregado de Prensa at the Spanish Embassy in Bonn to Director General de Prensa, 28 November 1963.

\textsuperscript{561} Quoted in Lehmann, \textit{Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren}, 89.

\textsuperscript{562} Aschmann lists the following publications, for which Barth wrote under his name and its Spanish version, Enrique Barth, the acronyms H.B. respectively E.B., and the pseudonym Gottfried Grosse: \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Presse, Stuttgart Nachrichten, Welt, Deutschen Zeitung} and \textit{Wirtschaftszeitung, Weser Kurier, Hamburger Abendblatt} and \textit{Westdeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung}.

Furthermore, Aschmann also highlights that Barth reported for German radio stations. Aschmann, "Treue Freunde ...", 144.

\textsuperscript{563} AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Heinz Barth to Director General de Prensa, 15 November 1951.

\textsuperscript{564} AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Agregado de Prensa at the Spanish Embassy in Bonn to Director General de Prensa, November 1955 [undated].
the German politics towards Spain\textsuperscript{565} was of great importance. This was not only reflected in his decoration with one of the most prestigious awards Francoist Spain had to offer, the \textit{Orden Imperial del Yugo y las Flechas}, but Franco himself granted Barth a personal interview, which was widely distributed in Germany in 1950.\textsuperscript{566} Nine years later, Barth also interviewed Foreign Minister Castiella for German television.\textsuperscript{567} Besides these accomplishments, however, Lehmann has shown that Barth’s relations with the Franco regime were not without tensions,\textsuperscript{568} which will also be discussed in Chapter 6.

The numerous accreditations of German correspondents initially reflected the need for employment by particular groups of Germans coming or remaining in Spain after 1945. Figure 4, however, also shows that the presence of German correspondents did not decrease but actually increased up to 1975. However, and as has already been argued above, this must be seen as a reflection of a general development in the international media interest in Spain since the end of the 1960s. In the case of Germany, this increased media interest simply came on top of the continued accreditation of many correspondents with a Nazi past. Besides the previously mentioned opening of fully staffed TV studios in Madrid by the public German broadcasters \textit{ZDF} and \textit{ARD}, major newspapers such as the \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} and the \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung} as well as magazines like \textit{Der Stern} sent staff correspondents to Spain since the mid-1960s.\textsuperscript{569}

**Special relations: Latin America and the Arab world**

The chapter on the ACPI has already briefly discussed the importance of relations with Latin America for the Franco regime. Figure 3 shows that the presence of Latin American correspondents in Spain reflected these special relations. By 1955, correspondents for Latin American media accounted for 20\% of the entire press corps. With between 31 and 41 accredited correspondents, their presence in Spain remained strong and stable throughout the following two decades.

Foreign trade cannot account for the strong presence of Latin American correspondents in Spain alone. While Argentinian credits were important for the Franco regime’s survival

\textsuperscript{565} Lehmann 2006, 87.
\textsuperscript{566} AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Untitled report on Barth [undated].
\textsuperscript{567} Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (henceforth AMAE), 7553, Folder 48: Declaraciones del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores al Señor Heinz Barth, 9 November 1959.
\textsuperscript{568} Lehmann, \textit{Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren}, 88-89.
\textsuperscript{569} Dirección General de Prensa, \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española}, 1965, 1458-1472; Dirección General de Prensa, \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española}, 1970, 291-299.
during its international isolation, economic relations with Latin America, however, remained far less important than Spain’s foreign trade with Europe. By 1961, only 6.2% of all Spanish exports were going to Latin America. In the course of Spain’s economic development and the strengthening of its economic ties with Latin America this figure rose to 17.6% in 1966. Thereafter, however, Spain’s foreign trade with Latin America once more decreased to 10.1% of all Spanish exports by 1975, amounting to fewer exports than to Germany. Foreign trade, therefore, was at best of secondary importance to Spain’s relations with Latin America. Instead, the strong presence of Latin American correspondents in Spain was primarily a reflection of the Franco regime’s cultural, historical and political relations with the region, cumulating in the ideological concept of *Hispanidad*.

Spain’s relations with the region, therefore, primarily served political aims, both on the international and national level. Besides the support for Spain’s foreign policy, Gómez-Escalonilla has pointed out that the Franco regime exploited its relations with Latin America in order to strengthen public support for the regime by propagandizing Spain’s alleged international importance within Spain. At the same time, the Franco regime actively tried to promote the Spanish authoritarian model for economic growth in Latin America during the 1960s. The special attention which the Francoist authorities treated the Latin American press corps with reflected this approach.

The Latin American press corps not only reflected Spain’s special relations with the region through its size, but also its composition. Figure 5 shows that correspondents from the Franco regime’s close ally Argentina were particularly numerous in Spain. At the same time and similar to the case of Switzerland, the total numbers of correspondents presented in Figure 5, however, are also misleading. Many Latin American correspondents in Spain were only semi-professionals. In 1960 and therefore even before the reform of the accreditation practice, for instance, 42.5% of all Latin American correspondents were only accredited as part-time journalists. This figure was almost 10% higher than the percentage of part-time journalists in the entire press corps. Following the revision of the accreditation guidelines in 1966, this percentage further increased. Indeed, in 1975 four out of the five accredited Argentinian correspondent were part-time journalists.

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This observation leads to the conclusion that the actual Latin American media interest was in fact less strong than the number of accredited correspondents would suggest. Instead, the strong presence of Latin American correspondents was at least partly the outcome of Spain’s social and cultural ties with the region and the strong presence of Latin American’s in Spain. The Instituto de Cultura Hispánica scholarship programme for students alone brought 12,000 young Latin Americans to Spain during the 1970s. Some of these students stayed and sought employment as correspondents for the media of their respective home country. The Colombian Rafael Gomez Gonzalez, for instance, came in 1960 as a scholarship holder before working for ten years as a stringer for the Colombian journal *El Espectador*. In fact, the relatively strong Colombian press corps in Spain seemingly had a similar background like the presence of numerous German correspondents. Colombians already in Spain tried to become correspondents in order to take advantage of the privileges coming with accreditation status. This conclusion was drawn by the Spanish embassy in Bogota in the context of the evaluation of a new accreditation for a Colombian ‘journalist’ in 1966:

A certain number of Colombian citizens residing in Spain – temporarily or permanently – have discovered the possibility to become correspondents for

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572 Based on the same sources as Figure 1.
573 Ibid., 149.
574 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.969, Folder Rafael Gomez Gonzalez: Accreditation Rafael Gomez Gonzalez
publications of dubious or no importance in this country simply in order to gain material advantages during their stay in our homeland.\textsuperscript{575}

Indeed, following the stricter application of the accreditations after 1966, the number of accredited Colombian correspondents dropped. By 1975 only half of the Colombian correspondents in Spain had an accreditation as full-time correspondents. Furthermore, as in the case of US Spanish language media, Cuban exiles, who had found employment for Latin American media, further increased the Latin American press corps in Spain. This included, again, Chelala López, who was accredited as a correspondent for a Puerto Rican newspaper during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{576}

While the number of Latin American correspondents only leads to partial conclusions about the respective media interest in Spain, it nevertheless sheds light on Spain’s special relations with this geographical region. Besides the case of the Argentinian press corps, this applied especially to the Mexican correspondents in Spain. In fact, the relations with Mexico marked the other end of the spectrum of Spain’s relations with Latin America. Mexico had not only supported the Spanish Republic during the Civil War, but became thereafter of central importance for Spanish Republican exiles. Thousands of Spanish Republicans found a new home in Mexico, and it was also Mexico where Spanish Republicans founded the first Spanish Republican government in exile in 1945.\textsuperscript{577} The Mexican government’s hostility towards the Franco regime resulted in the suspension of official diplomatic relations with Spain after 1939.\textsuperscript{578} In 1945, Mexico also proposed an article to the UN in order to exclude any former ally of the Axis Powers from membership and thereby prepared the international isolation of the Franco regime that followed.\textsuperscript{579}

Beside this official hostility towards the Franco regime and although diplomatic relations were only re-established after the death of Franco in 1977, Mexico nevertheless maintained

\textsuperscript{575} AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.774, Folder Bustamente Delgado: Embajador de España en Bogota to Director General de Prensa, 16 June 1966.

\textsuperscript{576} AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.968, Folder José R. Chelala López: Accreditation José R. Chelala López


\textsuperscript{578} Hoyos Puente, “México y las instituciones republicanas en el exilio: del apoyo del Cardenismo a la instrumentación política del Partido Revolucionario Institucional, 1939-1977,” 276.

informal relations. Following a governmental reshuffle in Mexico in 1946, Spain and Mexico signed a first commercial treaty a year later. The continuing presence of Mexican correspondents in Spain was not unlike the presence of Soviet correspondents since 1970 in that it was a reflection of these informal relations, which have been entirely overlooked in research on the subject. Against the background of the official policy, it is also remarkable that it was the aforementioned correspondent of a Mexican news agency, Rafael Miralles Bravo, who played a prominent role in the organization for correspondents in Spain. Besides his presidency of ACPI, he was twice the vice-president of the CIP during the 1960s.

During the 1960s, the presence of Mexican correspondents also reflected a change in the Franco regime’s attitude towards Latin America to a certain extent. As Pedro Antonio Martínez Lillo points out: ‘Given the political instability of the region, one perceived the necessity to de-ideologize as much as possible the relations with these countries’. This became especially visible in the course of Spain’s more economically driven, pragmatic foreign policy under the Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo from 1969-73. Parallel to Spain’s new ‘Ostpolitik’, Lopez Bravo tried to strengthen the economic ties with Latin America. This also included Spain’s relations to Chile under Salvador Allende. The accreditation of correspondents for the Chilean media reflected this development. Indeed, Television Nacional de Chile became the only Latin American TV broadcaster with correspondents in Francoist Spain in the beginning of the 1970s.

The Middle East and the Maghreb

Francoist Spain not only served as a base for some correspondents to cover both the Iberian Peninsula and parts of the Arab world but 15 correspondents from Arab countries also worked in Spain between 1955 and 1975. This presence of correspondents from the Arab world reflected the second, less important area of the Franco regime’s ‘politics of substitution’ after 1945. While still banned from the UN, until 1950 the Franco regime established not only diplomatic ties but also signed friendship and cultural agreements with

584 Dirección General de Prensa, _Anuario de la Prensa Española_, 1970, 290.
most countries of the Arab world. Indeed, the visit of the King of Jordan to Spain in 1949 was the first visit by any foreign head of the state to Spain since the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and thereby a key event for the internationally isolated Franco regime.\footnote{Raanan Rein, “In pursuit of votes and economic treaties: Francoist Spain and the Arab world, 1945–56,” Mediterranean Historical Review 13, 1-2 (1998), 202-203.}

As in the case of Latin America, the Franco regime saw the establishment of closer relations with Arab countries in the Maghreb and the Middle East as an additional option to improve its international standing after 1945 by establishing itself as a mediator between the Arab world and the West. At the same time, the Franco regime hoped to collect further votes within the UN in order to overcome its international ostracization. The Arab countries, for their part, also had a vital interest in the relations with Francoist Spain. Besides the establishment of trade relations, the majority of countries were young politically and sought for as far-reaching diplomatic recognition as possible. Furthermore, following the foundation of Israel, Arabic countries hoped to profit from Spanish influence in Latin America in order to generate further international support in the Palestinian question.\footnote{See ibid., 200. See also María Dolores Algara Weber, “España en el Mediterráneo: entre las relaciones hispano-árabes y el reconocimiento del Estado de Israel,” Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals, 79-80 (2007), 18-21.}

The Franco-Arab rapprochement was partly based on pre-existing ties, which included Spain’s protectorate in Morocco. Furthermore, despite of the strong influence of Catholicism in Spain, the Franco regime based its relations with the Arab world on a number of real or propagandistically constructed commonalities, not unlike its relations with Latin America. Foreign Minister Artajo, for instance, stressed during a tour of the Middle East in 1952 the common culture, history and ‘blood’ between Spain and the Arab world.\footnote{Rein, In pursuit of votes and economic treaties: Francoist Spain and the Arab world, 1945–56, 207.} That the authoritarian regimes in the majority of Arab countries strongly dismissed communism as well as Western liberalism, further facilitated the rapprochement.\footnote{Ibid., 198-199.}

Arab media actively promoted official friendship with Francoist Spain. Even during the Spanish Civil War, Syrian journalists had praised the Franco regime’s policy in Morocco. In 1959, the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram printed a lengthy report under the title ‘The heroes that made History’ praising of Franco as ‘the prototype, in the present era, of the strong personality which has gained victory’\footnote{Quoted in Matilde Eiroa San Francisco, Política internacional y comunicación en España 1939-1975: Las cumbres de Franco con los jefes de estado del siglo XX (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 2009), 294.}. The presence of correspondents for Arab
media in Spain, however, was limited. Almost all correspondents for Arab media only remained for relatively short time periods in Spain during the 1950s and early 1960s, and only five correspondents were accredited for Spain from the mid-1960s. The only case of a long-time accredited correspondent for Arab media was the Hungarian-born journalist Francesco Somogy de Perlac, descendent of a Habsburg noble dynasty. Somogy de Perlac worked for four different media from Libya, Iraq and Egypt after his first accreditation in 1961.\textsuperscript{590} According to his son, he was also active in Spain’s official foreign economic relations.\textsuperscript{591} His central role within the Arab press corps in Madrid was reflected in his accreditation for the \textit{Arab League} during the second half of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{592}

Sommogi de Perlac, however, remained an exception in the overall marginal presence of correspondents for Arab media in Spain. Besides the initial promotion of political proximity, relations with the Arab world soon lost importance for Spain once the regime overcame its international isolation and focused more on Western Europe.\textsuperscript{593} Furthermore, in contrast to the community of Latin American correspondents, nationals from Arab countries who might have taken up journalism while already in Spain, were far less numerous.

Nevertheless, the brief discussion regarding the Arab correspondents further highlights the importance of political aspects for the understanding of the composition of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. This becomes even more visible with regard to another group of correspondents from the Middle East, whose presence in Spain was rather exceptional: journalists for Israeli media. Out of consideration for its relations with the Arab world, Francoist Spain never recognized Israel and the two countries only established diplomatic relations more than a decade after the death of Franco in 1986.\textsuperscript{594} Nevertheless, although the only staff correspondent for Israeli media, the Bulgarian-born Israeli citizen Josef Asiel,

\textsuperscript{590} Dirección General de Prensa, \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española}, 1965, 1467; Dirección General de Prensa, \textit{Anuario de la Prensa Española}, 1970, 298. See also Francesco Alfonso Somoggi de Perlac y Jarvinen (son of Francesco Somogy de Perlac), Email to Tobias Reckling, 28 March 2016.

\textsuperscript{591} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{592} \textit{ABC}, “Periodistas Espanoles condecorado por la R.A.U,” 17 November 1966, 62 [unsigned]. See also Francesco Alfonso Somoggi de Perlac y Jarvinen, Email to Tobias Reckling.

\textsuperscript{593} Susana Sueiro Seoane, “La política mediterránea,” in \textit{La política exterior de España en el siglo XX}, ed. Florentino Portero, special issue, \textit{Ayer}, no. 49 (2003), 185–202, 192

reported from 1959 and throughout the existence of the Franco regime, from Spain. During the mid-1960s, Richard S. Mowrer at times also wrote as a freelancer for two Israeli papers.

The presence of Asiel in Spain, therefore, was another exception from the rule that the MIT only accredited correspondents from countries with diplomatic relations with Spain. At the same time, the accreditation of an Israeli correspondent reflected the Franco regime’s particular relations with Israel in the context of its general policy towards the Middle East. Despite the official propaganda in favour of the Arabs’ position in the Palestinian question, Spain nevertheless used its good relations in the region in some cases for important initiatives to provide humanitarian help to Jews in Muslim countries. The Franco regime, for instance, assisted Jews in Morocco in the end of the 1950s and Egyptian Jews during the Six-Day-War to leave. At least partly, the Franco regime used humanitarian support as a PR initiative directed towards the European and US publics in order to improve Spain’s foreign image. At the same time, however, Spain’s agency in these occasions was also the result of a certain tradition of supporting Jewish communities in the region, which dated back to the Second World War.

Besides the presence of Israeli correspondents, the MIT’s external offices in the Maghreb also reflected the Franco regime’s particular relationship with Israel. During the mid-1960s, for instance, the correspondent of a French Jewish journal, Armado Botbol, turned the Spanish tourist office in Tangier (with the approval of MIT employees) so much ‘into his office’ and an informational centre for other Jewish groups, that the MIT started to worry about political consequences. Finally, the presence of Asiel in Spain must also be seen against the background of the small but continuing presence of Jewish communities in Spain itself.

Correspondents from Eastern Europe, Cuba and China

The central importance of the political context and Spain’s formal and informal foreign relations for the understanding of the foreign press corps in Spain becomes most obvious

595 Until the beginning of the 1960s, Asiel was accredited for the newspaper Heruth. Since the mid-1960s and throughout the democratic transitions, the Israeli correspondent was writing for Yedioth Ahronoth (Tel Aviv). See Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1960-1961, 385. Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1965, 1465.
596 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.970, Folder Richard S. Mowrer: Accreditation Richards S. Mowrer.
598 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Oficina de Enlace to Alto Estado Mayor, 26 June 1965 [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.]
with regard to correspondents from communist countries. The previous chapter has shown that the MIT only accredited the first correspondents from Eastern Europe parallel to the improvement of economic relations since the end of the 1960s. However, when the first Soviet correspondents arrived in Spain, they not only met highly anti-communist Cuban exiles, but also official Cuban correspondents. After Castro’s revolution, Cuba became the only communist country with which Spain maintained economic and diplomatic relations and vice versa. The continued presence of Cuban correspondents in Spain reflected these official relations with the Castro regime. However, these correspondents mainly represented media like the business newspaper *El Comercio* during the 1960s. The first correspondent for the official Cuban news agency *Prensa Latina*, Carlos Herman Mora, however, was only accredited parallel to the exchange of correspondents between the Spanish news agency *EFE* and its Soviet counterpart *TASS* in 1970. It was only then that *EFE* signed a similar agreement with *Prensa Latina*. Before, the Spanish news agency had maintained a distanced relationship with *Prensa Latina*, which became visible in countries where both agencies maintained an office. In the beginning of 1970, for instance, Sanchez Bella ordered the transfer of the deputy chief of the *EFE* office in Mexico to Chile because of the journalist’s ‘intimate friendship’ with the director of *Prensa Latina* in Mexico.

In the context of the regime’s officially propagated anti-communism, it is remarkable that Mora became, in contrast to his Soviet colleagues, an important figure soon after his accreditation in December 1970. By 1973, Mora was elected as one of the speakers of the CIP and as vice-president of the ACPI. Mora was even included in a series of interviews with correspondents of major media, which the economic magazine *Actualidad Economica* published at the end of 1973. At the same time, however, the interview also showed through Mora’s careful answers that his presence in Francoist Spain was still a

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601 ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 84 [no archival signature].

602 ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 213 [no archival signature].


606 Echeverría, Corresponsales Extranjeros - Los Observadores Imparciales: Carlos Mora
sensitive issue. When, for instance, asked about his perspective on Spain, the Cuban correspondent answered diplomatically: ‘Well…expressing an opinion about questions related to Spanish politics would not be in accordance with premise of mutual respect which exists between Prensa Latina and EFE.’

That the presence of correspondents for Communist media in Spain was indeed a highly sensitive issue became also visible in the initiation of contact between EFE and its communist counterparts. In fact (and so far unnoticed by researchers), Soviet journalists had already approached EFE in a semi-diplomatic function years before the actual establishment of economic relations and the exchange of correspondents. Sergei Llossev, the head of TASS, made the first attempt to establish an exchange of correspondents in 1968. During a stay in New York, Llossev approached the correspondent of the Spanish newspaper Arriba with his proposition, who forwarded the information to the Spanish embassy. In the following discussion of the details of the proposal with the head of the Office for Diplomatic Information, Ignacio Llossev stressed that, although unusual, it would not be the first time that TASS would place a correspondent in a country without previously established diplomatic relations. With a TASS correspondent in Kinshasa, the capital of Congo, the TASS correspondent presented another example of such agreement.

While the Spanish authorities declined this first offer, Soviet journalists tried a year later to once more intensify relations with Spain. That Spain at this time had already prepared for the establishment of contacts with the Soviet Union was reflected in the fact that negotiations were now continued within Spain. The Francoist authorities allowed the TASS correspondent in The Hague, Yuri Kornilov, to enter Spain with an official accreditation as special correspondent at the end of 1969. Officially, Kornilov travelled to Spain in order to collect information for a series of reports on the Civil War correspondents Earnest Hemingway and Mikhail Koltsov, among others. However, Kornilov also expressed the need to meet with Manuel Fraga and made clear that such a meeting would not serve his alleged journalistic mission, but should be understood ‘rather as a diplomatic negotiation’. At the same time, Soviet correspondents attempted to speak with the

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607 Ibid., 11.
609 Ibid.
Foreign Minister explicitly in order to discuss the exchange of correspondents between TASS and EFE.\textsuperscript{610}

Only a few weeks after Kornilov, one of the most internationally prominent Soviet journalists, Victor Louis,\textsuperscript{611} came to Spain. Louis, whom The New York Times described as a ‘fascinating and enigmatic figure in the shady world of official Soviet journalism during the cold war’\textsuperscript{612}, officially worked as a correspondent for a number of Anglo-Saxon newspapers in Moscow. Less officially, Louis served as a spin-doctor for the Kremlin in order to place news in Western media. He was also an unofficial emissary in international relations. Louis claimed to be visiting Spain as a tourist and in order to collect information for a rather surprising future project: a tourist guide for Soviet citizens to Francoist Spain.\textsuperscript{613} However, Louis also met with various MIT officials in order to promote further contacts between Spain and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{614}

Soviet correspondents, therefore, informally played a central and semi-diplomatic role in the establishment of contacts between both Spain and the Soviet Union and TASS and EFE. Besides the parallel exchange of correspondents between EFE and Prensa Latina, the MIT also accredited correspondents from Poland in the following years.\textsuperscript{615} The exchange of correspondents with communist China, however, followed a very different mode but none the less also mirrored the Spain’s changing foreign policy.

Following the Sino-American rapprochement, the UN accepted the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the solemn representative of China in 1971. Consequently, the Republic of

\textsuperscript{610} AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Untitled report by Servicio Exterior del Ministerio de Información y Turismo para Ministerio de Información y Turismo [undated] [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.]

\textsuperscript{611} So far, there is hardly any non-Russian research available on Louis. One of the most important sources is therefore still a biography on Louis by Ilario Fiore from 1977. Fiore met Louis during his stay as a correspondent for the Italian broadcaster RAI in Moscow. In 1973, Fiore became RAI correspondent in Madrid. Interesting as Fiore’s biography on Louis is, it is based on personal information from Louis and other journalists and hardly on archival documents. For the original, Italian version of the biography see: Ilario Fiore, Caviale del Volga, spia del Cremlino : la prima biografia di Victor Louis, Collezione La Storia da vicino (Milano: Rusconi, 1977). In 1979, a Spanish translation was published: Ilario Fiore, Enviado especial del Kremlín: La primera biografía de Vikton Louis (Esplugas de Llobregat: Plaza & Janés, 1979).


\textsuperscript{613} AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Director of Soviet Board of Tourism to Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 2 September 1968 [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.]

\textsuperscript{614} AMAE, 13811, Folder 37: Untitled report on Viktor Louis in Spain [undated, but following documents connect the report to Louis’ stay in 1968].

\textsuperscript{615} ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Colaboradores de Prensa Extranjera, 472 [no archival signature].
China on Taiwan (ROC) lost its UN membership. Spain followed the US’ lead and established diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1973. This policy change, however, brought Francoist Spain into a difficult position both diplomatically and with regard to her existing press relations with Taiwan. Based on the commonly shared anti-communism of its military rulers, Spain and Taiwan had developed friendly relations after the establishment of diplomatic contacts in 1953. This was not the least also reflected in the presence of a small number of correspondents from Taiwan in Spain. The first among them, Lorenzo Y.C. Wang, started to work in Spain for the official Taiwanese Central News Agency before the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1951. Upon his replacement by the correspondent Eduardo Sou-er Mo in 1966, the Spanish newspaper Ya published a portrait of Wang, who ‘became a Catholic here and married’ and who considered Spain ‘a great country [...] because she keeps her spirit’. When the Franco regime established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, however, it had to break its ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan. This was a consequence of the PRC’s ‘One-China-Policy’ that, similar to the West German Hallstein Doctrine with regard to the GDR, excluded third countries from diplomatic relations if they recognized Taiwan. In contrast to Germany, where the Hallstein Doctrine had no consequences on the accreditation of journalists, the Francoist authorities actually extended the break with Taiwan to the accreditation of correspondents. In order to avoid ‘difficulties with the Chinese embassy in Madrid’, the MIT denied the renewal of Sou-er Mo’s accreditation in 1974. Shortly thereafter, the MIT accredited the first two correspondents for the Chinese news agency Xinhua in Madrid.

The cancellation of Sou-er Mo’s accreditation, however, was not the only consequence of the Franco regime’s rapprochement towards communist countries for the foreign press corps in Spain. Instead, this policy change also directly affected the exiles from communist countries among foreign correspondents. Before the improvement of relations with Eastern

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616 In the following, Taiwan refers to the Republic of China on Taiwan.
619 ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 51 [no archival signature].
620 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.390, Folder Lorenzo Y.C. Wang: Article from Ya [undated but directly refers to Wang’s replacement by Sou-er Mo].
621 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.385, Folder Eduardo Sou-er Mo Chang: Untitled report by the Ministerio de Información y Turismo [undated].
622 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 3: Sección de Prensa Extranjera, Corresponsales de prensa extranjera acreditados en España 1975 [undated].
Europe from the end of the 1960s onwards, the Francoist authorities continued relations with Cuba had (limited) consequences for the Cuban exiles working as correspondents. The previous chapter has shown that some Cuban members of the ACPI became active propagandists in Spain against the Castro regime. Of central importance to this propagandistic output was the previously mentioned journal *Acción Cubana*, published by Rosenado Canto Hernández. However, the MIT under Fraga considered Canto’s anti-Cuban propaganda increasingly problematic. A first clash resulted from the MIT’s censorship of a US critical article in *Acción Cubana*, against which Canto fiercely, but unsuccessfully, protested.\(^623\) In 1963, Canto broke with the former Cuban dictator Batista and thereby with the main financial supporter of *Acción Cubana*. In order to secure the journal’s survival, Canto applied to the MIT for additional funding. However, annoyed by the Cuban journalist, Fraga declined and *Acción Cubana* consequently closed down in 1964. A year later Canto’s new attempt to regain his status as foreign correspondents remained unsuccessful due to his missing credentials. Nevertheless, come the end of Canto’s activities, the MIT continued to support Cuban exiles among the correspondents, as became visible in the continued granting of honorary accreditations in 1970.\(^624\)

Cubans, however, were not the only group of expatriates from a communist country that included accredited foreign correspondents. Instead, a considerable number of exiles from Eastern Europe also came to the anti-communist Franco regime after 1945.\(^625\) Matilde Eiroa, who has examined the development of these diaspora communities, highlights in particular their publicist activities.\(^626\) Eiora stresses, however, that these publications mainly found their audience within the diaspora communities in Spain. The exiles who wrote for these media were not correspondents and therefore not accredited as such. This also applies to the members of the exile community who worked for Spain’s own contributions to the international propaganda battle during the Cold War. Since the end of 1949, *Radio Nacional de España* produced a series of programmes in Eastern European languages and broadcast these programmes beyond the Iron Curtain in order to ‘initiate the internal uprising against these governments’\(^627\). Like its American counterpart *Radio Free

\(^{623}\) AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.775, Folder Rosenado Canto Hernández, Rosenado Canto Hernandez to Manuel Fraga, 24 February 1964.

\(^{624}\) ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 198 [no archival signature].


\(^{626}\) Ibid.

\(^{627}\) Matilde Eiroa, “Una mirada desde España: mensajes y medios de comunicación de los refugiados de Europa del Este,” *Estudios sobre el mensaje periodístico* 17, no. 2 (2011), 490.
Europe (renamed in Radio Liberty in 1964) in Munich, exiles from communist countries were mainly responsible for producing these broadcasts. The Polish program, known in Poland as Radio Madrid, was particularly influential.628

More directly connected to the foreign press corps were, however, Eastern European exiles who were working for larger publications of diaspora communities outside of Spain. At least three such correspondents were accredited between 1955 and 1975. Most active among them was the Hungarian Aurel Czilchert-Mayr,629 who had mainly been writing for Hungarian diaspora publications in Germany630 but also in Canada631 since the beginning of the 1960s. For his work, Czilchert-Mayr received a special accreditation as correspondent for the ‘Hungarian exile press’ in general in 1965.632 Finally, the three correspondents who were working for Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, which had transmitters in Spain since the end of the 1950s,633 were mainly Eastern European emigrants and therefore belonged in this category. In contrast to the expatriates in Madrid who were contributing to the radio broadcasts of Radio Nacional de España, these journalists were fully accredited as correspondents.634

Following Spain’s rapprochement with Eastern Europe, however, Spain stopped its propagandistic activities against communist countries and official relations with the respective governments in exile. The MIT decided that ‘the emissions directed to Eastern Europe will from now on only and exclusively refer to Spain, with under no circumstances any commentary on the politics, neither national nor international, of the receiving countries’635. Consequently, the MIT also did not renew any of the accreditations for correspondents writing for communist diaspora publications after the end of the 1960s.

628 José M. Faraldo, Europe, Nationalism, Communism: Essays on Poland (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008), 101-107.
632 Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1965, 1469.
634 The Hungarian Carlos Benedek, for instance, was officially accredited for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty since 1958. See AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.770, Folder Carlos Benedek: Accreditation Carlos Benedek.
635 AGA (03) 049.021, 42.09030, Folder 2: Instrucción reservada para todas las emisiones dirigidas a Europa Oriental, 5 March 1970.
Conclusions

This chapter has examined the composition and development of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. The first part of the chapter has shown that the international media interest in Spain, as represented by accredited correspondents, had strongly increased by the 1960s. This general development reflected both the end of Spain’s international isolation during the 1950s and her economic development during the 1960s. At the same time, the chapter has also shown that the overall increase of correspondents was partially facilitated by the laissez-faire accreditation policy of the Francoist authorities. Furthermore, the economic privileges for staff correspondents made the accreditation as correspondent highly attractive for non- or semi-professional journalists. As a result, the revision of the accreditation policy in 1966 and 1967 was mainly responsible for the decrease in the number of accreditations.

The chapter has shown that international media interest in Spain further increased from the end of the 1960s. This became visible in the accreditation of staff-correspondents for major media as well as in the opening of TV studios for foreign broadcasters. This development also partly reflected a growing interest of parts of the Western publics in the Franco regime, which resulted from increased discontent with the continued existence of his right-wing dictatorship on the margins of Western Europe.

Furthermore, the chapter also has demonstrated that international media interest in Spain was by far the strongest in Western Europe. Correspondents for European media composed at any time approximately half of the foreign press corps in Spain. Correspondents for US and Latin American media composed in equal parts most of the remaining half of the foreign press corps in Spain.

In the second part, the chapter examined the composition of press corps from these regions in detail. This examination was undertaken by building on the findings of communication researchers that bilateral relations and foreign trade in particular are central factors for the explanation of the size of press corps. The findings have partly confirmed these assumptions. The countries with the strongest economic relations with Spain, Europe and the US, also had the most correspondents in Spain. The strong presence of European correspondents was also a simple reflection of Spain’s geographical location. At the same time, however, the chapter has also shown that particular political and ideological aspects and historical ties are crucial for the understanding of the foreign press corps in the right-wing Franco dictatorship. Most strongly, this applied to the disproportionally strong presence of German correspondents. Many of these correspondents were Nazis who had
fled to or remained in Spain after 1945. Furthermore, the strong Latin American press corps and the, albeit limited, presence of correspondents from Arab countries reflected the Franco regime’s special relations with these regions.

Both economic and political aspects also played a central role in the accreditation of correspondents from Communist countries. The Franco regime accredited correspondents from these countries, as well as from Israel and Mexico, in the absence of diplomatic relations but in the context of informal and economic ties. The presence of correspondents from these countries itself was therefore a form of informal relations. In fact, regarding relations with the Soviet Union, the chapter has brought out that correspondents themselves were central, semi-diplomatic actors for the establishment of these relations.
4. Inside the community of foreign correspondents

The previous chapter examined the composition and development of the foreign press corps within the international context of the Franco regime’s particular external political, societal, historical and economic external relations. In some exceptional cases, the chapter also discussed the biographical background of correspondents. In the main, however, the chapter focussed on an outside view of the foreign press corps in Spain.

Based on these findings and drawing on the work of Hannerz, Morrison and Tumber, this chapter will focus its view into the world of the foreign press corps in Spain as media professionals. The aims of this chapter are twofold. First, it will provide further insights into the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. Second, by methodologically building on the research about foreign correspondents by communication researchers and anthropologists, this chapter will explore the professional and social practices of foreign correspondents.

The chapter is structured in three sections. The first section will examine the employment status and accreditation times of correspondents in Spain as well as exemplary career paths of selected correspondents. This section will therefore provide a better understanding of the foreign correspondents in Spain as media professionals. By examining the accreditation times of correspondents the section will provide a better understanding of the changing composition of the press corps and allow for assumptions about the general local knowledge about Spain among the foreign correspondents. At the same time, it will also allow for additional conclusions of the international media coverage of Francoist Spain and the importance with which foreign media treated the Franco regime.

The second section focuses on two particular groups within the press corps in Francoist Spain; women correspondents and Spanish foreign correspondents. The importance of focussing on these two groups goes beyond a greater understanding of the press corps. The section will show that the focus on women correspondents also provides insights into the social structure of the press corps. Furthermore, the examination of Spaniards as correspondents will shed light on the particular importance of this group within the foreign press corps.

Finally, the last section of this chapter will address the working conditions of correspondents in Spain. In this context, the chapter will not just examine the working

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routines and the use of and access to informational sources by correspondents in the Franco regime. It will also highlight and examine the particular importance of informational networks among foreign correspondents.

**Accreditation times, employment status and career paths**

The absence of previous accreditation lists makes it difficult to examine the length of time for which the correspondents accredited during the 1950s were already working in Spain. The list of Civil War correspondents compiled by Armero and additional archival sources nevertheless allow for some general impressions. Indeed, altogether twelve staff correspondents accredited during the 1950s had already covered the Spanish Civil War. Some journalists, like Ralph Forte of UP and the Italian Cesare Gullino, were already in Spain before the Civil War and remained there throughout the following decades. Most of these journalists worked for international news agencies and thereby reflected the general composition of the foreign press corps at the time. Many of these journalistic Civil War veterans were correspondents from the Axis Powers who had found refuge in Spain after 1945 like the previously mentioned Germans Heinz Barth Werner Schulz and the Italian Cesar Gullino. For the pro-Fascist Gullino, political reasons also played a role in his remaining in Spain.

Most of the other Civil War correspondents like Henry Buckley and Richard S. Mowrer had left Spain before or shortly after 1939 in order to cover the Second World War. The most travelled among these correspondents was probably the journalist Cedric Salter, who gained a reputation as ‘the most chased about of British correspondents’ during the 1930s and 1940s. Although strongly in favour of the Second Republic, Salter had covered the Spanish Civil War, among others, for the pro-Rebel *Daily Mail* from the Rebel territories. After leaving Spain, he covered the Polish campaign until the German victory, reported on the further developments of the war in Eastern Europe and Turkey, went to Singapore and

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640 Preston, *We saw Spain die*, 150-151.
Burma, China, India and Tibet. During this period, he still found the time to publish books on his experiences in Spain as well as Poland. Following the end of the Second World War, Salter returned first to Turkey and then to Spain as a correspondent before eventually concentration on travel writing.

In contrast to the 1950s, the existing accreditation lists allow for a detailed examination of the further development of the foreign press corps until the end of the Franco regime in 1975. Figure 6 gives an overview of the results of this examination for the entire foreign press corps, both full-time and part-time correspondents. Structured in to cohorts by the accreditations lists from 1955, 1960/61, 1965, 1970 and 1975, the figure shows how many accreditations from one cohort were renewed in the next, the one after and so on. This examination, of course does not allow for a detailed analysis of the average accreditation times. A correspondent, who was for the first time included in an accreditation list in 1970, was accredited at one time or another after 1965. Nevertheless, the comparison of the different accreditation cohorts in Figure 6 allows for a general examination of continuity over time.

Figure 6 indicates that considerable personnel continuity characterized the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain and the comparatively long accreditation times of correspondents. In 1970 and 1975, approximately half of the entire foreign press corps was already accredited for five or more years. This included 20 journalists who were working in Spain for two decades or more. In fact, even some former Civil War correspondents (namely Richard S. Mowrer and the German Anton Dieterich) were still working in Spain in 1975. Figure 6 also shows, however, strong differences in accreditation times between the examined cohorts. Correspondents accredited during the 1950s or before, remained in Spain longer than foreign journalists who came thereafter. Almost half of the 157 correspondents accredited in 1957 were still working as journalists in Spain five years later and roughly a quarter of these correspondents were still accredited in 1965.

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644 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 3: Sección de Prensa Extranjera, Corresponsales de prensa extranjera acreditados en España 1975 [undated].
During the 1960s, however, this tendency changed. From each of the cohorts of newly accredited journalists in 1960, 1965 and 1970, only around one third remained in Spain as officially accredited correspondents for five or more years. In particular, the fluctuation of correspondents who came to Spain around 1960 is remarkable. After five years, only 30% of these journalists were still accredited, and in 1970 only 15% still worked as correspondents. At the same time, the cohort of new correspondents from 1965 was rather stable and still almost a quarter (24%) of these journalists continued to work in Spain in 1975.

These observations must be seen against the background of the previously made argument about the overall development of the foreign press corps as well as the different accreditation categories. Chapter 3 has shown that after a rapid increase of accreditations during the first half of the 1960s, the overall number of correspondents noticeably decreased thereafter. It was argued that it was not the decreasing international media interest, but the temporary accreditation of many part-time correspondents, which caused these changes. The examination of accreditation times further supports this argument. Figures 7 and 8 show that it was indeed mainly part-time journalists, who remained accredited only for short time periods. The most obvious explanation for this fluctuation is economic reasons. Seemingly, few part-time journalists were able to establish themselves as correspondents in a way that would have justified the renewal of their accreditations.

645 Based on the same sources as Figure 1.
Furthermore, the impact of the reform of the accreditation guidelines in 1966-67 led to the cancellation of numerous accreditations.

The examination of accreditation times by accreditation status in Figures 7 and 8 further reveals that staff correspondents were indeed accredited for long periods of time. By 1965, for instance, 43% of all full-time journalists had already been accredited for at least ten years. The percentage remained roughly stable until 1975. Thereby, this analysis not only confirms the previous argument that the fluctuation of the press corps during the 1960s did not reflect a decreasing media interest but rather the contrary. Many of the accredited staff correspondents remained in Spain and continued to report on the Franco regime throughout the following years. This shows that the foreign press corps was, by the end of the regime, composed of a considerable number of journalists with years or even decades of experience in Spain. In the context of the previous chapter, it is also noticeable that the longest accredited journalists in Spain in 1975 are not related to a particular national group. Until the 1960s, the general long accreditation times indeed can be explained at least partly by

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646 Based on the same sources as Figure 1.
647 Ibid.
the continued presence of the many German correspondents. Or, as the German correspondent Anton Dieterich put it in an interview with Lehmann, ‘the Germans came and stayed’\textsuperscript{648}. By 1975, however, the situation had changed. Only a quarter of the correspondents with ten or more years of experience in Spain who were accredited in 1975 were Germans. This was less than the overall percentage of the German correspondent in the entire press corps at the time.

The duration of the accreditations of correspondents in Spain, in international comparison, was remarkable. Hannerz highlights that in contrast to contemporary foreign correspondence ‘in the past it was clearly more common […] to keep correspondents as long as decades in major postings, especially in important European capitals’\textsuperscript{649}. While this general media policy might at least partly explain the long accreditations of correspondents in Spain, the Franco regime certainly was not a major posting. Furthermore, a comparison with Morrison’s and Tumber’s findings shows that Francoist Spain was indeed a special case. In their examination of the foreign press corps in London in the beginning of the 1980s, Morrison and Tumber found that the correspondents on average had five and a half years of experience in London.\textsuperscript{650} A detailed examination of the first accreditations of all correspondents accredited in Spain in October 1975 reveals, however, that these journalists on average had more than seven years experience in Spain.

The comparatively long average accreditation times of correspondents in Spain, therefore, only partially reflected the general policy for postings of foreign correspondents at the time. Instead, they must be seen as a particular characteristic of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. Three possible explanations present themselves for this observation. First, the total size of the press corps was still relatively small. The proportional impact of these long-serving correspondents, therefore, was relatively strong. Second, the last section of this chapter will show that the limited official information available increased the importance of local knowledge and contacts for correspondents in Francoist Spain. For foreign editors, therefore, the risk of their correspondents ‘going stale’ could have been less important than the access to information by well-experienced and connected correspondents. This was, for instance, the case for the correspondent of the \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, Walter Haubrich, whose foreign editor was a studied Romanist himself and well aware about the working conditions in Francoist Spain. Third, the next section

\textsuperscript{648} Lehmann, \textit{Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren}, 89 [note 305].
\textsuperscript{649} Hannerz, \textit{Foreign News}, 83.
\textsuperscript{650} Morrison and Tumber, \textit{The foreign correspondent: date-line London}, 462.
will show that the secondary importance of Spain for foreign media made the Franco regime an interesting market for freelancers, who in some cases made a living over time by working for a number of media.

**Freelancers, Stringers and Staff-correspondents**

The reasons for media to hire either stringers or employ staff correspondents in order to receive news from a particular region or country were and are primarily economic. Reuters, for instance, outlines in its *Handbook of Journalism*, a guide for its own employees:

> Reuters, like many news organisations, uses freelance journalists to supplement its network of staff journalists. We use “stringers” in places where the flow of news is not sufficient to justify the presence of a staff correspondent, in countries where the authorities may not allow Reuters to assign a staff journalist or to cover stories of a specialist nature when we do not have the necessary expertise among our own staff. We also occasionally use ad-hoc stringers for individual stories and assignments.651

With respect to Francoist Spain, the most likely reason to hire stringers was certainly the first in this list, and even more so for the numerous smaller newspapers which could neither afford nor were actually in need of a staff correspondent in Spain. The previous chapter has shown that some major media only started to employ full-time staff correspondents from the end of the 1960s. Before, a large number of freelancers provided even minor media with news from Francoist Spain.

The strong presence of freelancers, however, was not only a Spanish particularity, but also reflected general trends in journalism after 1945. The use of stringers grew during the 1950s and publications like the magazine *Time*, for instance, claimed to have ‘435 correspondents, stringers, and writers reporting from 33 locations around the world by 1958’652. At the same time, more and more new, and often small, niche publications came on to the market which could not afford staff correspondents. Using stringers therefore became the option of choice for many Western media who wanted to publish news from abroad without having to afford a staff correspondent.653

For the case of Francoist Spain, the actual presence of freelancers was even higher than the formal category of part-time journalists, who often only remained accredited for short time

653 Ibid.
periods, suggests. Instead, many fully accredited staff correspondents worked on a freelance basis for a number of publications for years or even decades, especially during the 1950s and early 1960s. The above mentioned journalists Heinz Barth and Richard S. Mowrer, both of them fully accredited as staff correspondents but working for numerous media, were the most noticeable cases.

The Spanish accreditation guidelines facilitated such arrangements. Chapter 1 has shown that full-time correspondents only had to prove that they were representing at least one media as a staff correspondent, received a regular monthly salary not lower than Spanish staff journalists and were exclusively dedicated to journalism. Given the comparatively low wages in Spain, the income criteria was unproblematic. Furthermore, the actual proof that the correspondent indeed received a sufficient fixed income was only based on the respective statement which the respective editors had to provide.

These regulations facilitated mutually beneficial arrangements between media and journalists who were on the necessary letters from the editor’s actual staff correspondents. In practice, these journalists had non-exclusive agreements with their official staff media, for which they worked as fixed stringers. The correspondents thereby could gain a full accreditation, but also sell their work to other media. For the media which provided the correspondents with the necessary credentials in Spain, this had the advantage of including the prestigious by-line ‘from our correspondent’ without having to pay for a staff correspondent.

The German correspondents Rolf Görtz and Sieglinde Herrmann, for instance, had such an arrangements. Görtz replaced Barth as the stringer of the German newspaper Die Welt in Madrid in 1962. Before coming to Spain, Görtz was a staff journalist of Die Welt. The editors of Die Welt, however, were not willing to pay a full staff correspondent’s salary for Görtz because of Spain’s limited newsworthiness. Instead, they offered him a deal as fixed stringer, which also allowed Görtz to work for other papers. In fact, Görtz took other parts of Barth’s Bauchladen, who had left as Die Welt’s staff correspondent to Paris. Nevertheless, Die Welt provided Görtz year after year with the necessary confirmation letter in order to renew his accreditation as staff correspondent.654

Like Görtz, the correspondent Sieglinde ‘Linde’ Herrmann also remembered that she did not have any problems in obtaining the necessary confirmation letters for the accreditation as staff correspondent while only working as stringer. Herrmann had come to Spain in the

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654 Rolf Görtz, interview by Tobias Reckling.
beginning of the 1960s for her husband Gustav Herrmann, who worked as correspondent for a number of German, Swiss and Austrian media since 1951. Sieglinde Herrmann first started to work with her husband and, after his death in 1963, took over his *Bauchladen*.

Herrmann and Görtz outlined that while the limited international media interest in Spain until the 1960s made it difficult to indeed become a staff correspondent with a regular income, it also had its advantages. The general absence of staff correspondents provided stringers with the opportunity to sell the occasional newsworthy reports to a wide network of media. Herrmann eventually did this through a bureau in Zurich, which offered and sold her articles to both Swiss and German media. Görtz’s predecessor Heinz Barth was able to use Spain as an economic opportunity even more so than Herrmann and Görtz themselves. According to the German Foreign Ministry, because of the wide distribution of his articles, Barth was considered the ‘best earning German journalist’ during the mid-1950s. Lehmann also argues that it was the limited interest of the German media, which made Barth’s monopoly over the reporting of Spain possible in the first place.

The most remarkable case among the staff-correspondents working as stringers was Richard S. Mowrer. After his return to Spain in 1951, he was accredited for the same US newspapers, for which he had previously covered the Spanish Civil War: the *Chicago Daily News* and *Christian Science Monitor*. Mowrer came from a family of famous US newsmen: both his father, Paul Scott Mowrer, and his uncle, Edgar Ansel Mowrer (also a Civil War correspondent), had been employed by the *Chicago Daily News* before him, both winning Pulitzer Prizes for Correspondence for their work. In Spain, Mowrer established himself as, what was described by the US magazine *Editor & Publisher* in 1966, a ‘one-man syndicate for newspapers all over the world from headquarters in Madrid […].’ Indeed, Mowrer wrote during the 1960s for ten large newspapers in the US, three in Canada, eight in Europe, two in Israel and one in Australia. Mowrer, who retired in 1977, can therefore

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655 AGA, (03)049.021, 58.358, Folder Gustav Herrmann.: Accreditation Gustav Herrmann. See also Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.
656 Rolf Görtz, interview by Tobias Reckling; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.
658 Ibid. 84-85.
660 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.970, Folder Richard S. Mowrer, Copy of article on Mowrer in *Editor & Publisher*, 8 October 1966 [no page number].
661 The quoted portrait in *Editor & Publisher* lists the following US publications for Mowrer’s articles in the mid-1960s: *Des Moines* (Iowa), *Register and Tribune* (Louisville), *Courier-Journal* (Milwaukee), *Journal* (Providence), *Journal* (Toledo, Ohio), *Blade* (Kansas City), *Star* (St. Louis), *Post-Dispatch* (Washington), *Star* (Quincy), *Patriot-Ledger* (York) and *Gazette & Daily*. 159
be described as a ‘transnational super-stringer’. It can only be speculated as to how far his background from a family of journalists and the contacts in the newspaper industry which came with it, helped him build his large network. In contrast to Herrmann, Mowrer distributed his articles himself. While researching new subjects, he made remarks in his notebooks as to whom he could sell particular stories. Mostly, however, he sold his articles on a first come, first served basis, as he explained to Editor & Publisher. His working routine also gives an impression of the economic necessities of freelancers like Mowrer and how many articles they had to sell in order to make a living:

I aim at four stories a month with interpretive background on the current news and occasionally write a feature story. [...] The copy is mailed out to all client newspapers and they are free to take it or leave it. Enough take it regularly to make the maintenance of the office feasible.

From an ideological point of view, reporting for numerous different media resulted for some freelancers in remarkable constructs. Like Barth, for instance, his successor Görtz was reporting for the conservative Die Welt as well as for the liberal-left newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung. In fact, when writing for other publications than Die Welt, Görtz usually used the pseudonym Richard Aschenborn. According to Görtz himself, this was necessary because of the different ideological orientations of the newspapers and their resulting position towards the anti-communist Francoist Spain. While the Spanish authorities were aware of Görtz’s commitment to various papers and also his use of pseudonyms, for German readers interested in Spain, these often very similar reports sometimes came as a surprise. The later Spain correspondent Walter Haubrich, for instance, remembered that, as a student in Germany, he was annoyed that the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Spain correspondent Richard Aschenborn would have often the same point of view as the conservative Die Welt’s representative in Spain.

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In a report on the correspondent, the Section for Foreign Press lists even more US media, to which Mowrer sold his work: Milwaukee Journal (Milwaukee), Philadelphia Inquirer (Philadelphia), New York Post (New York), News Chronicle, NBC, Evening Star (Washington), Sunday Star (Washington). See AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Untitled report on Richard Mowrer, 30 May 1966 [unsigned].


AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.970, Folder Richard S. Mowrer, Copy of article on Mowrer in Editor & Publisher, 8 October 1966 [no page number].

Rolf Görtz, interview by Tobias Reckling

ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Accreditation Rolf Görtz, Jefe Sección Prensa Extranjera to Director General de Prensa, 10 June 1965.

Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 14 July 2012.
On some occasions, however, Görtz adapted the tone and subject to the ideological orientation of the newspapers, as, for instance, he did in the context of the 25th anniversary of the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1964. On the anniversary, Franco had announced a partial amnesty and his plans to step down as head of state in the near future. Görtz used both announcements for articles in Die Welt and the Süddeutsche Zeitung, which the two newspapers published on the same day. Articles on the Spanish Civil War accompanied these brief reports. In his articles for Die Welt, which devoted only one text to the anniversary, Görtz concentrated on the personality of Franco. He highlighted the current ‘change of the dictatorship’ because of the non-ideological regime of Franco, while the Spanish Civil War itself was only treated marginally. Instead, Görtz stressed that the contemporary Spanish authorities did not talk about victory in the war anymore and the Civil War memory in general had declined in importance. Thereby Görtz’s articles reflected the official propaganda of the regime. In contrast to previous years, the anniversary of the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1964 was no longer celebrated as a victory over the communist and anti-Catholic republican troops, but as 25 Años de Paz (25 years of peace). While Victory Parade by the Spanish military marching through Madrid was renamed into Peace Parade, the overall emphasis of the regime’s propaganda was put on the peace, stability and economic progress achieved under Franco.

The Süddeutsche Zeitung, however, dedicated an entire page to the Civil War anniversary. Besides two articles by the paper’s Moscow correspondent and an eye-witness report from the last days of the Civil War, Görtz also published a long text. For the liberal-left Süddeutsche Zeitung, however, the correspondent concentrated on the current socio-economic changes in Spain as well as the importance of the EEC for Spain’s development without any emphasis of the importance of Franco himself. Görtz, therefore, adapted his articles to the different editorial lines of the newspapers. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that Görtz was by no means a defender of the Franco regime. In fact, he also

668 Rolf Görtz, “Vom Sieg ist kaum die Rede,” Die Welt, 1 April 1964, 3.
669 Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil española (Madrid: Alianza, 1996).
frequently published critical reports in *Die Welt*, which resulted in complaints from more Franco-friendly readers within the German community in Spain.\footnote{At the end of 1962, Görtz published a critical article in *Die Welt* on press censorship in Spain. This resulted in a letter of complaint by a German reader to the editors of the newspaper. Since this letter was found in Görtz’ accreditation file, the editors of *Die Welt* or Görtz himself must have forwarded it to the Spanish authorities. See ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Accreditation Rolf Görtz: Walter Wefers to editor of *Die Welt*, 3 January 1963. Görtz himself could not recall the episode in the interview.}

Görtz was not just a remarkable case because of his ideologically flexible reporting, but also because of his career path. His decision to leave his job as staff journalist in Germany in order to become a stringer in Spain was an unusual career choice. Based on Hannerz’s examination of correspondent’s careers, the following section will examine the more typical career paths of correspondents in Francoist Spain

**Correspondents’ Careers**

As an introduction to the study of correspondent’s careers in Francoist Spain, Hannerz presented two pieces of career advice that a senior correspondent received at the beginning of his career from two established journalists:

One told him he should go to a place where news was made or about to be made, write as a freelancer, and make himself indispensable – then someone would hire him. The other told him to get hired by the best paper he could, begin by doing local news and move on to foreign news whenever an opportunity arose.\footnote{Hannerz, *Foreign News*, 71.}

Based on these exemplary career starts and Hannerz’s examination of correspondent’s careers, some questions regarding the analysis of the press corps in Francoist Spain can be posed: Did the foreign correspondents start as journalists while already in Spain (either as a stringer or not), or were they sent to Spain by their home media? If the latter applied, did they have previous postings as correspondents before coming to Spain, or was Spain their introduction into foreign correspondence?

The previous section and chapters have shown that the professional situations and careers of correspondents in Francoist Spain were highly diverse, as the case of Görtz revealed. Some correspondents, such as Mowrer, followed their families’ tradition of journalistic work. Others, like some of the exiles from Cuba, became correspondents out of necessity. In general, however, correspondents followed relatively typical career paths, as discussed by Hannerz. The following section will discuss three such typical career paths that
correspondents in Francoist Spain took under the labels New Staff Correspondents, Transnational Correspondents, and National Correspondents.

The first category, New Staff Correspondent, refers to one of the typical career paths presented by Hannerz: go abroad, start as freelancer and then get a job as a staff correspondent. This category therefore refers to journalists who got into foreign correspondence in Spain by working as freelancers before becoming staff correspondents. However, typical as it may be in other countries, this path into foreign correspondence was the exception for the foreign press corps in Spain. With the exception of particular occasions such as the Burgos trials in the end of 1970, Spain was not one of those places ‘where news was made or about to be made’. Or, to put it differently, it was rather difficult to make oneself indispensable for foreign media in Spain since, in principal, news from Spain was dispensable. This thesis has already shown that Hannerz’s typical career path from stringer to staff was therefore rather unlikely for most correspondents in Spain. Numerous freelancers left journalism in Spain after relatively short time periods. Others, as the previous section has shown, took advantage of the generally limited presence of staff correspondents by establishing themselves as stringers for years or even decades.

Nevertheless, this thesis has also shown that the media interest in Spain increased from the end of the 1960s, which was reflected in a growing number of staff correspondents. While most of these new staff correspondents were sent to Spain, the rising media interest also allowed a number of already present freelancers to become actual staff correspondents. This applied, for instance, to the Dutch correspondent Kees van Bemmelen. Van Bemmelen was in Spain from 1964 onwards. After giving up his initial dream to become a painter, van Bemmelen started to work as a freelancer for Dutch radio and print media. This eventually led to his hiring by the major Dutch newspaper *De Telegraaf*, once the newspaper became interested in having a staff correspondent in Madrid at the beginning of the 1970s.675

In terms of media importance, the most noticeable cases of freelancers becoming staff correspondents in Spain were Harry Debelius of *The Times* and Walter Haubrich of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. Haubrich had already established himself as an expert on Spain well before he joined the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* as staff correspondent in 1969. Haubrich was one of the very few correspondents with an explicit academic background on Spain. Besides German literature, he had followed Romance linguistics at the universities in Frankfurt and Mainz and had spent time as an exchange in student in

675 Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling.
Dijon, Madrid and Salamanca. After his studies, he became a lecturer in German studies at the universities in Valladolid and Santiago de Compostela in the second half of the 1960s. There, he also started to work as a freelancer for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which eventually hired him as a staff correspondent. Before employing Haubrich, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung relied on reports filed by fixed stringers, namely the aforementioned Werner Schulz. Haubrich remained the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s staff correspondent in Spain until his retirement in 2002.

Haubrich and van Bemmelen do not just represent the typical career path of freelancer to staff correspondent. Their almost parallel employment as staff correspondents around 1970 also supports the observation made in chapter three on the development of the foreign press corps and international media interest in Francoist Spain. The increased interest in the Franco regime, therefore, also opened career paths for freelancers already working in Spain. In fact, both van Bemmelen and Görtz directly linked their employment as staff correspondents to the massive international media interest in the Burgos trials at the end of 1970s. In the opinion of these correspondents, the strong presence of the Franco regime in media all over the world convinced the editors that from now on a staff correspondent in Spain would be a worthwhile investment. Choosing freelancers with a profound knowledge of Spain instead of sending their own correspondent seemed like the best choice for these media.

While the latter certainly applied to Debelius’ employment as staff correspondent by The Times in 1970, the case was different. The prestigious English newspaper The Times was among the few foreign media which continuously had a staff correspondent in Francoist Spain since the end of the Spanish Civil War. When The Times’ long-term correspondent and co-founder of the ACPE, Stuttard, died in 1969, however, the newspaper was in need of a replacement. The Times’ editors chose Debelius who at the time had been working in Spain for more than a decade. Debelius was born in Baltimore, where he started to work for local and student papers while studying literature. He came to Spain to work on one of the American military bases under construction in the 1950s. During the late 1950s,
Debelius started to work as a freelancer for UP.\textsuperscript{680} Thereafter, he moved on to the radio and television broadcaster American Broadcasting Company (ABC),\textsuperscript{681} for which he reported from all over the world from the mid-1960s.\textsuperscript{682} In 1970, Debelius eventually became the staff correspondent of The Times in Spain and was therefore the only American correspondent of the British newspaper.\textsuperscript{683} The Times, which certainly had no shortage of available journalists, decided to choose a correspondent with vast experience in Spain instead of sending a newcomer.

The second category, Transnational Correspondents, refers to correspondents who received their journalistic training abroad, became correspondents and then, at one point in their career, were sent to Spain. In contrast to the previous category, Spain was therefore not the first post abroad for these correspondents. The careers of these correspondents followed the policy of many major media and news agencies to regularly rotate their staff. In Hannerz terms, they were ‘spiralists’\textsuperscript{684}.

One correspondent who followed this career path in Spain was Manfred von Conta. Von Conta became the first staff correspondent in Spain for the German Süddeutsche Zeitung in 1968 when the newspaper decided to replace their stringer (Görtz). He had left his university studies unfinished to pursue his first goal, becoming a journalist, in Munich. Besides some freelance work for other media, it was von Conta’s explicit aim to get a job with the renowned Süddeutsche Zeitung. Based on the advice given to Hannerz’s prospective correspondents, von Conta took the second option: getting hired by the best newspaper around. He succeeded in becoming a local reporter for the Süddeutsche Zeitung in 1954. After moving up to local reporter in Germany, the Süddeutsche Zeitung sent von Conta as correspondent to Vienna from 1962-68. Vienna was at the time the base for many Eastern European correspondents, and besides Austria von Conta also covered Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Following his reports on the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, the communist authorities expelled von Conta from Prague as a ‘CIA-Agent, whose writings had instigated counterrevolution’\textsuperscript{685}. When the foreign editor of his home paper, ‘looking for a place where a supposed CIA-Agent could work for them in safety’, asked if

\textsuperscript{680} Ibid., 15. See also ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 130 [no archival signature].
\textsuperscript{681} Ministerio de Información y Turismo, Club internacional de prensa (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1966), 54.
\textsuperscript{682} Echeverría, Corresponsales Extranjeros - Los Observadores Imparciales: Harry Debelius, 15.
\textsuperscript{683} Ibid. See also Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1970, 293.
\textsuperscript{684} Hannerz, Foreign News, 82.
\textsuperscript{685} Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling, See also Manfred von Conta. Skype-Interview Tobias Reckling, 12 February 2013.
he would go to Spain in 1969, von Conta ‘jumped with joy’. However, although von Conta was ‘contaminated’ with a love for both foreign correspondence and journalism as a youngster by reading Hemingway, he came without any prior experience of Spain or knowledge of Spanish. Von Conta started his stay in Spain, therefore, with an intensive programme of language learning and getting to know the country.

Von Conta remained in Spain for three years and then became the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s correspondent in Brazil. Therefore, von Conta represented the typical case of a ‘spiralist’, whose newspaper frequently rotated their correspondents. But his career was also typical in another respect for some correspondents in Francoist Spain. Media with an international network of correspondents like the Süddeutsche Zeitung interchanged their correspondents between Spain and Latin America, primarily because of the necessary language skills. The Süddeutsche Zeitung mainly used the posts in Spain as preparation for Latin America. Friedrich Kassebeer, von Conta’s successor in Spain, for instance, was also sent to Latin America after covering Spain from 1972 to 1978. In the case of The New York Times, the exchange went both ways. While The New York Times correspondent Sam Pope Brewer was sent from Spain to Latin America in the beginning of the 1950, his successors in Spain, Richard Eder (in Spain 1968-72) and Henry Giniger (in Spain 1972-1976), both had previous experiences in Mexico.

The last category of staff correspondents, National Correspondents, in principle also followed Hannerz’s typical career path: getting their first journalistic experiences at home and then, when the opportunity arises, taking up a post as foreign correspondent. However, in contrast to the former, for these correspondents Spain was their first beat, but others followed. They were therefore also ‘spiralists’ in Hannerz’s terms, but in their career were just one step behind the correspondents with previous postings. A correspondent who followed this career path was von Conta’s successor Kassebeer.

Kassebeer belonged to the first generation of German journalists who had started their careers after the Second World War. In fact, Kassebeer, a rather rare case for the time, had even received formal training as journalist in Germany. He had attended the first school for

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686 Ibid.
687 Ibid.
688 Ibid.
689 Friedrich Kassebeer, interview by Tobias Reckling, 8 April 2011, Dénia.
690 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.773: Folder Sam Pope Brewer: Accreditation Sam Pope Brewer.
692 AGA, (03) 049.21, 64.969: Folder Henry Giniger: Accreditation Henry Giniger.

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journalism (founded as an experiment and part of the Allied democratization programme) together with the first licensed German newspapers after 1945 in Aachen in the American occupied zone. Following his formal education, Kassebeer started his journalistic career at local and regional newspapers. From the 1960s onwards, he became the regional correspondent in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia for the magazine Der Spiegel and Die Welt before spending some time as editor for one of Germany’s regional broadcasters. In 1968 he joined the staff of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, again as correspondent for North Rhine-Westphalia.

When the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Spain correspondent Manfred von Conta left Spain in 1972, Kassebeer took his post in Madrid. Spain, therefore, was his first beat as a foreign correspondent after more than 20 years in journalism. In contrast to the freelancers who became staff correspondents like Debelius and Haubrich, therefore, Kassebeer had little previous knowledge of Spain, which he had only visited during summer holidays. This also applied to his language skills: like von Conta, he started to learn Spanish when his posting to Madrid was decided. Kassebeer remained in Madrid until 1978, when he once more replaced von Conta, this time as the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s correspondent in Latin America.

**Nationality and gender**

The popular image of the typical foreign correspondent was (and partly still is) that of a ‘lonely, hardened man’. Foreign correspondence was indeed for a long time a man’s occupation. Of course, famous women reporters had been around since the first half of the 20th century. In particular, women correspondents in the Spanish Civil War such as Martha Gellhorn and the photographer Gerda Taro are often presented as examples of early women correspondents. However, Taro and Gellhorn were still remarkable exceptions. A survey conducted by Theodore Edward Kruglak among US correspondents and stringers during the 1950s, found that only 1.9% of these journalists were women. An almost parallel

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693 On the first school for journalism see Otto Altendorfer, *Das Mediensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Wiebaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2013), 245.
694 Friedrich Kassebeer, interview by Tobias Reckling.
695 Ibid.
696 Ibid.
697 Hannerz, *Foreign News*, 93.
survey among foreign correspondents in the US found that the presence of women among these journalists was, at 5.4%, higher, but still very limited. This situation only started to change slowly. Still in 1975, Ralph Kliesch shows, only 10% of all US correspondents were women. It was only since the 1980s that women, as in other occupations, were increasingly employed as correspondents by US media.

Although less studies and surveys are available for European women correspondents and women correspondents in Europe, it can be assumed that the situation was similar. Antje Robrecht, for instance, does not mention any women correspondents at all in her study of the British press corps in Germany and German correspondents in Britain between 1945 and 1962. At the beginning of the 1980s, Morrison and Tumber still found that that ‘although the term “foreign newsmen” refers also to women, it is not that inaccurate as an inclusive term since only 15 percent of the foreign media corps [in London] are women.’

Newsmen also dominated the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain. However, compared to the US press corps, women correspondents were far more numerous in Spain. From 1955 until 1975, women correspondents represented between 10% and 16% of all accredited part and full-time correspondents. If only the full–time correspondents were counted, the percentage of women correspondents was slightly less, but compared with the above findings, still remarkably strong. Indeed, between 8% and 15% of all accredited full-time correspondents were women from 1955 until 1975. Particularly noteworthy is the relatively strong presence of women correspondents during the 1950s. In the mid-1950s, almost 10% of all full-time correspondents were women, five times as many as in Kruglak’s survey of US foreign correspondents at the time.

At least to some extent, the relatively strong presence of women correspondents was a reflection of the particular development of international media interest in Spain. The previous chapter has shown that the active promotion of Francoist Spain as a fashion and tourism centre, under Fraga especially, resulted in the increased accreditation of correspondents of specialized magazines during the 1960s. Many of these journalists, such as Aline Griffith, the previously mentioned correspondent of the fashion magazine Vogue,

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700 Donald A. Lambert, “Foreign correspondents covering the United States,” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1956), 349.
702 In 1991, 26% percent of the US foreign correspondents were women. See ibid., 31.
were women correspondents. Other examples were the correspondents for the US magazines *Look* and *Harper’s Bazar*, Marylin Kaytor705 and Elisabeth Howell706, both of whom were accredited during the mid-1960s. Therefore, the presence of women correspondents reflected a general employment policy of magazines, especially those dedicated to special interests like fashion. Indeed, Morrison and Tumber have shown that, in the beginning of the 1980s, magazines were ‘the best employers [for women], being the only medium with over half (52.9 percent) female staff. To a certain extent this is due to the specialized women’s interest sections [...]’707.

The accreditation of some women correspondents for fashion magazines, however, cannot explain the strong early presence of newswomen in Spain. A closer examination of these correspondents in Francoist Spain not only allows for a partial understanding of the relatively strong presence of these women correspondents but also provides insights into the composition of the foreign press from a sociological point of view beyond the gender aspect alone.

A crucial aspect in understanding the relatively strong presence of women correspondents during the 1950s is the observation that some were the wives or partners of the German correspondents with a past in Nazi Germany who remained in Spain after 1945. The previously outlined relaxation in accreditation policy also allowed these women correspondents to become accredited for the same media of their husbands. Notable examples were Ilse von Finckenstein,708 a relative of the Nazi Minister of Economics Hjalmar Schacht and partner and later wife of Otto Skorzeny; Ilse B. Schulz,709 the wife of Werner Schulz; and Amalia Tichmann,710 the wife of Karl Tichmann. Although a somewhat special case, Helga Lindscheidt also belongs on this list. Lindscheidt came to Spain with her husband Friedrich Lindscheidt for the German news agency *DIMITAG* in 1940.711 After

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710 Dirección General de Prensa, *Anuario de la Prensa Española*, 1965, 1467. See also Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling.
711 AGA (03) 049.21, 64.969, Folder Helga Lindscheidt: Untitled Report on Helga Lindscheidt by Dirección General de Seguridad, 30 June 1950.
the death of her husband she remained in Spain. Following the re-foundation of DIMITAG after 1945, Lindscheidt became the news agency’s Spain correspondent in 1950.\(^\text{712}\)

These double accreditations (with the exception of Lindscheidt) must be seen as another reflection of the attractiveness of the accreditation status and its associated privileges. By simply becoming accredited, these women correspondents contributed to their household income by, for instance, doubling the coupons for gasoline, which the Francoist authorities gave to all staff correspondents. The reform of the accreditation guidelines in 1966, however, ended these double accreditations. In fact, the new guidelines explicitly stated that only news agencies and broadcasters could have more than one staff correspondent at a time.

Besides these German couples, also a surprising number of women correspondents with different nationalities were married to other correspondents. The American Elizabeth Buckley, who in 1965 was accredited for the US magazine *Harper’s Bazaar*, was married to the British *Reuters* correspondent Henry Buckley. Likewise, the partner and later wife of the correspondent William Cemlyn-Jones, Jane Walker, was working for both *The Guardian* and the magazine *Time* during the Spanish transition. Sieglinde Herrmann was even successively married to two foreign correspondents in Spain.\(^\text{713}\)

Some correspondents couples, like *The New York Times* correspondents Camille and Jane Cianfarras during the 1950s, only remained briefly in Spain.\(^\text{714}\) They came together and planned to move on together to the next post. Both, however, died in the infamous sinking of the Andrea Doria on their way back to New York in 1956.\(^\text{715}\) The majority, however, were ‘long-timers’. The Tichmanns, Buckleys, Cemlyn-Jones and Walker and others remained for decades in Spain. In fact, some of these couples even founded entire journalist families. Patrick Buckley, the son of Elisabeth and Henry Buckley, for instance, started out in journalism in Spain for *AP* before becoming a scriptwriter. The son of Cemlyn-Jones and Walker, David Cemlyn-Jones, became more serious about journalism. He started to work for the Spanish news agency *EFE*, before moving on to *UPI* and, in 1972, *Reuters*.\(^\text{716}\)

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\(^{712}\) AGA (03) 049.21, 64.969, Folder Helga Lindscheidt: Accreditation Helga Lindscheidt.

\(^{713}\) After her marriage with Gustav Herrmann, who passed away in 1965, she was married to the Swiss correspondent Heinz Rudolf Ramseier. Ramseier was as correspondent of the Austrian socialist newspaper *Arbeiterzeitung* in Spain. Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling. On the accreditation of Ramseier see ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 254 [no archival signature].

\(^{714}\) AGA, (03) 049.21, 56.777, Accreditation Camille Cianfarrar.

\(^{715}\) NYPL MAD, MssCol 17792, Box 19, Folder 3-4: Biographical note on Camille Cianfarrar in content discipion.

\(^{716}\) AGA, (03) 049.21, 56.777: Folder David Cemlyn Jones: Accreditation David Cemlyn Jones.
The married women reporters were almost exclusively not Spaniards, but foreign nationals that had come to Spain with their husbands or at least met there. This is important with regard to the journalistic career of many of these women correspondents. In most cases, the husbands were accredited first, while the wives were accredited later on. This suggests that the husbands, at least in some cases, facilitated the access of their wives into the men’s world of foreign correspondence. This career path certainly applies to a number of women correspondents who took over the Bauchladen of their husbands after their deaths, namely Amalia Tichmann, Sieglinde Herrmann, and Ilse Schulz.

Sieglinde Herrmann gave some insights into her career into journalism through her marriage. Shortly after arriving in Spain in the beginning of the 1960s, she started to support her husband Gustav Herrmann, first informally and then as an accredited correspondent. Gustav Herrmann worked as a stringer for a number of Swiss, Austrian and German publications since 1953 and was one of the few early German correspondents who strongly opposed the Franco regime (further discussed in Chapter 6). Herrmann explained that getting into journalism was a rational choice for her in order to increase the household’s income. In the beginning, she argued in an interview, it was easier for her to publish her reports under her husband’s name. Following Gustav Herrmann’s death, Sieglinde Herrmann took over his Bauchladen.

Of course, not all accredited correspondent’s wives were mere semi-professionals, simply taking advantage of their husband’s occupation. Although their husbands were undoubtedly crucial in facilitating their access to the men’s world of foreign correspondence, Herrmann in particular became a well-known and influential correspondent in her own right. The following chapter will show that, due to her widely distributed journalistic output as well as her good contacts with the democratic opposition, Sieglinde Herrmann became one of the most influential correspondents in the foreign press corps. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, Helga Lindscheidt also became an influential correspondent in her own right. At the beginning of the 1960s, Lindscheidt was accredited for the important German economic newspaper Handelsblatt.717 The Spanish press attaché in Bonn reported in 1965 that ‘her articles convey a love for Spain and a real desire to understand the positive aspects of our country, her institutions and her politics’718.

717 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.969, Folder Helga Lindscheidt: Accreditation Helga Lindscheidt.
718 AGA (03) 049.021, 64.969, Folder Helga Lindscheidt: Agregado de Prensa at Spanish Embassy in Bonn to DG de Prensa, 28 July 1965.
It would also be incorrect to imply that all women correspondents became correspondents because of their husbands. The American Jocelyn Bush, who married the *Time* correspondent Pierro Saporiti in the 1950s, for instance, was already a well-established correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune* in her own right. After their marriage, she continued her journalistic work independently.\textsuperscript{719} The most noticeable example of a woman correspondent in Spain during the 1950s was, however, Jacqueline Darricarére d'Etchevers, bureau chief of *AFP* from 1957 to 1962.\textsuperscript{720} Her appointment as bureau chief for a major international news agency was not only exceptional for the foreign press corps in Spain at the time, but also in international comparison. Another of the very few women staff correspondents during the 1950s was Annemarie Schwyter, the first wife of Gustav Herrmann, Sieglinde’s later husband. Schwyter later on became one of the best known Swiss journalists. Between 1951 and 1960, she was reporting from Spain for the Swiss news agency *Schweizer Depechenagentur*,\textsuperscript{721} and returned frequently to the Franco regime thereafter.\textsuperscript{722} Furthermore, the Colombian journalist and poet Dolly Mejia is another example of an influential women correspondent in Francoist Spain. Accredited since the end of the 1950s,\textsuperscript{723} Mejia reported until the end of the dictatorship for a number of Colombian and Argentinian newspapers, agencies and magazines.\textsuperscript{724}

Besides these prominent examples, foreign correspondence remained a men’s domain in Spain which in turn was a reflection of the international media market. Not only were women correspondents few in numbers but even fewer women correspondents were accredited as staff correspondents for major media. The majority of the full-time women correspondents in Spain worked as stringers like Herrmann or Mejia. Therefore, the employment policy of foreign media in Francoist Spain reflected a general and long-standing tendency. Kevin Williams outlines that ‘prior to the 1980s women were three

\textsuperscript{719} ACMP, Secretaré de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 133 [no archival signature].
\textsuperscript{721} AGA 58.358, Accreditation Gustav Herrmann, Note on Annemarie Schwyter, 3 December 1964.
\textsuperscript{722} Moisés Prieto López, “«And that’s the way it is» Gedanken zum Wahrheitskonzept in Geschichte und Journalismus,” Paper presented at the Summer School „Wahrheit in der Geschichte und der Geschichtsschreibung“ (Zurich: 5-7 September 2012), 5.
\textsuperscript{723} ACMP, Secretaré de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 80 [no archival signature].
\textsuperscript{724} Mejia was accredited between 1958 and 1975 at one point or another for the following publications: *Cromos, El Voto Nacional, Sistema Alianza Nacional, Familia, Alianza Nacional Popular, Relediario* (all Colombia) and *El Economista* (Argentina).
times as likely to be employed as a stringer as men. Furthermore, despite their relatively large number in Spain, women correspondents were also marginalized in the correspondent’s organizations. Until 1975, Dolly Mejia was the only women correspondent who held any position (a speaker in her case) in any of the three organizations for correspondents, the ACPI. Even Darricaré d'Etchevers, as bureau chief of a major news agency, never held any position on one of the correspondent’s organizations in Francoist Spain. Instead, the ACPE’s and CIP’s board of directors was exclusively composed of men throughout the Franco regime and some of them, like the aforementioned president Tichmann, only worked for minor publications.

This situation only started to change during the 1970s, parallel to the earlier outlined (but still very limited) increased employment of women in other press corps. In 1970, 15% of all staff correspondents were women. Since the previous reform of the accreditation guidelines had ended the regime’s laissez-faire accreditation policy, these women correspondents were indeed working as professional journalists. Furthermore, the type of media which employed women correspondents changed. Jane Walker, for instance, during the Spanish transition became Time magazine’s full-time correspondent in Spain. The German news agency dpa replaced, after the death of Franco, Hans Rahm, the agencies long-time, pro-Francoist correspondent in Spain, with the experienced women correspondent Elisabeth Guth. Finally, and with some further delay, the position of women correspondents within the foreign press corps and the correspondent’s organizations also changed. In 1979, Amalia Tichmann was named honorary member of the ACPE, while Guth was elected in the association’s directorate. However, it still took until 1984, before the first women correspondent, Sieglinde Herrmann, was elected as president of the CIP.

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728 ACMP, Secretaré de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 290 [no archival signature]. See also Elisabeth Guth, interview by Tobias Reckling, 27 June 2011, Madrid.
729 Club Internacional de Prensa, Libro de Plata, Presidentes del Club Internacional de Prensa [no page numbers].
**Foreign foreign correspondents and local hands**

It was and still is common practice for media to hire what has been termed *foreign* foreign correspondents: correspondents of another ‘nationality’ than the media they work for.\(^{730}\) The foreign press corps in Spain was no exception in this regard. The correspondent Mowrer, with his very international media contacts, and some of the German and Latin American stringers were examples of such *foreign* foreign correspondents. These and others of what could also be termed transnational stringers filled the limited demand of newspapers and other media for news in Spain which could or would not afford a staff correspondent. The presence of other transnational stringers reflected the Franco regime’s particular ideological orientation, its foreign policy and the contemporary international context. This applied to the *foreign* foreign correspondents among the Cuban and Eastern European émigrés in Spain.

Besides these rather specific groups of transnational stringers, the hiring of *foreign* foreign correspondents as staff correspondents was for other media a normal part of personnel policy. This applied to the global news agencies *Reuters*, *UPI*, *AP* and *AFP* – although to different degrees. While both *AFP*\(^ {731}\) and *Reuters*\(^ {732}\) mainly employed French and British nationals respectively, the press corps of the American news agencies was far more international. *AP*, for instance, employed at one point or another correspondents of seven different nationalities until the death of Franco.\(^ {733}\) *Foreign* foreign correspondents were even more strongly represented in the *UPI* staff in Spain. Not only did *UPI* employed correspondents from nine different nationalities but non-Americans also directed the *UPI* office in Madrid at various times: the Spaniard Carlos Mendo (1962-65), the Italian Aldo Trippini (1966-74) and the Swiss Peter Gregor Übersax (1975-1977).

The appointment of the Spaniard Carlos Mendo as bureau chief of *UPI* in Spain points to the special case of Spaniards as *foreign* foreign correspondents. The hiring of locals as correspondents was not, of course, just a Spanish speciality. In order to save the money for more costly staff correspondents, it was and is common practice for foreign editors to hire

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\(^ {730}\) See Wu and Hamilton, US Foreign Correspondents: Changes and Continuity at the Turn of the Century, 528; Hamilton and Jenner, Redefining foreign correspondence, 306.

\(^ {731}\) See AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 3: Sección de Prensa Extranjera, Corresponsales de prensa extranjera acreditados en España 1975 [undated].

\(^ {732}\) Ibid.

\(^ {733}\) Ibid.
local journalists. In the case of a modern dictatorship like Spain, however, the employment of Spaniards as correspondents was nevertheless of particular importance.

Spanish journalists as correspondents were nothing new in Spain. The Spaniard Julio Alvarez del Vayo was, as president of the first ACPE, one of the most prominent foreign correspondents in Madrid. During the Franco regime, however, the previously outlined restrictions made it more difficult for Spaniards to become foreign correspondents. They were only accredited as correspondents if they were first signed into the official register for Spanish journalists. The stricter application of these guidelines under Fraga since the beginning of the 1960s caused some problems for Spanish correspondents of news agencies who were not signed into the official register for Spanish journalists. In general, however, the requirements for Spanish correspondents could easily be fulfilled and had little impact on the actual employment policy of international news agencies in Spain. AP had in its staff a number of Spanish journalists who had already been working for the agency for decades. José Torres Victoria, one of agency’s long-term employees, had started to work for AP during the Civil War; and his brother, Alejandro Torres Victoria, started to collaborate with the agency in 1933 and became staff in 1941. Both journalists remained with AP until the 1970s. The Torres brothers were no exception. Spanish correspondents like Emilio Moya and Alfredo Gómez Legendre also started to work for AP prior to 1945 and remained employed until after Franco’s death.

AP’s employment of Spanish journalists during the 1940s can be seen as a strategy to keep the cost of a functional bureau (in a post of secondary importance such as Francoist Spain) to a minimum. However, AP as well as other international news agencies, continued to hire Spaniards thereafter. The most prominent case of a Spaniard working for an international news agency was Carlos Mendo, who became the UPI bureau chief in Spain at the age of 29 in 1962.

The appointment of Mendo also points to a political aspect of the hiring of Spaniards by international news agencies. In general, the Spanish journalists working for AP and other news agencies since the 1940s and 1950s were rather sympathetic towards the Franco

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734 See for example Wu and Hamilton, US Foreign Correspondents: Changes and Continuity at the Turn of the Century, 528; Hamilton and Jenner, Redefining foreign correspondence, 306.
735 AGA, (03)049.021, 64.969: Information on Torres in communication between Harold Milks, bureau chief of AP in Madrid, and the Director General de Prensa, 29 March 1964.
737 The examined accreditation lists show that AP recruited, for instance, in 1952 the Spaniard Miguel Fernandez del Prado, in 1960 José de Manzanos, in 1966 Leopoldo Gómez Gonzalez and in 1970 Diego Luis Hortelano Marmol.
regime. Alejandro Torres, for instance, was described by the MIT as a ‘right-wing person and of excellent behaviour’\textsuperscript{738}. Of course, international news agencies did not have much to choose from at this time. The Civil War, the massive repression of the supporters of the Republic and the exile of numerous Spanish journalists\textsuperscript{739} as well the strict control imposed by the Francoist authorities on media and journalists, did not leave many other options. It can be assumed, however, that the employment of regime-friendly Spanish journalists in international news agencies was in the interest of the Francoist authorities. Indeed, the Spanish authorities tried early on to improve their relations with international news agencies as EFE signed contracts first with Reuters and then with UP in 1945 in order to ‘gain free world favour’\textsuperscript{740}. Henry F. Schulte, first UP and then UPI bureau chief in Spain from 1956 to 1962, claims that the Francoist authorities put their hopes on UP in particular:

One can only conjecture that the Spanish government was hopeful that United Press, a privately owned news agency obligated only by business ties to clients, would be more malleable and less likely to be anti-Franco than Associated Press, which, as an organization constituted by member U.S. newspapers, might be inclined to reflect the anti-Francoism believed [to be] rampant in the United States. The feeling that the purchase of the U.P. service entitled Spain to favourable treatment permeated some areas of government and did, to this writer’s personal knowledge, enter into exchanges between governmental officials and U.P. correspondents.\textsuperscript{741}

Schulte himself highlights that this agreement never affected UP’s respectively UPI’s reporting during his time in Spain. Nevertheless, against this background it is surprising that an American news agency was willing to accept a Spaniard - who, incidentally, would later go on to make his career within the Francoist system - as bureau chief. Unfortunately, the well known appointment of Mendo as UPI bureau chief has received no academic interest so far, and no further information on the background of Mendo’s appointment could be found in the files of the MIT.\textsuperscript{742} However, Mendo’s later career as well as UPI policy, nevertheless suggest that his appointment was a compromise that the UPI struck in order to appease the Francoist authorities and Fraga in particular.

\textsuperscript{738} AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.971, Folder Alejandro Torres Victoria: Untitled report on Torres, 16 February 1962.


\textsuperscript{741} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{742} As outlined in the introduction, it was not possible for this thesis to access the archives of news agencies such as UPI.
Indeed, Mendo was not just a successful journalist, but a ‘faithful follower of Fraga’\textsuperscript{743}, which was reflected in Mendo’s later career. Following his stay at \textit{UPI}, Fraga appointed Mendo as director of the state owned news agency \textit{EFE} in 1965.\textsuperscript{744} During the Spanish transition, Mendo also served as the press chief of Fraga’s right-wing party \textit{Alianza Popular}. Furthermore, while Fraga’s interest in placing a man of his confidence on top of the bureau of a major international news agency is self-evident, \textit{UPI} generally showed its willingness to compromise with the dictatorship on other occasions. A former \textit{UPI} employee highlights that ‘\textit{UPI} tried to have people in foreign capitals who could "get along" with the regime. This was on the premise that it was better to have some reporting from these capitals than none. The clients demanded it.’\textsuperscript{745} Chris Patterson and Vanessa Malila show in their study on South Africa’s attempt to buy into global news during the early 1970s that \textit{UPI} was vulnerable to the PR interest of dictatorial regimes.\textsuperscript{746} Indeed, Carlos Arias Navarro, by then Director-General of Security, had threatened Mendo’s predecessor Schulte with expulsion in 1962.\textsuperscript{747} The appointment of Mendo in the same year, therefore, could be seen as an attempt by \textit{UPI} to please its Spanish costumer. However, the question of how the appointment of Mendo came about and how much of an impact it had on Spain’s image in the \textit{UPI} wires in the beginning of the 1960s must be left to future research. Nevertheless, the above arguments shed light on a particular case of the employment of Spaniards by foreign news agencies in Spain.

While Mendo was supportive of the regime, political aspects also played a role in the employment of other young Spanish journalists during the 1960s, albeit but from the opposite position. These were representatives of a young, more critical generation of Spanish journalists. They had left the MIT controlled Official Journalism Schools or alternative institutions by the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{748} Some of the church controlled journalism schools were especially open to more democratic ideas. In Barcelona in particular, where demands for democracy and regionalist autonomy reinforced each other, journalism students found themselves in an ‘environment most politicized and hostile towards the

\textsuperscript{744} Barrera, \textit{Periodismo y franquismo}, 54.
official Madrid. But also in Madrid, journalism students took part in the growing student resistance against the Franco regime during the 1960s (further discussed in the following chapters). Or, as José Antonio Martínez Soler, better known under his journalistic pseudonym JAMS put it: “Going into journalism was a political decision at the time. We wanted to fight for democracy.” JAMS himself was one of these young journalism students who became journalistically active against the regime. At the beginning of the 1970s, he founded the Franco-critical weekly Doblón. Shortly after the death of Franco, JAMS was kidnapped and tortured by the Francoist authorities and thereby became a symbol of the journalistic fight for democracy.

Researchers have already highlighted that this generation of young journalists played an important role during the Spanish regime change. What this research has largely overlooked, however, is that some of these journalists received part of their journalistic education as correspondents for foreign media. The best known among them was probably Juan Luis Cebrián Echarri, who became accredited as the first Spain correspondent of the Italian news agency Inter Press Service in 1964, the year of the agency’s foundation. After the death of Franco, Cebrián co-founded the Spanish newspaper El País in 1976, which became of central importance for Spain’s democratization process. Other prominent examples were José ‘Pepe’ Oneto, who worked for AFP at the beginning of the 1970s, and Miguel Ángel Aguilar, who was accredited as correspondent for Belgian publications. Aguilar and Oneto both became central journalistic actors during the regime change.

Aguilar and Oneto had been journalistically active before becoming correspondents in the regime critical newspaper Madrid. Fraga’s partial liberalization of the press law in 1966

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749 Chuliá, El poder y la palabra, 185. See also Barrera, “Poder político, empresa periodística y profesionales de los medios en la transición española a la democracia”.
750 José Antonio Martínez Soler, interview by Tobias Reckling, 1 August 2012, Madrid.
751 Juan A. García Galindo, “Periodismo y periodistas en la transición política española,” in Prensa y democracia: Los medios de comunicación en la transición, ed. Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz, 87–100 (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2009), 92. See also José Antonio Martínez Soler, interview by Tobias Reckling.
753 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.776, Folder Juan Luis Cebrián Echarri, Accreditation Juan Luis Cebrián Echarri.
755 José Oneto Revuelta, interview by Tobias Reckling, 23 July 2012, Madrid.
756 Miguel Ángel Aguilar, interview by Tobias Reckling, 22 March 2011, Madrid.
757 See for example Castro Torres, La prensa en la transición española, 1966-1978. Castro extensively discusses the importance of Spanish journalists during the transition.
which ended the pre-censorship for Spanish media resulted in a thriving and more critical Spanish media landscape. However, the partial liberalization of the Franco regime’s control over the press did not mean complete freedom of expression and overly critical publications were frequently brought back into line with economic sanctions. The most direct expression of this control over the Spanish press was the closing down of Oneto’s and Aguilar’s employer, the newspaper Madrid, in 1971.\textsuperscript{758} It was thereafter that the two journalists sought employment for foreign media. As both journalists outlined, the work as correspondents not only provided them with a new source of income but, more importantly, gave them the opportunity of free expression that they did not have in the Spanish press.\textsuperscript{759} Journalists like Oneto and Aguilar were only two of the most prominent examples. Besides other formal employments of Spanish correspondents, news agencies also relied on Spanish journalists as informants and stringers, and were careful to protect their identity. AP, for instance, received (from at least the mid-1960s) news from Barcelona from two Spanish journalists: Juan Tomas Hernandez, who worked for the newspaper Diario de Barcelona and, from 1966, Pedro Pascual Piquer, who worked for El Correo Catalan.\textsuperscript{760} Neither of these two Spanish journalists, however, was officially registered as a correspondent. In fact, the by then director of AP in Madrid, Harold Milks, actively protected the identity of these two Catalan journalists. In a telephone call (which was overheard and interpreted thoroughly by the Spanish authorities), Milks not only informed Hernandez that he had hired Piquer as a new freelancer but also explicitly demanded that his name was not to be mentioned under any circumstances – a measure taken to protect the Spanish journalist.\textsuperscript{761}

That these Spanish journalists used foreign news agencies in particular to publish information that was critical of the Franco regime was also noted by the MIT. In a report from 1970, the MIT’s Liaison Office came to the conclusion that ‘a great part of the news and commentaries hostile to the Spanish regimen […] come from a small group of very young Spanish journalists which work for foreign news agencies in Madrid.’\textsuperscript{762} Working for foreign news agencies, therefore, became a way for these young journalists to undermine Francoist censorship. At the same time, this relationship was mutually

\textsuperscript{758} See Carlos Barrera, El diario Madrid: Realidad y símbolo de una época (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1995).  
\textsuperscript{759} José Oneto Revuelta, interview by Tobias Reckling; Miguel Ángel Aguilar, interview by Tobias Reckling  
\textsuperscript{760} AGA, (03)107.002, 42.0905, Folder 1: Oficina de Enlace to Ministro de Información y Turismo [undated, attached documents were dated 25 May 1966].  
\textsuperscript{761} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{762} AGA, (03)107.002, 42.09051: Información de las agencias de prensa extranjera sobre España, 29.5.1970.
beneficial. The Spanish journalists with close ties to the illegal political opposition provided foreign news agencies with information which was otherwise difficult to obtain.

Although news agencies were the most important employers of Spanish correspondents, they were not the only foreign media to do so – although only to a very limited extent. Besides the above mentioned Aguilar, only nine Spanish full-time and three Spanish part-time correspondents altogether were accredited for other foreign media than news agencies until the end of the regime.763 Nevertheless, and as the following chapter will discuss, in some cases it was precisely these Spanish journalists, and the Le Monde correspondent José Antonio Novais in particular, who played a central role within the foreign press corps. Besides his work for Le Monde, Novais also wrote for Portuguese, Brazilian and Mexican newspapers.764

Journalists, however, were only the most visible Spaniards working for foreign media in Spain. As elsewhere,765 foreign media in Spain - in particular, news agencies and broadcasters with fully staffed bureaus and well-equipped newspaper correspondents - employed Spaniards as so-called hands, drivers, secretaries and translators.766 In some cases, the importance of these local hands also went beyond these tasks. The New York Times correspondent Camille Cianfarra, for instance, hired a ‘tipster’ at a local newspaper with access to the wires of the Spanish news agencies. This ‘tipster’ had to inform Cianfarra about any important news which would break at night, when Cianfarra was asleep.767 Other former correspondents also stressed the importance of their local hands. Manfred vonConta, the correspondent of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, for instance, explicitly highlighted the importance of his assistant Bernardo Fernandez for his journalistic work. Fernandez not only helped von Conta with improving his Spanish and reading the Spanish newspapers, but also with the interpretation of the news. Von Conta further stressed that Fernandez, opened many contacts deep within the intellectual and artistic underground that occupy the many noisy tapas bars until long after midnight. […] The relation

763 Based on the examination of accreditation list from 1975. See AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 3: Sección de Prensa Extranjera, Corresponsales de prensa extranjera acreditados en España 1975 [unsigned].
764 AGA, (03) 107.01, 42.8807, Folder 1: Unsigned biographical report Jose Antonio Novais Tome, 19 July 1964.
765 Hannerz, Foreign News, 152-54.
766 The Section for Foreign Press even complained that it did not know exactly how many Spaniards were employed by foreign media. See in Spain: AGA, (03) 049.002, 14.076, Folder 162: Jefe Sección Prensa Extranjera to Director General de Prensa, 7 August 1962.
767 NYPL MAD, MssCol 17792, Box 19, Folder 3: Camille Cianfarra to Emanuel R. Freedman, 10 April 1952.
with my assistants was important to maintain contact with the reality of the outside world.\textsuperscript{768}

Fernandez himself described his own role for von Conta as not so much that of a secretary, but rather as a guide through Spanish life.\textsuperscript{769} With regard to the establishment of contacts, other correspondents such as Wolf Hanke, the correspondent of the German broadcaster \textit{ARD}, described the role of his Spanish cameraman in similar terms.\textsuperscript{770}

**Working conditions: Reporting from Francoist Spain**

This section examines the working conditions and working routines of correspondents in Francoist Spain. First, this section will address the question of where the correspondents worked, both within Spain and within the city where they were placed. The later aspect relates to the location of the actual workplace of the correspondent, their offices. Second, this section will examine the practical working routines of correspondents in Spain. The section will argue that the work of correspondents in Francoist Spain was in many respects not so different from that of foreign press corps in democratic countries. At the same time, however, the section will also show that the particular context of the Franco regime resulted in the development of specific strategies in order to gather information.

**Location: Madrid and the rest**

As in any other country, the capital was the place to be for foreign correspondents. The vast majority of all accredited correspondents in Spain lived and worked in Madrid. However, and in contrast to Morrison’s and Tumber’s findings for the foreign press corps in Great Britain,\textsuperscript{771} a small but noticeable group of correspondents was also accredited outside of Madrid. In 1955, this applied to 20 foreign journalists, which represented 13\% of the entire foreign press corps at the time.\textsuperscript{772} With 16 accredited correspondents, the second largest Spanish city, Barcelona, was the obvious choice after Madrid. However, this finding should not be overestimated as a particular interest in Catalonia. Half of these journalists were only part-time correspondents and most of the other only remained accredited for short time

\textsuperscript{768} Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling.
\textsuperscript{769} Bernardo Fernández, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 February 2013.
\textsuperscript{770} Wolf Hanke, interview by Tobias Reckling, 23 February 2012, Madrid.
\textsuperscript{771} Morrison and Thompson found that during the 1980s “all the foreign media corps either lived in or around London”. Morrison and Tumber, “The foreign correspondent: date-line London,” 452.
\textsuperscript{772} Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1955-1956, 207-211.
periods. A noticeable exception to this was the Dutch correspondent Theo Stols, who was accredited in Barcelona from 1952 and throughout the entire Franco regime. Another noteworthy but only briefly accredited correspondent in Barcelona was the Annemarie Schwytzer, the only women in the Barcelona press corps. In general, however, Barcelona was of minor importance as a location for foreign correspondents during the 1950s. None of the news agencies AP, UPI, dpa and Reuters had a correspondent or stringer in Barcelona. In fact, only Reuters had an officially accredited freelancer in Valencia, their only journalist outside of Madrid.

This situation started to change slightly throughout the 1960s with the general increase of the number of foreign correspondents in Spain. The head of the Reuters office in Madrid, Henry Buckley, for instance, in 1965 put his stringer in Valencia on the payroll as staff correspondent, much to the surprise of the Francoist authorities. The MIT officials noted that so far ‘none of the foreign news agencies which have an office in Madrid have any accredited correspondents in the provinces’. However, since ‘various newspapers which have correspondents in Madrid and also in Barcelona, Palma, Las Palmas, Gran Canarias and other Spanish provinces’, the Section for Foreign Press had no objections. Reuters, however, not only accredited a correspondent in Valencia, but also, shortly thereafter, a freelancer in Bilbao in the Basque Country. Other news agencies followed. Buckley’s son Patrick, for instance, worked as stringer for AP in Barcelona in 1970.

The increased interest by international news agencies reflected a growing media attention towards the Spanish regions. This was reflected in the total numbers of correspondents accredited outside of Madrid, their accreditation status and, although only partly, in the media they represented. In 1970, 17 full-time correspondents worked outside of Madrid, twice as many as in 1955. After working for a decade for minor publications, Stols became the correspondent for the major Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant in the mid-1960s. A central factor for this development was Spain’s booming tourist industry. Three

773 ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de correspondencia Extranjera, 67 [no archival signature].
774 195 ibid., 209.
775 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.773, Folder Bruce Alberto: Accreditation Bruce Alberto.
776 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.773, Folder Bruce Alberto: Jefe Sección Prensa Extranjera to Director General de Prensa, 30 October 1965.
777 Ibid.
778 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.969, Folder Ander Landaburu Illarranendi: Accreditation Landaburu Illarranendi.
779 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.774, Folder Paul Buckley: Accreditation Paul Buckley. Paul Buckley, however, only remained in Barcelona until January 1972 before leaving for the US.
781 Dirección General de Prensa, Anuario de la Prensa Española, 1965, 1467.
correspondents were accredited on the island of Mallorca alone, which at the time had developed into one of Spain’s most important tourist destinations. The tourism up and down the Catalan Costa Brava contributed to the increased placement of correspondents in Barcelona. The German tabloid Bild, for instance, had since 1965 placed its only Spain correspondents in the Catalan capital.\(^{782}\) Indeed, the still rather small foreign press corps in Barcelona started to develop a stable social life with regular meetings among the correspondents since the end of the 1960s.\(^{783}\)

**Location: Offices**

For most contemporary correspondents, the practical conditions of working abroad are very different from jobs at their media at home. Instead of working at a desk in a crowded editorial room, press correspondents in particular do their job in splendid isolation from their homes. Only seldomly would the expensive posting of a correspondent also allow for a separate office, as Morrison and Tumber observed in their study.\(^{784}\) This mainly applied to the international news agencies and fully staffed bureaus of international broadcasters maintaining its own offices.

Francoist Spain was in this respect not very different to other countries. The contact details provided with their accreditations, as well as the interviews, leads to the conclusion that most press correspondents in Spain worked from their homes. International news agencies had separate bureaus, which in most cases they kept for decades. Many of the Madrid correspondents had chosen homes close to the centre, which allowed for easy and short journeys within the city. Numerous correspondents lived often only a few streets from each other along one of Madrid’s main streets, the Paseo de Castellana, close to the ministries, embassies and some Spanish media.\(^{785}\) Other correspondents seemed to have followed in the choosing of their apartments their particular journalistic interests. José Antonio Novais of *Le Monde*, who frequently reported on the students protests in Madrid, lived in the university district Moncloa.\(^{786}\) Others preferred comfort over practicality. The German

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\(^{782}\) Ibid.  
\(^{783}\) Robert Bosschart de Lang, interview by Tobias Reckling, 1 August 2012, Madrid.  
\(^{784}\) Morrison and Tumbler, for instance, made similar observations about the work situations of London correspondents during the 1980s. See Morrison and Tumber, “The foreign correspondent: date-line London,” 458.  
\(^{785}\) See for example Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 14 July 2011.  
\(^{786}\) See for example Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior (henceforth AGMI), 183, 62: Asunto José Antonio Novais Tomé, 2 February 1967.
If press correspondents did not work from home, they often had shared offices in the bureaus of news agencies. UPI, which seemingly had plenty of space in its bureau on Plaza de la Cortes, rented office space to the correspondents of the Italian broadcaster Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), Time and McGraw-Hill World News and others. For some time, the correspondents Kees van Bemmelen, William Cemlyn-Jones and Harry Debelius shared an office at UPI. This location had multiple advantages for these correspondents and a direct impact on their working routines. The following section will show, that the daily contact and exchange of information with colleagues in particular was of central importance for correspondents in Spain. Furthermore, these journalists also had direct access to the news wires of UPI. Kees van Bemmelen summed up the advantages of his office in a nutshell: ‘I got most of my information from there.’

However, it was not only foreign media such as UPI that rented out offices to other correspondents. Although only exceptionally, Spanish media also made room for foreign correspondents and even the entire staff of news agencies. Reuters, in particular, had its office in the well-known building of the Spanish news agency EFE under the address Ayla 5. That Reuters was the first international agency to sign a contract with EFE in 1945 certainly facilitated this arrangement. Although the situation of Reuters at the EFE building was still an exception, it was also the foundation of a tradition of foreign correspondents working in the building of the Spanish news agency after the death of Franco. When EFE moved its offices in 1977, not the Reuters journalist went along, but numerous other foreign correspondents were also given offices in the new building on Espronceda 32. These included, among others, the correspondents of Radio France, the German news agency dpa, the Yugoslavian agency Tanjug as well as van Bemmelen and his colleagues, who moved over from UPI.

Working routines

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787 Friedrich Kassebeer, interview by Tobias Reckling.
789 Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling.
790 Ibid.
791 Olmos, Historia de la agencia EFE, 110.
792 Ibid., 480.
Hannerz points out that the routines by which contemporary correspondents proceed in order to fulfil their task of gathering information and producing reports for their home media are (at least in the self-estimation of correspondents) highly individual.\textsuperscript{794} In a number of case studies researchers have nevertheless identified routines and similarities in the work of correspondents in general and the core tasks of correspondents gathering information in particular.\textsuperscript{795} The interviews conducted for this thesis confirmed these findings in the case of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain.

If gathering information is the most important aspect of the work of correspondents, sources of information can become a central structural element for their daily routine. This leads to the question of which informational sources the correspondents in Spain used the most. The answers given to this question during interviews resulted in the following sources: Spanish media, Spanish journalists, non-state political actors, other correspondents, official information, and foreign media. While this list is, for the outlined methodological reasons, in some regards defective, it nevertheless can serve as a starting point for the following discussion of the listed informational sources. Furthermore, with regard to the central importance of the Spanish press, an observation made by Morrison and Tumber could also be confirmed: that the correspondents interviewed were eager to point out that not only did they rely on the Spanish press but also used other sources of information such as the personal contacts with opposition groups in particular.

This section will discuss the particularities of Spanish media, Spanish journalists, foreign media, and contacts among the correspondents as informational sources. The regime’s information policy and contacts to the political opposition represent aspects of the political function of the correspondents in Francoist Spain, which the next chapter will examine.

### Spanish media

The central importance of the media of the host countries as a source of information was also confirmed by the few researchers who have examined the working conditions and routines of foreign press corps.\textsuperscript{796} During interviews, however, the correspondents struggled with this fact and were eager to point out that they did not merely rely on Spanish

\textsuperscript{794} Hannerz, \textit{Foreign News}, 147.


\textsuperscript{796} See for example ibid., 134-136; Morrison and Tumber, “The foreign correspondent: date-line London,” 466-467.
media alone but also highlighted the use of other sources of information such as personal contacts with opposition groups. Morrison and Tumber were confronted with a similar reaction during their research. In practice, however, Morrison and Tumber argue that,

[…] a foreign correspondent is as good as the local media will allow. […] To a large extent it is the news, or more accurately, the departing point upon which to build their news. It could hardly be any other way, given the limited resources available to most correspondents.

Besides the correspondents’ hesitations, the interviews conducted with former foreign correspondents have shown that Spain was no different in this respect. Reading the Spanish press and (although less important) listening to Radio Nacional de España was a part of the daily routines of most staff correspondents. Accordingly, Manfred von Conta described his daily routine as follows:

A typical working day was mostly dull: getting up at 7, making coffee, going down to get the half a dozen newspapers of the day, coming back to my apartment on the third floor, opening the door for my assistant who comes at eight. READING, READING [sic!] with a pencil marking what has to be clipped.

Collecting clippings was a common habit among correspondents. Some, like Gustav Herrmann, even turned this journalistic necessity into a hobby and compiled entire books with Spanish newspaper clippings. Others, like Richard S. Mowrer, preferred his already mentioned notebooks to collect and order information on subjects which might be worth a story for one of the many media he worked for.

However, the Franco regime’s strict control over the public sphere in general and the press in particular necessarily limited the value of information. This made a certain cross-reading strategy and more reading was necessary to make the most of the information that was publicly available. Again, von Conta, who was supported in the ‘interpretation’ of the Spanish news by his assistant claims that,

The secret in hermetic systems is to detect the difference in the description different papers give of the same timeframe: what lacks in ABC will appear in Informaciones, La Vanguardia dares to talk about something Ya will not reveal or describe in a different way. After a while you get the structure of what’s going on.

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798 Ibid., 466.
799 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling.
800 Gustav Herrmann’s notebooks were accessed during the interview with Sieglinde Herrmann.
801 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling.
After the reformulation of the Spanish press law in 1966 in particular, the Spanish press became a bit more outspoken. Information not available before could now be at least partly derived from Spanish newspapers and magazines. Nevertheless, the gaps remained and the Spanish press (however important it was as a first source of information) was only a partially sufficient source of information for the correspondents work, at least if they took it seriously.

The media, which the correspondents consumed on a regular basis - as well as the informational value for their work - was diverse. Nevertheless, the answers given in the interviews provide a general impression. Among the five media which the correspondents considered generally of the greatest importance for their work, were the two magazines that were central for the democratic opposition in Spain: Cuadernos para el Diálogo and Cambio 16. Cuadernos para el Diálogo, founded by the former Minsiter of Education Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez in 1963, started as a Catholic publication but ‘in time brought together the entire opposition’802. Cambio 16, which was only founded in 1971 after the reform of the press laws, became the most successful of these new publications and was also crucial for the democratic opposition on the brink to democracy.803

Rather surprisingly, besides these two magazines, the five media of the greatest informational value named by the correspondents only included two daily newspapers, La Vanguardia Española and Informaciones. Both newspapers, which were already published in pre-Civil War Spain, were characterized by their comparatively liberal attitude and their reliable information. Published in Barcelona, La Vanguardia Española was, together with the traditional monarchic newspaper, ABC, with 200,000 issues the most widely distributed newspaper in Spain in the mid-1960s. 804 Although far less widely distributed, the Madrid newspaper Informaciones was on the daily reading list because of its perceived distance to the regime and the information on politics in the Spanish capital.

The fifth Spanish medium which the correspondents valued most highly as an informational source, was neither a newspaper nor a magazine but the private Spanish news agency, Europa Press. Following the liberalization of Spanish press law, the far more liberal and objective Europa Press developed in to a strong competitor for EFE on the Spanish market.

803 See Tusell, Spain: From dictatorship to democracy, 225.
804 Barrera, Periodismo y franquismo, 110.
Europa Press’ attempts to deliver objective domestic news on issues like student protests and strikes resulted in disciplinary proceedings by the Francoist authorities.\textsuperscript{805}

The correspondents interviewed naturally named other major newspapers like the Catholic Ya, the regime critical Madrid, and the traditionally monarchist major Spanish newspaper ABC as valuable sources of information – although the latter only came in ninth place on the list. Madrid probably would have been higher in this ranking if the Francoist authorities had not closed down the newspaper in 1971. The state-controlled Radio Nacional de España was considered as providing considerably little valuable news. Although some correspondents with the corresponding political leanings like Sieglinde Herrmann, however, valued the programme of the Communist broadcaster Radio España Independiente very highly, although this exile broadcaster was not a Spanish medium in the strictest sense. Of practically zero importance was the – also state-controlled – television media which came relatively late to Spain. In 1962 television was, with 300,000 TV sets in all of Spain, still of minor importance.\textsuperscript{806} The Ministry of Information and Tourism under Fraga promoted television and its importance for the Spanish public strongly increased throughout the following decade.\textsuperscript{807} As source of information for the foreign correspondents, however, it remained also thereafter marginal.

In sum, the correspondents highlighted that they relied strongly on media with a certain distance to the regime, which also provided reliable information on sensitive issues. At the same time, however, such rankings on the relative informational importance of particular media should also be considered with care. While the correspondents interviewed considered newspapers that were extremely close to the regime, such as El Alcazar and Arriba, of little informational value, this does not mean that they ignored them. Or, as the Dutch correspondent Bosschart de Lang put it: ‘I read them, but I never bought them.’\textsuperscript{808} Von Conta’s ‘READING, READING [sic!]’\textsuperscript{809} of all kinds of newspapers, therefore, was the daily routine.

\textit{Spanish Journalists}

\textsuperscript{806} Barrera, \textit{Periodismo y franquismo}, 86.
\textsuperscript{807} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{808} Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling.
\textsuperscript{809} Ibid.
Spanish journalists, the correspondent’s second most important source of information, often filled the informational gaps that remained in the censored Spanish press. Surprisingly, research on foreign correspondence in dictatorial regimes has so far paid no attention to the importance of the exchange of information between the journalists of the host countries and foreign correspondents. In the case of the Franco regime, at least, this informational exchange was central and mutually beneficial. Spanish journalists provided correspondents with information, which they could not publish in the censored Spanish press. Therefore, they could at least make them public abroad. At the same time, correspondents received valuable information for their reports.

For correspondents who had their offices in the buildings of Spanish media, this exchange of information with Spanish colleagues was particularly easy. Thomas ‘Tom’ Burns, who started to work for Reuters in the EFE building in 1974, highlighted: ‘I found the EFE-journalists extraordinary nice and helpful. They gave me - they gave all of us - stories that they themselves couldn’t publish’\(^{810}\). While the state-controlled news agency EFE was not generally critical towards the Franco regime, for journalists of pro-democratic media this exchange of sensitive information with correspondents was even more important. Indeed, the passing of information to the foreign press became a central way of criticizing the Franco regime. The Spanish journalist José Antonio Martínez Soler, for instance, expressed the importance of this relationship with the foreign correspondents:

> All of us democratic journalists were natural allies of the foreign correspondents from democratic countries. We were friends. We gave them many of our exclusive information, we did their work. […] The role of the foreign press was highly important to us. What was said outside of Spain also created within Spain a public opinion inside of the Spain among the elites and the middle class which was very favourable for the democratic process before the death of the dictator.\(^{811}\)

Although the actual extent of this informal informational exchange between Spanish journalists and correspondents is difficult to measure, its importance was confirmed throughout the interviews. Indeed, some of the regime critical Spanish journalists who temporarily worked as correspondents themselves, such as the journalists of Madrid José Oneto and Miguel Ángel Aguilar, were frequently named as important sources of information. The importance of these contacts between foreign correspondents and regime critical Spanish journalists will be further discussed in the following chapter.

\(^{810}\) Tom Burns Marañón, interview by Tobias Reckling.
\(^{811}\) José Antonio Martínez Soler, interview by Tobias Reckling.
Reading foreign media

In their discussion of correspondents work, researchers have only given very little attention to the importance of other foreign media as sources of information for correspondents. Hannerz mentions that he ‘could glimpse piles of newsmagazines like Time, Newsweek and Economist, as well as the International Herald Tribune’ on the desks of correspondents.\textsuperscript{812} Morrisson and Tumber also found that at least some of the London correspondents who answered their questionnaire read US publications.\textsuperscript{813} The existing research on foreign correspondence in dictatorial systems like the Soviet Union unfortunately does not discuss the importance of foreign media for correspondents’ work.\textsuperscript{814}

The above list on the importance of informational sources for foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain confirms this general lack of academic interest. The correspondents interviewed named foreign media as the least important source of information. Nonetheless, the limited international media interest in Francoist Spain also gave little reason to rely on foreign media as a source of information. Nevertheless, some correspondents were eager to stress their awareness of famous international media such as \textit{The New York Times}. One Argentinian correspondent, for instance, claimed to have read on a regular basis, among others, the \textit{Washington Post}, \textit{The New York Times}, \textit{Time Magazine}, \textit{Le Monde}, \textit{Le Figaro}, \textit{Times} and the \textit{Daily Telegraph}, in addition to the Spanish press.\textsuperscript{815} Generally, however, the correspondents mainly read media from their home countries. German correspondents would regularly read one or two newspapers or, more often, journals like \textit{Der Spiegel} in order to keep informed about home affairs.

Despite these reservations, two foreign media were indeed of great importance for the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain: \textit{Le Monde} and the Spanish-language programme of the \textit{BBC}. Approximately 80\% of all interviewed correspondents stated to have regularly consumed at least one of the two. The following chapter will show that \textit{Le Monde} and, to a lesser extent, the \textit{BBC} were indeed important sources of information in Francoist Spain not only for the correspondents, but also for the general public. Foreign correspondents,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{812} Hannerz, \textit{Foreign News}, 163.
\item \textsuperscript{813} Morrisson and Tumber, “The foreign correspondent: date-line London,” 468.
\item \textsuperscript{814} See for example Fainberg, “Unmasking the wolf in sheep's clothing”; Metger, “«Der Nervenkrieg hat hier jedenfalls zugenommen». Westliche Moskau-Korrespondenten in der Ära Chrusčěv und der Wandel der Zensurpraxis um 1960“.
\item \textsuperscript{815} Armando Puente, interview by Tobias Reckling, 16 June 2011, Madrid.
\end{itemize}
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therefore, followed in their reading of foreign media the particularities of the situation in Francoist Spain.

The evolution of cooperation: Correspondents inform correspondents

Williams highlights that foreign correspondents ‘cultivate an image of a community which is that of a tightly knit group’\textsuperscript{816}. However, Williams also stresses that this ‘community’ among correspondents in Western democracies should not be overestimated and has little impact on the correspondent’s journalistic work. Correspondents working in splendid isolation and in competition with each other seems to be the more common situation.

Although surprisingly little research has been done on this question, Hannerz argues that the different working conditions in dictatorships have a profound impact on the interaction between journalists.\textsuperscript{817} In his examination of the foreign press corps in Beijing, Hannerz comes to the conclusion that the shortage of information results in close cooperation and sharing of information among foreign journalists.\textsuperscript{818} The same can be said about correspondents in the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as a report from the German embassy in Moscow from the end of the 1960s about the Western foreign press corps suggests:

The special conditions in Moscow with little news and the difficulties to gain any information beyond the official proclamations have resulted in the development of a steady exchange of information and news among the Western correspondents [...].\textsuperscript{819}

Although access to information was less restricted, a similar development can be observed in Francoist Spain. While the correspondents interviewed named their colleagues as only the fourth most important source of information further interviews suggest otherwise. Indeed, correspondents with previous experience in journalism who came in the mid-1970s or later to Spain, such as the German TV correspondent Horst Hano or the correspondent of the \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} Udo Bergdoll, were surprised by the willingness of their

\textsuperscript{816} Williams, \textit{International journalism}, 94.
\textsuperscript{817} Hannerz, \textit{Foreign News}, 157-158. It is interesting to note that this question has received little attention in the recently published studies on correspondents in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Bernadette Kester, who explicitly examined the methods of news gathering of correspondents in non-democratic regimes (Russia), also does not discuss the question of news sharing and cooperation among correspondents. See Bernadette Kester, “The Art of Balancing Foreign Correspondence in Non-Democratic Countries: The Russian Case,” \textit{International Communication Gazette} 72, no. 1 (2010)
\textsuperscript{818} Hannerz, \textit{Foreign News}, 157-158.
\textsuperscript{819} Bundesarchiv [henceforth BA], B 145/7660, Deutscher Botschafter in Moskau to Auswärtiges Amt, 16 Movember 1967.
colleagues to openly share their contacts and information. Relying on information from colleagues was, at least for some correspondents, part of their daily work routines. Kees van Bemmelen, for instance, remembered the American super-stringer Richard S. Mowrer going around every day in his car to visit colleagues and asking what was new, and for Manfred von Conta, the call to colleagues in order to discuss the published news in the Spanish press belonged to his daily routines as did the reading of the press. Like in the Soviet Union, this cooperation among correspondents was born out of necessity. The necessary efforts in order to gather information beyond the censored press and the scarce official announcements could often only be accomplished in cooperation or, as Haubrich formulated retrospectively: ‘Logically one had to collaborate with colleagues and pass information to one another, because nobody could be everywhere’. The precondition for this cooperation with colleagues was, according to Haubrich, professionalism, trust, and reciprocity. The latter was particularly important since the information which the correspondents shared were often connected to the political opposition in Spain. The protection of these sources was naturally of central importance.

Haubrich also outlined that this cooperation sometimes went beyond mere passing of information and took the form of active and coordinated sharing of workloads and specific tasks among correspondents. When, for instance, the Francoist authorities only allowed a very limited number of correspondents into the courtroom during the Burgos trials in 1970, the correspondents gave turns to each other. While some attended the trials, others covered developments in the Basque country or elsewhere in Spain and later on exchanged their information. Furthermore, Friedrich Kassebeer revealed that he organized a meeting with members of the political opposition in his house outside of Madrid. It was also normal that various correspondents took part and were also involved in its preparation.

The outlined analysis of social networks leads to further, more general insights into this cooperation among correspondents. Most importantly, the level of cooperation was by no

821 Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling.
822 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling. See also Manfred von Conta. Skype-Interview Tobias Reckling, 12 February 2013.
823 Haubrich, “Corresponsales extranjeros en la España de Franco y de la transición,” 69.
824 Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling.
825 Ibid.
826 See for example Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 14 July 2012; Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling; Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling.
827 Friedrich Kassebeer, interview by Tobias Reckling.
means a commonly shared feature among all or even the majority of correspondents. The correspondents interviewed named on average 30 correspondents, or 25% of all staff correspondents, with whom they had ‘meaningful professional relations’. The range in the number of named journalists was between 9 and 55, which was between 7.5% and 45% of all accredited staff correspondents in 1975. If the examination is limited to ‘very important professional relations’ with other correspondents, this group consequently becomes considerably smaller. Indeed, the correspondents interviewed named on average twelve other foreign journalists with whom they maintained very important professional relations.

These ‘meaningful’ or ‘important’ professional networks among correspondents were very much along national and cultural lines. For the interviewed European correspondents, the contacts to Latin American journalists were for instance – and with a few exceptions - of very little importance. Since the interviews were mostly conducted with German correspondents, the existence of national networks becomes most visible for the German press corps. Although less data is available on other nationalities, the information provided by the few interviewed British and Latin American correspondents suggests that such national-transnational networks were not a German speciality. However, the German and German-speaking journalists maintained particularly close relations with each other. German correspondents, for instance, were the only group within the foreign press corps that maintained regular social gatherings for decades. Since 1961 at least, German press correspondents met at a monthly Stammtisch (group of regulars) in the still existing Bavarian-German restaurant Edelweiss, right next to the Spanish Cortes.

Two further observations (which are closely connected) can be made about the professional networks of correspondents: the professional status of particular correspondents played a crucial role and the networks were centred around a small number of prestigious long-term correspondents. These two groups were mostly but not completely identical. The German correspondent Anton Dieterich, for instance, was ‘only’ writing for the regional newspaper Badische Neueste Nachrichten, but practically all the German correspondents interviewed

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828 As already outlined, the correspondents were asked to evaluate the importance of their professional relations with other correspondents on a scale ranging from 0 for ‘no importance’, to 10 for ‘very important’. All evaluations between five and seven were evaluated as ‘meaningful professional relations’.

829 ‘Very important professional relations’, refers to all relations which have been characterized by the interviewees with eight to ten points.

830 Both Sieglinde Herrmann and Rolf Götz remembered that the Stammtisch already existed when they arrived in Spain in the beginning of the 1960. See Rolf Götz, interview by Tobias Reckling; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.
named him as an important source of information. The studied Romanist and long-time resident in Spain was a respected authority on Spanish culture and art history. Even correspondents like Haubrich, who held very different political views from those of Dietrich, mentioned his special status among the German press corps. At the same time, however, simply being an old hand among the correspondents was also not enough in order to play a prominent role within the foreign press corps. Richard S. Mowrer, for instance, had similar long-term experiences in Spain but was far less valued as a partner for the exchange of information since he was less generous with sharing his own knowledge.

While the national networks had a social function, professionalism, the prestige of the media the correspondents worked for, and the quality of information on offer were at the centre of networks operating on a transnational basis. José Antonio Novais (Le Monde), Harry Debelius (The Times), Walter Haubrich (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) and, to a lesser extent, William Cemlyn-Jones (The Guardian) fulfilled these criteria. Almost all of the journalists interviewed considered these correspondents as very important for their work. Furthermore, and as far as this can be said from the few interviews conducted with correspondents of major publications, these journalists also maintained among each other closer professional relations to each other than with other journalists. Walter Haubrich remembered that he regularly exchanged information with selected German colleagues and the correspondents of major US and British media, news agencies and the well-connected Novais from Le Monde in particular at the beginning of the 1970s.

The close cooperation between Haubrich and the correspondents of the Süddeutsche Zeitung - in particular Manfred von Conta but also with his successor, Friedrich Kassebeer - is an especially telling example of the willingness of correspondents to share information. In Germany, the liberal-left Süddeutsche Zeitung and the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung were fierce competitors on the media market. Under normal circumstances, the relations between the journalists of both papers could more accurately be characterized by competition than cooperation. In Spain, however, the cooperation between the correspondents of both papers was particularly close. The cooperation between these correspondents was facilitated by good personal relations (the correspondents were roughly the same age) and the commonly shared dislike of the Franco dictatorship. In fact,

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831 Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011.
832 Ibid.
833 In 1974, the Süddeutsche Zeitung had a circulation of 292,000 whilst the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung had 286,000. See Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e.V. (IVW), IVW Auflagenliste IV/1974 (Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1974), 32.
the political stance towards the Franco regime was also one of the core preconditions among correspondents.

The exchange of information between correspondents, of course, not only took place over the phone among a small group of journalists. In fact, correspondents who maintained contacts with the political opposition were particularly careful in what to say or not to say over the phone. The CIP, which many correspondents frequented, not least because of the good and highly subsidized restaurant, had some importance for meeting with other journalists. However, and as the second chapter has argued, correspondents were very well aware that the CIP was an institution of the Ministry of Information and Tourism. They were therefore very careful about whom to bring and what to talk about. Far more important were Madrid’s bars, where journalists not only met with their Spanish colleagues but also fulfilled a correspondent’s cliché by meeting each other.

**Conclusion**

Based on current research on foreign correspondents, it was the aim of this chapter to provide an understanding of the foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain as media professionals. The section has examined the accreditation times of correspondents, their employment status and exemplary career paths. Correspondents remained accredited in Spain for unusual lengths of time. Many of these long-time correspondents were stringers who profited from the fact that relatively few foreign media had staff correspondents in Francoist Spain. This increased the general market for stringers, who could sell their articles to a wide range of media, which could not afford or justify their own correspondents in Spain. At the same time, stringers could profit in Spain from accreditations as full-time correspondents. The examination of exemplary correspondent’s careers in Spain has provided further understanding of the journalistic careers of particular groups of correspondents.

The second section has examined women correspondents and the nationality of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain. A comparatively large number of women correspondents were accredited in Spain. However, a surprisingly high number of these women correspondents were married to correspondents and worked as semi-professionals with their husbands, in some cases even for the same media. This was partially facilitated by the regime’s accreditation policy. Nevertheless, some women correspondents became influential correspondents in their own right. These cases, however, remained exceptional
and women were marginal figures in both the foreign press corps and in the correspondent’s organizations in Spain.

The section also has shed light on the particular importance of Spanish journalists as correspondents for foreign media and foreign news agencies in particular. Employment in foreign media became of special importance for a young, pro-democratic generation of Spanish journalists during the 1960s. These journalists partially used their employment for foreign media, which were not subjected to the Francoist censorship, in order to publish regime critical reports. At the same time, the Franco regime attempted, with the employment of the Spaniard Carlos Mendo as UPI bureau chief in Madrid, to influence this major news agency’s reporting in their favour. However, further research on this case remains necessary. Finally, the section has highlighted the particular importance of local Spanish assistants to correspondents who partially facilitated local contacts and knowledge for their employers.

The final section has examined the working conditions and routines of correspondents in Francoist Spain. While most correspondents worked in Madrid, the Spanish regions, and Barcelona in particular, gained in importance for correspondents from the 1960s. Furthermore, the section has highlighted the special importance of the actual working location, the offices of correspondents. It has shown that some correspondents shared offices in Spanish and foreign news agencies, which had a profound impact on their access to information.

Access to information was the starting point for the final examination of the correspondent’s working routines. The section has argued that the Spanish press and regime-critical publications especially were central sources of information for the foreign press corps. However, confronted with the strict censorship by the Francoist authorities, personal contacts became more important. Spanish journalists were a central source of information for foreign correspondents. This was a mutually beneficial relationship since pro-democratic journalists used their contacts with correspondents to make information public abroad which could not be published in Spain. Furthermore, the exchange of information among correspondents was also crucial. Both personal and informal sources of information were particularly important aspects of the correspondents’ work in Francoist Spain.
5. Reading the foreign news: The foreign press and the Franco regime

The Spanish public in principle had access to foreign publications and therefore the reports of foreign correspondents in Francoist Spain. International broadcasters and the BBC in particular, beyond the reach of the Francoist authorities directly beamed their programmes in Spanish towards Spain. In contrast to the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, foreign press was also allowed to be sold in Francoist Spain shortly after the end of the Second World War. The need of the isolated regime to at least attempt to create a pseudo-liberal image in the eyes of the world was too strong. Of course, the Franco regime compromised its claim to internal informational control by allowing the distribution of uncensored foreign media.

Against this background, this chapter will examine the distribution of and access to foreign media in Spain as well as its importance for the Spanish public. The chapter will argue that foreign print media and broadcasters were not only an important source of uncensored information for the Spanish public but also that foreign media were of crucial importance for the Spanish opposition as both a source of information and a means of communication.

The chapter is structured in to three sections. The first section will examine the general access to foreign news - both broadcasters and print media - in Francoist Spain. The second section will discuss the particular importance of the foreign press for the Spanish opposition. This discussion includes the question of how far this support impacted on the opposition’s struggle against the Franco regime. Finally, the last section will be dedicated to the analysis of the regime’s attempts to control the distribution of the foreign press. By examining the control of foreign media within Spain both in quantitative and qualitative terms, this section will not only show how the Francoist authorities tried to find a balance between the need to accept the distribution of foreign press in Spain and its continued striving for informational control. The examination of the control of foreign media also allows further conclusions on the attention and the attitude of the foreign press towards the Franco regime.

**International Broadcasters**

Foreign radio broadcasts provided the Spanish public with the most direct access to foreign news (foreign broadcasts here refers exclusively to radio). In principle, Spanish citizens
could receive a wide range of foreign broadcasts. In 1975, the British BBC, in an attempt to stress the importance of the Spanish market for its own Spanish programme, counted 29 foreign broadcasters which ‘daily beam their programmes to the Iberian Peninsula’\(^\text{834}\). For language reasons most of these broadcasts were, of course, only of limited direct value for the vast majority of Spanish listeners. Broadcasts in French were the only exception to this rule due to the relatively widespread knowledge of French in Spain. French was ‘the predominant foreign language in Spanish classrooms’\(^\text{835}\) with which most Spaniards grew up. Britain and the US, with the support of parts of the Francoist elites, tried with considerable success to break this monopoly during the 1960s and 1970s by promoting English teaching in Spain. This strengthening of English teaching, however, only had an impact on later generations. French broadcasts and, as this chapter will argue in the following, the French press in general were therefore accessible to a far greater number of Spaniards than any other foreign media.

A number of foreign radio stations, however, also broadcasted in Spanish. They included the communist broadcasters from Eastern Europe, of which Radio España Independiente was the most important one. Radio España Independiente and major Western international broadcasters, in particular the French Radio Paris and the British BBC, not only broadcasted towards Spain in Spanish but also had programmes in Spain’s regional languages. Therefore, international broadcasters directly undermined Francoist centralization policy and repression of any expression of (mainly Basque and Catalan) regional identity and culture.\(^\text{836}\) For the case of Catalonia, Cinto Niqui has shown that Radio Paris in particular was initially of central importance. In 1947, for instance, the president of the Catalan Generalitat in exile, Josép Irla, called for a boycott of the Francoist referendum on 8 July via Radio Paris.\(^\text{837}\) Indeed, Gérard Malgat shows that Radio Paris

\(^{834}\) BBC Written Archive (henceforth BBC WA), E, 40, 732: Head of BBC’s Southern European Service to Central European Service, 30 October 1975.

\(^{835}\) Óscar J. Martín García and Rodríguez Jiménez, Francisco Javier, “¿Seducidos por el inglés? Diplomacia pública angloamericana y difusión de la lengua inglesa en España, 1959-1975,” Historia y política: Ideas, procesos y movimientos sociales, no. 29 (2013), 318. García and Rodríguez Jiménez argue that both Great Britain and the US actively tried, with the support of parts of the Francoist elite, to break the monopoly of French in Spain by promoting the teaching of English. Besides considerable successes in this attempt, however, it was not before the 1980s, and therefore after the end of the Franco regime, that English indeed took the place of French as the main foreign language taught in Spain.


\(^{837}\) Niqui, “Chronology of international radio in the Catalan language in the 20th century,” 97.
was a central medium of communication not only for Catalans but also for the large Spanish exile community in France in general.\textsuperscript{838}

Although \textit{Radio Paris}’ Catalan broadcasts were suspended in 1964,\textsuperscript{839} the Spanish programme continued throughout the Franco regime. In 1975, its director claimed in a meeting with the Spanish ambassador that \textit{Radio Paris} had ‘hundreds of thousands listeners’\textsuperscript{840} in Spain. The French radio station was thus not only an important source of information for the Spanish public beyond the reach of the Francoist censors but also, by regularly reporting on news about Spain from the French press, functioned as a transnational broker between the French and the Spanish public spheres. Therefore, \textit{Radio Paris} also gave the Spanish public direct access to at least some of the reports by French correspondents in Spain.

The \textit{BBC} was the other major foreign international broadcaster, which broadcasted in Spanish and had a significant audience there. As part of its \textit{External Services}, the \textit{BBC} had already started its Spanish Service with news bulletins during the Spanish Civil War in June 1938 and continued its work throughout the Franco regime.\textsuperscript{841} Shortly after 1945, the \textit{BBC} also included programmes in regional languages.\textsuperscript{842} Like its French counterpart, the \textit{BBC} became an important source of uncensored information for the Spanish public. In contrast to \textit{Radio Paris}, however, the \textit{BBC}’s Spanish Service during the Franco regime, while sometimes mentioned,\textsuperscript{843} has received very little attention by researchers so far.

The \textit{BBC}’s Spanish Service also differed in its content from \textit{Radio Paris} in that it mainly concentrated on world news and British-Spanish relations as well as cultural subjects and language lessons. The only partial exception were weekly press reviews on ‘Spain seen from abroad’, which were based on British press reports about Spain. Like \textit{Radio Paris} for

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\textsuperscript{838} Gérard Malgat, “Voix de la France, voix de l'exil. Les emissions en langue espagnole de la Radiodiffusion Francaise entre 1945 et 1968,” (Mémoire de DEA, Université de Paris X-Nanterre, 1997). Although only a Master’s thesis, Malgat’s study is nevertheless highly useful for the understanding for the importance of Radio Paris in Spain – especially in the absence of further studies on the subject.

\textsuperscript{839} Ibid., 98.

\textsuperscript{840} AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09030, Folder 7: Untitled report by the Spanish ambassador in Paris on a meeting with the director of \textit{Radio Paris}, 20 January 1975 [the report was propably directly sent to the Ministry of Information and Tourism].

\textsuperscript{841} BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Spanish Service, Development of Spanish Service for Europe (undated). On the BBC’s service during the Spanish Civil War see David Deacon, ‘‘A quietening effect’? The BBC and the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939),” \textit{Media History} 18, no. 2 (2012).

\textsuperscript{842} Niqui, “Chronology of international radio in the Catalan language in the 20th century,” 96. The BBC’s Catalan programmes, for instance, were started in 1947.

\textsuperscript{843} See for example Sahagún, \textit{El mundo fué noticia}, 230.
France, therefore, the BBC’s Spanish Service also functioned as a transnational intermediary between the British and Spanish public.

The BBC’s regular listeners’ polls and letters from the audience show that world news in particular was highly valued in Spain. This appreciation reflected the initially limited access to international news in Spain after the Second World War. Felipe Sahagún shows that, besides the official censorship, most Spanish media had a very limited network of their own correspondents. Furthermore, Spanish media heavily relied on the monopoly of the news agency EFE. Until the mid-1950s, EFE depended in turn on its contract with UPI. It was only after Spain was able to overcome its international isolation that EFE also signed contracts with other major news agencies like AP, Reuters and AFP. While the Spanish media increasingly widened its network of correspondents, it was only after the passing of the new press laws in 1966 that the private news agency Europa Press broke EFE’s monopoly. International broadcasters like the BBC, therefore, filled an important informational gap after 1945.

While important for a particularly interested part of the Spanish public, however, the general interest in world news was relatively limited and the BBC’s audience in Spain remained rather small after 1945. According to the BBC’s office in Madrid, this resulted precisely because of the lack of information on internal Spanish affairs:

The BBC is providing an excellent service of its kind, but it is not the right kind. The need is for something to fulfil the functions, as far as possible, of a free National Press. That is first, a complete news service and, secondly, a forum in which all kinds of public affairs, especially Spanish affairs, can be examined and freely discussed.

However, the limited, indirect comments on Spain’s internal politics through the BBC’s press review led to repeated conflicts with the Franco regime. In the beginning of the 1950s, the BBC’s office in Madrid reported back that Franco called the British broadcaster an agent

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845 Sahagún 1986, 230.
846 Ibid.
of ‘international freemasonry’. Spanish media, in particular Radio Nacional de España, frequently attacked the BBC for its reports.

The BBC therefore remained careful with its comments on Francoist Spain’s internal affairs. Despite the BBC’s formally independent status, this restraint also reflected the broadcaster’s particular relation with the British government, especially the Foreign Office. Researchers have shown that, even after its propagandistic efforts during the Second World War, the BBC closely coordinated its programmes with the Foreign Office for the sake of what they perceived as the British national interest. Alban Webb shows in his examination of the relations between the BBC’s External Services and the Foreign Office during the Cold War that this relationship was not a strictly formalized cooperation: ‘it was not the job of the BBC to conduct foreign policy’. Instead, ‘overseas broadcasting was based on a continually negotiated understanding’ between the BBC and the Foreign Office.

In contrast to the post-war British Labour government, the Conservative governments of the 1950s and early 1960s took a pragmatic approach towards the Franco regime. This policy change was driven by British economic interests and resulted in the temporary selling of arms and military equipment to the Franco regime. In this context, the British Foreign Office and especially the British embassy in Madrid repeatedly tried to change the BBC’s programme for the sake of improving relations with Spain. By 1955, the British embassy in Madrid felt ‘that broadcasts in regional languages were an irritant which it was desirable to eliminate in the present phase of Anglo-Spanish relations’. The British diplomats presented this eventually successful demand to the BBC together with a report ‘according to which Franco had once turned the knob of his wireless-set on his yacht during a weekend fishing trip and picked up the BBC in Catalan. This had sent him into a blind fury […]’. Consequently, the BBC suspended its broadcasts in regional languages to

851 Webb, “Auntie goes to war again,” 128.
852 Ibid.
855 BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Head of BBC’s Southern European Service to Central European Service, 12 December 1955.
856 BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Head of BBC’s Southern European Service to Central European Service, 12 December 1955.
Spain for the sake of British-Spanish relations the following year. Later attempts to restart the programme in order to provide an alternative to the communist broadcasters and *Radio Paris* came to nothing, as the Foreign Office pointed out that ‘their revival would stick out like a political sore thumb.’

In 1961, the British embassy in Madrid went a step further in asking for more ‘programmes showing the positive achievements of the Regime’. With this demand, however, the British embassy had less success. To begin with, the *BBC* office in Madrid highlighted that the British press simply lacked such positive articles on the Franco regime on which the *BBC* could report. Moreover, as the BBC journalists stressed, their Spanish listeners hardly expected the *BBC* to produce such reports – ‘however much it might please the Spanish regime’. The Foreign Office was well aware of this problem, which the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Ralph Murray, had already outlined in the previous year. Murray, a former BBC journalist, had spent time in Spain as Counsellor at the British embassy in Madrid in the beginning of the 1950s. Following a complaint about the *BBC* by the Spanish ambassador in 1960, he pointed out that it cannot ‘be claimed that the B.B.C are not echoing public opinion when they do publicize such items, because the plain fact of the matter is that public opinion in this country is highly critical of the Spanish regime’.

Despite these political restraints, the *BBC* continued to provide an important service of uncensored news for the Spanish public. With the worsening of British-Spanish relations, the Foreign Office also put less pressure on the *BBC* to report more positively on the Franco regime from the mid-1960s onwards. A central cause for British-Spanish disagreement was the permanent ‘bone of contention’, Gibraltar. The Spanish’ attempts to regain Gibraltar, pushed by Foreign Minister Castiella since 1966, ‘galvanized the entire Spanish foreign

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857 BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Foreign Office to BBC’s European Service, 10 January 1956.
859 BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Report by BBC office in Madrid to BBC’s Southern European Programmes, 6 January 1961.
860 BBC WA, E/1/2.345: Report by BBC office in Madrid to BBC’s Southern European Programmes, 6 January 1961.
861 Webb, “Auntie goes to war again,” 64; Webb, London calling: *BBC external services, Whitehall and the cold war 1944-57*, 64.
The struggle over ‘the Rock’ further worsened British public opinion on Spain, while Castiella, in coordination with the MIT, reacted by stirring up ‘strong nationalist, anti-British sentiment in Spanish public opinion’\textsuperscript{865}. Thereafter, the BBC also became more openly critical towards the Franco regime. Therefore, As such, the BBC not only reflected the general change in the British-Spanish relations on the propagandistic front but also fulfilled the demand that its Madrid correspondents had already highlighted during the late-1940s: providing the Spanish public with uncensored information on internal Spanish affairs. The BBC’s listeners’ polls showed that such information was indeed highly valued by the Spanish audience. At the beginning of the 1970s, a teacher from Valladolid, for instance, commented: ‘As you broadcast to a Spanish audience, topics covering Spain should occupy a more important part because we are not given a lot of information about our own political affairs.’\textsuperscript{867} A very similar comment came from a student: ‘To me your political programmes are always impartial and truthful. In any case I would not be able to tell if they were not because here the press, radio and television never speak about Spanish political affairs.’\textsuperscript{868}

Such programmes made the BBC an important source of information in Francoist Spain towards the end of the dictatorship. Foreign special correspondents, who came to Madrid in the aftermath of Franco’s death at the end of 1975, noted the BBC’s importance. The American journalist Martha Gellhorn, for instance, who had already covered the Spanish Civil War together with her husband at the time, Ernest Hemingway, returned to Madrid in 1975 in order to report on the end of Franco. During a phone conversation with Amnesty International, in which its Head of Information and Publications reported back to the BBC, Gellhorn was full of praise for the British broadcaster:

I have just had a telephone call from a top American journalist who had been to Spain for the first time in many years. For your information, she told me that everybody she came across - from intellectuals to taxi-drivers to people in villages in remote areas - was tuned in to the BBC Spanish service. They told her that this was the only way that they could get any news about what was happening in their own country.\textsuperscript{869}

\textsuperscript{865} Pardo Sanz, “La etapa Castiella y el final del régimen, 1957-1975,” 348.
\textsuperscript{866} Ibid., 361.
\textsuperscript{868} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{869} BBC-WA, E/40/7: Mark Grantham, Head of Information and Publications at Amnesty International, to BBC External Services, 17 December 1975.
Distribution of and access to foreign print media

Besides international broadcasters, the Spanish public had access to foreign print media as sources of information. After the Spanish Civil War and throughout the Second World War, the Francoist authorities strictly controlled the distribution of foreign press and allowed only a limited number of foreign media for distribution in Spain. As we have seen in Chapter 1, this changed rapidly after 1945, however, as the regime tried to improve its international reputation. Throughout the next two decades, the number of imported and distributed foreign print media increased continuously. By the mid-1960s, the MIT counted 633 different foreign print media altogether with 430,000 copies that were authorized for distribution in Spain.\footnote{Gaceta de la prensa Española, “En España se vende prensa de diecinueve países,” no. 173 (1965), 63-65 [unsigned].}

A closer examination of this total number reveals strong differences in the imported media types, however. Almost 80% of these publications (497 in total) were imported foreign magazines ranging from news magazines like the German publication Der Spiegel and the US magazine Time to much less politically relevant media such as fashion magazines, for example. Daily and weekly newspapers - 77 (12%) and 59 (8%) respectively - were imported in far smaller numbers. Even stronger and crucial to the examination of the impact of the foreign press on the Spanish public, were the differences in the origin of the imported media, which Figure 9 illustrates.

French and US publications were by far the most widely distributed foreign print publications in Spain, followed by British, German and Italian publications. However, as Figure 9 shows, these figures are meaningful in terms of news value to only a very limited extent. Indeed, the distributed US press almost exclusively consisted of altogether almost 200 different magazines, while only two daily and four weekly newspapers were distributed. With the exception of Belgium and Austria, all listed European importers of newspapers exceeded this number, especially print media from France, Germany and Great Britain. Compared to the US, the larger numbers of imported newspapers during the mid-1960s reflected Spain’s rising status as a European tourist destination. This became visible in the reports from the MIT’s branches in tourist regions. In 1963, for instance, the MIT office in Mallorca reported that more than 4,000 copies of the six authorized British daily newspapers were distributed on the island in June alone. The distribution of the two
authorized US newspapers was only 482 copies in the same month.\textsuperscript{871} Most of the British daily newspapers sold were tabloids such the \textit{Daily Express} with 1,700 copies alone, however. The British \textit{Times} only sold 200 copies in Mallorca in June 1963, almost exactly the same as \textit{The New York Times}.\textsuperscript{872}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure9.png}
\caption{Distribution of foreign press in Spain in 1965 (by type)\textsuperscript{873}}
\end{figure}

The examination of the actual print run of the distributed foreign publications further relativizes the strong presence of European media. Figure 10 clearly shows that, despite the large number of imported US magazines, British but also European media in general were imported and distributed in far larger numbers.

\textsuperscript{871} AGA, (03) 049.003, 17.211, Folder 23: Untitled report by the Regional Delegate to Director General Prensa, 13 July 1963.
\textsuperscript{872} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{873} This and the following Figure 10 are based on data published in \textit{Gaceta de la prensa Española}, “En España se vende prensa de diecinueve países”, 63.
Figure 10: Distribution of foreign Press in Spain in 1965 (by print run)\(^\text{874}\)

\(^{874}\) Based on the same data as Figure 9. *Gaceta de la prensa Española*, “En España se vende prensa de diecinueve países”, 63.
What becomes very clear from the examination of the print run of foreign media in Francoist Spain is the massive distribution of French media, however. In 1965, more than 160,000 copies of French magazines, almost 30,000 copies of French daily newspapers and approximately 15,000 copies of weekly newspapers were distributed in Spain. Only in the last category, weekly newspapers, was the distribution of French media slightly surpassed by the British press in 1965 because of the numerous separate Sunday issues of British daily newspapers. The above quoted report from the MIT’s delegation in Mallorca, for instance, lists more than 2,400 Sunday issues of distributed British newspapers.\(^\text{875}\) Spain, therefore, was an important market for French media and was treated by French publishers accordingly. This was, for instance, reflected in the context of the cancellation of the accreditation of the *Le Monde* journalist André Monconduit during the 1950s, which the following chapter will discuss. Parallel to the cancellation of Monconduit’s accreditation, the MIT also banned *Le Monde* from distribution in Spain. Consequently, in order to get *Le Monde* back in Spanish newspaper stands, the newspaper’s editors fired the correspondent for ‘economic reasons’\(^\text{876}\), as the Spanish press attaché in Paris reported back to Madrid.

While the larger distribution of German and British compared to US press can be seen as a reflection of Spain’s tourism industry, this factor alone does not explain the massive distribution of French media. Two strongly interrelated reasons account for this observation. First, as mentioned above, it reflects the widespread knowledge of French which made the French press accessible to large parts of the Spanish public. Second and most importantly, the French press treated Spain not only as an important market but parts of the liberal-left French press also gave its neighbouring country more attention than the generally unexceptional presence of French correspondents in Spain suggests. Partly, this special attention reflected the French public’s interest in internal Spanish affairs. Aline Angousturres shows that French tourism to Spain but also the strong presence of Spanish exiles and, later on, migrant workers, had indeed boosted French public interest in Spain.\(^\text{877}\) Indeed, in the direct aftermath of the Second World War, the organized political exile organizations such as the PSOE but also the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) with their propagandistic activities constituted the ‘backbone of the

\(^{875}\) AGA, (03) 049.003, 17.211, Folder 23: Untitled report by the Delegación Provincial de Baleares del Ministerio de Información y Turismo to Director General Prensa, 13 July 1963.

\(^{876}\) AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Untitled Biographical note on André Monconduit, 10 April 1964 [unsigned].

French public opinion on the Franco regime. However, Chapter 3 has shown that the strong presence of Republican exiles was not reflected in the positioning of French correspondents in Spain. Besides the general interest of the accessible French publications, this chapter will show that the obvious importance of French newspapers in Spain also reflected the special role of the liberal-left Le Monde and the reports of its Spain correspondents.

The Spanish public, however, not only had direct, but also indirect access to information published in foreign media through the Spanish press. News borrowing, the use of information already published in foreign media, was a widespread practice among Spanish media. After the Second World War, the borrowing of foreign news by the highly controlled Spanish media was mainly an act of coping with the limited access to world news. In fact, some media did not even see the necessity to make the origin of the translated and published articles known to the reader and therefore crossed the line into open plagiarism of the foreign press. This impression is given by a formal complaint about the practice, which the Spain representative of the US press syndicate Editors Press Service sent in 1953 to the MIT after Spain had joined UNESCO and signed the Universal Copyright Convention.

The reliance on news borrowing for world news remained a common practice throughout the following decades. The newspaper Madrid, for instance, had the special service El Mundo which consisted of translated articles from The Times, Le Figaro and the Sunday Times. According to the Madrid journalist Aguilar, however, the newspaper did not only create the cooperation with the foreign papers in order to provide the Spanish readers with a fuller picture of the world affairs than Madrid could have provided on its own. Aguilar explicitly highlighted in an interview that the section was not only about world news, but about uncensored news on Spain’s foreign affairs. Without taking the responsibility of authorship, the liberal newspaper therefore circumvented the formal rules of the Francoist

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880 AGA, (03) 049.001, 21.2416, Folder 88: Delegación Provincial in Barcelona to Director General de Prensa, 5 February 1953.
censorship and the authorities could not make any individual journalists responsible for the articles.882

The use of news borrowing in order to make information available to the public which otherwise could not be published became, as Felipe Sahagún also briefly mentions,883 of particular importance with respect to domestic news on Spain’s politics, economy and the political opposition. Not only could the newspaper protect its journalists from direct harassment by quoting foreign news but the reliance on major foreign publications gave the published news further legitimacy. In particular, liberal newspapers like Madrid, Informaciones or Cambio 16 actively used this strategy as Sahagún, who himself worked at the end of the 1960s for Informaciones, further stressed in a personal interview.884 Madrid regularly quoted newspapers like Le Monde or the Financial Times on Spain’s internal political affairs.885 In January of 1971, for instance, the Financial Times was a central source of information for an article by Madrid on the crisis of car manufacturer SEAT in Spain.886

Spanish journalists, however, not only made use of the work of their foreign colleagues. The exchange of sensitive information between regime critical Spanish journalists and foreign correspondents must also be at least partly seen against this background. Indeed, not only did Spanish journalists pass information to foreign correspondents in order to make them public abroad. They also did so precisely in order to borrow from the foreign media the respective reports and quote them later on. Both Spanish journalists as well as foreign correspondents remembered this practice well. Spanish journalists who were active from the end of the 1960s and critical towards the regime like Aguilar, Oneto and Martínez Soler vividly recalled the passing of information and waiting for their publication abroad. Martínez Soler recalled in an interview: ‘They published it in their newspapers – and the next day we published it here. […] It was perfect.’887

However, while Martínez Soler admitted that quoting foreign media instead of publishing the news themselves saved the Spanish journalists from taking direct responsibility for the authorship, this practice still came at a risk. Sahagún gives an example of the consequences,

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882 Miguel Ángel Aguilar, interview by Tobias Reckling.
883 Sahagún, El mundo fue noticia, 232.
884 Ibid., 232.
885 Ibid. See also Miguel Ángel Aguilar, interview by Tobias Reckling.
887 José Antonio Martínez Soler, interview by Tobias Reckling.
which news borrowing could have for Spanish media and journalists. In 1970, Madrid published a report by Le Monde on police controls in Spanish universities. This report resulted in a fine for the newspaper and its suspension for two months.\footnote{Sahagún, El mundo fué noticia, 232.} Indeed, Sahagún indirectly links the closedown of Madrid in 1971 to this news borrowing on domestic news. The Spanish newspaper was officially shutdown for, among others, ‘manipulating the press law and official propaganda’\footnote{Ibid.} Shortly after, Calvo Serer, who had become president of the Council of Administration of Madrid in 1966, had to go into exile in France.

**Foreign press and the Spanish opposition**

The previous section has shown that the Spanish public, through access to foreign media, to some extent had access to international news in general as well as uncensored reports on Spain. The foreign press became of particular importance for the political opposition against the Franco regime, however, both as a source of information and a means of communication. Indeed, as this section will argue, the foreign press became a central instrument for the political opposition for reaching a wider public outside and, to some extent, within Spain.

Apart from the continued but limited underground guerrilla resistance by the Maquis,\footnote{Antony Beevor, The battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936 - 1939, Rev. ed. (London u.a.: Penguin Books, 2006), 420-424.} the political opposition within Spain was, according to Julían Casanova and Carlos Gil Andrés, ‘lost in wilderness’\footnote{Casanova and Gil Andrés, Twentieth-century Spain, 265.} after the Second World War. This was the result of the Franco regime’s brutal suppression of any opposition after victory in the Spanish Civil War. As a result, the opposition against the dictatorship mostly re-organized outside of Spain. The thousands of anarchists, republicans, communists and socialists who had left Spain after the Spanish Civil War, actively continued their struggle against the Franco regime both in their own and foreign media like the above mentioned international broadcasters.

Political and social resistance within Spain slowly started to develop during the 1950s. From the beginning, this opposition against the Franco regime received the attention of the foreign and French press in particular. Le Monde intensively covered the emerging resistance against the Franco regime – such as labour conflicts and students protests - towards the end of the 1950s. Because of his frequent reports on these matters, the MIT
saw in the *Le Monde* correspondent André Monconduit the ‘chronicler of Spanish strikes, […] separatist manifestations, protests, social labour or economic unrest’\(^{892}\).

Reports by correspondents like Monconduit on the protesting students and workers and their repression counteracted the regime’s striving for international acceptance. The importance of the foreign press and the correspondents in Spain for the resistance against the Franco regime in particular, however, initially went beyond mere reports. Instead, the foreign press also provided regime critics with a platform on which to reach a wider public.

In the first instance, this concerned critics from within the regime. Monconduit, for instance, maintained close ties to monarchist followers of the Bourbon King Don Juan and members of the Opus Dei. In the beginning of the 1950s, it was members of these two groups who started to form an alliance which was to become known as *Tercera Fuerza*, a third force within the heterogeneous power structure of the Francoist system.\(^{893}\) Politically, this new group stood against both the Falange as well as the Regime Catholics around the Foreign Minister Martin Artajo. It aimed for a change of personnel in the government in order to secure the regime’s survival.\(^{894}\) Monconduit gave the *Tercera Fuerza* and one of its most prominent members, the director of the National Scientific Council (*Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, CSIC*) Rafael Calvo Serer in particular, a voice in the French press up to the point of being labeled by the Francoist authorities as his personal ‘spokesman’.\(^{895}\) Well-connected international protagonists of the political opposition like Serer also made their own use of the foreign press as a means of communication without the correspondents as intermediaries. In September 1953, Calvo Serer attacked both the Falange and the Regime Catholics through the French Press.\(^{896}\) In contrast to the correspondents, however, such actions for Spaniards came at a considerable risk. The Francoist authorities dismissed Calvo Serer shortly after from his post at the CSIC.

\(^{892}\) AGA, (03)049.021, 56.779, Folder Jean Creach/ André Monconduit: Reseña de comentarios e informaciones sobre España difundidas con la firma del corresponsal André Monconduit Crech [sic!] en periódicos y emisoras extranjeras (1957 a 1964), April 1964 [undated].


\(^{894}\) Ibid.

\(^{895}\) AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder Jean Creach/ André Monconduit: Untitled report on André Monconduit, 18 March 1964 [unsigned].

While the particular attention which Monconduit gave Serer was based on the ‘cultivated friendship’\textsuperscript{897} between the two men, other foreign media and correspondents also became important transmitters of the early opposition against the Franco regime. This interest of the foreign press in the early internal opposition against the Franco regime was also partially born out of journalistic necessity. While the Spanish press was censored, chapter six will show that the Francoist authorities followed a very strict information policy towards the foreign press. The political opposition was both willing and in the position and need of filling this informational gap for the correspondents. As the Reuter’s bureau chief Henry Buckley outlined to an OID official in 1950: ‘in Spain one has much better information from the hostile or rebellious groups than from the government’\textsuperscript{898}.

Besides opposition from within the regime like Calvo Serer, for most of the 1950s there was, however, little organized opposition within Spain to pass information to the foreign press. It was not before the end of the decade that organized political opposition fundamentally opposed to the regime started to form. A turning point in this process was the meeting of representatives of opposition groups in Munich in July 1962, outlined in Chapter 1. It became, both within and outside of Spain, a symbol for opposition against the Franco regime.

The group that became the strongest and best-organized opposition against the Franco regime were the Spanish communists. Through their control of the clandestine trade unionism of the Workers’ Commissions (Comisiones Obrerars, CC.OO), the Spanish communists became the ‘hegemonic force of the anti-Francoism’ in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{899} The CC.OO became a central force in Spanish labour conflicts since the beginning of the 1960s, undermining the regime’s attempts to control the Spanish work force through its own unions.\textsuperscript{900} The relations of the Spanish communists within Spain with the foreign press, however, were complicated. The communists had, through their exiled comrades, access to their own media like the aforementioned international broadcasters through which they could reach the Spanish public. On the other hand, in the context of the Cold War, the communists could not count on making their views public in Western media like the moderate opposition could in the French press. Even many social democratic and other

\textsuperscript{897} Onésimo Díaz Hernández, Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo Arbor (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2011), 213. See also AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder Jean Creach/ André Monconduit: Untitled report on André Monconduit, 18 March 1964 [unsigned].
\textsuperscript{898} AFFN, 11877: Oficina de Informacion Diplomática to Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, 25 March 1950.
\textsuperscript{899} Muñoz Sánchez, El amigo alemán, 84.
\textsuperscript{900} Casanova and Gil Andrés, Twentieth-century Spain, 264-265.
centre-left newspapers and their correspondents, who were strongly opposed to communism in the Cold War and in their own countries, kept their distance from the communists. Manfred von Conta of the liberal-left *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, who had covered Czechoslovakia and Hungary before coming to Spain, even explicitly avoided any direct contacts with ‘anti-democratic’ elements of the opposition like the communists.\(^{901}\)

Nevertheless, besides these limitations the foreign press was still an important communicator for the communist opposition against the Franco regime. Foreign media regularly covered the communist organized labour protests and especially the repression of the communist resistance by the Francoist authorities. This became strongly visible when the Francoist authorities imprisoned, tortured and eventually executed the communist leader Julian Grimau in April 1963. The intensive media coverage of the events in Spain turned the execution of Grimau into an international media event,\(^{902}\) which the correspondents Görtz and Herrmann, both accredited since the beginning of the 1960s, still remembered well.\(^{903}\)

The attention of the foreign press for the repression of the communist opposition continued thereafter, as the CC.OO leader Marcelino Camacho vividly recalled in his memoirs. The Francoist authorities imprisoned Camacho in 1967 and he was only pardoned after the death of Franco in 1975. Camacho enjoyed the support of the foreign press both before and during his time in the Francoist prisons:

> We have never appropriately valued the help which the majority of the foreign correspondents gave to us. Personally, if I want to be just and honest, I have to recall and recognize that, in the almost ten years I spent in the Francoist prisons in particular, they maintained almost weekly contact with Joséfina, my partner, and with my sister Vicenta. They used almost all of my cards [from prison] for their reports when they looked for information alternative to the official; they “followed the fights of the prison, as well as the ones in the companies and the streets.”\(^{904}\)

For the press, the story of the imprisoned workers’ leader and his wife waiting for him for almost ten years also constituted a human interest story and therefore made it even more interesting.

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\(^{901}\) Manfred von Conta. Skype-Interview Tobias Reckling.

\(^{902}\) See for example Muñoz Soro, “El «caso Grimau»: propaganda y contrapropaganda del régimen franquista en Italia (1962-1964)”.

\(^{903}\) Rolf Görtz, interview by Tobias Reckling; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.

\(^{904}\) Camacho, *Confieso que he luchado*, 188.
While parts of the foreign press kept their distance from the communists, the support of other, ideologically closer correspondents went beyond journalistic coverage. Some correspondents actively helped the communist opposition to establish contacts with foreign political parties and unions. According to Camacho, the correspondent Sieglinde Herrmann in particular ‘was a great help for us with the contacts to the German unions which followed our activities’\(^\text{905}\). The stringer Herrmann was officially accredited for, among others, the left-wing \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau} in the mid-1960s and had excellent contacts with German trade unionists and social democrats.\(^\text{906}\) Although the German trade union IG Metall and the SPD, which were of central importance for the Spanish opposition, did not directly support the communists, these contacts were nevertheless important. In the apartment of Herrmann, Camacho, for instance, met on various occasions the Spaniard Carlos Pardo, among others.\(^\text{907}\) Pardo, a Spanish emigrant in Germany, was an active IG Metall trade unionist and, as the chief editor of the IG Metall’s highly Franco critical monthly magazine \textit{Exprés Español},\(^\text{908}\) a central actor in the trade union’s ‘educational programme’ for Spanish workers in Germany. Besides Herrmann, Camacho also explicitly mentions in his memoirs three other correspondents which were of particular importance for the CC.OO: the Argentinian Armando Puente, who was working mainly for French media, Harry Debelius of \textit{The Times} and José Antonio Novais of \textit{Le Monde}.\(^\text{909}\) The latter was very central to events. In an interview with the Spanish journalist Nativel Preciado, Camacho’s widow recalled that ‘whatever happened to the political prisoners appeared the next day in \textit{Le Monde}, a thing which very much upset Franco’\(^\text{910}\).

\textit{Le Monde}, however, was not only important to Camacho during the 1960s, as it had been for the opposition within the regime during the 1950s but \textit{Le Monde} and the Spanish-born Novais, who became the newspaper’s correspondent in 1961, were of central importance for the entire political opposition. In contrast to Monconduit, as his predecessor as \textit{Le Monde} correspondent, Novais continuously reported for the French newspaper from Spain until after Franco’s death. The growing resistance against the Franco regime in the Spanish

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905 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling, 189.
906 Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling. On Herrmann’s accreditations see also ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Accreditation Sieglinde Herrmann [no archival signature].
907 Camacho, \textit{Confieso que he luchado}, 189. Linde Herrmann also remembered these meetings. See Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.
909 Camacho, \textit{Confieso que he luchado}, 189.
910 Nativel Preciado, \textit{Nadie pudo con ellos: Toda una vida luchando por los derechos y la libertad} (Barcelona: Espasa Libros, 2011), 133.
universities was crucial for this development. Following the substantial expansion of the university system, more and more students as well as teachers started to show their discontent with the dictatorship throughout the 1960s.\footnote{On the Spanish student protests see for example: Alberto Carrillo-Linares, “Movimiento estudiantil antifranquista, cultura política y transición política a la democracia,” \textit{Pasado y memoria: Revista de historia contemporánea}, no. 5 (2006).} Like other protagonists of a young, regime critical generation of journalists, Novais had studied at one of the newly created departments for communication, which became one of the centres of student protests. As a correspondent, he chronicled the student protests against the regime. Students and later journalists like Aguilar have remembered him as the person to go to in order to make the student’s protests public.\footnote{Miguel Ángel Aguilar, interview by Tobias Reckling.} The extent of Novais’ coverage became visible in a number of issues of \textit{Le Monde}, which the Francoist authorities retained because of his reports on student protests and their repression. In January and February of 1968 alone, the DG for the Press withheld altogether 25 issues of \textit{Le Monde}.

The importance of Novais and \textit{Le Monde} was not limited, however, to the reporting on the situation in Spain for the French public. Instead and as previously claimed, \textit{Le Monde} was a central source of information in Spain and for the political opposition in particular. The Francoist authorities’ control of the French newspaper’s distribution only had a limited impact on the access to \textit{Le Monde} by parts of the Spanish public. The Spanish journalist Aguilar and, among others, the correspondents Herrmann and Haubrich recalled in interviews, however, that the unauthorized issues of \textit{Le Monde} were also illegally distributed in Spain and in Spanish universities in particular.\footnote{AGA, (03) 107.002, 42.09044, Folder 1: Dirección General de Prensa, Prensa Extranjera: Publicaciones extranjeras cuya circulación ha sido denegada o rescindida, 1968.} The Spanish philosopher and essayist José Luis López-Aranguren highlighted this particular importance of \textit{Le Monde}. López-Aranguren was a professor at the Universidad de Complutense de Madrid until 1966, when he was dismissed by the Franco regime because of his support of the student’s protests. For him, \textit{Le Monde} during these years was the central ‘informational organ for Spaniards. A Spaniard, when he wants to know what is going on in Spain, must turn to “Le Monde” because in the Spanish newspapers one cannot inform himself.’\footnote{Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.} Today, Novais’ particular importance to the student protests is remembered in a street in

\footnotetext{\footnote{\textcopyright{} 2011 Tobias Reckling. Published by de Gruyter.}
Madrid’s university quarter, which was named after the correspondent because of his ‘close relationship with the world of university’ in 1998.

Besides the students’ protests and communists, *Le Monde*, mainly because of its correspondent Novais, was also decisive for further development of the internal Spanish opposition as a central source of information and means of transnational communication. This applied to the reorganizing Spanish socialists within Spain. After the end of the Second World War, the Spanish socialists - namely the PSOE - were organized in exile in Toulouse under the long-term leadership of Rodolfo Llopis. From there, the PSOE organized its campaigns against the Franco regime both in a variety of its own media and through the French press. During the 1960s, however, socialists within Spain became increasingly dissatisfied with the ‘heavy hand of Llopis’ exiled bureaucracy. They perceived the exile leadership as increasingly disconnected from reality in Francoist Spain, and started to strive for independence. In 1968, this process resulted in the foundation of the Socialist Party of the Interior (Partido Socialista Interior, PSI) under the leadership of Tierno Galván. Galván, a university professor, was dismissed from his post by the Francoist authorities together with López-Aranguren in 1966 because of his support of student protests.

Like Camacho, Galván also stressed in his memoirs the central agency of Novais as one of the correspondents ‘who worked the most in support and to the benefit of democracy’. Although Galván does not elaborate on this point in his memoirs, it can be assumed that the publicity by *Le Monde* was of particular importance for him in his parallel struggle against the Franco regime and for independence from the exile leadership in France. It gave him the possibility to reach both the Spanish and French public.

Besides its central role, *Le Monde* was of course not the only foreign medium, which the internal Spanish opposition used in order to make itself heard, as Galván further outlines:

> On many occasions we intervened like editors in the service of the foreign journalists, because it was us who gave the ready prepared news to the correspondents. There was hardly a morning when we, leaving for work, did

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918 Paul Preston, “The Decline and Resurgence of the Spanish Socialist Party during the Franco Regime,” 218.
920 Tierno Galván, *Calvos sueltos*, 224.
Even more than for Galván’s PSI, the foreign press was crucial to the other, eventually more successful, socialist party organization created in Spain during the Franco regime. The foundation of the PSI only was the first climax in the internal Spanish socialists’ striving for independence from the exile leadership. Following a conflictual process that began at the beginning of the 1970s, this process culminated in the creation of a PSOE executive and, eventually, a PSOE party organization within Spain. The young Felipe González, the later Spanish Prime Minister, became secretary general. In 1974, the Socialist International officially legitimized the so-called Renewed PSOE (PSOE Renovado) and the PSI, which was no longer the only internal socialist party, was renamed into the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular, PSP). Following the PSOE’s success in the first democratic elections after the death of Franco in 1977, PSP was eventually integrated into the PSOE in the following year.

For the socialists around González, presence in the foreign press was not only important because of the general publicity both within and outside of Spain but also for reaching out to the international public which was crucial for the Spanish socialists in order to secure – in rivalry with the PSI – the necessary financial, logistic and ideological support from abroad. This applied in particular to the support from the German SPD and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which was associated with it. Recent research has shown that foreign support was crucial to the PSOE’s eventual success. In fact, Antonio Muñoz Sánchez also explicitly mentions German and Swiss correspondents and the correspondents of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in particular. Arnold Hottinger, for example, played an active part in the SPD’s eventual decision to concentrate its support exclusively on the PSOE within Spain.

However, and in contrast to Galván, central PSOE leaders such as González or Alfonso Guerra hardly mention the foreign press in their memoirs. Nevertheless, the available evidence strongly suggests that foreign correspondents and the foreign press in fact played

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921 Tierno Galván, *Calvos sueltos*, 411.
922 Preston, “The Decline and Resurgence of the Spanish Socialist Party during the Franco Regime,” 221.
a central role. In particular, the interviewed German correspondents still remember very well the extremely active press work of the PSOE which was coordinated at the beginning of the 1970s by the later General Secretary of NATO, Javier Solana. Walter Haubrich in particular not only recalled the PSOE’s active presswork but also openly admitted that he was personally very much in favour of the PSOE and González or ‘the new star on the Spanish sky’ as he called him in an article published during the transition. Haubrich personally spoke to González for the first time in 1974, shortly after the Socialist International officially recognized the Renewed PSOE. At this time, González was working clandestinely under his code name Isidoro out of Seville on the reorganization of the PSOE within Spain. Thereafter, Haubrich became one of the correspondents who most strongly supported the PSOE. This was reflected in his frequent and favourable press reports on the PSOE during the Spanish transition. The numerous awards which Haubrich, like Novais, received in democratic Spain, as well as the obituaries in Spanish media after his death in 2015 reflected his importance for the democratic opposition during the Franco regime.

The relations of the foreign press with the political opposition against the Franco regime, however, must naturally remain incomplete. Too diverse was the loosely organized opposition against the Franco regime and too widespread were the contacts of the foreign correspondents. When asked about his contacts with the opposition by the time of Franco’s death, the Argentinian correspondent Puente, for instance, provided a long list, which included, besides the aforementioned groups, Falangists and Catholics critical of the regime, Basque and Catalan nationalists and important lawyers critical of the regime and who supported the opposition in the Francoist courts. Two groups whose representatives could also be found in Armando’s lists and which in some cases were identical, however, were nevertheless of special importance for the foreign press core in general: the moderate opposition which, at least in part, came from within the regime, and Spanish journalists.

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925 See Rolf Görtz, interview by Tobias Reckling; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling; Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011; Friedrich Kassebeer, interview by Tobias Reckling.
927 Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011.
929 See for example Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling.
As we have seen above, for Franco critical dissidents like Calvo Serer, the foreign press and the French press especially remained an important means of communication. Following his exile to France after the closing down of Madrid in 1971, Calvo Serer used the French press to make his criticisms of the Franco regime public as he had previously done in the 1950s. By paraphrasing Emile Zola’s famous criticism during the Dreyfus affair in France, Calvo Serer attacked the Franco regime in a Le Monde article under the title ‘Moi aussi, j’accuse…’.\footnote{Rafael Calvo Serer, “Moi aussi, j’accuse…,” Le Monde, 11 November 1971, 5. On the Franco regime’s reaction and Calvo Serer’s exile, see Onésimo Díaz Hernández, Meer Lecha-Marzo, Fernando de and Antonio Fontán, Rafael Calvo Serer: La búsqueda de la libertad (1954-1988) (Madrid: Rialp, 2010), 213-15.} However, other members of the moderate opposition within Spain also maintained close relations to the foreign press corps. This applied to Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, the former Minister of Education who became a leader of the Christian Democratic opposition and founded the regime critical Cuadernos para el Diálogo during the 1960s. Another group of particular importance for the foreign press and vice versa were regime critical monarchists around José María Areilza, who after the death of Franco became Spain’s Foreign Minister. During the Spanish transition, in particular the Christian Democrats around Ruiz-Giménez received, like the socialists, considerable international support from European Christian Democratic party networks.\footnote{See Kaiser and Salm, „Transition und Europäisierung in Spanien und Portugal. Sozial- und christdemokratische Netzwerke im Übergang von der Diktatur zu parlamentarischen Demokratie“.} Like Ruiz-Giménez, Areilza also had a career in the Franco regime and served as Spanish ambassador in Paris from 1960 until 1964 in addition to other posts. Since the mid-1960s, Areilza distanced himself from the Franco regime and became a leading figure of Spain’s moderate, pro-democratic opposition.

Among the examined memoirs of actors of the political opposition, Areilza dedicated the most attention to his contacts with the foreign press and its importance for his opposition to the regime.\footnote{Areilza, Crónica de libertad, 111-114.} Besides numerous personal memories, Novais was to Areilza a ‘man of great civil courage in decisive moments’.\footnote{Ibid., 114.} The relationship between central actors of the moderate opposition with the foreign press was, however, of special importance for both parties for two reasons. First, representatives of the moderate opposition like Areilza had the attention of the conservative, right of centre media that were not fully opposed to the Franco regime and rather suspicious of the left-wing opposition. Areilza, for instance, explicitly highlights his relation with Le Figaro’s Spain correspondent Jacques Guillemé.
Brulon as his ‘best link […] to the conservative French press’\(^{935}\). While for Areilza, Guillemé Brulon was a representative of the ‘most conservative right-wing’ of France and in favour of the Franco regime, he was nevertheless open to Areilza’s ideas for democratic change. In fact, the presence in Le Figaro was for Areilza ‘an aspect of great importance in order to attain in France the support of a great sector of the right Gaullists and post-Gaullists’\(^{936}\).

Second, the correspondents interviewed generally stressed the particular importance of these former Francoist politician’s for their understanding of the regime’s internal affairs. Areilza himself outlines this aspect very clearly in his memoirs. The foreign correspondents ‘generally […] turned to me [Areilza] in order to obtain reliable information on what was going on on the political terrain.’\(^{937}\) Against the background of limited official information, Areilza saw himself mostly as a translator and interpreter of the Franco regime’s politics: ‘My role was to compensate the voluntary absence of information which characterized the government spokespersons’\(^{938}\). Ruiz-Giménez described his relations with the foreign press in similar terms. In Ruiz-Giménez’s published diaries, his special importance for the foreign press becomes particularly visible in the context of the suppression of the growing resistance against the dictatorship at the end of the 1960s. Following the declaration of yet another state of emergency in January 1969, correspondents turned to Ruiz-Giménez in order to attain a better understanding of what was going on within the regime:

> Today, I spent almost the entire morning receiving foreign journalists who want to know and who try to understand what is almost incomprehensible. To all of them I emphasized the complexity of the matter, with current factors […] and background factors […].\(^{939}\)

Ruiz-Giménez’ day in January 1969 continued with visits and calls from foreign correspondents, which led to his conclusion: ‘The Government must know all this and can do nothing less than worry about (the tourism, the European Common Market, etc.)’\(^{940}\). The Francoist government was well informed about the reports in the foreign press through the MIT’s regular newsletters. The question remains, however, to what extent the attention of the foreign press and the relationship with the foreign correspondents made a difference for the Spanish opposition. Given the complexity of the evolution of the multi-faceted anti-

\(^{935}\) Ibid.
\(^{936}\) Ibid.
\(^{937}\) Ibid.
\(^{938}\) Ibid.
\(^{939}\) Rodríguez de Lecea, Teresa and Itziar Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta, Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez Cortés: Diarios de una vida, vol. 1 (Madrid: Congreso de los Diputados, 2013), 190. Exprés Español
\(^{940}\) Ibid., 191
Francoist opposition and the variety of internal and external factors involved, this question is difficult to answer. The available evidence nevertheless allows for some conclusions, however.

The most immediate avenue of support in the foreign press corps for the Spanish opposition was the direct political involvement of individual correspondents. As such, the role that some correspondents fulfilled as transnational brokers and emissaries between the Spanish opposition and foreign political actors became of particular importance. Both Galván and Camacho have outlined the importance of Sieglinde Herrmann for the establishment of contacts with the German Social Democrats and IG Metall during the 1960s. Herrmann, however, was not the only correspondent to mediate between the political opposition and foreign political actors. Another example is the German correspondent Manfred von Conta, who delivered in the beginning of the 1970s information of the Spanish opposition to the German embassy in Madrid. A concrete example of when his support had a direct impact, was the imprisonment and subsequent impeachment of the journalist Carlos Pardo for ‘illegal propaganda’941 in May 1971. The Spaniard Pardo was living in Germany where he edited *Expres Español*, the highly Francocritical magazine of the German trade union IG Metall for Spanish workers. The Francoist authorities arrested him during a visit to Spain. Von Conta, who was contacted by the illegal socialist Spanish General Workers Union (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT), not only immediately informed the Spanish embassy informally about Pardo’s imprisonment but the correspondent also delivered a letter from the UGT to the German ambassador,942 in which the Spanish trade unionists asked for German support on behalf of Pardo.943 This attempt was successful. After long diplomatic negotiations between the Francoist authorities and the German ambassador in Madrid, Hermann Meyer-Lindenberg944 and German SPD politicians,945 Pardo was released.

The support of parts of the foreign press for the political opposition in some cases went so far that the foreign journalists themselves could be considered as active members of the
anti-Francoist opposition. This applied in particular to Herrmann, Novais and Haubrich. In the case of Haubrich, his proximity to the opposition became almost symbolically visible in the proclamation of the Democratic Junta of Spain. Parallel to the group’s official proclamation in Paris, the Democratic Junta’s branch within Spain was founded in Haubrich’s apartment Madrid in 1974. In interviews with him for this thesis, Haubrich admitted that he and his colleagues sometimes had their doubts in how far their support of the political opposition still was compatible with their professional ethics as journalists requiring a certain distance and objectivity.

This direct support of parts of the foreign press corps for the political opposition, however, was still exceptional. The question therefore remains as to how far their general coverage of the resistance against the Franco regime had an impact on the opposition’s situation. For the correspondent Manfred von Conta, there was little doubt that it had:

For members of the opposition, those foreign press people that had an open ear for them could be life-saving, because harsh repression of opponents just for their ideological convictions was sure to be criticized in democratic Europe. Spain had to find out for economic reasons how to get along with the rest of Europe and could not behave at will – the men in charge of the regime might have felt an agonizing frustration because of that.

The occasion to which von Conta indirectly refers and in which he considered the foreign press as ‘life-saving’, was the Burgos trials at the end of 1970s. Following the intensive news coverage by foreign media and international protests, the Francoist authorities changed the six original death sentences into prison sentences. Like von Conta, his colleagues Herrmann, Haubrich and others as well as members of the opposition, also considered the support and news coverage during the Burgos trials as crucial. For Areilza, the ‘transmission of the international image of the events served as visible weight, decisive in the hour of the global commutation of the death penalties’. In the aftermath of the oppositional euphoria after the Burgos trials, the Spanish journalist Aguilar even coined the phrase: ‘Franco, who until now had only felt responsible before God and History, also begins to be so before the foreign press’. As Martínez Soler recalled in an interview,

947 Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 14 July 2012.
948 Manfred von Conta, Email to Tobias Reckling.
949 Areilza, Crónica de libertad, 114.
Aguilar’s praise of the foreign press became a running joke among oppositional Spanish journalists.\footnote{José Antonio Martínez Soler, interview by Tobias Reckling.}

There is no doubt that the international press coverage of the Burgos trials in 1970 had a strong impact on the regimes decision to reverse the death sentences on 30 December 1970. At the same time, however, the Burgos trials also took place in a very particular international situation that is overlooked in the literature that discusses them. Practically parallel to the Burgos trial, the so-called First Leningrad Trial took place in the Soviet Union against a group of 16 mostly Jewish Soviet citizens who had tried to hijack a plane in order to flee to Israel. The KGB arrested the group before the group could realize its plan. Although nobody was harmed, the entire group was put on trial in December 1970. On 24 December, a Soviet court condemned two members of the group to death and the others to long prison sentences only one day before the announcement of the verdict of the Burgos trials.\footnote{Kerstin Arnborst-Weihs, Ablösung von der Sowjetunion: Die Emigrationsbewegung der Juden und Deutschen vor 1987, Arbeiten zur Geschichte Osteuropas Bd. 10 (Münster: Lit, 2001), 157-160.}

Like the Burgos trials, massive international protests accompanied the trial in Leningrad.\footnote{Ibid., 158.} Indeed, Western media like the German magazine Der Spiegel perceived the two trials as comparable cases of ‘terror justice’.\footnote{Der Spiegel, “Spanien/Diktatur: Wahre Gefahr,”, 4 January 1971, 60-61 [unsigned].} A commentator in the strongly anti-communist Springer daily newspaper Die Welt pointed out that ‘one has to name Madrid and Moscow in the same breath’. The situation was therefore favourable for the Francoist propagandists to show mercy in the eyes of the international public in order to distance themselves from the communist enemy. The same thought might have also played a role in the suspension of the death sentences by the Soviet officials only one day after the Spanish announcement.

What is more important than this contextualization of the Burgos trials in 1970 is, however, that it remained an isolated case. Other trials that resulted in death sentences ended, besides intensive international news coverage and protests, very differently. When the Francoist authorities sentenced the communist leader Julian Grimau to death in 1963, the Franco regime did not only execute Grimau but even executed the two anarchists, Joaquín Delgado and Francisco Granados, only four months after Grimau despite all international protests.\footnote{B.N. [unknown acronym], “Burgos und Leningrad,” Die Welt, 30 December 1970, 1.}

Furthermore, while Burgos indeed marked a turning point in the international perception of the Franco regime, the international media coverage of later trials did not change the
verdicts. In 1973, the Franco regime executed the Catalan anarchist Salvador Puig Antich with the garrotte despite massive international media coverage and protests including pleas for clemency by the Vatican. Two years later, the Franco regime carried out the executions of five members of ETA in September 1975 despite massive international media, public protests, and clemencies for mercy by European governments as well as European institutions. Ruiz-Gimenez quoted expectation that the consequences of such decisions for the Spanish tourism industry and relations with the EEC would make an impact, therefore, remained an unfulfilled hope. The executions in 1975 resulted in the temporary suspension of Spain’s trade agreement with the EEC and the withdrawal of 15 governments’ ambassadors in Spain.

Nevertheless, the foreign press was a crucial means of communication, information and support for the Spanish opposition under the conditions of the Francoist dictatorship. The Spanish journalist Nativel Preciado is also right in stressing that foreign correspondents were the ‘spokespersons of the workers, unions, clandestine parties, Spanish journalists and, in general, of every individual whose mouth the regime intended to close’. Preciado aptly concludes that the reports in international media ‘about the Burgos trial or the last executions of Franco contributed as a determining factor to the progressive erosion of the regime’. Beginning with the international protests against the Burgos trials in 1970 and culminating in the international ostracization of the regime following the executions in 1975, the reports of the foreign press on the situation in Spain without question contributed to the growing international isolation of the Franco regime. At the same time, the foreign press also contributed to the strengthening and international visibility of the political opposition throughout the last years of the regime. During the early months of the Spanish transition in particular, before the Spanish press gained greater independence, the support of the foreign press was crucial. Shortly after the death of Franco, for instance, the BBC gave the still illegal opposition a voice in Spain by broadcasting a series of interviews with key political actors. These included interviews with the Socialist leader Felipe González, and the exiled leader of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo.

Besides the importance of the foreign press for the political opposition however, the foreign media’s impact on the regime itself was limited, as the majority of cases of death penalties

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957 Crespo MacLennan, Spain and the process of European integration, 1957-85, 114.
958 Ibid.
959 Preciado, Nadie pudo con ellos, 133.
960 Ibid., 140.
961 BBC, WA, E/40/7: Spanish Service Interviews since November 1975, 11 March 1976.
and their execution despite international protests discussed above shows very clearly. In
decisive moments like the aforementioned trials, the inner circle of the Francoist leadership,
as Haubrich put it in an interview, simply ‘did not care’. This does not imply that the
Franco regime was indifferent about its image in foreign media. The next chapter will show
that the Franco regime actively tried to influence and control the work of foreign
correspondents in Spain. First, however, the following section will discuss how the
Francoist authorities controlled the distribution of foreign press in Spain.

Control of the foreign press by the Franco regime

While the Franco regime allowed the import of foreign press in Spain in principle, this by
no means implies that it gave up control over its distribution. As this chapter has already
shown in the case of *Le Monde*, the Franco regime was careful not to allow the distribution
of foreign print media with regime critical content. The Francoist authorities applied this
indirect censorship from the beginning of the reauthorization of foreign press for
distribution in Spain after the Second World War until the death of Franco and even
thereafter. Analysis of the censored newspapers not only provides insight into this praxis
but also, in connection with the previously highlighted examination of the distribution of
foreign press and the importance it had for the political opposition, it also allows for
conclusions on the actual reporting of particular foreign media on Spain.

The Franco regime was not particularly discrete about the control of foreign press (which
was obvious for interested Spanish readers anyway). In 1966, for instance, the MIT
included in a publication for Spanish media professionals, lists of non-authorized foreign
newspapers for the years 1964 and 1965. These lists, however, were mainly concerned with
non-authorization because of pornographic or perceived amoral content. The Franco regime
had ‘left public morality in the hands of the Catholic Church’, for which such content
was neither acceptable nor appropriate for the Spanish public. According to this
publication, the MIT excluded 323 mainly German, French, British, and American
publications from distribution for such reasons between 1962 and August 1965. This
strict censorship of foreign publications was a long-standing policy, closely monitored by
the Catholic Church. During the mid-1950s German publishers complained to the German

962 Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 14 July 2012.
963 Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, *Fear and progress: Ordinary lives in Franco’s Spain*, 1939-1975 (Chichester,
Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 139.
964 Gaceta de la prensa Española, “En España se vende prensa de diecinueve países”, 65.

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embassy in Madrid about the ‘all too strict’ censorship practice of the regime. In a meeting with the German press attaché in Spain, a representative of the MIT then explained that the Francoist authorities followed ‘especially strict standards for pictures of pin-up girls and pictures of summery beach life’. If the MIT’s own censors would not be thorough enough on this matter, the Catholic Church would directly intervene. Although even the MIT representative personally declared that he had ‘not always considered the strictness of the Church as justified’, he stressed that nothing could be done about this. The discussion ended with the recommendation from the MIT that, if German media had an interest in distribution in Spain, they would also have to accept in the future the ‘risk of a ban for photos of women exposing too much skin’. This policy remained unchanged until the end of the regime.

The MIT publication from 1965 also provided information on publications which the Francoist authorities had not authorized for political reasons. These included ‘tendentious or false information’ as well as offences against the head of state. According to the MIT, however, very few foreign publications were actually banned for such reasons. This included four Swedish newspapers, including the popular daily *Aftonbladet*, which the MIT did not authorize for ‘rude lies in connection with alleged tortures in Spain’. Primarily, however, the MIT banned *Le Monde* from the Spanish sales stands. In 1965, for example, the MIT did not authorize *Le Monde* for ‘tendentious or false information’ from 3 March to 2 July.

These numbers as well as the reasons given for the non-authorization, however, did not reflect the reality of the MIT’s actual policy. Although no data for 1965 is available - which would allow for a direct comparison - an internal MIT censorship list for foreign publications from 1968 allows for a partial comparison (Figure 11). In total, the MIT under Fraga refused to authorize 562 foreign publications for sale in Spain in 1968, despite Fraga’s self-promotion as a liberalizer. Not only was this number far higher than the official account in 1965 but the number of newspapers not authorized for non-moral reasons

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966 Ibid.
967 Ibid.
968 *Gaceta de la prensa Española*, “En España se vende prensa de diecinueve países”, 65.
969 Ibid.
970 Ibid.
increased, although this nevertheless remained the most frequent cause for the MIT’s non-
authorization of foreign publications.

The comparison of these two lists is, of course, problematic. Spain had changed
considerably between 1965 and 1968. Students articulated their discontent with the regime
on a massive scale, while the number of workers strikes had tripled compared to 1966 and
the Basque ETA had developed into an active terrorist organization.971 This growing
resistance and its repression by the Franco regime also resulted in an increase in
international news coverage. Besides these considerations, the comparison of these lists
allows for further insights into the actual censorship praxis of the Francoist authorities.

The difference to 1965 becomes visible, for instance, in the treatment of the US press. The
official list of 1965 and the internal list of the MIT from 1968 both account for practically
the same number of issues of US publications not allowed for sale in Spain (54 in 1965 and
51 in 1968). However, while the MIT, in order to protect the Spanish public from the ‘moral
decay from abroad’, did not officially authorize these 54 US publications in 1965, the
internal list of the MIT gives another impression. In 1968, the MIT accounted for 14 issues
of US media which were not authorized for political reasons. These included, among others,
an issue of Newsweek (4 November 1968) because of an article on demonstrations in Spain
and an issue of Time (26 July 1968) on censorship in Spain.972 Given both the political and
propagandistic importance of the Franco regime’s relationship with the US, it seems that
the official publication of non-authorizations of US-media for political reasons did not seem
opportune.

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971 Tusell, Spain: From dictatorship to democracy, 222
972 AGA, (03) 107.002, 42.09044, Folder 1: Dirección General de Prensa, Prensa Extranjera, Publicaciones
extranjeras cuya circulación ha sido denegada o rescindida, 1968.
While this treatment of the US press sheds light on the actual MIT policy with respect to the control of the foreign press, it also reflects the limited interest of the US press in Spain’s internal affairs at the time. This conclusion follows from an analysis of the regime’s policy towards foreign press which followed Spanish politics with greater attention and especially towards the French press. Figure 11 shows that the French press was not only the most widely distributed foreign press in Spain, but also by far the most often non-authorized foreign press. Not only were more than a third of all not authorized publications in 1968 French (217). Instead, the vast majority of these banned French publications (168) were stopped for political reasons from sale in Spain. This conclusion becomes evident by examining the attitude of the Francoist authorities towards media from other major European countries. Of the 110 non-authorized issues of German media, for instance, the MIT only banned 13 for political reasons in 1968. Almost 90% of the non-authorized German publications were excluded from sale for moral reasons - such as the five issues of

Figure 11: Foreign print media not authorized for sale in Spain in 1968\(^{973}\)

\(^{973}\) Based on ibid.
the magazine *Wochenend* which had women in bikinis on their front pages.\(^974\) The moral control of the Catholic Church remained intact besides the fact that Western European women were already omnipresent on Spanish beaches anyway.\(^975\) The examination of the British press provides a similar picture.

The large number of French publications banned for political reasons further supports the argument made above regarding the special role of the French press. Not only was the French press the most widely distributed and, in terms of language, accessible foreign press in Spain but the large number of non-authorized French media in 1968 also supports the argument that the French press treated the Franco regime with a considerable and critical attention. This applied to *Le Monde* in particular. The French newspaper and its correspondent Novais in Madrid accounted for more than half (102 in total) of the French publications banned for sale in Spain in 1968. Therefore, *Le Monde* was and remained the single most non-authorized foreign print media in Spain. This strict attitude of the Francoist authorities towards *Le Monde* and, as the following chapter will show, its correspondents in Spain, was probably the most direct reflection of both the newspapers attention towards the Franco regime and its resulting importance for the Spanish public. Indeed, at times the justifications listed by the MIT for the non-authorization of *Le Monde* leave the impression that it contained a special section on Spain with daily reports. In February 1968 alone, for instance, the MIT banned 16 issues of *Le Monde* as a result of Novais’ almost daily reports on the situation in Spain and the growing student protests against the Franco regime.

The examined censorship list of the MIT not only provides insights into the reality of the regime’s control of the foreign press at the end of the 1960s but also shows that the majority of foreign press had seemingly little interest in Spain’s internal political affairs and therefore gave the Spanish censors little reason to intervene. Foreign publications were mostly banned for moral reasons. That the only occasional banning of other non-French publications for political reasons was a reflection of the obvious lack of general interest in Spain became visible when the Franco regime increasingly moved into the spot light of international media interest from the end of the 1960s.

\(^974\) Ibid.

\(^975\) According to Nash the ‘iconic eroticized’ Swedish female tourist became a symbol for these changing morals and concepts of femininity through mass tourism. Mary Nash, “Mass Tourism and New Representations of Gender in Late Francoist Spain: The Sueca and Don Juan in the 1960s,” *Cultural History* 4, no. 2 (2015), 137.
Chapter 3 and 4 have shown that a new generation of staff correspondents came to Spain from the end of the 1960s. This had a direct impact on the Franco regime’s international media image. While the German press corps, with its many former Nazi correspondents, for instance, gave the Franco regime (until the end of the 1960s) little reason to censor, this fundamentally changed with the appointment of this new generation of journalists.

Figure 12: Foreign print media not authorized for sale in Spain, October 1975

The more critical attitude of parts of the foreign press corps and the resulting increase of censored foreign publications became clearly visible in the context of the most important Spanish media event since the Civil War: the death of Franco. The long illness of the dictator as well as the previous execution of five alleged terrorists drew, since October 1975, hundreds of correspondents into Spain who reported intensively on events. Figure 12 shows that the MIT coped with this situation with an equally intensive policy of non-authorization of foreign publications. In October 1975 alone, and therefore still almost a month before the actual death of Franco on 20 November 1975, 287 issues of foreign media

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976 Based on AMAE. 14078: Relaciones de publicaciones extranjeras en España, October 1975.
were not authorized for distribution in Spain. The examination of the censored publications reveals two fundamental changes. First, while French publications still accounted for almost a third of all non-authorized foreign publications, the distribution in terms of nationality had changed significantly. Italian and Swiss media were also increasingly being non-authorized, while the censorship of US publications had become marginal. Second, political reasons had become the single most important reason for the MIT’s non-authorization of foreign media. Of the almost 50 censored German publications, for instance, almost 90% (42 issues) were non-authorized because of reports on political developments in Spain. While this result must be seen in the context of the executions in October 1975 and Franco’s terminal illness, it nevertheless strongly reflects the changed attitude and attention of the German press towards Spain.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the access, control and importance of foreign media in Francoist Spain. The chapter has shown that French media were of particular importance to the Spanish public, both because the attention they dedicated to Spain and the widespread knowledge of French. International broadcasters with Spanish programmes, in particular *Radio Paris* and the *BBC*, also gave the Spanish public direct access to foreign news. The examination of the Spanish Service of the *BBC* has also shown, however, that this broadcaster was functioning under particular political constraints imposed by the Foreign Office. With the examination of the particularities of the *BBC*’s Spanish Service towards the Franco regime, the chapter has highlighted an aspect of the *BBC*’s broadcasts during the Cold War which so far has received little attention by researchers.

Besides this direct access to foreign news, the chapter has stressed that the Spanish public also had an indirect access through republished or quoted articles from the foreign press in Spanish media. This practice of news borrowing was especially exploited by regime critical journalists in order to make information accessible that they could not directly publish in the Spanish press. These Spanish journalists explicitly passed information to foreign correspondents in order to quote them later on. For Spanish journalists, this practice not only provided their news with the additional legitimacy of referring to major foreign media but also, to a certain extent, protected them from repressions by the Francoist authorities because they did not take responsibility for the authorship of the published news.
The chapter has further shown that the foreign press and the contacts to the foreign correspondents were of central importance for all components of the political opposition. This was a mutually beneficial relationship since the political opposition was a crucial source of information for foreign correspondents. This applied especially to the moderate opposition with personal ties to the Franco regime.

The foreign press provided the opposition not only with access to an international public. In particular, the widely read and distributed French newspaper *Le Monde* also was crucial for the opposition as means of communication within Spain. Instrumental for *Le Monde*’s importance was its Spanish-born correspondent José Antonio Novais. However, other correspondents and their media, namely Walter Haubrich of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, were also crucial transnational communicators for the Spanish opposition. In this respect, the personal support of correspondents like Haubrich, Novais and others for the political opposition went beyond journalistic neutrality.

The crucial importance of *Le Monde* and its Spain correspondents for the Spanish public in general and the opposition in particular was reflected in the frequent censorship of the newspaper by the Francoist authorities. Other foreign media were mainly censored because of, from the point of view of the conservative Catholic Franco regime, amoral content. The chapter has shown, however, that this changed with increased international interest in the regime and the accreditation of a new generation of staff correspondents from the end of the 1960s. Foreign media thereafter also became generally more critical about the Franco regime, as was reflected in the intensified censorship of foreign publications.
6. Foreign correspondents and the Franco regime: between control and persuasions

The presence of foreign correspondents was for the Franco regime, as for other modern dictatorships that tolerated the presence of foreign journalists, a necessary abnormality. For the sake of its foreign image and the stability of its slowly recovering international acceptance after 1945, the Franco regime had little other choice than also accept the presence of foreign correspondents. However, the actual work of these correspondents was often difficult to bear for the Francoist authorities without taking action – which they did regularly.

This chapter examines the means employed by the Franco regime to directly influence and control foreign correspondents. Rosendorf, who briefly discusses this subject, argues that ‘the Franco regime had a rather steep learning curve during the 1950s when it came to handling the US press, particularly newspaper correspondents based in or frequently visiting Spain. But learn they did, and in fairly short order’ 978. Rosendorf in particular discusses the case of the The New York Times correspondent Samuel Pope Brewer. In 1951, the MIT cancelled Brewer’s press card and asked the correspondent to leave Spain within two months. Shortly thereafter, however, the MIT revised its decision and re-accredited Brewer. Rosendorf, who is primarily concerned with the successful Spanish PR campaign in the US, argues that the massive negative press coverage of the episode in the US caused the MIT to reconsider. Rosendorf further presents this episode as a brief and very counter-productive relapse in the regime’s successful attempt overall to improve its foreign image after 1945 and that ‘Francisco Franco was determined never to repeat... this mistake’ 979. Indeed, according to Rosendorf, ‘the Franco regime would never again harass foreign correspondents’ 980.

Rosendorf based this conclusion exclusively on a book written by one of Brewer’s successors as The New York Times correspondent in Madrid, Benjamin Welles. 981 Welles worked from 1956 until 1962 in Spain. We remember from Chapter 1 that Welles was surprised to work free of direct censorship in Spain. He also stressed that he never was

978 Rosendorf, Franco Sells Spain to America, 93.
979 Ibid., 94.
980 Ibid., 94.
981 Ibid., 94
‘summoned to the Foreign, the Information, or any other ministry to be upbraided, threatened, or pressured.  

For Rosendorf, therefore, the Franco regime’s interest in the improvement of its foreign reputation far outweighed the temptation to use harsh means against too critical foreign journalists. This chapter shows, however, that the actual policy of the Franco regime was far less stringent. While it became particularly careful with the correspondents of the influential The New York Times, the Francoist authorities continued to sanction foreign journalists - including US correspondents - until the end of the dictatorship using a variety of means. Furthermore, besides expelling correspondents and withdrawing their accreditations, the Francoist authorities also made use of an entire tool kit of measures to control the foreign press corps in Spain. This included, among others, threats, public campaigns against particular journalists, surveillance and the attempt to use diplomatic channels. Besides such sanctions, buying sympathy for the Franco regime through bribery also played a role. 

Although the Francoist authorities did not learn as fast as Rosendorf suggests, learn they did nevertheless. Therefore, this chapter examines how the policy of the Franco regime towards foreign correspondents changed from the 1950s together with Spain’s return onto the international stage. 

The chapter has four sections. The first three sections address the Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign press corps as it evolved over time. The last section assesses to what extent the regime’s policy had any actual impact on the behaviour of foreign correspondents in Spain and their attitude towards the Franco regime.

From international isolation to the ministry of Manuel Fraga 

This thesis has already shown that the policy towards the foreign press was a sensitive issue for the Franco regime after the end of the Second World War. Spain desperately tried, under the leadership of the newly appointed Foreign Minister Martin Artajo, to repair its international reputation. The adaption of the policy towards the foreign press corps was an integral part of this strategy. This became visible in the end of the pre-censorship of foreign

\[982\] Welles, Spain. The gentle Anarchy, 92-93.
correspondents and the first attempts to install an international press club in 1945 as well as the subsequent liberalization of the distribution of foreign publications.

At the same time, however, the Foreign Ministry under Artajo found itself in a constant competence struggle with the newly founded Ministry for National Education and its Directorate General for the Press. The DG for the Press was less willing to accept this new approach towards the foreign press. This conflict of interest became particularly evident once the regime’s attempt to avoid its ostracization by the Allies had failed. Thereby, Artajo had lost the central argument in order to implement a less strict policy towards the foreign press corps. In 1947, the Ministry for National Education expelled a number of correspondents from Allied countries from Spain due to their critical reporting despite the negative consequences for the regime’s attempts to improve its international reputation. Most notably, the DG for the Press withdrew the accreditation of the AFP correspondent Raymond Hubert because of his alleged false reports in March 1947. This resulted in official complaints by French diplomats. Only a month later, the DG for the Press even cancelled the accreditation of a US correspondent, thus demonstrating that the Francoist authorities still had its difficulties with the new policy of non-censorship for correspondents. Similarly, after intercepting a telegram from the New York Post correspondent Francis E. McMahon to his newspaper, the DG for the Press immediately withdrew the journalist’s credentials. Although the DG for the Press did not expel McMahon from Spain, without his accreditation he was no longer able to send telegrams or communicate with his paper through official channels. Only fully accredited correspondents could send their reports through the Spanish telecommunication facilities.

The particular case of McMahon not only led to reports in major publications such as The New York Times, but also to the further worsening of the diplomatic relations with the US. Indeed, the case resulted in a lengthy exchange of letters between the US Chargé d'affaires in Madrid and the man who had worked so hard for the improvement of relations with the US, Foreign Minister Artajo. Artajo, however, was in this case only the intermediary. What made the case even more difficult was that McMahon, who was actually a philosophy professor on leave for his journalistic activities, was also (although with strongly liberal

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983 AGA, (03)049.021, 58.366, Folder Raymond Hubert: Gobierno de la República Francesa, Delegación en España to Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 29 March 1947.
views) an outspoken Catholic and well known in the US. Although Artajo sent a lengthy reply to the American embassy in which he defended the decision of his fellow minister, he also dedicated a part of letter to assure the US administration that the withdrawal of McMahon’s credentials would not mean ‘any rectification in the firm and proven criterion which the Spanish Government maintains to assure without any censorship or control complete liberty of behaviour for foreign correspondents duly accredited in Spain.’

That the Foreign Ministry was indeed not pleased with the decision of its colleagues in the Ministry for National Education became clear when the UP called the foreign ministry’s Office for Diplomatic Information a few days later. The OID simply answered to the demand for an official statement on the matter that ‘they don’t have anything to say on this since this is a matter of the DG [for the press].’

The policy towards the foreign press corps remained an issue between the two ministries and its responsible sub-departments. Following the diplomatic frictions after the withdrawal McMahon’s accreditation, however, Artajo’s influence was once more strengthened and other correspondents were expelled until 1951. Nevertheless, the DG for the Press still tried to keep the foreign press corps in line. One of the measures taken was that the DG for the Press simply refused to give accreditations to correspondents it considered as problematic. This policy, which the Francoist authorities continued to use, aimed at avoiding too critical correspondents and the need to expel them later on. The most noticeable case of a correspondent whose application for an accreditation was refused was the previously mentioned French correspondent André Monconduit in 1950.

The previous chapter has already shown that Monconduit became, as correspondent of *Le Monde*, of great importance for dissidents within the regime and Calvo Serer in particular. The French journalist, however, was an ambiguous figure and had a complicated relationship with the Franco regime. According to Onésimo Díaz Hernández, Monconduit was ‘profoundly Catholic, anti-communist and anti-liberal.’ A former member of the right wing, monarchist and Catholic Action française, Monconduit had later joined Jacques Doriot’s pro-fascist French Popular Party (Parti populaire français) and held official posts.

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989 Díaz Hernández, *Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo Arbor*, 213, Footnote 120.
in the Vichy regime. After the Allied victory, Monconduit went, like other member of the Vichy regime, to Francoist Spain and started work as correspondent for the French publications *Nuit et Jour* and *La Revue Française*. In accordance with his political and ideological convictions, Monconduit was initially sympathetic towards the Franco regime. French diplomats reported that Monconduit actively contributed to the Franco regime’s attempts to improve its foreign image.

Monconduit developed and intensified his ties with monarchist and Catholic circles and with the influential Opus Dei member Calvo Serer during these years. At the same time, Monconduit’s reports on the Franco regime became increasingly critical. This became apparent, for instance, in the context of the referendum for the Law of Succession, which the Francoist authorities held in July 1947. Aimed at both weakening the monarchist opposition within Spain as well as further improving the regime’s foreign image, the referendum established Spain as a kingdom without, however, practical consequences on the regime’s structures. Monconduit reported that ‘enthusiasm for the referendum was false’ and that under free conditions the Spanish people would have voted ‘no’. In other articles, the journalist criticized the Falange and highlighted the regime’s oppression of critical voices. In light of the journalist’s past and much to the surprise of the French diplomatic representatives in Madrid, Monconduit became, with the support of his Catholic contacts, Spain correspondent for the left-liberal *Le Monde* in 1950. Against the background of his previous criticism of the Franco regime, the DG for the Press viewed Monconduit’s future reports for the widely distributed *Le Monde* with great concern.

990 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Notas generales sobre André Monconduit, 27 February 1964; See also Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Nantes (henceforth CADN), 396 PO/F/334, Folder Jean Creach: Untitled note on Jean Creach; See also Díaz Hernández, Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo Arbor, 213, Footnote 120.
992 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Notas biograficás de André Monconduit, April 1964 [unsigned, undated].
993 CAD Nantes, 396 PO/F/334, Folder Jean Creach: Untitled biographical report on Jean Creach [unsigned and undated. Since the note is followed by various reports from the French embassy in Madrid, it seems likely that also this report was written by French diplomats].
994 Díaz Hernández, Rafael Calvo Serer y el grupo Arbor, 212-213.
995 Tusell, Spain: From dictatorship to democracy, 62.
996 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Notas biograficás de André Monconduit, includes quotes from *Nuit et Jour* 9 July 1947, April 1964 [unsigned, undated].
997 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Notas biograficás de André Monconduit, includes quotes from articles by Monconduit 1947-50, April 1964 [unsigned, undated].
999 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Untitled biographical report on André Monconduit, 18 March 1964 [unsigned].
Consequently, the DG for the Press denied Monconduit’s accreditation despite the weak position of the still internationally isolated Spain in 1950.\textsuperscript{1000} It was only after repeated interventions by the Foreign Ministry’s OID and embassy in Madrid that Monconduit was eventually accredited in the following year.\textsuperscript{1001}

The Francoist press authority’s willingness to lean hard on correspondents despite the Foreign Ministry’s interest to improve the international perception of the regime became even more visible in the case of Brewer. In April 1951, the DG for the Press cancelled Brewer’s accreditation because of the journalist’s ‘insidious campaigns often incompatible with the truth and the dignity of our country’\textsuperscript{1002}. Brewer himself explained that the Franco regime ‘apparently thought it safe to get tough with U.S. correspondents’\textsuperscript{1003} in 1951. By that time, Spain had started to overcome her international isolation. In the end of 1950, the US had granted desperately needed economic help to Spain and the UN had lifted its ban on Spain. The US resumed diplomatic relations with Spain in 1951.

However, the Franco regime was still far from having overcome its international pariah status. It would be another two years before the signing of the Madrid treaty with the US in 1953, which further boosted the Franco regime’s international standing, secured its economic survival. The timing of the withdrawal of the influential left-liberal The New York Times’ correspondent’s accreditation, therefore, was hardly in the interests of Artajo’s continued attempts to improve Spain’s international reputation. And, as Rosendorf outlines, the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation certainly did hard harm Spain’s reputation with a ‘torrent of negative coverage in the American press’\textsuperscript{1004}.

The consequences of the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation hardly could have come as a surprise for the Francoist authorities. The reactions to the above discussed cancellation of McMahon’s credentials were similar. The question, therefore, remains why the DG for the Press had still decided to take actions against Brewer - a decision which still puzzled Spanish diplomats more than a decade later.\textsuperscript{1005}

\textsuperscript{1000} AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Notas biograficás de André Monconduit, April 1964 [unsigned, undated].
\textsuperscript{1001} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1002} AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.773, Folder Samuel Brewer: Director General de Prensa to Oficina de Información Diplomática, 17.4.1951
\textsuperscript{1003} Quoted in: Rosendorf, Franco Sells Spain to America, 94.
\textsuperscript{1004} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1005} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Vicente de la Serna to Subdirector Oficina de Información Diplomática, 3 March 1965.
The DG for the Press certainly disliked Brewer’ writings reports about Spain. The multi-angled strategy employed by the DG for the Press to counter Brewer’s reports also give an impression of the variety of means that the Francoist authorities used to cope with critical correspondents at the beginning of the 1950s. In order to limit Brewer’s influence on other correspondents, the DG for the Press issued communiques that gave the official Spanish view on Brewer’s reports and distributed them within the foreign press corps in Spain. At the same time, Spanish newspapers such as ABC, concerned about the impact of Brewer’s report on the upcoming UN vote on Spain in 1950, printed attacks on both Brewer and The New York Times. These internal measures were externally accompanied by frequent demands for corrections, which the Spanish Chargé d'affaires in the US sent to The New York Times’s office. These measures, however, had no effect. Cyros Leo Sulzberger, The New York Times’ chief foreign correspondent in Paris, outlined in a letter to his uncle, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the publisher of the newspaper, that the Spanish complaints were a sign ‘that Sam is doing a good job’.

In short, the Francoist authorities did everything short of actually expelling Brewer altogether. That the DG for the Press eventually used this available last means indeed reflected the changed diplomatic situation for Spain in the beginning of 1951, although only partly for political reasons. The newly appointed US ambassador Griffis disliked Brewer personally due to some previous conflicts with the correspondent. At the end of 1950, C.L. Sulzberger stressed that Griffis’ appointment as potentially problematic for Brewer’s position in Spain. Indeed, Griffis called the publisher of The New York Times a few days after his appointment and asked for the Brewer’s transfer. Griffis received a negative answer, together with the warning that ‘even if I [A. H. Sulzberger] wished to order Brewer away, which I don’t, it would create a feeling against him, Griffis, which I thought was very undesirable’. A. H. Sulzberger and C. L. Sulzberger had already agreed in advance that Brewer would remain in Spain. The Franco regime would interpret Brewer’s transfer, so C. L. Sulzberger argued, ‘as a change in policy in the New York Times towards the

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1006 José M. Massip, “La serena actitud Española ante la votación de la O.N.U es destacado por la Prensa Inglesa,” ABC, 8 November 1950, 12.
1007 NYPL MAD, MssCol 17792, Box 12 Folder 1: Memo from Sam Pope Brewer to Cyros Leo Sulzberger, 14 June 1950.
1008 NYPL MAD, MssCol 17782, Box 243 Folder 16: Cyros Leo Sulzberger to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, 23 November 1950.
1009 NYPL MAD, MssCol 17782, Box 243 Folder 16: Cyros Leo Sulzberger to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, 30 January 1951.
Franco regime. Creating such an impression was for the chief foreign correspondent - who himself met Franco for an interview in 1959 - not in the interest of the newspaper:

‘No New York Times correspondent who does a good job will ever [sic] please the Franco regime.’

Against this background, the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation aroused in A. H. Sulzberger ‘a little bit of the feeling that it was Griffis and not Franco that was basically responsible’. The timing, so shortly after Griffis appointment, indeed was peculiar and both The New York Times and the US embassy in Spain concluded that the ‘decree against Brewer was not occasioned by any particular story and is aimed at the New York Times as well as Brewer personally’. Furthermore, the Francoist authorities were very well aware about Griffis’ history with Brewer. The US correspondent Edward Knoblaugh, a well-known correspondent who covered the Spanish Civil War, had outlined to the head of the Section for Foreign Press personal conflicts between Brewer and the new ambassador, including Griffis’ own attempt to have Brewer transferred. These circumstances, therefore, strongly suggest that the DG for the Press took advantage of the situation and hoped that Griffis’ dislike of Brewer would make the expulsion of Brewer acceptable without too much harm to the regime’s relations with the US.

Griffis, seemingly hopeful that the Francoist authorities’ decision to cancel Brewer’s accreditation would be the solution to his problem with the correspondent, shortly thereafter asked A. H. Sulzberger ‘what the attitude of the New York Times was in case the Spanish Government should suggest that they would not reaccredit Brewer, but would accept another correspondent’. The attitude of The New York Times had not changed and the newspaper publisher pointed out that it ‘will never permit a foreign government to name our correspondent for us’ and ‘that the correspondent we had named in Madrid was

1011 NYPL MAD, MssCol 17782, Box 243 Folder 16: Cyrus Leo Sulzberger to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, 30 January 1951.
1013 NYPL MAD, MssCol 17782, Box 243 Folder 16: Cyrus Leo Sulzberger to A.H. Sulzberger, 30 January 1951.
1014 NYPL MAD, MssCol 17782, Box 243 Folder 16: Arthur Hays Sulzberger to Edwin L. James, 27 April 1951.
1015 NYPL MAD, MssCol 17782, Box 243 Folder 16: Arthur Hays Sulzberger to Edwin L. James, 23 April 1951.
1016 AGA (03) 049. 021. 58.362, Folder Edward Knoblaugh: Conversación celebrada a las 19 horas del 1 de Abril de 1951, entre el corresponsal de la I.N.S.; Edward Knoblaugh, y el Jefe de la Sección de prensa extranjera, 21 April 1951.
1017 NYPL MAD, MssCol 17782, Box 243 Folder 16: Arthur Hays Sulzberger to Edwin L. James, 23 April 1951.
A. H. Sulzberger also pointed out to Griffis that if Brewer’s credentials were not reinstated, *The New York Times* would send no new correspondent to Spain and that Spain’s image in the newspaper would not improve. At the same time, *The New York Times* also made its point of view clear to the US State Department by demanding to ‘apply more heat’ to the Francoist authorities. Eventually, this left Griffis with little other choice than to protest against the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation. Following this diplomatic pressure, the Francoist authorities soon gave in. After the Spanish government had even discussed the matter in cabinet meeting, the DG for the Press quietly reinstated Brewer’s credentials without officially revoking its decision, a procedure to which Brewer had also agreed. *The New York Times*, therefore, won its battle. However, the newspaper did not keep its correspondent in Spain for long. At the end of 1951, it replaced Brewer with the similarly critical Camille Cianfarra. A.H. Sulzberger had already discussed this solution to the problem between Brewer and Griffis - to transfer the correspondent at a later point in time - before. First, however, *The New York Times* wanted to make its point clear, which it certainly succeeded in doing.

The case of the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation, therefore, was far more complex than Rosendorf is aware of. Besides the involvement of Griffis, it is particularly important to note that the Francoist authorities did not reinstate Brewer’s credentials because of bad PR in the US, but because of diplomatic interventions. In the end, the DG for the Press had no reason to hope that the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation would in result in a more positive attitude of *The New York Times* towards Spain. Instead, the decision was a thoroughly failed attempt by the Franco regime to show strength with regard to critical correspondents.

Following this experience with the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation, the Francoist authorities refrained, though only temporarily, from further direct actions against foreign journalists. In 1951, the Ministry of Information and Tourism under the Falangist Arias-
Salgado attempted to smooth relations with the foreign press corps. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the first attempt to create an international press club was a reflection of this change. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry tried to use the opportunity of the MIT’s creation to enhance again its influence over the policy towards the foreign press corps. Indeed, Monconduit’s eventual accreditation was mainly a success of the Foreign Ministry in the end of 1951.

However, neither the experience with the cancellation of Brewer’s accreditation nor these administrative reforms resulted in a fundamental change of regime’s attitude towards the foreign press corps. Chapter 1 has already shown that the MIT’s personnel gave little reason to expect a more liberal attitude towards the foreign press. The new DG for the Press, Juan Aparicio, had already held the same post in the highly restrictive and Falange controlled VSEP (see Chapter 1). At the same time, Arias-Salgado’s MIT was also not willing to give up its competences over the foreign press. Although the new ministry initially remained careful to not directly sanction foreign correspondents, other means of control such as the surveillance of the communication of foreign journalists, remained intact. In 1952, the new correspondent of The New York Times, Camille Cinafarra, complained to his foreign editor about the constant ‘tampering with my mail’ by the Francoist authorities. The MIT used other methods that were more direct in order to keep the correspondents. Cianfarra, for instance, reported to his foreign editor that he was summoned by Aparicio after the publication of critical articles, a practice which was also continued by the MIT throughout the following decades.

The MIT, however, did not restrain itself to such soft means of control for long. Following the signing of the Madrid agreement with the US in 1953, the Francoist authorities seemingly felt secure enough to once again lean hard on correspondents in Spain. Not even two years after the journalist’s eventual accreditation for Le Monde, the DG for the Press not only cancelled the accreditation of the correspondent Monconduit, but fully expelled him from Spain. The DG for the Press justified its decision with Monconduit’s ‘constant tendentious intervention in Spain’s internal affairs’. As we have seen in the previous

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1024 NYPL-MAD, MssCol 17792, Box 19 Folder 3: Camille Cinafarra to Emanuel R. Freedman, 17 April 1952. This control of the correspondent’s mail continued throughout the following years. See NYPL-MAD, MssCol 17792, Box 19 Folder 3: Camille Cinafarra to Emanuel R Freedman, 15 January 1954.

1025 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Jefe Sección de Prensa Extranjera to Director General de Prensa, 30 October 1953.
chapter, the actual background of Monconduit’s expulsion was the correspondent’s close ties with regime critics and with Calvo Serer in particular.

The previous chapter has also shown that Le Monde was less protective about this correspondent than The New York Times was with Brewer. While negative press coverage accompanied the expulsion, the left-liberal newspaper let the Vichy collaborator Monconduit go in order to secure Le Monde’s further distribution in Spain. While the expulsion of Monconduit therefore initially seemed to be a success for the Francoist authorities, it soon turned into a diplomatic disaster. In contrast to Le Monde, the French Foreign Ministry was less willing to accept the expulsion of a French correspondent by the Franco regime. It reacted by choosing the Spanish newspaper which ‘would suffer the most from the absence of a correspondent in Paris’1026, the widely distributed ABC, and expelled its correspondent, Pedro Roca, from France.

This diplomatic intervention was hardly in the interest of Spain’s foreign policy towards France, which was ‘one of the strongest supporters of Spain’s international ostracization’1027 after 1945. Against the background of the Spanish-US rapprochement from the beginning of the 1950s, however, the attitude of the French government towards Spain also started to change. In the context of the Madrid Pacts with the US in 1953, the French government even started to discuss the lifting of its ban on arms sales to Spain, which it eventually did in 1955.1028 The expulsion of the correspondent of the important Le Monde in this still sensitive time of Spain’s relations with its northern neighbour was therefore a particular delicate matter. For the Francoist authorities, however, it was seemingly a necessary step. Too close were Monconduit’s ties with the Tercera Fuerza, the moderate critics from within the regime around the Opus Dei member Calvo Serer. Calvo Serer wanted to secure the regime’s survival by excluding representatives of the Falange as well as Catholics such as Artajo from the government.1029 Monconduit’s expulsion, therefore, was part of an internal power struggle and also in the interest of the Foreign Ministry.

1026 CADN, 396PO/F/44/431: L’ambassadeur de France en Espagne au ministère des affaires étrangères français, 14 November 1953. See also AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Expulsion de Creach y represalia contra Rocamora [undated].
1028 Ibid., 441.
His expulsion in 1953, however, was not the end of Monconduit’s journalistic career in Francoist Spain. Two years after the strengthening of the Opus Dei in the new government of 1957, his close ties to Opus Dei helped him to become accredited as correspondent for the French journal *Combat*.  

Monconduit’s expulsion in 1953 remained the last time that the Francoist authorities expelled a correspondent until the 1960s. This did not exclude, of course, the continued practice of other means of control such as (often only temporary) withdrawals or denial of accreditations. In these cases, however, the Foreign Ministry and the OID soon intervened for the sake of Spain’s foreign relations. When, for instance, the correspondent of the magazine *Time*, John Blake, faced problems in gaining an accreditation in 1956, José María Areilza, by then Spanish ambassador to the US, intervened. Areilza outlined to the MIT that although *Time* was not at all in favour of Francoist Spain, the non-accreditation of its correspondent ‘in the end does not serve our political interest’. Not only was *Time* extraordinarily ‘influential abroad and in certain powerful sectors of the American public, above all in the Republican circle’, but its owner, Henry Luce, and his wife, Clare Boothe-Luce, herself US ambassador to Rome under the Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, had close personal ties to the White House. The MIT accredited Blake immediately thereafter.

In 1955, DG for the Press Aparicio also tried to keep the foreign press corps under control by renewing a number of accreditations for shorter periods than the usual six months. To the surprise of the Spanish ambassador in Bonn, the DG for the Press not only applied this measure to critical voices such as *The New York Times* correspondent Cianfarra, but also the regime friendly and highly influential Heinz Barth. Lehmann, who discusses this incident exclusively in German diplomatic sources, shows that not only the Spanish ambassador, but also the German embassy in Spain was very much surprised about this decision. In the opinion of the German diplomats, Barth’s generally favourable reports about the Franco regime had given little reason for this sanction. Instead, Lehmann argues that Barth’s closeness to the Falange partly contributed to the shortening of Barth’s

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1030 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder André Monconduit: Notas generales sobre André Monconduit (Pseudonym Jean Creach), 27 February 1964.
1032 Ibid.
1033 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores to Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 13 June 1955.
accreditation by the DG for the Press. Barth not only maintained close relations with the Falange during his time as a journalist in Spain before 1945 but the Falange also had helped Barth by employing him in their press department after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Against this background, the Falangist Aparicio, who was also in charge of the foreign press in the VSEP, seemingly expected even more loyalty from Barth than the correspondent had already shown and reacted strongly to any form of slight criticism in Barth’s reports. Besides the reports from the Germany embassy, which Lemann quotes, a report by Aparicio to the Minister of Information and Tourism also support this interpretation. Lehmann further argues that Aparicio also might have tried to use the rivalry among the German correspondents in order to improve the general reporting about Spain by weakening Barth’s extraordinarily strong position.

Barth himself reacted, as the Spanish ambassador in Bonn reported, by threatening to move to Portugal and report on Spain from there. The Spanish ambassador therefore strongly argued for the revision of this sanction against Barth, whom he considered ‘of great help for us’ in Germany. Lehmann stresses that the Spanish Foreign Ministry also let the German diplomats directly know that it considered this action of the MIT as ‘idiotic and stupid’. This evaluation, very strongly reflected the two ministries’ different approaches towards the foreign press. Eventually, and following official interventions by the German embassy, the MIT also reversed this decision.

Besides sanctions against correspondents, the MIT also actively tried to improve the Franco regime’s foreign image through ‘softer’ means. Spain’s external PR campaigns, which Rosendorf has examined in the case of the US, also included the employment of foreign journalists. The Spanish embassy in Washington, for instance, employed in the 1950s the former Time journalist Anatole Visson as public relations officer. Visson used his media contacts in order to get positive news coverage about Spain. But also within Spain, the MIT tried to use foreign correspondents for its PR.

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1035 Ibid.
1036 Ibid., 89.
1037 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Director General de Prensa to Ministro de Información y Turismo, 20 June 1955.
1038 Lehmann, Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren, 89.
1039 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores to Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 13 June 1955 [Report on telegram from Spanish ambassador in Bonn].
1040 Quoted in Lehmann, Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren, 89.
1041 Ibid.
1042 In 1954, Visson, for instance, contacted The New York Times with the suggestion to not only publish regime critical reports, but occasionally also ‘on something good [that surely also] must be happening in
Previously, the Francoist authorities were notoriously uncommunicative towards the foreign press, a fact Henry Buckley had complained about to the OID at the beginning of the 1950s. The Foreign Ministry tried to change this and regime friendly correspondents like Barth ‘entered and left the […] [OID] like his own home’\(^{1043}\) in order gain information. In 1954, the MIT also decided to improve its information policy towards the foreign press by creating an information office within the Section for Foreign Press.\(^{1044}\) The success of this attempt to channel pre-selected information to the foreign press corps, however, was limited. Neither Görtz nor Herrmann, who were already in Spain from the beginning of the 1960s, recalled using the MIT’s information office.\(^{1045}\) Nevertheless, this was a change in the MIT’s information policy.

The MIT under Arias-Salagdo did not stop at providing correspondents with material designed to improve Spain’s image. The Francoist authorities also set out to financially incentivize correspondents to report more positively on Spain in ways that went beyond the already existing privileges that came with accreditation status. Lehmann quotes from a German embassy report from 1955, which states that the MIT provides some correspondents with certain ‘advantages – according to reliable, although not provable information even of a financial nature’\(^{1046}\). In his discussion of the sanction against Barth, Lehmann connects the granting of these ‘advantages’ to the MIT’s general attempt to use the competition among German correspondents for the purposes of the regime by favouring some correspondents over others. While this might have played a role for the German press corps, it is more likely that bribes were generally part of the Francoist policy towards the foreign press. Due to the lack of further documentary evidence and interviews with correspondents who were already in Spain at this time, the extent to which the MIT bribed correspondents remains difficult to examine for the 1950s. The continued use of bribes under Fraga during the 1960s, which the next section will examine, suggests nevertheless that this was indeed a well-established part of the MIT’s policy towards the foreign press corps.

\(^{1043}\) AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.769, Folder Heinz Barth: Untitled and unsigned report on Heinz Barth, 31 July 1955.

\(^{1044}\) Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling; Lehmann, \textit{Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren}, 88.

\(^{1045}\) Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling; Rolf Görtz, interview by Tobias Reckling.

\(^{1046}\) Quoted in: Lehmann, \textit{Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren}, 89.
The situation for the foreign press further improved after the governmental reshuffle in 1957. Both the Foreign Minister Castiella and the Opus Dei technocrats in the new government ‘worked hard to streamline the political image of the dictatorship’\textsuperscript{1047}. Arias-Salgado increasingly came under pressure for his restrictive press policy.\textsuperscript{1048} It was this context that Arias-Salgado and its new DG for the Press, Adolfo Muñoz Alonso, whom Aparicio was replaced by in 1958, allowed the creation of the two associations for foreign correspondents, first the ACPE and then the ACPI. That Arias-Salgado was indeed able to follow a different approach towards the foreign press when it directly served the regime’s purposes became visible in 1959. When the Republican US President Eisenhower, under whom Spanish-US relations strongly improved, visited Madrid as part of his world tour, the MIT’s DG for the Press in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry’s OID managed the foreign press ‘extremely well’ according to Welles:

several dozen American correspondents were travelling with him, and at least a hundred American, European, African, and Asian reporters arrived to cover the visit. To everyone’s surprise, the regime organized press facilities with remarkable efficiency. […] A press room was set up in the Castellana Hilton hotel, extra telex and telephone links were specially installed. Typewriters, paper, and desks were provided, press stickers for correspondents’ automobiles were printed. Eisenhower’s quarters at the Moncloa Palace were opened for inspection; even television and newsreel trucks were included for the arrival. Every facility that the press might need was there.\textsuperscript{1049}

The Franco regime, for which the personal visit of the US President marked a boost in its international recognition, turned Eisenhower’s stay into a propaganda coup. Even Franco himself, as C.L. Sulzberger recalls, kept a signed photograph of Eisenhower in his study.\textsuperscript{1050} Welles, however, further highlights that this attention for the foreign press was very short-lived. ‘The next day, Eisenhower flew away and the honeymoon was over. The facilities ended and the press was back where it started. The Spanish performance was brilliant – for one day.’\textsuperscript{1051} Arias-Salgado also continued to sanction correspondents during his last years in office. Against the background of the attention the Franco regime gave to its relations with the US, it is remarkable that the MIT decided once more to lean hard on a US correspondent. In April 1962, and despite the journalist’s many years in Spain, the DG for the Press refused the accreditation of the US correspondent Richard S. Mowrer. Welles, on whom Rosendorf bases his conclusion that the Francoist authorities never again sanctioned

\textsuperscript{1047} Paul Preston, “Populism and parasitism: the Falange and the Spanish establishment, 1939–75,” 141.
\textsuperscript{1048} Welles, Spain. The gentle Anarchy, 93.
\textsuperscript{1049} Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{1050} Sulzberger, The last of the giants, 532.
\textsuperscript{1051} Welles, Spain. The gentle Anarchy, 93.
any correspondent after Brewer, does not mention the case of Mowrer although he still was in Spain at this time.

For the MIT, Mowrer’s articles were ‘characterized at all times by his open hostility towards the Spanish regime (which he constantly describes as Franco dictatorship)’\textsuperscript{1052}. In particular, the MIT was concerned about ‘reputational threats’\textsuperscript{1053} resulting from Mowrer’s frequent reports on a particularly sensitive issue in Spanish politics: the situation regarding religious minorities, namely Protestants and Jews, in Catholic Spain. Because of the dominant role of Protestantism in public and political life, this was a particular sensitive issue in the US, but also in Europe. Rosendorf highlights that the discrimination of these groups in Spain ‘incensed co-religionists and a broad swath of liberals in America, which resulted in an ongoing barrage of US secular and religious media invective and political activism’\textsuperscript{1054}. Mowrer, who officially was accredited for the Boston-based \textit{Christian Science Monitor} but distributed his articles as a freelancer to a wide network of media (discussed in Chapter 4), not only kept these debates alive by continuously addressing the topic\textsuperscript{1055} but also informed other US correspondents to the situation of Jews and Protestants in Spain. In the opinion of the MIT, the ‘anti-Spanish’ articles of Cinafarra in \textit{The New York Times} especially ‘were not in few cases inspired by Mowrer\textsuperscript{1056} during the 1950s.

Rosendorf shows that, under the new Foreign Minister ‘who brought with him the conviction that these oppressive policies were both substantively wrong and inimical to Spain’s international reputation and goals’\textsuperscript{1057}, Spain started to change its policy towards religious minorities. Not renewing Mowrer’s accreditation was unlikely to solve the problem and actually made it worse. Mowrer in particular was not only an important correspondent, but was from the offspring of a famous family of journalists. Any action against him by the Francoist authorities was therefore likely to result in a strong media echo

\textsuperscript{1052} AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Report on Richard S. Mowrer, 07 February 1966 [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.]
\textsuperscript{1053} On the importance of the Franco regime’s religious policy for Spain’s perception in the US see Rosendorf, \textit{Franco Sells Spain to America}, 119.
\textsuperscript{1054} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1055} AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Report on the foreign correspondent Richard S. Mowrer, 07.02.1966 [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.] Rosendorf also refers various times to Mowrer’s articles. See Rosendorf, \textit{Franco Sells Spain to America}, 119.
\textsuperscript{1056} AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Report on the foreign correspondent Richard S. Mowrer, 07 February 1966 [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.]
\textsuperscript{1057} Rosendorf, \textit{Franco Sells Spain to America}, 119.
in the US. The Spanish ambassador to the US therefore asked the MIT for the immediate reversal of its decision, which it did.\textsuperscript{1058} That the MIT under Arias-Salgado was willing to sanction a correspondent like Mowrer despite harming Castiella’s foreign policy strategy must be seen at least partly against the background of the difficult personal relations between the two ministers. According to Cianfarra’s successor as The New York Times’ correspondent, Benjamin Welles, Arias-Salgado’s ‘morbid jealousy of Foreign Minister Castiella was […] proverbial. Foreign press criticism of Spain by Arias’ minions and rushed daily to Franco to demonstrate the alleged incompetence of Castiellas’s diplomats\textsuperscript{1059}. The situation, however, was solved shortly after Mowrer’s sanction with the appointment of Fraga as new Minister of Information and Tourism.

**Manuel Fraga and the Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1962-1969**

The previous chapters have frequently stressed that Fraga tried hard to improve Spain’s international image during the 1960s. The foreign press became instrumental to this purpose. This resulted in his massive external PR campaigns which Rosendorf examines thoroughly for the US and Gienow-Hecht and Fischer briefly for Germany.\textsuperscript{1060} The regime’s external PR policy included the hiring of foreign PR firms, the production of specialized print media for foreign audiences such as the Spanish Newsletter in the US (published 1962-1972),\textsuperscript{1061} and the invitation of tourism journalists to Spain. Gienow-Hecht and Fischer show that the Franco regime saw the invitation of journalists as a ‘relatively expensive, but extremely effective measure’\textsuperscript{1062} for the improvement of the Franco regime’s image through its promotion as a tourist destination. The importance of tourism as both a means and an end for Fraga’s external PR strategy was, as Gienow-Hecht and Fischer further highlight, reflected in the creation of a National Tourism Award for Foreign Journalists in 1962. For journalists outside of Spain, the award came with a trip to Spain,

\textsuperscript{1058} AGA (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Untitled report on the foreign correspondent Richard S. Mowrer, 07 February 1966 [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.]

\textsuperscript{1059} Welles, Spain. The gentle Anarchy, 91

\textsuperscript{1060} Rosendorf, *Franco Sells Spain to America*; Gienow-Hecht and Fischer, “Was ist und wozu braucht man «Nation Branding»?”

\textsuperscript{1061} Rosendorf, *Franco Sells Spain to America*, 87-93.

\textsuperscript{1062} Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Carolin Fischer, “‘Was ist und wozu braucht man «Nation Branding»?” [quoted from manuscript of the yet unpublished book chapter with the permission of Jessica Gienow-Hecht from 19 March 2016].

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while correspondents already working in the Franco regime received 50,000 pesetas. Furthermore, the new Minister of Information and Tourism also tried to improve relations with foreign media on a personal level. Following a round trip through the US after the opening of the World Fair in 1964, the new Minister of Information and Tourism met almost daily with chief editors of major US media such as Newsweek, The New York Times, Washington Post, NBC and the Chicago Tribune. Even Franco himself joined the Spanish PR efforts by giving a TV interview to the US broadcaster CBS in 1963.

In the examination of the International Press Club, Chapter 2 has already shown that the foreign press corps within Spain were included in Fraga’s PR campaign. Fraga, however, also implemented more general policy changes in the regime’s relations with the foreign press. On the surface, Fraga’s policy towards the foreign press was more attentive and cooperative than the approach of his predecessors. Shortly after his appointment and, as Benjamin Welles remembered, ‘to the astonishment of the many foreign journalists whom Arias had shunned’, Fraga invited correspondents of major foreign media to dinner. He announced to the correspondents that ‘we respect the information you send to your newspapers [...]. We believe that you will be able to objectively report what the Movement has done, is doing, and hopes to do’. That the new minister and his new personnel, with which he replaced Arias-Salgado’s staff, would implement a new approach became visible for the correspondents early on in his information policy. Henry F. Schulte, from 1956 to 1962 bureau chief of UPI in Spain, describes this departure from the previous information policy in his book on the history of the Spanish press:

Under the direction of Fraga, Ministry of Information personnel cooperated more with foreign correspondents, providing information that would have been unavailable during the period when Arias-Salgado was director. Fraga himself held regular press conferences and took over some of the responsibilities of government spokesman, a role ignored by his predecessor.

The CIP became central to this changed information policy. Chapter 2 has shown that besides Fraga himself, other high-ranking Francoist officials also gave frequent press conferences in the CIP.

1063 Ibid.
1066 Welles, Spain. The gentle Anarchy, 98
1067 Ibid.
1068 Ibid.
However, Fraga’s new information policy had rather strict limits and did not go beyond the means it served: the improvement of the Franco regime’s foreign image. Critical questions were therefore not welcome. The correspondents soon learned this lesson as well as the fact that Fraga was far less liberal that his self-promoted image when away from the wider public. Welles highlights that ‘despite the cooperation of the Ministry personnel and his own accessibility, Fraga’s attempts at working closely with the foreign press were not completely successful’\textsuperscript{1070}. Fraga, according to the correspondent Édouard de Blaye, was infamous for his ‘unpredictable access to fury’\textsuperscript{1071} and reacted harshly to unwanted questions. Influential correspondents such as Harold Milks (AP) and Pierre Brisard (AFP) soon started to refuse to attend Fraga’s briefings because, as Milks explained in an interview to Schulte, ‘we are insulted if we ask a pertinent question’\textsuperscript{1072}.

Nevertheless, Fraga’s approach in the field of official informational policy still did mark a change in the regime’s attitude towards the foreign press. The MIT accompanied these changes with the continuation of already previously established measures for the improvement of the correspondent’s attitude towards Spain, namely the bribing of foreign journalists. Several of the correspondents interviewed pointed out that the regime granted financial or other material favours to certain correspondents.\textsuperscript{1073} The Dutch correspondent Kees van Bemmelen even had the ultimately unrealized plan to ‘write a book about certain correspondents who accepted apartments or envelopes in exchange for favouring Franquism’\textsuperscript{1074}. A common bribery was, for instance, to offer the correspondents apartments in Madrid or elsewhere at a reduced price. Haubrich, for instance, recalled a visit by Spanish officials shortly after his arrival in Spain, who offered him a ‘very affordable’\textsuperscript{1075} holiday apartment.

None of the interviewed correspondents, however, admitted to have accepted any bribe beyond the privileges of the accreditation status and yearly Christmas presents from Spanish ministries’ such as boxes of wine from the Ministry of Agriculture. It is therefore practically impossible to evaluate the success of this policy. It may be the case that correspondents who already benefited from accreditations as honorary correspondents, a

\textsuperscript{1070} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{1071} Blaye, \textit{Franco and the politics of Spain}, 234.
\textsuperscript{1073} See Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling; Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling Robert Bosschart de Lang, interview by Tobias Reckling.
\textsuperscript{1074} \textit{El País}, “Corresponsales Extranjeros: Testigos de un cambio,”, 38–44, 40.
\textsuperscript{1075} Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011.
sign of the regime’s appreciation, also accepted further offers from the Francoist authorities. These journalists were, however, already in favour of the Franco regime anyway. The more regime critical correspondents like Haubrich and Herrmann also speculated, without presenting any factual proof, about the acceptance of bribes by some of the CIP’s presidents during the 1960s, who were elected with the support of the MIT. The statement of the regime friendly Cuban exile and long-term vice-president of the CIP, Chelala López, that the Franco regime ‘did everything to welcome the foreign correspondents in Spain’, indeed shows that less critical correspondents appreciated the regime’s efforts. However, Chelala López also did not mention in the conducted interview any direct bribes.

The bribing of foreign correspondents by state authorities was, of course, not a Spanish speciality. Herzer shows that Nazi Germany also used such means in order to improve relations with the foreign press corps and that ‘the transition from more or less appropriate support to open bribery was fluent’. The same applied to the Franco regime. The privileges for accredited staff correspondents and the CIP with its subsidized restaurant, both of which were well accepted even by regime critical correspondents, were on the one end of the scale, and direct bribes, such as apartments at a reduced price, on the other. The regime’s financial support for the ACPI were somewhere in between.

Fraga’s attempts to improve relations with the foreign press corps did not end with an improved information policy and bribery. Instead, one of the most remarkable aspects of Fraga’s policy towards the foreign press corps was his success in informally influencing the placement of correspondents for foreign media. The previous chapter has already discussed the case of the appointment of Fraga’s confidant Carlos Mendo as UPI bureau chief in 1962. Almost parallel, Fraga also managed to influence the replacement of the bureau chief of AFP, Jacqueline Darricarére d'Etchevers. Mendo explained to Henry F. Schulte in an interview that AFP replaced Darricarére d'Etchevers with Pierre Brisard in return for a contract that allowed AFP to supply news to EFE in 1962. Foreign correspondents working in Spain were well aware of this extraordinary compromise by a major international news agency. Besides Schulte, the former correspondent Édouard de Blaye also later wrote in his book on the Franco regime that Fraga, ‘dissatisfied with the way that the Madrid correspondent of Agence France-Press […] was reporting the political

1076 José R. Chelala López, interview by Tobias Reckling.
1077 Herzer, Auslandskorrespondenten und auswärtige Pressepolitik im Dritten Reich, 243.
evolution of the régime [sic] – or, more correctly the lack of evolution – discreetly secured her replacement’. Furthermore, opposition groups also referred to the replacement of the AFP correspondent in a leaflet that attacked the MIT’s press policy and circulated in Bilbao a few years later.

UPI and AFP did not remain Fraga’s only successes in exercising influence over the personnel of the foreign press corps in Spain. In 1965, the MIT, in close cooperation with Castiella’s Foreign Ministry and its diplomats, even managed to affect the appointment of a new correspondent by The New York Times. The Spanish embassy in the US received information in March 1965 that The New York Times planned to send Thomas J. Hamilton as its new correspondent to Spain. The information came from Welles, who had left his post as The New York Times’ correspondent in Madrid in 1962 but seemingly maintained good relations with Spanish diplomats in the US. The Spanish diplomats received this news with considerable concern because they knew Hamilton. He had already covered Spain for The New York Times from 1939 to 1941 and ‘did not precisely distinguish himself for his sympathy’ towards Spain, as the Spanish press attaché in Washington, Luis Lopez Ballesteros, highlighted. Shortly thereafter, Hamilton also published the book Appeasement’s Child. The Franco regime in Spain, followed by the article Spanish Dreams of Empire in the influential journal Foreign Affairs. Both publications, according to the Spanish ambassador Alfonso Merry del Val, very much ‘disliked by the government of this epoch’ since Hamilton had strongly attacked the Franco regime.

The Spanish authorities’ reacted differently to the notification of Hamilton’s appointment. This time, however, the opinions not only differed between the Foreign Ministry and the

1079 Blaye, Franco and the politics of Spain, 234.
1080 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.356, Folder Guillén-Mé-Brulon: Copia de una hoja que ha circulado en Bilbao sobre la expulsión del Sr. Brulon [sic], 28 March 1967.
1081 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Spanish Ambassador in Washington to Angel Sagaz, DG for the Relations with the USA in the Foreign Ministry, 2 March 1965.
1083 Thomas J. Hamilton, Appeasement’s Child: The Franco Regime in Spain (New Yok: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1943). Despite the annoyance which Hamilton’s book caused to the Francoist authorities, they had seemingly rather little knowledge of its actual content. In fact, following the information that Hamilton would become the new The New York Times’ Spain correspondent, Francoist officials desperately tried to locate a copy of the book, which was out of print by this time. The Spanish officials even asked Serrano Suñer, who was personally attacked by Hamilton in the book, if he owned a copy. Serrano Suñer, however, denied to own a copy. See AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Undated note on Hamilton.
1085 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Marqués de Merry del Val to Angel Sagaz, Director General for the Relation with the US in the Foreign Ministry, 2 March 1965.
MIT, but also among Spanish diplomats. Víctor de la Serna Gutiérrez-Répide, descendent of an important Spanish journalist dynasty and at the time the Spanish representative at the UN, recommended accepting Hamilton’s appointment.\textsuperscript{1086} De la Serna knew Hamilton, who had been for the last 20 years \textit{The New York Times} chief correspondent at the UN. He pointed out that the journalist always tried to inform himself about the official Spanish position when writing about matters concerned with the Franco regime. De la Serna further highlighted that ‘much water had gone under the bridge’\textsuperscript{1087} since the publication of Hamilton’s book and it therefore should not be overestimated.

The Spanish ambassador Merry del Val saw things very differently. He was convinced of Hamilton’s continued anti-Spanish attitude that would result in ‘very serious and unpleasant conflicts which could lead to his definitive expulsion from our country’\textsuperscript{1088}. Furthermore, the ambassador considered the planned appointment of Hamilton a ‘real provocation on the side of the New York Times’\textsuperscript{1089}. The MIT and the Foreign Ministry agreed with the Merry del Val and therefore wished to deny Hamilton’s accreditation. However, while the Spanish press attaché in Washington believed that ‘the book is more than enough reason for international observers to deny an accreditation’, he was rather unsure on how to proceed. López-Ballesteros was worried that the rejection of Hamilton’s accreditation would ‘provoke in \textit{The New York Times} a negative reaction and they would send another person with a less clear record but darker intentions’\textsuperscript{1090}. Instead, therefore, the Spanish embassy in Washington started to use all informal channels available in order to avoid Hamilton’s appointment. Merry del Val made his concerns about Hamilton known to the State Department\textsuperscript{1091} and to the newly appointed US ambassador to Madrid, Angier Biddle Duke, by highlighting that Hamilton’s appointment would be a bad start to his mission.\textsuperscript{1092} At the same time, the Spanish embassy repeatedly called \textit{The New York Times} foreign editor Sidney Gruson.\textsuperscript{1093} Merry del Val

\textsuperscript{1086} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Victor de la Serna to Emilio Martín Martín, Subdirector de Officina Información Diplomatica, 3 March 1965.
\textsuperscript{1087} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1088} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Spanish Ambassador in Washington to Angel Sagaz, DG for the Relations with the USA in the Foreign Ministry, 2 March 1965.
\textsuperscript{1089} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1090} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Luis López-Ballesteros to Manuel Jiménez Quilez, 2 March 1965.
\textsuperscript{1091} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Marqués de Merry del Val to Manuel Fraga, 15 March 1965.
\textsuperscript{1092} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Marqués de Merry del Val to Angel Sagaz, Director General for the Relation with the US in the Foreign Ministry, 2 March 1965.
\textsuperscript{1093} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Marqués de Merry del Val to Manuel Fraga, 15 March 1965.
reported back that, although Gruson would not provide any further information, he ‘was aware that the appointment of Hamilton would not be suitable’\textsuperscript{1094} and ‘understands our position’\textsuperscript{1095}.

Fraga initially had little hope that these attempts aimed at making a point for the ‘respect of our system of government’\textsuperscript{1096}. Partly, this insistence on making a point against \textit{The New York Times} can be seen against the role, which the newspaper had played in recent Spanish politics. In 1960, the Spanish authorities had secretly negotiated with Germany about the creation of bases and training facilities for the German military in Spain. Not least because of memories of the former ties between Nazi Germany and the Franco regime, which the realization of this plan would arouse, the US, Great Britain and France unsuccessfully intervened through diplomatic channels. However, it was \textit{The New York Times} that eventually stopped the plan by making it public in C.L. Sulzberger’s foreign policy column.\textsuperscript{1097} ‘Certainly not without the knowledge of the US-administration’\textsuperscript{1098}, Sulzberger had received confidential information from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, the American Lauris Norstad.\textsuperscript{1099} Sulzberger told Norstad that his column ‘might very well raise enough reaction to kill the entire project. He smiled.’\textsuperscript{1100}

This involvement of \textit{The New York Times} in foreign policy plans important to the Franco regime was the background against which the MIT decided to show its strength against the US newspaper. The resistance to the appointment of Hamilton, however, not only remained a symbolic gesture that indeed led to a success. Instead of Hamilton, \textit{The New York Times} appointed Ted Szulc as its new correspondent in Madrid.\textsuperscript{1101} In the opinion of López-Ballesteros, the intervention of the US ambassador in Madrid and the US State Department were instrumental for this decision.\textsuperscript{1102} However, while Szulc ‘was young enough to lack emotional prejudices and political nostalgias’\textsuperscript{1103} with regard to Spain, López-Ballesteros

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\textsuperscript{1094} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1095} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1096} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.357, Folder Thomas J. Hamilton: Manuel Fraga to Marqués de Merry del Val, 22 March 1965.
\textsuperscript{1097} Lehmann, \textit{Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren}, 166.
\textsuperscript{1098} Ibid., 165.
\textsuperscript{1099} Ibid., 165-166. See also C.L. Sulzbeger’s account on the matter see Sulzberger, \textit{The last of the giants}, 644-645.
\textsuperscript{1100} Ibid., 645. Lehmann also quotes parts of this passage from C.L. Sulzberger’s book. Lehmann, \textit{Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren}, 166.
\textsuperscript{1101} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.386, Folder Tad Szulc: Luis López-Ballesteros to Manuel Fraga, 11 May 1965.
\textsuperscript{1102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1103} Ibid.
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pointed out to Fraga that Szulc was still far from being a ‘comfortable correspondent’\(^\text{1104}\). Indeed, the MIT soon found itself collecting Szulc’s frequent articles ‘on negative aspects of the national life’\(^\text{1105}\). Nevertheless, the avoidance of Hamilton’s appointment was still a striking success for the Spanish authorities. For Hamilton, however, this decision was easy to bear. De la Serna pointed out that Hamilton had his doubts about returning to Spain anyway.\(^\text{1106}\) The reluctance of the Spanish authorities might just have offered him an easy way out of this appointment.

**Control and sanctions**

In contrast to his predecessor, Fraga tried to use ‘soft’ means and less public interventions in order to improve both Spain’s foreign image and cope with critical correspondents at home. Far less visible was also the intensified control and monitoring of the press corps and the foreign press during his term in office. Chapter 1 has shown that the newly created Liaison Office became a central sub-department within the MIT for the collection, evaluation and exchange of information on foreign media within the MIT. Furthermore, Chapter 3 has highlighted that the CIP remained controlled by the MIT and served as a means of control of the foreign press corps.

The intensity of the MIT’s monitoring of the foreign press and the press corps in Spain became visible, for instance, in the case of Walter Haubrich. Haubrich started to write without an official accreditation as a freelancer for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* while still working as a lecturer at the University of Santiago de Compostela in 1965. The MIT immediately noticed that the new articles were signed, in the usual style of the German newspaper, with the unknown acronym *wha*.\(^\text{1107}\) The Spanish officials swiftly tried to find out the identity of the author, predominantly because *wha*’s article was far more critical towards the Franco regime than the usual reports by the newspaper’s officially accredited correspondent, Werner Schulz. Schulz, as Chapter 3 has shown, was one of the many German correspondents with a Nazi past, and was willing to disclose Haubrich’s identity and protest to the newspaper’s editors about the critical reports.\(^\text{1108}\) The MIT, however, did
not need his help. In conjunction with various sub-units and the Spanish press attaché in Germany, Haubrich’s identity was revealed within a few days. Numerous detailed reports on correspondents in Spain and their political attitude towards the regime, which were included in their accreditation files, further document the MIT’s intensified interest in information about the foreign press corps. Compared to Arias-Salgado’s time in office, the number of the reports increased under Fraga.

The MIT under Fraga, however, was not only more interested in who was reporting what from Spain and the political attitude of the correspondents but it gave also particular attention to the journalist’s sources within Spain and their contacts with the political opposition. The MIT under Arias-Salgado most likely had the same interest. The importance of the foreign press for the growing opposition, however, made this information more important during the 1960s. At the same time, the interviews with correspondents who worked in Spain during this decade also allow for a better understanding of the MIT’s monitoring of the correspondent’s work. Interviewed correspondents with close ties to the political opposition such as Haubrich, Herrmann and van Bemmelen all reported that foreign journalists were well aware that their telephones were bugged. Herrmann remembered that she frequently heard a click during her calls, which she interpreted as the turning on of the recording machines. One time, something had gone wrong with the surveillance and she could hear the unwanted listeners drinking coffee and talking. Transcripts on various phone calls received and made by the correspondent José Antonio Novais document the extent of this surveillance. In charge of this part of the surveillance was, however, the DG for Security, subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior and responsible, among other things, for the Spanish police forces, which passed the reports on to the MIT. Personal meetings therefore remained, under the pseudo-liberal Fraga, the method of choice for the passing of sensitive information.

Fraga, however, did not stop with the collection of information. The intensified and improved monitoring of foreign media was the basis for frequent complaints by Fraga or his subordinates to particular correspondents. Sieglinde Herrmann, who practically lived across the street from the MIT, still remembered these meetings vividly. The MIT

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1109 AGA (03) 049.021, 58.383, Folder Werner Schulz: Delegado Provincial del Ministerio de Información y Turismo in La Coruna (Galicia) to the DG for the Press, 27 August 1965.
1110 Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.
1112 Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.
summoned some correspondents so often that both the journalist and the MIT officials started to joke about it. When André Monconduit was called to MIT due to his ‘erroneous and false’ reports for Combat in October 1963, he greeted the Head of the Section for Foreign Press with the question of whether a button on the table was to start the microphone. The MIT official jokingly replied that ‘this is not how we do it. This is a button for calling the Guardia Civil’.

Complaints, bribery or informal interventions did not solve the MIT’s problems with the foreign press corps and foreign journalists continued to report critically about the Franco regime from Spain. In some cases, the MIT under Fraga accepted the resulting negative PR and reacted in the same way as in previous years by sanctioning individual correspondents. In fact, and besides all his liberal announcements, Fraga’s strong attention to the foreign press was also reflected in his willingness to temporarily cancel accreditations of eight correspondents because of their reports on Spain, more often than any of his predecessors after 1945 or any of his successors at the top of the MIT. Therefore, his attitude towards the foreign press was in line with his policy towards the Spanish press, where sanctions and pressure against journalists and Spanish media was frequently used as a means of control. This attitude earned Fraga the description of an ‘all-powerful dictator of the press’ by the former correspondent Édouard de Blaye.

Although Fraga frequently used sanctions against correspondents, he nevertheless used them differently. He was aware that the cancellation of accreditations did not actually solve any problems but only created negative PR. The MIT’s more frequent cancellation of accreditations under Fraga was more of a warning in order to keep the press corps in line than actual sanctions. Both the continued use of sanctions and Fraga’s different approach became at the same time symbolically Kafkaesque in the MIT’s treatment of Monconduit.

After returning to Spain in the end of the 1950s, Monconduit continued with his criticism of the Franco regime, closely monitored by the MIT. Since the Section for Foreign Press’ complaints seemingly made little impact on the correspondent, the MIT decided to

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1113 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder Jean Creach/ André Monconduit: Report on the visit of the correspondent of Combat, Jefe Sección Prensa Extranjera to Director General de Prensa, 13 October 1962.
1114 Ibid.
1115 Blaye, Franco and the politics of Spain, 234.
1116 AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.779, Folder Jean Creach/ André Monconduit: Reseña de comentarios e informaciones sobre España difundidas con la firma del corresponsal André Monconduit Crech [sic] en periódicos y emisoras extranjeras (1957 a 1964), April 1964 [undated].
the cancel the correspondent’s accreditation in March 1964. Monconduit, who as we have seen already was expelled from Spain by Arias-Salgado, subsequently became the first correspondent sanctioned by the MIT under Fraga not even two years after his appointment as Minister of Information and Tourism. However, Monconduit worked for two French media, the journal *Combat* and the broadcaster *Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française*. While his Franco critical attitude was apparent in his reports for both, the MIT only withdrew his credentials because of a recent and presumably false report for the French broadcaster. His accreditation for *Combat* remained valid. This resulted in the surreal situation that when the MIT informed Moncuduit to return his press card for *Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française*, it also asked him to send two new photos so that his accreditation for *Combat* could be renewed. The cancellation of his accreditation, therefore, had only limited consequences for the correspondent and he could continue to work in Spain. It was a clear warning by Fraga that he was willing to use sanctions against critical correspondents. But he obviously was not willing to risk negative PR and diplomatic problems by once more expelling the correspondent. The MIT continued to use sanctions as a means of deterrence in a similar manner thereafter, as became evident in the cancellation of Harald Grossmann’s accreditation in 1967.

Grossmann, of Swiss nationality, wrote from Spain for a number of Swiss and German publications since 1961. In 1967, he published in the Swiss journal *Die Weltwoche* an interview with the exiled leader of the Spanish communists, Santiago Carrillo. That ‘a foreign correspondent accredited in Spain and published declarations of leaders of an illegal organization even if the interview has been realized outside of the national territory’ was unacceptable for the MIT and it immediately cancelled Grossmann’s accreditation, a clear warning to the foreign press corps in Spain. The MIT, however, did not expel Grossmann and he remained in Spain and journalistically active. In 1972, three years after the end of Fraga’s ministry, Grossmann, for instance visited the press corner for foreign correspondents, which the MIT had installed for the upcoming wedding of Franco’s niece. Because of his missing accreditation as correspondent, he was ‘invited to leave the

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1118 Ibid.
1119 AGA, (03)049.021, 58.355, Folder Harald Grossmann: Accreditation Harald Grossmann.
1120 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Report on Arthur Harald Grossmann by the Liaison Office, 15 June 1967 [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.]
1121 Ibid.
room.\textsuperscript{1122} but nothing more. In fact, later that year the MIT accredited Grossmann again as correspondent, this time for the German weekly journal \textit{Stern}.\textsuperscript{1123} Like Grossmann, other correspondents such as Kees van Bemmelen also remained in Spain and continued to work as correspondents despite the MIT having cancelled their accreditations. The MIT had withdrawn van Bemmelen’s accreditation because of his critical reports in the second half of the 1960s,\textsuperscript{1124} but re-accredited him for the Dutch newspaper in \textit{De Telegraaf} in 1971.\textsuperscript{1125} In the meantime, van Bemmelen had nevertheless continued to report as a freelancer from Spain.\textsuperscript{1126}

Though fond of using sanctions, Fraga was extremely careful in their practical application. Nevertheless, in two exceptional cases the MIT not only cancelled accreditations but also expelled the correspondents from Spain. When the MIT expelled the Austrian correspondent Gustav Herrmann in 1964, however, it only did so under particular circumstances which allowed the MIT to publically justify its decision in the eyes of the world instead of cancelling only for the correspondent’s criticism of the regime.

Herrmann, the first husband of Sieglinde Herrmann, had written for a number of Swiss, Austrian and German newspapers from Spain since 1951.\textsuperscript{1127} In contrast to many of his German or Austrian colleagues from this time, Herrmann was highly critical towards the regime, however. The MIT had followed for some years the criticism on Spain in Herrmann’s reports and had at least since 1962 (already under Fraga) considered the cancellation of his accreditation.\textsuperscript{1128} Herrmann regularly reported on, among other issues, political repression and police violence in Spain.\textsuperscript{1129} What particularly offended the MIT was Herrmann’s constant reference to the Franco regime as a ‘fascist dictatorship’.\textsuperscript{1130} In 1964, the MIT eventually found a reason which allowed it to expel Herrmann without contributing to the regime’s external perception as a repressive dictatorship. Herrmann had

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\textsuperscript{1122} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.355, Folder Harald Grossmann: Report on Harald Grossmann, 8 March 1972 [unsigned].

\textsuperscript{1123} ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 228 [no archival signature]

\textsuperscript{1124} Kees van Bemmelen, Interview by Tobias Reckling.

\textsuperscript{1125} ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Corresponsales Extranjeros, 221 [no archival signature].

\textsuperscript{1126} Kees van Bemmelen, Interview by Tobias Reckling.

\textsuperscript{1127} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.358, Folder Gustav Herrmann: Director General de Prensa to Director General de Seguridad, 4 December 1964.

\textsuperscript{1128} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.358: Folder Gustav Herrmann: Letter from the editor in chief of the newspaper \textit{Der Bund} to the Spanish ambassador to Switzerland, 29 November 1962.

\textsuperscript{1129} See for example Gustav Herrmann, \textit{Die Dialektik der Fäuste und Pistolen}, Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 March 1964.

\textsuperscript{1130} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.358, Folder Gustav Herrmann: Gustav Herrmann to Manuel Fraga, 6 November 1963.
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falsely reported that Soviet military aircrafts were spotted over Spain,\textsuperscript{1131} in the context of the Cold War a good reason for the MIT to expel Herrmann. Against this background, the Foreign Ministry also accepted the MIT’s decision ‘without any reservation’.\textsuperscript{1132} An intervention by the president of the ACPE, the AP bureau chief Harold Milks, did not change the MIT’s decision. While the president of the CIP, the regime friendly German correspondent Tichmann, did not see any reason to protest, Milks highlighted the ‘effects on the foreign public opinion’\textsuperscript{1133} of Herrmann’s expulsion. Justified with Herrmann’s false report and disregarding the correspondent’s considerably poor health at the time, the MIT expelled him anyway. His late wife Sieglinde Herrmann in her interview blamed the stress caused by the expulsion for his death shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{1134}

Besides his carefulness in the use of sanctions against correspondents, Fraga also expelled one foreign correspondent in March 1967, the French journalist Jacques Guillemé-Brûlon, without any appropriate justification and despite the potential consequences for Spain’s international reputation. Guillemé-Brûlon was Le Figaro’s first staff correspondent in Spain, accredited since 1964.\textsuperscript{1135} That Fraga was willing to expel the correspondent of an influential conservative newspaper like Le Figaro was remarkable. Under de Gaulle, at the time President of the Fifth Republic, French-Spanish relations had improved, in particular economically,\textsuperscript{1136} and Le Figaro was strongly pro-Gaullist. Guillemé-Brûlon’s expulsion, therefore surprised contemporary observers like the British ambassador in Madrid, who reported to the Foreign Office:

The "Figaro" correspondent had always seemed to lean over backwards to be kind to the regime and it is surprising that he should have suddenly found Fraga more than he could take. Novais of "Le Monde" who has often had Guillemé-Brûlon held up to him as a model of objectivity and moderation must be laughing. […] The expulsion of the correspondent of a paper so moderate and pro-Government as the "Figaro" […] must have had a cooling influence on French-Spanish relations. […] The incident reinforces the view […] that the trend towards liberalism in Spain should not be taken for granted.\textsuperscript{1137}

\textsuperscript{1131} Gustav Herrmann, Russische MIG über Spanien, National Zeitung, 9 November 1962
\textsuperscript{1132} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.358: Folder Gustav Herrmann: Fernando Maria Castiella to Manuel Fraga Iribarne, 18 December 1964.
\textsuperscript{1133} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.358, Folder Gustav Herrmann: Harold Milks to Director General de Prensa, 18 December 1964.
\textsuperscript{1134} Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.
\textsuperscript{1135} ACMP, Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación: Libro Registro de Correspondales Extranjeros, 60 [no archival signature].
\textsuperscript{1136} Sánchez Sánchez, „Franco y De Gaulle. Las relaciones hispano-francesas de 1958 a 1969”.
\textsuperscript{1137} NA, FCO 9, 562: Letter from the British embassy in Paris, 10 March 1967.
Within Spain, the press close to the regime, such as the newspaper *Pueblo*, reported that Guillemé-Brûlon was expelled because of his general ‘informational conduct’. The actual background, however, was that the journalist had offended Fraga during a press conference on religious freedom in Spain following the minister’s harsh reaction to one of his questions. Although *AFP* officially reported that the Spanish authorities only expelled the correspondent after he had written about the incident in *Le Figaro*, the notoriously choleric Fraga took the decision on the day of the conference and before the actual publication of the article. Van Bemmelen, who was present at the press conference, recalled this chain of events. It also was explicitly highlighted in a later report on Guillemé-Brûlon by the MIT.

Although Angoustures surprisingly does not mention the expulsion of Guillemé-Brûlon in her examination of perception of the Franco regime in the French press, it had a strong impact. Besides *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde* also dedicated articles to Guillemé-Brûlon’s expulsion. Noteworthy was also the reaction within Spain. Opposition groups circulated the previously quoted leaflet in Bilbao in which Fraga was attacked for his expulsion of Guillemé-Brûlon and his past sanctions against correspondents. Furthermore, and as in the case of Herrmann, the different attitudes of the president of the CIP and the ACPE towards the Franco regime also became more visible. While the ACPE officially protested against Guillemé-Brûlon’s expulsion, the president of the CIP, at this time the regime friendly Portuguese correspondent Juan Alberto de Oliveira, even excused Guillemé-Brûlon’s behavior and thanked Fraga for his presence. Despite these internal protests by correspondents and the effects in the Spanish press, Fraga did not reverse his decision.

Fraga’s willingness to accept a fall out with the French conservative press because of a personal conflict was even more remarkable considering the Franco regime’s already

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1138 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.356, Folder Guillemé-Brulon: Copy article from the Spanish newspaper *Pueblo*, 10 March 1967.
1140 Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling.
1145 *Le Monde*, “M. Fraga Iribarne refuse de Revenir sur l'expulsion du correspondant du « Figaro ».
1146 AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.356, Folder Guillemé-Brulon: Juan Alberto de Oliveira to Manuel Fraga Iribarne, 8 March 1967.
existing problems with *Le Monde* and its Spain correspondent, José Antonio Novais. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Spaniard Novais was highly critical towards the Franco regime and of central importance to the Spanish opposition. As the frequent non-authorization of *Le Monde* suggests, it is therefore not surprising that Novais himself came into conflict early on with the regime. In fact, the MIT never collected more information on nor had such a conflict-ridden relationship with any other correspondent.\(^\text{1147}\)

Compared to his foreign colleagues, however, Novais was more difficult to control than other foreign correspondents. As the correspondent George Axelson explained to the readers of the Swedish newspaper for which he reported from Spain, *Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten*, the MIT could not expel Novais because he was a Spaniard.\(^\text{1148}\) However, the Francoist authorities also did not simply imprison Novais and Fraga only decided to cancel his accreditation in March 1965.\(^\text{1149}\) By this time, as a thorough MIT report on Novais’ journalistic work since the beginning of the 1960s shows,\(^\text{1150}\) the correspondent had already published with great frequency critical reports on the Franco regime for approximately three years. His articles in *Le Monde* as well as in the Brazilian newspaper *O Estado São Paulo* as well as the Mexican *Novedades* for which he worked as freelancer, were characterized in the opinion of the MIT by his constant ‘negative intentions’\(^\text{1151}\) towards the Franco regime. Fraga’s constraint to take earlier or more severe action against the correspondent suggests that Novais’ was to a certain extent protected from the regime’s sanctions by his prominent status and the newspaper’s special attention to Spain. At the same time, the regime’s previous experiences with the expulsion of the *Le Monde* correspondent Monconduit might also have served as a warning.

That Novais was indeed a particular case for the MIT became more visible in the context of the cancellation of his accreditation because of Novais ‘constant deformation of the truth about certain events which have taken place in Spain’\(^\text{1152}\). In contrast to previous cancellations, the MIT accompanied the withdrawal of Novais’ credentials with an intensive press campaign both inside and outside of Spain. That Fraga saw the need to

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\(^{1147}\) AGA, (03) 107.01, 42.8807, Folder José Antonio Novais; AGMI, 183, 62: File on José Antonio Novais.

\(^{1148}\) AGA, (03) 049.021, 56.768, Folder George Axelson: Translation of article from *Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten*, 31 March 1966.

\(^{1149}\) *Le Monde*, “Le ministère espagnol de l’information retire sa carte de presse étrangère à notre correspondant à Madrid,” 1 March 1965 [unsigned].

\(^{1150}\) AGA, (03) 107.01, 42.8807, Folder on José Antonio Novais: Report on José Antonio Novais, 5 March 1965.

\(^{1151}\) Ibid.

justify his sanction of the prominent correspondent internationally was reflected in the fact that he started his campaign not in the Spanish press, but in an interview with the Danish newspaper *Ekstra Bladet*. Spanish newspapers reprinted parts of the interview, while the MIT’s own newspaper *El Español* published the complete text.\footnote{See *La Vanguardia Española*, “Importantes declaraciones del senor Fraga Iribarne a un periódico danés,” 10 March 1965, 17.} It is noteworthy that the Danish newspaper had no permanent staff correspondent in Madrid. Given the content of the interview and in particular his attacks on Novais and the correspondents strong standing within the foreign press corps in Spain, it can be assumed that Fraga selected the newspaper on purpose.

In the interview itself, Fraga extensively stressed the changed and liberalized political atmosphere in Spain. He highlighted that Spain ‘is open for observation to the entire world’ and that all kinds of correspondents were ‘following their professional tasks with full freedom’ but that ‘unlimited freedom should not be mistaken for the right to give a false image of our country’\footnote{AGA, (03) 107.01, 42.8807, Folder José Antonio Novais Tomé: Reprint of Fraga’s translated interview in the newspaper *El Español*, 20 March 1965.}. Against the background of these general arguments, Fraga justified the withdrawal of Novais’ accreditation by the correspondent’s lack of ‘professional ethic[s]’, reflected in his ‘false’ and ‘tendentious’ reports.\footnote{Ibid.} Fraga further argued that the correspondent not only had close links to opposition groups, but in particular to the ‘most extreme elements of Falangism’\footnote{Ibid.}. In a somewhat paradoxical turn, therefore, the authoritarian Fraga justified the cancellation of the correspondent’s accreditation with his alleged anti-democratic, Falangist conviction.

The MIT’s newspaper *El Español* repeated the same arguments, together with personal attacks on the correspondent and his alleged alcoholism, in a special issue dedicated to the ‘causa Novais’\footnote{Ibid.}. The MIT also used Novais’ ties to the Falange as an argument against the correspondent. Novais was in his youth indeed a dedicated follower of the Falange. Although he had distanced himself from the Falange thereafter, the Ministry of the Interior highlighted in a report that he continued to use his connections with high ranking Falangists as a source of information.\footnote{AGMI, 183, 62: Report on José Antonio Novais Tome [unsigned, undated].} It could be speculated that these contacts also might have initially protected him from sanctions by the MIT. That the MIT particularly used the correspondent’s ties to the Falange as an argument against him within Spain, however,
reflected recent developments within the Franco regime. Following the governmental reshuffle in 1957 and the dismissal of the Falangist Arias-Salgado 1962, the Falange - in particular of the Opus Dei technocrats - had further lost their power within the regime. The most right-wing Falangist hardliners thereafter opposed the very limited liberalization under Fraga. The Falange’s left, social-reformist wing, with which Novais particularly maintained contacts, directly opposed the regime. Shortly after the cancellation of Novais’ accreditation, *Le Monde*, for instance reported that the Falangist newspaper *Arriba* published a letter demanding the ‘legalization of the opposition’, addressed to Fraga. The MIT’s highlighting of Novais’ relations to the Falange within Spain, therefore, must be seen against the internal conflicts among the ‘families’ of the regime.

The withdrawal of Novais’ accreditation and the attacks on the *Le Monde* correspondent did not work out as planned, however. Fraga received the unwanted negative PR and foreign media, both in France and elsewhere, reported intensively on the matter. The Spain correspondent of the British *Economist*, Richard Comyns Carr, for instance, wrote that among the regime’s attempts to oppress the growing opposition

> one of its silliest actions has been to attempt to discredit and silence Don José Antonio Novais […]. It is a measure of the gap still separating Spain from the free world that the minister of information should believe that by withdrawing Sr. Novais’s press-card he can intimidate either correspondent or editor.

The consequences of his action against Novais became even worse for Fraga when the correspondent decided in a surprising move to sue both Fraga163 and Jesus Ezcurra, the DG for Television (who had promoted the issue of *El Español*), for defamation. According to *AFP*, this was the first ever time that any Spanish citizen had sued a minister. Consequently, the ‘causa Novais’ continued to receive further international media attention. Novais’ lawyer, Eduardo Cierco Sanchez, who was also close to the

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1159 Ibid.
1160 See Paul Preston, “Populism and parasitism: the Falange and the Spanish establishment, 1939–75”.
1163 AGMI, 183, 62, Folder José Antonio Novais Tomé: Report by Director General de Seguridad, 18 March 1965.
1164 AGMI, 183, 62, Folder José Antonio Novais Tomé: Copy of report by AFP, 9 April 1965.
1165 AGMI, 183, 62, Folder José Antonio Novais Tomé: Copy of report by AFP, 17 March 1965.
political opposition, further stirred French attention by giving a press conference on the action against Fraga in Paris. Even more surprising than Novais’ choice of weapons was the result. Before the matter was eventually closed quietly and action dismissed, the judge in charge ordered fines against both Fraga and Ezcurra for not showing up in court. What started out as a carefully coordinated attack on Novais resulted therefore in a PR disaster for Fraga. For Novais himself, the entire affair ended in victory and had no effect on his journalistic work. While he continued, like other correspondents, to report from Spain also without a press card, he was eventually re-accredited in the end of the 1960s.

Besides all liberal propaganda and the improved information policy, Fraga’s general policy towards the foreign press remained highly restrictive. He experimented, however, with a more multi-faced strategy in order to improve the regime’s control over the foreign press. Nevertheless and while more carefully than his predecessor, Fraga continued to use sanctions against foreign correspondents, at times besides all negative external PR. Following the expulsion of Guillemé-Brûlon in 1967, Fraga refrained from further direct sanctions of correspondents for the last years of his ministry.

The late Franco regime and the foreign press, 1969-1975

Besides his authoritarian style, Fraga was one of the driving forces of the regime’s ‘apertura’ during the 1960s. He did implement a limited liberalization, most strongly visible in the new press law of 1966. As we have seen in Chapters 1, this brief phase of the regime’s ‘apertura’ ended with the governmental reshuffle in 1969 and Fraga’s replacement with the Francoist hardliner Sánchez Bella in 1969. In line with the generally more repressive attitude of the new government under Carrero Blanco, also Sánchez Bella took a more restrictive stance towards the foreign press and ended the improved information policy of Fraga. According to Haubrich, he even publically - and rather absurdly - accused correspondents of Western media of their alleged communist agency and their funding by ‘Moscow’s gold’. Such accusations seemed even more ridiculous

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1167 AGA (03) 107.01, 42.8807, Folder José Antonio Novais: Report on Eduardo Cierco Sanchez, 1 June 1965.
1168 AGA (03) 107.01, 42.8807, Folder José Antonio Novais: Report from Spanish Embassy in Paris to the Oficina de Enlace, 14 June 1965.
1169 AGMI, 183, 62, Folder José Antonio Novais Tomé: Director General de Seguridad to Minister de la Gobernacion, 31 March 1965.
1170 AGMI, 183, 62, Folder José Antonio Novais Tomé: Copy of report by AFP, 9 April 1965
in the context of the regime’s own rapprochement with Eastern Europe and China under the new Foreign Minister López-Bravo.

However, while the correspondents Herrmann and Haubrich recalled threats by the MIT under Sánchez Bella against correspondents,\textsuperscript{1172} it stopped at that. No correspondents’ press cards were actually withdrawn under Sánchez Bella and no correspondents expelled. The Foreign Ministry closely monitored and upheld this restraint towards the foreign press for the sake of Spain’s foreign relations. In the context of the regime’s recent external policy successes, namely the signing of the trade agreement with the EEC in 1970, the Foreign Ministry was careful not to provoke international protests or diplomatic interventions by expelling correspondents. After the dismissal of Fraga, the Foreign Ministry through its OID, once again took a more active role in the policy towards the foreign press of the MIT under Sánchez Bella. This became evident when Sánchez Bella threatened to close down the CIP following complaints from foreign correspondents in 1970 and the OID intervened (see Chapter 2).

This MIT’s carefulness in its relations with foreign journalists became evident in its treatment of the French correspondent Édouard de Blaye. De Blaye provoked the MIT because he ‘always finds the occasion to spray all the poison he can against the regime and against Spain’\textsuperscript{1173} in his reports for French and Belgian broadcasters since his accreditation in 1969. As president of the ACPE, he also tried to include José Antonio Novais on its board of directors in 1970 (discussed in Chapter 2). In fact, in the opinion of the MIT, he consciously tried to provoke his expulsion in order to promote his Franco critical book he was working on.\textsuperscript{1174} The DG for the Press was convinced that an expulsion would be for de Blaye ‘great propaganda, which would assure the success of his book’\textsuperscript{1175}. Instead of expelling the journalist, therefore, the DG for the Press ‘adopted with him an attitude of considerable carefulness’\textsuperscript{1176}.

The MIT’s restraint in the use of direct sanctions under Sánchez Bella was also a compromise to the changed general presence and attitude of correspondents in Spain since the end of the 1960s. He was confronted with a new generation of self-confident and regime

\textsuperscript{1172} Walter Haubrich, interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011; Sieglinde Herrmann, interview by Tobias Reckling.

\textsuperscript{1173} AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.975, Folder Édouard de Blaye: Informe: Édouard Albert de Blaye, April 1970 [undated].

\textsuperscript{1174} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1175} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1176} Ibid
critical staff correspondents of major foreign media, which contributed to the massive international coverage of the Burgos trials. These journalists, as became evident in the conflict surrounding the CIP, were also less willing to accept the MIT’s control. This, however, not only applied to the correspondents of liberal-left media but also conservative media and their correspondents became more critical towards the regime. Most notably, this was the case for Haubrich and his work for the conservative German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The new Spain correspondent of the most conservative British newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, however, also reflected this development.

During the 1960s, the Spanish ambassador to London described The Daily Telegraph as ‘the most favourable of the London newspapers (which is not much to say)’ towards Spain. This was not in the least due to the sympathies that the newspaper’s long-term Spain correspondent Alan Walker, president of the CIP in 1965, had for the regime. This situation, however, fundamentally changed with the appointment of Harold Sieve as The Daily Telegraph’s new Spain correspondent in 1969. A Spanish journalist described Sieve as ‘enfant terrible of the correspondents in Madrid because he says everything that he thinks and writes everything that he says’. Because of his ‘tendentious style about the problems of our country’, as a MIT report outlined, Sieve became one of the fiercest critiques of the regime. While without a foreign correspondent in Spain, the French Le Figaro was also highly critical of the Franco regime. Writing from France, the expelled correspondent Guillemé-Brûlon published frequently critical reports about the regime. It can be speculated that Guillemé-Brûlon’s expulsion by Fraga had not improved his or his editors’ opinion of Francoist Spain.

Sánchez Bella also refrained - besides threats - from direct actions even against very critical correspondents such as de Blaye, Sieve and Haubrich. Like Fraga, the MIT continued to use other, less public means in order to exercise control over the foreign press corps. This included, although only exceptionally, the denial of accreditations of new correspondents who were considered as potentially too critical. In 1972, the MIT refused to issue an

1177 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.971: Folder Alan Walker, Spanish embassy in London to Manuel Fraga, 17 April 1963.
1179 AGA, (03) 049.021, 64.971; Folder Alan Walker: Spanish embassy in London to Manuel Fraga, 17 April 1963.
1181 AGA (03) 49.021, 64.971, Folder Harold Sieve: Untitled report, 22 January 1974.
accreditation for Wolf Hanke, whom the German public broadcaster ARD planned to send as its first staff correspondent to Spain. The MIT was concerned of Hanke’s alleged ‘radical left wing’ ideology and his ‘known differences with the Spanish regimen’, both reflected in the MIT’s opinion in the correspondent’s financial donations for political refugees from Spain. While the MIT report only quotes confidential sources for this information, Hanke was convinced that the new Spanish ambassador in Bonn, Francisco Javier Conde, was behind this. His colleague Von Conta, who had reported on the matter to the chief foreign correspondent of his newspaper, Hans Ulrich Kempski, held the same opinion. Hanke further speculated that his previous post for the ARD as the only Western TV correspondent in Prague might have contributed to the suspicion of the Francoist authorities and the denial of his accreditation.

In the practical handling of the denial of Hanke’s accreditation, however, the carefulness with which the MIT under Sánchez Bella treated the foreign press also became visible. An open rejection of the accreditation would have provoked international media coverage. Instead, the MIT decided to react with administrative silence and therefore not at all publically. Hanke never received any official information of the status of his application for an accreditation.

In their assumption that the Spanish ambassador to Germany was behind the denial of Hanke’s accreditation, von Conta and Hanke were probably right. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the relationship between the Francoist authorities and the German press corps in Spain became highly problematic. At the centre of these conflicts were the strongly Franco critical correspondents Walter Haubrich and Manfred von Conta of the two major German newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung but also others such as Herrmann. Besides print media, the correspondent of the German broadcaster ZDF, Michael Vermehren, also contributed to the negative image of the Franco regime by producing and broadcasting reports on the Spanish opposition.

AGA (03), 49.021, 42.8931, Folder 5: Nota Informativa. Asunto: Corresponsal de TV Alemana en España, 11 February 1971.
1184 Ibid.
1185 Ibid.
1186 Wolf Hanke, interview by Tobias Reckling, 28 September 2011, Madrid.
1188 Wolf Hanke, interview by Tobias Reckling.
1189 Ibid.
1190 AGA, (03) 049.021, 42.09043, Folder 8: Report on Michael Vermehren [undated] [General access restricted until 2024 for the protection of personal data. The AGA granted partial and supervised access for this research project on 22 September 2011.]
The MIT and the DG for the Press, however, only played a secondary role in evolving conflicts with the German press. Instead, it was in this ‘war with the Germans’\textsuperscript{1191}, as a former OID employee put it in an interview with Felipe Maraña Marcos, that the active role of the Foreign Ministry, primarily through the OID and its ambassador in Bonn, became visible.

The starting point of the conflicts with the German correspondents was the, in the opinion of the Francoist authorities, ‘persistent press campaign in Europe’\textsuperscript{1192} against Spain during and following the Burgos trials. After official complaints to correspondents and newspapers had brought no success, the OID decided to discuss this situation and possible reactions in a dedicated meeting with representatives of the MIT and other Francoist institutions in March 1971.\textsuperscript{1193} The Francoist officials highlighted the particularly problematic German news coverage on Spain and its possible impact on Spanish migrant workers in Germany. However, it was pointed out that direct sanctions of correspondents were ‘neither politically nor diplomatically useful in these moments’\textsuperscript{1194}. Instead, the OID decided to apply ‘a persistent diplomatic pressure’\textsuperscript{1195}. The Foreign Ministry, therefore, took the lead.

All attempts to implement sanctions against the German correspondents through diplomatic channels, however, remained unsuccessful. The examination of the course of action chosen by the Franco regime, however, not only shows the important role that the Spanish Foreign Ministry took in the regime’s policy towards the foreign press after Fraga. It also reflects more generally the regime’s continued authoritarian attitude towards the foreign press corps during the last years of the Franco dictatorship, despite its abstention from direct sanctions. The Foreign Ministry was still willing to invest considerable time and energy in order to have problematic correspondents removed from Spain.

The Spanish authorities started to apply their strategy by the end of 1971. Following a continuation of critical reports on Spain in the German press, the State Secretary of the Spanish Foreign Ministry asked the German ambassador in Madrid, Hermann Meyer-Lindenberg, for a personal audience.\textsuperscript{1196} Meyer-Lindenberg was appointed as ambassador to Spain under the social democrat Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister in 1968. Through his

\textsuperscript{1191} Maraña Marcos, Información internacional en España, 1020
\textsuperscript{1192} AMAE, 13441 Ex. 34: Report on meeting in Foreign Ministry, 24 March 1971.
\textsuperscript{1193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1194} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1196} PAAA, B26 451: Report from German ambassador in Madrid for Foreign Ministry in Germany, 21 December 1971.
marriage to the sister-in-law of the Spain correspondent of the German broadcaster ZDF, Michael Vermehren, Meyer-Lindenberg maintained close personal ties to the German foreign press corps in Spain. Like Vermehren, Meyer-Lindenberg had emigrated during the Nazi regime and only returned to Germany in 1954. Unlike some of the other German diplomats and correspondents in Spain such as the former Nazi judge Nüßlein, from 1964 to his retirement in 1974 honorary consul of Germany in Barcelona, Meyer-Lindenberg was rather unlikely to have any sympathies for the Francoist authorities.

The Francoist authorities were aware of Meyer-Lindenberg’s biographical background. His unwillingness to accept sanctions against German correspondents, therefore, should not have come as a surprise. Following complaints about the ‘deformed and tendentious reports, which only treat negative phenomena’ by parts of the German press corps, the Spanish State Secretary explained that the existing evidence would suggest at least the withdrawal of Haubrich’s and von Conta’s accreditations. Meyer-Lindenberg replied, as he reported back to the German Foreign Ministry, by highlighting the great harm such actions would cause for Spanish-German relations and that it would be seen ‘as sign of censorship and intolerance and therefore prove the enemies of the regime right’.

Following this meeting, the Francoist authorities took no direct action against the correspondent. However, they also did not give up and continued diplomatically to prepare the ground for sanctions. Meyer-Lindenberg, who also had informed the correspondents about the meeting, reported back a few weeks later that the State Secretary’s approach was part of a larger campaign led by the Spanish ambassador in Bonn against Haubrich and von Conta in particular. Conde, according to Meyer-Lindenberg ‘had during the last months attempted to arrange measures against some of the German correspondents in Spain’. It was also shortly thereafter, that von Conta sent his report to Kempski, in which he highlighted the denial of Hanke’s accreditation as the first success of Conde’s more far-
fetching attempts to ‘silence critical voices in German journalism’ in Spain. The chief foreign correspondent of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* took this seriously enough to forward the letter to the German Foreign Ministry.

While Meyer-Lindenberg had strongly opposed the Franco regime’s attempts to take action against the correspondents, the German Foreign Ministry showed more understanding for its Spanish colleagues. In an internal report, not only the Spanish ambassador was defended as a ‘renowned scientist and diplomat’ but it also argued that von Conta and Haubrich ‘so strongly identify with the opposition against the regime that their objectivity as correspondents did not remain untouched’. But, not the least because von Conta was to leave Spain anyway in the end of the year, no further action, either for or against the correspondents, was suggested.

In the meantime, however, the Spanish Foreign Ministry continued to seek for ways in which to discredit the German correspondents, both within Spain and through its ambassador. One occasion to do just this came for the head of the OID, José-Vicente Torrente Secorum, during German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel’s visit to Spain in June 1972. Together with Scheel came the head of German Foreign Ministry’s press department, Guido Brunner. Meyer-Lindenberg reported that Torrente directly approached Brunner during the visit in order to complain about von Conta and Haubrich as ‘the last straw’. Seemingly, Torrente hoped that Brunner, who was born in Madrid and had a Spanish mother, would have sympathies for the Spanish position.

Brunner remained the focus of the Foreign Ministry’s and the OID’s campaign against some of the German correspondents. Shortly after Scheel’s visit, the Spanish Foreign Ministry suggested to the Spanish ambassador in Germany to continue to approach Brunner. He was to highlight the correspondents’ work could have a negative ‘impact on the friendly relations between both countries’ if they should continue to remain in Spain.

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1208 AMAE, 12427, 17: State Secretary in the Spanish Foreign Ministry Garbriel F. Valderrama y Moreno to the Spanish ambassador in Bonn, Francisco Javier Conde, 8 July 1972.
The available evidence suggests, however, that ambassador Conde neither saw any realistic possibility to pursue this matter with Brunner nor that the German diplomat became active on behalf of the Franco regime. What he did, however, was to initiate a campaign in the Spanish press against the German correspondents. In July 1972, only one month after Scheel’s visit to Madrid, the Spanish newspaper ABC attacked Haubrich, Herrmann and von Conta personally in an article written by the journalist Alfredo Semprun. Semprun complained that for these correspondents ‘our development, our initiatives in foreign policy etc. [...] do not exist’. Instead, they continued after the «anti-Spanish December of 1970» - the Burgos trials - to contribute ‘to the campaign most tendentious and hostile’ towards Spain in all of Europe. Following a visit to the office of ABC in Madrid, Meyer-Lindenberg reported that Semprun wrote his article without the knowledge of the editors of ABC and used the absence of the foreign editor in order to place it. The ABC editors personally suggested to Meyer-Lindenberg that the ambassador Conde was behind the affair.

That this was very likely the case was reflected in the promise of ABC’s Bonn correspondent Miguel Angel Gozalo, at the time on vacation in Madrid, to make up for Semprun’s attacks. Indeed, a few weeks later, he published in ABC an article that must have come as a surprise for careful readers of ABC. Gozalo wrote that the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Haubrich’s employer, was characterized by ‘its good information and it politics of separation from all extremes’. A few weeks later, Gozalo also praised both the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as one of the ‘most independent and serious newspapers of Germany’. Although Gozalo did not refer directly to Semprun’s attacks and did not mention the German correspondents, the message was clear and understood as such by Meyer-Lindenberg. Besides the continued complaints by the OID, these articles in ABC marked the end of Spanish attempts to have the German correspondents replaced.

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1210 Ibid.
1211 Ibid.
1214 Miguel Angel Gozalo, “Se acusa a Quick de evadir impuestos y difundir secretos oficiales,” ABC, 12 August 1972, 19.
1215 PAAA B26 451: Deutscher Botschafter in Madrid to Auswärtiges Amt, 10 August 1972.
Following these unsuccessful efforts against the German correspondents, both the MIT and the Foreign Ministry refrained from further direct and indirect action against correspondents under the short ministry of the more liberal Pió Cabanillas (January–October 1974) and his ‘tolerance towards the liberty of expression’\textsuperscript{1216}. Correspondents who worked under both Sánchez Bella and Cabanillas explicitly highlighted in their interviews the improved information policy and the less strict censorship through non-authorization of foreign publications.\textsuperscript{1217} It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that it was under Cabanillas that the MIT cancelled the accreditation of a staff correspondent in Spain for the last time. However, as was pointed out in Chapter 3, the circumstances that led to the cancellation of the press card of the Taiwanese correspondent Eduardo Sou-er Mo in April 1974 were very particular. The decision was a consequence of Spain’s recent rapprochement with China and not a reaction to the correspondent’s work.

However, and despite the acceptance of the reform of the CIP, under Cabanillas’ successor, Herrera Esteban, the MIT once more applied a stricter policy towards the foreign press. Besides the intensive non-authorization of foreign publications (Chapter 5), this also included (albeit very limited) sanctions against foreign correspondents in the last months of the regime.\textsuperscript{1218} Felipe Maraña Marcos also mentions the expulsion of the Nicaraguan journalist Joaquin Mejia Mejia in January 1975 but didn’t provide any further details. Mejia, however, was not a foreign correspondent but worked for a Spanish newspaper. It was his criticism of the Franco regime in the Spanish weekly newspaper Granada Semanal that eventually caused his expulsion from Spain.\textsuperscript{1219} While this incident reflected Herrera Esteban’s stricter attitude towards the press, it was not technically a sanction against the foreign press corps.

The last foreign correspondent against whom the MIT applied a sanction was de Blaye. The French correspondent had left Spain at the beginning of the 1970s and published his already quoted book on the regime with a caricature of Franco on the cover in 1974.\textsuperscript{1220} In October 1975, de Blaye applied for an accreditation as a special correspondent in order to cover the military trials and following executions of five alleged terrorists as well as the expected death of Franco. Against the background of his book and the previous conflicts with the

\textsuperscript{1216} Carlos Barrera, Periodismo y franquismo: De la censura a la apertura, 154-155.
\textsuperscript{1217} See Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling; Ana Westley, interview by Tobias Reckling; Robert Bosschart de Lang; interview by Tobias Reckling; Walter Haubrich. interview by Tobias Reckling, 21 October 2011.
\textsuperscript{1218} Maraña Marcos, Información internacional en España, 1019.
\textsuperscript{1219} AMAE, 13975: Report on Joaquin Mejia Mejia, 20 February 1975.
\textsuperscript{1220} Blaye, Franco ou la monarchie sans roi.
correspondent, however, de Blaye’s was the only one of the almost 400 applications for accreditations by special correspondents coming to Spain in the end of 1975 which the MIT rejected for political reasons.\footnote{AGA, (03) 049.021, 65.875, Folder Édouard de Blaye: Accreditation Édouard de Blaye.}

**Conclusions**

The chapter has shown that the Francoist authorities applied a number of means in order to control the foreign press corps to influence the correspondent’s reporting from Spain. These means ranged from the change of the official information policy over bribes, informal and diplomatic interventions, public press campaigns against and defamation of particular correspondents to the sanctioning of correspondents through the cancellation of press cards and expulsions. The Francoist authorities, however, faced a basic dilemma in their treatment of the foreign press. The MIT tried to extend its control over the foreign press corps, but direct sanctions of foreign correspondents always came at the risk of provoking negative international PR and even diplomatic interventions. Following their experiences with the consequences of expulsions during the 1950s and for the sake of its foreign policy interests, the Francoist authorities used these means carefully. Instead, the Francoist authorities and the MIT under Fraga in particular, tried other, less public, methods such as diplomatic and informal interventions in foreign media’s personnel policy in order to exercise control over the foreign press corps. The dilemma of attempting to exercise control over the foreign press corps without provoking an international reaction led to some absurd situations. Under Fraga, the MIT withdrew the press cards of correspondents without expelling the correspondents from Spain. They therefore simply continued to report from Spain.

However, and in contrast to Rosendorf’s previously quoted conclusions, the Franco regime continued to expel correspondents until the end of the 1960s despite all negative effects. Even after the Francoist authorities refrained from the direct sanction of correspondents, it continued to intensively use (without success) diplomatic channels in order to try and have correspondents expelled. Besides the relative freedom of correspondents in Spain, the Francoist authorities, therefore, were only able to come to an acceptance of the dilemma they faced during the very last years of the regime.
The chapter has further argued that the Francoist authorities also used sanctions against particular correspondents as a means of deterrence for the rest of the press corps. The question that remains is whether or not these attempts to exercise control over the foreign press corps were successful. Success can be understood as an active influence over the foreign press corps in the interest of the Francoist authorities.

Fraga’s successful influence on the personnel policy of foreign media on the surface seems particularly successful. Although further research is needed on this topic and especially on the (presuming it exists) change of the news agencies reports on Spain, this applied in particular to the appointment of Carlos Mendo as bureau chief of UPI. The instalment of a Spanish correspondent as close to the regime as Mendo, however, remained an absolute exception. In the few other cases where the Francoist authorities managed to influence the appointment of particular correspondents, the foreign media choose their own replacement. Thereby, Fraga’s victories remained superficial and, in fact, had little impact on reporting from Spain. Following Darricarére d’Etchevers replacement with Pierre Brisard as AFP bureau chief, Fraga hoped that the economic leverage that had helped him to have Darricarére d’Etchevers replaced, the deal between AFP and EFE, would allow for an ongoing control over the new AFP bureau chief. Soon after his arrival in Madrid, Brisard received demands to submit his reports to the MIT before sending them to France. Schulte, however, highlights that Brisard successfully refused to follow this demand.\textsuperscript{1222} In fact, the previous chapter has shown that AFP became, through the employment young Spanish journalists, an important medium of communication for Spanish regime critics during the 1960s. In the case of Szulc, whom the The New York Times sent to Spain instead of Hamilton, the MIT soon reported the he tended ‘in his articles to pick up the negative aspects of the national life, for which his has be warned on more than one occasion’\textsuperscript{1223}.

The replacement of correspondents through pressure on their editors, however, only ever succeeded in exceptional situations. Instead, and as has been outlined, the Francoist authorities mainly concentrated on correspondents in Spain and either tried to threaten and pressure them or use bribes in order to influence their reporting. The chapter has argued that, although difficult to examine, bribery most likely only affected correspondents already in favour of the regime.

\textsuperscript{1223} AGA, (03) 049.021, 58.386, Folder Tad Szulc: Report on Ted Szulc, 30 May 1966.
The use of sanctions had a limited impact as a means of deterrence and control of the foreign press corps. The Dutch correspondent Roger Stephan Bosschart de Lang, for instance, remembered having to explicitly avoid particular phrases like ‘Franco dictatorship’ in his reports during his first years as correspondent in Spain so as not to provoke conflicts with the Francoist authorities.\textsuperscript{1224} Although Bosschart de Lang was the only correspondent to admit such self-censorship, his case is nevertheless indicative. At the time, towards the end of the 1960s, Bosschart de Lang was only working on a freelance basis for a number of Dutch, Belgian and British media. He was therefore economically dependent on his accreditation in Spain. Furthermore, the Dutch journalist also did not live in Madrid with its large community of correspondents but in relatively isolated Barcelona.

Bosschart de Lang himself stressed in his interview that his economic situation together with his personnel attachment to Spain, where he very much wished to stay, were the central reasons for his self-censorship. It ended as soon as he became a staff correspondent and moved to Madrid in the beginning of the 1970s.\textsuperscript{1225} While noteworthy, in the absence of further evidence it only can be speculated whether the fear of sanctions had a similar effect on other freelancers.

On staff correspondents, the deterrence strategy of the regime, however, had little to no impact. Von Conta, for instance, saw no reason for being afraid of expulsion from Spain. If he had been expelled by the MIT, so claims von Conta, the \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} simply ‘would just have sent me somewhere else’\textsuperscript{1226}. Von Conta already had some experience of such situations due to his previous banning from Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{1227}

Like von Conta, other regime critical staff correspondents also saw no reason for being afraid of the Francoist authorities. Van Bemmelen pointed out that, in case of expulsion, ‘I would have been famous’\textsuperscript{1228}, which might indeed have boosted his journalistic career.\textsuperscript{1229} The chapter has shown that the MIT believed that de Blaye wanted to provoke his expulsion precisely for this reason. Like other correspondents such as Haubrich and Herrmann, van Bemmelen was very well aware of the dilemma the Francoist authorities therefore faced: ‘they [the Francoist authorities] did not want that kind of publicity’\textsuperscript{1230}. As a means of

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1224} Robert Bosschart de Lang. interview by Tobias Reckling.
\bibitem{1225} Ibid.
\bibitem{1226} Manfred von Conta, Skype-interview Tobias Reckling.
\bibitem{1227} Ibid.
\bibitem{1228} Kees van Bemmelen, interview by Tobias Reckling.
\bibitem{1229} Ibid.
\bibitem{1230} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
deterrence and a tool for exercising control over the foreign press corps, sanctions against correspondents were therefore of very little success.
Conclusions

Building on the findings in the previous chapters, the conclusions will highlight this thesis’ contribution to current research on three levels. First, it will bring out how the insights from the examination of the foreign press can improve our understanding of the nature of the Franco regime. Second, the conclusions will discuss how the combination of approaches from historical research and social and communication research in this thesis can fruitfully be applied to relevant research topics. Third, the conclusions will discuss possible future research, which can be developed from the findings of this thesis.

Foreign correspondents in the Franco regime

The examination of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain sheds new light on the Franco regime’s internal and external development during the Cold War. To begin with, the quantitative and qualitative examination of the correspondent’s presence in Francoist Spain provide insights into the constitution of the foreign press corps itself. By understanding correspondents in this context primarily as representatives of international media interests, this approach contributes to the still understudied international perception of the Franco regime from a global perceptive. It shows how international media interest increased throughout the 1960s. Since the end of that decade especially, major European media started to employ staff correspondents in Spain. This general development only partially reflected the development of the Spanish economy and its large tourist industry. In fact, the Francoist repression of the growing resistance against the regime during the 1960s and in particular the Burgos trials in 1970 fuelled this rising media interest.

The discussion started with the assumption that the general composition of the foreign press corps could also be explained through Spain’s external economic, political and other relations. The thesis generally confirms this finding from communication research. Besides Spain’s economic relations, the composition of the press corps reflected the Franco regime’s special ties with Latin America. Latin American correspondents even had their own association in Francoist Spain from the end of the 1950s, the Association of Ibero-American Press Correspondents. At the same time, however, the Franco regime’s political orientation also had an impact on the press corps, which did not reflect particular foreign media interest. Most importantly, numerous German journalists with a past in Nazi Germany found in the right-wing Franco regime a new field of activity after 1945. These
journalists had a fundamental impact on the image of Spain in Germany during the 1950s. Aschmann and Lehmann have already stressed the special importance of the German correspondent Heinz Barth.\textsuperscript{1231} Through his multiple media contacts he was a central figure for the formation of German public opinion about Spain during 1950s. This thesis shows, however, that Barth was only the most prominent case among many. Thus, the examination of this particular group of correspondents also provides further insights into the development of German journalism in general. Norbert Frei, Johannes Schmitz and others have already shown that despite the Allied’s denazification policy, many journalists with a Nazi past continued their careers after the end of the Allied occupation in German media.\textsuperscript{1232} This phenomenon was especially pronounced in the German press corps in the right-wing Franco dictatorship.

German correspondents were not the only group of correspondents that were particularly attracted by the right-wing Franco dictatorship and much less representatives of any international media interest. Political exiles from communist countries and from Cuba after Castro’s revolution also were accredited in Francoist Spain. The Franco regime’s relations with communist countries also impacted in other ways. With the exception of Cuban correspondents, no journalists from communist countries were accredited in the deeply anti-communist Francoist Spain for the first two decades after 1945. This changed, however, in the course of the rapprochement between Spain and the communist countries in Eastern Europe and China. Parallel to the tightening of economic relations from the end of the 1960s, Spain exchanged correspondents with communist countries – although both were mutually subjected to strict regulations. In fact, Soviet correspondents played a semi-diplomatic role in the beginning of Spanish relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, by examining parallels between the composition of the foreign press corps and the Franco regime’s foreign policy, the thesis sheds new light on the still relatively unstudied relations of the Franco regime with the communist world during the Cold War.

Apart from the particular restrictions for correspondents from communist countries, foreign journalists could work relatively freely in Spain. The Francoist authorities ended the censorship of correspondents’ despatches shortly after the end of the Second World War. This step must be seen as part of the regime’s general attempts to improve its foreign image. Thereafter, the Franco regime also tried to improve its external perception by improving

\textsuperscript{1231} Aschmann, “Treue Freunde ...”?; Lehmann, Die Bundesrepublik und Franco-Spanien in den 50er Jahren.
\textsuperscript{1232} Frei and Schmitz, Journalismus im Dritten Reich.
relations with the foreign press corps. The accreditation status for correspondents was, for instance, highly attractive even for semi-professionals because of the economic privileges that came with it. Furthermore, a number of the correspondents interviewed pointed out that the regime used bribes in order to improve the reporting of foreign correspondents. The foundation of two independent associations for correspondents at the end of the 1950s further reflected attempts to gain the favour of the foreign press corps. The Minister of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga, worked in particular on improving the regime’s external image by paying greater attention to the foreign press during the 1960s. Besides an intensified information policy, his foundation of the CIP was the most visible result of this change. The Franco regime’s policy towards the foreign press corps within Spain, therefore, reflected the regime’s (and in particular Fraga’s) general attempt to increase its international standing through soft diplomacy as has been recently examined by Rosendorf as well as Gienow-Hecht and Fischer.\(^{1233}\)

This was, however, not only a slow development but also only one part of the Francoist policy towards the foreign press. Despite the freedom to work in Spain, constant attempts by the Francoist authorities to control the foreign press corps through threats, the cancellation of accreditations, diplomatic interventions, informal negotiations with foreign media and expulsions were also made. Despite its weak international position, the Francoist authorities expelled or cancelled the accreditations of correspondents of major foreign newspapers including The New York Times and Le Monde. In contrast to Rosendorf’s assumption, the Franco regime continued to use such measures, although only occasionally, thereafter. Despite his external self-promotion as a liberalizer, Fraga too continued to use harsh sanctions even against the correspondents of prestigious newspapers such as Le Figaro. However, he accompanied this kind of direct action with more indirect attempts to control the foreign press corps during the 1960s. This included the successful intervention in the personnel policy of foreign media. Fraga’s authoritarian approach towards the foreign press was symbolically reflected in the CIP. While announced as an organization for and by foreign and Spanish journalists, it remained under the control of the Francoist authorities.

The examination of the Francoist policy towards the foreign press further reveals that it was not a one dimensional policy. In fact, the regime’s approach towards the foreign press corps

\(^{1233}\) Gienow-Hecht and Fischer, “Was ist und wozu braucht man «Nation Branding»?”; Rosendorf, Franco Sells Spain to America.
was a frequent point of debate within and among Francoist authorities. Formally, all competences over the foreign press lay with the Ministry of Information and Tourism and its institutional predecessors. The thesis shows, however, that the Foreign Ministry occasionally tried to influence policy towards the foreign press. While the MIT used sanctions in order to extend its internal informational control also over the foreign press corps, the Foreign Ministry intervened in the interest of the Franco regime’s foreign image and policy interests. Interventions by the Foreign Ministry - namely by its specialized sub-department OID - in the MIT’s treatment of foreign correspondents continued until the last years of the Franco regime.

This policy towards the foreign correspondents which oscillated between attempts at currying favours and sanctions combined with the struggle over competencies among a variety of actors, was not a Francoist particularity, however. In his examination of the foreign press corps in Nazi Germany, Herzer arrives at similar results.\(^{1234}\) His research shows that in Nazi Germany, policy towards the foreign press was, much more than in Francoist Spain, a constant point of struggle between Goebbels’ Reich Propaganda Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. In Nazi Germany, this power struggle partly reflected the general rivalry among the totalitarian regime’s institutions. To a certain extent, this also applied to Francoist Spain and the rivalry between the Foreign Minister Artajo and the Minister of Information and Tourism Arias-Salgado during the 1950s. In the Francoist dictatorship, however, this struggle over competencies was more the result of the regime’s evolving international ambitions and the parallel claim for internal informational control. Furthermore, the struggle over competencies was not a constant one but strongly connected to the personalities at the top of the ministries and the general development of the regime’s policy. In contrast to the 1950s, for instance, the Foreign Ministry under Castiella and the Ministry of Information and Tourism under Fraga closely coordinated their policies. When the hardliner Sánchez Bella replaced Fraga at the end of the 1960s, however, the Foreign Ministry and its OID respectively once more tried to intervene.

The Foreign Ministry’s intervention in the MIT’s policy under Sánchez Bella, however, shows that it did not necessarily try to establish a more liberal policy towards the foreign press corps. Instead, the Foreign Ministry was primary concerned with Spain’s external perception for the sake of the Franco regime’s foreign policy. This became evident in its

\(^{1234}\) Herzer, *Auslandskorrespondenten und auswärtige Pressepolitik im Dritten Reich.*
intensive use of diplomatic channels in order to have German correspondents replaced at the beginning of the 1970s.

The conflicts between correspondents and the MIT over the management of the CIP in 1970 also reflected a change in the regime’s relations with the foreign press. A new generation of staff correspondents, appointed towards the end of the 1960s, were not only more critical towards the Franco regime, but openly rejected the regime’s control over the foreign press. The organizational basis for this resistance was the independent Association of Foreign Press Correspondents. For the International Press Club, this resistance was eventually successful and it became independent from the MIT’s control before the death of Franco.

Finally, the thesis highlights the particular role of foreign correspondents and the foreign press in general and for the Spanish public and the political opposition in particular. Foreign media were in principle freely distributed in Francoist Spain and were an important source of uncensored information for the Spanish public. This applied in particular to French media due to the widespread knowledge of French. At the same time, international broadcasters with Spanish programmes such as the BBC, Radio Paris and communist broadcasters from Eastern Europe gave the Spanish public direct access to foreign news. Furthermore, through news borrowing from foreign media in parts of the Spanish press, the Spanish public also indirectly had access to the content of foreign publications. The thesis argues, therefore, that the reports of foreign correspondents had a direct impact on the Spanish public.

The importance of the foreign press was strongest for the Spanish opposition. *Le Monde* was crucial as a central means of information for opposition groups within Spain. The highly regime critical correspondent José Antonio Novais was especially influential. Novais, as well as other correspondents such as Haubrich, maintained close relations with the Spanish opposition. As such, they became important transnational communicators for opposition groups. This was a mutually beneficial relationship. The correspondents received valuable information from the political opposition, which otherwise was not available in the censored Spanish press or from the notoriously uncommunicative Francoist authorities. Spanish journalists who were critical of the regime were another crucial source of information for foreign correspondents. By highlighting the importance of these informal informational networks, this thesis not only sheds light on the particular importance of the foreign press within Spain. It further demonstrates the impact of dictatorial regimes such as the Franco dictatorship on the working conditions of foreign correspondents.
The findings on the foreign press as a source of information and means of communication within Spain in particular not only contributes to research on the Spanish political opposition but these observations can also provide new insights to the ongoing debate about the development of civil society in Francoist Spain since the 1960s and its importance for the Spanish transition. Neither Víctor Pérez Díaz\textsuperscript{1235} in his seminal book, \textit{The Return of the Civil Society}, nor Pamela Beth Radcliff’s\textsuperscript{1236} more recent contribution to the subject, takes account of the foreign press. The presented evidence suggests, however, that foreign media and their correspondents in Spain played an important role for the diffusion of non-censored information. Therefore, the foreign press and correspondents might have contributed to the diffusion of pro-democratic ideas within the Spanish society.

**Mixed methods approach and the historical study of foreign correspondence**

This thesis also shows that the combination of an historical approach with methods from communication research and anthropology can be very useful for understanding foreign correspondence. Building on insights and concepts from communication research was crucial for the understanding of the foreign correspondents as media professionals. It was the starting point for this thesis which led to insights into the world of foreign correspondence in Francoist Spain. The application of these approaches to a historical case study has drawn on what historical research does best, namely the source based examination and understanding of context. The application of these approaches therefore not only contributes to the understanding of the foreign press corps in Francoist Spain but also provides new empirical insights for the understanding of foreign correspondence in communication research and neighbouring disciplines.

The quantitative examination of the composition of the press corps and the accreditation times of correspondents are instrumental for the understanding of foreign correspondence in Francoist Spain. Without a media analysis, which would hardly be possible on such a scale, this approach provides first insights into the general development of international media interest in Francoist Spain. The thesis further shows that the particular working situation in Francoist Spain had an impact on the correspondents’ accreditation times. The

\textsuperscript{1236} Radcliff, \textit{Making democratic citizens in Spain}.
difficult working conditions in the Francoist Spain made the appointment of experienced correspondents the more suitable choice for many media.

The examination of the correspondents’ working conditions was an area where this mixed-method approach proved particularly valuable. The insights from communication researchers allowed for the identification of the general working routines of correspondents and the particularities of the situation in Francoist Spain. This applies in particular to the understanding of the importance of personal networks. Researchers such as Hannerz only briefly mention the increased willingness of correspondents to share information under the conditions of dictatorial regimes. By highlighting this aspect through the analysis of social networks for the correspondents in Spain, this thesis therefore also builds on Hannerz’s observations with further empirical evidence.

A new, but for Francoist Spain, crucial aspect was the importance of informal contacts with Spanish journalists as sources of information. Current communication research generally stresses the importance of the domestic press for foreign correspondence. While this importance decreases in dictatorial regimes like the Franco dictatorship, the thesis shows that informal information from Spanish journalists became crucial. By building upon insight from the social sciences, this thesis not only provides a better understanding of foreign correspondence in Francoist Spain from a historical perspective, but its findings - such as the particular importance of informal informational networks - also contribute to the study of foreign correspondence in general.

The importance of the close contacts with regime critical journalists directly relates to the political importance of foreign media and the foreign press. Historical research generally highlights the political role of correspondents with regard to their involvement in and for diplomatic relations. In Spain, foreign media and correspondents became of particular political importance because of their crucial importance to the political opposition and the Spanish public in general. Therefore, this thesis sheds light on both the political agency of correspondents and the particular role of both correspondents and foreign press in dictatorial regimes. It has shown that correspondents served as a source of information and transnational intermediaries for the Spanish opposition. Because of the distribution of foreign media, Francoist Spain was in this regard, of course, special.

In sum, this thesis has shown the particular value of a mixed-method approach for the understanding of foreign correspondence. At the same time, it also demonstrates that for the study of foreign correspondence in dictatorial regimes, a flexible understanding of the
role and agency of correspondents is necessary. The exclusive understanding of correspondents as media professionals in communication research comes with the risk of simplifications. Political aspects of their work or political agency do not fit into this scheme. Historians, at the same time, generally over-stress this political importance of correspondents as ‘diplomats in shirt-sleeves’\textsuperscript{1237}. On this basis, they may miss insights that can be drawn from the understanding of correspondents as media professionals. This thesis shows that a combination of the two understandings of foreign correspondents can prove a valuable approach instead.

**Future research**

The findings of this thesis also put a spotlight on its shortcomings and areas of future research. First, this applies to the thesis’ empirical basis. This thesis partly relies on interviews with correspondents. Besides the outlined methodological problems coming with this approach, the interviews with former correspondents necessarily remained incomplete. Not all former correspondents could be interviewed for practical reasons or because they were no longer alive. Given the time that has passed since the end of the Franco regime, however, this will become an even greater problem in future.

Less a shortcoming than an area for future research is this thesis’ concentration on the understanding of foreign correspondence within Spain. Besides interviews, this thesis has primarily relied on Spanish sources. In order to understand possible political aspects of the foreign correspondents’ work in the area of international politics, only selected archives outside of Spain were consulted (France, Great Britain, Germany). Future research could therefore be extended by drawing on additional sources outside of Spain such as the US archives. Given Spain’s particular relationship with the US and the conflicts with US media and correspondents, research in US archives in particular would likely yield some excellent new data. Furthermore, the examination of the particular presence and role of Soviet correspondents in Francoist Spain through Russian archives could shed further light on this particular aspect of Cold War media history. Fainberg\textsuperscript{1238} and Metger\textsuperscript{1239} have recently shown that Russian archives can indeed be a valuable resource for the understanding of


\textsuperscript{1238} Fainberg, *Notes from the rotten West, reports from the backward East*.

\textsuperscript{1239} Metger, *Studio Moskau*; Metger, "«Der Nervenkrieg hat hier jedenfalls zugenommen»: Westliche Moskau-Korrespondenten in der Ära Chruščёv und der Wandel der Zensurpraxis um 1960".
foreign correspondence during the Cold War. Particularly interesting in this context would be additional research on the Soviet journalist Viktor Louis and his role for the Kremlin.

The thesis has used archival material from two media, The New York Times and the BBC, because of their particular importance and accessibility. The introduction has argued that this limitation was not only a concession to the scope of this thesis but also that media archives are generally difficult to access. Future research nevertheless could attempt to build on this thesis by conducting further research in particular media archives. This research could provide insights into the understanding of particular media and correspondents such as Le Monde and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. More promising, however, would be the attempt to include the findings of this thesis in more general historical examinations of these particular media. For the understanding of foreign correspondence in Francoist Spain, additional research in newspaper archives would most likely only provide limited additional insights.

Useful to the understanding of foreign correspondence in Francoist Spain, however, would be further research in the archives of international news agencies such as the UPI. This research could shed further light on the Franco regime’s successful attempt to influence directly the personnel policy of international media. By building on this thesis and existing research on the UPI’s role for South African propaganda however, it also could provide more general insights into this private news agency’s relations with dictatorial regimes.

The case of UPI directly relates to the most important area of research which could build on the findings of this thesis: studies on the international perception of the Franco regime. For the case of UPI, a thorough analysis of UPI reports on Spain for the beginning of the 1960s could examine wherever the appointment of Mendo had an impact on the news agency’s reporting on Francoist Spain. Apart from this particular case, more general examinations on foreign media’s reporting on Francoist Spain are still an important gap in current research. Such research could directly connect to this thesis and to the recently growing number of studies on the international perception of the Spanish transition to democracy.

This thesis also contributes, albeit from a different perspective, to the understanding of the Franco regime’s soft diplomacy after 1945. Rosendorf as well as Gienow-Hecht and Fischer have recently shown that the examination of the Franco regime’s soft diplomacy

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1240 Paterson and Malila, “Beyond the Information Scandal: When South Africa bought into global news”.

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provides new and valuable insights. While Rosendorf has discussed only briefly the role of correspondents, future research on the Franco regime’s soft diplomacy could build on the insights of this thesis.

Furthermore, future research could concentrate on a detailed examination of the practice of news borrowing from foreign publications in the Spanish press. Content analysis of Spanish media and a parallel crosschecking of foreign publications might be a fruitful approach for such a research project. More interviews with Spanish journalists who were active during the Franco regime would also be extremely helpful. Such a study would provide valuable insights for the understanding of this particular importance of foreign media and foreign correspondents for the Spanish public during the Francoist dictatorship.

The examination of news borrowing from foreign media and the foreign press corps’ relations with Spanish journalists could directly relate to further in-depth research on the importance of foreign media and correspondents within Spain. Such a research project could be based, for instance, on interviews with Spanish political actors. At the same time, it could further examine, from a more general perspective, to what extent foreign media and correspondents have contributed to the distribution of democratic ideas in Spain. The results of such research project not only would be a valuable contribution to the understanding of the importance of the foreign press and correspondents in Francoist Spain. In addition to the findings of this thesis, they also could add an interesting perspective to the ongoing research on the formation of the Spanish civil society.

This thesis, therefore, shows a number of promising areas for future research on Francoist Spain. At the same time, it was also the aim of this thesis to highlight both the value of foreign correspondence as subjects of historical research and the usefulness of methods and concepts drawn from the social sciences for their examination in historical perspective. Both can contribute to future research on the history of foreign correspondence. Studies on foreign correspondents in Portugal under Salazar, for instance, would provide a useful comparison. However, approaches from the social sciences can also contribute to the understanding of foreign correspondence in democratic countries. Historical research could therefore contribute beyond its disciplinary borders to a more general understanding of foreign correspondence. Historians could also test and evaluate approaches such as the importance of personal networks among correspondents and contacts to the journalists of

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1241 Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Carolin Fischer, “Was ist und wozu braucht man «Nation Branding»?”, Rosendorf, _Franco Sells Spain to America._
the host countries. As such, historical research could provide an understanding of foreign correspondence and political situations in particular, which might prove useful for communication research on contemporary press corps. This thesis could serve as a case study for such future endeavours in the world of foreign correspondents. This world is just too rich as a subject for historical research to restrict itself to the memoirs of correspondents.
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The AMAE does not have a systematic comparable to the NA or the PAAA. Therefore only the
sigantures are listened: 12065, 1289, 1284, 12427, 12065, 13811, 14078, 13441, 12437.

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E/3 – Audience Research
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<td>PGRS Name: Tobias RECKLING</td>
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<td>First Supervisor: Wolfgang KOISEN</td>
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| Title of Thesis:                                 | Foreign Correspondents in Francoïs Spain |
| Thesis Word Count: (excluding ancillary data) | 40,000 |

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