Administering Europe

Community officials and the bureaucratic integration of Europe

(1952-1967)

Katja Seidel

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July 2008
Abstract

Administrations and administrative elites are key to the understanding of the history of the European Union. While they are protagonists in the integration of Europe, they have been severely neglected in historical research. This thesis makes a significant contribution to the historiography of the European integration process by combining the study of the origins of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Commission of the European Economic Community with an analysis of the biographies and careers of European civil servants. The study is based on extensive archival research in ten archives in seven countries and on semi-structured interviews with former officials of the High Authority and of the Commission.

The thesis covers three main themes. It firstly sheds new light on how the European administrations emerged and which structures, staff recruitment mechanisms and working methods they adopted. The recruitment patterns in particular invite the analysis of the role of external influences of member state governments and interest groups on the European administrations which could undermine their independence. The thesis thus unfolds the conflicts and difficulties faced by the High Authority and the Commission and their officials. It reveals that many decisions concerning the administrations and staff recruitment were guided not by considerations of practicality and pragmatism but by the aim of gaining legitimacy for the supranational administrations. Secondly, the study examines the biographical background of the first European high officials. Here, the concept of generations helps to highlight and put into perspective similarities and differences between officials and contributes to explaining why these individuals chose to invest their careers in the European integration process. The thesis also studies socialisation mechanisms within the administrations which facilitated a European identity formation among the civil servants. By focusing on administrative cultures that emerged in the Commission, the third theme combines the study of administrative structures with that of individuals. The thesis examines the examples of the common agricultural policy and competition policy and shows how administrative cultures and actor socialisation can impact on preference formation and ultimately influence the shape of Community policies. It thus demonstrates that analysing administrative cultures and socialisation processes are crucial for understanding Community policies.
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Bibliography
Declaration

Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award.
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Administrative Affairs Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIACE</td>
<td>Association Internationale des Anciens des Communautés Européennes</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANL</td>
<td>Archives Nationales, Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbed</td>
<td>Aciéries réunies de Burbach-Eich-Dudelange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAK</td>
<td>Bundesarchiv, Koblenz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMWi</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian-Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPF</td>
<td>Conseil National du Patronat Français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coreper</td>
<td>Permanent Representatives Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGB</td>
<td>Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund</td>
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<tr>
<td>DKBL</td>
<td>Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKV</td>
<td>Deutsche Kohlenverkaufsgesellschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECE</td>
<td>United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHA</td>
<td>European Commission Historical Archives, Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENA</td>
<td>École Nationale d'Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETUC</td>
<td>European Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Euratom</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FJM</td>
<td>Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAEU</td>
<td>Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISH</td>
<td>International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>International Ruhr Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAEF</td>
<td>Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAAA</td>
<td>Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV</td>
<td>Minutes, or procès-verbal, of the High Authority and Commission meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVESI</td>
<td>Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie</td>
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Acknowledgements

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Particularly in the early stages, the project benefited greatly from the advice and support of Professor Eckart Conze of Philipps-Universität Marburg and the discussions in his research seminar. I was also invited to present the project in the research seminars of Professors Wilfried Loth, Universität Duisburg-Essen, and Gabriele Clemens, Universität Hamburg. Finally, I am very grateful to my Director of Studies, Professor Wolfram Kaiser, for his advice, criticism and encouragement.

I thank my parents for their endless and unconditional support and my friends and colleagues for being there during the good and the bad times: Charlotte Ball, Maria Fritsche, Brigitte Leucht, Anorthe Kremers, Antje Robrecht, Claudia Schraut and, last but certainly not least, Geoffrey Kite.
Dedication

To my parents and grandparents
Conventions

Throughout this thesis the term Germany is used for the Federal Republic of Germany.

Dissemination

Publications


Presentations

„So ein Mix von Menschen.“ Gruppenbiographische Studien zu Beamten in der Hohen Behörde der Montanunion und der EWG Kommission (Research Seminar of Prof. Gabriele Clemens, Universität Hamburg), 16 November 2007

Establishing an Economic Constitution for Europe: DG IV and the Origins of a Supranational Competition Policy (EGIPP Seminar, University of Cardiff), 24 October 2007


Supranationality in Operation? The High Authority of the ECSC, 1952-1955 (Conference The Lost Decade. The 1950s in European economy, society and culture, University of Cardiff), 11-13 July 2007

Formation of a European administrative elite in the EEC Commission (European Integration History Seminar, University of Reading), 13 June 2007

Formation of a European Administrative Elite (Conference on 50 Years Treaty of Rome, University of Hildesheim), 23-26 May 2007
Administrative culture(s) in the EEC Commission. The case of DG Agriculture (RICHIE II conference, Copenhagen, Denmark), 7-10 December 2006

Policy-making at the supranational level. The DG Competition in the EEC Commission (Workshop Integrating Europe 1945-72: Transnational and supranational perspectives University of Trondheim, Norway), 8-10 September 2006


Presentation of the PhD project at the Research Seminar in Modern European History, University of Duisburg/Essen (Professor Wilfried Loth), June 2005

Presentation of the PhD project at the Research Seminar of Professor Eckart Conze, Philipps-Universität Marburg, June 2005

The High Officials in the High Authority of the ECSC and the Commission of the EEC 1952-1967: A European Elite (First HEIRS Conference, University of Cambridge), 5-6 November 2004
Introduction

1. The formation of a European administrative elite

'A new race of man was emerging in the Luxembourg institutions, as if in a laboratory.' Jean Monnet, the first president of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), expected the personnel of the High Authority to develop into a new European man. This new species was to take on a pioneer role in the European integration process and take the lead in uniting European countries. The first European civil servants are generally described as the idealistic generation of convinced Europeans. These men and (very few) women, while coming from diverse national, cultural and social backgrounds, allegedly formed a European administrative elite working together to shape Europe and to define European interests. Although acting mostly in the background, they had a vital influence on the European integration process. This thesis investigates the biographical background of this 'new race of man', the European officials, and their motives for entering the European administrations, examining if and how they adopted European values and aims. Did they become 'European' through administering Europe?

The study of this 'new race of man' has to be placed in the context of the European administrations. The creation of the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC) triggered the bureaucratic integration of Europe. For the first time, European nation states partly renounced national sovereignty by transferring responsibilities in key policy areas to these new European organizations. The institutional framework laid down in the ECSC treaty, signed on 18 April 1951 by the governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands,
was based on four pillars: the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Common Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers and the High Authority. The High Authority was to watch over the implementation of the ECSC treaty, generate a European interest and have decision-making powers of its own. Less than six years after endorsing the ECSC treaty, the Heads of State and Government of these six countries (‘the Six’) signed the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). The EEC marked a move away from sectoral integration towards horizontal integration. Its task was to realise a common market, integrating the entire economies of the member states. The institutional framework of the EEC was modelled after that of the ECSC with a slight shift in the distribution of power and competences. It included the Council of Ministers, the European Court of Justice, the European Parliamentary Assembly, which renamed itself European Parliament in 1962, and the European Commission. The Council of Ministers was assigned a more important role as the main decision-making body of the Community. While in theory the Commission was slightly less powerful than the High Authority, the treaty still made it the guardian of the treaty, responsible for furthering the common interest, and the mediator between institutions. The Commission was also responsible for administering policies and for representing the Community in economic matters vis-à-

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2 On the history of the High Authority see Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994. Throughout the thesis the term ‘High Authority’ is used to describe both the institution as such and the college of nine members designated by the member states presiding over the institution. The same goes for the term ‘Commission’, which usually describes the institution as such but is sometimes also used to refer to the college of Commissioners.


4 On the so-called ‘Relance européenne’ see Serra 1989. On the treaty negotiations see Küsters 1982. However, a comprehensive account of the treaty negotiations based on archival sources is still lacking, however. A highly specialised organization with a mixed balance-sheet, Euratom was soon in the shadow of the EEC and shall play no role in this study. On the emergence of Euratom see Weilemann 1983; for a short balance-sheet cf. Nugent 2001: 33-35.
vis third countries.\textsuperscript{5} Crucially, it had executive-type functions such as the right of initiative with which it could initiate Community policies and legislation and oversee implementation of these rules. Without proposals from the Commission there would be no European policies. This right of initiative was, and still is, part of the originality of the Community system and decisively distinguishes the Commission from permanent secretariats of international organizations.

Another distinctive trait of the European administrations that could be important for the emergence of the European 'race of man' was the creation of a European civil service in the High Authority and subsequently the Commission. The notion of 'European' civil servant, however, seems like a contradiction in terms. Bureaucracy and civil servants played an important role in the rise of nation states in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Against this backdrop it may seem surprising that this concept was transposed to the European level. This is striking evidence for the interconnectedness of national and European administrations and the influence of national models on the latter. Many of the early High Authority staff came from national civil services and continued to perceive themselves as civil servants. Early memoranda and working documents of the High Authority administration frequently employed the terms \textit{fonctionnaire} and \textit{Beamter} (civil servant).\textsuperscript{6} Importantly, these officials did not want to lose any of the privileges that were associated with this status. The fact that many of them, who served their home countries as civil servants, were suddenly required to develop similar links and solidarities with the European

\textsuperscript{5} Cf. for a detailed account of the Commission's roles Coombes 1970: 78-86.
\textsuperscript{6} Cf. for example CEAB 3 387, Cesare Balladore-Pallieri, Vorschlag für den Verwaltungsausschuss, 30 June 1953, 116. In the sources, the staff of the European administrations are referred to as \textit{fonctionnaire} in French and \textit{Beamter} in German. This corresponds to the English terms civil servant and official. The terminology in the sources, and the fact that the personnel statute introduced a career system similar to that of a national civil service, justify applying the terms 'civil servant' and 'official' to the staff of the European administrations.
bureaucracies could give rise to loyalty conflicts. Yet, the European civil service was sometimes seen as the civil service of a future European federal state. This service could also further the development of a stable and independent ‘supranational’ workforce in the European administrations. Permanent staff brought continuity and could possibly develop stronger loyalties with the organization they were serving, as their career depended on it.

The civil service of the High Authority became the point of reference for the Commission. In 1958 it was not a question anymore of whether Commission officials should become European civil servants. The personnel statute of the EEC and Euratom, introduced in 1962, was modelled after the ECSC statute of 1956. It introduced four staff categories, or careers: A, B, C and D. Officials of the A career, that is the leading positions in the administration occupied by officials normally holding university degrees, are at the centre of this study. Their length of service, skills and in-depth knowledge of decision-making processes make senior civil servants particularly suitable for studying socialisation processes in the European bureaucracies. The thesis will not focus on the High Authority members and the Commissioners. These were nominated by the governments of the member states and only remained in the European administrations for a limited period of time.

Administrations and administrative elites are key to the understanding of the development of European Union (EU) policies and the Community as a whole. They are protagonists in the integration of Europe. However, they have been severely

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neglected in historical research. By combining the analysis of European administrations with a prosopographical study of European civil servants, this thesis breaks new ground.

2. Towards a supranational history of the EU

Until the 1990s the historiography of the European integration process concentrated in the main on member states and their attitudes, politics and policies towards Europe, and occasionally, on emerging European policies such as the common agricultural policy (CAP). 9 These studies were written in the tradition of diplomatic and political history, assuming that governments had the power to formulate European policies without significant domestic constraints and were pursuing ‘national interests’. Whenever particular actors were taken into account in this narrative, they were the so-called founding fathers like Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer and Jean Monnet. 10

In recent years, however, the historiography of European integration has experienced a shift in focus. Increasingly, historians acknowledge the importance of non-state actors and European institutions that are part of what could be called the incipient European political system. 11 The trend favours the evolution of a supranational and transnational historiography of the European Union. 12 This research also became more interested in actors at the European level, the interplay between

11 Rasmussen 2008.
12 One of the first who used the term ‘supranational history’ is Laursen 2002. While it has certainly been practised for a long time, the concept of ‘transnational history’ has only been developed during the last decade. See for example Milza 1998; Osterhammel 2001.
actors and institutions at the EU and the national levels, and non-state actors.\textsuperscript{13} The range of institutions in this European political system is broad. It encompasses member state governments and administrations, European institutions, including the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and other institutional actors such as the Economic and Social Committee, as well as pressure and interest groups and political parties.\textsuperscript{14} In his book \textit{The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s}, Piers Ludlow aims at writing a 'supranational history' of the EEC.\textsuperscript{15} He is one of the few historians who takes up the challenge to write EU history by taking into account the multinational and multi-institutional nature of policy making in the Community. Moreover, in several articles Ludlow has analysed the development of the Community and its policies from a multilateral perspective, including formal and informal Community institutions such as the Commission and the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper).\textsuperscript{16} For him, the contribution of Community institutions – and not just that of member states – to the development of the EEC and its policies needs to be taken into account for understanding fully the 'workings of a supranational system'.\textsuperscript{17}

Such a historiography would require a detailed knowledge of the structure and functioning of the European institutions and of their personnel. However, historical studies focusing on the European administrations of the High Authority and the Commission are few. In 1993 Ludolf Herbst stressed the lack of research on the European bureaucracies.\textsuperscript{18} Since then matters have improved only slightly and there still is a significant research gap in this field. There are works that at least partly

\textsuperscript{13} For an overview over recent publication trends see Kaiser 2006b.
\textsuperscript{15} Ludlow 2006a.
\textsuperscript{17} Idem. 2006a: 212.
\textsuperscript{18} Herbst 1993.
address this gap. In 1994 Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin published their important *History of the High Authority*. However, the authors do not pay much attention to the internal organization, staff policy and administrative staff of the High Authority. These issues are addressed in more detail in Yves Conrad's MA dissertation, published in 1989, and in a special issue of the *Yearbook for European Administrative History* on the beginnings of the European administration, published three years later. Conrad's work is important in that he maps out the elements that constituted the administration of the High Authority with great attention to detail. However, it is not so much a critical history of the beginnings of the High Authority. Both studies contain pioneer work, but this work urgently needs to be continued, updated and expanded. While these volumes concentrate on aspects of the High Authority administration, a special issue of the journal *Storia Amministrazione Costituzione* focuses on the Commission's administration. Published in 2000, the contributions cover different characteristics of the Commission under the presidency of Walter Hallstein (1958-1967) and thus provide a valuable introduction to the topic. However, the contributions vary in their quality.

Although Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence have lamented a general lack of studies on the European Commission, the number of works on this European institution is still considerably higher in public administration and political science than in contemporary history. Since the late 1950s, the administrations of the High Authority and the Commission in particular have received considerable attention. Researchers were interested in the originality of these multinational bureaucracies that resembled more national than international administrations. In addition, in the 1960s

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and 1970s, social scientists observed an increased influence of bureaucracy in modern society generally,\textsuperscript{23} which is why the ‘Eurocracy’ in Brussels was also given more attention. Political scientists analysed both the structure of the Commission’s administrative services and the European administrative staff.\textsuperscript{24} These works were often based on interviews with European officials. They therefore provide valuable insights into the atmosphere of the European administrations in the 1960s and 1970s. However, much of this research was conducted with the aim of testing or proving the neofunctionalist ‘spill-over’ theory, in which supranational institutions play an important role.\textsuperscript{25} With this in mind, and the necessary caution, the thesis will utilise these studies mainly as source material.

The range of actors in the incipient European political system is at least as diverse as the range of institutions, if not more so. The list includes politicians, policy entrepreneurs, representatives of interest groups, members of the High Authority, the EEC and Euratom Commissions, the European Assemblies, the ECJ and, last but not least, civil servants at the national as well as at the European levels. While they are still understudied according to Wilfried Loth,\textsuperscript{26} these European actors are becoming more the focus of historical research. Two recently published volumes mark this trend. Bernd Bühlbäcker focuses on German actors in the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), the German Federation of Trade Unions, and in political parties such as the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) who were

\textsuperscript{23} See for example Downs 1967; Jacoby 1973.


\textsuperscript{25} For neofunctionalist scholars such as Ernst B. Haas integration was a process in which integration in one policy area would result in integration of another, related policy sector. This so-called ‘spill-over’ effect was facilitated by supranational institutions and by the socialisation of elites into adopting the goals of integration.

\textsuperscript{26} Loth 2001: 104-5.
involved in the negotiations leading to the ECSC treaty. He explores how a small elite group dealt with the challenges of European integration in the early 1950s. Some of them, like Franz Etzel, later entered the High Authority. However, the focus on German actors necessarily implies that Bühlbäcker does not take into account either the transnational dimension of the emergence of the ECSC, or the multinational dimension of the High Authority. Moreover, the endpoint of his study is 1952 when the High Authority took up office. Hence, he does not consider potential socialisation processes within the European institutions and changing attitudes towards Europe, possibly resulting from them.

Achim Trunk analyses the European identity of political elites between 1949 and 1957. He develops and applies convincingly a theory of collective identities which he defines as forces profondes (Pierre Renouvin), or deep forces, underlying and influencing the political process. More precisely, he studies the discourse of politicians of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the ECSC Parliamentary Assembly. Trunk concludes that there was indeed a European identity. However, this was based more on a negative reaction to perceived threats from the Soviet Union and the United States and a feeling of European decline, than on a positive identification with a common European history or symbols. This important study of political elites of several countries during, what Trunk calls, the 'experimental phase' of European integration, shows the importance of collective identities for policy-making. It also demonstrates that purely economic explanations of European integration, as in Alan S. Milward's seminal study The European Rescue

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29 Ibid., 316.
of the Nation State.\textsuperscript{30} are too limited in scope. While Trunk mentions European institutions as potential triggers of European identity formation, he does not attribute them much influence during the period he studies.\textsuperscript{31} Neither does he refer to the personnel in these newly founded European administrations, who could be seen as pioneers of European identity formation.

Another small set of studies deals with the members of the High Authority and the EEC Commission. In 1980 Hans Dichgans, himself a former member of the Consultative Committee of the ECSC and the European Parliament, published a book on the ‘human capital’, as he called it, of the ECSC. His study is based on letters and interviews with former members of the Consultative Committee, the European Parliamentary Assembly and members and leading officials of the High Authority. Dichgans's main merit is to have collected crucial information on the biographies of these actors. In a more academic study, Nicole Condorelli-Braun explores the biographical background, the recruitment modalities and careers of the members of the High Authority, the Euratom and EEC Commissions and the judges at the ECJ.\textsuperscript{32} Writing in 1972, her research relies on published sources, such as Community legislation or newspaper articles, as she did not have access to Community archives. More recently, in her PhD thesis Mauve Carbonell has written a source-based collective biography of the members of the High Authority, something which is lacking for the EEC Commission.\textsuperscript{33} Surprisingly, for the Commission there are only a handful of works dealing with Commission members. Among them is the volume by Beate Neuss which deals with the German members of the Commission.\textsuperscript{34} Her aim is

\textsuperscript{30} Milward 1992.
\textsuperscript{31} Trunk 2007: 323.
\textsuperscript{32} Condorelli-Braun 1972.
\textsuperscript{33} Carbonell 2006b.
\textsuperscript{34} Neuss 1988.
to test whether the alleged importance of ‘Europe’ for the different governments of the Federal Republic was expressed in their personnel policy towards the Commission. The study is thus trapped in the paradigm of Germany ‘loosing out’ in Europe by sending second rate Commissioners. Moreover, Neuss, a political scientist, did not take archival sources into account, but based her study entirely on interviews, memoirs and newspaper articles. As to research on individual Commission members, a biography of Commission Vice-President Sicco Mansholt was published recently. A biography of Commission President Hallstein, however, is still lacking.\(^{35}\)

The permanent administrative staff of the High Authority and the EEC and Euratom Commissions are even more severely understudied. Among the exceptions is Conrad’s MA dissertation which also touches upon the administrative staff of the High Authority.\(^{36}\) However, he does not study the European civil servants in a systematic way. The same can be said about the recently published *History of the European Commission*. One of the aims of this volume is to introduce the Commission civil servants, these ‘behind the scene’ actors, into the historiography of the EU.\(^{37}\) The study relies heavily, and not unproblematically, on oral history accounts of former civil servants. While the second and longer part of the book is concerned with the different policy areas, the first part deals with the administration and its personnel. However, here the main focus lies on the college of Commissioners although one chapter is dedicated to the long-serving secretary general of the Commission, Emile Noël.\(^{38}\) This history of the Commission grants high officials a more prominent role in European integration history, but it is not a study of Commission high officials. In summary, none of these historical studies provides a

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\(^{35}\) For Mansholt see Merriënboer 2006. For Hallstein see Loth and Wessels 1998 and Schönwald 2001.  
\(^{37}\) Dumoulin 2007.  
collective biography of European civil servants, analyses recruitment mechanisms or focuses on socialisation processes within the European administrations.

Images, stereotypes, values and mentalities can influence behaviour. So far, the ‘images of Europe’ of European senior civil servants have only been investigated by political scientists like Liesbet Hooghe. Based on questionnaires and structured interviews, she analyses the biographical and career background of senior Commission officials, aiming to explain their different attitudes towards concepts such as supranationality and intergovernmentalism, democracy and technocracy. Although, according to her study, most officials preferred supranationalism to intergovernmentalism, it also reveals that the European Community has not succeeded in creating recruitment and socialisation mechanisms that are able to generate a consistent and uniform ‘European attitude’ among the European officials. It is doubtful, however, whether any organization, even a national administration, can achieve a uniform attitude amongst its staff. In a recently published article, Jarle Trondal attributes a stronger socialisation power to the Commission than Hooghe. His results challenge Hooghe’s study by showing that national officials seconded to the Commission do adopt supranational values, even though they are less likely than permanent Commission officials to adopt ‘European attitudes’. Moreover, Trondal writes that ‘actor-level supranationalism’ can strengthen the autonomy of the European administrations vis-à-vis member state governments. Such an attempt to analyse and account for socialisation processes at the European level is lacking in the historiography of European integration.

39 Hooghe 2001; 1999a; 1999b and 1999c.
40 Hooghe 1999c: 365.
42 Ibid., 1112.
Hence, concerning both the history of the institutional organization of the European bureaucracies and the European administrative staff crucial areas remain to be explored. Firstly, the High Authority and Commission administrations have never been researched in a comparative perspective. Secondly, a study of recruitment patterns of the first intake of staff for the High Authority and the Commission is lacking. Linked to this is, thirdly, the question of to what extent member state governments and interest groups could influence staffing and the administration in general. Lastly, the administrative staff and their alleged European *esprit de corps* have not yet been the subject of historical analysis and, importantly, an analysis of the European officials' biographical background and of socialisation factors they were subjected to in the High Authority and the Commission is still missing. Accordingly, this thesis combines a study of the set-up of the administrative structures and recruitment patterns with an analysis of the biographies and careers of the European civil servants, as these two dimensions influence each other. By analysing the origins of the European administration and the formation and Europeanization of a European administrative elite, this project seeks to make a significant contribution to a supranational history of European integration.

3. Concepts, approaches and method

As the study deals with such different dimensions as institutions, individuals and socialisation processes, it is informed by several theoretical concepts and approaches. This multi-conceptual approach will help guide the analysis of primary sources in relation to the research questions underlying the thesis.

For the institutional dimension of the thesis, the works of sociologist M. Rainer Lepsius provide a useful conceptual tool. Lepsius defines institutions as social
structures. The principles and legitimacy underlying these structures are expressed in symbols.\textsuperscript{43} Accordingly, one aspect of Lepsius’s institutional analysis focuses on ‘central ideas’, or, to put it differently, on the ideological foundation of an institution. These central ideas have an effect on the structure of institutions, and/or structure, behaviour in the institutional context. Lepsius calls this process the constitution of criteria for rationality, that is, behavioural norms. The compliance with these norms is considered as ‘rational’ and serves as a code of conduct, which subsequently becomes independent of subjective motivations and interests.\textsuperscript{44} ‘Supranationality’ as the central idea is at the centre of the analysis of the High Authority administration. Supranationality was part of the High Authority’s self-understanding. With the Schuman Plan and the treaty establishing the ECSC, the term ‘supranational’ entered the debates about European integration. Article 9, ECSC treaty, described the High Authority as being ‘supranational’. The term described something – be it an institution or a policy – as standing above nation states.\textsuperscript{45} While the Commission shared many of the High Authority’s characteristics, the term became discredited and did not enter the treaty establishing the EEC, as the political circumstances in the mid-1950s made it less likely for member state governments to accept a rhetoric of supranationality, in particular after the French National Assembly had rejected the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954. However, the institutional set-up of the ECSC with a supranational administration was maintained and transferred to the EEC and members of the Commission like Hallstein and Mansholt pursued the ideal of supranationality. Therefore, supranationality is also an underlying principle for the Commission.

\textsuperscript{43} Lepsius 1995: 394.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 395.
\textsuperscript{45} Cf. also Thiemeyer 1998.
Actors are the key to institutions and institutional culture, not least in terms of the constitution and conservation of an institutional memory and institutional values. Accordingly, Maurizio Bach, a sociologist studying the European administration of today, adds a human, or actor, dimension to Lepsius's institutional analysis. According to Bach, in order to survive, institutions need social groups whose motivations and solidarities shift towards the realisation of the aims of the institution. They thus internalise the norms of the institution and their (professional) success depends on reaching the targets inherent to the institution. Similarly, Ernst B. Haas emphasizes that 'supranationality in operation' 'depends on the behaviour of men and groups of men'. Hence, the institutional and the human dimensions are inseparable and it is vital to reconstruct the working environment of high officials when researching the formation and Europeanization of a European administrative elite.

The concept of Europeanization in turn is useful for both the institutional and actor dimensions of the thesis. Europeanization is a term used by different disciplines, mainly the social sciences, to describe a variety of phenomena and processes. Mostly, these are defined as processes of adaptation of domestic structures of EU member states, accession countries or new member states to EU policies, norms, values, legislation or policy-making styles. Referring to the European political system, however, Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso describe Europeanization as 'the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance', alluding to institutions and institution-building and to policy networks. Although elite socialisation, mostly referring to adaptation of elites

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47 Haas 2004: 59.
48 On the term Europeanization in general see Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Olsen 2002. For Europeanization processes in Central and Eastern Europe see the contributions in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmaier 2005.
49 Risse, Green Cowles, Caporaso 2001b: 1.
in the member states to these structures of governance, is named as a factor,\textsuperscript{50} the concept does not seem to have been applied to individuals or groups of people acting at the European level. Claudio Radaelli defines Europeanization as 'processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms'.\textsuperscript{51} Whilst his explanation is also more geared towards change in member states, the definition could be used, firstly, to describe the process of institution building, for example of the European administrations in Luxembourg and Brussels. Moreover, when replacing ‘institutionalisation’ with internalisation, it could, secondly, be applied to individuals. Europeanization can thus be defined as a socialisation process whereby people adopt norms, values and aims of European institutions such as furthering European integration and extending the power and influence of the High Authority or the Commission. This definition of Europeanization as a process of institution building and of the emergence of new rules and norms at the European level, and as a socialisation process of actors adopting these rules and norms, informs this thesis.

At the same time, the thesis has to deal with the difficulty of ascertaining socialisation effects. This will be done by looking at the incentives individuals had to adopt the rules and norms of the European administration and the aim of furthering European integration. Such a motivation could, firstly, result from the morally grounded conviction that a united Europe is the only way for citizens of Europe to live in peace. Secondly, it is possible that European civil servants were more pragmatic and less guided by idealistic motives. In this case, Europeanization would flow from

\textsuperscript{50} M.E. Smith cited in Featherstone 2003: 13.
\textsuperscript{51} Radaelli 2000: 4; and idem. 2003: 30.
their 'rational' considerations of what attitude might further their career and how they could extend the power of the Commission, and with it their own influence and prestige. The thesis will explore what motives guided action of European officials and whether they developed a homogeneous sense of the Community, and attitude towards it, and if so, which factors incited them to do so.

To ascertain a Europeanization of officials, it has to be established if and which internal factors inherent to the officials' biographies and which external factors, that is, the influence they were subjected to in the High Authority and the Commission, facilitated or obstructed Europeanization. Trunk, for example, argues that collective traumatic experiences, such as war and other catastrophes, can lead to, or facilitate, the redefinition of identity. Identities are not monolithic blocks, however, but new identities develop and coexist side by side with old identities. Therefore, utilising the concept of 'multiple social identities' seems appropriate as it opposes the assumption that one new European identity supplants national, regional or other identities.

For analysing internal Europeanization factors of civil servants, the concept of generations or cohorts can be a useful analytical tool. It could help, for instance, to detect and explain similarities between the experiences, biographies and motives of European civil servants. In his seminal article, Das Problem der Generationen, published in 1928, Karl Mannheim first conceived of a generation as marked by specific ‘generational experiences’ dating back to the childhood and youth which had an impact on entire groups of people born in specific time spans. Following

52 For a contemporary study of these questions see the works of Liesbet Hooge 1999a, 1999b, 1999c and 2001.
53 Trunk 2007: 51.
Mannheim, Helmut Fogt developed a theory of 'political generations' in the 20th century. These generations describe age groups or cohorts that are confronted with similar key events that lead them to consciously assess ideas and values of the political regime under which they grew up. Each generation has in common a basic understanding of attitudes, conduct, norms and values of political relevance. Mainly applied by German historians and sociologists to the German case, I will utilise the generational approach and test whether it can be applied fruitfully to analyse officials of the High Authority and the Commission. The important aspect here is the subjective dimension defining a generational experience. It is not about taking specific years of birth and imposing a meaning on them. Keeping this in mind, the concept may help detect and explain group identities. The high officials analysed here were born between 1897 and 1935. These years correspond roughly to two distinct generations: the Jahrhundertgeneration, or century generation, and the 45ers. The first refers to individuals born in the period of circa 1900 to 1912. The latter includes individuals born between circa the 1920s and up to 1935. Research on the 45ers in Germany shows that they were deeply marked by World War II and the need to create a peaceful order in (western) Europe. As a consequence they generally had a positive attitude towards the European integration process. It needs to be tested whether this is also the case for European civil servants from the six member states. As to the century generation, one assumption is that, contrary to the 45ers, the members of this generation were too old and too much influenced by their experiences in World War I and the inter-war period to become very much involved and to invest a lot of energy in the European integration project.

56 Cited in Herbert 2003: 96.
57 Reulecke 2003: VIII.
58 Moses 1999.
Finally, institutional structures and administrative personnel are part of what anthropologists call organizational or institutional culture. Institutional culture is composed of values, norms and aims of the institution, as well as its history and particular rules of the game.\(^{60}\) This concept can be applied to the Commission as a whole, or parts of it – numerous studies have pointed to the internal fragmentation of the Commission.\(^{61}\) This thesis analyses aspects of the administrative cultures in the Directorates-General (DG) for Competition (IV) and Agriculture (VI). To demonstrate the importance of administrative cultures for the development of these policy areas, it is useful to draw on a more recent approach in European integration theory: historical institutionalism. Scholars of this school such as Paul Pierson developed the concept of 'path dependence'.\(^{62}\) They claim that early events in a sequence of events are disproportionately important and that the longer a particular 'path' remains unchanged, the greater is the possibility of a solution being 'locked in'.\(^{63}\) It is likely, but would need to be confirmed in the thesis, that the founding years of an organization and the institutional culture developed during this early period are vital as they determine the 'path' an organization, and the policies developed by it, will take.

While these concepts and approaches are used heuristically for informing the research questions of this thesis, the method used to address them is a critical analysis of a wide range of primary sources, the nature of which is outlined in section five below.

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\(^{60}\) For an overview see Allaire and Fisirotu 1984; for an anthropology of the Commission cf. also the works of Bellier 1995; Abélès and Bellier 1996; Bellier and Wilson 2000a and 2000b.


\(^{62}\) Pierson 2004. Cf. also Rasmussen 2008 for an overview of different institutionalisms.

\(^{63}\) Pierson 2004: 18.
4. Structure of the thesis and research questions

The thesis is divided into two parts, a shorter part A dealing with the High Authority and a longer part B dealing with the Commission. In terms of the administrative history of Europe, the High Authority certainly has to be considered as a model for the Commission. Its institutional legacy is arguably stronger, however, than its influence on the integration process in both political and economic terms. The study thus does consider the High Authority, but puts more weight on the Commission in the analysis.

The executives of the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC were merged in 1967. The EEC Commission imposed its structure and working methods on the unified Commission, the merger being more of a takeover of the other two administrations. The Commission thus had the greater long-term impact on EU history.

The time frame of the thesis is restricted to the founding years of the High Authority and the Commission, respectively. The early years of an institution are regarded as crucial. Once in place, administrative structures, working methods but also core values of the organization are difficult to modify. This leads to the assumption, which needs to be investigated in the thesis, that core features of the High Authority and the Commission were established in the early years, but created long-term 'path dependencies' defining corridors for the future evolution of the administration. Consequently, for the High Authority, the core period explored is the presidency of Jean Monnet (1952-55). The chapters on the Commission mainly concentrate on the early years of the presidency of Walter Hallstein (1958-67).

Chapters AI and BI analyse the administrations of the High Authority and the Commission. The core concerns of these chapters are firstly, the organizational decisions taken at the beginning and what consequences these decisions had. The

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64 For the Commission this is confirmed by Nugent 2001: 19.
second concern pertains to the particular difficulties encountered when setting up a supranational administration in terms of organization, working methods and staff recruitment. Thirdly, assuming that the members of the High Authority and the Commission could not act in a vacuum, the impact of different administrative models and pressures of national governments and societal actors on the High Authority and the Commission need to be assessed. One hypothesis is that the independence of these European administrations was most challenged in the area of staff recruitment, the patterns of which are also explored in these chapters. These three aspects link up, fourthly, with the question in what respect these emerging bureaucracies were genuinely 'European', or, to put it differently, whether a European administrative culture emerged in the Commission and the High Authority.

These organizational structures constituted the social environment in which European civil servants interacted. Biographical studies of selected groups of high officials (83 for the High Authority and 109 for the Commission) are at the centre of chapters AII and BII. Chapter BII focuses in particular on officials of the DGs IV and VI, as competition and agriculture were two of the most successful policy areas of the Commission. First and foremost, these chapters try to answer the simple, but central, question who the first European officials were. The chapters systematically study the biographical background of these officials, examining their origins, previous experiences and their motives for entering the European administrations. This should help ascertain whether they had similar backgrounds and experiences and even a similar attitude towards European integration. The two chapters, moreover, study socialisation mechanisms within the administrations which could have facilitated the officials' adoption of institutional values, norms and aims and which in turn could
have resulted in the creation of a European *esprit de corps*, and ultimately a European administrative elite with a similar outlook.

Chapter BIII explores the possibilities of linking the results of chapters BI and BII to policy outcomes in DGs IV and VI. According to the concept of path dependence, early decisions in a policy area are particularly important as they determine the path a policy will take and which is difficult to modify later on. This chapter asks, firstly, if and in what way DG IV and DG VI developed distinctive administrative cultures. And if so, what were the key elements of these specific cultures? Secondly, the chapter examines whether high officials were socialised into adopting these cultures. The chapter aims to show how these factors might have contributed to implementing and reinforcing the path to which the Commission, and in particular the DGs, became committed in competition and agricultural policies.

5. Sources

There are obstacles to studying what Antonio Varsori calls a ‘slippery topic’.65 One of the reasons why the administrative staff of the European institutions have been neglected so far lies in the lack of availability of, and access to, source material. As personal files are not subject to the 30-year rule and remain closed, the first difficulty is finding and accessing sources that give information on the European administrative staff.66 This obstacle was overcome in the thesis by multi-archival research in Community, national, political party and private archives in seven countries combined

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65 Varsori 2006: 11.
with semi-structured interviews with former High Authority and Commission officials.

The historical archives of the Commission and the European Union in Brussels and Florence, respectively, were the starting points. However, historians interested in the administrative history of the Commission encounter difficulties. For example, the files of the Executive Secretariat and the DG for Administration, the two units mainly concerned with the administration in the Commission, are not accessible. The lack of these sources can partly be compensated by studying minutes of the Commission's meetings. While these only reflect the decisions that were taken and not the views of individual Commissioners, the decision-making process becomes visible in the third part of the minutes. These are the hand written notes of Noël and constitute the most interesting part of the minutes. For the thesis, I have taken into account Noël's minutes of the years 1958 to 1961, inclusive. The situation for the High Authority administration is considerably better, as the sources of the Secretariat and DG Administration are accessible. Lastly, the archives in Florence hold personal papers of a few high officials such as Noël, Max Kohnstamm and Pierre Uri. Due to these officials' important roles within the administrations, their papers contain important source material not only on their biographical background but also with regard to the administrative history of the EU.

Sources of the High Authority and the Commission such as policy proposals are generally very technical and give away little about the authors, let alone the authors' attitude towards European integration. Records of Community archives thus have to be complemented by documents from a range of different archives such as governmental archives in the member states and archives of foundations and political parties. These documents can, for example, convey an outside view of member state
governments on the High Authority and the Commission and their personnel. Some archives also hold personal papers of key actors such as Monnet, Hallstein, Mansholt and Hans von der Groeben. Finally, the focus of the thesis on officials from DG IV and DG VI has guided the choice of archives. As arguably the main actors in these DGs and policy areas were German, French and Dutch, national and non-Community archives in Italy and Belgium were not taken into account.

Given the general shortage of information on high officials in archival sources and the technical character of many official sources, these have to be complemented with eye-witness interviews. I have conducted 39 semi-structured interviews with former civil servants of the High Authority and the Commission. Moreover, I have used interviews that were conducted by other researchers for their own research projects. The lack of personal files make interviews an important source of information on the biographical background of European civil servants. Moreover, archival sources rarely convey the atmosphere of a place, or the interpersonal relations in the High Authority and the Commission. Such insights gained from interviews are extremely valuable for reconstructing the history of the High Authority and Commission bureaucracies. Also, in the age of the telephone, it is often not possible to trace conversations and decisions in the sources. As Wolfram Kaiser writes, 'to compensate for the fragmented written documentation, contemporary historians need to make greater use of interviews with key actors in a more systematic way than they did in the past'. No doubt, there are shortcomings of interviews as a source, in particular if the interviews take place at a much later date than the actual events.

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67 On oral history and some of the problems this research method entails see for example Yow 1994.
68 A large number of interviews is deposited in the Historical Archives of the European Union (henceforth HAEU) in Florence and the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe (henceforth FJM) in Lausanne. I would like to thank Sibylle Hambloch and Jürgen Elvert for making the interviews they conducted with former civil servants and Commissioners available to me.
Interviewees tend to overemphasize their personal contributions or idealise their time in the European administration as their halcyon days. To a certain extent, however, it is possible to compare the statements in interviews with written sources, contemporary studies and interviews that other researchers have conducted in the 1960s and 1970s, thus nearer to the date.\textsuperscript{70} Therefore, if balanced with archival sources and contemporary reports as far as possible, interviews can be a useful tool in historical research.

The autobiographical writings of actors entail similar problems. Memoirs were rarely written by European civil servants but more often by former members of the High Authority and the Commission.\textsuperscript{71} These have different levels of informational value, reliability and accuracy. Moreover, most ‘pioneers’ of European integration often spare the details of the establishment of the institutions’ administration and are thus generally not very informative in this respect. One exception is Robert Lemaignen, writing in 1964 with a fresh memory of the difficulties encountered by the Commission in the late 1950s and early 1960s.\textsuperscript{72} Another, more particular, problem is posed by the memoirs of Jean Monnet.\textsuperscript{73} It is likely, and sometimes evident, that these were read widely by former High Authority and Commission civil servants. This background could then influence and even distort their own memory of events, which they contributed to interviews or round table discussions, for example. All in all, however, a multilateral and multi-archival approach combined with eye-witness

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{70} For example Peterson 1971, 1974/5; Michelmann 1978a, 1978b.
\item\textsuperscript{72} Lemaignen 1964, see esp. the first two chapters ‘Origines et premiers pas’ and ‘Le T.E.E. “Bruxelles–Paris”’.
\item\textsuperscript{73} Monnet 1976 and 1978.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
interviews and autobiographical writing provides a sufficiently wide source basis to answer the research questions of this thesis.
A The High Authority of the ECSC

I. Establishing a supranational administration, 1950-1955: challenges and constraints

Introduction: supranationality in operation

The High Authority was to be an institution of a new kind. Neither an international organization nor a national administration, it was a hybrid between both models: a supranational organization, or even, as many thought, 'Europe's first government'. After taking up office in Luxembourg on 10 August 1952, the High Authority's main task was to set up and manage a common market for coal and steel in which neither of the industries or governments of member states would receive preferential treatment nor be discriminated against. Jean Monnet, the first president of the High Authority, had conceived the first European administration as a supranational organization. During his presidency, he and his colleagues sought to build an administration that could meet this principle. Therefore, the central idea underlying the High Authority was supranationality. Living up to the supranational principle was considered necessary, not least because the ECSC was seen by many as a first step towards the construction of a united Europe. Hence, it had to be a success from the start. In a commentary of the ECSC treaty, dating from October 1951, the French negotiation team declared that supranationality was at the basis of the ECSC, and of the High

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Authority in particular. Some of its institutional features stipulated in the treaty were declared as being the gateway to supranationality. These were, for instance, the number of High Authority members (nine) which did not correspond to the number of member states (six) or the absence of a rule of unanimity for the decisions taken by the college of High Authority members. Not least, the report assumed that a higher degree of supranationality would soon be attained through the esprit d'équipe that would inevitably develop between individuals who collaborated in the High Authority and who were 'joint together by the same task, [that is] to really create this supranational idea which is the foundation of the treaty'.

In this chapter, supranationality as the central idea of the High Authority and the underlying norm for setting up the organization, defining working methods and recruiting staff, will be tested against the administrative reality in Luxembourg during the Monnet presidency (1952-1955). In three fields of analysis, namely the organizational set-up, working methods and recruitment patterns, the chapter investigates in what way the ideal of supranationality influenced the choices that were made. It examines where the High Authority had to make concessions and deviate from the central idea of supranationality. In a similar vein, the chapter analyses how independent, vis-à-vis member states and interest groups, the High Authority was in recruiting staff and, accordingly, how much independence could be expected of the administrative personnel thus appointed.

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4 Ibid., 21. All citations from sources and literature written in French, German and Dutch were translated into English by the author.
1. The institutional set-up of the High Authority

The ECSC treaty was extremely vague about the administrative organization and the status and number of personnel that the High Authority would need to appoint. In very general terms, it stated that the 'High Authority shall make all appropriate administrative arrangements for the operation of its departments' (Article 16). It also stipulated that the tasks of the High Authority should be carried out with a 'minimum of administrative machinery' (Article 5). The college of the members of the High Authority was composed of nine 'independent individuals' chosen with regard to their general competencies (Article 9) of which eight were nominated by the governments of the member states and one was co-opted, thus emphasizing the independent character of the High Authority. The members' term of office was six years, with one third of the members to be renewed every two years (Article 10). Article 16 assigned the president a strong role in administrative matters: 'Under the general rules of organization to be adopted by the High Authority, the President shall be responsible for the administration of the departments and for the implementation of the acts of the High Authority.' In administrative questions, therefore, the members of the High Authority, and the president in particular, were given great autonomy.

Nevertheless, between the signing of the treaty and it coming into force in August 1952, the governments of the member states and the industries concerned embarked on preparations for the organization and staffing of the High Authority. The coal and steel industries held consultations both at national level and in transnational meetings where they discussed staffing and organizational schemes. At the national

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5 The members appointed in 1952 were: the Frenchmen Jean Monnet (President) and Léon Daum; the Belgians Albert Coppé (Vice-President) and Paul Finet (co-opted member); the Germans Franz Etzel (Vice-President) and Heinz Potthoff, the Dutch Dirk Spierenburg; the Italian Enzo Giacchero and Albert Wehrer from Luxembourg.
level, according to Ulrich Sahm of the German foreign ministry or Auswärtiges Amt (AA), a powerful lobby organization of the iron and steel industry in Germany, the Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie (WVESI), had already decided on which individuals to put forward for posts in the High Authority that were of interest to them. At a transnational level, in May 1952, representatives of the steel industries of the six countries held a meeting in Luxembourg at which they discussed the implications of the Schuman Plan for their industry and different organizational schemes for the new supranational administration. According to Charles Barthel these preparations had little consequences and did not result in more transnational cohesion between the coal and steel industries of the Schuman Plan countries. However, these preparations may have facilitated collaboration between industries, enterprises and interest groups in the medium term.

As to the governments, these also devised plans to influence the organization of the High Authority. Some of them were discussed in the Interim Committee in which government representatives met several times between April 1951 and July 1952. One example for such a preparatory document is the so-called Spierenburg report of February 1952, drafted by Dirk Spierenburg, a high official in the Dutch ministry of economics, leader of the Dutch negotiation delegation and future member of the High Authority. Spierenburg urged that the problem of the internal organization

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8 Barthel 1996.
9 The Interim Committee did not take any decisions on organization and staffing of the High Authority, not least because Germany withdrew the internal organization and personnel for the new administration from the agenda of the first meeting on 17 May 1951. Gillingham 1991: 294.
of the ECSC institutions should be tackled before the members took up office in order to guarantee a smooth start. As the president of the High Authority had particular competencies in administrative matters, Spierenburg thought it would be advisable to discuss in advance basic questions of the organizational structure of the High Authority with him. Indeed, Monnet was involved in preliminary discussions before the High Authority's inception.

Monnet's conceptions of the High Authority's administration were both vague and precise. It is worthwhile taking them into account for Monnet had a vital influence on shaping the High Authority administration – not least because the president was given the necessary powers in the treaty. Monnet was, on the one hand, convinced of the crucial importance of institutions as regulators in the relations between states. Contrary to people, who come and go, he considered institutions a factor of stability where experiences and knowledge are accumulated. On the other hand, he was very cautious when it came to establishing rigid and thus possibly irrevocable structures in the High Authority. Similarly, the importance he attributed institutions did not result in a penchant for large and bureaucratic machineries. A model he favoured was, for instance, the Tennessee Valley Authority in the USA, an independent expert based administration set-up in 1933. Monnet had introduced a similar structure at the French Planning Commission, or ‘Plan’, which he founded in 1946 to revive and modernise the French post-war economy and which he headed until 1952. For

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12 Monnet 1978: 360.
13 Ibid., 449.
14 Cf. ibid., 398 and Ekbladh 2002 on the TVA.
15 Monnet 1978: 275f. The French Planning Commission was responsible for setting up and implementing the Plan de modernisation et d'équipement de l'Union française, the French national
Monnet, the Plan was the proof that an efficient administrative body did not necessarily have to be large. He preferred a small and flexible administration de mission. In his memoirs, Monnet explained how he expected the High Authority to work: 'A few hundred European officials would suffice to let thousands of national experts work and to incite the powerful machineries of the enterprises and the member states to serve the purpose of the treaty.' The High Authority should not rival national administrations but collaborate closely with them as well as with industries, interest groups and experts. A small homogeneous team, filled with 'European spirit' and capable of adapting to the respective problems and tasks would suffice. They should be supported by a small number of departments, as decreed by the treaty (Article 5), to assist them in their job.

These concepts did not remain unchallenged. A meeting between Monnet and Franz Etzel, a prominent Christian democrat and member of the German Bundestag and future vice-president of the High Authority, in July 1952 illustrates the clashing views between him and member state governments. The latter were eager to see rigid structures introduced to the High Authority from the outset; structures which they could, ideally, influence. Monnet explained, however, that introducing a rigid organizational structure right from the start would not be appropriate for the High Authority, given the novelty of the tasks it had to fulfil. On the contrary, the organization of the High Authority should be gradually adapted to the experiences

programme for modernization and reconstruction. This is often referred to as Monnet Plan or French Plan. On the French Planning Commission see Mioche 1987 and Mioche and Cazés 1990.

18 BAC 233/1980 33, Erwägungen über die Organisation der Hohen Behörde, no author, undated [1952].
gained. He was thus not inclined to accept the proposals and the organizational scheme forwarded by Etzel in the name of the German government. Shortly before the establishment of the ECSC, in a meeting of Dutch, German and French participants, most of them future members and officials of the High Authority, drafts were presented by the German delegation for general organizational rules and working methods, a règlement d’organisation and a règlement intérieur, provided for in the treaty. Monnet rejected both drafts.

Other member governments such as the Dutch with the Spierenburg report also thought about the administration of the High Authority. One of the main concerns of the Spierenburg paper was how to avoid the small member states being dominated by the large member states. The government of Luxembourg had similar concerns. It devised an organizational scheme in which it intended to limit the powers of the High Authority president by introducing the post of a secretary general at the top of the administrative hierarchy. This draft, which was classified as 'strictly secret', shows that the Luxembourg government mistrusted Monnet. All these drafts and schemes were attempts to influence the organization and, subsequently, policy-making in the High Authority. Not surprisingly, Monnet tried to prevent this kind of influence taking. In a similar vein, he opposed the idea of having a permanent German ‘mission’ established in Luxembourg, something the German government envisaged. He thought the High Authority as a supranational organization should be enabled to

19 Ibid., Aide-Memoire über die Besprechung mit Herrn Etzel, Zeitplan über die Inkraftsetzung des Schuman Plans, 16 July 1952.
20 CEAB 3 37, Duits Voorstel [rest illegible], 4 August 1952, 8-17. The participants at this meeting were: Jean Monnet, Léon Daum, Pierre Urt, Jacques van Helmont, Etienne Hirsch, Heinz Pothoff, Ulrich Sahn, Franz Etzel, Max Kohnstamm and Richard A. Hamburger.
23 Ibid. For similar fears of the Belgian government that Monnet could dominate the High Authority see Conrad 1989: 41.
communicate directly with governments of the member states.\textsuperscript{24} From these preliminary discussions one can derive that Monnet had very precise ideas regarding the role, the independence and the supranational character of the first European administration. Initially, at least, he succeeded in defending his ideas.\textsuperscript{25}

1.1 \textit{The establishment of the High Authority administration}

Faithful to Monnet’s initial strategy of maintaining the administrative apparatus small and the hierarchies flat, the nine High Authority members and their collaborators attempted to organize the administrative services according to functional principles. A first draft organizational scheme, drafted by a group of high officials, the \textit{comité de démarrage}, envisaged the creation of only four to five large divisions plus a Secretariat.\textsuperscript{26} The proposal was rejected by the High Authority, not least because this would not provide a national of each member state with the leadership of a division. More organizational schemes circulated in the High Authority in August and September 1952. It was Uri’s proposal of 25 September which seems to form the basis of the organization as it contained the main divisions and services that were created a week later.\textsuperscript{27} In the 14\textsuperscript{th} meeting, the High Authority decided to set up twelve divisions and services: Economics, Production, Investments, Market, Social Affairs, Transport Service, Statistics Service, Legal Service, Financial Affairs Service, Internal

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\textsuperscript{25} Monnet also seems to have succeeded in excluding organizational and staff related questions from the agenda of the meetings of the Interims-Committee. See PAAA, Abtlg. 2, Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman-Plans, Bd. 186, Bl. 1-3, Sahm to Hallstein, Aufzeichnung. Betr.: Gespräch mit dem Mitglied der Belgischen Schuman-plandelegation Herrn Vinkh (sic!), 18 February 1952.
\textsuperscript{26} FJM, Personal Papers of Jean Monnet, AMH 3/1/7, Note sur l’organisation de la Haute Autorité, annotations manuscrites de J.M. Corrections manuscrites de P.Uri, undated.
\textsuperscript{27} FJM, AMH 3/3/14, P. Uri, Note sur l’organisation initiale du travail et des services, 25 September 1952.
\end{flushleft}
Affairs Service, Interpretation and Translation Service and a Secretariat. In an interview, Pierre Uri, a close collaborator of Monnet, bemoaned that the first organizational chart had been rejected for reasons of nationality, thus deviating from the ideal of supranationality. Eventually, 'more directorates were created than initially planned'. The minutes of the High Authority's meetings do not reveal these quarrels about the organizational structure. It is likely that the members discussed these questions informally, not least because Monnet thought it important to uphold the unity of the college, as least towards the outside.

The High Authority took a fundamental decision in not dividing the administration in coal and steel departments. This was contrary to the opinion of coal and steel experts in the High Authority such as the Belgian François Vinck who argued that the sectors were too different to treat them in the same divisions. In a speech addressed to the organizational committee of the Parliamentary Assembly, Monnet explained this decision: 'Had we separated our administration in coal and steel, inevitably, the means and ways the High Authority would have embarked upon would have been different and would have jeopardised our target of creating a common market.' Effectively, not separating coal and steel had already been envisaged by Monnet before the High Authority took up office. It can be seen as a political move, as blazing a trail for the common market with the possibility of extending it to other sectors of the economy and was thus in conformity with the supranational ideal.

One of the original organizational features of the High Authority was the principle of multiple leadership. Responsibility for a service was often not assigned to one person but to two or even three. Monnet explained that the traditional form of one director heading one division would not have been an appropriate solution for the High Authority where a ‘balanced judgement’ of decisions was particularly important.\footnote{FJM, AMH 3/3/23, Exposé de M. Jean Monnet, Président de la Haute Autorité, devant la commission d’organisation [de l’Assemblée commune] de la Communauté européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, 18 November 1952.} This formula implies that multiple leadership was a shield protecting against accusations that the decisions of the High Authority were biased. Supranationality was thus put on the defensive and maintaining a high degree of independence necessitated extraordinary measures. Also, the president explicitly wanted to boost the team spirit among the officials by attributing the leadership of a division to individuals with different national backgrounds. Especially the ‘Franco-German couples’ were important to Monnet. His ‘special relationship’ with Vice-President Etzel\footnote{Monnet 1978: 450.} was thus reflected, at the administrative level, by the pairs Uri and his deputy Rudolf Regul in the Economics Division, in the Legal Service by Michel Gaudet and Robert Krawielicki and in Transport by Roger Hutter and Werner Klaer. The Market Division was headed by the ‘three kings’\footnote{FJM, AMH 4/2/9, Note pour M. Monnet, n.a. [M. Kohnstamm], undated.} \footnote{CEAB 2 588, Communiqué, 24 November 1959, 1-3. For the reform cf. Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994: 479-486.}: the German Hermann Dehnen, the Belgian Vinck and Tony Rollman from Luxembourg. Multiple leadership did not survive the administrative reform of 1959/60, however, when the twelve divisions were merged into seven DGs, each headed by one director-general.\footnote{CEAB 2 588, Communiqué, 24 November 1959, 1-3. For the reform cf. Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994: 479-486.} Dehnen thus took over DG Coal and Rollman became responsible for DG Steel. The reform was essentially a realignment of the High Authority’s administrative structure
and hierarchy with that of the EEC Commission in Brussels. It can also be seen as a normalisation: there was no need anymore for multiple leadership to demonstrate the impartiality of the High Authority. Also, the fact that Dehnen had been responsible for the coal sector and Rollman for the steel sector within the Market Division was sanctioned by the creation of separate DGs for Coal and Steel. The decision not to separate coal and steel was thus reversed once the EEC was set up, because it was certain that the competencies of the ECSC would not be extended to other sectors of the economy and, not least, because the non-separation had revealed itself to be impractical.

1.2 The influence of high officials on the organization of the High Authority

High officials had a considerable influence on the organizational structure of the High Authority. This was, on the one hand, due to a power vacuum in the High Authority. The nine members of the college, of which only three, Monnet, Spierenburg and Wehrer, had participated directly in the ECSC treaty negotiations, relied heavily on the expertise of a core group of officials, most of whom had either been present at the negotiations or were experts in the coal and steel sector. On the other hand, Monnet had transferred his working methods from the French Planning Commission to Luxembourg. At the Plan he used to surround himself with a core group of collaborators who were closely involved in the decision-making process. In Luxembourg, Monnet remained faithful to this practice. Officials such as Uri were closely involved in conceptualising High Authority policies and the organizational set-up. In particular the members of the comité de démarrage had a lot of influence on the organization. In its first meeting, the High Authority had established this “kick-off”

team composed of Uri, Vinck, Richard Hamburger from the Netherlands, the German Rolf Wagenführ, the Italian Cesare Balladore-Pallieri and Christian Calmes from Luxembourg. Their main task was to establish an overall working programme for the High Authority but they were also asked to draft its organizational structure. Uri, especially, authored several memoranda on the organization of the High Authority in August/September 1952. His memorandum about the priority tasks of the High Authority was a key text in which he established a working programme and drafted an initial organizational scheme for the administration. The Economics Division that figured in this document was tailored to Uri and to his expertise in economic matters. Moreover, he advocated the idea to place the coal and steel sectors in the wider context of the economies of the member states. The Economics Division should thus be seen as the future European ministry of economics.

Max Kohnstamm, the secretary of the High Authority, was another confidant of Monnet. He tried to use this influence on Monnet to bring more structure into the administration and to improve the working methods. Kohnstamm also played an important role as a go-between between the different members of the High Authority on the one hand and between the members and the administration on the other. However, there were limits to the influence of high officials in the High Authority. Some of the members disapproved of Uri’s extended role and his acting as a ‘tenth member’ of the High Authority. The autonomy of high officials was somewhat restricted and canalised by the working parties that were introduced in late 1953.

38 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 1st session, 11 August 1952, 3.
39 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 8th session, 4 September 1952, 35.
40 CEAB 9 26, P. Uri, Memorandum über die Gliederung der zuerst anfallenden Aufgaben der Hohen Behörde, 23 August 1952.
42 Cf. also Spielenburg 1994: 74. See also chapter AII for a short biography of Kohnstamm.
43 Cf. for example CEAB 2 715, PV of the High Authority, 82nd session, 15 April 1953; Spielenburg 1994: 69; 72; Interview Katja Seidel (K.S.) with Gérard Wissels, Overijse, 22 April 2004.
These working parties were formally incorporated into the general organizational regulations of November 1954 and presided over by High Authority members. 44

2. Establishment of practices and working methods

'Provided with a collegiate structure by the treaty [...] and vested with supranational responsibilities and powers, the High Authority had to invent an original working method.' 45 This note on organizational problems, dating from November 1952, suggests that, as a consequence of its supranational character, the High Authority had to develop a unique working method. However, one gets the impression that the working methods of the early High Authority mainly responded to original difficulties. The members of the High Authority had to maintain the principle of collegiality and the non-hierarchical structure of the administration had led to a situation where directorates and services existed side by side 'deprived of a joint leadership apart from the High Authority itself'. 46 Finally, and not least of the difficulties, was Monnet’s reluctance to introduce stable administrative structures. All these problems had to be incorporated in an 'original working method'.

2.1 Organizing the work in the High Authority

One of the main characteristics of the launching period was what could be called Monnet’s personal leadership. For instance, he had a preference for frequent meetings with his colleagues and leading officials whom he would summon whenever he

46 FIJ, AMH 6/6/1, Projet de directive du Président de la Haute Autorité, undated [January 1953].
deemed it necessary – regardless of the time of the day, whether it was a holiday or a weekend. Personal leadership may have been an appropriate working method at the very beginning, when a constant exchange of ideas and a high degree of inventiveness were necessary to set up the organization and to establish the common coal and steel market, but it could not be a permanent solution. Officials soon felt overworked, in particular those working in Monnet’s entourage. Similarly, the meetings of the High Authority were randomly summoned, unorganized and exceedingly long. There were early attempts to regularise the meetings, but these were fruitless as the members again tried to introduce a jour fixe for their meetings in the middle of 1955. These arbitrary working methods combined with the ideal of the High Authority as a ‘think tank’ prevented the institution from becoming a ‘normal’ administration for a long time. Nonetheless, Monnet’s personal leadership has become legendary and is part of what could be called the founding myth of the High Authority. François Duchêne wrote:

The atmosphere of permanent emergency he [Monnet, K.S.] generated (and to which quite a few strongly objected) drove people of different and stubborn traditions to overwork together and, almost without knowing it, to develop a corporate identity and pride.

Initially, for Monnet, the principle of collegiality required avoiding all premature distribution of tasks among the High Authority members. For instance, he and his collaborators thought that assigning a division to each member would cause suspicion in the member states: “The nomination of the directors is already accompanied by

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49 CEAB 2713, PV of the High Authority, 14 session, 1 October 1952, pt. 1, 68-70, here 68.
50 CEAB 2268, PV of the High Authority, 268 session, 6 June 1955.
51 Duchêne 1994: 239.
52 BAC 233/1980 33, Erwägungen über die Organisation der Hohen Behörde, undated [1952].
distrust: at least they have collaborators with a different national background in their departments. On the contrary, a member of the High Authority to whom a service is entrusted would be in the limelight.\textsuperscript{53} Maintaining a high degree of collegiality was thus synonymous with preserving the supranational character of the High Authority. Not least, according to Barthel, the coal and steel industries strongly advocated the collegiate principle, thus hoping that Monnet would be counterbalanced by his colleagues.\textsuperscript{54} Consequently, it was necessary to find a working method enabling the High Authority to address its tasks without abandoning the principle of collegiality.

In their 15\textsuperscript{th} meeting, the High Authority members discussed their working methods and a possible distribution of tasks.\textsuperscript{55} Monnet felt that these questions were closely linked to the role the president would assume within the college. Maurice Lagrange, Advocate-General at the ECSC Court of Justice, advised Monnet in this matter.\textsuperscript{56} Of primary importance for Lagrange was the question of who would have the authority vis-à-vis the administration. The treaty made the president head of the administration but also provided for the possibility of delegating presidential powers to other members (Article 16). Finally, any possible distribution of tasks should not prevent the college from keeping an overview of the High Authority's policies and from taking decisions in joint deliberations. Monnet, following Lagrange, proposed two alternative ways of realising these principles. Either he could assume the role of a \textit{Président-Directeur Général} who alone would be responsible for the administration and the supervision of the preparation and the execution of decisions. A \textit{Président du Conseil} was the other solution, whereby each member would be assigned a division or

\textsuperscript{53} FJM, AMH 3/3/31, P. Uri, Note pour le Président sur la répartition des départements entre les Membres de la HA (confidentiel), 4 October 1952.
\textsuperscript{54} Barthel 1996: 243.
\textsuperscript{55} CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 15 session, 2\textsuperscript{nd} October 1952.
\textsuperscript{56} FJM, AMH 3/3/18, M. Lagrange, Note sur le fonctionnement des services de la Haute Autorité, 6 October 1952.
a service by delegation of presidential powers. The High Authority would thus resemble a Council of Ministers.\textsuperscript{57} The minutes of the High Authority meetings do not reveal if any decision was taken in this matter. It is likely that neither solution satisfied Monnet's colleagues, the first solution assigning too much power to the president and the second sacrificing the principle of collegiality. The High Authority thus missed out on an opportunity of clarifying competences and defining working patterns early on.

A year later, in autumn 1953, finding a solution became a pressing need as the lack of co-ordination between the services on the one hand, and the college and the administration on the other, seriously affected work in the High Authority.\textsuperscript{58} Spierenburg, who thought one year of experimenting with the administration was more than enough, presented a draft for a \textit{règlement général d'administration} and a scheme for five working groups to be created, chaired by High Authority members.\textsuperscript{59} This time, Monnet was prepared to delegate some of his powers to his colleagues. The options were either to create a 'Council of Ministers' with each member taking over responsibility for a division or the establishment of working parties.\textsuperscript{60} Monnet favoured the first solution whereas Kohnstamm and Spierenburg urged him to opt for the latter model in order to maintain the principle of collegiality.\textsuperscript{61} In a memorandum to his colleagues, Monnet established a sort of balance sheet of the first year of activity. According to him, the members had tried to maintain the college as the High Authority's decision-making authority even though the services had worked rather

\textsuperscript{57} CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 15 session, 2\textsuperscript{nd} October 1952.
\textsuperscript{58} FJM, AMH 6/4/38, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet (III), 21 November 1953.
\textsuperscript{59} CEAB 2 586, D. Spierenburg, Note pour les membres de la Haute Autorité, 21 November 1953, 8-12; including the documents 'Projet de Règlement Général d'Administration' and the 'Propositions' for working groups.
\textsuperscript{60} One of the first drafts of an overview of the working parties to be established dates back to early September 1953. FJM, AMH 6/7/6, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 7 September 1953.
\textsuperscript{61} FJM, AMH 6/7/7, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 17 November 1953; see also the documents in FJM, AMH 6/4/38 and Bühlbäcker 2005: 35-36.
autonomously when preparing the decisions. While this had been acceptable in the launching period, Monnet came to the conclusion that in the future the preparation of decisions should not be separated from their execution. After the opening of the common market for coal and steel in early 1953, the preparation of new decisions had to be inspired by the execution of previous ones. 62 Having said that, Monnet ‘acknowledged that [...] the various services needed some kind of permanent points of contact on the highest level’. 63 He then suggested delegating some of his presidential powers to his colleagues so that he could concentrate on the overall co-ordination of the High Authority, the negotiations with the US on a loan to the High Authority and the association of the United Kingdom with the ECSC. 64 This suggestion entailed that the members took over responsibility for a certain sector of the High Authority. Etzel’s chef de cabinet, Wolf von der Heide, analysed both Monnet’s and Spierenburg’s proposals and came to the conclusion that Monnet’s suggestion would weaken the collegiate principle. 65 He was not the only one to make this conclusion as the High Authority opted – Monnet was outvoted – for setting up six working parties composed of three to four members each, to the presidents of which Monnet delegated his executive powers. 66 However, Monnet remained responsible for the implementation of decisions. 67 One reason for Monnet’s defeat in this matter was mentioned by von der Heide: the collegiate principle was a guarantee for member states for the impartiality of the High Authority. 68 With a government-like structure,

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64 CEAB 2 1239, J. Monnet, Memorandum, 24 November 1953.
65 CEAB 2 586, W. von der Heide, Vermerk, 28 November 1953, 47-49.
66 CEAB 2 586, Protokoll der 134. Sitzung der Hohen Behörde, 26 November 1953, 57-59, with the final decision being taken on 1st December: CEAB 2 718, PV of the High Authority, 137 session, 1st December 1953.
67 CEAB 2 718, PV of the High Authority, 137 session, 1st December 1953, pt. 1.
where every member took over responsibility for one policy area, it would sooner or later be this member who would be decisive in the decisions taken in this area. The High Authority thus decided against extending its supranational rule and risking a hostile reaction from the member states.

The six working parties that were created were: Market; Investments, Finance and Production; Labour; External Relations; General Objectives, Long-term Policy and Short-term Economic Situation; Administrative Matters. This system was maintained until the merger treaty came into force in 1967, when the High Authority was amalgamated with the Commissions of Euratom and the EEC. The working groups’ role was to ‘coordinate the activities of several divisions interested in similar problems; [...] to direct the studies carried out by the division; to bring final proposals to the High Authority for decision; and to oversee the execution of those decisions.’

Efficiently co-ordinating tasks, maintaining the supranational principle and the collegiate character of the High Authority had been the main motivations for creating working groups. Decisions continued to be taken within the college and each member had the right to make suggestions to any working group and to be informed about the progress of work in the working parties. Monnet tried to minimise the significance of the working parties, however. He emphasized that they were internal working groups which would not be visible outside the High Authority. The image towards the outside world should be that of a united High Authority, not least because not every member, and thus not every member state, was entrusted with the leadership of a working group. The introduction of working parties and the delegation of presidential authorities were an important step towards a more regularised administration.

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70 FJM, AMH 6/7/28, [J. Monnet], untitled, 4 December 1953.
Similarly, the introduction of the general regulations of organization and the internal rules of procedure of the High Authority, mentioned in Articles 16 and 13, respectively, of the ECSC treaty, was a long overdue step towards institutionalising rules and practices. It had taken the High Authority two years to decide on these general regulations of organization, working methods and recruitment that were finally introduced on 5 November 1954.\footnote{CEAB 2 223, PV of the High Authority, 224 session, 5 November 1954, Annex I and Annex II.} Monnet’s reluctance to fix procedures and structures too early, before the administration worked efficiently, explains this delay.

Thus, there can be no doubt that Monnet’s conceptions of the working methods of a supranational administration shaped the early history of the High Authority. The rather chaotic conditions at the beginning, the endless discussions in the frequent but irregular High Authority meetings and Monnet’s notion of personal leadership, in short, the omnipresent figure of Monnet have become part of the founding myth of the first European administration. However, Monnet was counterbalanced by members such as Spierenburg, or collaborators such as Kohnstamm, who did not believe that an unclear distribution of tasks and disorganization were essential features of a supranational administration. It was often perceived that only with the advent of Monnet’s successor, René Mayer, did the High Authority turn into a smoothly running bureaucracy.\footnote{Cf. HAEU, INT 659, Interview R.P.B.H. Dingemans, J. Schram with Edmund Wellenstein, The Hague, 10 July 1998.} Nonetheless, the foundation was laid under the Monnet presidency with the introduction of working groups and the evolution of the role of the Secretariat within the High Authority.
2.2 The role of the Secretariat

Even before the High Authority took up office, Monnet had suggested the Dutchman Kohnstamm for the post of secretary of the High Authority. As Monnet wanted to maintain flat hierarchies, the Secretariat was - in theory - not to be interposed between the college and the administration. It was therefore not conceived as a powerful Secretariat-General that one finds in many international organizations. In reality, however, it came close to becoming such a Secretariat-General as it subsequently turned into the co-ordinating body that the High Authority was otherwise lacking. Although at first reluctant to assign too many tasks to the Secretariat, Monnet sanctioned this development. Much of this is due to the initiative of the first secretary of the High Authority. Kohnstamm’s notes and letters to Monnet show the insufficient organization and overlapping responsibilities in the administrative services and the need for a co-ordinating body. Through Kohnstamm’s initiative, the Secretariat became the heart of the High Authority. Importantly, Monnet assigned it responsibility for co-ordinating and facilitating the flow of information in the High Authority. Notes from the divisions that were initially sent to the members directly soon had to be forwarded to them via the Secretariat. Also, the divisions were to keep the Secretariat informed about their work. In addition, secretaries were introduced in each division who met in weekly meetings chaired by Kohnstamm.

74 Interestingly, the Secretariat of the EEC Commission was conceived in a similar way and subsequently experienced a similar development. Anxious not to create a too powerful Secretariat, the members of the Commission created an ‘Executive Secretariat’, situated at the same level as the DGs in the hierarchy. However, under executive secretary Emile Noël, the Secretariat soon developed into the power house of the Commission (see for example Kassim 2004). Cf. chapter B I.
77 CEAB 1 821, J. Monnet, Note à MM. les Directeurs, 1 October 1953, 4.
78 Ibid., J. Monnet, Note pour messieurs les Membres et Messieurs les Directeurs, 16 September 1953, 3.
had suggested these meetings to Monnet in the first place in order to be able to keep the members informed on what was going on in the High Authority.\textsuperscript{79} In reality, therefore, the secretary was interposed between the members and the directors. A collaborator of the Secretariat called it the ‘Cabinet of the nine members’.\textsuperscript{80} Since September 1953, the Secretariat distributed weekly reports of activities, including important dates and events of the High Authority.\textsuperscript{81} These reports were established in addition to the monthly report of activities of the ECSC for which the secretaries of the divisions co-ordinated the contributions of the High Authority.\textsuperscript{82} Finally, Kohnstamm was also responsible for putting together the agenda of the High Authority meetings and for writing the minutes.\textsuperscript{83}

In March 1953, it was Kohnstamm who urged Monnet to establish working groups. Otherwise, he argued, the High Authority would reach a dead end and the divisions would take on a life of their own and nobody would know what was going on.\textsuperscript{84} Again in November 1953, Kohnstamm asked Monnet not to create ‘mini ministers’ by assigning the members responsibility for a division.\textsuperscript{85} After the constitution of the working parties, the information flow was mainly directed via these groups.\textsuperscript{86} However, the Secretariat was still in charge of co-ordinating the working parties, of establishing timetables and reports of their meetings for the members.\textsuperscript{87} It thus preserved its influential role in collecting and channelling information. In his note to his successor, Monnet wrote that he relied on the Secretariat to keep him informed

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\item \textsuperscript{79} FJM, AMH 6/4/15, Letter M. Kohnstamm to J. Monnet, 7 August 1953.
\item \textsuperscript{80} FJM, AMH 6/6/5, W. Ernst, Mémoire demandé par M. Kohnstamm à l'intention de M. Etzel, 30 June 1953.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Cf. CEAB 2 1190-1195.
\item \textsuperscript{82} CEAB 2 1187, Sitzung der Sekretäre der Hauptabteilungen zwecks Vorbereitung des Monatsberichts, 3 September 1953, 1-4.
\item \textsuperscript{83} FJM, AMH 6/6/1, Projet de directive du Président de la Haute Autorité, undated [Jan. 1953].
\item \textsuperscript{84} FJM, AMH 6/4/5, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 26 March 1953.
\item \textsuperscript{85} FJM, AMH, 6/4/38, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet (III), 21 November 1953.
\item \textsuperscript{86} CEAB 7 405, Note E. Wellenstein to the Directors of the Market Division, 12 October 1956.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Spierenburg 1994: 74.
\end{itemize}
on everything that was going on in the High Authority as well as concerning the
relations between the High Authority and the other institutions of the ECSC. For him,
the Secretariat even substituted a ‘cabinet présidentiel’.

2.3 Introduction of the Cabinet system

Ministerial Cabinets, that is the personal staff of a minister, have been an important
feature in the French administration since the early 19th century, but they are also
known in Italy and Belgium. The High Authority introduced such a Cabinet system.
However, the sources show no trace of the motives underlying this decision. It is
probable that Cabinets were introduced on the suggestion of the French, but also the
Belgian and Italian members of the High Authority who were familiar with this
system. Seeing the benefits of having one or more personal collaborators, the other
members would not have objected. The Cabinets were small, with only one and later
two members, the chef de cabinet and the deputy chef de cabinet. Cabinet officials, as
personal aides and advisers, were to assist the member in their daily tasks, preparing
opinions on policy matters and informing them on what was generally happening in
the High Authority. Cabinet members were entitled to request information from the
divisions and services but they could not take part in the meetings of the directors.
Neither did they have regular meetings amongst themselves like those introduced in
the Commission. Also, unlike in the Commission, they were not allowed to take part
in the meetings of the High Authority and/or replace an absent member in these

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88 CEAB 2 91, [J. Monnet], Projet de note du President Monnet pour son successeur, undated [1955], 7.
90 Interview K.S. with Gérard Wissels.
91 CEAB 2 1239, M. Kohnstamm, Note à MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorité, 21 October 1953.
Publications of the European Communities 2002, 94.
meetings. The directors, on the contrary, were frequently called to participate in a High Authority meeting. Cabinet officials could, however, represent their member in the meetings of the working parties. Another important task of Cabinet staff was to maintain contact to governmental bodies and institutions in the members’ home countries. Importantly, in the multinational administration of the High Authority, the Cabinet staff, which was mainly composed of people having the same nationality as the member, was a source of trust. For example, Cabinet members advised their members on the possible implications a policy proposal could have in their country of origin. Moreover, the Cabinet members’ advantageous employment conditions suggest their importance for High Authority members. In case the member they worked for left the High Authority, they were guaranteed further employment in an equivalent position, or they would receive a generous compensatory payment in case they had to leave the administration. On the whole, however, Cabinets did not play a very important role in the High Authority. They were significant in that they constituted a national element in the supranational administration. Crucially, Cabinets, introduced by the High Authority, developed into a core feature of the European administration and became very influential in the European Commission.

93 CEAB 2 574, PV of the High Authority, 574 session, 6/7 April 1960.
94 CEAB 2 577, PV of the High Authority, 577 session, 5 May 1960; Interview K.S. with Gérard Wissels.
95 Cf. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (henceforth BAK), B 102, No 8628, Etzel an Rust, 25 November 1954.
96 Interview K.S. with Winrich Behr, Düsseldorf-Hubbelrath, 14 June 2005.
97 CEAB 3 387, Statut du Personnel des Cabinets des Membres de la Haute Autorité, 1 July 1953, 119.
3. Personnel policy and recruitment patterns

This section focuses on recruitment patterns in the High Authority before the introduction of a regularised recruitment procedure or 'concours' in 1957. The haphazard and personalised recruitment of the beginnings had long-term consequences for the institution, as many of the initial staff stayed in the High Authority for the remainder of their careers, some of them even transferring to Brussels before or after the merger of the executives in 1967. The recruitment mechanisms exemplify characteristics of the European administration. Moreover, the choice of high officials is important with regard to the question of the formation of a homogeneous European civil service. According to Monnet and his collaborators, the supranational and independent character of the High Authority should not only be reflected in the institutional setting but also in the recruitment patterns. The ideal of a nationally autonomous workforce recruited independently by the supranational High Authority emerged from an early note on the organization. The skills and the personality of the applicants should be decisive and not whether the person was presented by a government or 'some kind of organization':

Naturally, they [the European civil servants, K.S.] have to be chosen indiscriminately among the countries of the Community without favouring one country. It will be sufficient to avoid all national preference and to focus on the personal skills so that, spontaneously, nationals of the six countries see themselves integrated in the services in balanced proportions.98

Was the High Authority able to live up to the supranational principle when it came to appointing its administrative staff? After all, a strong impact of nationality on

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98 FJM, AMH 3/1/7, [P. Uri], Note sur l'organisation de la Haute Autorité, Annotations manuscrites de J.M. Corrections manuscrites de P. Uri, undated.
recruitment could have obstructed the development of an *esprit de corps* among the administrative staff.

3.1 Initial recruitment of leading officials of the High Authority

The treaty negotiations in Paris were considered a good recruitment ground for European officials with the right attitude to work in the supranational High Authority.99 Monnet regarded the participants of the negotiations as a source of 'European spirit' that they could endow on the High Authority from the outset.100 He thought that this hard core of Schuman Plan experts should serve as the basis of the organization.101 The national delegations in Paris were composed of a small number of people, mostly lawyers and economists and experts of the industries concerned. The often described cordial atmosphere at the negotiations and Monnet's ability to persuade the delegations not to negotiate against each other but to pursue joint solutions contributed to the 'corporate feeling developed in the Schuman conference'.102 However, the Luxembourg government, for one, had other reasons for proposing members of its negotiation team for posts in the High Authority. Because these people had become experts in matters concerning the ECSC treaty, had developed a mutual understanding and worked well with Monnet and his colleagues, only they would be able to control and restrict the power of Monnet as High Authority president who 'wants to dominate this organization to be, [and] surround himself with men who obey'.103 The Luxembourg ambassador in Paris could have a point here as Monnet did not regard everyone who had taken part in the negotiations as apt to work

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100 FJM, AMH 3/1/1, Aide-mémoire sur la conversation avec M. Etzel, Correction manuscrites de J.M., 16 July 1952.
in Luxembourg. Hinting at Sahm from the Schuman Plan department in the AA, Monnet emphasized that ‘national forces’ were not welcome in the High Authority.\(^{104}\) Monnet suspected that Sahm was acting on behalf of ‘probably Westrick’,\(^{105}\) state secretary in the German ministry of economics. The sources do not shed light on whether these allegations were true or whether Sahm actually aspired to a post in Luxembourg. However, Monnet’s reticence regarding Sahm shows his suspicion of the German economics ministry, which was not enthusiastic about Monnet’s sectoral integration model and even less about economic planning. In addition, Monnet could have been aware of Sahm’s activities as head of the Schuman Plan department in securing a sufficient representation of Germans in the High Authority administration.\(^{106}\) It is very likely that Monnet thus concluded that Sahm would not be able to assume the role of an independent European official.

Clearly, an important obstacle for entering the European administration was Monnet’s consent and his understanding of who was to be considered a ‘European’. It was only a handful of national civil servants, economists, trade unionists and coal and steel experts who first entered the High Authority in August 1952: Pierre Uri (French Planning Commission), Rolf Wagenführ (economic advisor to the DGB), Richard A. Hamburger (ministry of economics, Netherlands), Hans vom Hoff (DGB), Walter Much (ministry of justice, Germany), François Vinck (ministry of economics, Belgium), Tony Rollman (Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva (ECE), Arbed, Luxembourg), Max Kohnstamm (Dutch foreign ministry), Charles Reichling (foreign ministry, Luxembourg), Christian Calmes (foreign ministry, Luxembourg) and Cesare Balladore-Pallieri (Italian ministry of finance).


\(^{105}\) CEAB 3 37, Letter R. Hamburger to D. Spierenburg, 5 August 1952.

The core group of collaborators soon had to be extended. The members agreed that each of them would establish a list of candidates for leading posts in the High Authority. Monnet wished to discuss these candidacies with each member individually. Accordingly, the minutes of the High Authority meetings do not mirror discussions on the appointment of leading officials. This way of proceeding suggests that recruitment was a very sensitive topic. It is plausible that the members confided in Monnet where particular interests of their governments lay and where they would be able to make concessions. In November 1952, the High Authority decided on the recruitment of the directors. The bulk of leading officials seems to have been appointed by January 1953, according to staff lists. The newly appointed directors and deputy-directors were invited to suggest candidates for other posts in their divisions. In theory, these nominations were subject to approval of the Administrative Affairs Committee, and of a member, usually the member with the same nationality as the candidate. In reality, however, the directors, who knew best which abilities were needed for a certain task, were free to recruit the candidates of their choice.

These personalised recruitment patterns at the beginning were at the same time inevitable and problematic as they could give rise to favouritism. As Sonia Mazey put it: 'Internal cleavages – along national, sectoral and ideological lines – which existed

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107 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 11 session, 18 September 1952, 59.
108 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 15 session, 2nd October 1952, 3-9, here 3. Cf. also CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 18 session, 14 October 1952, 94-95.
109 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 23 session, 4 November 1952, 118-121, here 120-121; and CEAB 1 1414, Situation générale des services du personnel de la Haute Autorité, 29 November 1952.
110 CEAB 1 1415, Administration Haute Autorité, 27 January 1953.
113 Spierenburg 1994: 76.
within the college of the High Authority were thus quickly reproduced and reinforced at the administrative level.\textsuperscript{114}

3.2 Contacts, networks and the wider implications of recruitment

High officials who were sent to the High Authority by member state governments were certainly chosen for their expertise. However, they were also selected because they were associated with certain social, political and economic worldviews and preferences which should ideally prevail at the European level.\textsuperscript{115} Importantly, staffing the High Authority appeared no less than a matter of determining the future economic and social order of Europe. The question was, for example, whether Europe would be governed by a more dirigiste economic policy and economic planning, the path France chose after World War II, or a more market oriented policy like in Germany. One of the earliest documents raising such concerns came from the foreign ministry in Luxembourg mentioned above. In the text, written after the summer break of the Schuman-Plan negotiations in August/September 1950, the administrative staff were considered as a source of power for whoever would head the High Authority administration. The text goes so far as to point out that the recruitment of certain persons could entail the danger that social conceptions would be put into practice which were not in the interest of the citizens of Luxembourg and which could be harmful for the economy and the living standard in the Grand-Duchy.\textsuperscript{116} From the perspective of the governing Christian democrats, Monnet and his collaborators stood for (socialist) statism. Having the right people in the right post in the administration

\textsuperscript{114} Mazey 1992: 39.
\textsuperscript{116} ANL, Affaires Etrangères, No. 11384, Concerne la question des pouvoirs du Président et la création des services administratifs, STRICITEMENT SECRET, undated [ca. August/Sept. 1950].
was thus considered important, not least in order to guarantee that the appropriate
'philosophy' would reign in the European administration and, ultimately, in Europe.
In the notes of a telephone conversation Hamburger, the Dutch official and European
civil servant to be, and his counterpart in Luxembourg agreed that staffing should not
be left to the High Authority, not least because they feared that Monnet's personnel
policy would disadvantage the small member states.\textsuperscript{117}

While it was the members of the High Authority who presented the lists of
potential candidates,\textsuperscript{118} these lists were most likely established in close collaboration
with governments and interest groups in the member states. Experts of the coal and
steel sector and representatives of trade unions as well as civil servants figured
prominently on these lists. As the High Authority's main clients, representatives of the
coal and steel industries had been extremely sceptical about this supranational
organization deciding their fate.\textsuperscript{119} The members of the High Authority facilitated the
entry of personnel from these interest groups into the administration. The candidacy of
the Luxembourg steel expert Rollman from the steel consortium Arbed, for instance,
is a case in point. Recruiting him should have accommodated fears in the Luxembourg
government – and, no doubt, in the Arbed – that the local steel industry would not be
adequately represented in the services of the High Authority.\textsuperscript{120} Other candidates with
expertise in, and ties to, the coal and steel sector were Max Schensky, a former high
official of the German mining administration, Caspar Berding from the Netherlands
and Gérard Delarge, a former director of a mine in the Borinage in Belgium. German
industrialists attempted to infiltrate the High Authority's administrative services with

\textsuperscript{117} ANL, Affaires Etrangères, No. 11387, Tél. de M. Hamburger (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, La
Haye) with R. [presumably C. Reichling], 2 April 1952.
and AMH 4/3/193; list of Etzel: CEAB 12 55, List of Vice-President Etzel, undated, 136-141.
\textsuperscript{119} Barthel 1996.
\textsuperscript{120} ANL, Affaires Etrangères, No. 11384, Report Wehrer to Bech, 2 August 1950.
trustworthy candidates, as they also feared the statism of Monnet and his collaborators from the Plan. When it became clear that the members of the High Authority would not be representatives of the industries, they focused on the administrative ranks.\textsuperscript{121}

For instance, Etzel secured Wilhelm Salewski, \textit{Hauptgeschäftsführer} or chair of the WVESI, the director post of the Investment Division.\textsuperscript{122} Similarly, René Tezenas du Montcel of the French Groupe de Contrôle Charbon, which was part of the economic committee at the High Commission to Germany, was the candidate of Charbonnages de France, the French state owned coal-mining company.\textsuperscript{123} It is thus misleading if Barthel argues that Monnet attracted distrust among the industries concerned because he rarely opted for experienced people with a coal and steel background.\textsuperscript{124} In fact, these people actually dominated the technical divisions of the High Authority.

Certainly, Monnet brought with him a group of officials from the Plan and the French civil service such as Uri, Jean-Jacques Rabier, Michel Gaudet, François Fontaine, Jacques van Helmont, André Lamy and young high-flyers such as the Inspecteur des Finances, Jean Guyot, who, at the age of 31, became director of the Financial Service in the High Authority.\textsuperscript{125} National administrations were generally an important source of officials. Many of those who had taken part in the ECSC treaty negotiations had served in ministries of the member states. The files of the German ministry of economics (BMWi) highlight that national administrations identified and presented candidates to the High Authority. Future leading High Authority officials of German origin, such as Schensky, Regul (German Coal Administration, Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung, DKBL), Hans Michaelis (BMWi) and Dehnen (DKBL) had

\textsuperscript{121} Bührer 1999: 217.
\textsuperscript{124} Barthel 1996: 243.
\textsuperscript{125} Monnet 1978: 451.
already been in the focus of the ministry since November 1951, long before the
members of the High Authority were even nominated. In fact, the majority of
leading German officials in the High Authority, employed by January 1953, were
suggested by the BMWi. While this seems to contradict the supranational attitude
Monnet initially sought to maintain when recruiting personnel, a pre-selection of
candidates at the national level was indispensable as the High Authority
administration would not have been able to manage and process thousands of
applications from six member states. Moreover, the bulk of the 1,800 candidacies
the BMWi collected was not taken into consideration by the High Authority. After all,
it had autonomy in recruitment matters and civil servants at the BMWi like Hans von
der Groeben complained that ‘suggestions of the BMWi do not have priority’. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the High Authority had to compromise in
recruitment matters. Civil servants in the French foreign ministry pondered how best
to include officials from the Direction des Affaires Économiques et Financières, the
ministry’s economics and finance directorate, in the High Authority administration.
These should form a link and a source of information for the French administration. In
particular, having French officials of the Quai d’Orsay in the entourage of the High
Authority’s president, the centre of decision-making, was of interest. For the
German government there was more to it than merely having a link in the High
Authority. It particularly tried to advance individuals who were convinced market
economists. For example, when a vacancy in Uri’s Economics Division came up,

126 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Kellermann an Dr. Krautwig, Betr.: Organisation der Schumanplan-
Behörde, 27 November 1951.
127 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Deutsches Personal bei der Hohen Behörde, 19 January 1953.
128 CEAB 3 389, C. Balladore-Pallieri, Vorlage für den Verwaltungsausschuss, undated [presumably
1953], 38. The personnel division of the High Authority was inundated with 4,300 applications.
130 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Paris, (henceforth MAEF), DE-CE Coopération économique
Affaires Économiques et Financières, 29 July 1952.
leading BMWi officials sought to get someone into the post who was a market economist and could counterbalance the tendencies of planning and *dirigisme* that they believed existed within the High Authority. It was a general concern for the German government which economic model would ultimately prevail in Europe. The administration of the High Authority was also a battleground of the major tendencies in economic governance of the time.

Obviously, the trade unions were also interested in being represented in the services of the High Authority. Whereas Paul Finet was a candidate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) at the level of the High Authority members, the trade unionists Hans vom Hoff and Guiseppe Glisenti were employed at the administrative level. Like Finet, both vom Hoff and Glisenti had taken part in ICFTU meetings. In addition, vom Hoff had been the DGB representative in the German delegation at the ECSC treaty negotiations and the DGB had asked Adenauer to secure a post for him in the High Authority. Vom Hoff thus became conseiller in the High Authority. However, the sources of the High Authority reveal very little about these discussions as it was never openly acknowledged by Monnet that the High Authority employed people because they had a certain background or useful contacts. This would have gone against the principles of independence and supranationality. Also, once in the High Authority, these people had to prove themselves. In the case of vom Hoff, for example, the BMWi deplored that he 'was not able to assert himself'. In general, however, trade unionists had

131 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Vermerk für Herrn Min. Dgt. Solveen von Dr. Spandau, 6 January 1955.
133 BAK, B 102, No. 8615, Letter DGB to Adenauer, 27 September 1952.
135 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Note H. von der Groeben to Staatssekretär Dr. Westrick, 28 May 1953.
excellent relations to Monnet and also Mayer and the European administration was one of the few career opportunities outside the trade unions. According to Patrick Pasture ‘the transnational European trade union elite [...] shared a common culture with the burgeoning European administration’ particularly in those divisions dealing with social concerns.\textsuperscript{136}

One would have expected the International Ruhr Authority (IRA) to be a source of well-qualified personnel for the High Authority. The IRA’s secretary general, H. E. Georges Kaeckenbeeck, tried to persuade Monnet to employ officials of the IRA in the ECSC but, as he acknowledged, his attempt was not very successful.\textsuperscript{137} However, the High Authority did employ some former IRA staff such as Marcel Jaurant-Singer\textsuperscript{138}, T. F. Noyon and Ernest Steinmetz. In addition, the High Authority benefited from the well qualified secretarial and translation staff of the IRA.\textsuperscript{139} For political reasons, however, Monnet sought to avoid any obvious continuity between the IRA and the High Authority because of the different ‘esprit’ that should develop in the latter, i.e. it should have a strictly non-discriminatory approach.\textsuperscript{140} Not surprisingly, the German government was only too content to see the IRA dissolved and replaced by the ECSC where the Germans were treated as equal partners.

\textsuperscript{136} Pasture 2005: 123.
\textsuperscript{137} Dorfey 1999: 214, FN 29.
\textsuperscript{139} Interview K. S. with Marcel Jaurant-Singer, Paris, 22 January 2005.
\textsuperscript{140} A document even stated that, according to Uri, it should be avoided ‘at all costs’ to appoint IRA personnel. ANL, Affaires Etrangères No. 11384, Concerne la question des pouvoirs du Président et la création des services administratifs, STRICITEMENT SECRET, undated [ca. August/Sept. 1950].
3.3 The national balance

While Monnet and Uri stated repeatedly that the nationality of the candidates should not play a role in recruitment, the reality was different. Governments of the member states and industries wanted to see their nationals represented in an acceptable number, not convinced that their concerns would be sufficiently looked after in an institution with a supranational label. For example, the German steel industry did not trust an unbiased ‘Europeanness’ to develop in the High Authority soon, and therefore emphasized the need of ‘national’ criteria in recruitment in order to defend their corporate interests, for example the abolition of discriminatory regulations and production controls. In spite of the supranational rhetoric, in October 1952 Uri presented a note on the ‘balanced distribution’ of posts which took into account the figures of production and consumption of coal and steel, the seats in the General Assembly and the population of the member states as criteria for filling posts in the High Authority. From the outset, a ‘certain equilibrium’ between nationalities was agreed upon by the members. But these rules should be flexible. It seems the resolution to keep a flexible approach towards the national balance was soon abandoned. The High Authority admitted difficulties in maintaining a national equilibrium because well qualified people with the desired national background were often not willing to come to Luxembourg. Especially people from Italy were often not prepared to live permanently north of the Alps. However, the national balance meant that it was hardly possible to appoint a more qualified candidate with a different

141 Bührer 1999: 208-10.
142 FJM, AMH 4/5/2, P. Uri, Note sur la “repartition équitable” pour les postes dans les services, 15 October 1952.
143 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 23 session, 4 November 1952, 118-121.
144 CEAB 2 713, Note à MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorité concernant un entretien informel qui a eu lieu le vendredi, 5 décembre [1952], 165-7, here 166.
145 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 30 October 1958, 19.
passport. Sometimes less well-qualified candidates were employed in order to fulfil the national quota.

The departure of high officials and the search for suitable successors triggered discussions about whether they had to be replaced with officials of the same nationality as this would limit the field of candidates and might discriminate against other, more capable, candidates. In these discussions the members usually sought that their nationality would not be discriminated against, also because they would be pressurised by their governments if they did not ensure the 'adequate' representation of their nationality in the administrative services of the High Authority. According to Uri the candidate of a government had to be accepted as it was considered a taboo to judge the candidate of another member state. As a consequence, he thought that a number of candidates were forwarded not with the benefits of the Community in mind but, for instance, to get rid of unwanted personnel. In his note of November 1953, Monnet stated that the initial phase was characterised by the careful choice of collaborators, 'taking their competencies into account as well as showing consideration for national sensibilities – indispensable in the first phase of the supranational organization'. This 'first phase of supranationality' was not followed, as Monnet had hoped, by a second phase where the nationality of staff would not play a role. Under pressure of member state governments the formula of recruiting personnel on a 'wide geographical basis' entered the ECSC personnel statute (Article 28) and subsequently the personnel statute of the EEC and Euratom. Lastly, the

146 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur le Directeur du Personnel et de l’Administration et Monsieur le Chef du Service Budget et Contrôle, 8 October 1958, 18.
147 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 30 October 1958, 19.
148 CEAB 2 726, PV of the High Authority, 268 session, 6 June 1955, pt. 4.
national balance had another implication. The number of posts given to German nationals compared to the number of posts occupied by French nationals expressed, for the German government, the degree of equality for Germany realised in the High Authority.  

3.4 Daily allowances - contracts - personnel statute

The situation of the first collaborators in Luxembourg was precarious. The ‘Convention about the dispositions of the transitional period’, annexed to the ECSC treaty, provided for recruitment on a contractual basis before the Committee of Four Presidents – composed of the presidents of the Court of Justice, the General Assembly, the High Authority and the Council of Ministers – would meet for the first time (§ 7, Article 3 of the Convention). This controlling body should establish an overall estimated budget, decide on salary levels, the overall number of staff and their statute in the ECSC institutions (Article 78(3) ECSC). At first, the High Authority remunerated its collaborators on the basis of – generous – daily allowances which they received on top of their normal salary. A 29-year old official in the German finance ministry could earn an incredible 4,541.40 German mark per month in Luxembourg on top of his meagre public sector salary of 518 German mark. Thus, on the one hand, it was very lucrative to work for the High Authority under the daily allowance scheme. On the other hand, many individuals who came to Luxembourg sought security in their jobs rather than financial advantages. Recruitment of new staff

152 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Dr. Menges an Referat Z 2 über III D (von der Groeben), 30 August 1957.
154 FJM, AMH 3/3/7, Technischer Aufbau, Note, n.a., undated.
155 BAK, B 102, No. 8214, Hartmann [Finance Ministry] to the Minister of Economics, 8 October 1952, citing the example of Heinrich Gerns.
156 FJM, AMH 3/4/2, R. Hamburger, Chronologie de l’exécution des mesures d’organisation, 10 October 1952.
seems to have been hampered by the lack of job stability. A commitment towards European integration or the momentary benefits of high remuneration was not enough to keep officials working in the High Authority. Very soon, they demanded secure jobs and the opportunity of a career in the European administration. In 1954 Kohnstamm notified Monnet of a general dissatisfaction among staff.\textsuperscript{157} The main causes were the delay in the introduction of the statute and the randomness of the salary levels attributed to individual officials, leaving people doing a similar job and having the same qualifications with a different salary. Moreover, the individual situation of the officials differed: personnel coming from the Dutch civil service, for instance, were only granted up to six months of unpaid vacation from their employer. After this period, they had to decide whether they wanted to return to their old job or stay in the High Authority.\textsuperscript{158} Monnet and officials such as Balladore, however, thought that the contractual period – with a three months period of notice – was an opportunity to test the future European civil servants, to keep the most apt and send away the weakest.\textsuperscript{159}

From the outset it was not clear whether staff in the ECSC institutions would benefit from a statutory regime similar to that of a national civil service.\textsuperscript{160} Article 16 of the ECSC treaty merely stated that the High Authority ‘shall make all appropriate administrative arrangements for the operation of its departments’. Article 7 of the dispositions of the transition period attributed the Committee of Four Presidents the task to elaborate a personnel statute but did not state which form this statute should

\textsuperscript{158} FJM, AMH 3/4/4, R. Hamburger, Note à MM. Les Membres de la Commission pour les Questions administratives, 20 October 1952.
\textsuperscript{160} In the framework of this thesis, the preparatory works on the personnel statute of the ECSC, its provisions and implications can only be treated in a cursory manner. For the statute of the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom see Sassi 2000.
have. Jacques Rueff, judge at the European Court of Justice, explained that the supranationality of the High Authority was one of the reasons for introducing a statute: ‘We thought that a corps of supranational officials (fonctionnaires) was, in fact, virtually a corps of national civil servants who had supranationality as their nationality. And that made us decide in favour of a statute.’

In December 1952, the Committee of Four Presidents set up a ‘Comité statut’ in charge of elaborating a personnel statute and a provisional statute. The decision to attribute the staff of ECSC institutions the status of European civil servants was thus taken already four months after the inauguration of the ECSC. However, work on the statute progressed slowly because Monnet did not prioritise this project. He did not want the statute to become ‘the preamble of the general Statute of the European civil service’. Instead, it should be short and adapted to the particular problems of the ECSC. In addition, discussions at the level of member state governments hampered work on the statute. A point of discord between the member states was, for instance, the detachment procedure. High officials in the Quai d’Orsay wished to uphold the possibility of sending, or ‘detaching’, French civil servants to the Community administration where they would stay for a limited period of time and then return to the French civil service. In this, the French were supported by German officials in the AA and the
Monnet was opposed to incorporating detached national civil servants in the services of the High Authority. On his initiative, Article 27 of the draft statute comprised a paragraph that required national civil servants to quit their post in the national administration before they could take up a post in one of the ECSC institutions. This paragraph was eliminated, however, and did not appear in the final version of the statute. After Monnet resigned from his post as president in November 1954 and left Luxembourg in June 1955, Spierenburg seems to have been the only member left to fight the detachment procedure, arguing that it would not guarantee the necessary degree of independence of an official. The other High Authority members claimed, however, that if officials were guaranteed reintegration in their home administration, this would make them even more independent. Finally, a very important reason for the High Authority members to abandon the principle of incompatibility between national civil service and European civil service was pressure from the German and French governments. The High Authority adopted the personnel statute in December 1955 and Article 2(3) provided for the possibility of incorporating officials temporarily in the ECSC services. Detachment and national balance were the elements that underline most the grip of the member state governments on the High Authority’s staffing policy. Conrad sees in this a gradual

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166 PAAA, B 18, Bd. 151, Dr. Müller-Roschach, Kurzprotokoll der Ressortbesprechung über das Personalstatut der EGKS, 9 December 1955.
170 PAAA, B 18, Vol. 7, Dr. Müller-Roschach, Aufzeichnung, 12 January 1956, 3. The Benelux countries were in favour of European officials quitting the national civil service. Cf. ibid., Dr. Motz to the Ministers of the Interior, Finance and Economics, 19 January 1956.
sacrifice of supranational principles under Monnet’s successors.\textsuperscript{172} However, for people who defended supranationality, such as Kohnstamm, the statute was nevertheless of crucial importance for the formation of a high quality ‘corps of European officials’.\textsuperscript{173}

Conclusion: consolidation and bureaucratisation

‘Under no circumstances will we create an administration. We want to maintain our organization as reduced as possible and avoid all tendencies of bureaucracy.’\textsuperscript{174} However determined Monnet and his collaborators may have been to maintain the High Authority as a small and flexible administration, bureaucratisation seems to have been inevitable, not least because of the increasing complexity of the tasks the High Authority had to fulfil. More staff and rigid structures had become indispensable. According to Bach, bureaucratisation is a process of consolidation and persistence of the supranational institutional framework.\textsuperscript{175} This is a positive view of a process that was often perceived as hampering innovation, flexibility and rationality within the administration. The members and staff did not perceive the High Authority as an organization that worked in a smooth and rational way.\textsuperscript{176} In interviews, former High Authority officials frequently underlined the anarchical character of work under the

\textsuperscript{172} Conrad 1992: 70.
\textsuperscript{173} FJM, AMH 6/4/31, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 22 October 1953.
\textsuperscript{175} Bach 1995: 370.
\textsuperscript{176} CEAB 7 8, C. Balladore-Pallieri, An die Herren Direktoren, 15 March 1953.
Monnet presidency where working hours did not exist. Nevertheless, the chaotic beginnings and the heavy workload seem to have contributed to forging a ‘team spirit’ among the High Authority staff. Anecdotes such as officials catching a couple of hours of sleep in the office, stretched out on the floor under their desks, became part of the founding myth of the European administration, also passed on to, and propagated by, officials who had entered the High Authority long after Monnet’s departure.

Another persisting problem under the Monnet presidency were overlapping responsibilities and duplication of work between the divisions, which were a result of an ambiguous demarcation of responsibilities. Defining the scope of the divisions seems to have caused serious problems that were still not solved long after the working groups had been established. For Potthoff a clear demarcation of responsibilities between the divisions and services was a first step towards a ‘rationally’ organized administration. It was only when work on the statute reached its final stages in spring 1955 that the High Authority saw the need to know the structure of its divisions, the number of the different tasks as well as the internal hierarchy of each division. Before then, there was no detailed organizational scheme of the different services and divisions and their internal hierarchies. The lack of co-ordination between the divisions also seems to have facilitated an unintended increase in staff numbers. Divisions tended to feel responsible for an area, for which

177 See for example the interviews K.S. with Marcel Jaurant-Singer and with Max Kohnstamm, Fenffe, 26 April 2004.
180 CEAB 7 10, Dr. H. Potthoff, Notiz an das Sekretariat z. H. von Herrn Ernst, 27 February 1953.
they demanded and employed personnel, that was also covered by other divisions.\textsuperscript{182} The High Authority was thus not able to live up to the aim of retaining a small and flexible administration. At the beginning of January 1953, the High Authority had 280 employees.\textsuperscript{183} At the end of 1958, the number of staff had more than tripled to 938.\textsuperscript{184} Increasing staff numbers are an indicator for bureaucratisation but also for the changing role of an administration: ‘[W]ith the opening of the common market, the administrative services became increasingly involved in the daily management and adjustment – i.e. the execution – of Community policies.’\textsuperscript{185} The High Authority had lost its initial character as think tank working with external experts, dear to Monnet, because the services soon aimed at undertaking all the work themselves.\textsuperscript{186}

By trying to keep the administration small and flexible, did Monnet ‘defy organizational logic’, as Mazey suggests?\textsuperscript{187} It is more likely that, with his experience at the Plan, Monnet really believed that the High Authority could remain a small \textit{administration de mission}. However, there were external factors that played against him, such as member state governments requesting the creation of supplementary divisions and observing the national balance. Another factor why Monnet could not succeed in keeping the administration small and flexible was that the staff pressed for job stability. The statute was thus necessary, but at the same time limited the High Authority’s flexibility in recruiting and dismissing staff.

\textsuperscript{183} CECA, Haute Autorité, Exposé sur la Situation de la Communauté, 10 Janvier 1953, 18. However, another staff list counts only 100 employées, CEAB 3 389, Situation du Personnel et des Services à la date du 27 janvier 1953, 6-10.
\textsuperscript{185} Mazey 1992: 43.
\textsuperscript{186} CEAB 2 319, PV of the High Authority, 319 session, 17 May 1956.
\textsuperscript{187} Mazey 1992: 45.
Even though the Monnet presidency is often described as a period of job insecurity, chaotic working methods and disorganization, it was precisely under this president that the High Authority took far-reaching decisions on its organizational form and introduced working methods that would continue to be used until the High Authority ceased to exist in 1967. Similarly, work on the personnel statute had already begun in late 1952, but it was only introduced in July 1956, after Mayer had succeeded Monnet at the presidency of the High Authority. The introduction of working parties guaranteed that the members continued to take decisions as a college until 1967, thus preserving a supranational decision-making procedure. The first intake of staff had a great impact on the High Authority and the first to arrive were often those who stayed longest in the administration as will be shown in chapter AII. However, this also resulted in the blocking of high level posts. The ‘three kings’, for example, dominated the coal and steel departments of the High Authority until the mid-1960s. The same can be said for the members of the High Authority. People like Coppé, Wehrer, Potthoff and Finet remained in the High Authority, not least because they lacked career opportunities in their home countries. The technical nature of the High Authority’s task made it difficult to trigger further integration and to gain attention in the media and among the citizens of the member states. After the departure of both Monnet and Mayer, the High Authority would have needed members with an ‘image of Europe’. Monnet and officials such as Kohnstamm had insisted on the wider political impact of High Authority policies and under Monnet’s presidency there were attempts to reach the public and to make more of the High Authority than just the coal and steel authority.\(^\text{188}\) Still, Mazey’s claim that the ‘High

\(^{188}\) Cf. FJM, AMH 6/4/7, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, Personnel et confidentiel, 30 March 1953.
Authority was more intergovernmental than supranational in character\textsuperscript{189} overstates the influence of the member state governments. She leaves aside all considerations of 'Europeanization' of High Authority members and staff and of individuals of member state governments, industries and trade unions who participated in the Council of Ministers or the Consultative Committee and who were certainly affected by the structures, working methods and ideas that were at the heart of the High Authority.\textsuperscript{190}

In spite of the High Authority not being able to totally live up to the supranational ideal, it is likely that working in a multinational administration with a claim of supranationality had an effect on its administrative staff and created a corporate identity and loyalties with the institution. The next chapter discusses factors that could have facilitated or obstructed a Europeanization of high officials in the High Authority.

\textsuperscript{189} Mazey 1992: 46.
\textsuperscript{190} The study of Carbonell 2006b shows that the High Authority members did indeed undergo a Europeanization in the High Authority. See also Dichgans 1980.
II. Towards a European administrative elite? The first European high officials

Introduction

This chapter examines a group of the first European civil servants in the High Authority. Their biographies and careers form the basis of the chapter, which focuses in particular on possible Europeanization factors. Europeanization processes, as defined here, consist of socialisation mechanisms which could facilitate a shift of loyalties to the European level and the European officials’ adoption of a sense of community and supranational aims and values.\(^1\) I will test whether in terms of its administrative staff the High Authority indeed became a “‘hothouse’ for supranationalism”.\(^2\) The first section considers internal factors of Europeanization, that is, the officials’ biographical background including their education, experiences and careers before entering the High Authority. The second section explores external factors that could have triggered or enhanced Europeanization processes such as living and working in Luxembourg. The final section features three biographies of European high officials.

The A career, ranging from A1 (director) to A7 (administrator), generally required a university degree and relevant professional experience. Directors were at the top of the administrative hierarchy and headed the largest administrative units in the High Authority. Highly qualified civil servants, they served the High Authority members as advisers and were responsible for policy drafts devised in their division and submitted to the High Authority. The main focus of this chapter will be on A

\(^2\) Trondal 2007: 1112.
officials of the Market Division\textsuperscript{3}, Economics Division and the Secretariat. This choice allows the study of a wide range of officials, with one technical division concerned with the coal and steel market, the other division dealing with more general economic questions and the Secretariat playing a vital role in the smooth running of the High Authority.

Staff numbers in the High Authority changed constantly and are difficult to determine. According to the internal ECSC Monthly Bulletin, in July 1956 the High Authority had 662 employees, of which 171 A, 54 B and 389 C officials and 48 L (language) staff.\textsuperscript{4} Of the 171 A officials, twelve worked in the Economics Division, 21 in the Market Division and seven in the Secretariat. Altogether, this chapter includes 19 officials from the Economics Division, 25 from the Market Division and 26 from the Secretariat (including the External Relations Division, the Legal Service and some officials who served in Cabinets).\textsuperscript{5} In addition, 13 officials, randomly selected across other divisions of the High Authority, serve as a comparison group. Due to the fact that not all officials worked in these divisions at the same point in time but moved on to other divisions or left the High Authority, the number of officials studied here is higher than the staff numbers given for the individual divisions in 1956. The study thus comprises 83 officials which is quite a high proportion of the 171 A officials, given that biographical information for the High Authority officials is hard to come by. Many of these first European officials born in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, died before it became more common to conduct interviews with witnesses of

\textsuperscript{3} In 1959 the Market Division was split into a Directorate-General for Coal and a Directorate-General for Steel.

\textsuperscript{4} Monthly Bulletin cited in: CEAB 12 89, Note à l'attention du Président, 18 July 1956, 1-2. However, according to another document, dating from July 1956, the High Authority had 695 officials, 177 of the category A, 110 B, 356 C and 52 linguistic staff. CEAB 12 89, Note à l'attention du Président, 18 July 1956, 1-2.

\textsuperscript{5} These figures refer to civil servants who spent their entire career or at least part of it in these divisions.
European integration since the 1990s and they left few traces in archival sources. Some officials, therefore, are merely known by name and by the position they held within the administration. For others it was possible to obtain biographical details. Due to the fragmented source material, the picture that emerges of the High Authority personnel is not exhaustive. However, it is a crucial step towards a fuller analysis of the first administrative staff of the European administration in Luxembourg.

1. Internal factors of Europeanization: the officials' biographical background

The ideas and ideologies, political convictions and values, and aims and objectives of individuals are the result of their accumulated experiences. What (generational) experiences did the High Authority's civil servants share? To understand their convictions, aims and, importantly, their actions, it is essential to explore and assess their biographical backgrounds.

1.1 Age and social background

In order to place the officials in a generational context, determining the age groups they belonged to is vital. The average year of birth of officials in the first intake of Secretariat staff is 1918. They were born between 1905 and 1929. The typical civil servants in the Secretariat were in their early to late thirties when coming to Luxembourg. Compared to the Secretariat, officials of the Market Division were significantly older. Their average year of birth is 1906 with three officials born in the

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6 18 out of 26 officials. Of five officials the date of birth is not known and three were not taken into consideration as they entered the High Authority in the late 1950s or early 1960s, and thus do not correspond to the first intake of staff.
19th century, one in 1897 and two in 1899. Three were born shortly after the turn of the century, in 1902 and the youngest was born in 1922.7 When entering the High Authority the officials in the Market Division were on average over a decade older than their colleagues from the Secretariat. Finally, with 1915 as the average year of birth of staff, the Economics Division was more similar to the Secretariat. The oldest official was born in 1899 and the youngest in 1928. If one includes the officials who entered the High Authority after 1956, the average year of birth rises to 1918 in the Economics Division.8 While this renders the Market Division the oldest by far, the officials of the comparison group were born in 1910 on average, with two officials born in 1899. This corresponds more to the results for the Market Division and shows that this higher average age was not exceptional.

The age distribution suggests that the High Authority staff was heterogeneous. However, the officials' years of birth indicate that they may have shared certain generational experiences.9 As explained in the introduction, the concept of generation can be a useful analytical tool to determine similarities and differences between groups of individuals and thus to reach more general conclusions on these groups. Jürgen Reulecke coined the term Jahrhundertgeneration, or century generation, which he applied to Germans born between circa 1900 and 1912.10 At first sight century generation corresponds to the seemingly unique German experience of defeat in World War I, political and economic crisis in the inter-war years and the rise of national socialism. However, I argue that individuals born in these years shared some experiences across national borders. They grew up during World War I and

7 This number includes 14 officials out of 25, of seven the year of birth is not known and four entered the High Authority after 1956 and were not taken into consideration.
8 Twelve out of 19 officials were included. Of six the year of birth is not known.
9 Mannheim 1978.
10 Reulecke 2003.
experienced political and/or economic instability in the 1920s and 1930s which did not only hit Germany but also Italy, France and the Netherlands, for example. Italy saw the rise of fascism in the 1920s and during the war France was governed by the nationalist collaborationist government of Marshal Philippe Pétain (1940-44). While taking into account the diversity of the different personal experiences, the concept of century generation can thus be applied to individuals from the six member states and was not a generational Sonderweg of German officials.

Born on average in 1918, the staff of the Secretariat and the Economics Division is nearer to the so-called 45er generation, a generation that was profoundly marked by World War II and 1945 as an important turning point in their lives. This generation dominated the Commission and is discussed in more detail in chapter BII. What impact did the generational background of the officials have on their ability to adopt European values? The members of the century generation reached the height of their careers in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus the possibility of supporting European integration as a new way of peaceful cooperation between European states opened up to them relatively late in life. Ulrich Herbert attributes them a high degree of rationality and dispassion. Arguably, they were less likely to adopt and internalise European values and aims. Considerably younger at the end of World War II, the 45ers were more likely to adapt to the multinational surroundings in the High Authority. Herbert also attributes them a particularly positive attitude towards the European integration project.

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11 Moses 1999.
12 Herbert 2003: 98.
13 Herbert 2003: 105.
1.2 Educational background

Exploring the educational background and previous professional experience of officials is vital for comprehending their preferences and decision-making behaviour. This subsection explores whether the diversity in age is complemented by a diversity of the officials’ educational background. This is likely as the tasks of the divisions and services of the High Authority were diverse and required a range of different skills. Indeed, Table 1 suggests that there are such variations in the educational background among staff of all four groups.

Table 1. Educational background of high officials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No university studies</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Economics</th>
<th>Law/ Economics</th>
<th>French Grande École</th>
<th>Engineering /Mining</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Not known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Division</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Economics Division</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With five lawyers, four economists, five with a double degree in law and economy, five graduates from a French elite Grande École and one, Kohnstamm, holding a degree in modern history, the Secretariat was dominated by generalists. In contrast, the Market Division was clearly a division of experts. Fourteen officials held a degree in engineering, of which nine specialised in mining. However, at least two of the three directors of the Market Division, namely Rollman and Dehnen, had not studied at a university but received training on the job. Dehnen had worked in a bank before

14 Trondal 2007: 1116.
embarking on a career in different enterprises in the German coal industry and Rollman had left school at the age of eighteen with a certificate of the École Industrielle et Commerciale in Luxembourg. He then worked in steel enterprises in France and Luxembourg. Of Vinck, the third director, it is not known for sure whether he obtained a university degree. It is probable that he, too, trained on the job in the Belgian coal industry.

The Economics Division was, like the Secretariat, a division composed of generalists with the exception of one engineer. But the educational background of officials of the Economics Division was more complex. Several officials held degrees in more than one subject. This can be explained by the fact that in France it was common to study more than one subject and French officials were in relative majority in this division, or at least in the group studied here. In this respect, the German deputy director Regul fitted well into this group as he held degrees in history and economics. With philosophy, law, economics and a diploma of the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA), Uri accumulated the most degrees. While it would go too far to compare the Economics Division to the French Planning Commission, it is true that with Uri being responsible for recruitment in his division, a network of French economists entered the High Authority. Uri, Pierre Pujade and Jacques Cros had studied at the Institut de Sciences économiques appliquées under the economist François Perroux who had connections with Robert Marjolin and the Plan. Finally, the educational background of officials from the comparison group is more balanced with generalists and specialists evenly distributed. All in all, judging by the age and

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16 Information from HAEU, INT-ECH 716, interview Yves Conrad et Julie Cailleau with Jacques-René Rabier, Brussels, 8 January 2004. François Perroux (1903-1987) was the founder of the Institut de Sciences Economiques Appliquées and was among other things Professor at the Collège de France.
educational background, the High Authority staff seems to have been divided into two groups: younger generalists of the 45er generation and older coal and steel experts of the century generation.

1.3 Professional background

The officials’ professional background before entering the High Authority can be divided into five categories: national civil service; business; interest groups; universities and research institutions; and international organizations.

Table 2. Professional background of group of high officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Civil Service</th>
<th>Business (in particular coal and steel industry)</th>
<th>Interest groups (industry, trade unions etc.)</th>
<th>University/ Research/</th>
<th>International organisation</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Not known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Division</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Division</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison group I</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bulk of officials had worked in national administrations in the member states. In the Secretariat alone twelve officials came from the national civil service. In the Market and Economics Divisions, eight and seven officials, respectively, had been civil servants. It is not surprising that the group of former civil servants was not the strongest in the Market Division. In this division expert knowledge of coal and steel markets was needed and this was best available from practitioners having worked in businesses operating in this sector. This explains the high number of officials (eleven) from private enterprises working in the Market Division. On the contrary, the number
of officials from private enterprises is nil in the Economics Division and negligible in the Secretariat and the comparison group. The number of people from interest groups is very low in all three divisions studied here. At first sight, this seems to confirm Monnet’s claim of the High Authority’s neutrality. However, this first impression has to be modified when looking at the comparison group where former interest group employees constitute the largest group of officials. This suggests that the number of former interest group employees in the High Authority as a whole was not negligible.

1.4 War experience

In the present study war experience refers to World War II, although some High Authority officials had experienced World War I. Set up only seven years after the end of World War II, it is unlikely that the war did not play a role in the High Authority – if not in the decisions of the High Authority, then at least in the everyday working life of the officials. It is difficult to reconstruct from the sources, however, in what way these experiences had an impact. While interviews give some idea, they have to be treated cautiously. The war experiences of the officials were diverse and include fighting as a soldier against Nazi Germany or in the Wehrmacht, activities in the resistance, imprisonment, persecution, experiencing occupation or suffering the loss of friends and relatives. The question is which mechanisms allowed the officials to overcome possible feelings of resentment and mistrust against, especially, their German colleagues. Georges Berthoin, Monnet’s chef de cabinet, recounts that after he had arrived in Luxembourg he invited all the chefs de cabinet to dinner and asked them what they did in 1943, including Winrich Behr, then an officer in the General

17 There seems to be only one official in the Market Division, Otto Hotzel, who fought in both World War I and World War II.
Staff of the Wehrmacht. Further, they discussed how to deal with the situation, whether it was possible to forgive and forget. The majority of the French and Dutch colleagues said, according to Berthoin, that they could neither forget nor forgive but that they were determined to look ahead and 'to construct the future together'. If this was the motto for dealing with the past, it did not prevent officials from meeting their German colleagues with mistrust and even hostility. The Luxembourger Calmes, for example, had been imprisoned in the Concentration Camp Hinzert near Trier. In an interview he stated that his first reaction to the Schuman Plan was hostile. The only positive aspect he found in the proposal was, according to him, that it would lead to peace. He also 'tested' his German colleagues, confronting them with what he had to endure during the war. Behr recalls such an encounter when he and his wife were invited to dinner by Calmes and Calmes showed them the wrought-iron coat rack he had made in captivity. However, the attitude of a 'fresh start' without forgetting the past was displayed by other officials including Kohnstamm, who had himself been imprisoned several times during the war. He befriended Behr and described his first encounter with him:

You walked into my office and said that you were a regular officer. I said that was none of my business and that we were here to talk about the future, not the past. Later, we talked about the past and there comes a time when this is indispensable. But there are times when action has to be forward-looking.

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21 HAEU, Int 489, Interview François Duchêne with Winrich Behr, Düsseldorf-Hubbelrath, 29 April 1987.
Calmes and Kohnstamm stand for two ways of dealing with the immediate past. Clearly, the 'fresh start' was not always very smooth.

Also of interest is how the German government dealt with the role that potential German candidates for the High Authority may have had during World War II. The Federation for the Victims of the Nazi Regime urged the German chancellery and economics ministry to carefully consider candidates' backgrounds and careers during the period of National Socialism and to exclude compromised individuals. 23 While Hallstein required information on whether the members of the German delegation at the Schuman Plan negotiations had been NSDAP members, 24 this was not followed through rigorously when it came to staffing the High Authority. However, a certificate of 'denazification' was among the criteria German candidates had to fulfil. The files of the economics ministry reveal a case where a candidate was considered unsuitable for working in an 'interstate organization' because of his membership of the Waffen-SS. However, it was merely out of consideration of the opinion in other member states that this candidate was excluded and not because of a conviction of the German government that these individuals should generally not be able to make a career in the public sector. 25 Surprisingly, the German government seems to have lacked consideration when it came to the German High Authority members. While not a member of the NSDAP, 26 Vice-President Etzel, born 1902, had a background in the völkische Bewegung, or nationalist movement, of right-wing student corporations in Germany in the inter-war period and he fought in the

23 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Abschrift. Bund der Verfolgten des Nazi-Regimes (BVN) an das Bundeskanzleramt und das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, 21 July 1952.
24 PAAA, Abteilung 2, Sekretariat, Vol. 90, Bl. 27, Sahm to Hallstein, 31 October 1950.
25 BAK, B 102, No. 8615, Vermerk Buff, Abtlg. Z 2 k an III D 1, 28 July 1959. At roughly the same time, however, the Commission employed former SS-Obersturmführer Siegfried Korth.
26 A negative search result by the BA Berlin-Lichterfelde confirms that Etzel had not been a member of the NSDAP. Letter to K.S., 5 May 2008.
Wehrmacht during the war. These corporations were traditionally anti-Semitic, revanchist and anti-French.\textsuperscript{27} With regard to Etzel and Fritz Hellwig, an anti-French nationalist before and during World War II, Bühlbäcker concludes in his study that the ‘federal government displayed a considerable moral indifference’ when it came to the assignment of posts in the High Authority to politically incriminated individuals.\textsuperscript{28} At first sight, Heinz Potthoff, a trade unionist and candidate of the DGB, seems to have been chosen because he had not been a member of the NSDAP. Yet, Potthoff was only second choice because the DGB’s first candidate, Heinrich Deist, had been a NSDAP member and Adenauer feared that his candidature would be criticized or even rejected by the other member states on this ground.\textsuperscript{29} However, consideration for the other member states was only a pretext for Adenauer to reject Deist’s candidature, as his economic orientation, which tended towards economic planning, could have caused problems for Etzel who was supposed to defend the values of the social market economy in the High Authority.\textsuperscript{30}

All in all, the German government did not pursue a convincing policy to exclude all individuals with a dubious past from entering the High Authority. In a way, Etzel’s and Hellwig’s biographies are representative for Germans of the century generation. It is also not untypical that after the war both became convinced democrats. In this respect, the choice of Etzel, a co-founder of the CDU, as vice-president of the High Authority was logical because he was a prominent personality in western Germany and close to Adenauer. His candidature should signal the importance the German government attributed to the ECSC. Combining the former

\textsuperscript{27} On Etzel see Bühlbäcker 2007: 149-88.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 355.
\textsuperscript{29} 234. Kabinettsitzung, 11 July 1952, TOP A (\textit{Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung\textendash;online}) http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/1020/k/k1952k/kap1_2/kap2_54/para3_15.html (accessed 7 January 2008).
\textsuperscript{30} Bühlbäcker 2007: 287.
nationalists Etzel and Hellwig with Monnet and other High Authority members, some of whom had fought in the resistance movement such as Giacchero, could have led to conflicts – unless they granted each other the right to renounce old beliefs and the ability to change. Moreover, at the origins of the fruitful collaboration between Monnet and Etzel was certainly also the attitude of ‘do not forget but look ahead’. However, this attitude could sometimes be forced upon the High Authority members as they had to accommodate the candidate choices of member state governments. This becomes evident in the case of Etzel’s successor at the High Authority, Karl-Maria Hettlage (1959-1967), a former member of the SS and close collaborator of Albert Speer. Neither the governments of the other member states nor the High Authority protested against Hettlage’s candidature, which was considered a matter of intra-German affairs.

1.5 International experience

International experience can point to a greater ability of individuals to adapt to new work and life-related circumstances. It can render people more open, tolerant and flexible. In the case of European officials it could mean that they responded in a positive way to the multinational experience in the High Authority and, ultimately, adopted the goals of European integration. According to Trondal, officials with international experience ‘may be conducive to supranationalism’ and are more likely to adopt ‘supranational role perceptions’. Looking at the proportion of officials who had such an experience, and at the nature of this previous international experience,

32 Condorelli-Braun 1972.
will thus round off the picture of internal Europeanization factors. Table 3 lists the international experience of High Authority officials.

Table 3. Previous international experience of high officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretariat</th>
<th>Market Division</th>
<th>Economics Division</th>
<th>Comparison group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall figure for international experiences exceeds the number of officials analysed because some individuals had accumulated two or more such experiences. The figures in the ‘none or not known’ column are high. It is likely that a large proportion of officials in this column actually did not have any international experience before entering the High Authority. Otherwise the proportion of officials having such an experience would seem excessively high for the early 1950s.

In the Secretariat, the most widespread international experience was studying abroad (nine). Only two officials worked for international organizations and another two participated in international negotiations. The overall picture is that of a very mobile Secretariat staff. However, the high number of university studies in another country, as opposed to other experiences such as working abroad, is also accounted for by the relatively young age of the Secretariat staff, in comparison to, for example, officials from the Market Division. The former often had not had the time to gain more experiences before entering the High Authority.

The officials of the Market Division had the most diverse international experience. Seven had worked temporarily for international organizations such as the
United Nations and the OEEC. For example, Dehnen presided over the coal committee at the OEEC. Vinck participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations and had been the president of the coal committee of the United Nations. The case of Rollman, who had diverse international experiences, is discussed in detail in section three. All three leading officials had international experience linked to their industrial sectors. With four officials having participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations, the Market Division seems to have absorbed the core of the small negotiation team that entered the High Authority. Officials in the Economics Division had the least international experience. Three studied abroad, including Uri, who also participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations. Officials in this division were rather young with a large proportion raised in the French elite education system where a stay at a university abroad was not necessarily an advantage for a successful career in France.

The general picture that emerges from this analysis is that of considerable mobility of High Authority officials. Part of this mobility goes back to the transnationally organised coal and steel industry in the inter-war period and initiatives concerning these industries in the post-war period. To name another example in addition to Rollman, the Frenchman René Tezenas du Montcel had been the director-general of a Polish mining company in the 1930s. After the war he worked for the French administration of the Allied Control Commission in Berlin in the industrial production division. In addition, the young and mobile staff in the Secretariat accounts for a lot of the High Authority officials' mobility. For example, the German Klaus Ewig spent several months abroad on work experiences in Great Britain and Switzerland during his studies and wrote his PhD thesis in France. Three

34 CEAB 12 55, F. Etzel to J. Monnet, 25 September 1952, 136-141, here 139.
assumptions emerge from this picture. Firstly, the high proportion of internationally experienced staff suggests that the High Authority attracted a more than average mobile and flexible staff. Secondly, it is likely that these officials possessed an increased ability to adapt to work in a multinational and multilingual administration where the main working languages were French and, to a lesser extent, German. Thirdly, because of their openness, they were more likely to adopt European values and aims. Their motives to enter the High Authority may clarify whether this mobility coincided with a particular interest in European integration matters.

1.6 The high officials' motives for working for 'Europe'  

Was it idealism or pragmatism or something entirely different that enticed officials to leave their home countries, move to Luxembourg and work for the newly founded ECSC? Idealism and pragmatism seem to be the two extremes between which a range of motives is situated. However, these motives do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive as individuals can have a set of different motives. No doubt, with regard to the long-term success story of the European Communities, in eye-witness interviews the number of those who claim they acted out of idealism, and who would like to be counted among the pioneers of European integration, is greater than those who admit that they were led by pragmatic motives. In an interview Behr said, half ironically, that there is hardly any retired European civil servant who does not claim to have had this European impetus while working at the High Authority.36

Certainly, some individuals were drawn to the High Authority because they wanted to contribute to the success of this first supranational administration and to European integration generally. In the main, these idealistic motives were drawn from

36 Interview K.S. with Winrich Behr.
experiences in World War II. Some individuals worked hard towards getting a post in Luxembourg, like the Dutchman Gérard Wissels whose initial application to the High Authority was unsuccessful as he lacked professional experience. Wissels then worked in the harbour of Rotterdam to gain this experience, reapplied and entered the Cabinet of Spierenburg in 1954. Typical for a German official, Wolfgang Ernst mentioned the ‘moral shock’ of the Germans after the war and the doubt he and others had about whether other countries would ever treat Germany as an equal partner. However, when Ernst met Monnet, he ‘became convinced that the Monnet line was a real [...] perspective for a common European future’. In the case of Ernst and also Behr, idealism was complemented by a political motive, namely contributing to a project that allowed Germany’s return to the international political scene and to negotiation tables as an equal partner. Some officials date their interest in European affairs back to their engagement in the resistance movement. Berthoin was active in the Union des étudiants patriotiques in Grenoble where he met Simon Nora, another French official. According to Berthoin they discussed plans for Europe’s future because they thought a situation similar to that after World War I, a new Versailles, had to be avoided. It was thus from a historical perspective that these officials saw the need for a united Europe. Kohnstamm had similar motives when he thought that after the war Germany should not be oppressed but stabilised and integrated into the international community.

Pragmatic motives range from pecuniary or career advantages to simply being sent to Luxembourg by an employer. As shown in the previous chapter, work in the

37 Interview K.S. with Gérard Wissels.
38 HAEU, Int 29, Discussion with Wolfgang Ernst (from the series 06 – „Les origines de l’administration communautaire“, Table ronde organisée par l’IUE, 09/07/1991).
39 Interview K.S. with Winrich Behr, Düsseldorf-Hubbelrath, 14 June 2005.
40 HAEU, INT-ECH 702, Interview with Georges Berthoin.
41 Mak 2005: 680.
High Authority was indeed lucrative, at least at the beginning. In March 1953 Monnet made it explicit that the High Authority aimed at attracting and maintaining highly qualified staff by paying them a high salary comparable to those paid in the private sector.\textsuperscript{42} Financial reasons may thus have facilitated the officials’ decision to become expatriates. Allowances compensated for the fact that the officials had to move to another country, such as a five per cent residency allowance which the officials received on top of their salary.\textsuperscript{43}

A motive that has to be situated between pragmatism and idealism was that of finding a solution for the European coal and steel industry. After World War II leading coal and steel experts such as Salewski and Rollman but also Vinck, Dehnen and Schensky pondered the question how the European coal and steel industry could survive, particularly in the face of US competition, and came to the conclusion that the only possible solution was a close cooperation or even integration of these industries at the European level.\textsuperscript{44} Writing in the late 1940s, Salewski had been in favour of a revival of the inter-war steel cartel of the 1920s\textsuperscript{45} – for him the ideal form of transnational industrial cooperation.\textsuperscript{46} Although he finally supported the Schuman Plan, his candidature to the High Authority was not uncontested. Etzel and Potthoff insisted on Salewski, but Monnet and Uri feared ‘that he is too well networked and has been linked for too long with the German steel cartels’.\textsuperscript{47} Rollman also had the survival of the European steel industry in mind but, as he had become an internationally accepted steel expert working for international organizations, he was

\textsuperscript{42} CEAB 14 2, Commission des quatre Présidents, Procès-Verbal de la deuxième séance tenue à Luxembourg, le jeudi 26 mars 1953, 7.
\textsuperscript{43} CEAB 1 1347, Personalordnung der Gemeinschaft, undated [1956], 103-135, here 105-110.
\textsuperscript{44} For Salewski see Bührer 1986; for Rollman see the biography in section three below.
\textsuperscript{45} For the international steel cartel see Barthel 2006.
\textsuperscript{46} Bührer 1986: 93.
\textsuperscript{47} CEAB 3 37, Letter R. Hamburger to D. Spierenburg, 5 August 1952, pt. 4.
less associated with a particular business or interest group. Therefore, his candidature was not contested.

2. External factors of Europeanization: living and working in Luxembourg

2.1 Careers in the High Authority

The length of service can facilitate socialisation processes within an organisation. Socialisation theory sees a link between duration and intensity of service and the development of an *esprit de corps* and of a ‘perception of group belongingness’. 48

What kind of a career did the first European civil servants have and how long did they stay in the High Authority or European Community institutions? The majority of officials studied for this chapter entered the High Authority in 1952 or 1953 (15 of the Secretariat, 16 of the Market Division, eight of the Economics Division and twelve of the comparison group). A further two officials entered the Secretariat in 1954, three in 1955 and three more were recruited after 1955. 49 Four officials joined the Market Division in 1954 and four entered later than 1955. 50 The Economics Division recruited 13 of the officials studied here between 1952 and 1956 and six after this date.

Civil servants from the Secretariat spent an average of 15.7 years in the services of the High Authority, the EEC or the Euratom Commission. Eight officials stayed less than ten years, three between ten and 20 years, five between 20 and 30 years and two over 30 years. 51 One could assume that those who stayed less than ten years were the least committed to European integration, especially if they did not

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48 Trondal 2007: 1118.
49 Of three officials the entry date is not known.
50 Of four it is not known.
51 For eight officials the length of service is not known.
simply retire but went back to their home countries to pursue their careers. The latter is certainly the case for individuals such as Jean Poincaré and Paul Delouvrier, two of the so-called French high flyers, who were offered leading posts in the French administration in Algiers. However, among those who served less than ten years are also Monnet's close collaborators François Fontaine and Kohnstamm who left the High Authority shortly after Monnet and continued to serve him outside the High Authority. In their case, time does not seem to have been a determinant factor of Europeanization as they already had strong idealistic motives to enter the High Authority in the first place. Kohnstamm, for example, believed that he could serve the cause of European unity better at Monnet's side than in the High Authority which was limited to the coal and steel sector. 52

With 15.2 years the average length of service of Market Division officials is similar to that of Secretariat officials as are the 15.8 years of average service of officials in the Economics Division. In the latter, the length of service was between three and 32 years.53 Eleven officials of the Market Division worked ten years or longer in the High Authority and only three stayed for less than ten years.54 The Italian Carlo Facini, who started his career in the Market Division, even worked in the EC administration for a total of 35 years. In summary, an average of more than 15 years of service for all three divisions is quite long. However, counting from 1952/53, it implies that on average these officials left the High Authority before the merger of the executives in 1967 or shortly thereafter. Older officials retired and younger officials moved on, like Behr who took a job in private business in 1960, at the age of 42. The officials in the Market Division, in particular, were on average 15 years away from

52 Interview K.S. with Max Kohnstamm.
53 This is the average length of service of eleven people. Of eight it is not known.
54 For ten officials the length of service is not known.
their retirement age when entering the High Authority. Finally, this average length of
service is less than the average length of service for officials in the Commission’s DG
IV and DG VI (22 and 24 years). This does not necessarily point to a lesser degree of
loyalty of High Authority staff towards their institution but can also be explained by
the younger average entry age of Commission officials, outlined in chapter BII.

The possibility of pursuing a career within an institution facilitates the
development of loyalty links between this institution and its staff. It is thus important
to find out whether European officials had the chance to make a career in the High
Authority or, subsequently, in the Commission. Of the Secretariat officials two,
Kohnstamm and Wellenstein, reached the position of secretary/secretary general
which corresponds to A1 or director-general. In 1968 Wellenstein became director-
general of DG External Relations in the Commission. Rabier also became director-
general in the Commission while Behr was made deputy executive secretary (A2)
there. Three officials reached the post of director-general in the High Authority, two
became directors (A2) and two deputy directors (A2). One official became speaker of
the High Authority.55 Another two officials became heads of division (A3) in the
Commission, one was conseiller hors classe in the High Authority, usually a position
corresponding to A1 but not necessarily influential. A conseiller was a consultant, but
often with a reduced amount of responsibility compared to a director-general. Such a
post could be created to reward someone, for example if a suitable high post was
lacking, but it could also be used to promote someone to free the post for a more
talented person. One official reached the post of head of division (A3) in the High

55 After the reorganization of 1961 this should correspond to an A2 post. Cf. Spierenburg and Poidevin
1994: 482.
Authority and one reached A4. Four officials had been chefs de cabinet (A2). One of them, Wissels, reached the post of deputy director-general (A1) in the Commission. A total of seven officials from the Secretariat served in Cabinets at one point in their career.

Of the officials from the Market Division four reached the post of director-general in the High Authority and three in the Commission – Vinck among them who had already been director-general in the High Authority. Eight officials became director in the High Authority and one in the Commission. Another official became conseiller in the Commission. Two officials were heads of division in the High Authority, one in the Commission. One official ended up as head of the information office of the Commission in Geneva and one became chief adviser in the External Relations Division. The Economics Division finally counts four directors-general (all in the Economics Division) and one deputy director in the High Authority. Robert Sunnen first became chef de cabinet and then director in the Commission. Another official also ended up director in the Commission. Two officials remained A4 in the High Authority and another two became heads of division in the Commission.

Judging from the positions they reached in the hierarchy of the European administration, these officials were among the most influential civil servants in the High Authority and its coal and steel policy. No official remained in a position below A4. Some officials continued to have influential positions in the Commission. In particular younger officials were drawn to the Commission long before the merger. Facini, Behr and Pujade went to Brussels in 1958 where they were offered good posts.

56 While in the Commission the deputy chefs de cabinet were attributed A3, in the High Authority they were lower on the payscale. For example Spierenburg’s deputy chef de cabinet Wissels was an A5 in 1956. See CEAB 12 813, Bulletin mensuel de la Communauté à l’usage du personnel des institutions, February 1957, 16.
57 Of ten officials in the Market Division the final career position is not known.
58 Of three officials in the Economics Division the final career position is not known.
They were attracted by the scope of tasks of the new European administration and thought that the future lay in Brussels.\textsuperscript{59} Hans Michaelis was one of the few High Authority officials who went to the Euratom Commission in the late 1950s where he was promoted to director-general. The Bulletin of the ECSC in 1960 shows clearly a rising number of people leaving the High Authority.\textsuperscript{60} The bulk of High Authority officials, however, went to Brussels after the merger in 1967. Overall, former officials from the Secretariat and the Cabinets seem to have made longer careers and ended up in more senior positions in the Commission. This is not surprising given their younger average entry age. With their more general professional training they were also more versatile than, for example, a highly specialised mining engineer. Sünnen, an economist from the Economics Division, said he had no problem adapting to work in DG Regional Policy in the Commission.\textsuperscript{61} All in all, officials were able to make good careers in the High Authority. This could have triggered Europeanization processes. Analysing the working and living conditions will add more potentially significant dimensions.

2.2 Living in Luxembourg

Accounts of the first months after the High Authority took up office can take on a nostalgic and mythical note. The officials felt they were part of something new and different. ‘Creation’ and ‘invention’ are notions which they evoke frequently when talking about the early days in Luxembourg.\textsuperscript{62} When comparing contemporary accounts with memories and eyewitness interviews from a later date there seems to be

\textsuperscript{59} Interview K.S. with Winrich Behr.
\textsuperscript{60} CEAB 12 814, Bulletin mensuel CECA, October – December 1960.
\textsuperscript{61} Interview K.S. with Robert Sünnen, Brussels, 9 December 2003.
\textsuperscript{62} Cf. for example HAEU, INT-ECH704, Interview Yves Conrad and Ghjiseppu Lavezzi with Michel Bonnemaison, Brussels, 12 February 2004.
an element of truth in these stories. In a letter of October 1952, Kohnstamm described the atmosphere in Luxembourg to a friend. What stands out in his account is his impression of the remoteness of Luxembourg, both in a geographical sense and in the sense that people were deprived of their usual contacts. They therefore did not have a choice but to get involved. In these conditions the dynamics that unfolded and developed within the High Authority between high officials were probably more intense than if the High Authority had been in Paris or Brussels. It is in smaller and more remote places like Geneva, where Monnet gained his experience as an international civil servant at the League of Nations, and Luxembourg that international or supranational civil servants as well as national representatives learned to think in transnational and supranational categories through communication and transaction. According to René Girault, the European institutions and international organizations in Europe became milieus in which national perspectives were overcome. Former High Authority officials' descriptions of the unique atmosphere in Europe's smallest capital are in conformity with Girault's statement.

Yet, the fact that Luxembourg was only the provisional seat of the High Authority had negative repercussions for the lives of its personnel. Faced with job insecurity and problems such as schooling for the children, many officials refrained from bringing their families to Luxembourg immediately. Later, the permanent move of the family to Luxembourg was a difficult decision to make as it could mean exchanging bustling capitals such as Paris and warmer climates such as Italy for a life in the Grand Duchy. The transport connections were poor, there was no airport, an

63 HAEU, DEP MK 1, Letter Kohnstamm to Dr. W. A. Visser 't Hooft, Secretary General of the World Council of Churches', Geneva, 24 October 1952.
64 Girault 1995: 88.
65 Cf. for example Rabier 1993 and the interviews K.S. with Winrich Behr and Max Kohnstamm.
underdeveloped rail network and no motorways. The Frenchman Michel Bonnemaison vividly recalls his move from Paris to Luxembourg where the shops closed at five o’clock in the afternoon and the local population was hostile, not least because the ‘invasion’ of ECSC staff had caused a rise in property prices.\(^{67}\) This isolation contributed to creating close links between the officials – forced links as they could hardly escape each others’ company. Groups of officials organized their spare time or weekends together; for example, the families of Gaudet, Kohnstamm, Behr and Wellenstein became friends.\(^{68}\) Other important meeting places were the European parishes, organized on the initiative of ECSC officials. Here the divide was less between nationalities than between Protestants and Catholics.\(^{69}\) The High Authority also organized activities for its staff. In July 1953 the director of the administration, Balladore-Pallieri, spoke of the officials’ ‘moral isolation’ and suggested the High Authority should encourage initiatives of officials to develop social relations by founding a club.\(^{70}\) This initiative was pursued and the *Amicale des fonctionnaires* was founded in October 1953, offering a restaurant, evening classes, sports events and excursions.\(^{71}\) One has to contrast this with Brussels, a larger city where people lived further away from each other and where the transport connections, for example with Paris, were better. Wissels stated that at first the officials who relocated to Brussels tried to ‘do it like in Luxembourg’, that is, meet with colleagues of all nationalities.\(^{72}\) However, soon a sort of Dutch club emerged. Rabier, who also had insight into both administrations, thought that in Luxembourg the relations between officials from

\(^{67}\) HAEU, INT-ECH 704, Interview Yves Conrad and Ghjoseppe Lavezzi with Michel Bonnemaison, Brussels, 12 February 2004.

\(^{68}\) Interview K.S. with Winrich Behr.


\(^{70}\) CEAB 2 89, Cesare Balladore-Pallieri, Plan de travail dans le secteur administratif, 13 July 1953.

\(^{71}\) Interviews K. S. with Ferdinand Kuhn-Régnier and Antoon Herpels. Cf. also Conrad 1989: 110-1.

\(^{72}\) Interview K. S. with Gérard Wissels.
different national backgrounds were closer than in Brussels. Not least, this was due to both the city and the administration being smaller. The choice of the seat of the ECSC certainly turned out to be a lucky one when it came to facilitating more cohesion and integration of its multinational staff. Gérard Bossuat cites Gaudet about Luxembourg’s powers of integration and, ultimately, of transformation of mentalities:

Luxembourg was a lieu de rencontre, a place of encounters, and place of close contacts. There were people with whom one had been unfamiliar, if I may say so. Germans who one saw for the first time in a totally different light than one used to see them for several generations; people from countries of the north like the Netherlands. We met and got to know each other and friendships were formed which, thank God, still exist today. Through these friendships we collectively discovered what these different countries stood for, what animated them in their activities, in their strive for creation and their vision of the future.

The officials’ families were part of this transformation process and one important medium was the European school. Schooling proved to be a problem at the beginning. The existing schools were unable to provide lessons in all the children’s mother tongues and were also seen as provincial. This problem was attended to early, however, as many leading officials had small children and pressed for a solution. A temporary remedy was to provide transport to the nearest schools in Belgium, France and Germany. While this worked well for older children attending secondary school in Arlon, Thionville and Trier, the long commute was strenuous for smaller children. Moreover, Italian, Dutch or Flemish speaking children had no access to schooling in their mother tongue. To remedy the situation, officials of the ECSC institutions in Luxembourg founded the Association des intérêts éducatifs et familiaux des

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74 Cited in Bossuat 2006: 77.
75 Cf. Conrad 1989: 120-130 for a more detailed account on the founding of the European school.
76 CEAB 3 20, Umfrage, 10 November 1952.
fonctionnaires non-luxembourgeoises de la C.E.C.A.\textsuperscript{77}, chaired by the Belgian Registrar at the Court of Justice, Albert van Houtte, to advance the cause of the European school. The High Authority allocated resources for the school to the association and rented a house in the avenue Pasteur in Luxembourg.\textsuperscript{78} The first measure was to install an infant school in May 1953. The infant school should prepare the children for the 'atmosphere of the future European school'.\textsuperscript{79} On 1\textsuperscript{st} October 1953 the primary school opened its doors. This proved to be a success. In early 1954 the school had 141 pupils.\textsuperscript{80} A year later, in October 1954, a secondary school followed, also financed by the High Authority.\textsuperscript{81} While this was a rapid development, it took another three years until the school was attributed a statute and, more importantly, until the school’s diploma was recognised in European countries.\textsuperscript{82} The European baccalauréat was finally established in July 1957.\textsuperscript{83} This means that after five years some parents still sent their children to Trier or to their home countries for secondary school education to make sure that they could continue their education at universities without problem.\textsuperscript{84}

While a single school for children of all nationalities was necessary because there were too few children sharing one mother tongue to justify separate schools, ideological reasons for a school educating the children of six countries together were

\textsuperscript{77} CEAB 1 1501, École Européenne à Luxembourg: Ouverture, undated.
\textsuperscript{78} ECHA, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, Haute Autorité, 3\textdegree Rapport Général, Dépenses administratives de la Communauté durant le deuxième exercice financier (1\textdegree juillet 1953-30 juin 1954), 39 and 65.
\textsuperscript{79} CEAB 3 386, Cesare Balladore-Pallieri, Note pour la Commission Administrative, undated [1953], 137 and ibid., Balladore-Pallieri, Note aux fonctionnaires chefs de famille, 6 April 1953, 138.
\textsuperscript{80} CEAB 12 63, Commission des quatre Présidents, Procès-Verbal de la sixième séance, 19 March 1954, 96.
\textsuperscript{81} CEAB 12 63, Commission des quatre Présidents, Procès-Verbal de la septième séance, 11 October 1954, 124-125.
\textsuperscript{82} CEAB 1 1501, Statut de l'École Européenne, October 1956.
\textsuperscript{83} Spierenburg 1994: 77-8 and ibid., 77 footnote 152.
\textsuperscript{84} In 1957 Uri sent his son to a French Grammar school near Paris where he could specialise in philosophy. CEAB 9 554, P. Uri, Note à la Division du Personnel et de l'Administration, 31 October 1957, 258.
also advanced. The children should adopt a ‘European attitude’ by receiving a ‘European education’ from the start.\textsuperscript{85} Already in the first year, they learned a foreign language, German or French, in which they were taught subjects such as history and geography.\textsuperscript{86} Older children could take up a second foreign language. However, this was optional and, looking at the timetable suggested by the association, lessons in the children’s mother tongue clearly predominated.\textsuperscript{87} As the school should also prepare the children for secondary education in their home countries, they had supplementary lessons in ‘national and local history and geography’. Like the European officials, their children should also be rooted in their own language and culture while learning to understand, interact and work with other cultures and languages. Overall, the European school was a central institution for High Authority officials. It contributed to forging friendships and acquaintances as parents met through their children.

2.3 Role models and working methods

Role models can trigger processes of imitation and social learning. When writing about role models in the High Authority, it is appropriate to discuss Monnet first. In many eye-witness accounts, Monnet has been described as a quasi-mythical figure. For many, he personified the High Authority during the founding years. In the first instance, it was the experience of the team spirit of the treaty negotiations, facilitated by Monnet, that united the core staff of the High Authority. In January 1953 Walter Much, who entered the Legal Service in late 1952, wrote to Hallstein: ‘To keep this spirit [of the treaty negotiations, K.S.] alive in the rough climate of reality is my daily

\textsuperscript{85} CEAB 3 387, A. van Houtte (chairman of the board for studying school problems), Entwurf für eine Schule der Gemeinschaft, undated [1953], 152-162, here 152.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 154.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 160.
Those who worked with Monnet often conveyed the appeal it had for them to work for him. George Ball described Monnet’s dynamism and unusual working methods in the following terms: ‘He was oblivious to the need for allocating time to other requirements, such as sleeping or even eating. [...] That he seemed always able to find men willing to submit to his stimulating but exasperating methods of work testified to his extraordinary charisma [...]’. In an interview Gaudet recalled Monnet’s ability to bring people together and to focus their attention and their abilities on a certain problem. According to Duchêne and Kohnstamm, Monnet was able to make people feel important and he let them know that they were making a significant contribution.

Monnet’s working methods clearly focussed on participation. During his presidency, high officials frequently took part in the meetings of the High Authority. According to Wellenstein, ‘all officials who had something to do with the problem at hand practically had access to the meeting-room of the High Authority. It was always a very crowded place.’ At the beginning, there was a ‘creative chaos. All opinions were allowed. Everybody in the rather large circle around Monnet could suggest things, and they were even taken up.’ This accounts for the influence of high officials in the decision-making process in the High Authority, also shown in the previous chapter. Participation certainly contributed to creating loyalty links between officials and High Authority members, and, moreover, towards the High Authority as an institution and its values and aims. Gaudet claimed that Monnet succeeded in

89 Ball 1982: 73.
91 Ibid., and the interview K.S. with Max Kohnstamm.
convincing the entire staff of the High Authority that, in fact, their work was not about coal and steel but about European unity. However, the working methods seem to have changed under Monnet's successors. Participation of high officials in the meetings of the High Authority was less frequent and was transferred from the High Authority to the working groups. In 1960, under President Piero Malvestiti (1959-63), Spierenburg intervened in favour of high officials participating more in the decision-making process as they lacked insight into what was going on in the High Authority. However, Herpels recalls the openness of discussion in working groups where even lower-ranking officials were heard and felt they were part of the decision-making process. This was 'fantastic also for the pride of the official'. Also, in their volume on the High Authority, Spierenburg and Poidevin underline that the High Authority never stopped to 'call on the heads of services. [...] Thus, the upper echelons of the High Authority continued to be much more closely involved in the decision-making process than their counterparts in Brussels. This system [...] developed a momentum of its own and did much to prepare the ground for the European civil service.

It is difficult to grasp the real influence of Monnet on High Authority officials. There is no doubt that he was able to engage and motivate his close collaborators. People like Dehnen remained in contact with him long after Monnet left the High Authority. He certainly won over some of the experts to his views on European integration. Retrospectively, however, other officials were sceptical regarding Monnet's abilities and impact. The chaos of the first years of the High Authority dominated their memories. For them, Mayer was the 'saviour' who turned the High

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95 ECHA, CEAB 2 577, PV of the High Authority, 577 session, 5 May 1960.
96 Interview K.S. with Antoon Herpels.
Authority into a well functioning organization. Wellenstein recalled about Mayer: 'He had a great sense of orderly administration, orderly procedures, orderly meetings, with an agenda [...] which with Monnet was never, never, never the case. [...] He [Mayer] gave the High Authority a very strong political face, but in a totally different way.' Mayer thus has to count among the role models as well. Finally, there were role models outside of the institution with less day-to-day impact like Robert Schuman. A great admirer of Schuman, French official Bernard Zamaron even founded a 'Centre Robert Schuman pour l'Europe'.

2.4 Factors prone to obstruct Europeanization

Some factors that could hamper Europeanization of High Authority officials such as the national balance were discussed in the previous chapter. According to Coppé, the national balance in the High Authority was observed but in a less strict manner than in the Commission. There were no 'flags' on certain posts. There is evidence, however, that, like in the Commission, the High Authority members defended what they saw as the interests of their country of origin and watched over the national balance. In one case Giacchero even urged his colleagues to accept any candidate he might present to readjust the geographical balance in favour of Italy. Thus, in the High Authority the national balance could lead to blocked careers and cause

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98 Interview K.S. with Marcel Jaurant-Singer.
100 Interview K.S. with Bernard Zamaron, Luxembourg, 15 March 2005. The Centre is near Metz and is not to be confounded with the Centre d'Études et de Recherches européennes Robert Schuman in Luxembourg.
101 HAEU, Int 28 Albert Coppé (from the series 06 – „Les origines de l’administration communautaire”, Table ronde organisée par l’IUE, 9 July 1991). See also CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, Note à MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorité concernant un entretien informel qui a eu lieu le vendredi, 5 December [1952], 165-7, here 166.
102 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 30 October 1958, 19. Cf. also ibid., E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 8 October 1958, 18.
frustration among officials. Also, a phenomenon that began to be a problem in the High Authority in the mid-1950s was filling leading posts by ‘parachuting’ in individuals who were external to the European administration.103

Likewise, the detachment procedure could cause loyalty conflicts. Member states wanted to retain some influence on the European administration and detachment continued to be an important source of qualified employees for the High Authority. This guaranteed a supply of personnel but possibly not the most independent and committed staff. Relations between national administrations and these officials in the High Authority remained particularly close. However, the national affiliation of officials could also serve as a pretext for accusations of partiality. In one case an official was accused of experiencing a loyalty conflict as his recommendations went against the perceived interests of a member state. Nora, a detached official and French Inspecteur des Finances, took over the Economics Division in 1960 but resigned already in December 1962 to return to the French civil service. After he had handed in his notice, Nora participated in an important study on the coal sales companies in the Ruhr that recommended not to authorise the constitution of two new sales companies. When the High Authority discussed the recommendations in its weekly meeting, the German member Hellwig considered the fact that Nora had already resigned, and would return to his home administration, as an important factor. He thought that this would have ‘psychological consequences’ [in Germany], as the ‘negative conclusions of the report were largely due to the fact that Nora played a significant role in writing the report’.104 Hellwig accused Nora of acting on behalf of the French government against German interests. The High Authority was divided over the matter with the

103 CEAB 3 554, P. Finet, Note pour MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorité, 18 January 1955, 1.
two French members actually on Hellwig’s side. However, the smaller member states outvoted them, and the High Authority decided in favour of notifying the Ruhrbergwerke that their request could not be granted in the present form. It seems probable that the French members decided to take sides with their German colleagues to distance themselves from Nora and to prevent any future retaliation by German members should a similar situation arise concerning a sales agency in France.

Interest group affiliation could cause loyalty conflicts, too. The High Authority was under great pressure to incorporate diverse political and economic interests. As shown above, it needed the cooperation of these interest groups to succeed in its work. Conflicting loyalties could also result from previous experiences that strongly influenced an individual. For example, Frenchman Jaurant-Singer was deeply marked by his experience of fighting with the British and Canadian troops to liberate France during World War II. He belonged to the Special Operations Executive (SOE), set up by Winston Churchill in 1940, which consisted of volunteer agents who were trained in Britain and parachuted into France. For Jaurant-Singer contributing to the liberation of his country, together with British and Canadian troops, was a formative experience and therefore possibly more important than the experience at the High Authority. He has since been engaged in Franco-Canadian relations trying to preserve the history and memory of his fellow soldiers of the SOE. Moreover, before entering the High Authority he had already worked for international organizations and he did not find the High Authority any different from them.\(^\text{105}\) Nora recounts how the *Maquis*, a group within the French Resistance movement, had an impact on him and his friends as an experience that taught them ‘a certain number of values, [...] patriotism,'

\(^{105}\) Letter Marcel Jaurant-Singer to K.S., 19 December 2004 and Interview K.S. with Marcel Jaurant-Singer.
solidarity, fraternity'. They became part of a technocracy eager to reconstruct and modernise France from within the highest levels of the administration. In the case of another official, Berthoin, these resistance values could be transferred to the European level but these officials' loyalties remained primarily towards the French administration.

3. The biographies of three High Authority officials

This section discusses the biographies of three High Authority officials. They represent different types of officials typical of the High Authority in the period studied. However, the three individuals chosen are exceptional in that they were able to exert more influence on High Authority policies and administration than the average official. They are also exceptional in that they have actually left sufficient source material that allows analysing their roles.

Pierre Uri represents the generalist official. Not a coal or steel expert, Uri was concerned, after the war, with the reconstruction of France and, subsequently, Europe. Other generalist officials were, for example, the economists Regul and Wagenführ, the lawyers Gaudet and Krawielicki, and Behr. All of them were convinced of the necessity of European integration and thought that horizontal integration was preferable to sectoral integration. The generalist is followed by the expert type official, represented by Tony Rollman. Like the generalists, the experts came to be convinced of the necessity of European integration. However, they had been first and foremost concerned with finding a solution for the European coal and steel industry.

Other experts were Salewski, Schensky, Dehnen and Vinck. Max Kohnstamm, finally, stands for the realistic idealist. The realistic idealists' engagement for European integration exceeded their day-to-day work in the High Authority and became a lifelong occupation. This is a rare type of official. Rabier, Wissels, who became Secretary General of the Union of European Federalists, Berthoin, Fontaine, Wellenstein and Zamaron can be counted among them. For all three types World War II marked a caesura in their lives which induced them to choose European integration as a solution for post-war societies. Finally, these types of officials partly match with types that can be found in the Commission discussed in chapter BII. However, with Rollman, the steel expert, and Uri and Kohnstamm, Monnet's close collaborators, the individuals presented here also account for the particular conditions of sectoral integration in the ECSC.

Pierre Uri: philosopher, economist and 'planificateur à la française'

Born in Paris in 1911, Uri studied at the ENA, obtained the Agrégation (a French state diploma enabling its holder to teach at schools and universities) in philosophy and embarked on an academic career teaching at Reims university. Uri, a Jew, lost his teaching post following the Loi du 3 octobre 1940 portant statut des Juifs, or law against Jews, passed by the Vichy government. He used this forced break to study political economy, economics and law at the Centre de Perfectionnement aux Affaires de la Chambre de Commerce in Paris, an evening school for professionals. Although keeping a low profile in Paris, he had to flee to Lyon to avoid imprisonment. After the war Uri definitely turned to economics and entered the Institut de Sciences Économiques Appliquées of French economist Perroux. Like Uri, Perroux was close

to the Socialists and both favoured a Keynesian policy to overcome France's economic problems after the war. Uri entered the French Planning Commission in March 1947 and soon made his way into the inner circle around Monnet. Part of Uri's self-understanding and self-confidence is certainly due to the impression of having contributed to the modernisation of France at the Planning Commission. Uri then contributed to the drafting of the Schuman Plan which he partly revised. For him, the appeal of the Schuman Plan lay in its solution to the German question but also in its capacity to resolve France's economic problems. Together with Monnet and Etienne Hirsch, Uri played an important part in the interstate negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris in 1951. By then, Uri was taken with the idea of European integration, not least because he found a task where he could successfully employ his problem solving capacity. In 1952 he wrote an article about Europe's future in which he predicted a spill-over process from integration in the coal and steel sector to other sectors of the economy. These are the ideas Uri took with him to the High Authority.

Uri's role in the High Authority cannot be underestimated. He first chaired the groupe de démarrage and then took over the directorship of the Economics Division, the scope and capacities of which he had sketched out himself. At the High Authority Monnet employed working methods that had proved successful at the Planning Commission. He continued to rely on Uri's capacities to devise complex solutions for political and technical problems. However, while the other members of the High Authority respected Uri's abilities, relying solely on Uri could not be a

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109 Uri 1991: 60.
110 HAEU, DEP PU 244, P. Uri, L'Europe se ressaisit, Réalités, July 1950.
111 Ibid., La prospérité par l'Union, Réalités [May] 1952.
112 Already two weeks after the High Authority took up work, the group submitted the 'Memorandum über die zuerst anfallenden Aufgaben der Hohen Behörde', which was mainly drafted by Uri. CEAB 9 26, 23 August 1952.
permanent solution in a multinational administration. In 1953, Kohnstamm reported to Monnet an ‘outburst’ of High Authority members against Uri’s dominance in the High Authority.\textsuperscript{113} It was not least due to the deficient organization in the early days that Uri could play such a prominent role which was claimed back by the High Authority members when the working groups were introduced at the end of 1953. Not surprisingly, Uri defended the technocratic element of the High Authority. According to him, only the expert knowledge concentrated at the supranational High Authority and the Commission, and not representatives of members states, could generate the common interest.\textsuperscript{114} It is likely that his disregard for diplomatic or political solutions was also a reason why he never became a member of the High Authority or the Commission, something to which he aspired.

Uri’s idea of Europe was essentially an economic one. In his speeches he rarely mentioned the European Political Community (EPC) or the EDC which were important to Monnet and Kohnstamm. In 1955 Uri contributed to the so-called ‘relance européenne’, first by drafting a paper on economic integration of Europe in April 1955. For him economic integration was essential to ensure the survival of the European economy vis-à-vis that of the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe had to become an economic ‘third force’.\textsuperscript{115} Uri claims to have presented the idea of horizontal integration to the German State Secretary in the AA, Friedrich Ophüls in a meeting with him and Monnet. Monnet passed on the memorandum Uri drafted to Paul-Henri Spaak.\textsuperscript{116} According to Uri, however, the passages on horizontal economic

\textsuperscript{113} FJM, AMH 6/4/14, M. Kohnstamm to J. Monnet, 1 August 1953.
\textsuperscript{114} Cf. for example HAEU, DEP PU 197, Conférence de M. Pierre URI à la Société Italiana per la Organizzazione Internazionale – Roma, 28 March 1957.
\textsuperscript{115} HAEU, DEP PU 53, P. Uri, Premières réflexions sur le document intitulé « Considérations sur le problème de la Coopération ou de l’Intégration », 5 April 1955.
\textsuperscript{116} HAEU, DEP PU 53, [P. Uri], Projet de Déclaration, 13 April 1955. See also Monnet 1978: 471-473 and Gerbet 1989.
integration were not taken up as both Monnet and Spaak preferred further sectoral integration. Instead, it was the project of Dutch Foreign Minister Johan Willem Beyen of 1952 that constituted one of the bases of the Benelux memorandum of 18 May 1955. It is likely that of Uri's text the passages on sectoral integration in the sectors transport, energy and atomic energy, which he had included on Monnet's request, were taken up in the Benelux memorandum, but not the passages on horizontal integration, so important to Uri. However, by co-drafting the so-called Spaak report in April 1956, and by participating in the Val Duchesse negotiations, Uri contributed to the Common Market after all. He then served the Commission in an expert group, drafting a report on the economic situation in the member states. Not having obtained a post as a member of the High Authority or the Commission, Uri was stuck in his post as director of the Economics Division and left the High Authority in 1959. Not least because he was considered the prototype of French planning mentality, the German government opposed a greater role for Uri in any of the supranational administrations. He also lacked the necessary backing in the French government.

In 1961 Uri took over the post of Director General of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs in Paris where he wrote extensively on European integration and the relations between the United States and Europe. Moreover, he was charged with several missions, studies and reports in Europe, South America and also in his native

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117 It is difficult to measure the contribution of individuals to the events preceding the Messina conference. See the round table discussion in Serra 1989: 175-6.
120 The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs was founded in 1961 as a Brainchild of the NATO Parliamentarians. For example Uri 1963, or HAEU, DEP PU 249, P. Uri, For a Community of the Free World, in: Réalités, December 1961.
France. In interviews in later years Uri tried to enhance his reputation as a 'founder of Europe'.

*Between Japan and Luxembourg: the steel expert Tony Rollman*

A keen amateur film-maker, Tony Rollman captured much of his life on film. The audio-visual material was put together in a documentary by the Luxembourg film maker Delphine Kieffer in 2004. In this respect Rollman is exceptional among the experts of the century generation who remain among the least well known European civil servants. Having spent much of his life travelling to the most remote corners of the world and having lived nearly a decade in Japan, the title of the film, 'a European adventure', is somewhat too limiting.

Born 30 March 1899 in Reisdorf, Luxembourg, Rollman started working for the Arbed at the age of 22. Until 1944 he travelled the world in the service of the Arbed sales organisation Columeta. After the war he worked for the Luxembourg government, became economic councillor in the Luxembourg legation to Brussels and participated in the Marshall Plan negotiations in Paris in 1947. In 1948 he became the chairman of the steel division of the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva (ECE, United Nations). In Geneva Rollman presided over works on a report entitled 'European Steel Trends in the Setting of the World Market', published in November 1949. The study concluded that if no measures were taken, the European steel industry would generate eight million tons of excess steel by 1953. For Rollman, these were alarming prospects and he saw the urgent need to co-ordinate the European steel market. The steel report was discussed in the European press. For example, the west

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121 Cf. for example HAEU, Int 32, Interview Roger Morgan with Pierre Uri, Florence, 6 June 1991. The subtitle of his autobiography *Penser pour l'action* is 'un fondateur de l'Europe'.

122 Documentary *Tony Rollman*.

German weekly, Die Zeit, concluded that 'in Tony Rollman and Gunnar Myrdal European unity has powerful and courageous advocates'. In early 1950 Myrdal, head of the ECE, invited Rollman to present his ideas to the Socialist federalist and former French Economics Minister André Philip, who at that time was a member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. It is uncertain what was really discussed at this meeting. Rollman’s thinking was probably informed to some extent by the cooperation of steel makers in the International Steel Cartel of 1926. However, as far as it can be established, Rollman did not envisage a revival of the steel cartel of the inter-war period but seems to have endorsed the competitive principle that should govern the ECSC. Moreover, ideas of cooperation in the iron and steel sector were being developed in all six founding countries at that time, with the Benelux countries being advanced because of their experience with the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union (1921) and the Benelux customs union (1944).

Monnet, who knew Philip, invited Rollman to come to Paris to discuss his thoughts. Suggestions such as Rollman’s were taken up and incorporated by the drafters of the Schuman Plan. Nearly forty years after the events Rollman wrote a short note about this period of his life. In retrospect it is difficult to separate Rollman’s ideas from Monnet’s whose memoirs Rollman had certainly read, when he wrote in 1986:

> Because I was a steel expert, I had the idea to start with steel and its raw materials, coal and ore. And from this emerged very valuable political

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125 Dichgans 1980: 34.

126 The International Steel Cartel is often seen as a precursor of the ECSC. Cf. Gillingham 1986.


128 Dichgans 1980: 33.

129 For a detailed discussion of the emergence of the Schuman Plan and other post-war initiatives targeted at European integration see Leucht 2008a, chapter 3.
considerations. Coal and steel are needed by any war industry. If one withdrew these two materials from the rule of nation states and put them under control of a European authority, nation states would be deprived of the possibility of starting a new war in Europe.  

Rollman participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations in 1950-51 as a member of the Luxembourg delegation. Subsequently, he was an obvious choice for the High Authority. Rollman was already 53 years old when in 1952 he became director in the Market Division and became responsible for integrating the steel markets of the Six. Convinced of the necessity of his work, Rollman deplored the lack of collaboration from the trade unions and member state governments. They were reluctant to endorse the market principle in the steel sector. As to the enterprises, Rollman deplored that the leading figures were against the supranational principle. He claimed that they had, against the rules of the treaty, favoured concentration in the steel industry and informal close cooperation, effectively reconstituting the old cartels.

When Rollman retired from the High Authority at the age of 65, he concluded, somewhat wearily: ‘In 1964, I had been at the ECSC for twelve years already; twelve years during which I tried to bring to bear the supranational conceptions that were at the basis of the High Authority.’

With the problems of the European steel industry as a starting point in the late 1940s, Rollman seems to have endorsed the supranational principle of the High Authority. However, at the High Authority, Kohnstamm thought that Rollman and some of his expert colleagues lacked strong faith in Europe. In August 1953, he wrote to Monnet:

133 Documentary 'Tony Rollman'.
The difficulty with Rollman, to take an example, [...] is that at the end of the day he does not believe in the possibility of a revolution of the European economy [...]. He is afraid of these enticing prophecies which he considers being disconnected from reality. The truth is that the only means to reach our aim, that is, a united Europe, is to give people new hope and to tell them: "the limit is the sky". One tends to forget the plain biblical truth that a prophecy is an act of faith and not of mathematics. It is this faith that many people here are lacking. And it is precisely this faith that we need to have in Europe. It is obvious, that one cannot convey to others what one does not believe in oneself.134

Max Kohnstamm: Dutch, European and world citizen

Max Kohnstamm was the European conscience of the High Authority. As the Secretary of the High Authority, he thought that the role of the institution exceeded coal and steel. The High Authority was the first and until then only supranational institution and so had to serve as a model.135 Born in Amsterdam in 1914, Kohnstamm came from a family of academics. He studied modern history in Amsterdam and spent the academic year 1938-39 at the American University in Washington DC.136 Kohnstamm was impressed by the hands-on approach of the Americans, for him a stark contrast to the Europeans petrified by the coming war.137 Appalled by the appeasement policy of the French and British governments, Kohnstamm and his family did not have any illusions about the nature of the National Socialist regime in Germany. Although he was half-Jewish Kohnstamm returned to the Netherlands. During the war, he was active in the Dutch Resistance and was imprisoned several times between 1942 and 1944. After the war he served Queen Wilhelmina as private secretary before taking over the German department in the Dutch foreign ministry. Kohnstamm was one of the first Dutchmen to travel to Germany after the war.

134 FJM, AMH 6/4/14, Kohnstamm to Monnet, 1 August 1953.
135 CEAB I 920, Entwurf für die Funktionelle und Strukturelle Organisation des Sekretariats der Hohen Behörde, 21 January 1953.
136 For this period see the edition of Kohnstamm’s correspondence with his father. Kohnstamm 2003. For Kohnstamm’s biography see also Mak 2005: 676-685.
137 Interview K.S. with Max Kohnstamm.
participating in a meeting between Dutch and German Protestants in 1947 where he also met Gustav Heinemann. Finding a solution to the German question and avoiding a new Versailles was important to Kohnstamm for two reasons. Firstly, the economy of the Netherlands was dependent on that of its larger neighbour and secondly, a politically and economically stable Germany was important to Kohnstamm on a personal level after his experiences in the 1930s and during captivity. Therefore, in Kohnstamm’s eyes, the Schuman Plan provided an ideal solution: equality but at the same time integration and thus control of Germany. Kohnstamm volunteered to participate in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris where he met Monnet. The two got on very well, not least because they had both spent time in the United States and, according to Kohnstamm, for both European integration was only a step towards a new world order. Monnet’s ideas promised a transformation of international relations. The creation of supranational institutions would lead to legal certainty as member states gave up part of their sovereignty. This was vital for Kohnstamm who had experienced despotic rule under German occupation.

Kohnstamm’s role as Secretary of the High Authority between 1952 and 1956 has already been discussed in the previous chapter. What stands out is that he tried to see the overall context of European integration in his everyday work. Not least because of his high expectations and hopes, he was soon disappointed by the administrative reality of coal, steel and scrap in Luxembourg. When the EDC failed in August 1954, Kohnstamm thought that Monnet had to leave the High Authority to

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138 Gustav Heinemann (1899-1976) was a member of the Council of Protestant Churches in Germany (1945-67). He held several posts as minister in western Germany and was elected president of the Federal Republic in 1969. The meeting is described in Müller-Armack 1971: 39-40.
139 Interview K.S. with Max Kohnstamm.
140 Mak 2005: 682.
141 HAEU, DEP MK 1, M. Kohnstamm to J. van Helmont, 23 February 1954.
gain room for manoeuvre to launch new initiatives and he was ready to accompany him. Kohnstamm entered Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe as its vice-president in 1956. Like Monnet, Kohnstamm became convinced of the necessity of securing Europe’s energy supply through cooperation in the atomic energy sector. In 1956-57 Kohnstamm therefore also served as secretary general to the Committee of the Three Wise Men, consisting of Louis Armand, Franz Etzel and Francesco Giordani. The Committee was in charge of preparing a report on the possibilities of integrating the atomic energy sector and of cooperating with the United States’ government on this question. This report constituted a preparatory document for Euratom. After this interval, Kohnstamm served the Action Committee full-time. While he believed a spill-over from economic integration to political union would occur in Europe, during the 1960s he realised that no progress was being made towards political integration. Kohnstamm feared that de Gaulle’s hostility towards British accession to the EEC would establish Europe as a ‘third force’ between the United States and the Soviet Union. For him, however, a united Europe including Britain with close relations to the United States was the precondition for a peaceful organisation of the western world, and, in the distant future, the whole world. The Action Committee was eventually dissolved in 1975. Kohnstamm then became the first President of the European University Institute in Florence. Contrary to Uri, Kohnstamm tried to minimise his own contribution to European integration. When he

142 HAEU, DEP MK 2, M. Kohnstamm to Tommy, 9 February 1955.
145 CEAB 2 640, M. Kohnstamm, L’expérience CECA, undated [1956], 5.
146 Cf. for example HAEU, DEP MK 32, Monnet 7187, entry 19 January 1959.
was awarded the Franklin Roosevelt Freedom from Fear medal, ‘my first thought was: why me? My next thought put my mind somewhat at ease. The medal must have been awarded to me in order to honour the two statesmen who taught me the force of hope: President Roosevelt and Jean Monnet.’

Conclusion

In terms of its staff, the High Authority was a divided administration. On the one hand, there were the members of the century generation, mainly coal and steel veterans like Salewski, Rollman, Dehnen and Schensky. On the other hand there were the generalists and realistic idealists such as Kohnstamm, Gaudet and Behr who were more open, more multinational and multilingual than their counterparts. Arguably, they adopted European values more easily. For Schensky, for example, the work in the High Authority did not constitute a break in his career. In his farewell note of March 1967 he wrote that his time in the High Authority was a satisfying end to his career in mining which spanned 46 years. Although he spent the last 15 years of this career in a European administration, there was not a word about European integration. While experts such as Salewski and Rollman believed that transnational cooperation was primarily necessary to secure a future for their industry in Europe, they were open to Europeanization effects. A note from Kohnstamm to Monnet of October 1953 suggests that a Europeanized staff developed in the High Authority, which had adopted supranational values:

147 Max Kohnstamm, Acceptance speech, 19 April 2004 (in possession of K.S.).
148 CEAB 7 1570, M. Schensky to D. Del Bo, 2 March 1967, 112.
In my opinion it is remarkable to see how the supranational spirit has developed in the High Authority during the first year of our work. Guyot told me the other day how he was delighted with the objectivity with which people such as Salewski and Regul worked on questions concerning investments. Uri made a similar remark concerning Dehnen and Regul.149

In his neofunctionalist study Haas wrote that supranationality also depended on the 'behaviour of men and groups of men'.150 It appears that the lack of supranationality in the administrative structure and working methods, as shown in chapter AI, was at least partly counterbalanced by the attitude and corporate identity that developed among the staff. After the merger, many of the High Authority officials who went to Brussels thought that in Luxembourg the administration had been more ‘European’, more informal and based on personal relationships between colleagues. All in all, it was considered less hierarchical than ‘Hallstein’s machinery’ in Brussels.151

150 Haas 1968: 59.
151 Interviews K.S. with Antoon Herpels, Bernard Zamaron, Gérard Wissels, Klaus Ewig, Ferdinand Kuhn-Régnier and Robert Sünnen.
B The Commission of the EEC

I. Prudence and pragmatism: the institutional establishment of the Commission

Introduction

In the 1960s and early 1970s bureaucracies were a popular object of research. In numerous studies academics analysed what they called the 'bureaucratic phenomenon', or even 'the bureaucratization of the world'.¹ In the near future, these researchers predicted, the western world would be governed by bureaucracies. This corresponded to the strong belief in technical progress and in the manageability of technical, economic and political problems, which characterised this period. Bureaucracy was seen as a modern way of policy making. The establishment of the Commission has to be considered within this temporal and ideological context. The Commission was a child of this period and thus part of a trend – an institution with a future, or so it seemed. The European administration has often been described as an expert based administration. Not yet the government of Europe, it defined itself through expertise, one of the main sources of bureaucratic power, and attempted to gain reputation and recognition by acting like a competent actor and interlocutor.² In 1958 the nine members of the Hallstein Commission were optimistic: they were going to construct Europe.³ Moreover, neofunctionalist scholars attributed an important role

¹ This is the title of a book by Henry Jacoby 1973. See also Downs 1967: 1; 255-66; Putnam 1973; Brugmans 1967: 337.
² This aspect is also mentioned by Ludlow 2006b: 42.
to institutions for furthering integration, and the Commission’s successes in the early 1960s seemed to prove the theory right.

In the 1970s, the Commission’s reputation was suffering. This can be put down to several intra-Community factors such as the crises of the mid- to late 1960s and internal administrative problems. However, it also suffered because bureaucratisation became increasingly unpopular. The European bureaucracy, accused of lacking democratic legitimacy, was subjected to harsh criticism, especially in the European press. Nevertheless, the 1960s bureaucracy hype has left its imprint on the Commission. Early decisions on the organization and working methods taken in this ambience of optimism and belief in its problem solving capacity left to be an important legacy on its administrative services and, what is more, its personnel.

Anthropologists Marc Abélès and Irène Bellier rightly define the Commission as a continuous creation and as a ‘cultural compromise’, in which different identities and affiliations were combined ‘in the name of a common project’. The administrative structure the Commission adopted was necessarily an answer to the Community’s pluralism. Some political leaders such as Charles de Gaulle feared that the Commission could become a ‘technocratic and deracinated Areopagus’. However, I will demonstrate that the Commission did not intend to create a bureaucracy that was aloof and disconnected from the member states’ interests and needs. Instead, the Commission and especially its first president, Walter Hallstein, showed a high degree of consideration towards these interests when designing the administration and recruiting personnel.

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4 For the crises of the Community in the 1960s see Ludlow 2006a.
5 See for example the article ‘Half Kafka and Half Chaplin’. In Time Magazine, 9 December 1974, 10; Scheuer and Weinstock 1977 are addressing the problems of bureaucracy and democratic deficit.
6 Abélès and Bellier 1996: 432.
The scope of this chapter is limited to the set-up period of the Commission’s administration, covering primarily the years between 1958 and 1962, the year the personnel statute was introduced. The initial period is salient because administrative structures were established, practices and principles institutionalised, working methods tested and either adopted or rejected and the first intake of staff was completed. The first section of the chapter considers the institutional set-up of the Commission while the second section examines the working methods the Commission established. The focus of the third section will be on problems connected to staffing the Commission’s administrative services. From the beginning, the Commission was aware of the shortcomings of its creation. The fourth section will therefore analyse the Commission’s efforts to reform the administration and improving its efficiency.

1. Towards a European administrative organization: the Institutional set-up of the Commission

1.1 Principles, models and concepts: decisions in early 1958

The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC was the legal basis for the set-up and functioning of the Commission. Similar to the ECSC treaty, however, the EEC treaty contained few precise provisions on the shape of this institution. The Commission, the treaty merely decreed, should be headed by a college of nine Commissioners, designated by the governments of the member states ‘on the grounds of their general competence’ (Article 157(1), EEC). The Commissioners, appointed at a conference of foreign ministers of the Six on 6 and 7 January 1958 in Paris, were Walter Hallstein

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8 The Comité intérimaire, a preparatory committee set up by the six governments to operate between the signature of the treaty and the establishment of the EEC, did not take any decisions regarding the shape of the institutions or their future personnel. On the Comité intérimaire see Dumoulin 2006.
(president, Germany), Piero Malvestiti (vice-president, Italy), Sicco Mansholt (vice-president, Netherlands), Robert Marjolin (vice-president, France), Robert Lemaignen (France), Giuseppe Petrilli (Italy), Michel Rasquin (Luxembourg) who, after his death in April 1958, was replaced by Lambert Schaus, Jean Rey (Belgium) and Hans von der Groeben (Germany). The Commissioners should act independently from the member states (Article 157(2), EEC). Their term of office was four years, renewable. Few treaty articles referred to the administration and its personnel. Article 212, however, contains the important provision that staff regulations should be established, thus creating a European civil service. Until this personnel statute entered into force, the institutions should recruit their staff on a contractual basis (Article 246(3), EEC). The members of the Hallstein Commission were thus free, in principle, to adopt for their institution the administrative structure they saw fit.

Although the college of Commissioners acted quickly and took major decisions on the administration between January and March 1958, during the first months the Commission did not have an organization to speak of. At first, the Commissioners were assisted by personal collaborators they brought to Brussels. To address the initial and most urgent tasks set by the treaty, the college established ad hoc working groups. A working group composed of Marjolin, von der Groeben and Mansholt, for instance, was in charge of administrative questions. In their choices and decisions regarding the Commission's administration, the Commissioners were certainly influenced by experiences they had gained in their previous occupations – be it in their home countries' governments or civil service or in international organizations. Marjolin, for example, frequently evoked the case of the Organization

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for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) where he had been secretary general.  

When taking decisions on the shape of the administration and on working methods, the Commission thus discussed, ruled out, adopted or adapted examples of national, European and international administrations with which they were familiar. These served as a pool of possible models and ideas for the new European bureaucracy. Some elements from national administrations, when employed in the Commission, turned out to be ill-suited. For instance, by imitating the structure of German ministries, a division for 'general affairs and matters of principle' was installed in nearly every DG. In retrospect, Hallstein's chef de cabinet Karl Heinz Narjes thought these units were 'more of a hindrance than a help'. Moreover, the college decided that when naming the different administrative units it would use terms which already existed in the member states rather than inventing new ones. Aligning the Commission's administration with the civil services of the member states should facilitate interaction between Commission officials and civil servants from national administrations.

Given these national and international models, how far was the High Authority a model for the Commission? Firstly, the differences need to be acknowledged. The Commissions of the EEC and Euratom were founded under different political circumstances. Following the failure of the EDC in 1954, in the mid-1950s member state governments were less inclined to attribute powers and funds to a supranational organization. It is also likely that the member states had drawn a lesson from the experience of the High Authority and chose to keep the new supranational institutions under closer control. For example, unlike the ECSC treaty the EEC treaty did not

10 Cf. for example HAEU, DEP EN 722, 21.9-9.11.60 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 11 October 1960.
provide for a Committee of Four Presidents which could decide autonomously on administrative and staff related questions. While the High Authority was given its own resources and far reaching budgetary autonomy, the Commission had not been granted this degree of independence and financial security. On the contrary, each year it had to negotiate with the Council of Ministers the number of posts it could create and the salary of staff it could employ. This financial dependence in budgetary, and therefore staffing, matters limited the Commission’s autonomy in administrative matters considerably. Executive secretary Noël deplored this dependence on the goodwill of the finance ministers of the Six. It was therefore a disappointment for the Commission when, in the merger treaty, the member states did not confer the High Authority’s budget autonomy to the entire single Commission.

Secondly, in terms of administrative structure, the High Authority certainly served as one model for the Commission. Moreover, it assisted the Brussels administration in the initial period, for example by providing it with staff and funds. The Luxembourg experience helped the Commission to take quickly those decisions of a more practical nature such as on contracts for personnel, salary and insurance matters. The experiences made in the High Authority prevented the Commission from making similar mistakes. For instance, it did not adopt the short-term contract system which had led to great dissatisfaction among High Authority staff. On 25 January 1958 the Council decided that the Commission would provisionally adopt the regulations of the High Authority in terms of salary and pensions for high officials. However, eager to manifest their independence and convinced of the importance of

13 HAEU, DEP EN 815, E. Noël, La fusion des Communautés Européennes, talk given at the Centre Européen Universitaire, Nancy, University year 1965/66, 8.
15 ECHA, Rapport de la Commission de contrôle relatifs aux comptes de l’exercice 1958, undated, 57.
the EEC, the Commissioners were keen to establish their own (institutional) identity as soon as possible.

1.2 Shaping the administration

The Commission opted for an organizational structure with nine directorate-generals, or DGs, corresponding roughly to the policy areas stipulated in the EEC treaty and, importantly, to the number of Commissioners. The DGs were: External Relations (I), Economic and Financial Affairs (II), Internal Market (III), Competition (IV), Social Affairs (V), Agriculture (VI), Transport (VII), Overseas Countries and Territories (VIII) and Administration (IX). In addition, the Commission set up an Executive Secretariat and three common services, namely Press and Information, Statistics and Legal Service, which it administered together with the High Authority and the Euratom Commission. Within the DGs a hierarchy was created by subdividing them into directorates and divisions. According to a note of 1962, the DGs were considered as 'ministerial core', or proto-ministries, that would one day become the ministries of a European government, an assumption which is characteristic both for the Commission's ambition and its optimism at that time. Each DG was to be presided over by a group of three to four Commissioners, with one Commissioner acting as group president.

The EEC treaty, contrary to the ECSC treaty, did not make the president head of the administration; this was possibly to prevent the Commission president from becoming as strong a figure as Monnet had been at the High Authority. However, as the Commission could decide on the internal structure and distribution of work among

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17 BAK, N 1266/1253, Dem Herrn Präsidenten, n.a. [Cabinet Hallstein], 21 November 1962.
the Commissioners, Hallstein subsequently claimed and obtained similar administrative powers as his counterpart in the High Authority. In the Commission’s second meeting, he took over responsibility for the institution’s personnel policy, a task he shared with two other members of the college.\footnote{BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 2\textsuperscript{nd} session, 24, 25 and 27 January 1958, pt. 9-10.} This marked the beginning of the president’s strong position and influence on recruitment and the administration. Hallstein subsequently took over responsibility for DG IX by chairing the working group ‘Administration’ composed of himself and the three vice-presidents. The Commission thus created its own ‘Committee of Four Presidents’. This shows that Hallstein understood his role as president as keeping an overall view of Commission policy making and not being absorbed in one policy area. It also demonstrates the importance he attached to administrative – and especially staff related – questions for strengthening his position of power and influence in the Commission.

The shape of the administration did not solely follow functional considerations but was also guided by concerns for a balanced and just distribution of posts among nationals of the six member states. In some cases, this even led to the creation of supplementary administrative units. Vice-President Malvestiti, for instance, stated that in order to ensure the adequate representation of Germans in his DG he would have to set up an additional directorate.\footnote{Document inserted in: HAEU, DEP EN 701, 12.4.-25.5.60 (101\textsuperscript{e} à 105\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), session 13/14 May 1958.} The institutional set-up did not progress smoothly, not least because the Commissioners disagreed on what dimension the bureaucracy should have. During 1958 the Commission recruited more than 1,000 people. Marjolin warned his colleagues that ‘our system will be attacked’, adding, ‘our fundamental interest is to have a minimum staff constituted of capable people’.\footnote{HAEU, DEP EN 705, 1.10.1958-19.11.1958 (31\textsuperscript{e} à 38\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 2 October 1958.} His ideas of the Commission’s administration resembled more Monnet’s concept of a small and
flexible organization while Hallstein was in favour of creating 'a large administration'. Conflicts within the college and with the Council were bound to arise.

Another problem affecting work in the Commission in the early days was the question of the seat. Brussels had only been declared the provisional seat and the member states failed on various occasions to agree upon the definite seat of the Commission, or the Community institutions in general. This meant that, at first, the Commission was obliged to hold meetings in Luxembourg, Strasbourg and other places throughout the Community and this made it more difficult to get the administration to run smoothly. Not least, this insecurity about the seat entailed insecurity for the Commission's personnel. Finally, in mid-1958, Brussels was declared 'siège de fait'. The unresolved question of the seat is symptomatic for the chaotic early days of the Commission. However, the first Commission led by Hallstein is said to have developed a great team spirit, not least because the president sought to organize the meetings of the Commissioners in an informal and intimate atmosphere, trying to limit the number of participants to a minimum. According to Lemaignen, these meetings in small and cramped offices in the absence of an audience to impress gave their discussions a feeling of intimacy.

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22 Ibid. See also the memoirs of Hallstein's chef de cabinet, Berndt von Staden 2001: 179-80.
23 For the decision for Brussels as the 'siège de fait' see HAEU, DEP EN 702, 3/6 - 15/7/1958 (20° bis 24° réunion), 2 July 1958. For the difficulties caused by this insecurity, see Lemaignen 1964: 33-36.
24 Lemaignen 1964: 32.
1.3 President Hallstein’s ideas on Europe and the Commission’s role in it

As the case of Monnet has shown, the president of a European administration is more than an equal among equals. While any president’s leadership qualities are generally important for the success of organizations such as the High Authority or the Commission during their term of office, it is the first president of a newly founded organization who has a strong impact on shaping its administration, culture and working methods. It is therefore vital to discuss Hallstein’s ideas on European integration and the role he attributed to the Commission in this process.

Hallstein was a German law professor, former State Secretary in the AA and member of the CDU.25 Heading the German delegation at the negotiations on the ECSC treaty and being closely involved in those on the Rome Treaties, meant that he had extensive experience in European integration affairs. As a federalist, he was influenced by people like Monnet. The two men met for the first time at the Schuman Plan negotiations in Paris 1950/51, and Hallstein was deeply impressed by the Frenchman. Both Monnet and Hallstein preferred close economic and political integration to loose market integration as for instance in a free trade area, propagated by the German Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, for example.26 For both men, effective supranational institutions and clear rules of the game were the precondition for successful and durable integration. A transformation of European consciousness could only be achieved with the help of institutions, Hallstein believed.27 Despite the failure of the EDC in 1954, he was still convinced – not least as a consequence of World War II and the Cold War – of the inevitability of political integration.28 He

27 For Hallstein’s concept of institutions see Schönwald 2001: here 159.
28 Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, Sankt Augustin, (henceforth ACDP), Personal Papers of Hans von der Groeben, I-659, 070/2, Der Staatsssekretär des Auswärtigen Amtes [presumably
therefore saw his role of Commission president as a political one. According to
Jonathan White, the works of neofunctionalist academics influenced Hallstein and his
collaborators.\textsuperscript{29} The successes of the Commission in the 1960s in turn influenced the
scholars of this school. Neofunctionalism is said to be a "translation" into academic
terminology of the EC Commission's original strategy.\textsuperscript{30} In the mid-1990s Cris Shore
argued that neofunctionalism has remained at the basis of the Commission's self-
image, that is, that 'it would emerge as the future government of this new
supranational state'.\textsuperscript{31} Accordingly, for Hallstein integration was a process, a
continuous creation. Economic integration for him was not only a step towards a
political union but it was already a political act in itself.\textsuperscript{32} In his book \textit{Europe in the
making} – the German edition is entitled \textit{Der unvollendete Bundesstaat} (the unfinished
federal State) – he takes up the notions of \textit{Sachlogik}, or material logic of integration,
\textit{engrenage} (interlocking) and 'spill-over' to describe this process. The latter term was
coined by the neofunctionalist scholar Haas.\textsuperscript{33} For Hallstein, the Community was
intended as a federation and its constitutional structure was 'clearly federal in intent
and design'.\textsuperscript{34} Hallstein's model for the European federation was the United States of
America.\textsuperscript{35}

He qualified the administrative services of the three executives of the ECSC,
Euratom and the EEC as 'the modest embryo of what will one day be a truly European

\textsuperscript{29} White 2003.
\textsuperscript{30} Wessels 1998: 244.
\textsuperscript{31} Shore 1995: 220.
\textsuperscript{33} Haas 1968 [1958]: 283.
\textsuperscript{34} Hallstein 1972: 34.
\textsuperscript{35} Schönwald 2001: 164.
administration'. This explains some of the choices Hallstein made for the Commission in which he saw Europe's future government. His goal was, therefore, to create an independent, well-structured and sufficiently sized administration which could match the ones in the member states. The administrative staff of the Commission should be on a par with civil servants of the member states and representatives of industry and interest groups. Hallstein described the Commission as the executive of the Community, representing the common interest vis-à-vis member states and the outside world. The nine Commissioners – the college – had to be united in this task and to constitute a unified and independent body. He underlined this, for example, in his farewell speech to the European Parliament in June 1967. While aiming at extending the influence of the Commission, Hallstein had, however, a realistic view of the powers given by the treaty to the member states on the one hand and to the Commission on the other. According to him, upholding the balance between the national and 'what could be called the European element' was important:

The Communities have not been designed to make states disappear but rather as a kind of union between them. [...] It goes without saying that the Commission has to encourage this rapprochement [of the member states' economic policies, K.S.] through proposals and initiatives and for this work it would need the support of national authorities.

In the course of the 1960s, Hallstein substituted the term 'supranational' with the concept of 'Community'. In order not to offend, he renounced calling 'a spade a spade'.

37 Hallstein 1972: 58.
38 Ibid., 59.
40 See Schönwald 2001: 156.
Because the use of the word "supranational" appears to some to imply that we are bent upon destroying national identities. The "Community" concept, by contrast, implies – and rightly – that states renounce merely a part of their sovereignty, or rather that they put parts of their national sovereignty into a common pool which is controlled by "Community" institutions whose decisions are in fact their own.41

Even though avoiding the term ‘supranational’, Hallstein aimed at defending the Commission’s prerogatives in the Council. Whenever the governments of the member states attempted to take a decision in which Hallstein thought the Commission should be involved, he made this known. Reminding the governments of the member states to abide by the articles of the treaty was often the only weapon the Commission had to preserve its prerogatives.42 As a law professor Hallstein defended a legalistic perspective of the European Community founded upon law. For him, the Community as a Rechtsgemeinschaft, or community of law, was a guarantee for a peaceful and prosperous Europe.

Although defending the Commission’s rights granted by the treaty, Hallstein was also a pragmatic leader. Compared to Rey, Mansholt and sometimes Marjolin, he often took a moderate position in the Commission’s meetings. In 1962, for instance, Rey wanted the Commission to play a much more active political role in the Community. He asked his colleagues: ‘Shouldn’t the Commission be ready to fight and, from time to time, put the virtues of courage in front of those of caution? Shouldn’t it make its existence as an authority [vis-à-vis the member states, K.S.] be felt more, and, as a consequence, shouldn’t it render itself more respected and even

42 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 139 session, 2ème partie, 15 March 1961.
feared? As the Commission's president, Hallstein was more cautious. His views, at least regarding questions related to the Commission's administration and staffing, were characterised by pragmatism. Unlike Monnet, Hallstein was, for instance, a great advocate of the national balance and of recruiting staff from national administrations. His colleague Marjolin, on the contrary, was in favour of choosing and promoting staff by taking more the individual qualifications and merit into account and less the candidate's nationality. In this respect, therefore, the judgement of Andrew Moravcsik – that Hallstein and Mansholt lost their sense of reality and were, in contrast to people like Marjolin, politically 'unconnected and unconcerned with democratic politics' – clearly does not apply to Hallstein, at least in the early years of the Commission. Not least, the president was keen to win over public opinion and, faithful to a long standing demand of the Christian democrats and of the federalists, he sought to strengthen the European Parliament.

The future of the Commission and of European integration was, however, a different matter. In Hallstein's opinion, the Commission should be empowered to 'take all measures necessary for the implementation of the treaty on its own authority, without having to rely on special and specific approval by the Council of Ministers'. His caution in administrative questions did not prevent him from seeking a greater role for the Commission in the future development of the Community. Firstly, though, a smoothly running administration had to be created, that was close to, aligned with and accepted by the administrations of the member states.

43 ACDP, I-659, 058/1, J. Rey, Note pour Messieurs les présidents et membres de la Commission. Délibérations de la Commission au seuil de son second quatriennat, 13 January 1962. See also Conrad 2006: 86 on Rey urging the Commission to play the role of 'prophets' and not only of the 'clergy'.
44 Cf. HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.-27.7.60 (108° à 114° réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960.
46 Already at the Schuman Plan negotiations, Hallstein asked for direct elections of the General Assembly of the ECSC. Schönwald 2001: 154 and 162.
2. The establishment of practices and working methods

2.1 Between collegiality and autonomy: the Commission as a college

The principle of collegiality was, and still is, a distinctive feature of the European administration. The members of the Commission, like the High Authority members, chose to act as a college and to take their decisions in common deliberations. The members were meant to act in unity and speak with one voice towards the outside world. One Commissioner could, in principle, represent the entire college in all policy areas. However, the variety and the complexity of the tasks conferred on the Commission imposed a compromise solution. The Commissioners were thus confronted with the question of how to organize and distribute the work between them and, at the same time, respect the principle of collegiality. The Commission considered either introducing the *Ressort-Prinzip*, with each Commissioner taking over responsibility for one department, or a working group system, similar to the one introduced by the High Authority. The members opted for a modified version of the latter. The nine working groups established consisted of three to four members. Each working group president was responsible for one administrative unit and not, like in the High Authority, for a policy area across several departments. Decisions were prepared in the working groups, but the final decisions on Commission policies were taken by the college in weekly meetings.\(^\text{48}\)

Thus, the Commission initially opted for a combination of a departmental and collegial structure. However, Hallstein’s chef de cabinet, Berndt von Staden, pointed out in 1960 already that the working group system had effectively ceased to function

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\(^{48}\) The Commission mentioned the group presidents for the first time in its sixth session: BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 6 session, 24-26 February 1958, pt. 10.
According to von Staden, this was due to the fact that the groups had no real purpose as they could not even take decisions on matters of minor importance. In his opinion, a delegation of decision-making to the group level was not desirable either because of the danger that the groups could act as a miniature Commission. There are more reasons why the group system did not work properly. As each group president had a particular responsibility for one DG, he 'virtually received a delegation of the Commission to execute the day to day tasks in his sector'. The group presidents were reluctant to share this responsibility with their colleagues and soon they were de facto in charge of the policy of their respective DGs. The group presidents were thus comparable to ministers in national governments. In contrast, in the High Authority the working groups were cross-departmental. The members of the High Authority could therefore not lay claim to the leadership of a particular department and were more inclined to share leadership. In the Commission, a similar system would not have been feasible, however. Given the large scope of the Commission's tasks, it would have been impossible for the Commissioners to keep up to date in every policy area of the Commission. Moreover, the allocation of portfolios, or group presidencies, to the Commissioners had been a struggle in which satisfying the interests of national governments had played an important role. In these highly sensitive areas the Commissioners were not very enthusiastic about sharing their spheres of influence. For example, von der Groeben was a member of the agriculture working group and his opinion on the aims of the CAP differed considerably from

49 BAK, N 1266/1071, B. von Staden to President Hallstein, 30 May 1960.
50 Ibid.
51 HAEU, DEP EN 800, E. Noël, Le fonctionnement de la Commission et ses rapports avec les autres institutions européennes. Visite d'information d'un groupe de banquiers français à la Communauté Européenne, 14 November 1958, 2.
52 Noël 1992: 151.
Mansholt’s ideas.\textsuperscript{53} Von der Groeben sought to bring into the Commission a German adviser for agricultural policy, Professor Hermann Priebe of Frankfurt University, founder and director of the Institute for Rural Development Research. Priebe became consultant to DG VI in June 1958.\textsuperscript{54} The German Commissioner had – in vain – promoted Priebe’s appointment as the second deputy director-general in DG VI, alongside Mansholt’s trusted collaborator Berend Heringa and under director-general Louis-Georges Rabot, to counterbalance the Franco-Dutch influence on the CAP.\textsuperscript{55}

Nevertheless, the Commission took the principle of collegiality very seriously. When the administrative units were dispersed across different buildings in Brussels, it was considered important that the Commission members kept their offices under one roof, while also having an office in the building of their respective DGs. In a Commission meeting, Mansholt explained that the unity of the Commission should be expressed in the spatial proximity of the Commissioners.\textsuperscript{56} This closeness made informal and spontaneous communication between the members possible and certainly contributed to the good working atmosphere attributed to the Hallstein Commission. Finally, like in the High Authority, collegiality served as a shield against accusations of partiality. According to Noël, the Commission always took national interests into consideration without abandoning its independence and its impartiality.\textsuperscript{57}

This was possible not least because the principle of collegiality inspired trust in the Commission.

\textsuperscript{53} Von der Groeben 1982: 106-8.
\textsuperscript{55} BAK, N 1266/1253, Note Cabinet [Narjes?] to President Hallstein, 14 June 1962.
\textsuperscript{56} HAEU, DEP EN 701, 12.4-3.6.1958 (14 to 19 session), 7 May 1958.
\textsuperscript{57} HAEU, DEP EN 815, E. Noël, Le Comité des Représentants Permanents. Exposé fait à l’Institut d’études européennes de l'Université libre de Bruxelles, 19-21 April 1966, 12.
2.2 Deciding on appropriate working methods (1958-60)

The Commissioners adopted the High Authority's custom of using Wednesday as the jour fixe for their weekly meetings. Von der Groeben described the Commission's deliberations in his memoirs. According to him, Hallstein did not hesitate to bring about a decision by vote. While the literature emphasizes Hallstein's aim to maintain a harmonious relationship with his colleagues and to avoid voting, von der Groeben's view is confirmed by Noël's handwritten minutes of the Commission's meetings which show that the Commission did resort to voting. Simple majority was sufficient, according to the Commission's rules of procedure. While certainly seeking to reach consent among the members, Hallstein also thought it important that decisions were taken quickly. Shelving decisions and postponing matters would give the impression that the Commission was not up to its tasks, he feared.

In June 1958 DG IX proposed general rules of collaboration between the Commission and the DGs. These stated that the latter were at the disposal of the Commission and were given their tasks by the Commissioners. Collaboration across DGs was encouraged and desired but in a controlled manner, that is, by respecting the hierarchy. For discussing and deciding on practical matters such as working hours, the Commission set up an administrative committee composed of the directors-general and the executive secretary. Judging from entries in Noël's diary, the meetings started in November 1958 on a weekly basis but seem to have become less frequent. The Commission introduced its formal rules of procedure, provided for in Article 162(2),

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58 See for example Conrad 2000: 169.
60 Ibid.
61 HAEU, DEP EN 349, Projet de règlement provisoire d'organisation des services, présenté par la Direction Générale de l'Administration, 24 June 1958.
EEC treaty, only at the end of 1962. One reason for this delay could be that a certain amount of experience was needed to reveal best practice and appropriate working methods.

In July 1960 the members held an extraordinary meeting to discuss the Commission’s working methods and the functioning of the administration. Before the meeting, Commissioners Lemaiguen and Petrilli distributed notes with their observations. These give an insight in the working methods but they also reveal the perceived faults of the new European administration. Firstly, both Lemaiguen and Petrilli were content with the practice of involving the group of the chefs de cabinet in the work of the college, for instance, by asking them to examine and discuss documents and problems before a Commission meeting. This method had until then only been used in exceptional cases. The main reason for the trust the Commissioners placed on their chefs de cabinet was, according to Petrilli, that these shared, unlike the directors-general, the political beliefs of the respective Commissioner. The two Commissioners were thus in favour of strengthening and enlarging the Cabinets.

Secondly, given the increasing workload of the Commission, Lemaiguen demanded a better and more efficient distribution of work. As a result of the need to discuss and decide everything as a college, Lemaiguen found the Commission’s meetings too detailed and time-consuming. He deplored that the members did not have enough time to concentrate on the overall picture – the political side of their jobs. For instance, instead of being absorbed in lengthy Commission meetings, Lemaiguen would have liked to dedicate more time to cultivating his contacts with political

leaders in Paris and representatives of French industry. The Commissioners should, he suggested, only meet once every two weeks and resort to the written procedure, that is, a proposal was not discussed in the Commission's meeting but circulated in the Cabinets and, if no one objected, subsequently adopted. Moreover, Lemaignen admitted that he ignored for the most part what was going on in the other DGs. Often the Commissioners were only confronted with a proposal as the result of the work of a DG in their weekly meetings, and then they had to take major decisions. Thus, in practice the principle of collegiality did not work very well. Lastly, Lemaignen regretted that the Commission had embarked on a process of bureaucratisation. Having to produce a receipt for every external phone call would 'at the same time harm our means of action and our dignity' and would add fuel to the Commission’s critics’ fire.65

On 18 July 1960 the Commission met in conclave to discuss these issues. First and foremost the nine Commissioners committed to the principle of collegiality. It was especially the president who stressed the importance of the college structure. Contrary to Lemaignen, Hallstein did not think that the Commission was 'overburdened with work' and was thus not prepared to reduce the number of Commission meetings.66 However, for minor decisions, the Commissioners decided that the written procedure should be applied in a more systematic manner, sometimes combined with preparatory work by the chefs de cabinet. This resulted in a strengthening not only of the role but also of the size of the Cabinets as each Commissioner was entitled to add additional Cabinet staff.67

66 For the above see: HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.-27.7.60 (108é à 114é réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960.
As it was intended as a general exchange of views, Rey took the meeting as an opportunity to criticize Hallstein’s leadership. According to him, only the important decisions were taken by the college, the Commissioners otherwise enjoying too much autonomy in their sectors. Rey thus backed Lemaignen in arguing that the Commission should not aspire to taking every decision of minor importance in the college. In essence, Rey stated that Hallstein was overworked because he had taken on too many tasks, for example, he aimed at studying most documents the Commissioners received from the administration himself, assumed responsibility for the external relations of the Commission and headed the administration. Rey maintained that the administration suffered from this situation. He suggested that one Commissioner should assist Hallstein in managing it. This also resulted in a severe critique of the Director-General for Administration, Maurit van Karnebeek, whom Rey described as a charming man who was not ‘up to his administrative task’. Vice-President Mansholt backed Rey. According to him, the administration was ‘the weak spot’ of the Commission. Also, the administrative committee did not function properly, according to Mansholt. Concerning the importance of the administration, he stated that ‘we are also the slaves of our administration’. He mentioned ‘Parkinson’s law’, a phenomenon that civil servants tended to create work for each other and that especially in public administrations, ‘work expands so to fill the time available for its completion’. The political head of the Commission’s administration, the college, was thus not entirely in control of its own creation which had taken on a life of its own.

68 HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.-27.7.60 (108° à 114° réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960.
69 Ibid.
Hallstein acknowledged his colleagues' criticism of DG IX. Also, the president said that he would be ready to delegate some of his tasks but at the same time he emphasized that he wanted to retain responsibility for the Commission's personnel policy. All in all, Hallstein was satisfied with how the Commission worked. He, rightly, pointed out that there was no item on the Commission's agenda which had not been put there by a member. It was thus their responsibility if the agenda was overburdened. But who of the Commissioners was prepared to admit that a matter they were dealing with was not important and renounce putting it on the agenda?

The meeting consolidated basic working methods and showed that the principle of collegiality needed to be applied in a more flexible manner. The Cabinets as the trusted personal advisory bodies of the Commissioners were strengthened. The college clearly saw the inefficiency of DG IX as one of the main problems of the administration. The notorious weakness of this DG was partly compensated by the executive secretary however with whom Hallstein collaborated closely.

2.3 The role of the Executive Secretariat under Emile Noël

While agreeing on the necessity of creating a Secretariat in the Commission, the Commissioners decided that the future secretary should not bear the title of secretary general. The latter would have corresponded to a position that was hierarchically situated above the other administrative units. The Secretariat as conceived by the Commission should only be responsible for 'technical aspects' of the Commission's activities and would not be in charge of the preparation of the Commission's

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71 HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.-27.7.60 (108ème et 114ème réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960.
decisions, for instance. Moreover, secretary general was the title the heads of many international organizations bore – a connotation the Commissioners sought to avoid.

On 26 March 1958 the Commission appointed the Frenchman Noël who had been recommended by Marjolin. Noël was not prepared to settle for the simple title of secretary, however, as in France, this title would appear rather insignificant. Instead, he asked to be made executive secretary, a title used in the French civil service. Noël led the Commission’s Executive Secretariat, which was renamed Secretariat General in 1967 after all, until his retirement in 1987.

The shape of the Executive Secretariat was, according to Noël, inspired by the French administration, and the French government’s Secretariat General in particular, and by the British Cabinet Office with which the French government was in close contact in 1956/57 when Noël worked with Guy Mollet, at that time Président du Conseil, or Prime Minister. It was composed of four divisions: greffe (registry), internal relations, relations with the other Community institutions, and a division responsible for putting together the Commission’s general report. The Secretariat’s responsibilities comprised preparing and organizing the Commission’s meetings, establishing the minutes and communicating the college’s decisions to the services. Moreover, it oversaw the execution of decisions and assisted the services with keeping the Commission informed about their work. In June 1958 the Commission assigned deputy executive secretary Behr the task of representing the Commission in the Coreper on the grounds that the Secretariat was in charge of (administrative) relations
with the Council. In the Coreper meetings, Behr was accompanied by the director-
general or another high official of the interested DG(s). The Commissioners
themselves did not participate in the Coreper. The Executive Secretariat was thus one
of the intermediaries they were able to use to remain close to, and informed about, the
member states’ points of view. The Secretariat drafted a note after each meeting,
summarising the discussion. This note was then distributed prior to the next
Commission meeting. The Commission could thus react immediately and give new
instructions to the executive secretary and his deputy. As Noël and Behr took part in
the Commission’s meetings, they were equally well informed about the Commission’s
views, and could act accordingly in the Coreper, or advise the officials of the DGs
concerned. Given the increasing importance of the Coreper in the EEC, this is where
the Commission’s Executive Secretariat differed most from the High Authority’s
Secretariat.

Beyond the formal tasks assigned to the Executive Secretariat, Noël soon
assumed more responsibilities. As seen in the High Authority, administrations develop
informal structures that fill a gap such as lacking institutionalised communication
channels. Even though the Commission initially sought to prevent the Secretariat
from turning into a powerful administrative unit, it underwent a development similar
to the High Authority’s Secretariat. An indispensable co-ordinating unit, it soon took
over important information and communication tasks and was in charge of the
distribution of information. For instance, on Noël’s initiative the Secretariat

78 BAC 209,80/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 19 session, 3-4 June 1958, pt. 2. See also the
interview with Behr’s successors, Axel Herbst, HAEU, INT-ECH 677, Interview Wilfried Loth and
Veronika Heyde with Axel Herbst, Bonn, 25 May 2004; and HAEU, INT-ECH 683, Interview
Veronika Heyde with Helmut Sigrist, Bonn, 7 January 2004.
79 HAEU, DEP EN 815, Emile Noël, Le Comité des Représentants Permanents. Exposé fait à l’Institut
d’études européennes de l’Université libre de Bruxelles, 19-21 April 1966, 35.
80 See Ludlow 2005a.
81 Downs 1968: 63.
distributed regular notes with information on the Commission’s and the other EEC institutions’ activities to the directors-general, directors and heads of division. The Commissioners approved of this initiative.\textsuperscript{82} By 1960, the Secretariat sent weekly notes to the heads of division and monthly reports to the directors-general to keep them informed.\textsuperscript{83} From mid-1958 onwards, Noël held weekly meetings, on Friday mornings, with the assistants of the directors-general.\textsuperscript{84} They discussed administrative questions but also the outcome of the Commission’s gatherings and what was generally happening in the Commission. These meetings were a means to keep the directors-general and thus the Commission’s services informed. One former assistant called the group of assistants a phalanx and a co-ordinating element in the Commission.\textsuperscript{85} Another official from the Executive Secretariat and close collaborator of Noël went so far as to call the assistants the Hausmeier, or major-domo, of the Commission and Noël’s source of power.\textsuperscript{86} These meetings were also important at a psychological level. They facilitated contact between officials across DGs and left them feeling informed about what was going on in the Commission. Later on, and at first only infrequently, Noël also held meetings with the directors-general\textsuperscript{87} and the chefs de cabinet.\textsuperscript{88} In fact, it was only under the presidency of Jean Rey, after the

\textsuperscript{82} BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 35 session, 29/30 October 1958, pt. 5.
\textsuperscript{83} BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 112 session, 2\textsuperscript{ème} partie, 18 July 1960.
\textsuperscript{84} See for example HAEU, DEP EN 2122 (Agenda 1958), according to Noël’s diary entries, the first session was on the 26 September 1958.
\textsuperscript{85} Interview K.S. with Helmut von Verschuer, Nentershausen, 16 February 2004. Nowadays the assistants still hold their meeting on Friday mornings although their role has changed slightly from an administrative to a more political role. See Anonymous. Coordinating the coordinators. In Courrier du personnel no 70, 23-29 October 1997, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{86} Interview K.S. with Henri Etienne. Brussels, 7 March 2005.
\textsuperscript{87} Interview K.S. with the assistant to the director-general of DG IV, Brussels, 14 April 2004.
\textsuperscript{88} See for example HAEU, DEP EN 2124, Agenda 1960, entry of 25 April.
merger of 1967, that the weekly meetings of the chefs de cabinet were institutionalised.89

Noël was thus an indispensable source and also recipient of information. He had a major role in designing the Commission's administrative structure. According to Hussein Kassim, the Secretariat "played a crucial role in institutionalizing the Commission: establishing and regularizing its procedures, [and] shaping an independent administration [...]".90 This was also possible because of the close relationship between Hallstein and Noël, which allowed the Secretariat to develop into this important co-ordinating unit. Moreover, Noël's experience and his intimacy with the French political scene made him a valuable collaborator.91 He advised the members of the Commission and Hallstein in particular, who observed retrospectively:

Originally, this Secretariat was meant to be little more than a technical body to assist the Commission as and when required; but under its outstanding French Secretary-General, Emile Noël, it soon acquired a more important role and, though hardly ever noticed by the general public, became an essential part of the Commission's machinery.92

The Secretariat was a central instrument for Hallstein to realise his aim of building an important administration, matching those of the member states. Moreover, Noël was important for the creation of the Commission's institutional identity. Through collecting and distributing information, 'the Secretariat established, and at the same time became keeper of, the Commission's institutional memory'.93 What is more, the executive secretary assumed an important role in the Commission's external

89 HAEU, Int 30, Emile Noël (Serie 06 – Les origines de l'administration communautaire, Table ronde organisée par l'IUE, 06/07/1991).
91 Von der Groeben 1995: 379. See also chapter BII for a short biography of Noël.
93 Kassim 2004: 52-3.
representation. It was him who received groups of visitors (for example students or members of parliaments) and who explained to them how the Community worked. Noël thus acted as an informal ambassador. By receiving visitors, giving talks and writing articles about the Community and the role of the Commission, he promoted European integration. For instance, his piece, ‘How do the European Communities work’ was widely read. Finally, Noël played a crucial role in the staff policy of the Commission. He kept an eye on the distribution of posts between nationals of the member states and discussed suitable candidates with the directors-general and the Cabinets.

2.4 The role of the Cabinets

Introduced by the High Authority, the Commissioners’ Cabinets became one of the most important and perhaps also one of the most contested characteristics of the European administration. In the first Commission meeting, the members agreed on appointing a small number of personal staff to assist them. At the beginning, these Cabinets were composed of a chef de cabinet and a deputy chef de cabinet, while Hallstein was granted a third A official. They were attributed the grades A2 (chef de cabinet) and A3 (deputy chef de cabinet), corresponding to director and head of division in the hierarchy of the administration, thus inferior in rank to director-general.

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94 See for example the documents in HAEU, DEP EN 2667, 1960-1976.
95 Noël 1963.
98 BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 40 session, 6 December 1958, pt. 13.
While at first it appeared that Hallstein imposed his view that the Cabinets should have little importance in the Commission,\textsuperscript{100} they rapidly gained influence. The reasons for this development are diverse. As in the case of the Executive Secretariat, another informal structure developed in the administration to fill a gap and to respond to a certain need. The principle of collegiality left the Commissioners with the obligation to keep themselves informed on other policy areas. With the growing workload of the Commission, the Commissioners tried to delegate tasks and attributed more responsibility and power to their personal collaborators on whom they relied for advice and assistance. The Cabinet staff vetted information such as incoming proposals from other DGs. It made sure that these did not contain aspects which could be problematic or were not acceptable for their Commissioner's home government. The Cabinet staff largely ended up deciding which pieces of information would reach the Commissioner. It is not surprising that most Cabinet staff shared their Commissioner's nationality. Petrilli's note for the conclave, which was ironically drafted by his chef de cabinet, showed that the Italian Commissioner trusted his personal collaborators more than the director-general heading his DG; the former shared his political beliefs and his national background and the latter did not.\textsuperscript{101} In his memoirs, von der Groeben underlined the important role of Cabinet members as trusted advisers in a multinational administration – advisers usually of the same nationality.\textsuperscript{102}

The Cabinet members' role as trustees of the Commissioners was enhanced by the fact that they could represent their member in the Commission's meetings.

\textsuperscript{100} IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 97, J.J. van der Lee, Memorandum voor Dr Mansholt, 23 April 1958. On Hallstein's desire to keep the personal collaborators of the Commissioners to a minimum see also the passage in Lemaignen 1964: 49-50.
Although deprived of the right to vote, they were allowed to speak and articulate their member’s opinion. The role they wished to assign to their Cabinets depended largely on the Commissioners themselves. For instance Alfred Mozer, Mansholt’s chef de cabinet, was neither a specialist in agricultural policy nor in administration. In charge of promoting European integration and of the vice-president’s relations to social democrats and other politicians across Europe, he took pride in never having attended a meeting of the chefs de cabinet. 103

In the early 1960s the chefs de cabinet only met infrequently before the Wednesday sessions of the Commission to discuss a specific problem. However, when the Commission’s workload increased, and as alternative co-ordinating bodies were lacking, these meetings became more important. The Commissioners introduced two categories of decisions, A and B. Decisions of the A category would only appear on the Commission’s agenda for the weekly meeting if one of the Commissioners wished to further discuss the topic. Otherwise the chefs de cabinet would decide. 104 By circa 1965/66 the Cabinets started preparing the decisions of the college. In a report of 1967, Wellenstein, secretary-general of the High Authority, Giulio Guazzugli-Marini, secretary-general of the Euratom Commission, and Noël qualified the weekly meetings of the chefs de cabinet as the most important and efficient preparation and problem solving method in the Commission. 105

The Cabinets also played a vital role in the Commission’s staff policy. 106 Here, their role differed most from Cabinets in national ministries and their influence was probably most pronounced. They observed the national balance of staff and put

104 HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.-27.7.60 (108e à 114e réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960.
106 HAEU, Int 30 Emile Noel.
forward candidates, especially for A4 and A3 posts. The presidential Cabinet was particularly influential in this area.\textsuperscript{107} The chefs de cabinet discussed the ‘nationality of a vacancy’ with Noël.\textsuperscript{108} Cabinet members then looked for suitable candidates in the Commission first, and then in the member states. According to Mozer, the Cabinets had a \textit{Vorschlagsrecht}, or the right to nominate suitable candidates for leading posts in the Commission.\textsuperscript{109}

The influence of the Cabinets and the increasing exclusiveness of the relationship between the Commissioners and their Cabinets to the detriment of the directors-general triggered problems and jealousy as some Cabinets attempted to control the access to their Commissioner. Moreover, former Cabinet members were likely to be promoted to a higher position in the administration once their service in the Cabinet ended, for instance when their Commissioner left. Careers via the Cabinet became an important and contested issue.\textsuperscript{110} The increasing power of Cabinets was also a result of the weakness of the Commission’s administration. In this fragmented administration into which the Commission developed, policy proposals were often prepared and discussed in one DG without consultation of other DGs. Therefore, the Cabinet meeting was often the first occasion where a proposal would be discussed across different DGs.

\subsection*{2.5 The role of high officials}

Like in the High Authority, the employees of the Commission were divided into four different careers: A, B, C and D. The A career required a university degree and

\textsuperscript{107} Coombes 1970: 153.
\textsuperscript{108} Interviews K.S. with Franz Froeschmaier, Brussels, 15 April 2004 and with Manfred Lahnstein.
\textsuperscript{109} IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter A. Mozer to Klaus Pöhle, 14 October 1964.
comprised eight grades: director-general (A1), director (A2), head of division (mainly A3, but initially also A4 and A5), principal administrator (A4/5), administrator (A6/7) and, later, assistant administrator (A8). Young graduates with no or very little professional experience were employed as A6/7, later as A8. After the personnel statute entered into force in 1962, A8 to A3 officials were in principle recruited through a competitive entry examination, the concours. For A1 and A2 posts, or the 'political posts', this recruitment procedure did not apply, however. 'Political post' means that a candidate external to the European administration could be appointed ('parachuted in') and that A1 and A2 officials could be dismissed from the service in the Commission with only a short period of notice. However, in practice A3 posts were often enough considered as 'political posts' although not labelled as such in the statute.

Directors-general were the most senior category of officials in the Commission. They headed a DG and worked closely with the member responsible for the policy area of their DG, the president of the working group. In order to ensure impartiality, the Commission decided that the directors-general had to have a different nationality from the respective president of the working group. Sometimes they had different political convictions as well as in the case of von der Groeben, a Christian democrat and the director-general of DG IV, Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, a socialist. In some cases, this affected the relationship between a Commissioner and the director-general. For instance, Commissioner Petrilli suggested that the directors-general should not be involved in political decisions of the Commission because they

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normally did not share the political beliefs of the respective Commissioner. Generally speaking, the relations between Commissioners and their directors-general seem to have become more distant over the years. Yet, Hallstein called the directors-general the ‘élite’ of the administration because the scope of their competencies was comparable to that of an entire ministry in the member states. He compared them to ‘Permanent Under-Secretaries’ in the United Kingdom’s administration. Directors-general had an important role in the formulation of the Commissioner’s preferences and they represented the authority of the Commissioner vis-à-vis the administrative services. In 1960, Lemaignen deplored that there were hardly any links or cooperation among the directors-general themselves. Therefore, according to Lemaignen, they did not form a ‘corps’ while this kind of solidarity had become ‘almost instinctive within our Commission and between our Cabinets’. This suggests that already in the early 1960s the directors-general acted like ‘dukes’ defending their duchies within the administration, something von der Groeben deplored in 1966. As the directors-general usually remained in the administration for a longer period of time than the Commissioners, Lemaignen thought that the ‘corps’ of the directors-general should develop into the conscience of the Commission and its ‘keeper of experiences and tradition’. Yet it seems that they mainly conserved the experiences and traditions of their own DGs.

115 HAEU, DEP EN 702, 3.6.-15.7.1958 (20e bis 24e réunion), 24 June 1958.
117 Ibid.
Hierarchically positioned between the director-general and the heads of division and presiding over several divisions, the tasks of the directors were otherwise rather ill-defined. For instance, the German Commissioners do not seem to have expected them to conceptualise policies. Von der Groeben deplored that the directors played too important a role in devising policy proposals. For him the heads of division alone should be ‘l’homme de conception’\textsuperscript{120}, the ones to formulate policies as in the German administration. There clearly was a misunderstanding resulting from variations in the administrative cultures between the member states. Narjes explains this difference: ‘[T]he division head from France or Italy approached his new, expanded duties and his greater freedom guardedly and in disbelief at first, while the German division head felt treated like a child.’\textsuperscript{121} The Commission considered the division as the core unit of the administration and consequently attributed an important role to the heads of division which was later on sanctioned in the Commission’s rules of procedure.\textsuperscript{122}

The assistants to the directors-general were an unusual category of officials. Initially, they were A4 or A3 category staff as they should not compete with the directors and become ‘assistant directors-general’. However, they were considered as potential future heads of division or even directors.\textsuperscript{123} In charge of the secretariat, the administration and the organization of work in a DG, the assistant was directly responsible to the director-general.\textsuperscript{124} The assistants supported them in their daily tasks and maintained relations with the Commissioners’ Cabinets and the other

\textsuperscript{120} HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.-27.7.60 (108\textsuperscript{e} à 114\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960. Underlined in the original text.

\textsuperscript{121} Narjes 1998: 113.

\textsuperscript{122} ACDP, 1-659, 058/1, Geschäftsordnung der Kommission (KOM (62) 378), 17 December 1962, Article 20.

\textsuperscript{123} BAK, N 1266/1264, Note to President Hallstein, no author [Cabinet Hallstein] 13 November 1962.

services of the Commission. They also advised the directors-general in questions of staffing. However, the nature of tasks and responsibilities the assistants were given depended on the director-general. For example, Helmut von Verschuer in DG VI was more concerned with questions related to the CAP than Charles van Aken with questions related to competition policy in DG IV. 125 Through their weekly meetings chaired by Noël, the assistants had important co-ordinating functions in the Commission and were a source of information for their directors-general. 126

Competent leading staff, directors-general, directors and heads of division, were vital for the overall performance of the Commission, the performance of a DG and for the motivation of other employees in an administrative unit. Playing an important role in the administration and being treated with respect and esteem has an effect on individuals. Not least it facilitates the development of loyalties towards an organization. The EEC treaty comprised an annex, the ‘Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities’, which said that the Commission members, and a group of officials to be defined by the Commission, would benefit from laissez-passers as valid travel documents within the member states. 127 Likewise, a group of officials would be declared immune from legal proceedings ‘in respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity’. 128 These measures should guarantee Commissioners and high officials the necessary independence when executing their tasks. Apart from sharing the European status and diplomatic immunity with the Commissioners, high officials were entitled to represent the Commission at external events. 129 They were also occasionally present in the weekly meetings of the Commission. However, it seems

126 BAK, N 1266/1264, Note Smulders to President Hallstein, 12 November 1962.
127 EEC treaty, Protocol on the privileges and immunities, Chapter 2, Article 6.
128 Ibid., Chapter 5, Article 11.
129 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 67 session, 8 July 1959, pt. 5.
that they did not participate as freely and frequently in the discussion as in the early
days of the High Authority. As a general rule, the executive secretary, his deputy, and
the greffe were the only officials present in the Commission’s meetings on a regular
basis. Directors-general, directors but also heads of division and sometimes even
lower ranking officials were invited to participate in a meeting if their area of
expertise was discussed and if a member required their assistance.\textsuperscript{130} However, this
presence of non-members in the sessions did not remain uncontested. In September
1959 Hallstein deplored that, compared to Cabinet meetings of national government
ministers, too many officials took part in the Commission’s meetings.\textsuperscript{131} While in the
conclave of July 1960 the Commission confirmed the presence of officials in the
weekly meetings in principle, after an incident where information from a meeting was
leaked the Commissioners tried to restrict the presence of officials in their
meetings.\textsuperscript{132} Instead, the members were allowed to bring a member of their Cabinet to
assist them. Even if in practice officials continued to take part in the weekly sessions,
this incident strengthened the role of the Cabinets as the Commissioners trusted
collaborators to the detriment of high officials.

If they could not participate regularly in the Commission’s meetings, the
Commission thought it nevertheless necessary to keep the officials up to date on
Community matters. For instance, it organized meetings of A officials up to heads of
division at which one Commission member would talk about a current problem of the
Commission. President Hallstein thought this was necessary not least because he often
considered drafts coming from Commission officials as ‘naive’ and not taking into

\textsuperscript{130} See for example BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 15 session, 28-29 April 1958.
\textsuperscript{131} HAEU, DEP EN 711, 22.7.59-22.9.59 (69\textsuperscript{e} à 74\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 7 September 1959.
\textsuperscript{132} BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 140 session, 2ème partie, 22/23 March 1961.
account current Commission policies. He thus had high expectations of the Commission’s staff which they could not always fulfil.

The quality and abilities of the high officials first appointed varied. With the personnel statute imminent in late 1960 and early 1961 the Commission tried to evaluate its personnel and attempted to dismiss incapable staff. The danger was, according to Marjolin, that with the continuous presence of mediocre staff the Commission’s services would end up being inferior to national administrations. It would also signal to the more talented and hard working staff that there were no sanctions for weak performance. Thus, the Commission established a *commission d’intégration* for the personnel statute, which should assess the Commission’s officials up to heads of division. The college itself decided on the fate of the directors-general, directors and some heads of division. In a meeting in February 1962, each Commissioner submitted problematic cases in his directorate-general. The college also tried to consider the possible implications of a decision to dismiss someone: consequences for the national balance and social considerations were weighted against harm for the Commission’s performance and reputation. For instance, Schaus pointed out that if he sent directors home, there was no guarantee that their successors would be more capable. According to him the Commission could not always choose the most capable people because of ‘political pressures’. Therefore, the cases of non-integration in the statute were the exception. Some officials were offered a lower grade (*déclassement*), however. Also, for the cases of social hardship, the Commission suggested solutions such as a research contract. Financially, this

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133 HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.-27.7.60 (108e à 114e réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960.
134 HAEU, DEP EN 724, 14.12.60-1.2.61 (128e à 133e réunion de la Commission), 21 December 1960.
135 HAEU, DEP EN 322, Réunion de la Commission, 23 February 1962.
136 HAEU, DEP EN 323, Réunion de la Commission, 28 February 1962.
137 Ibid.
must have been a considerable loss for the Commission but it allowed the officials concerned to save face. Solidarity with personnel who had spent four years in the administration and fear of political consequences guided the Commission’s decisions. However, the Commission was stricter towards its personnel than the High Authority. A High Authority source suggested, but did not specify further, that the Commission undertook a thorough investigation into their staff’s background before they were given the status of civil servants.\(^{138}\)

The minutes of this Commission meeting of February 1962 indicate that inept members of staff were distributed unequally across DGs. For instance, Rey, responsible for DG I, complained about two of his directors, Robert Faniel and Riccardo Luzzato.\(^{139}\) Likewise, Schaus was not satisfied with any of his three directors in DG Transport while there were few complaints about DG IV and DG VI staff. Vice-President Mansholt thought that this was due to the careful choice of collaborators by his director-general Rabot. The one case discussed for DG VI concerned the Belgian Director for Agricultural Structures, Roger Grooten. Mansholt thought that he was not the ideal man for the post. According to him, in the domain of agricultural structures there was an expert community within and outside the Commission of which Grooten was not part and which he was not capable of joining.\(^{140}\) The fact that Grooten was not part of this network was considered harmful for the Commission’s structural policy in agriculture.\(^{141}\) This shows the importance of contacts and networks of leading Commission officials for the Commission’s success in a policy area; contacts which they either had before entering the Commission or

\(^{139}\) HAEU, DEP EN 322, Réunion de la Commission, 23 February 1962.
\(^{140}\) Ibid.
\(^{141}\) HAEU, DEP EN 323, Réunion de la Commission, 28 February 1962.
which they had to acquire subsequently. The college decided that Grooten should remain in his post until DG VI was restructured and a more suitable position was found for him. However, two years later, Grooten was still the director of the Directorate for Agricultural Structures. Confronted with member states' demands, the Commission had to compromise. Determination to act as expressed in the Commission’s meetings was therefore not always followed by consequent action. Under these circumstances, the Commission’s administration performed surprisingly well. The examples of DG IV and DG VI show that it was possible to choose well qualified staff even when under external pressure. In an interview, the director-general of DG IV, Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, prided himself that he successfully appointed qualified personnel while at the same time abiding by the rules of national balance just like any other DG in the Commission. This is confirmed by a contemporary statement of President Hallstein: ‘There are few cases in DG IV but not because of generosity but because of careful recruitment.’ Thus, if the director-general was capable, and if the Commissioner and the director-general collaborated closely, it was possible to put together a competent team.

The Commission’s civil servants were regarded as the institution’s memory and a guarantee for continuity. Shortly before Hallstein left the Commission in 1967, Narjes wrote to him saying that it was important to think about ways to place ‘reliable Europeans’ in the Commission so as to guarantee that the highest ranks in the administration ensured continuity of the integration policy independent of the change in political leadership, that is, after Hallstein’s departure.

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142 BAK, N 1266/1254, K. Meyer to President Hallstein, 9 April 1964.
143 Interview K.S. with Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Bilthoven, 29 April 2004.
144 HAEU, DEP EN 322, Réunion de la Commission, 23 February 1962.
145 BAK, N 1266/1105, Note K.-H. Narjes to President Hallstein, 7 January 1967.
3. Towards a European administrative staff? Recruitment patterns and personnel policy

3.1 The beginnings of the Commission’s staff and recruitment policy

The effectiveness of an administration depends significantly on the skills of its personnel. Therefore, recruitment is of vital importance to any organization. The Commission started appointing personnel from early 1958. However, the personnel statute introducing a standardised selection procedure for European civil servants only came into force in 1962. Hence, between the Commission being set up and the statute entering into force lay four years of more or less unregulated recruitment. As Gaudet, the head of the Commission’s Legal Service, emphasized in March 1959, the absence of a personnel statute gave the Commission great freedom in recruitment matters that was only limited by budgetary restrictions.

The first appointments were meant to be for a limited period of time only. Many of the first Commission officials remained, at first, in the service of their home administration. However, the Commissioners were aware of the fact that these appointments could create a certain prerogative for a job in the Commission. A careful selection of these collaborators was thus necessary. The Commissioners’ expectation proved to be accurate. Although initially appointed on the basis of temporary contracts, the first Commission officials were for the most part transferred to the status of permanent officials during 1962. Moreover, they often stayed in the Commission for the remainder of their professional careers, many of them reaching leading positions in the administration. According to David Coombes, only seven per

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146 Downs 1968: 228.
147 HAEU, DEP EN 708, 25.2.59-11.6.59 (51e à 58e réunion de la Commission), 18 March 1959.
148 Ibid.
cent of A posts between 1962 and 1967 were filled through a *concours*, a competitive entry examination, or with people from outside the Commission generally. The other posts were filled through internal promotion, internal *concours* or transfers from other Community institutions.\(^{150}\) Analysing the initial recruitment patterns of the Commission’s top-level staff is thus paramount when considering the long-term service of some of these officials and the influence they therefore had on the administration and, what is more, on Commission policies.

The Commission’s initial staff consisted of the Commissioners’ personal collaborators they had brought with them to Brussels. Likewise, the High Authority provided the Commission with staff, either on a permanent or temporary basis. This core group had to be extended, however. In their first meeting, the Commissioners defined three sources of potential collaborators for the Commission: national governments, international organizations and independent candidates.\(^{151}\)

When selecting and recruiting its first staff, the Commission benefited from, and was dependent on, the assistance of member state governments. In March 1958 the Commission asked for the personnel files of suitable candidates pre-selected by national administrations.\(^{152}\) Initially, the Commission was all the more dependent on assistance from the member states because it did not yet have a human resources department able to deal with the 15 to 18,000 applications the Commission received.\(^{153}\) Nevertheless, the Commission wanted to quickly regularise and centralise the recruitment procedure and DG IX was to play an important role in this. The

\(^{150}\) Coombes 1970: 142-3.
Commission asked the other DGs to collaborate closely with DG IX. However, the fact that the Commission had to remind the DGs on more than one occasion of working together with DG IX shows that it was often circumvented by the autonomously acting DGs. Staff matters were of high political importance. As Coombes has argued, as a result, 'less real power has been delegated from Commission staff here [to DG IX, K.S.] than anywhere else'. The nine Commissioners discussed and decided personally on the recruitment of A officials in their weekly meetings while B and C staff were initially appointed by a detached Belgian official in collaboration with Hallstein. Later, B officials were appointed in regular meetings of the president and the vice-presidents while DG IX appointed C staff.

Noël described the first year of the Commission as a great 'recruitment rush'. This can be put down to the initiative of President Hallstein who wanted to create a fait accompli vis-à-vis the member states. In November 1958, Hallstein urged his colleagues to tap the full potential of the budget for 1958 that provided for 1,231 officials. By the end of 1958, the Commission had already appointed most of the directors, heads of division and other leading officials, 399 A officials in total. In February 1959, the total number of staff amounted to 1,108 officials.

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155 Coombes 1970: 152.
156 BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 18 session, 20-22 May 1958.
158 CEAB 2 4334, Réponse à la question écrite no. 55 posée par MM. Vals, Leemans et Thom, undated [ca. September 1963], 234.
159 HAEU, Int. 30, Emile Noël.
160 Ibid.
162 HAEU, DEP EN 707, 7.1.-25.2.1959 (45° à 51° réunion de la Commission), 21 January 1959.
Hallstein recommended prudence, however. The Commission recognised the danger of paralysing the administration by recruiting too many people in too hasty a manner. Recruitment continued in the following months and years but there were now restrictions set by the Council and the Commission had to reduce its demands. The times of abundant and generous recruitment were over. In early 1959 the Council established an Expert Committee for Budgetary Questions which made recommendations to the Commission. While willing to take these recommendations as a basis for discussion, the Commission rejected the committee’s suggestion of introducing an average cost per official and to limit the overall number of officials to 1,300 in 1959. Moreover, in order to circumvent the restrictions set by the Council, the Commission invented ruses such as systematically appointing young university graduates in the B, instead of the A career. However, attempts to obtain the transformation of B posts into A posts from the Council were only partly successful. Finding an agreement on the Commission’s budget and staff numbers became an annual challenge and a source of conflict not least because budget debates always had political implications. The Commission saw itself as a victim of the member states whose motives were more often than not guided by domestic political and financial considerations. In Hallstein’s perception, the denial of additional posts by the governments of the member states was directed against the dynamism of the Commission. He considered that refusing the Commission the necessary staff

164 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 36 session, 5 November 1958.
165 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 710, 17.6.1959-22.7.1959 (64ª à 69ª réunion de la Commission), 17 June 1959.
166 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 46 session, 2ème partie, 21 January 1959, pt. 8.
168 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 85 session, 16 and 18 December 1959, pt. 12.
constituted a violation of the treaty. The Commission was thus in a constant dilemma between striving for autonomy and budgetary dependence. For the Council, the budget was an important means to control the Commission.

3.2 Attracting high-flyers: the Commission’s strategies and expectations

According to Coombes, ‘the main qualification for inclusion [in the Commission’s administration, K.S.] was to be “pro-European”’. But was being ‘pro-European’ a key prerequisite for future European officials? There is no evidence in the sources that European commitment was among the decisive factors for recruiting candidates. Expertise and language skills were the only criteria the Commissioners agreed upon. The personnel statute was even more vague, merely stating that the applicants had to have the citizenship of a member state and the necessary language skills. This lack of concrete criteria suggests that the whole recruitment procedure was based on informal rules, personal preferences and also, no doubt, political consensus. For Hallstein, service in national administrations was a good preparation for a job in the Commission. For example, he did not want to support a young German applicant who lacked this experience: ‘He should serve for a couple of years in a firmly organized German administration’, before applying for Brussels, Hallstein wrote.

But how could people be attracted in case the European idea was in itself not reason enough for well qualified staff to come to Brussels? The Commission thought that a high salary would facilitate their decision. For instance, the concern that the

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170 HAEU, DEP EN 722 21.9.-9.11.60 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 14 October 1960.
171 Coombes 1970: 142.
172 For one of the rare discussions on staff skills see for example BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 7 session, 5-6 March 1958. Compte-rendu confidentiel.
174 Personalstatut 1962, Art. 28.
175 BAK, N 1266/1113, Letter President Hallstein to the state secretary in the German ministry of justice, Walter Strauß, 10 June 1958.

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Commission would not attract a sufficient number of high calibre staff guided the college’s discussion about the members’ and officials’ income tax levels. The net income should ensure ‘the recruitment of quality personnel in all the member states’. The salary should neither be inferior to the ECSC nor to European intergovernmental organizations and the Permanent Representations as these were the institutions with which the Commission thought it had to compete. In mid-1959, the Commission submitted a letter to the Council, asking for an advantageous income tax, a residence indemnity and family allocations for its personnel which it considered necessary for ‘psychological reasons’. By 1964, however, the initial difference between the salary level in the member states and the higher salary level in the Commission seems to have dwindled. According to Mansholt’s chef de cabinet, the Commission had severe problems attracting high calibre staff because the salaries in the member states had increased by circa 30 per cent since 1958 compared to 8 per cent in the Communities, not least because of the favourable economic situation in most western European countries in the 1960s. The Commission had, in particular, difficulties recruiting A1, A2 and A3 officials from member states’ administrations.

The distribution of grades and salary levels, or so-called echelons, to the newly appointed European officials was a delicate matter. In September 1958 the Commission still had not established criteria for the classification of candidates. The Commissioners even feared that this insecurity could be an obstacle to the

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176 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 41 session, 2ème partie, 10 December 1958, pt. 9.
177 BAC 209.80, W. Hallstein to M. Couve de Murville, 26 June 1959 (document annexed to PV of the EEC Commission, 65 session, 2ème partie).
178 According to a table comparing salaries in the German civil service with those of the Commission.
179 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter A. Mozer to K. Pöhle, 14 October 1964.
180 BAK, N 1266/1264, Aufzeichnung betreffend die Notwendigkeit und die Möglichkeit einer Verbesserung der Besoldungsregelung des Statutenentwurfs für die Spitzengrade der Kategorie A, undated [1961].
recruitment of capable people.\textsuperscript{182} DG IX then established guidelines for the classification of appointees but this led to inequalities in rank between officials who had similar qualifications. As a result, the Commission had to proceed to a reclassification in early 1960.\textsuperscript{183} However, the problem was not only DG IX. Wanting to guarantee the Commission the service of quality staff, Commissioners readily argued in favour of attributing a candidate a high grade and salary level by referring to their international and professional experience or their special knowledge.\textsuperscript{184}

In the member states’ civil services, classification of officials was handled in different ways, and, resulting from this, the Commissioners had diverging views which had to be accommodated in a common solution.\textsuperscript{185} Concerning age or seniority as a possible criterion for classification, Marjolin demanded the greatest possible flexibility, preferring that the previous careers of the candidates should be decisive. He thought that it would be better to have an \textit{ancienneté professionnelle} instead of an \textit{ancienneté d’âge}, the former being an advantage for the young French ‘high flyers’ in the Commission. Hallstein, on the other hand, stated that the Commission should not be too generous when classifying its officials because the Commission was closely interrelated with national administrations where seniority always played a role.\textsuperscript{186}

Finally, the Commission decided that age should be one of the criteria to judge a candidate. In one of the next meetings, the college adopted a wage scale related to seniority with the possibility of handling this in a more flexible manner for A1 and A2 officials where the individual situation of the applicant would also be taken into

\textsuperscript{182} HAEU, DEP EN 703, 15.7 – 7.9.1958 (25\textsuperscript{e} à 28\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 4 September 1958.
\textsuperscript{183} BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 92 session, 2\textsuperscript{ème} partie, 10 February 1960.
\textsuperscript{184} BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 41 session, 2\textsuperscript{ème} partie, 10 December 1958, pt. 10.
\textsuperscript{185} See for example the discussion whether age should be a criterion for classification, HAEU, DEP EN 702, 3.6.-15.7.1958 (20\textsuperscript{e} à 24\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 24 June 1958.
\textsuperscript{186} HAEU, DEP EN 717, 2.3.-12.4.60 (95\textsuperscript{e} à 101\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 9 March 1960.
consideration. A promotion to the next point on the pay scale, or echelon, would automatically take place every two years. This corresponds, for instance, to the career system in the German civil service.

While the Commission tried to attract able people by offering them a good salary and other advantages, in return it required them to be independent. When in 1960 it turned out that some of the detached officials in the Commission continued to receive salaries from their home governments, the college sought to put an end to this practice. According to Rey and Mansholt, the Commission officials should be entirely independent from the governments and it would be intolerable if anyone depended on a national administration for their salary. In February 1960 Hallstein wrote letters to the governments of the member states in which he argued that these payments could 'give the impression that they call into question the Commission’s independence which is an essential character of the administration'.

3.3 Personal contacts and networks resulting in appointments

Initially, recruitment for the Commission was based on personal contacts, networks, recommendations, and sometimes even haphazard encounters. For Monnet, the negotiations leading to the ECSC treaty had been a source of 'European spirit' and a source of European officials. Hallstein had also played an important role in the Val Duchesse negotiations. However, the sources do not explicitly name the treaty negotiation as an important source of staff for the Commission. This might be because

187 HAEU, DEP EN 705, 1.10.-19.11.1958 (31\textsuperscript{e} à 38\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 2 October 1958.
189 HAEU, DEP EN 715, 6.1.-10.2.1960 (86\textsuperscript{e} à 92\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 23 January 1960.
190 HAEU, DEP EN 706, 19.11.-27.12.1958 (39\textsuperscript{e} à 44\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 10 December 1958.
Hallstein’s role in the negotiations and in the preparatory phase of setting up the Commission cannot be compared to Monnet’s fundamental role in founding the ECSC. However, it might simply have been understood by then, also because of the High Authority’s experience, that experts participating in the negotiations made excellent staff for the European administration. The fact is that leading Commission staff had participated in the Val Duchesse negotiations – Franco Bobba, Jean-François Deniau, Ernst Albrecht and Theodor Hijzen, to name but a few.

In order to fill the organizational chart with appropriate personnel, the Commission proceeded in a top-down mode. In the Commission’s twelfth session, on 9-10 April 1958, the directors-general were officially nominated. They then assisted the working group presidents in recruiting leading staff for their respective DGs. Unfortunately, the exact circumstances of the Commission’s first appointments, especially the appointments of directors-general and directors, are far from transparent. Due to the informality of the selection process and due to the political importance attached to these posts, the sources do not reveal much information about this procedure. The decision about which candidate of which member state was to head a DG was certainly guided by particular interests of the member states. The French government, for example, thought it paramount that a French candidate was appointed at the head of DG Agriculture. Mansholt and Marjolin therefore proposed Rabot, an experienced international civil servant whom Mansholt already knew from the Green Pool negotiations. As will be shown in more detail in chapter BIII, international expert networks formed at international negotiations on agriculture were crucial for recruitment in DG VI, which was composed of leading officials with a

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194 HAEU, Int 30, Emile Noël.
similar background and with a similar outlook on the CAP to be created during the 1960s.

A slightly different example is DG IV. Before 1958 there was hardly a competition policy community in Europe to speak of. Moreover, von der Groeben himself was rather inexperienced in this field. For him it was more difficult to find personnel with a suitable background or previous knowledge in the matter. The German cartel office, the Bundeskartellamt, and the Dutch cartel office were a source of recruitment for DG IV, but von der Groeben also had to appoint officials from other member states that did not have competition legislation and where competition law was not part of the university curriculum. However, as will be shown in chapter BIII, von der Groeben was determined to transfer the German concept of competition to the European level. In the case of DG IV it is therefore more appropriate to speak of a network, composed of Commission officials, lawyers, judges and national civil servants, that was constituted after the establishment of the Commission and after the first successes in the common competition policy rather than a network that already existed as a primary source of recruitment.

3.4 Member states, parties and interest groups

Member state governments, political parties and party networks, industries and trade unions sought influence on the Commission’s administration by putting forward candidates for the Commission’s services who they thought would represent their interests at the European level. In addition to a balanced distribution of posts between nationalities, there was a ‘political balance’ for high-level posts which the
Commission observed from the outset. First and foremost, the nine seats of the Commission were distributed among the important political parties ruling in the member states: Socialists, Christian democrats and Liberals. For Belgian candidates there was even a balance between candidates in terms of language and regional origin from Flanders or Wallonia. However, matters were more complex than this. There was an overall national and political balance between the members of the High Authority, the Euratom and EEC Commissions. Moreover, interest groups such as trade unions and industry had to be satisfied as well and Petrilli, in charge of DG Social Affairs and Lemaignen, respectively, were meant to be contact people for these groups in the Commission.

This complexity was reflected at the level of high officials. From the second half of 1957 onwards the recruitment of leading staff for the Commission had been discussed in the member states. European Christian democrats met several times during 1957 just for this purpose, as Kaiser demonstrates, but no decisions for staffing the new European administration were made as the treaty accorded the Commission the authority to decide on appointments. Notwithstanding this legally granted autonomy, the interests of the governments of the member states were discussed in the Commission’s meetings and the Commissioners kept in close contact with their respective governments while these decisions were being taken. For instance, for the first meeting of the Working Group Administration on 25 January 1958, Marjolin drafted an organizational scheme for the Commission. The following

196 Cf. Condorelli-Braun 1972: 81; 90. However, no member of the Hallstein Commission was a trade unionist. With the German Wilhelm Haferkamp a trade unionist entered the Commission only in 1967. See ibid., 89-90.
197 See for example BAK, N 1266/1462, Dok. I. Welche Aufgaben ergeben sich nach Inkrafttreten der Verträge über den Gemeinsamen Markt und Euratom? undated [1957].
day, Hallstein and von der Groeben returned to Bonn to discuss this scheme with top-
level officials of different German ministries. These German officials discussed the
upcoming meeting of the Commission as well as German and what was perceived as
the other member states' 'interests' and possible candidates for leading posts in the
Commission. The French Commissioners Marjolin and Lemaignen had similar
discussions at the Quai d'Orsay. Most likely, staff questions were discussed in a
similar manner in the other member states. As these matters were often informally
discussed, they are not always reflected in the written documentation. Back in
Brussels, the Commission members had to be considerate of these interests. In this
respect, the nomination of Grooten as director in DG VI is symptomatic. Here, the
Commission was under pressure from the Belgian government, with Rey underlining
'the extreme political importance of the nomination of Mr. Grooten for the Belgian
side'.

In member state governments and ministries there was also the opposite
reaction. Some of the German ministries did not want to lose their best civil servants
to 'Europe'. The ministry of agriculture seemed downright hostile towards the EEC,
and one official, who chose Brussels over Bonn, felt treated like a Volksverräuber, a
traitor of his country. Rudolf Hüttebräucker, state secretary in the agricultural
ministry between 1962 and 1968, recalls that his ministry preferred sending less

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1958, 27 January 1958. See also ibid. Protocole of a meeting between Hallstein, Müller-Armack,

200 Lemaignen 1964: 51. In an interview François Muller referred to a working group in the Quai
d'Orsay which preselected French candidates and submitted a list to the commission. Interview K.S.
with François Muller, Strasbourg, 19 March 2005.

201 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 42 session, 2ème partie, third session, 17 December
1958.

Broder Krohn, ehemals Direktor der Landwirtschaftsabteilung der EWG, dann Generaldirektor für
Entwicklungsfragen (pensioniert etwa 1977) in Brüssel am 15. Januar 1981. See also the interview K.S.
capable civil servants to Brussels in order to get rid of them. Compared to this situation, the French ministries seem to have been more aware of the potential importance of the Commission and thus proposed good candidates. When the future director-general for DG VIII, Helmut Allardt, examined the French candidates for his DG recommended by the Commissioner in charge, Lemaignen, he reported to Hallstein that the French candidates ‘made on average an excellent impression and will - because of their qualifications and technical know-how - very likely dominate, something I anticipate not without concern’. These examples suggest that member states differed in how seriously they took the importance of staffing the Commission. However, to claim that France proposed good candidates throughout while Germany only wanted to get rid of its lame ducks would go too far. For the German economics ministry, Bernhard Löffler insists on the openness of at least the departments concerned with European questions and the enthusiasm of the civil servants working therein. These officials spent a significant part of their work life abroad, be it by attending meetings and negotiations in Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Brussels or by spending a couple of years as detached officials in the European administrations. This suggests that there was not only a frequent exchange between ministries in Paris and the Commission but also between the Commission and some ministries in Bonn.

Political parties were equally interested in being adequately represented in the new Commission. For example, the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI), the

204 BAK, N 1266/1216, H. Allardt to President Hallstein, 29 April 1958.
205 Officials in interviews often referred to the young French ‘geniuses’ in Brussels such as François-Xavier Ortoli, Jean-François Deniau, Emile Noël, Michel Gaudet and Louis Georges Rabot. See for example the interview Sibylle Hambloch with Manfred Caspari, Bad Honnef, 16 October 2002.
206 Löffler 2002: 208-9; 571.
European network of Christian democratic parties, attached great importance to the new European administrations.\textsuperscript{207} It is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the outcome of the efforts to influence recruitment by political parties, transnational party networks and interest groups. However, the following example shows that the Commission at least tried to comply with their demands. In May 1958, Lucien de Groote, a collaborator of NEI President August de Schryver, met Natjes, then Hallstein’s – Christian democratic – deputy chef de cabinet, to discuss the organization’s representation in the Commission’s administrative services.\textsuperscript{208} Although Natjes did not promise de Groote any appointments in the Commission, shortly after this encounter de Schryver expressed his gratitude in a letter to Hallstein for appointing one candidate supported by the NEI.\textsuperscript{209} Hallstein and others in the German government involved in the European integration process like Heinrich von Brentano, the minister of foreign affairs between 1955 and 1961, were key members of the NEI. The example of the NEI shows that these parties were at times more concerned about promoting Christian democrats for key posts in the Commission than about advancing candidates of their respective nationalities. One of the reasons is that the number of higher-level appointments in the administration assigned to every member state was limited. Therefore, the NEI tried to support candidates who shared their political and ideological beliefs. From 1957 onwards, the NEI organized meetings to prepare for the founding of the EEC. They expected the administrations of Euratom and the EEC to grow to 10,000 officials within five years, more than Hallstein could have dreamed of. When it came to the distribution of these posts, the

\textsuperscript{208} BAK, N 1266/1281, Note K. Narjes to President Hallstein, 2 May 1958.
\textsuperscript{209} BAK, N 1266/1290, Letter A.E. de Schryver to President Hallstein, 6 June 1958.
NEI thus asked for quotas not only regarding the nationality of the candidates but also an ideological quota, regarding political and social tendencies. 210

The Socialist parties did not want to leave the battlefield to the Christian democrats. First of all, European Socialists promoted the candidature of Mansholt as Commission president. In May 1957 Jaap van der Lee of the Dutch Socialist Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) met Noël, at that time chef de cabinet of Mollet. Mollet should try to convince ‘the Germans’ to support Mansholt, van der Lee demanded. 211 Also, Monnet’s Action Committee was involved in these negotiations. Mansholt and van der Lee met Monnet and Kohnstamm in October 1957. 212 However, Mansholt, ‘a farmer and a socialist’, was not acceptable to Chancellor Adenauer, a Christian democrat. 213

In May 1958, Mansholt’s departing chef de cabinet, van der Lee, recommended that Mansholt should employ a Catholic as his successor in the Cabinet because he might be dependent on the support of the Dutch Katholieke Volkspartij, the main coalition partner of the PvdA until December 1958, in case he wanted to stand for Dutch Prime Minister or become the first Socialist Commission president. 214 Against van der Lee’s advice, Mansholt chose the Socialist Mozer. However, as deputy chef de cabinet he appointed Willem van Slobbe, a Christian democrat, who had also been proposed by van der Lee. 215 Whether a Christian democrat as Mansholt’s chef de cabinet would have raised Mansholt’s chances of becoming Commission president is doubtful. Yet, this episode illustrates the importance of the particular political constellation in the Commissioners’ home countries for the Brussels administration.

211 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, N6 4, Letter J. van der Lee to J. A. W. Burger (Dutch Minister of State), 20 May 1957.
212 Ibid., J. van der Lee to J. A. W. Burger, 11 October 1957.
213 This is cited on several occasions, for example Mansholt 1974: 85; HAEU, Int 654, Jaap van der Lee.
214 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 97, J. van der Lee to S. Mansholt, secret, 9 May 1958.
215 Ibid.
As to the trade unions, judging from documents of the European Trade Union Confederation, the influence of trade unions on the common market, for instance in the EEC treaty negotiations, seems to have been less important than in the ECSC.\footnote{IISH, ETUC, No. 86, Document: Les conséquences pour les syndicats des nouveaux Traités sur la Communauté Economique Européenne et Euratom. Rapporteur: H. Strater, membre du Comité d’I.G. Metall, RFA, 18 July 1957. See also Pasture 2000: 88.}

At the level of the Commission members the trade unions did not have a candidate. However, Pasture believes that the only times trade unions collaborated successfully internationally ‘were primarily aimed at ensuring trade union representation in the European institutions or the nomination of trade unionists in the European administration’.\footnote{Pasture 2000: 96.} Indeed, there are examples for Commission officials with a trade union background having reached top-level posts in the Commission. For instance, Willy Schlieder, an official in DG IV and later director-general for Competition had been the personal collaborator of Alfred Rosenberg, leader of the DGB.\footnote{HAEU, DEP EN 722 21.9.-9.11.60 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 20 October 1960.} In a nutshell, the Commission’s administration reflected to a certain extent the power-balance between political parties and interest groups in the member states. By obliging requests of parties and interest groups, the Commission tried to recreate a miniature image of member states’ societies at the European level, not least with the intention of obtaining greater legitimacy for the European administration.

A couple of years later, in 1964, accommodating political party interests within the Commission’s recruitment and promotion mechanisms seems to have become routine and was institutionalised. It was mainly via the Commissioner’s Cabinets, but also through high officials, that the respective parties sought backing. In a letter, the member of the executive board of the DGB, Waldemar Reuter, named the German officials van Doellen, Hitzelberger, Kraus and Rogalla as influential in the
German personnel policy in the Commission in the sense that they had orders from ‘Bonn’ to promote Germans who shared the political orientation of the federal government, at that time a coalition of Christian democrats and Liberals.\footnote{IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter W. Reuter to H. Schmitt-Vockenhausen, 22 April 1964.} According to Manfred Lahnstein, former chef de Cabinet of Commissioner Wilhelm Haferkamp in the 1970s, the German staff policy in the Commission increasingly concentrated on furthering the careers of promising young professionals who had received a scholarship from the party foundations Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.\footnote{Interview K.S. with Manfred Lahnstein.}

3.5 National balance

While Monnet liked to emphasize that nationality did not play a role in the distribution of posts in the High Authority, Hallstein had a more pragmatic attitude:

I have never shared the view that in selecting its civil servants the Commission could loftily dismiss the question of the nationality of the candidates, by simply saying: “We recognize only Europeans.” Such an attitude appears to me not only to be naïve and dogmatic but also to ignore political reality.\footnote{Hallstein 1972: 61.}

According to the president, the Commission followed a ‘rough and ready rule of thumb in filling posts in its Civil Service’.\footnote{Ibid.} From the outset, the Commission observed an informal national balance for the distribution of posts.\footnote{BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 4 session, 7-10 February 1958, pt. 10.} Later on, this objective was fixed in the personnel statute: recruitment should be based on a wide
geographical basis among the member states. Although there was never an official quota, this rather vague formula was more than a ‘rule of thumb’; it was applied thoroughly to the overall number of staff appointed in all categories and all DGs. The national balance was particularly strictly observed with regard to the A1, A2 and A3 posts.

There are good reasons why the Commission thought it necessary to respect a national balance. Firstly, a strong disequilibrium within the administration to the detriment of one or more member states might lead to distrust vis-à-vis the Commission and its policies; a situation that could prevent a proposal from being adopted in the Council. Secondly, and linked to this, for the Commission the national balance was a means to maintain its independence. It was a shield against allegations of partiality. Thirdly, it enabled the Commission to reject clientelist demands for giving jobs to unsuitable candidates by stating, for example, that this job had to go to a member of a different nationality. And finally, the member states should be represented in the Commission’s services particularly in policy fields where they made a major financial contribution to the budget. Accordingly, the French Commissioner Henri Rochereau, Lemaignen’s successor, responsible for DG VIII, stated that he would only accept a German as the German director-general Heinrich Hendus’ successor because ‘since Germany was the greatest net contributor it had to occupy a position of responsibility in the development fund’.

The great disadvantage of this system was that the need for constant surveillance of the balanced national distribution of posts required substantial

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224 Verordnung Nr. 31 (EWG), Nr. 11 (EAG) über das Statut der Beamten und über die Beschäftigungsbedingungen für die sonstigen Bediensten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft. (1385/62), Art. 27.
225 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 34 session, 21-23 October 1958.
226 BAK, N 1266/1293, K. Naijes to W. Hallstein, Bericht über die Kommissionssitzung, 23 February 1967. Rochereau’s predecessor, Lemaignen, was of the same opinion. See Lemaignen 1964: 57.
administrative resources.\textsuperscript{227} For instance, one official of DG IX was in charge of the surveillance of the national balance in each and every administrative unit of the Commission and the Commission received monthly reports on the situation. There was thus a professionalised system of supervision of the national balance, involving DG IX, the Executive Secretariat and the Cabinets. In their weekly meetings, the nine Commissioners spent a large amount of time calculating and discussing the just distribution of posts in the Commission. As the Commissioners were assigned a particular responsibility for the candidates and officials of their respective countries of origin, each Commissioner defended the alleged interests of his country.\textsuperscript{228} Generally, no candidate for a higher level post was to be appointed without consulting the Commissioner of the candidate's nationality.\textsuperscript{229} The Commission even resolved to create supplementary posts in order to satisfy a country's demands or to respect the national equilibrium. In DG VI, for instance, an AI post for a conseiller was created which went to the Italian Mario Bandini.\textsuperscript{230} This was a costly solution which was one of the causes why the administration expanded rapidly.

Despite the fact that no post was to be 'reserved' for candidates of a certain country,\textsuperscript{231} in practice the DGs became fiefdoms of the member states, and sometimes even of a ministry within a specific country. For instance, the post of director-general for DG VIII had been filled with people from the German AA when in 1964, State Secretary Rolf Lahr said that the AA would 'cede' this post to the economics ministry.\textsuperscript{232} Rey severely criticized this system. He deplored that the Commission had

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\textsuperscript{227} Olivi 2000: 231.
\textsuperscript{228} See for example HAEU, DEP EN 706, 19.11.-27.12.1958 (39\textsuperscript{e} à 44\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 17 December 1958.
\textsuperscript{229} BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 20 session, 11-12 June 1958, pt. 13.
\textsuperscript{230} HAEU, DEP EN 706, 19.11.-27.12.1958 (39\textsuperscript{e} à 44\textsuperscript{e} réunion de la Commission), 17 December 1958.
\textsuperscript{231} Verordnung Nr. 31 (EWG), Nr. 11 (EAG), Art. 27.
\textsuperscript{232} BAK, N 1266/1280, Note K. Narjes to W. Hallstein, 18 January 1964.
\end{flushright}
established an 'Europe des Patries' for its top-level officials.\textsuperscript{233} Also, Rey was a strong advocate of internal recruitment, that is, filling a vacancy for a leading post in the Commission with an internal candidate, thus allowing the growth of 'home-made' European officials. When Hallstein suggested appointing Axel Herbst from the AA as a successor to deputy executive secretary Behr, Rey gave his consent but only on the condition that the Commission sought to appoint an internal candidate for the next vacant post.\textsuperscript{234} The Commission, however, only paid lip service to the practice of recruiting staff first and foremost within its own administration. What is more, it proved practically impossible to change the deadlocked initial arrangement with the nine director-general and other leading posts distributed among nationals of the Six. Even if not able to put forward a suitable candidate, the government of a member state was often not prepared to (even temporarily) renounce a post. It was often assisted in this attitude by the Commissioner of the country who took up the case in the Commission meetings, arguing that his country would be disadvantaged if it could not keep the post. For instance, the quest for a successor for the Italian director-general in DG VII, Giuseppe Renzetti, proved to be a nightmare that lasted several months. As it turned out to be difficult to find a suitable successor with an Italian passport, the Commission first considered the possibility of swapping directors-general in order to be able to appoint a director-general of a different nationality for DG VII and at the same time respect the national balance.\textsuperscript{235} After this solution proved to be too complicated, the college discussed the candidate suggested by the Italian government, Tergia, from the Italian ministry of transport. However, after the Commission had compromised on many candidates before, this time it wanted to make a point and only

\textsuperscript{233} BAK, N 1266/1293, Note K. Narjes to W. Hallstein, 23 February 1967.
\textsuperscript{234} HAEU, DEP EN 716, 17.2.-2.3.1960 (93° à 95° réunion de la Commission), 24 February 1960.
\textsuperscript{235} BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 112 session, 2\textsuperscript{me} partie, 9/10 November 1960.
accept someone of 'adequate rank and character. Our prestige is at stake.' And Tergia was, according to Hallstein, not up to the difficult tasks facing DG VII. Finally, the Commission persuaded Renzetti, who was due to return to the Italian administration, to stay in the Commission for another year. After that he was succeeded by Bruno Minoletti who also did not last long. In 1965, the Commission appointed a former head of division as Director-General for Transport, the Italian Paolo Rho, to succeed Minoletti. The DG remained in Italian hands. The case of the Renzetti succession shows that the Commission was torn between keeping its independence, appointing the best candidate and satisfying the requests of a member state. Despite declarations that the quality of the directors-general was vital for the Commission's success, Commissioners had to give in to pressures from the member states.

This bargaining certainly disadvantaged suitable internal candidates working already in the services of the Commission. Maintaining the national balance was undeniably a factor causing immobility and inflexibility within the administration. Having the right passport and the right contacts sometimes proved more useful than skills, especially when it came to reaching a position above the grade of A4. One official explained that, for those lacking (political) backing, reaching A4 was already an achievement. No doubt, the national balance led to frustration among the civil servants. Von der Groeben detected a 'justified malaise among the competent

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236 HAEU, DEP EN 722, 21.9.-9.11.60 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 9 November 1960.
237 Ibid., 8 December 1960. See also HAEU, DEP EN 724, 14.12.60-1.2.61 (128e à 133e réunion de la Commission), 21 December 1960.
238 CEAB 4335, Information à la presse, 4 February 1965, 21.
239 HAEU, DEP EN 723, 10.11.60-14.12.60 (123e à 128e réunion de la Commission), 16 November 1960.
240 Interview K.S. with the assistant to the director-general of DG IV.
officials', and he called for more internal recruitment for leading posts.\textsuperscript{241} In retrospect, though, the Commission's officials tend to defend the underlying system of national balance. In an interview one official argued that every culture and every tradition should be represented in the European administration, as its personnel stood for the diversity of Europe.\textsuperscript{242} Others maintained that it would have been impossible to proceed differently in a multinational administration.\textsuperscript{243} The national balance became an integral part of the European administrative culture. A member of Hallstein's Cabinet tried to explain the typical 'European' ways of the Commission's administration to the newly appointed deputy executive secretary, Helmut Sigrist:

> All this [turning down suitable internal candidates in order to appoint Sigrist, an external candidate, K.S.] should not alarm you but rather demonstrate that staff management in a European Community follows entirely different rules than in the Auswärtiges Amt.\textsuperscript{244}

### 3.6 Towards a personnel statute

The personnel statute, which entered into force on 1\textsuperscript{st} January 1962, resulted, like in the High Authority, in the creation of a European civil service. This was an event of major importance for Commission officials. Job security and a career were guaranteed. In short, the statute created the framework for providing the Commission with an independent and stable workforce. It is not possible to discuss the establishment of the personnel statute in detail.\textsuperscript{245} It is important, however, to outline some of the underlying ideas and discussions accompanying its elaboration.

Work on the common personnel statute for Euratom and the EEC, and initially also the ECSC, began in late 1958 with the establishment of a working group

\textsuperscript{241} BAK, N 1266/1293, Note K. Narjes to W. Hallstein, 23 February 1967.
\textsuperscript{242} See for example the interview K.S. with Giampiero Schiratti, Brussels, 22 April 2004.
\textsuperscript{243} See for example the interview K.S. with Georges Rencki, Tervuren, 5 April 2004.
\textsuperscript{244} BAK, N 1266/1214, Letter [Narjes?] to H. Sigrist, 21 January 1964.
\textsuperscript{245} On the personnel statutes of the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom see for example Sassi 2000.
composed of national experts and representatives of the EEC and Euratom Commissions. For the Commission, job security and autonomy for its employees were important issues. A delicate problem was, therefore, whether only internal or also external candidates should be considered for a post in the Commission. In this respect, detachment was also an important topic for the Commission. Member states’ legislations concerning detachment differed considerably. The French legislation was the most advantageous for the officials as it facilitated their reintegration in the home administration. On their return, detached French officials received their full salary until a post corresponding to their former rank was available. The Dutch law was the most disadvantageous. Dutch officials who entered the services of an international organization could take six months of extraordinary leave. After this period of time they had to choose between the national and the international administration. French officials, on the contrary, could maintain indefinitely their links with the national administration while serving the international administration. Not surprisingly, in the Coreper working group ‘Statute’ the opinions diverged. The French and German governments were advocates of a ‘continuous osmosis’ between the national and the European administration. They were backed by the Luxembourg government which feared that its administration could be drained of the best people. ‘In contrast’, wrote the French permanent representative, ‘my Italian, Dutch and Belgian colleagues have pointed out that they were very firm partisans of a statute.

247 BAC 118/1986, No. 1076, Groupe de travail "statut", Note présenté par la délégation allemande, 12 June 1959, 9-12.
248 Ibid., Groupe de travail “statut”, Note introductive de la délégation française, 20 February 1959, 18-21.
249 All above, see ibid., Annexe, La situation des fonctionnaires détachés des administrations nationales ou internationales, undated, 23-27.
which would guarantee the gradual establishment of a corps of European civil servants completely independent of their respective governments. The Euratom Commission supported the latter approach while the EEC Commission was more in favour of the French and German position, although initially it was divided. Hallstein had a very pragmatic attitude in this question. According to him, imposing the obligation to quit the national civil service permanently would considerably limit the choice of candidates willing to come to Brussels. Rey, however, doubted the independence of detached officials and he thought that they should opt either for Europe or their home administration. Hallstein dismissed these objections as ‘understandable in theory’ but ‘unrealistic’. Finally, his colleagues agreed and the final version of the statute allowed for detachment. However, the detachment rules and conditions remained different in the member states. In 1963, Hallstein’s Cabinet deplored the disadvantageous conditions for detached officials from Germany. These would deter people from coming to Brussels and they would obstruct the ‘German personnel policy: the constant circulation of qualified officials between the Federal Republic and the European Communities (and international organizations) as well as between these Communities (and organizations) and the Federal Republic’. The German government, despite being in favour of an exchange, did nothing to facilitate it. Even Commissioner von der Groeben, a former civil servant in the economics ministry, was refused a promotion in absentia.

252 HAEU, DEP EN 71/2, 22.9.59-24.10.59 (75e à 78e réunion de la Commission), 30 September 1959.
253 HAEU, DEP EN 719, 31.5.-14/15.6.60 (105e à 107e réunion de la Commission), 15 June 1960.
256 See the article „Karriere hat Ruh“", in: Der Spiegel, No. 39, 26 September 1963, 29-30.
After the statute came into force, the Commission criticized that it did not allow for a ‘dynamic’ personnel policy and was not suitable for a young and fast growing administration. Mozer complained, for example, that the recruitment procedure was very slow and that the Commission tended to fall back on recruiting people under the label of ‘experts’. This way, it could circumvent the lengthy concours procedure and instantly fill a vacancy. This implies that advertised posts were often a farce and already filled with this ‘expert’. The normal concours procedure consisted of initially advertising a post internally in the Commission. If no suitable candidate was found, then officials from the other Community administrations were invited to apply. If this failed to produce a suitable candidate, the vacancy was made public in the Official Journal.

Even if the statute made ‘parachuting’ of external candidates into posts in the Commission more difficult, it was still possible to feign a recruitment procedure, ruling out internal candidates and appointing an external candidate, as seen in the case of Sigrist. For the officials already in the Commission, both practices obstructed their chances of promotion and led to frustration. The Commission gained staff which brought in different experiences and new ideas. The question is, however, if it was possible to create a unified European civil service with detached and ‘political’ officials.

4. Inflexibility, inefficiency and dissatisfaction: reforming the administration

Reforming its administration and working methods have been objectives for almost all Commissions to date. Public management expert Les Metcalfe argues that 'until now, reform of the Commission has been discussed in a ritualistic way without any real expectation that action would follow'. These attempts may have been ritualistic. However, if over the decades the different 'reformers' addressed similar problems, it shows that the initial arrangements concerning working methods and administrative structures were persistent and engraved in the Commission since its early days. The next section will look at what three of these reform attempts between 1958 and 1972 reveal about the persisting long-term problems in the administration and the changes and developments in the Commission's organizational structure.

4.1 The Bosboom en Hegener report of 1959

Since March 1958, the Commission was aware of the fact that its organizational scheme ran the risk of duplicating tasks in the different DGs. Moreover, partly due to the careful application of the national balance, the administration lacked flexibility from early on. As a result, during 1958-59 the Commission discussed measures for improving the efficiency of its organization while continuing to develop it. One of the main concerns was the malfunctioning of DG IX which is one of the reasons why, in early 1959, the Commission charged the Amsterdam based management consultants group Raadgevend Efficiency Bureau Bosboom en Hegener NV with undertaking a preliminary analysis of the efficiency of the organizational structure and working methods. It was an opportune moment for assessing what had been achieved so far: in

early 1959 the establishment of the Commission’s complex administrative machinery was already quite advanced and, at this early stage, adjustments could still be made quite easily, or so the college believed.

On the one hand, the decision of calling in external advisers accounts for the Commission’s openness and the importance it attached to the administrative services and their smooth running. On the other hand, it suggests that not even one year after its establishment the decisions taken in organizational questions had left the Commission with serious efficiency problems which, once engrained in this already quite large administration, would be difficult to remedy later on.

The Rapport d’étude préliminaire sur l’efficacité de l’organisation du travail à la Commission de la Communauté Économique Européenne à Bruxelles, or Bosboom en Hegener report, was composed of two parts. 261 The first part, submitted in May 1959, provided an analysis of DG IX whereas the second part, completed in August of the same year, was concerned with the general organization of the Commission. The analysts first identified two internal obstacles to efficiency to which there was no remedy: multinationality and national balance. 262 The consultants did not see the diversity of mentalities and languages as an asset because, according to them, the officials tended to consider the working methods of their home country as the ideal. Instead of looking for the most adequate working procedures in the Commission, they preferred to stick to the methods with which they were familiar. 263 In 1959, the Commission was thus far from being a unified administration with well developed and

262 HAEU, DEP EN 352, Bosboom Report, Part 1, 5.
263 Ibid., 5.
accepted 'European' working methods. As to the second factor, the consultants thought the national balance should be applied in a less dogmatic manner as this would allow for better matches between an employee's qualifications and a job.\(^{264}\) However, all in all they were impressed with the quality of the Commission's staff. This demonstrates that the initial recruitment had, after all, provided the Commission with mainly adept and motivated staff:

The enthusiastic manner in which the large majority of officials conceive of their task and their average high level of expertise justify the prediction that it is possible to continue developing this administration in a harmonious and successful manner.\(^{265}\)

The Commission's main tasks would be to keep the growing organization under control and to constantly adapt it to different and changing tasks. Here again, the consultants were optimistic because the Commission had succeeded in recruiting well qualified staff.\(^{266}\) This also implied a danger, namely that officials could be tempted to usurp tasks which did not fall into their competence. As long as the administration was still rather small, this was not considered a problem. The consultants, however, did see this as an increasing problem.\(^{267}\) The Commission officials were thus very enthusiastic, worked more than required and tended to extend their area of responsibility.

As to the question of how the Commission could improve its organizational scheme, the report suggested several possibilities derived from classical organization theory, for example, to organize the administration according to the objectives of the treaty, or to group all activities concerning one object – a country, for example – in

\(^{264}\) Ibid.  
\(^{265}\) HAEU, DEP EN 353, Bosboom Report, Part 2, p. 4.  
\(^{266}\) Ibid., 7.  
\(^{267}\) Ibid., 7-8.
one administrative unit.\textsuperscript{268} The Commission had opted for the first possibility which was a logical choice but entailed difficulties, according to the consultants. Whereas in some policy sectors the treaty set a strict working schedule for the Commission, it granted more freedom of manoeuvre in others. A structure exclusively based on objectives was therefore not appropriate, the analysts thought, because the Commission’s administration had to remain flexible to accommodate new tasks.\textsuperscript{269} Moreover, an organization based on objectives required great co-ordination efforts. However, as radical restructuring would have considerable consequences for the administration, and might also not result in a logically structured organization, the analysts did not make recommendations for a different organizational structure.\textsuperscript{270} In other words, they did not have a solution for the Commission's efficiency problems. However, they suggested that short-term tasks should be addressed by temporary committees. This would avoid creating new and permanent administrative units. Later, these units would be called ‘task force’, the first dealing with the British application in 1961.

For the analysts, the Commission’s ever increasing staff budget was an indicator of weak leadership. They thus recommended establishing a strong centralized power that should transform the general objectives of the treaty in a working programme and control the execution and outcome of it.\textsuperscript{271} Therefore, by delegating some of its power and refocusing the college’s tasks, it should become an effective authority-exerting body. The results of the Bosboom en Hegener report were taken into account by the comité de rationalisation.

\textsuperscript{268} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., 34.
4.2 The comité de rationalisation and the Ortoli report (1960-61)

In February 1960, Hallstein established a committee composed of three directors-general: Franco Bobba, François-Xavier Ortoli and Pieter VerLoren van Themaat. The main task of this comité de rationalisation was to make suggestions for rationalising the administration and, in particular, for reducing the DGs' demands for more staff. The Commissioners were aware that tasks in the Commission were not evenly distributed. Some officials were overworked while others were underemployed. Marjolin stated that he had experienced a similar situation at the OEEC. As a result, they had simply dismissed one third of the staff after the first three years because the focus of tasks or the tasks themselves had changed. The Commission, however, was not inclined to take such radical measures. Moreover, Hallstein criticized that, while everybody was in favour of rationalisation, nobody was inclined to make the sacrifices in their own services. This would have meant ceding staff, and people were associated with power.

In December 1960, the Commission charged the rationalisation committee with producing a report on the functioning of the Commission's services. The study, submitted in May 1961, was based on a questionnaire distributed to all A and B officials, excluding A1 and A2, of which about 700 were returned. Compared to the Bosboom Report, which was based mainly on interviews at director level, this approach added a different perspective on the Commission's organization. Also, this was an internal report, established by officials employed by the Commission who knew the organization from the inside. The authors concluded that the external

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272 HAEU, DEP EN716 17.2.-2.3.1960 (93e à 95e réunion de la Commission), 24 February 1960.
275 Ibid. Rapport sur l'organisation des services de la Commission, présenté par M. Ortoli (après premier examen par le Comité de rationalisation), 1.
reputation of the Commission was excellent. On the inside, however, this perception had to be at least modified. While great successes had been achieved in some policy areas, in other sectors a kind of ‘international routine’ had kicked in. Some officials did not know their exact task and as a result, wrote studies and reports that were often unnecessary.\textsuperscript{276} The committee made three main suggestions for improving the situation. Firstly, dismissing superfluous or underqualified staff; secondly, reorganizing the administration; and thirdly, reorienting its activities. The first measure concerned mainly the so-called ‘mediocre staff’ who, as shown above, were often kept in the Commission out of reasons of ‘humanitarianism, political considerations or lack of courage of the superiors’.\textsuperscript{277} The second suggestion involved a reorganization of the administrative units, which had become necessary after three years because duplication of work had occurred.\textsuperscript{278} As to the third recommendation, according to the report, the Commission lacked a programme prioritising certain activities or policy areas. Instead, it would treat all aspects of the EEC treaty as being equally important.\textsuperscript{279} The report described the Commission as a very heterogeneous administration with some units performing extremely well and others less so. As to personnel policy, the report predicted that in the future there would be a ‘blockage of careers’. As the Commission had recruited the bulk of staff in a short time span with little staff being over the age of 50, hardly any movement could be expected in the leading positions in the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{280}

In June 1961 the Commission discussed the results of the rationalisation committee and its consequences. The college set up a working programme and

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{276} Ibid., First part, 3.
\item\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., 4.
\item\textsuperscript{278} Ibid., 6.
\item\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., 12.
\item\textsuperscript{280} Ibid., 21.
\end{enumerate}
procedures allowing the judgement, evaluation and dismissal of insufficiently qualified officials and employees as the introduction of the personnel statute was imminent.\textsuperscript{281}

The Bosboom en Hegener report and the Ortoli study were the last attempts of reform the Commission undertook in the 1960s. Few of the suggestions of the Bosboom and Ortoli reports were implemented. The reasons for this lack of determination to actually implement changes could be that change would affect the power structure within the Commission. Individual interests of Commissioners were at stake and directors-general were also not prepared to abandon competencies and power. Also, the 1960s were a busy and active period for the Commission. As long as the DGs that were regarded as successful in terms of output – the Ortoli report named DG Agriculture – continued to work smoothly, the Commissioners turned a blind eye to these weaknesses. It was only after the merger of the executives and with the first enlargement looming that the Commission under President Franco Maria Malfatti (1970-72) charged external experts with another analysis of the organization.

4.3 The Poullet report of 1972

The Poullet report is beyond the time-frame of this thesis. However, while it pointed out administrative problems of the early 1970s, these were the result of decisions and developments in the 1960s. Contrary to the Bosboom and Ortoli reports, this study dealt with an established administration of 14 years. A comparison between the previous studies and this report could thus reveal continuing and persisting problems from the late 1950s to the early 1970s.

\textsuperscript{281} BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 150 session, 2ème partie, 14 June 1961.
In March 1972 the Malfatti Commission commissioned a report on the internal functioning of the post-merger Commission from Edouard Poullet, Professor for Public Administration at the Université Catholique de Louvain. The outcome of this analysis, the so-called Poullet report, was published in November 1972.282 The lack of flexibility of the administrative structure in adapting to new tasks, already pointed out in the Bosboom and Ortoli reports, was now more apparent. In particular, the Poullet report took into account the Commission's dual responsibility for the elaboration and the co-ordination of policies on the one hand and the administration of these policies on the other.283 The study thus looked for a 'strategy of organization', the aim being to match the organization with its tasks and to suggest reforms accordingly. Professor Poullet's team derived its information essentially from discussions with the Commission's Co-ordination Committee,284 founded for this purpose, and from interviews with high officials.

The first chapter of the report analysed the internal functioning of the Commission's services. Again, the Commission was complimented on its staff: 'One cannot help but underline, on this occasion, the great motivation of the leading European civil servants [...].285 But at the same time, the Commission was described as an extremely hierarchical, centralised and also fast growing administration. Within ten years, the number of officials had tripled, increasing from fewer than 2,000 in 1962 to nearly 6,000 in 1972.286 This rapid growth had an effect on the structure of the organization as well as on social relations and career management. The merger of the

283 Ibid., 1.
284 The committee was presided over by Noël and it was composed of leading officials such as von Verschuer and Wellenstein.
286 Ibid., 8.
executives led to a further destabilisation of the organization, according to Poullet. Taking into account the history and the external environment of the organization, the study was the first, of the reports discussed here, to acknowledge that external factors influenced the administration. The Commission’s structure was thus primarily seen as an answer to its position and tasks in the Community. 287 One external factor was the diversity, extent and complexity of the Commission’s tasks. This made it more difficult to find a suitable organizational structure, a problem that had already been pointed out by the Bosboom en Hegener analysts. However, especially the difficulty to accommodate the two tasks of innovation on the one hand and administration on the other, seems to have become more pressing as the former required more supple and flexible structures than the latter. 288

The challenges of multinationality were a second factor. Compared to the Bosboom en Hegener report, there was a change in tone, however. In 1972, the Commission was already an established and experienced multinational organization.

It seems that the results are particularly good [in the Commission, K.S.]. The interpersonal relations develop, it seems, in a spirit of confidence and cooperation. No doubt, the institutional loyalty of the employees and their feeling of being part of a common enterprise play an important role in this situation. 289

However, like the Bosboom report, Poullet pointed to the negative aspects of multinationality such as the national balance and the college structure. The latter had an impact on the internal functioning of the services, and had resulted in a centralisation of the organization. 290 Furthermore, the report warned not to ‘reserve’

287 Ibid., 6.
288 Ibid., 9-10.
289 Ibid., 10.
290 Ibid.
posts in the administration, in particular at the higher level, for certain nationalities which was detrimental to the atmosphere in the organization.291

By 1972 the Commission's administration was subdivided into circa 150 administrative units, including some very small ones.292 This increase was partly a consequence of the limited availability of leading positions in the Commission already pointed out as an increasing problem in the Ortoli report. Moreover, the report criticized the fragmentation of the administration. There was hardly any cross-DG collaboration when it came to the preparation of a proposal. Instead, one DG would employ what the report called 'the tactics of the fait accompli'.293 As a consequence, collaboration was only maintained via the top level posts, the Commissioners and their Cabinets, which had led to a centralization of the administration. This problem, already detected in 1959, had therefore been aggravated. The compartmentalisation was also enhanced by the fact that some DGs were more important than others. Some had access to more resources and power and were thus not dependent on cross-DG collaboration. As a remedy, the report suggested establishing a central authority which would overlook the administration and encourage cooperation: the Secretariat General.294 This would further enhance the important co-ordination function the Secretariat had acquired since the establishment of the Commission. Moreover, the Poullet report shows how much the meetings of the chefs de cabinet gained in importance compared to the early 1960s. Their weekly meetings were now an integral part of the Commission's working methods and compensated for the lack of co-ordination between the DGs.295

291 Ibid., p. 11.
292 Ibid., 14.
293 Ibid., 17.
294 Ibid., 22.
295 Ibid., 25-6.
The next part of the report dealt with how the administration's fragmentation influenced the performance of the Commission. Policies were conceptualised mostly in one single DG and were thus coined by the style of this DG and were not part of an overall political programme or strategy. For this reason, it was difficult to present coherent proposals and to set priorities. This fragmentation therefore had an important effect on policy outcomes, because this kind of organization more or less excluded a profound discussion on general policy directions. In its weekly meetings, the college mainly decided on proposals from the different administrative units. A single Commissioner, together with his DG, was thus able to exert a major influence on the policy orientations of his area of responsibility.

The third part of the report was concerned with the need to reconsider and enforce the role of the Commission as Europe's policy initiator. In general, according to Poullet, the Commission's administration seemed more designed for administrative tasks than for developing policies. The Commission would need a detailed working programme, something the Ortoli report had already demanded. Poullet recommended using methods derived from economic planning. The Commission had already decided to adopt PPBS (= Planning-Programming-Budgeting System), a management system guided by management by objectives. The report thus suggested enhancing co-ordination and flexibility by reinforcing the Secretariat General, inter-DG working groups and task forces or study groups. In a long-term perspective, the report suggested a regrouping of the small administrative units into larger and better structured units. According to the report, the administrative structure of the Commission (sub-divided in DG, directorate and division) invited

296 Ibid., 33.
297 Ibid., 37.
298 Ibid., 61.
299 Ibid., 55.
compartmentalisation. Better management would be the answer in the long run.\textsuperscript{300} In summary, the Poullet report shows that many problems of the early 1960s persisted or had become worse in the early 1970s, such as the lack of co-ordination and the fragmentation of the administration. At the same time, the Commission officials appear to have developed strong loyalties with the institution. They also seemed to be as motivated in the early 1970s as they were in the late 1950s.

**Conclusion**

Regarding the administration, the decisions taken in the late 1950s and early 1960s by the Hallstein Commission were characterised by prudence and pragmatism, accommodating the interests of member state governments. Hallstein’s pragmatic attitude dominated over calls for more independence from member states by Commission members like Rey. The Commission quickly developed into a large bureaucracy. Hierarchies were introduced resulting in a high degree of rigidity, compartmentalisation and reluctance to reform and change. The Executive Secretariat and the Cabinets took over important co-ordinating tasks, thus filling gaps in the organization. Similar to the High Authority, the main characteristics of the Commission as a supranational administration were the principles of national balance and collegiality.

The years of the Hallstein Commission can be qualified as a success, even a striking one, according to Ludlow. An administration was set up from scratch, the CAP and the customs union were successfully implemented. ‘[F]or much of its first decade of operation, the Brussels institution gained a reputation for administrative

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid., 83f.
activism and efficiency rather than bureaucratic inertia. Yet, it is doubtful whether this goes for the Commission as a whole. Some DGs were more successful than others. The Commission was not a homogeneous administration. This chapter has shown that from very early on, the administration was fragmented with the different DGs acting autonomously and defending their spheres of influence. Within the DGs there was sufficient space for the development of DG-specific identities and cultures. Before studying the examples of the DGs for Competition and Agriculture in chapter BIII, the next chapter will deal with the European high officials who made possible the success of the Hallstein Commission and who were affected by these administrative structures.

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301 Ludlow 2006b: 41.
II. Biographical studies: high officials in the Commission

Introducing the ‘Eurocrats’

Technocrats, Eurocrats and *apatrides* – these are some of the terms attributed to Commission officials. In July 1961, the *Economist* described this new species, the European civil servant, or ‘multilingual tough-minded European’, as characterised by youth, European spirit and enthusiasm.¹ In their study of 1969 on European elites, Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden simply qualify the Eurocrats as the ‘EC elite’.² They argued that the European civil service differed from its national counterparts by being composed of officials with a higher average education and a lower average age. The study also ascribed the Eurocrats ‘an impressive *esprit de corps*’ and a ‘deep sense of identification with the Community’.³ The term Eurocrat thus has a positive connotation and stands for a strong identification of the European civil servants with the European cause. It describes a European official imbued with the values of the European Community. The term technocrat could have an equally positive connotation. For the federalist Henri Brugmans, technocracy was a modern – and better – form of bureaucracy.⁴ A technocrat was superior to the bureaucrat as the latter, a product of nationalism, stood for the old divided Europe whereas the former represented innovation and team spirit. For Brugmans, Monnet was the model

² Lerner and Gorden 1969: 262.
³ Ibid., 263-4.
⁴ Brugmans 1967: 338. See also Lerner and Gorden 1969: 283.
technocrat. Finally, the term *apatride* was used by General de Gaulle to express his contempt for the Commission and its personnel. All three expressions have something in common. They imply a shift of solidarity from the national to the European level and account for supranational socialisation processes.

The biographies of Commission high officials are the focus of this chapter. The first section explores the biographical background of these civil servants, establishing similarities and differences in their lives and careers, such as generational experiences and motivations to work for 'Europe'. These are called internal factors of Europeanization. The officials' lives as expatriates living and working in Brussels, constitute external factors of Europeanization. These will be analysed in section two. The third section will discuss exemplary biographies, illustrating different sociological types of officials. The concluding fourth section of the chapter will introduce examples of different identities that were present in the Commission, and civil servants' images of Europe.

Before beginning with the analysis, the group of officials studied here needs to be defined more closely. A sample of 109 A officials, including Cabinet staff, from the DGs IV (57 officials) and VI (52 officials) forms the basis of this chapter. These officials entered the Commission between 1958 and 1963. Some officials from the Executive Secretariat have been included as well. The data is based on memoirs, interviews and archival sources such as personal papers or CVs. Given the limited number of officials in the sample, the aim of this chapter, as in chapter AII, cannot be a quantitative sociological study of the Commission’s high officials in the 1960s. Instead, it is a qualitative study with an in-depth analysis of the biographies and careers of a small group of European civil servants. The focus on staff of two DGs

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5 Ibid., 339.
allows for a comparison of their backgrounds and permits the biographies and careers to be linked to the policies of these DGs. The latter will be attempted in chapter BIII. Responsible for the CAP and competition policy, DG VI and DG IV were, and still are, among the most important DGs in the Commission. An analysis of the administrative staff of these two DGs is important in that it may contribute to a better understanding of how these two policies were developed, and by whom.

1. Internal factors of Europeanization: biographical background

The profession of the father, or the parents, usually determines the social background of an individual. However, data on the family background of the high officials is virtually non-existent. The lack of a larger set of data means that this question has to remain open here and, if at all, can only be taken into account in the individual biographies in section three. As to the generation which constitutes the group of high officials analysed here, the average year of birth of DG IV officials is 1924, while that of DG VI officials is 1922. These average years conceal the fact that the officials were born between 1905 and 1935. There was thus a possible age gap of up to thirty years between them. However, the breakdown of the years of birth shows that the majority of officials were born in the 1920s. In DG VI, two were born between 1900 and 1909, ten between 1910 and 1919, 17 between 1920 and 1929 and six in 1930 and after. In DG IV, the oldest was born in 1910, three between 1910 and 1919, 17 between 1920 and 1929, and five were born in 1930 and after. The leading officials in both DGs, the directors-general, directors and heads of division, tend to belong to the

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6 These figures have been established from average years of birth of 26 (DG IV) and 35 officials (DG VI).
older age group, those who have experienced the inter-war period and World War II. The leading officials – A3 up to A1 and Cabinet staff – were on average born in 1920 in the case of DG IV and 1917 in the case of DG VI.

1.1 War

Recurring themes in memoirs and interviews can point to the existence of similar or typical experiences and similar attributions of meaning of a social group. What, then, were the experiences and the ‘baggage’ the officials took with them into the Commission? As the years of birth show, the first Commission officials belonged to the war generation. However, in terms of formative years and events, there is a difference between those born 1905 and those born after 1930. Mozer, for instance, born 1905 in Munich, lived through World War I, the crisis years and the downfall of the Weimar Republic. While lacking experience reaching this far back, those born between 1910 and 1928 often actively participated in World War II. For those born later, the war provided for strong and formative memories in their childhood and youth. Without doubt, the experience of the war had an impact on all of them. As the data sample comprises only one woman, war experience here has to be understood as the experience of young men in World War II. For the officials from DG IV and DG VI this encompassed military service as well as experiencing persecution, captivity, expulsion, forced labour, occupation and torture. The members of the Commission also went through the ‘school of war’. For example, former Resistance fighter Michel Rasquin suffered the consequences of Gestapo torture and died at the age of 52.

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7 See Kruse and Schmitt 1999: 161.
8 On Mozer see also Wielenga 1997a.
9 See the interview K.S. with Henri Etienne.
10 Lemaignen 1964: 55.
to the Commissioners responsible for DG IV and DG VI, von der Groeben served in the Wehrmacht while Mansholt was active in the Dutch Resistance. Moreover, being born in 1907 and 1908, respectively, both men had memories of World War I and had experienced the crisis years of the late 1920s and 1930s.

Like in the High Authority, National Socialism and the potential involvement and guilt of German officials must have been topics in the Commission. During the 1930s and 1940s, some future Commission officials supported and spread Nazi ideology. For example, the lawyer Arno Schulze-Brachmann wrote a legal essay in 1940 full of anti-democratic comments about the ‘German party state’, referring to the Weimar Republic. Other examples are the future directors-general Helmut Allardt and Günther Seeliger. Their PhD theses dealt with the German Volksgemeinschaft, or ethnic community, and defended the NS economic policy, respectively. Both include passages full of contempt for market economy and individualism. Moreover, German officials born up to the year 1928 most certainly participated in the war, either as soldiers in the Wehrmacht, as Flakhelfer, young men, often teenage boys, deployed as helpers at the flak defence, or in the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the Reich Labour Service. The younger ones belonged to the so-called ‘Flakhelfer generation’ that survived the war relatively unscathed and politically relatively uncompromised. These ‘Flak-democrats’ are said to have played an important role in the rebuilding of

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14 In Nazi Germany, students born between 1926 and 1928 were recruited for the flak once they turned 16 or when even younger. Since 1943 the Notabitur, or emergency A-levels, was the normal way to leave the Gymnasium (grammar school). See the cases of Günther Fitterer (born 1928), Ivo Schwartz and Helmut von Verschuer (both born 1926).
Germany after 1945. Older officials sometimes held high ranks in the Wehrmacht. Hans-Broder Krohn, for instance, director in DG VI, had been an officer in the General Staff; likewise deputy executive secretary Behr. There are at least two cases that are more problematic: Siegfried Korth, head of division in DG VI, was a SS-Obersturmführer based at the eastern front during the war. His SS-career can be traced in files held by the Bundesarchiv. However, they do not contain any evidence of war crimes. Friedrich Arnsmeyer, also a DG VI official, was a Stammführer in the Hitlerjugend. Eleven grades above a simple Hitlerjunge, this was a high position in the hierarchy of this nazi youth organization. He became a member of the National Socialist party at the age of 17. None of these four seems to have committed war crimes, however. At least, the responsible institutions in Germany did not have incriminating information on any of them. It is unlikely that individuals would have been considered for a post in the Commission if it had been known that they had committed war crimes. The sources do not reveal whether the Commission had an official policy regarding former German soldiers or members of the National Socialist party. The college appears to have decided each case individually. A former member of the SS could apparently enter the Commission’s administration if he was able to obtain the clearance certificate.

On the other side were those officials who had fought against Germany, or suffered from German occupation or atrocities. The Belgian Raymond Craps had

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15 See for example Bude 1987.
16 There is no evidence that Krohn or Behr were members of the NSDAP. See the letter to K.S. from the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (henceforth BA Berlin), 16 November 2007.
17 The SS file of Siegfried Korth, BA Berlin, NSDAP-Zentralkartei.
18 For Arnsmeyer see the interview K.S. with Friedrich Arnsmeyer, Porta Westfalica, 9 February 2004. However, the BA Berlin could not confirm Arnsmeyers HJ-membership. It is certain, however, that he became a member of the NSDAP in 1943. BA Berlin, NSDAP-Gaukartei, Arnsmeyer, Friedrich.
19 Information of the BA Berlin.
participated in the liberation of his country, occupied by the German army. Mozer survived the German occupation of the Netherlands hidden in a mental health hospital. In interviews two Belgian officials recalled their experiences of the occupation in their home town Brussels. The family of Maurice Barthélémy, the son of a Lotharingian farmer, was expelled by German troops while VerLoren van Themaat's academic mentor, Benjamin Telders, died in the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen in April 1945. Mixing these officials who directly or indirectly suffered the cruelties of the Nazi regime with a former member of the Waffen-SS or a former leader of the Hitler youth was potentially an explosive combination. What role did the war play in everyday working life? What mechanisms allowed trust to form between former enemies?

It is remarkable that in interviews some non-German officials recall and recount the war experiences of their German colleagues, especially their experiences—and suffering—on the eastern front. In interviews the Belgian official Frans de Koster spoke about German Commission officials who allegedly 'hid' in the Wehrmacht in order not to be compromised by the Nazi regime. De Koster recalled Behr's past more than forty years after Behr had left the Commission and he named others, like Schnippenkötter, Narjes and Krohn who allegedly also tried to keep a low profile by volunteering for the Wehrmacht. Thus, even non-German officials such as de Koster adopted the image of the 'clean' and 'uncompromised' soldier of the Wehrmacht, which was constructed and nurtured in the west German society in the

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21 See the interviews K.S. with Eduard Brackeniers and Jean Dubois, Brussels, 20 April 2004.
22 Ibid.
1950s and 1960s to foster integration and social peace.\textsuperscript{24} Having served in the Wehrmacht was seen as normal and even positive.

Moreover, many officials considered for this chapter cite the war as their main incentive to 'make Europe'. For some, European integration brought about the end of a thousand years of 'civil war' and was a guarantee for lasting peace between European countries.\textsuperscript{25} Without overemphasizing the influence of this aspect on the everyday work of the officials in the Commission, this was an important motive for officials from diverse national and cultural backgrounds making the effort to collaborate. It is justified to speak of World War II as a shared generational experience and a major source of social identification. Former officials themselves used the term 'generation' when describing the group of the first European officials. For instance, Rudolphe Dumont du Voitel wrote on the occasion of his retirement in 1987:

We belong to a generation that went through a lot. As young people we experienced the war, we were shocked by this excessive nationalism. We realised that Europe will not be able to survive without a reconciliation of the European people and countries and I believe that this experience has influenced us decisively.\textsuperscript{26}

For many civil servants 1945 marked a break and the European institutions were a guarantee to maintain peace in Europe. A.D. Moses characterises Germans born between 1918 and 1930 as '45ers' because 1945 marked the most important turning point in their lives.\textsuperscript{27} There are good reasons for applying this denomination to the first Commission officials. Working in the Commission implied pursuing an ultimate

\textsuperscript{24} This image of the 'clean' Wehrmacht has recently been overthrown by historical research, e.g. for example Browning 1992; Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung 1996; Müller und Wehenn 1996

\textsuperscript{25} Interviews K.S. with Ernst Albrecht, Beinhorn, 27 April 2005 and Jean Boudet.

\textsuperscript{26} Dumont du Voitel, ein engagierter Europäer, in Les Anciens, Bulletin No 6, May 1987, 7-13, 60.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Moses 1999.
common goal, namely preventing European countries from starting a new war. The origins of the legendary ‘team spirit’ of the Eurocrats lie at least partly in the shared generational experience and similar socialisation during World War II which resulted in shared norms and values and the conviction that building Europe was a means to avoid future armed conflicts in Europe.\textsuperscript{28} It gave their work meaning beyond the daily routine. The fact that people had fought on different sides did not lead to division. On the contrary, this shared experience seems to have furthered understanding, especially in the case of German officials who had been ‘simple’ soldiers. The idea of the ‘clean’ Wehrmacht seems to have been widely accepted in the Commission and certainly facilitated the integration of the German officials. This potential for reinterpreting history and for accepting a discourse which was dominant in Germany at the time was a necessary precondition for the integrative success of the Community. Otherwise, the administration could have fallen apart, or at least split into two camps – the Germans and the rest.

1.2 Education, professional background and entry age

The civil servants in DG IV and DG VI for whom information was available, obtained their degrees from 48 different universities across western Europe and the USA. It is thus difficult to make out patterns. The universities in Paris, however, are by far the most prominent with eleven officials having graduated there. The next in line are Bonn with four, Tübingen and Göttingen with three and Leuven, Brussels, Munich, Stuttgart, Rome, Leiden, Utrecht and Bordeaux with two officials. Compared to France, the other member states did not, and still do not, have such a centralised

university system. This explains the diversity of places of study in these countries. However, the German universities named above were those with a good reputation, as were Leiden, Leuven, Utrecht and Rome.

The distribution of types of university degrees in DG IV and DG VI varies between the two DGs. This can be explained by the different requirements of expertise in these policy areas.

Table 1. Distribution of university degrees in DG IV and DG VI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DG</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Economics/Political economy</th>
<th>Law/Economics</th>
<th>French Grande École</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DG IV</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(1 College of Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG VI</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the group of DG VI officials, the number of generalists, who studied law, economics or held a degree from a Grande École, slightly exceeds the number of specialists who had a degree in agriculture (16 versus 15). Moreover, with two political scientists DG VI counted another two generalists, not to mention Mozer, an autodidact journalist. Yet, DG VI was mainly concerned with highly technical matters. Even with their preponderance in the group studied here, generalists in DG VI sometimes felt inferior because of their lack of technical background. In DG IV, degrees in law, economics or a combination of both dominated. The official with a degree in agriculture also had a degree in economics and a postgraduate degree from the College of Europe in Bruges, founded in 1949/50. Among the German civil

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29 This official also had a first degree in agriculture.
30 This information was available for 34 of the 52 DG VI officials studied in this chapter. It is difficult to compare university courses across countries. For example, the Grandes Écoles taught a broad mix of subjects and a law degree in France and Belgium is often combined with economics while in Germany the two subjects are hardly ever combined.
31 See for example the interview K.S. with Georges Rencki. See also Coombes 1970: 211.
32 This information was available for 26 of the 57 DG IV officials studied in this chapter.
servants in DG IV the number of law graduates was particularly high with six plus another one with a combined degree in law and economy.

The types of degrees correspond to what one would expect to find in a national civil service. The high percentage of law degrees reflects the dominance of law graduates in the German civil service, which was often seen as the equivalent to a degree from a French Grande École or an English Oxbridge degree, with its graduates making a similar claim of belonging to an elite of generalists, ready to take over leading functions in state and society. Among the French officials in DG VI, four graduated from the ENA or from one of the other Grandes Écoles, which in France was, and still is, the entry ticket to the highest ranks of the national civil service. Obviously, in the Commission there could be no dominant type of official, such as the lawyer in the German administration. Commissioners and those responsible for recruitment fell back on the qualifications they were familiar with, thus reproducing patterns from the member states' administrations. In the case of DG IV with its mixture of lawyers and economists, von der Groeben most likely brought his experience from the German economics ministry to Brussels. In the ministry in Bonn he had experienced the collaboration between lawyers and economists as uncomplicated and enriching for both sides, as had the Dutch director-general VerLoren van Themaat who, like von der Groeben, had worked as a lawyer in an economics ministry.

Even though the sample of officials studied here is too small to make far-reaching and generalising conclusions, the distribution of university degrees suggests that the Commission officials reproduced, or were part of, the patterns of elite

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33 Löffler 2002: 137. See also Page and Wright 1999: 8.
34 Löffler 2002: 140.
formation in their countries of origin. While pioneers of European integration such as Brugmans emphasized the fresh start made in the Brussels’ administration compared to national administrations, which were, according to him, ‘creations of the 19th century’, a ‘fresh start’ was not what could possibly be achieved in the Commission. This becomes even more evident when looking at the age and the professional background the officials had when starting to work for the Commission.

The average age of the officials who entered the Commission’s services between 1958 and 1962 was quite low. For DG IV it was 34.7 years and for DG VI 36.9 years. This confirms the impression many observers in the 1960s had of the Commission as a young administration. Naturally, an average age of 35 includes the 25 years old graduate as well as the 60 years old veteran. These figures, therefore, suggest that most officials did not start their careers in the Commission coming straight from university, which would perhaps have allowed for a ‘fresh start’. This made the Commission’s staff more experienced on the one hand but it may also have made the officials less flexible in adapting to the new multinational surrounding and working patterns on the other. What is more, if they had circa eight to ten years of previous professional experience, they may have already undergone strong socialisation in their previous appointment. In terms of socialisation it is revealing to look at the employment of officials immediately before they entered the Commission.

The knowledge and previous experience of the officials were an important asset for the Commission on which it relied and which it utilised. This could be the intimate knowledge of a national administration, an interest group or an international

36 See for example the Economist, June 1961; see also Merriënboer 2006: 249.
network. The distribution of the types of previous occupations in Tables 2 and 3 shows that the national civil services were clearly the main previous employer.

Table 2. Last position DG IV officials held before entering the Commission.37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>National civil service</th>
<th>Cartel office</th>
<th>Interest groups</th>
<th>International organization</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>University/Research</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lux</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Last position DG VI officials held before entering the Commission.38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>National civil service</th>
<th>Interest groups, parties</th>
<th>International organization</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>University/Research</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lux</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An impressive number of 21 officials of DG VI had worked in the national civil service before coming to Brussels (table 3). The number is equally high for DG IV when adding the five officials who had worked for national cartel offices to the 17 from the national civil service (table 2). In DG IV, interest groups and university or research come next, with five recruits each. International organizations follow with three while only one official came from private business. This is remarkable as one should think that private companies were the main ‘clients’ of DG IV. Fear of being accused of partiality may have prevented the Commission from employing more

37 This information was available for 37 of the 57 DG IV officials.
38 This information was available for 39 of the 52 DG VI officials.
people from private business. Also, the lacking appeal of this new European civil service in terms of salary and, initially, job security compared to private business may have hampered recruitment among this group. In DG VI, interest groups also come second with five recruits, followed by international organizations, private business and university or research with four recruits each. A German research institute for agriculture provided the Commission with three officials, two of them future heads of division. Finally, neither in DG IV nor in DG VI international organizations seem to have been the preferred recruitment ground. An obvious question would then be whether the European officials possessed international experience of another kind.

1.3 European and international experiences and political background

The question whether Commission officials had previous international experience and were thus already internationally socialised before entering the Commission is important as this would indicate an ability to adapt to new situations and to succeed in a multinational administration such as the Commission. This experience encompasses dealing with individuals of different national, cultural and linguistic backgrounds and can thus be seen as a preparation for working in the Commission. 'International experience' includes university studies in a foreign country, service in international organizations, participation in negotiations at the international level, military service and employment in a foreign country.

At least 23 of the future DG VI officials had some kind of international experience. Three worked in international organizations, six studied abroad, seven participated in international negotiations, for instance in the framework of the OEEC, and seven had other experiences such as a job abroad. In DG IV the number of __________

39 Of 26 it is not known, 3 had no international experience.
officials with international experience was considerably lower. Of the DG IV sample group, a minimum of 16 had international experience.\footnote{Of 36 it is not known, 4 had no international experience.} Five worked in international organizations such as the Council Secretariat of the ECSC in Luxembourg, the High Authority or the OEEC, six studied abroad, mainly in the United States, and three participated in international negotiations, in the OEEC or the Benelux customs union. One Belgian spent his military service in Germany and another Belgian worked in Germany. Deprived of the possibility to study in their home country, for officials from Luxembourg undertaking university studies necessarily implied moving abroad. After the war they were mainly attracted by French universities or Grandes Écoles. They were fluent in French (and German) and familiar with the particular working methods taught at these universities.

Given that in the 1950s it was far from common to study or work abroad, this proportion both in DG VI and DG IV seems rather high. In fact, it might have been higher as for many officials it is not known whether they had previous international experience. Unfortunately, there are no comparable studies on national administrations showing the percentage of national civil servants with international experience which could establish whether this degree of international experience of Commission officials was exceptional or not. In any case, prior international experience certainly facilitated understanding among colleagues of different national and cultural backgrounds. Sometimes these experiences had resulted in the formation of transnational networks, for instance in the negotiations on the Green Pool in the early 1950s, which certainly provided for a kind of pre-socialisation and was a preferred recruitment ground for DG VI.\footnote{See chapter BIII.} However, multiple international experience
was the exception. Thus Albrecht studied in the United States and in Switzerland, worked for the Secretariat of the ECSC Council of Ministers and was the secretary of the Internal Market group at the Val Duchesse negotiations.

A surprisingly small number of officials were active in groups and networks furthering European integration such as the European (student) Movement. In DG VI these were Georges Rencki, Mozer, van der Lee and François Muller. In the sample of DG IV officials, there is no comparable case. Barthélémy, another DG VI official, was active in a Franco-German student movement. He is not the only one emphasizing that his interest in ‘Europe’ was triggered by the aim of Franco-German reconciliation. In his study on French elites in the European Communities, Bossuat also emphasizes this aspect: ‘For some, the emergence of a European Community culture was directly linked to the experience of the Franco-German conflict’. European integration was a means for many – in particular French and German – officials to overcome this Franco-German antagonism. All in all, the divide between DG VI and DG IV is interesting and difficult to explain. It is possible that Mansholt, a federalist, attracted more individuals with a well developed interest and activism in European groups than von der Groeben, who was clearly pro-European but not as ideologically committed.

If federalist commitment was not very pronounced among officials, how about their political beliefs? It would be naïve to believe that European civil servants, especially in the higher ranks, were politically neutral. However, as the topic was not openly discussed in the Commission, it is difficult to determine the political background of high Commission officials. As shown in chapter BI, the Commission’s

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42 Interview K.S. with Maurice Barthélémy, Brussels, 13 April 2004.
43 Bossuat 2006: 57.
One way to deal with the diversity of opinions, political convictions and social groups in Europe was to include as many of them as possible in the administration. One example is the director-general in DG IV, VerLoren van Themaat, who, close to the Dutch Socialist Party, was most probably also recruited to counterbalance von der Groeben, a Christian democrat. However, people might not want to admit that they obtained their posts because of their political affiliation as this would imply that their skills were less important. Moreover, the Commission wanted to preserve an image of neutrality of their high officials. For instance, on the occasion of the appointment of B. M. Smulders as director-general in DG IX, Rey criticized the Commission’s press communiqué announcing his appointment for containing information on Smulders’ previous political posts. ‘The Commission specifies that no mention of a possible political affiliation should figure on any document or communication of an official nature issued by the Commission’s services.’

Political ties were particularly important in countries such as Belgium and Italy, where sometimes even for the lower ranks of the national civil service party membership was a necessary precondition for recruitment. These principles seem to have been transferred to the Commission. For instance, the Belgian de Koster was a socialist. In 1957, he entered the Cabinet of the Flemish socialist minister Henry Fayat at the ministry of external trade. When in June 1958 the socialist-liberal coalition was replaced with a Christian democratic government, he had to give up his post. As a compensation, however, he found himself on Rey’s list for a job in the Commission.

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44 Interview K.S. with Pieter VerLoren van Themaat. See also the interview K.S. with Ernst Albrecht, Burgdorff/Beinhorn, 27 April 2005 who states that VerLoren van Themaat was a socialist.
45 However, von der Groeben was not a party member of the CDU while a Commissioner. See for example von der Groeben 2002: 47-8.
46 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 146 session, 2ème partie, 17 May 1961.
48 Interview K.S. with Frans de Koster.
1.4 Motives

The officials' motives for entering the Commission were diverse, combining different elements of personal and career considerations. They were very subjective. Finding out about motives is particularly problematic if officials try to recall them in retrospect, with a time gap of up to 45 years between now and the events. For example, pecuniary or personal motives such as problems in the previous workplace most likely are omitted in these recollections. Nevertheless, this section attempts to outline possible incentives that may have encouraged the officials to work for the Commission. Motives of staff are important in that they impact on the Commission's overall performance. According to Robert Peterson, a mixture of career and ideational motives were most beneficial for the Commission as these officials would perform best in the job.49

The experience of World War II and the aim to overcome the Franco-German divide as a strong incentive to work for Europe are the main ideational reasons given in interviews and autobiographical writings. However, there were other significant motivations to work for the Commission. Curiosity and a sense of adventure were certainly among them. In interviews, a number of former civil servants claimed that they were interested in working in an international context in general, and for European integration in particular.50 Another recurring theme in interviews is that as young people they did not care what the salary would be or whether the job was secure, as long as it was interesting.51 The answers in interviews Peterson conducted in 1964/65 with A-officials of the Commission are strikingly similar to what officials

49 Peterson 1974/75: 31-33.
50 See for example interviews K.S. with Franz Froschmaier, François Muller and Georges Rencki.
51 See the interviews K.S. with Aurelio Pappalardo, Brussels, 8 March 2005, François Muller, Eduard Brackeniers, Giampiero Schiratti, Franz Froschmaier, Henri Etienne and Ivo Schwartz.
chose to tell much later in life, namely that they were excited about their tasks in the Commission which they considered as pioneer work. This consistency makes interviews conducted with Commission officials in a later stage of their life more credible. For some officials the salary was certainly an incentive or a bonus to work for the Commission, even if it is something they do not readily admit. The salary in the Commission was, at least initially, considerably higher than for comparable posts in national administrations. Interestingly, career prospects were hardly ever named in interviews as a main motive to move to Brussels. The reason might be that at the beginning it was not certain whether having a career would be possible as the success of the institution was not guaranteed from the outset. For the officials studied here, who entered the Commission in the set-up period, it was often a step into the unknown with important consequences for their private and professional lives. Then again, once the Commission was established, having a career may have been something many considered as understood. Some officials had more specific reasons to enter the Commission. For one, the Commission presented the opportunity to become a civil servant, as the German civil service in 1958 was more or less closed as long-serving soldiers and returning prisoners of war received preferential treatment for a long time. For another, Europe was a family matter. Jean Dubois’s father had participated in the Val Duchesse negotiations as a Belgian civil servant and his brother worked for the High Authority. Dubois himself entered the Commission in December 1958.

This section has shown the officials’ awareness of belonging to one generation and of sharing a life-shaping experience, World War II. Moreover, the future

52 Peterson 1974/75: 27.
53 Olivier de Vos is one of the few to admit that it were also financial reasons that made the post in Brussels attractive. Interview K.S. with Olivier de Vos, Breda, 25 February 2005.
55 Interview K.S. with Jean Dubois.
Commission officials had similar university degrees and comparable previous professional experience, with the national civil service dominating. They were experienced individuals, but at the same time young and flexible enough to adapt. Previous international experience has certainly led to a certain openness and curiosity which could help them overcome conflicts resulting from their different cultural backgrounds. These are biographical factors, or internal preconditions, which made the officials predisposed towards engaging in a new task and, possibly, eventually adopting new values. Much depended on what they would find in the Commission.

2. Space and time: external factors of Europeanization

Trondal emphasizes the power of institutions to transform actors' identities and allegiances. The Commission officials could then have formed a 'socio-psychological community', based on 'sentiment, affect, shared values – the kind of solidarity characteristic of Church, family or nation'. Accordingly, if integration were to succeed, Hallstein thought it necessary to create new identities and to redirect loyalties towards the Community. Which factors could have triggered or intensified such a process among European civil servants?

2.1 Careers in the Commission

The first factor is time. Long-term exposure to institutional dynamics increases the likelihood of being affected by them. Moreover, long careers of European civil servants...
servants could be an indicator for a high degree of loyalty towards the Commission and a high degree of job satisfaction. Indeed, long careers in the Commission seem to be the norm for the officials studied. The majority of the officials entered the Commission in 1958: 28 of DG IV and 20 of DG VI. In 1959, another eleven entered DG IV and eight DG VI. Officials who commenced their service in DG IV remained in the Commission for another 25 years on average – the time of service ranging from four to 38 years. The average time of service is comparably long for officials who started their careers in DG VI. They stayed for an average of 22 years, the length of service extending between eight and 34 years. The relatively young entry age of the first European civil servants made this long service in the Commission possible. This high level of stability suggests, moreover, that the officials identified with the Commission, or at least they thought that the career prospects there were good enough to stay. However, a lack of alternatives and the comparably high income may also have been motives to remain in the Commission. It was only between 1984 and 1996 that a large proportion of this 'pioneer' generation finally retired and left the Commission. These officials therefore blocked upper grades in the Commission’s administration well into the 1980s and early 1990s. This long-term service of the first European civil servants is striking and the stability of personnel also accounts for continuity in the Commission’s common agricultural and competition policies.

The civil servants in DG Agriculture were particularly committed to staying in their DG. Only five officials left DG VI for another DG. This stability is certainly

59 In 1960 six in DG IV, respectively eight in DG VI; 1961 eight in DG IV respectively six in DG VI; four in 1962 in DG VI and none in DG IV; three in DG VI in 1963; and one in each DG after 1963. DG VI was the fastest growing DG in the Commission; thus, the number of A officials in DG VI increased more rapidly than in DG IV during 1960-63.

60 These numbers are based on information on 22 officials in DG IV and 26 officials in DG VI.

61 17 out of 26 in DG VI and 17 out of 22 in DG IV.

62 Of 26 officials analysed five left DG VI.
due to the specialisation of many of DG VI's officials. However, they also seem to have identified strongly with this DG and the CAP. Of the officials who left, three moved to DG VIII, one to DG Regional Policy and one, Pierre Malve, left to serve in the Cabinets of Commissioner Deniau and Commission President Ortoli in the 1970s. DG Development had, of course, also to deal with problems concerning agriculture. Hence, it was probably the first DG outside DG VI officials considered moving to. Moreover, like civil servants in DG VI, DG VIII officials strongly identified with their policy area. 63

It is more difficult to assess the stability of DG IV officials as this DG was reorganized in 1967 when the Directorates for Tax Harmonisation and Approximation of Laws were assigned to DG Internal Market (DG XI). Of 22 DG IV officials, twelve moved to another DG. Four moved to DG XI, three to DG Financial Institutions and Taxation (DG XV), one to Industry (DG III) and two to DG VIII. Franz Froschmaier left DG IV to work for the Commission's information office in Washington and Manfred Caspari became Deputy Director-General for External Relations before returning to DG IV as director-general. DG IV's first director-general, VerLoren van Themaat, encouraged his officials to move to other DGs to build a network of allies throughout the Commission. 64 The officials who left DG IV should spread the economic concepts of competition and market economy in other parts of the Commission.

The long-term exposure of the officials to institutional structures, both in the Commission and in the DGs, increased the likelihood of being affected by institutional dynamics and of developing strong loyalties with the institution. However, the time

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63 See Dimier 2004.
64 Interview K.S. with Eduard Brackeniers.
effect alone would certainly not have been sufficient to create loyalties if career chances were not satisfactory.

When studying the career patterns of the first European civil servants, it seems that career opportunities were quite good for officials who started their careers in the late 1950s or early 1960s. As to the starting positions, in DG VI there were two officials in the Cabinet as well as five A7/6, twelve A5/4, five A3, five A2 and one A1 (table 4). At the end of their careers, apart from three A4, all of them reached a rank of head of division (eight A3, plus one head of division with grade A4) and above (table 5). The figures for DG IV are very similar. At the end of their careers, one official reached A4, 13 became A3, eight ended up as A2 and six became A1 while two reached the rank of conseiller principal (tables 6 and 7).

Table 4. Entry position of DG VI officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
<th>A5</th>
<th>A6</th>
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Table 5. Final position of DG VI officials

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65 Entry positions in DG VI for 30 officials out of 52.
66 Final position in DG VI for 29 out of 52 officials.
Table 6. DG IV Entry position 67

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Table 7. Final position of DG IV officials 68

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Although in interviews many officials accounted for the great job satisfaction they experienced when working in the Commission, careers in the European administration were and are subject to particular practices and differed from those in national administrations. As pointed out in chapter B1, not every official had the opportunity to reach a post of head of division or above. Multiple factors influenced career decisions in the Commission. Many A4 officials were aware of the fact that, because of their nationality and because of the political importance of the posts above A4, they could not become head of division. Peterson gives the example of an A4 official who stated that he would stay in the Commission in spite of his blocked career, because of the great work satisfaction and ‘believe it or not, a commitment to working for a united Europe’. 69

67 Entry position in DG IV for 30 out of 57 officials.
68 Final position in DG IV for 30 out of 57 officials.
69 Peterson 1971: 134.
It is often emphasized that service in a Cabinet is a career booster. However, in DG VI, apart from van der Lee, Mansholt’s Cabinet staff was stable and did not ‘jump’ to other high positions in the Commission’s administration. The situation is different for DG IV. No less than three future Directors-General for Competition – Albrecht, Schlieder and Caspari – went through service in the Cabinets of von der Groeben and Wilhelm Haferkamp who succeeded von der Groeben as German Commissioner. In addition, Froschmaier ended up as Director-General for Information, Communication and Culture after having served in the Cabinets of these two Commissioners. Service in a Cabinet usually improved the position of an official by one or two steps in the hierarchy. However, furthering a career with help from a Cabinet was not popular. According to Peterson, ‘when administrators refer to their own contacts with Cabinets, they are often apologetic or deny that these contacts involved attempts to obtain promotion. In general there is a norm of non-recourse to the cabinets.’ It was also possible to get from A7 to the top of the hierarchy without having served in a Cabinet as the example of Eduard Brackeniers shows, who ended up Director-General for Translation.

As many officials chose to spend the remainder of their careers in the Commission, post-Commission occupations are not the norm. However, many officials retired rather early, around the age of 60. The early retirement age can be explained by the workload with which leading officials had to cope throughout their careers which led to exhaustion, and, importantly, by the fact that due to enlargements the Commission had to free posts for officials from new member states. Some officials chose to withdraw gradually from Community affairs and they became

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72 See the examples of Christopher Audland, Daniel Guggenbühl and Helmut von Verschuer who retired aged 60; others such as Ivo Schwartz and Jean Dubois retired at the age of 65.
special advisers to the Commission,\textsuperscript{73} or to a Commissioner.\textsuperscript{74} The Commission thus utilised their know-how and experience. Others went into politics. Van der Lee became mayor of Dordrecht and Eindhoven and held a seat in the Dutch Raad van State, the Council of State, between 1979 and 1988. Albrecht was minister president of Lower Saxony from 1976 to 1990 while Froschmaier became minister of economics and finance in the German Land Schleswig-Holstein. Some moved into academia. Three officials taught at the College of Europe in Bruges and the Université Libre de Bruxelles. Noël became president of the European University Institute in Florence and VerLoren van Themaat accepted a professorship in International Law at Utrecht University. Another official, Pappalardo, set up a law firm in Brussels. Generally speaking, a transfer to private business was less frequent. One German official became a freelance councillor for agriculture, helping individuals, federal states and national ministries in dealing with European legislation, thus cashing in on his special knowledge of the Brussels maze.

\subsection*{2.2 Living and working in Brussels}

'Bruxelles, l'Européenne' is the title of a book edited by the Belgian historian Michel Dumoulin.\textsuperscript{75} It is very likely that Brussels and its specific urban and social environment had an impact on the officials. As highly paid expatriates, they were sometimes detached from the reality in their home countries and from the Belgian population of Brussels. Often, they led a kind of 'bubble life' in a golden cage. Albrecht has recalled that his family leaving Brussels was not an easy step for them as they also left behind the community of officials of six different countries. He

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{73} Schwartz, Ritter, von Verschuer, Rencki and Nicolas Bel.
\textsuperscript{74} For example Dubois to Karel van Miert.
\textsuperscript{75} Dumoulin 2001.
\end{footnotesize}
described his return to Lower Saxony and to politics as a *Rückkehr ins Volk*, or return to the people,\(^76\) as opposed to the privileged and aloof existence of a European civil servant. While the officials underwent supranational socialisation when working at the Commission, they also socialised with people from different national and cultural backgrounds, meeting in clubs, churches and schools. A particular European culture developed in Brussels and the officials were part of it. Abélès and Bellier call it an institutional, administrative and political culture.\(^77\)

As shown above, most people attracted by a career in Brussels were fairly young and flexible. They were either single or married but with a young family, which was easier to relocate. When coming to Brussels in the late 1950s, many officials and their wives perceived the Belgian capital as a provincial town, particularly when they were from cities such as Paris or Berlin. Especially for the officials’ wives, most of whom stayed at home, life in Brussels was a harsh contrast to what they were used to and they felt isolated, not least because of the language barrier.\(^78\) In the early years, the provinciality of Brussels was overcome – according to eyewitnesses – by an active social life. One ‘cocktail’ followed the other.\(^79\) Those who were single and came to Brussels when they were in their early and mid-twenties savoured this new freedom.\(^80\)

However, this probably reflects more the experience of officials who did not have a leading position in the administration at the beginning, as those at the top of the hierarchy usually emphasized that they did not have much of a social life while

\(^{76}\) Albrecht 1999: 44.
\(^{77}\) Cf. Abélès and Bellier 1996: 436.
\(^{78}\) See for example the conversations with Mrs Imbert and Mrs Gleichmann, widows of deceased DG IV officials.
\(^{79}\) For example the diaries of Jean Schwed, an official in the Executive Secretariat, of 1960 and conversation K.S. with Mrs Schwed, Brussels, 11 March 2005.
\(^{80}\) Interview K.S. with an official of DG V, Brussels, 8 December 2003.
working for the Commission. Nevertheless, at the beginning, the Commission was, like the High Authority, a small administration where people got to know each other well. François Muller remembered that he and others had a 'great thirst and an immense pleasure to get to know' people with different backgrounds. Some Commissioners invited high officials to their homes and sometimes a close contact between Commission members and high officials developed. However, this rosy picture of intercultural understanding has to be put into perspective. Despite attempts to bring together the members of the international community in Brussels, for example in the European Club, some officials recount that people of different nationalities rarely mixed in their private life. One official qualified his life in Brussels as 'predominantly marital'; this withdrawal into the family could also be observed for officials in the High Authority. However, one of the means of socialising with officials, including those of different nationalities, were precisely their children.

The European schools had a great symbolic value for social integration and Europeanization of European officials and their families. Aimed at providing a European education for the next generation, they brought children and families of different national and cultural background together. In order to cater for the educational needs of the officials’ children, in mid-1958 the European institutions in Brussels decided to create a European school, which opened its doors in 1958 in the

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81 See the interviews K.S. with Ernst Albrecht, Franz Froschmaier, Frans de Koster and Henri Etienne.
82 Interview K.S. with François Muller.
83 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 97, Letter van der Lee to Mansholt, 8 November 1958.
84 The European Club in the Château de Saint-Anne in the Val Duchesse was founded in 1961 on the initiative of the European Movement in Brussels. PAAA, Pol 04 22, No 218, R. Lahr to Auswärtiges Amt, 25 August 1961.
86 Interview K.S. with Kurt Ritter.
suburb of Ukkle. Marcel Decombis, co-founder of the European school in Luxembourg, was convinced of these schools' Europeanization effects, as a European spirit would essentially develop through education. All in all, the European school was another place to meet and mix for European officials and furthered integration through the children. While praising the benefits of the European school, not all parents sent their children there. It was an all-day school and some, especially German parents, were not used to this concept and thought it was hard on their children. Some preferred national schools such as the German school or the Lycée français in order to facilitate reintegration of their children in the school and university system of their country of origin. Another option was to send the children to a Belgian school, a decision which showed these officials' willingness to integrate in the Belgian society. In particular for the Dutch officials the Flemish speaking schools were an attractive alternative.

Like in Luxembourg, the relationship between the native Bruxellois and the 'Eurocrats' was not without strain. The new inhabitants of the Belgian capital were met with indifference and sometimes even hostility. Their high salaries and advantages of tax-free shopping and cheap petrol caused envy among the locals, according to officials interviewed. Many mentioned that they had problems integrating in the Brussels society or did not make an effort. A contemporary newspaper article confirms that the officials mainly lived 'on the margins' of the

89 See for example HAEU, INT ECH-682, Interview Veronika Heyde and Myriam Rancon with Ivo Schwartz, Brussel, 16 January 2004.
90 See for instance interviews with François Muller.
91 Conrad 2001: 141.
92 Interview K.S. with Olivier de Vos.
However, the prejudices seem to have been reciprocal. The Belgian society was seen as conservative and closed. One official explained, moreover, that in 'the European milieu with all these different nationalities, with activities that were open towards European and global problems, there was already such a diversity between us that there was little need to find contacts among the locals'. For others, however, the motto was to 'go native'. One official organized Commission teams that participated in public events such as marathons. This was considered a good publicity for the Eurocrats and an opportunity to get to know the local population. Another means of integrating in the Belgian society were the church parishes.

However, for many French officials and Commissioners, Paris remained the place where one spent weekends and holidays. This might explain why they did not make more effort to integrate in the Belgian society. The evening train between Brussels and Paris, the 'Transeuropean Express', has become legendary. It provided not only a speedy means of transport between the French and the European capital, but it was also an important informal place to meet, where matters could be discussed in private amongst officials, Commissioners, representatives of interest groups and journalists.

While the fact that the Commission was a multinational and multilingual administration caused many difficulties, it was at the same time an opportunity to build trust and solidarity. In interviews, officials account for the fact that they assisted each other in coping with working in a foreign language by translating and explaining.

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94 Interview K.S. with François Muller.
95 Interview K.S. with Henri Etienne.
97 Lemaignen 1964: 43-44.
for each other.\textsuperscript{98} From today’s perspective, however, these are part of the myth of the pioneer generation of the Commission and all statements about how smoothly everything worked have to be handled with care. Another factor in this respect are the long working hours. Most officials, when interviewed, stated that they voluntarily renounced spare time and regular working hours because they were so engaged with, and so enthusiastic about, their work.\textsuperscript{99} This may well be true. However, the long working hours were also a source of concern, as they had repercussions on the officials’ health and family life. In 1962, the Commission’s medical examiner diagnosed a large number of cases of psychological strain, having led to some breakdowns as a consequence of long working hours.\textsuperscript{100} Many Commission officials were simply overworked and this made it difficult for them to settle and integrate in Brussels.

\textbf{2.3 Socialisation and Europeanization mechanisms in the Commission}

The previous two subsections argued that the time factor, combined with job satisfaction and the particular environment of living and working in Brussels had an impact on the officials. This subsection deals with other socialisation factors, such as expert culture, role models and working methods. It also explores the limits of these socialisation factors.

In the Commission, what could be called an ‘expert culture’ developed. This led to an identification of officials with the institution, combined with a strong identification with Commission policies. In 1965 Albrecht judged the Commission’s expertise to be one of its main assets through which it could gain credibility and

\textsuperscript{98} Interviews K.S. with Olivier de Vos and François Muller.
\textsuperscript{99} See for example interviews K.S. with Giampiero Schiratti and Franz Froschmaier.
\textsuperscript{100} BAK, N 1266/1268, Hitzelberger to von Staden, 29 September 1962.
recognition as a Community actor.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, the expert culture enabled the officials to overcome prejudices and to perceive the other simply as a colleague.\textsuperscript{102} It certainly helped to bridge the cultural and linguistic divide, which could have led to misunderstandings and conflicts. These difficulties were overcome, it seems, mainly through collaboration and through the sense of working for a cause adopted as common and worth pursuing. In an article of 1967, von Verschuer attempts to explain the dynamics, difficulties and challenges of multinational cooperation.\textsuperscript{103} He is one of the few who reflected on these problems while still an active official in the Commission. The views expressed in his article somewhat differ from the ideal of multinational solidarity and cooperation that comes across in some of the interviews with officials long after their retirement. Verschuer observed that the cooperation of people with different national backgrounds required patience and the will to engage with other people. He concluded, however, that the strongest link between people of a different kind would develop through a common mission. For him, a DG VI official, the CAP was the ideal example for a task behind which people of different national and cultural backgrounds could rally.\textsuperscript{104} Decades later, DG VI officials such as Barthélémy spoke of the strong will to collaborate with each other and to achieve something together. ‘Because there really was this will, this will to succeed, to achieve results […]. There was this strong sense of being able to construct something together,


\textsuperscript{102} Abéïès and Bellier 1996: 433 and 437.

\textsuperscript{103} Verschuer 1967.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 5.
of having to accomplish a common creation.'

Beyond the expert culture, the fact that the first European civil servants belonged to one generation with shared experiences such as the war has to be considered as a strong factor of socialisation. Shortly before his retirement in 1988, Gérard Imbert, Director in DG XV, looked back at what brought the Commission officials together apart from the expert culture:

We have lived through nationalist experiences which have let everyone of us down because we were children of the war. It was thus an immense hope for us to find ourselves together [in the Commission, K.S.]. The European spirit emerged thanks to the high degree of trust and the relations that have developed among us and which have facilitated greatly finding solutions for certain problems within the Commission's administration.

According to Imbert, this *esprit de corps* of the early generation has disappeared gradually with every enlargement of the Community. Officials would cling to these early memories, this 'unique moment in time', in the less 'golden' 1970s and 1980s.

According to Albrecht, he and his colleagues in the Commission in the late 1950s and early 1960s believed that they were writing history. For him, this explains why nobody complained about the long working hours. The sentiment of being able to change the course of history, even if it was in small steps and even if it took years until a policy was finally adopted and implemented, is a factor of Europeanization. Although not everybody was as conscious as Albrecht of their 'contribution to

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105 Interview K.S. with Maurice Barthélémy.
106 See the interviews K.S. with Giampiero Schiratti, Hans-Broder Krohn, Franz Froschmaier, Maurice Barthélémy, Ivo Schwartz and Jean Dubois.
107 Institutions financières, interview with Gérard Imbert in *Courrier du Personnel*, undated [ca. 1988], kindly provided by Mrs Imbert.
108 Ibid.
109 Interview K.S. with Giampiero Schiratti.
110 Interview Sibylle Hambloch and Gerold Ambrosius with Ernst Albrecht, Beinhorn, 22 March 2002
history', many felt that they participated in something new and important. Moreover, as shown above, the officials were conscious of the past and the war experiences of their colleagues. Lastly, moving to Brussels in the late 1950s and early 1960s was considered an exceptional career move. This view has been upheld, and even picked up by the children of European officials. For instance, the son of a French Commission official, who spent his childhood in Brussels, referred to his father’s years in the Commission as an ‘adventure’ even though his father had a long, stable and successful career of 29 years in the Commission.\(^{111}\)

The time factor, good career prospects, living and working in Brussels, commitment to an expert culture and shared generational experience have to be complemented by another socialisation factor. There had to be someone to animate and motivate the officials. European role models, therefore, count as a sixth factor of socialisation. While officials refer to Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, Philip and Brugmans as what could be called ‘eternal’ or ‘spiritual’ role models,\(^{112}\) there were also, and perhaps more importantly, role models within the Commission. The close collaboration between Commissioners and the civil servants of their DG, especially during the first years, facilitated the formation of loyalties. For instance, Mansholt was perceived as being approachable, enthusiastic and assertive, and this seems to have made a deep impression on DG VI officials.\(^{113}\) Moreover, leading officials such as the directors-general of DG VI and IV, Rabot and VerLoren van Themaat, served as role

\(^{111}\) Email from Laurent Imbert to K.S., 1 January 2005. CV Gérard Imbert, honorary director-general of the Commission, kindly provided by Mrs Imbert. See also HAEU, INT-ECH 683, Interview Veronika Heyde with Helmut Sigrist, 7 January 2004.

\(^{112}\) The latter two were named by Rencki, see HAEU, INT-ECH717, Interview Ghjiseppu Lavezzi with Georges Rencki, Tervuren, 13 January 2004.

\(^{113}\) On Mansholt see for instance Thiemeuer 2005. See also the interviews K.S. with Raymond Craps, Helmut von Verschuer, Georges Rencki and Marice Barthélémy.
models, too. Noël, the ‘énience grise’ of the Commission, as he is sometimes referred to, apparently had become a legend while still working in the Commission. As he recalled in an interview, Lahnstein, who entered the administration in the mid-1960s, already then thought of Noël as the Ur-Europäer, or prototype European. The reasons why a person was considered a role model are diverse. It could be their European conviction but also outstanding expert knowledge and hard work as in the case of Berend Heringa, deputy director-general in DG VI. The presence of role models motivated officials, triggered social learning and facilitated socialisation.

The working methods introduced by the Commissioners in DG VI and DG IV seem to have encouraged discussion and inspired creative policy solutions. They count as a seventh socialisation factor. Mansholt’s so-called ‘round table’, for instance, has become legendary and is discussed in more detail in chapter III. The CAP was principally elaborated in this intimate circle. Such an environment gave even lower ranking officials the feeling that they were participating in creating and shaping the CAP. Taking part in decision-making, or at least having the impression that one was involved in decision-making, was important for creating solidarity with the policy and the institution. Von der Groeben established similar working methods in his DG IV, also creating an atmosphere of open-mindedness and discussion. High officials account for the great freedom of manoeuvre they had especially at the beginning where even A5 or A6 officials could have a lot of responsibility. In Coombes’s study, Commission civil servants highly rated having some initiative in the decision-

114 For example the interviews K.S. with Raymond Craps, Hans-Broder Krohn and Marice Barthélémny.
115 Interview K.S. with Manfred Lahnstein.
116 See for example the interview K.S. with Maurice Barthélémny.
117 The ‘table ronde’ was composed of Mansholt, his Cabinet, Heringa, Rabot and his assistant von Verschuer as permanent members plus the directors and other officials concerned with the matter to be discussed.
118 See for example the interviews K.S. with Aurelio Pappalardo and Eduard Brackeniers.
119 Interview K.S. with Franz Froschmaier.
making process and some gave the prospect of this as a reason for having joined the Commission in the first place. ‘The chief motivation of these officials was far more a desire to participate in a new and interesting undertaking, and to be given the opportunity to take some initiative in the policy-making process.’ According to the available eyewitness evidence, this sense of camaraderie and common purpose contributed to forming an esprit de corps among the early European civil servants.

Long-term service and job satisfaction, particular living and working conditions in Brussels, expert culture, a shared generational experience, pioneer spirit, the presence of role models and participatory working methods contributed to a strong identification with the Commission and European integration and count as socialisation factors that have facilitated Europeanization. What factors, however, could have obstructed Europeanization? The uncertain career prospects in the Commission’s administration, mentioned already, have to count among the obstacles to Europeanization. Often posts above A4 were ‘reserved’ for members of a certain nationality. It was therefore unlikely that, for instance, a French A4 would succeed his or her Italian head of division. One official gave a blocked career as the main reason for leaving the Commission with a golden hand-shake in 1973 on the occasion of the first enlargement. Advancing in the career required great flexibility and the willingness to move to another division or DG, which could be difficult for highly specialised officials. The reluctance of the other Community institutions such as the Council to commit to European integration and support Community policy solutions were certainly factors prone to cause frustration. It was uncertain if a proposal, often elaborated in hard work and lengthy negotiations, would finally be adopted and

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121 Interview K.S. with Friedrich Arnsmeyer.
implemented. If it was adopted at all, it could take years and sometimes decades to get a proposal through the Council. Patience was clearly one of the qualities a European official needed. Another factor which may have obstructed Europeanization was the change of climate in the 1970s and early 1980s, accounted for in interviews. An article in *Le Monde* of 1979 criticized the loss of role models, the lack of independence of the Commission and the lack of Community spirit. ‘[N]umerous officials deplore the present weakness of the Commission and they regret the loss of the energy and the independence of Commissioners such as the Dutchman Sicco Mansholt, the father of the common agricultural policy.’

In 1984, Imbert gave a talk about the difficulties of realising the free movement of services. After the Commission had made – in his eyes – a good proposal for a flexible directive already in 1976, eight years later the negotiations had come to a standstill. For Imbert, the main reason for the failure of the negotiations was that

> the attitude at the level of the experts [of national administrations, K.S.] has changed. [...] Because at the moment, I regret having to say this, [...] instead of coming with an open mind, they tend to consider their own legislation as a kind of bible and they try to impose their bible to the other member states.

Also, the working methods, where even an A7 official would get to see, and be heard by, the Commissioner, could not be sustained forever. At the beginning, the size of the administration was limited and personal relationships among the civil servants could develop more easily. As the administration grew, the feeling of belonging to a kind of ‘family’ subsequently diminished.

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A strong pre-socialisation in another institution could make Europeanization difficult, if not impossible. Especially temporary Commission officials could resist the Community socialisation mechanisms. Coombes identifies a specific type of official who did not integrate in the ‘common culture’, the French ‘ENA graduate’-type. According to Coombes, this type existed in civil services in all member countries. While these officials possessed great technical skills and competence, they ‘lacked the sense of adventure and shared undertaking, which so many officials enjoyed even in senior positions’. The next section presents six types of officials, the ‘ENA-type’ among them.

3. Exemplary biographies of high officials

This section proposes a classification of officials into sociological types, a concept used in qualitative biographical sociology which refers to the variants, or types, occurring in a certain sphere of activity or society. Contrasting these types with each other allows the construction of a typology. It is not easy, however, to classify people with different talents, complex thoughts, ideas and behavioural patterns. Yet, the previous sections have revealed some key similarities between officials as to their background, personal and professional experiences and motives for working in the Commission. Establishing sociological categories for Commission officials could help to obtain further clarifications about the nature and outlook of the Commission’s staff. The categories are derived from the findings presented in the previous two sections: events in the biographies and lessons the officials have drawn from them; early career

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patterns and previous socialisation; motives for working in the Commission; ambitions for their careers; and, last but not least, their stance on European integration and the Commission's role in this process. Not every Commission civil servant fits entirely into one of the categories outlined below. Most officials combine elements of two or more categories. However, this section will primarily discuss examples of officials who come close to ideal types of Commission officials.

Six categories emerge from the analysis of the officials' biographies; these can be arranged into opposing pairs. The first pair is constituted of the 'expert' and the 'political official'. While they are distinctive, they are in some respects also complementary. Both have the aim of furthering European integration. They differ, however, with regard to the means they employ to realise this goal. Whereas the first focuses on defending the rights of the institution as they are defined in treaties and Community legislation, the political official campaigns for extending the power of the institution and takes part - visibly or covertly - in the political struggle between member state governments and the Commission. While political party membership is not necessarily a criterion for political officials, they often spent part of their career in a Commissioner's Cabinet. Examples of political officials are Ernst Albrecht, Franz Froschmaier, Klaus Meyer, Manfred Lahnstein, Karl Heinz Narjes and Henri Etienne. Among the experts are Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Ivo Schwartz, Berend Heringa and Maurice Barthélémy.

The second pair is constituted of what could be termed 'novice' and 'veteran'. The first came straight from university and was, as regards the professional career, entirely socialised in the Commission. Eduard Brackeniers, François Muller, Aurelio Pappalardo and Kurt Ritter are examples of this type. The 'veterans' are represented by someone like Hans-Broder Krohn, an officer during World War II and a civil
servant in the German agricultural ministry, who entered the Commission at the age of 45, or Alfred Mozer. Veterans have diverse personalities and motives for working for the Commission. Some, like Mozer and Krohn, entered the Commission as a consequence of their previous personal experience. Others were sent by their governments after they had served in national administrations for many years. Some of the latter managed to adapt to the Commission, others failed to do so and returned to their home countries.

Finally, the last two types could be called 'realistic idealist' and 'pragmatist'. While the first put themselves into the service of European integration and often developed strong loyalties to the Commission, for the latter the Commission was a career step or booster. There are French examples for both groups: Emile Noël and Georges Rencki rank among the first category while especially the so-called French high flyers such as Jean-François Deniau, François-Xavier Ortoli and Alain Prate fall into the latter category. In the following, I will present one exemplary biography for each of the categories: the political official (Albrecht), the expert (VerLoren van Themaat), the novice (Brackeniers), the veteran (Krohn), the realistic idealist (Noël) and the pragmatist (Deniau).

**Ernst Albrecht** represents the political official with a mission. For Albrecht, a federal state was the ultimate goal for Europe; a federal state in which the regions were to play an important role under a European roof but in which the nation states would continue to exist. Accordingly, he organized his memoirs into three sections: Europe, Lower Saxony and Germany. While Germany comes last in this list, it takes up the largest space in Albrecht's autobiography. In it he argues that German federalism should be a model for the organization of Europe. Albrecht was very

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126 Albrecht 1999.
attached to his region, Lower Saxony, of which he became minister president in 1976. He strove to turn Lower Saxony into an 'autonomous, self-confident component in the multi-level structure of a united Europe'.

Born in Heidelberg in 1930, Albrecht grew up in Bremen, a Free city in northern Germany. As a teenager during the war, Albrecht was trained as a medic and deployed to give first aid after bomb raids; this experience, he said, had a profound effect on him as he was directly confronted, and had to cope with, the horrors of war. It caused Albrecht to adopt a 'never again' attitude. After the war, he became interested in philosophy and theology — his way of coping with the disorientation resulting from the lost war and the Nazi regime. He studied theology, philosophy and political economy at the universities of Tübingen, Cornell, Basel and Bonn. In Basel he was taught by the philosopher Karl Jaspers and the Swiss theologian Karl Barth, one of the founders of the Bekennende Kirche, or Confessing Church, a Protestant Confessional Resistance movement.

During his stay in the United States in 1949-50, Albrecht recalled, he was frequently asked to explain the situation in Europe rather than just Germany. He thus came to see himself as a kind of ambassador of both Europe and Germany. Albrecht qualified this experience as a turning point at which he decided that he wanted to work for European unity and for the west German Federal Republic that had just been founded. In order to be able to join the civil service and work for the common welfare, Albrecht abandoned philosophy to study political economy. This change of direction also appears to be a result of his reflection that the economic crisis of the

127 Ibid., 48.

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Weimar Republic had caused its downfall and that a similar outcome had to be avoided for the young Federal Republic.\textsuperscript{132} Albrecht considered the Schuman declaration of May 1950 as an important event that confirmed his desire to work for European integration.\textsuperscript{133} He chose the following topic of his dissertation: ‘Is Monetary Union the precondition for Economic Union?’ In 1954, Albrecht was appointed by the ECSC Council Secretariat in Luxembourg. Two years later, he became the secretary in the negotiations between Adenauer and Mollet about the restitution of the Saar to Germany. This is where Albrecht met Adenauer whom he admired and whose policy of anchoring the Federal Republic of Germany in the west and pursuing a policy of reunification from a ‘position of strength’ he supported. For Albrecht, the well-being of Germany was inextricably linked to a strong and prosperous western Europe able to attract the central and eastern European states as expressed in the so-called ‘magnet theory’.\textsuperscript{134} At the Val Duchesse negotiations Albrecht became the secretary of the Internal Market Committee. Von der Groeben, who presided over this committee, then recruited him as his chef de cabinet in the Commission. When von der Groeben took over DG Regional Policy in 1967, Albrecht succeeded VerLoren van Themaat as director-general of DG IV. However, having reached the top of the Commission’s administrative hierarchy at the age of only 37, Albrecht left the Commission in 1970. He sought to enter politics in his native Lower Saxony and was elected to the regional parliament for the Christian democrats. In 1976 Albrecht was elected minister president of Lower Saxony.

As von der Groeben’s confidant, Albrecht also played an important role in the Commission in general. He was engaged in defining and enhancing the political role

\textsuperscript{132} Albrecht 1999: 11.
\textsuperscript{133} HAEU, Int 640, Interview Wolf D. Gruner with Ernst Albrecht, Hanover, 7 August 1998.
\textsuperscript{134} Albrecht 1999: 26.
of the Commission in the Community and was among Hallstein's close advisers. Importantly, he was one of the authors of the proposals Hallstein presented to the European Parliament in March 1965 which triggered the empty chair crisis. In this episode Albrecht's role of a political official was most pronounced. For him, the Commission was the impartial institution working for the common welfare and presenting balanced solutions that were in the interest of all member states. Even during the empty chair crisis, Albrecht remained optimistic and expected the role of the Commission to expand to other policy areas in a kind of spill-over movement. In January 1966 he wrote:

In the long run, new targets will come up for which we do not yet have [...] the responsibility, for example the improvement of living conditions [of European citizens, K.S.]. To the extent to which the expressly formulated aim of the EEC treaty (common market) is realised, it will lose importance vis-à-vis these complementary aims. Then, the problem of the overall political direction will have to be addressed in Brussels.

The fact that Albrecht envisaged aims that went beyond those fixed in the EEC treaty distinguishes him from the expert official described below.

In a number of interviews in recent years, Albrecht has defended the Commission's proposals of March 1965. Moreover, not accepting any criticism or remembering any negative aspects of the early years in Brussels, he has tried to convey his idealized view of the Commission in discussions with historians. Today, Albrecht is worried about Europe's future which, according to him, is still not a united, democratic and social Europe, capable of defending human rights and peace in

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135 This is confirmed by Albrecht and numerous eye-witnesses.
137 Interview K.S. with Ernst Albrecht. See also the interviews with Sibylle Hambloch and HAEU, INT-ECH 671, Interview Jan van der Harst and Veronika Heyde with Ernst Albrecht, Burgdorf/Beinhorn, 4 March 2004.
the world. He fears that a change of attitude of the younger generations, which take peace and freedom for granted, could jeopardize the integration process that he and his colleagues, who were under the impact of the experiences of World War II, had worked for.

Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, born on 16 March 1916 in Rotterdam, was a Dutch lawyer and specialised in cartel law. As an expert, he played a crucial role in defining and fleshing out the Commission’s competition policy, a policy area where the Commission ended up with considerable autonomy and power vis-à-vis enterprises and member states. It was thus less through direct political intervention that VerLoren van Themaat sought to further integration and to expand the power of the Commission than through expertise and based on Community law.

Graduating from school in 1934, in the middle of the economic crisis of the 1930s, VerLoren van Themaat decided to study law, a subject which he thought would guarantee employment. After graduating from Leiden University in 1939, VerLoren van Themaat studied for a PhD in international tax law with Professor B.M. Telders. During the German occupation of the Netherlands, Telders acted against the German occupiers by informing the Dutch administration about their rights to resist orders by the occupiers on the grounds of the Hague Convention of 1907. In December 1940, Telders was imprisoned and died in the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen. VerLoren van Themaat saw Telders as his role model both in terms of his moral courage and his legal expertise. In 1946 he obtained his PhD and entered the ministry for economic affairs where he became responsible for cartel policy and price

139 See also chapter III.
140 See the interview Hambloch/Ambrosius with VerLoren van Themaat.
142 VerLoren van Themaat 1995: 1558.
control. VerLoren van Themaat was instrumental in designing important economic legislation for the Netherlands and he served as an adviser to the Dutch delegation during the negotiations leading to the ECSC and EEC treaties. In 1957 he became head of the working group ‘cartels’ in the negotiations for a European Free Trade Area which eventually failed at the end of 1958.

VerLoren van Themaat entered the Commission in April 1958 as director-general of DG IV. As a lawyer, he saw the EEC treaty as the basis of Community law and its principles had to be defended. He therefore had little understanding that political considerations or necessities could influence decision-making. An article in the German weekly, Der Spiegel, of December 1959 demonstrates this. When the French government introduced tax concessions in favour of certain products, such as machines, to compensate for the ten per cent tariff reduction in the common market, it violated Article 92 of the EEC treaty on state aids, the application of which fell into the responsibility of DG IV. Following this protectionist measure, VerLoren van Themaat wrote a protest letter to the French government asking it to lift the tax abatement. The letter was kept secret in the Commission as Hallstein wanted to avoid showing France up as breaching the treaty but it was leaked to the press. When the French government failed to react, VerLoren van Themaat considered proposing legal action at the Court of Justice. However, von der Groeben, Hallstein and the German government sought to avoid this. VerLoren van Themaat, according to Der Spiegel, wrote to von der Groeben that the German government seems to be ‘anxious to limit

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144 Interview K.S. with VerLoren van Thernaat.
145 Ibid.
the Commission’s means of intervention if these would seemingly entail curtailing member states’ national sovereignty'.

VerLoren van Themaat left the Commission in 1967 to become a professor of Dutch, European and International Social and Economic Law at Utrecht University. Between 1981 and 1985 he was Advocate General at the European Court of Justice. The post had been created following the accession of Greece to the EC. According to VerLoren van Themaat, the Council of Ministers had discussed whether the appointment of a fifth Advocate General, who should be from a small member state, would disrupt the balance between small and large member states at the Court; a concern for which VerLoren van Themaat lacked sympathy: ‘As if for a Court the national background and the political orientation [of a Court member, K.S.] would play a role.’

During his career, VerLoren van Themaat served at two European institutions and taught European law. Moreover, he was part of a transnational network of lawyers and European law experts which developed as a consequence of European integration. For instance, he was instrumental in setting up the London-Leiden meetings, a forum for discussing and developing the law of the Communities and from which the Common Market Law Review emerged. Moreover, in 1973, the Commission charged him with a report on economic legislation in the member states. From 1970 onwards, VerLoren van Themaat co-edited a commentary on European Community law. In 1974 he became a member of the Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. In an article in 1995, he reflected on the future of the European

147 Interview K.S. with VerLoren van Themaat.
148 Ibid.
149 Kapteyn 2007: 103.
150 Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat 1995.
Union after Maastricht. As to the role of the Commission, he thought that it should remain as small as possible to guarantee its independence and enable it to develop objective and high quality policy solutions while it was controlled by the European Parliament and the Court.¹⁵¹ Ivo Schwartz, VerLoren van Themaat’s collaborator in DG IV, can also be counted among the experts. For Schwartz, the Commission as a non-elected body had to gain legitimacy and reputation through expertise.¹⁵² Schwartz and VerLoren van Themaat, the law experts, aimed at contributing to this. They were what could be called institutionalists, praising the independent ‘expert Commission’ and a Community based on law.

The Belgian Eduard Brackeniers entered the Commission as a young graduate at the lowest level (A7), terminating his career as director-general (A1). A novice in the world of employment, he thrived in the Commission’s career system, always keeping his eyes open for opportunities and often being ‘at the right place at the right time’.¹⁵³ His loyalty belonged to the Commission as a whole, not to one DG. Brackeniers thought of himself as a generalist, a type of official who knows how to change and develop.

Born in December 1931 in Antwerp, Belgium, Brackeniers received a bilingual education. After attending the Flemish Jesuit College Notre Dame in Antwerp, he studied at the Francophone University of Namur for two years. He then graduated from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Flanders with a PhD in law (in Flemish) and a degree in economics (in French). Before entering the Commission Brackeniers worked briefly at the Institut Catholique des Hautes Études Commerciales in Brussels. His recruitment for the Commission was informal, typical for the early

¹⁵¹ VerLoren van Themaat 1995: 1554.
¹⁵² Interview with Ivo Schwartz.
¹⁵³ The information in the following paragraph is derived from: Interview K. S. with Eduard Brackeniers.
recruitments for the Commission and typical for a small country such as Belgium. When Baron Jean-Charles Snoy et d'Oppuers from the economics ministry, the former head of the Belgian delegation at the Val Duchesse negotiations, looked for young graduates for the Commission, he asked for suitable candidates at the universities of Leuven and Brussels. Brackeniers' professor at Leuven suggested him. In an interview Brackeniers emphasized that he was already then interested in Europe and that he had discussed questions of European integration with this professor. Entering the Commission in early 1959, Brackeniers started working for DG IV. However, he did not become particularly passionate about competition policy. Brackenier was less interested in theory and meticulous interpretation of case law and treaty articles. His strengths lay in organizing and communicating. Unlike many of his colleagues, therefore, he was not very attached to DG IV. He admired VerLoren van Themaat and von der Groeben but he also mentioned that VerLoren van Themaat encouraged people to leave DG IV in order to have allies in other DGs, a suggestion Brackeniers took up. As career opportunities in DG IV were not good for Belgians, he concluded that to advance in his career he needed to move on and apply for posts in other DGs. In 1973, he became assistant to Fernand Braun, director-general in DG Internal Market. Under President Delors, Brackeniers was promoted to director in human resources. Finally, Brackeniers became first Director-General for Informatics and then for Translation. While he did reach the top of the Commission's administrative hierarchy, he was never in charge of one of the politically important DGs such as Internal Market or Competition. For a career entirely within the Commission, without service in a Cabinet, it seems that this was as far as one could get. When Brackeniers retired in 1996 he had spent more than 37 years in the Commission.
Working in an international context was a new experience for Brackeniers when he entered the Commission in 1959. To him, at first, the Germans seemed the most 'foreign' among the foreigners in the Commission. With Belgium occupied twice by German troops and his family suffering bombing raids and food shortage during the war years, he met his German colleagues with reservation. According to him, however, they discussed these problems, sharing their personal experiences; this led to mutual understanding. For Brackeniers 'building Europe' to maintain peace was therefore an important motive to work for the Commission. Another novice, Klaus-Otto Nass, admitted that he had not been interested in European integration when entering the Commission as a young graduate with one year of experience in the German economics ministry. However, Nass accounted for the great socialisation pressure – in a positive sense – in the Commission. According to him, one would get 'infected' with this contagious European spirit at the Commission.\footnote{HAEU, INT-ECH681, Interview Wilfried Loth and Veronika Heyde with Klaus-Otto Nass, Paris, 2 April 2004.}

**Hans-Broder Krohn** was born in 1915 in Bredstedt, Northern Frisia, Germany.\footnote{For the following see the interview K.S. with Hans-Broder Krohn.} Unlike the novice Brackeniers, Krohn entered the Commission following a career as soldier and civil servant. A veteran such as Krohn brings in a wider range of personal experiences, and it were mainly these experiences which incited him to make a radical career change and work for European integration.

Krohn graduated from school in 1934. For a time after his graduation there is a gap in his curriculum vitae. An orphan, Krohn was raised by his grandparents, and it is likely that he worked for his grandfather for a while, a veterinary doctor and merchant. Krohn joined the Wehrmacht in 1939 where he reached a position of officer in the
Wehrmacht chief of staff.\footnote{Information provided by the Deutsche Dienststelle für die Benachrichtigung der nächsten Angehörigen von Gefallenen der ehemaligen deutschen Wehrmacht.} After the war, until 1946, Krohn was a prisoner of war of the British army. As a consequence of his role as a former officer in the chief of staff he was not allowed to enrol at any German university immediately after the war. As he intended to study agriculture, Krohn worked as a farm labourer for four years, between 1946 and 1950. At the age of 35 Krohn began studying at the University of Göttingen, from which he graduated in 1954. He then became assistant to Professor Arthur Hanau, one of the founders of the \textit{landwirtschaftliche Marktlehre}, or market theory in agriculture. According to this theory, agriculture was a sector of the economy like any other and should not receive subsidies or special treatment. Krohn accompanied Hanau to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome and became interested in world agricultural affairs, publishing a comparative analysis of international agricultural markets in 1957.\footnote{Krohn, H. B. (1957). \textit{Futtergetreidewirtschaft der Welt 1900-1954}. Berichte über Landwirtschaft, N.S., Special Issue No. 165. Hamburg and Berlin: Paul Parey.} In 1956-7 he entered the German ministry of agriculture to become head of section at the OEEC, where he was responsible for agricultural analyses and statistics. In 1957, Krohn became the personal aide of Agricultural Minister Heinrich Lübke. He accompanied Lübke to the Stresa conference in June 1958. When Lübke, who supported the integration of the Six, became President of the Federal Republic in 1959, Krohn entered the Commission. According to Krohn, he chose Europe deliberately because of his personal experiences in World War II.\footnote{Interview K.S. with Hans-Broder Krohn.} Another reason that facilitated this decision was that European integration was a taboo subject in the agricultural ministry. Krohn stated that he had not been very popular among his colleagues as he was open-minded about European integration and, faithful to the theories of his academic teacher Hanau,
opposed agricultural protectionism. Krohn vividly recalls that when leaving the ministry in Bonn, State Secretary Theodor Sonnemann called him a ‘Volksverräter’, or traitor of his country.

However, there was another reason that could have facilitated Krohn’s decision to leave the ministry and the German civil service. Krohn had not been a typical German Beamter as he had not followed the normal career path for civil servants. Lübke wanted Krohn to become a civil servant and to enter the ministry at a high level on the grounds of his professional experience. However, this was the exception in the German civil service at that time and the staff council of the federal government only offered Krohn a position as Oberregierungsrat, merely one rank above the entry level for graduates, thus very low given Krohn’s age and experience. Krohn rejected the offer but continued working in the ministry as Lübke’s personal aide. It is doubtful whether he would have had a future in the ministry after Lübke left. This episode can also explain Krohn’s negative judgement of the closeness and small-mindedness of the German civil service and his unconditional praise for the Commission’s administration and its – as he perceived it – flexibility.

Krohn entered the Commission as head of division in DG VI. He made a fast career, being promoted to Director for Economy and Agrarian Law in 1963 and deputy director-general subsequently. He belonged to the inner circle of DG VI and frequently participated in Mansholt’s table ronde. However, when it became evident that the Commission was not able to push through its ideas vis-à-vis the member states and farmers’ lobbies, and that the EEC would end up with a protectionist agricultural

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160 See the interview K.S. with Hans-Broder Krohn.
policy, Krohn left DG VI. 'The CAP was only for the farmers and this is the development I opposed,' he said in retrospect. In spite of the weaknesses of the CAP, Krohn admired Mansholt and the fact that he had established the CAP out of a set of vague treaty articles. In a text of 1970 Krohn regarded the CAP as the motor of the integration process in the 1960s. He criticized the increasing technicality of the subject, however, which in his view prevented political progress. The lessons he had drawn from his personal experience in World War II and the German agricultural ministry had raised high expectations in him as to how the Commission should work to create a united Europe, starting with a common agricultural policy. Disappointed, he left DG VI and became Director-General for Development in 1970. In DG VIII Krohn negotiated and concluded the Lomé treaty of 1975.

The example of Krohn shows that perceptions can guide action. He felt mistreated in the German agricultural ministry and found a new home in the Commission. For him, this experience resulted in the fervent adoption of supranationalism. Allegedly, Krohn was one of the authors of the Hallstein proposals of March 1965. Krohn strongly identified with the Commission, to which he retrospectively referred as 'we'. After working for Hanau and Lübke, who he both admired, Krohn found a new role model in Mansholt. In an interview, Krohn emphasized the positive experience of collaborating with people from six different countries who, according to him, all shared the same thought 'we want to make Europe'. In his opinion only people who became independent of 'their' government deserved admiration. He cited Rabot, the director-general of DG VI, who, according to Krohn, 'never saw himself as part of the French government', but was 'a real

161 Ibid.
163 Ibid., 3.
164 Interview K.S. with Henri Etienne.
Krohn compared himself to Hallstein, who he thought had suffered a similar fate: ‘The people in Bonn wanted to get rid of him and sent him to Brussels.’ Krohn retired from the Commission in 1978 and taught at the College of Europe in Bruges until 1992.

A prominent example of a realistic idealist is Emile Noël, perhaps the Commission’s best known, and in many ways its ‘model’ official. For nearly three decades Noël was the conscience and memory of the Commission. Extremely hard working, Noël was committed to the European cause and to the Commission which for him embodied this cause. Noël was born on 17 November 1922 in Constantinople (renamed Istanbul in 1930) and grew up in southern France. A graduate of the French elite education system, he held a degree from the École Nationale Supérieure in maths and physics. During World War II, Noël was active in the French Resistance.

Two causes emanated from this experience and he pursued these after the war: Europe and the youth. After the war, Noël became secretary general of the youth movement Camerades de la Liberté, which developed out of the Resistance. Invited by Georges Rebattet, a former Resistance leader and deputy secretary general of the European Movement, Noël got involved in the movement in early 1949. Like Rencki, another realistic idealist, it was thus out of the French Resistance that Noël became interested and involved in European integration. Noël started working for the Council of Europe at the end of 1949 and became the secretary of the General Affairs

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165 Interview K.S. with Hans-Broder Krohn.
166 Ibid.
167 As the only Commission high official, Noël was dedicated a chapter in the recently published History of the European Commission, entitled ‘Emile Noël, a loyal servant of the Community of Europe’. Bossuat 2007.
168 HAEU, DEP EN 1254, Curriculum Vitæ of Emile Noël, 17 June 1945. For biographical information on Noël see also Previti Allaire 2004 and Bossuat 2007.
169 HAEU, DEP EN 1254, Curriculum Vitæ of Emile Noël, 17 June 1945.
170 See HAEU, DEP EN 1182, Camerades de la Liberté et Train-exposition de la jeunesse, Spring 1947.
Committee.\textsuperscript{171} Greatly in favour of European political integration, he was disappointed by the limits of the Council of Europe, however.\textsuperscript{172} During that time he came into contact with European federalists like Alexandre Marc and Brugmans who, according to the historian Cathérine Previti Allaire, had a profound effect on Noël,\textsuperscript{173} as had the integration initiatives of the early 1950s. During this period, he collaborated closely in the development of a European Political Community. From 1952 to 1954 Noël was seconded to the \textit{Ad hoc} Assembly of the ECSC which was in charge of elaborating the EPC. Temporarily unable to attend the meetings, Noël wrote to the Belgian federalist Fernand Dehousse: ‘Brand [a colleague, K.S.] keeps me informed about the war machines you set up against the national fortresses. I hope to be back in time to witness them collapsing.’\textsuperscript{174} A socialist himself, Noël met the French socialist politician Guy Mollet in the International Secretariat of the European Mouvement in 1949. Mollet recruited him as his chef de cabinet in 1954 when he was President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Noël was also a technical adviser to the Secretariat of the Common Assembly of the ECSC in 1955 and became the First Secretary in the Council of Europe in 1956. In early 1956 Mollet, then prime minister, called him back to Paris and made him first his chef de cabinet and then deputy director of his Private Office. In this capacity, Noël supervised and coordinated the French delegation to the common market and Euratom negotiations.

Noël’s early years of European commitment were at least in two ways a preparation for his later role in the Commission. Firstly, he was able to build a network of important individuals involved in European integration. Secondly, his tasks were similar to those he would later assume in the Commission, namely co-

\textsuperscript{171} Kassim 2004: 52.
\textsuperscript{172} Previti Allaire 2004: 83.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{174} Noël cited in ibid., 86.
ordinating and advising – in short, pulling the strings in the background. For example, during the Val Duchesse negotiations he acted as intermediary between the French delegation, the French government and Avenue Foch, the headquarter of Monnet’s Action Committee.¹⁷⁵ Noël knew Monnet well and was in close contact with the Action Committee throughout his career. In the months before he was appointed executive secretary, Noël’s diary entries show that he met with Monnet several times, most likely discussing possibilities of him entering the Commission. Later, in the early 1960s, Kohnstamm visited Noël regularly in Brussels.¹⁷⁶ Even though it was Marjolin who proposed him as executive secretary, Noël was already a well-known figure in Europe and had close contacts with Monnet and other key personalities.

Noël combined experience in European integration and administration with intimate knowledge of the French administration and political scene. As executive secretary he could utilise this knowledge and contacts at national and European levels to the benefit of the Commission and to expand his influence within the institution. Noël developed a deep sense of solidarity with the Commission. He thought the institution was ‘irreplaceable and its role vital’, as it ‘best serves both the Community and its Member States. The Commission must be a living force; it must assert itself politically [...].’¹⁷⁷ He expected this loyalty from other Commission officials. According to him, a pronounced European conviction was necessary to be able to accept the negative sides of working in the Commission, such as the national

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 89; see also HAEU, DEP EN 349, Documentation Presse, Index Quotidien de la Presse, ‘Les hommes, les fonctions, les affaires, 29 March 1958.
¹⁷⁶ HAEU, DEP EN 2124 diary January to June 1960; EN 2125 diary June to December 1960; EN 2126 diary 1961; EN 2128 diary January to June 1962.
¹⁷⁷ Noël 1990a: 55.
balance. As a compensation, however, the officials would find great satisfaction in
their work. For Noël, being able to work for the Commission was a privilege.

A federalist, Noël qualified the 1960s as a 'pre-federal phase' where features
such as the national balance and the principle of collegiality were necessary to create
trust in the member states. In a speech he gave in 1962, Noël was explicit about the
political nature of the Communities when he invited his audience to consider the
advantages of a European federal ministry of agriculture. Noël saw the EEC as a
future global player and he expected further and deeper integration to develop in a
kind of 'mathematical certainty', similar to Hallstein's Sachlogik. This was in 1962,
at the height of Commission optimism. In May 1963, after the first setback of de
Gaulle's veto on British accession, Noël gave a talk about the prospects of the EEC.
While he considered that the Community was recovering from a crisis of confidence,
he remained optimistic that integration would continue through the creation of
irrevocable acts such as the customs union. The inevitable political impact of these
would strengthen the Community institutions. Furthermore, Noël anticipated the
introduction of majority voting in 1966 which would bring about further progress for
the integration of Europe. Even in the aftermath of the empty chair crisis, when
majority voting was informally shelved, his speeches reflect his faith in the

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178 Emile Noël, 'La fonction publique européenne', allocution prononcée le 25 octobre 1981 à
l'occasion de la remise de la médaille Robert Schuman par Gaston Thorn, président de la Commission.
In: Hommage à Emile Noël, Luxembourg, Office des publications officielles des Communautés
179 Penaud 1993: 55.
180 HAEU, DEP EN 815, Emile Noël, La fusion des Communautés Européennes, talk given at the
Centre Européen Universitaire, Nancy, undated, University year 1965/66, 7.
181 HAEU, DEP EN 800, Journées d'information sur les problèmes européens, 23-24 mars 1962.
Samedi 24 Mars 1962: Discussion sur les problèmes Européens préparée par M. Emile Noël, 121.
182 Ibid., 124.
183 HAEU, DEP EN 804, Emile Noël, Discours devant la Commission parlementaire de l'association de
la Grece à la Communauté, 6 June 1963, 4.
institutions. He was certain that a solution to the crisis could only be found within the existing institutional framework. 184

For Noël, like for Albrecht, European integration was a means to avoid repeating the same mistakes as in the inter-war period, that is humiliation of the vanquished and economic protectionism, which in his view had led to the economic and political crises of the 1920s and 1930s. The integration of Germany in a European structure had already been discussed in the Resistance and Noël had participated in these discussions. 185 For him, Europe’s future lay in a European federal state. In 1975 Noël presided over a group called ‘European Union’ that was set up by the federalist Commissioner Altiero Spinelli. The group’s report suggested setting up a European government, endowing the European Parliament with full legislative powers, and extending the powers of the Community to foreign affairs and security. 186 While in the early 1980s Noël was pessimistic regarding the future of the Community, 187 he regained his optimism after the Single European Act was signed in 1986. He immediately demanded that people should set their aims higher and extend integration to defence and security policy. 188 In 1990, Noël looked back on his career and concluded:

I have indeed been fortunate in being able to combine my work with my personal commitment in the service of such an enterprise. I can assure you that, wherever I may be my commitment to the institution and to those who direct and represent it is as strong today as on the day I joined. 189

184 See HAEU, DEP EN 816, Emile Noël, Quelques aspects institutionnels de la crise des communautes, Le fonctionnement des Institutions pendant la crise, 15 September 1966.
187 Noël 1990b.
188 Noël 1990c: 158.
189 Noël 1990: 58.

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Noël retired in 1987 after 29 years of service to become President of the European University Institute in Florence.

An ENA graduate, Jean-François Deniau advanced fast in the French civil service after entering the Inspection des Finances in 1950. A member of the French administrative elite, he stands for the pragmatist in the Commission. Pragmatists are not characterised by their lack of interest in European integration but by the fact that they did not commit their career fully to the service in the European institutions.

Deniau held multiple loyalties. Born in Paris in 1928, he was raised and socialised in the French university and administrative systems. In the late 1940s Deniau served in the French army in Indochina and, in 1963, became the French ambassador to Mauritania. He thus acquired a broad outlook beyond the borders of Europe with the French colonial empire crumbling but still existent. However, Deniau was interested in European affairs as well. In the French administration he was one of the few who volunteered to participate in the Val Duchesse negotiations. In 1958, at the request of Marjolin, he entered the Commission as director in DG External Relations at the age of 29. In 1961 he was promoted to A1 and in charge of the first accession negotiations with the United Kingdom. As a Gaullist, however, he was personally opposed to British accession to the EEC. After de Gaulle’s veto in 1963, which Deniau personally supported, he accepted the post in Mauritania. Unlike Noël, Deniau did not choose to stay in the Commission permanently. In 1963 Deniau returned to the French civil service because, as he later explained, he knew how Brussels worked. ‘I have spent enough time there’, he declared. In 1967, on his return from Mauritania, he did not know whether French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou would give him a

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191 Ibid.
post as a minister in the French government or whether he would become a 
Commissioner in Brussels. Deniau did not seem to have had any preference, either. He 
was made Commissioner in 1967 and stayed in Brussels for another six years. 
However, he stood for the Gaullists in the French elections in 1968 as he could not 
understand why one should choose between Europe and the nation: ‘It shocked him 
[Rey, K.S.] when I presented myself at the elections in France in May 1968. [For Rey, 
K.S.] one had to choose between the national and the European sphere.’ In 1973, 
he returned to Paris to take up a high position in the French administration. During the 
1970s and 1980s Deniau served as minister in several French governments. Moreover, 
a successful author, Deniau was elected member of the Académie Française in 1992. 

Deniau played an important role during the negotiations leading to the EEC 
treaty as well as in the early Hallstein Commission. No doubt, he was loyal to the 
Commission while an official and a Commissioner in Brussels. For him, however, the 
tasks he was confronted with were first of all an intellectual challenge. Many of his 
colleagues in the Commission have praised the competence of Deniau and his 
colleagues from the French administration. However, according to Herbst, for 
instance, they were ‘lone warriors’ and did not like teamwork. Von Staden, later 
Hallstein’s chef de cabinet, worked with Deniau in DG External Relations. Ten years 
his senior, von Staden wrote in his memoirs that he learned to admire Deniau who 
introduced him to the method of thinking of this ‘exceptional type of human being’, 
the graduate of a French Grande École. ‘I marvelled at this director who resembled an

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192 Ibid.
193 Cf. the interviews K.S. with Ernst Albrecht and Ivo Schwartz and HAEU, INT-ECH 765, Interview 
Michel Dumoulin and Julie Cailleau with Fernand Braun, Brussels, 8 December 2003.
194 HAEU, INT-ECH 677, Interview Wilfried Loth and Veronika Heyde with Axel Herbst, Bonn, 25 
May 2004.
exotic being from another planet,' wrote von Staden.195 Interestingly, in a long interview Deniau gave Bossuat in 2004, there is no allusion to what European integration meant to him and what his vision was for a united Europe. Neither in his book, *L'Europe interdite*, published in 1977, nor in the interview does he profess any kind of sentimentality about his time in the Commission. For other officials, the experience of working with people from different backgrounds – some of them former enemies in World War II – to create common policies from scratch, count among the main reasons for their fascination with their work in the Commission. For Deniau, the Commission seems to have been a space which one can conquer and where one can do interesting work. In *L'Europe interdite* he defended the quality and the work of the Commission, not least because he contributed to it. To a certain degree the socialisation mechanisms of the Commission seem to have worked even in the case of a pragmatic énarque. In his book, Deniau is more explicit about his views on Europe’s future than in the later interview. His view is pragmatic in the sense that it does not prescribe one ideal state of Europe in the future and in the sense that Deniau refuses to define the geographical boundaries of Europe: 'Everybody is European who considers himself or herself to be European.'196 This has to be seen in connection with Deniau’s Gaullist outlook on Europe’s role in the world. Europe should be united and strengthened in economic, social and military terms. Most of all, it should be strengthened to be able to stand up against the USA. The Europeanness of the citizens of the European countries had to be nurtured, but nurtured against the USA.197 Europe should be established as the ‘other’, offering a third way between the two

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196 Deniau 1977: 46.
197 Ibid., 246; 270.
superpowers. In the late 1970s, Deniau thus falls back on solutions of the 1950s and early 1960s.

Pragmatists like Deniau were useful for the Commission as they were often exceptionally ambitious and talented officials. Ortoli, who at the age of 33 became director-general of DG Internal Market, is comparable to Deniau. Ortoli left the Commission in 1962 to serve in Pompidou's government in France. Between 1966 and 1972 he held several portfolios in the French government before returning to Brussels in 1973 as Commission president. Pragmatists do not necessarily have to be French ENA graduates, however. Commission officials who came from the AA, such as von Staden, Schnippenkötter, Herbst and Sigrist can also be counted among them.

For them, the Commission was a step in their careers, often leading to posts as ambassadors. On the one hand, pragmatists were important in that they brought fresh ideas into the administration. On the other hand, they were often parachuted into top-level posts in the administration and thus obstructed career opportunities for the Commission’s ‘home grown’ officials. Moreover, they were not willing to commit themselves to staying in the Commission and they remained loyal to the institution they worked for before. Thus, they were prone to introduce different and often conflicting identities into the Commission.

4. Identities, images and roles of Commission officials

This section explores, firstly, the Commission’s dilemma in dealing with its officials’ identities. It secondly discusses the different roles officials could assume in the administration, not least because the Commission utilised its civil servants’ identities.
The section finally investigates what 'European attitudes' European civil servants had or what they perceived as such.

4.1 Identities in the Commission

Identities are multiple and never static. The Commission officials analysed in this chapter have European, national, regional but also institutional identities of a different nature and degree. Therefore, it is impossible to speak of the officials’ European identity as monolithic without variations. It is possible, however, to give examples of different kinds of identities within the Commission. Hallstein aimed at rapidly creating an independent administration with a distinct (institutional) identity. However, as shown in chapter BI, he was not in favour of creating a sealed off European civil service. What is more, with his preference for officials from the AA, he did not hesitate to bring civil servants with a strong institutional identity of their own into the Commission. Hallstein, himself from the AA, thought that these officials were best suited to work in a European administration. This is reflected in the recruitment pattern of leading German officials. Hallstein’s Cabinet staff, Schnippenkoetter, von Staden, Narjes, Meyer and both first German directors-general in the Commission, Allardt and Seeliger, came from the AA. Another example is the nomination of Herbst as deputy executive secretary and successor of Behr.\(^{198}\) Herbst’s successor, Sigrist, again was a diplomat from the AA. He was already acquainted with the members of the ‘small group of the Auswärtiges Amt’ in the Commission before coming to Brussels.\(^{199}\) Another stronghold of these people was DG VIII where the director-general, Hendus, himself from the AA, sought to replace departing German

\(^{198}\) HAEU, DEP EN, 716 17.2.-2.3.1960 (93\(^{e}\) à 95\(^{e}\) réunion de la Commission), 24 February 1960.

officials with AA diplomats. Civil servants coming from the German diplomatic service may have been well qualified to work in the European civil service but at the same time they had a strong AA identity, and many of them only stayed in the Commission for a short period of time. The AA sent people to Brussels and called them back to Bonn, as in the case of Hendus, Schnippenkötter and von Staden, while Allardt returned after falling out with his Commissioner, Lemaignen. The Commission thus resembled a post among others in a diplomatic career. Socialisation and development of loyalties through, for example, long-term exposure to the Commission’s administration, was difficult to achieve. Advising a young diplomat, an official from Hallstein’s Cabinet said that ‘in the foreign service you will find a home [Heimat] which despite all the optimism has, according to my feeling, still somehow more of a solid basis and constitutes more of a family than our European institutions’.

The situation was similar, if not more pronounced, in the French administration. A memorandum of the French foreign ministry shows that it made abundant use of the detachment procedure with the explicit aim to serve the interests of the French government from within the European administration. The attitude of French personnel policy towards international administrations was to ‘place officials in the different international secretariats who are able to act in favour of French interests, but who at the same time comply with the requirements of the international civil service’.

201 BAK, N 1266/1280, Narjes to President Hallstein, 18 January 1964.
such as the Inspection des Finances, have to count as a source of identity and of a
certain vision of the world. Michel Mangenot has described the ENA concours as a
rite of passage signifying 'the entrance into technocracy'. 204 The ENA is the
reproduction mechanism of a social elite and of a certain façon d'être. 205 Indeed,
Coombes calls the type of official not affected by the Commission's culture the
'French ENA official'. This strong socialisation mechanism certainly made it difficult
for the Commission to supersede this identity and to Europeanize officials from the
French administration.

Hence, there were strong identities of national administrations in the
Commission which could slow down the Europeanization of these officials. However,
while the Commission created a European civil service, it also wanted to keep open
ways to provide its services with experienced external staff bringing in new ideas.
This was a dilemma. Lemaignen believed that officials who chose to spend their entire
career in the Commission served the European cause loyally while others, who
expected to return to their home administration, were less independent in their
thoughts and daily work. 206 For people like von Staden or Deniau there was always an
open backdoor leading back to (higher) positions at the national level. All in all, they
were too implicated in the networks and reward systems of their home administration
to cut all ties, and career chances seemed better there than in Brussels. However, it is
still possible that these temporary officials served the Commission loyally and,
moreover, helped to disseminate European convictions and consciousness back in
their home administration. Von Staden, for instance, is reported to have 'missed' the

204 Mangenot 1999: 93.
205 Ibid., 94.
206 Lemaignen 1964: 72.
Commission when back in the AA. It is likely, however, that officials who were recruited through a concours or who entered the Commission as novices developed more of a European or institutional identity because they owed the Commission their career and professional identity. At the same time, the Commission did not want to employ *apatrides* as these were not very useful for developing common policies.

4.2 European officials as negotiators and go-betweens

As it was one of their tasks to forge compromises, European officials who were able to switch between their different identities were regarded as particularly useful for the Commission. This becomes evident in the following example. In his function as a member of the ‘merger working group’ of the Commission, the Luxembourger Etienne met with Jean Dondelinger, then a Luxembourg diplomat, ‘as a compatriot and friend but also as a civil servant interested in the smooth running of the Communities’. Etienne discussed with Dondelinger possible compensations Luxembourg could receive after the merger of the executives, stating that ‘on this occasion the compatriot was not in conflict with the Commission civil servant’. Etienne was able to interpret and translate the ‘emotional’ state of his compatriots for Noël. The executive secretary used the information provided by Etienne to respond to a request of Hallstein, namely to make proposals for possible compensations for Luxembourg which was about to loose the High Authority. The Commission utilised the national background of its collaborators in order to obtain insider

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207 BAK, N 1266/1214, Narjes to Stülpnagel, 8 June 1964.
208 HAEU, DEP EN 313, H. Etienne, Note à l'attention de M. Noël, strictement personnelle, 8 February 1965.
209 Ibid.
211 Ibid., E. Noël, Note pour Monsieur le Président Hallstein, strictement personnelle, 11 February 1965.

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information and subsequently form an opinion about the political and psychological situation in a member state.

The official as negotiator and go-between was therefore important for the success of Commission policies. This is how the Commission’s administration could best utilise its bureaucratic power. The officials’ expertise but also their special knowledge of their home country or of a particular interest group were crucial in this respect. One official recounted how the CAP was realised by sending Commission officials in their respective countries of origin to explain a proposal.\textsuperscript{212} What is more, the officials naturally brought in their viewpoints – shaped by their socialisation in the different member states – when elaborating European solutions in the Commission and this was what was expected of them. As one official put it, there was no ‘European’ type of official emerging in Brussels:

Instead, a healthy rootedness in one's own nationality has proven to be an advantage for a constructive collaboration of individuals with different nationalities. This rootedness bears the invaluable advantage that one has at one's disposal national experiences, detailed knowledge of national and even regional conditions and access to national networks [...]\textsuperscript{213}

One could derive from this statement that the Commission, as it represented all the member states adequately and competently, was most competent for finding European solutions and creating European policies. The European civil servants, and the national balance, thus legitimised the Commission to act in the name of the member states. To capture this Commission strategy, Scheinman utilised the term ‘bureaucratic interpenetration’.\textsuperscript{214} This interpenetration was based on institutionalised contacts but also on private networks and friendships between the Commission and national

\textsuperscript{212} Interviews K.S. with François Muller and Ernst Albrecht.
\textsuperscript{213} Von Verschuer 1967: 5.
\textsuperscript{214} Scheinman 1971: 204-5.
administrations. Gaining information and keeping partners in national administrations informed reduced the risks of policy failure and deadlocks. The Commission needed to develop into an expert administration in order to gain credibility and to develop and secure its role in the institutional interplay of the EEC. An example of what made the ‘expert Commission’ were the DG VI officials who, as the apparently disinterested party, forged package deals to guarantee a successful outcome of Council meetings.215 Albrecht has confirmed the Commission’s advantage of ‘being in the know’ and its ability to come up with compromise solutions in the Council.216 European officials were go-betweens, mediators and diplomats. They were part and masters of what could be called the Community’s compromise culture. ‘Everything one does is a compromise,’ one official said, ‘if you cannot live with this, you become unhappy.’217

4.3 European attitudes of high officials

In 1965, according to the study of Lerner and Gorden based on interviews with Commission officials, 93 per cent of the ‘Eurocrats’ were in favour of a Monnet-inspired United States of Europe, whereas only 5 per cent supported de Gaulle’s Europe des Patries solution. More than two out of three officials opted for a federation as a political model for Europe.218 However, there was a gap between the officials’ daily routine work, which was often very technical, and more far-reaching political aims such as a federation. One official, who worked under the federalist Commissioner Spinelli, stated that he appreciated Spinelli’s enthusiasm for the federal cause. However, he thought that it went too far when Spinelli asked him to insert into

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215 See chapter BIII.  
216 Interview Sibylle Hambloch/Gerold Ambrosius with Ernst Albrecht, Beinhorn, 22 March 2002.  
217 Interview K.S. with an official from DG V.  
218 Lerner and Gorden 1969: 264.
his technical papers and proposals paragraphs with political messages that Spinelli’s Cabinet had prepared.\textsuperscript{219} Thirty years on, Abélès and Bellier observed a pragmatic attitude of Commission officials in their study. However, they also have a strong political message: constructing a Europe of peace in this fast changing world and the permanent search for the ‘smallest common denominator’.\textsuperscript{220} It was through realistic policy solutions and compromises that Europe could progress but not through inserting political messages in a technical proposal.

At a more individual level, there are, however, some attitudes and character traits that seem to reflect certain values of European civil servants. These can be identified in interviews but also in articles in the employees’ newspaper of the Commission, the \textit{Courrier du Personnel}, or in \textit{Les Anciens}, the bulletin of the association of the former officials of the EC, the Association Internationale des Anciens des Communautés Européennes (AIACE). Recurring themes are, for example, honesty and ingenuity which was particularly valued to overcome the heaviness and laggardness of the Commission’s administration.\textsuperscript{221} The fight of the officials against the bureaucratic beast, finding pragmatic and practical solutions to policy problems and difficulties of administrative life in the Commission was considered important. The ability to come up with compromise solutions, for instance in the Council, was also highly valued.\textsuperscript{222}

Like many others, looking back on forty years of European integration, Paul Collowald believed that the period between 1949 and 1989 stands for forty years of

\textsuperscript{219} Interview K.S. with Costantino Friz, Brussels, 10 March 2005.
\textsuperscript{220} Abélès and Bellier 1996: 442.
\textsuperscript{221} See for example \textit{In Memoriam. Hommage à Jean-Claude Morel}. In \textit{Courrier du Personnel} No 229, 1-7 February 2002, 6.
\textsuperscript{222} Obituary Gérard Imbert, \textit{Courrier du Personnel} No 326, 4-10 June 2004, 7.
peace and democracy in Europe. He refers to the beginnings of the Communities in Luxembourg, which he calls the ville mythique of Europe where the ‘European adventure’ began. The officials often use terms such as ‘adventure’, ‘pioneer’ and also battle vocabulary such as ‘fight’ to describe the process and politics of European integration. For Collowald, building Europe was a battle that had to be fought mainly against politicians in national governments. Peace, economic growth and stability in Europe and in the world through European integration were also important topics.

When in 1987 Dumont du Voitel, who entered the Commission in 1960, became president of AIACE, he said that one of the aims of his presidency was to support the efforts of the Commission to strengthen the reputation of ‘Europe’ and to ensure that the Community institutions worked more efficiently and thus could assume their role in the world more effectively. The mission of Europe in the world derived from Europe’s heritage of the two world wars. Esprit européen for one official was ‘to develop this European Union and to make this part of the world a better place’. In brief, the analysis of interviews, memoirs and publications suggests that the Commission officials formed a ‘socio-psychological community’, based on shared values and ideals. However, this community was shaken by change brought about by events such as the enlargements. Especially British accession made an impact on the officials and some looked back with nostalgia to the days of the Europe of the

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225 This is emphasized by Georges Brondel, Courrier du personnel No 318, 19-23 March 2004, 5-6. See also Brondel 2003. See also the interview K.S. with Eduard Brackeniers.
227 Interview with an official from DG V.
Moreover, in interviews a number of officials referred to the difference between ‘now’ and ‘then’. While younger people at the Commission tended to see the Commission merely as a step in their career ‘in the past, one entered the Commission like one joined a religious order’. Also, while acknowledging that the new member states had the right to be in the EU, many thought that the EU of today had nothing to do with the Europe of the Six anymore – it is cooperation instead of integration. However, they were torn between the historical debt towards the Central and Eastern European countries and a more cohesive smaller community.

Many people [...] tend to find that enlargement has gone too far and too fast [...] At the end of the day [...] these are European peoples that have suffered because we let them down [during the Cold War, K.S.], because of our egoism and our weakness. [W]e have a duty to welcome and include them.

Conclusion

The Commission was bound by the treaty to submit policy proposals to the Council, composed of representatives of the member states. Therefore, the Commission civil servants preparing these proposals had to be aware of the preferences of the different governments, otherwise the proposals would have had little chance of being adopted. Officials therefore could not act detached from interests promoted by national governments. Apart from being able to work out European solutions, the officials were expected to act as ambassadors or translators of their home countries’ needs and problems. In a similar vein, they acted as negotiators with representatives from their home countries in order to explain European policies to them. The Commission used

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230 For example interview K.S. with an official from DG I, Brussels, 10 December 2003.
231 Interview K.S. with Aurelio Pappalardo; see also the interview K.S. with Costantino Friz.
232 Interview K.S. with François Muller.
the national identity, special knowledge, and cultural and previous professional background of their officials deliberately and did not wish to employ apatrides, or deracinated officials. However, this did not necessarily lead to conflicting loyalties between 'Europe' and the 'nation' because the first European civil servants developed a strong *esprit de corps*. The origins of this team spirit lie in seven main factors: firstly, in the shared generational experience and similar socialisation during World War II that resulted in shared norms and values and the conviction that building 'Europe' was a means to avoid future armed conflicts in Europe; secondly, the long-term exposure to institutional structures, combined with thirdly, career opportunities and a high degree of job satisfaction; fourthly the emergence of an expert culture focused on the shared task of building 'Europe' through Community policies; fifthly, the particular living and working conditions in Brussels; sixthly, the presence of European role models like Hallstein, von der Groeben and Mansholt, who inspired motivation and enthusiasm; and lastly, the participatory working methods these Commissioners introduced. The crises of 1963, 1965/66 and the first enlargement were key events for the officials, however, and they had a negative impact on their motivation.

According to Coombes, despite setbacks in the integration process a 'common culture' developed in the Commission. But 'our research suggests that this common culture is not an evangelical kind of organization commitment [...]'.\(^{233}\) As this chapter has shown, however, there was indeed an organizational commitment. This seems to have originated from a pioneer spirit and the motivation of working for a common cause and creating European policies together. There seems to have been a change of atmosphere resulting from the crises of the 1960s, the enlargement of 1973 and the

\(^{233}\) Coombes 1970: 260-1.
steady growth of the administration which resulted in a less flexible and more hierarchical administration. In 1970 Coombes detected among European civil servants a loss of institutional identity and a malaise resulting from these factors.\textsuperscript{234} The findings presented here, however, suggest that the institutional identity that was built up during the first 'euphoric' years of the Commission, survived to some extent in the long term. It was the reason for many civil servants to continue to believe in the goal of further integration and in progress in spite of the manifold setbacks. The presidency of Delors proved them right, or so they thought. It is impossible to demonstrate that the performance of an official in the Commission is linked to his or her particular identity structure, but a war generation identity did link the officials transnationally through shared norms and values. This facilitated Europeanization. It is likely, as will be discussed below, that this similar mind-set of the officials had an influence on policy outcomes.

Finally, it is at least arguable that the Commission developed an overall administrative identity. The loyalties of officials often belonged to their Commissioner or the director-general in their DG. The specialisation and compartmentalisation within the Commission's administration, which I have pointed out in chapter BI, make it likely that, due to overspecialisation, the officials mainly identified with political 'sub goals' of the organization, namely those of the particular DG for which they worked.

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., 263.
III. Institutions, administrative cultures and their role in EU policy-making: the examples of DG IV and DG VI

Introduction: institutions and institutional cultures

Institutions matter in EU policy-making. In the introduction of their book with the programmatic title *Rediscovering Institutions*, March and Olsen claim that '[s]ocial, political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective life'.¹ This is particularly true for the institutions of the EU, which have taken over competencies from nation states. While these institutions were established to serve a certain purpose, scholars of historical institutionalism argue that institutions cannot always be controlled but end up gaining autonomy and pursuing their own agendas.² Moreover, once in place, institutional structures and, importantly, the policies devised and administered by them, are difficult to modify as the political and social costs of change and reform become high.³ According to Paul Pierson, early events in a sequence of events are disproportionately important, and the longer a particular path remains unchanged the greater the likelihood of a solution being ‘locked in’ – a phenomenon known as ‘path dependence’.⁴ The founding years of an organization are therefore vital as they determine the ‘path’ an organization and the policies developed by it will take.

¹ March and Olsen 1989: 1.
³ Cf. for example Pierson 2004.
⁴ Ibid., 18.
Institutions are traditionally defined as ‘formal organizations, rules and procedures’.\(^5\) It is in this sense that the term is used in this chapter. However, while organizational structures can be seen as a framework within which policies are devised, they are also places of social interaction and socialisation. Institutional structures exert pressure on the behaviour and interest formation of individuals, for example by rewarding a certain behaviour.\(^6\) This chapter argues that the socialisation of administrative staff helped to maintain a particular path as the staff adopted the norms and values of the organization. These norms and values were also shaped by early policy decisions. The definition of institutions thus needs to be opened up to include informal norms, identities and conventions which influence and structure behaviour of actors, something neo-institutionalists call ‘informal institutions’.\(^7\) In the context of this chapter this refers in particular to the administrative culture that develops within an institution.

The Commission’s administration was fragmented, a development triggered by the Commission’s initial choices concerning its organization and working methods. Already in December 1960 Marjolin complained that the administration was a ‘federal system’ – each DG rests upon its Commissioner. There is no ‘civil service’, but several civil services having too much autonomy.\(^8\) Contemporary studies such as Coombes’s also noticed this phenomenon. According to him, the Commission was a ‘porous organization [...] in which different styles of administration and different normative approaches compete for domination’\(^9\); thus, each DG can be considered as

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\(^5\) Rasmussen 2008: 35.
\(^6\) Wiener 2006: 38.
\(^7\) Pollack 2004: 139.
\(^8\) HAEU, DEP EN 724, 14.12.60-1.2.61 (128\(^{e}\) à 133\(^{e}\) réunion de la Commission), 21 December 1960 (underlined in the original text). See also Hallstein’s comment in HAEU, DEP EN 711, 22.7.59-22.9.59 (69\(^{e}\) à 74\(^{e}\) réunion de la Commission), 29 July 1959.
an organization in itself. In fact, different administrative cultures developed at the level of the DG’s which included a ‘mission’, values and working methods that were closely related to a DG’s policy area.

This chapter makes the case that the administrative cultures that developed in DG IV and DG VI during the founding years, and the subsequent socialisation of officials into these cultures, helped bring about, and keep on track, the policies in these areas. It proposes a three step analysis which could help explain how a particular path in competition and agricultural policies was chosen and implemented, and why it was difficult to modify this path at a later date. The first step consists of determining the historical context. Institutions do not materialise from out of nowhere and policies are not created from scratch. The shape of both depends on particular political, legal and social contexts that are the results of long-term developments. This chapter establishes, firstly, the importance of context, previous experiences and events for the shape of institutions and policies. This includes previous experiences and ideas of Commissioners and leading officials on the one hand and institutional models and policies dating from before the set-up of the Commission on the other. These ‘pre-cultures’ were transferred into the Commission and early policy decisions were taken in accordance with the pre-shaped views of leading staff.

Sociological institutionalism argues that ideas, norms and rules are ‘forged within a social environment’\textsuperscript{10} such as institutions. However, ideas and norms were also transferred into the institutions and amalgamated with others to shape a new and unique ‘social environment’, an administrative culture. The emerging administrative cultures contributed decisively to creating and reinforcing policy paths. Identifying core elements of DG IV’s and DG VI’s administrative cultures is thus the second step.

\textsuperscript{10} Wiener 2006: 43.
Closely linked to this is the third step, the socialisation of actors into these cultures. The adaptation of Commission bureaucrats to administrative cultures helped secure the continuity of a policy. Actors outside the Commission were also affected by socialisation processes, for example through network building. The Commission utilised both internal socialisation and network building as a means to secure the longevity and continuity of a particular policy path.

1. **Step one: the legacy of context and previous experiences**

1.1 *Hans von der Groeben and the legacy of ordo-liberalism*

Nowadays the existence of a DG for Competition in the Commission is taken for granted. However, the following incident shows how a small episode determined future developments in European competition policy. In a first draft of the Commission’s organizational scheme, dating from January 1958, Marjolin subsumed responsibility for the EEC treaty’s competition rules under a large department for political economy and finance that he intended to take over himself. Competition policy would very likely have evolved differently had Marjolin been responsible for this area. French competition policy was entirely different from what developed in post-war Germany in this domain. In France ‘competition law long operated in the shadows of dirigiste economic controls [...]. Since the inception of the European Community, France and French officials have often tended to resist a more vigorous role for competition law in the process of European integration."

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Hallstein and von der Groeben presented Marjolin’s scheme to leading government officials of the economics and foreign affairs ministries in Bonn. At the meeting, the participants demanded that competition should become an independent administrative unit, reflecting the importance the German government attached to competition policy. The emergence of a German preference at this meeting in Bonn laid the ground for DG IV to become the ‘German’ DG in the Commission. Competition became a DG in its own right led by von der Groeben, who was a former senior civil servant in Ludwig Erhard’s economics ministry. Social market economy, a term coined by Erhard’s State Secretary Alfred Müller-Armack, and the ordo-liberalism of the Freiburg School framed this ministry’s policy-making and became equally important for policy-making in DG IV.

Closely linked to neo-liberalism, the ordo-liberal Freiburg School was developed in Germany in the early 1930s by an interdisciplinary group of academics at the University of Freiburg. Its main protagonists were the lawyers Franz Böhm and Hans Großmann-Doerth and the economist Walter Eucken. Having witnessed the downfall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism, these scholars were convinced that the main cause of this had been the failure of the legal system to prevent the rise and subsequent abuse of private economic power. After World War II they aimed at creating a new society with competition at the heart of their economic and political programme. A competitive economic system was to the benefit of all in

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13 Cini 1996b: 466.
society, they argued. It provided the key to the two complementary goals of economic prosperity and political stability.

Von der Groeben collaborated with Müller-Armack and scholars of the Freiburg School at the economics ministry. He shared this outlook on competition, not economic planning, as central to the smooth functioning of an economy or a European common market.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, from the late 1940s to 1957, a German competition law was intensively discussed in the Federal Republic. This also has to be seen in the context of Allied deconcentration and decartelisation policies in post-war Germany.\textsuperscript{17} Other European countries, on the contrary, lacked experience with competition legislation. Until 1958 only the parliaments of France and Germany had adopted national competition laws, the Dutch parliament enacting a law on cartels only in July 1958.\textsuperscript{18} At the European level, the ECSC treaty comprised anti-trust rules in articles 65 and 66.\textsuperscript{19} Contrary to other policy areas covered by the treaty, competition policy was thus a fairly recent field in which the administrations of member states had little experience. The treaty only defined some basic principles which were to be fleshed out later on. It was thus up to the Commission, and in particular DG IV, to define a competition policy and to make proposals to the Council.

DG IV was given responsibility for four sectors: restrictive practices and monopoly policy, state aids, approximation of laws, and taxation (Articles 85 to 99, EEC). Starting from there, von der Groeben and his collaborators developed a holistic competition concept, corresponding to the ordo-liberal notion of

\textsuperscript{16} Von der Groeben 1995: 244-5 and 258-9.
\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Murach-Brand 2004 for the evolution of the German competition law in this context.
\textsuperscript{18} The German Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkung (GWB), 27 July 1957; in France the Ordonnance No. 45-1483, 30 June 1945 and the law of 1953; and the Dutch cartel law, 16 July 1958. The Italian Codice Civile only included a couple of vague articles on competition.
\textsuperscript{19} On the development of these articles during the treaty negotiations and the influence of transatlantic networks on this process see Leucht 2008b. See also the PhD thesis, Leucht 2008a.
Wirtschaftsverfassung, or economic constitution, that is, an 'economic order based on competition'.

They conceptualised the common competition policy with the aim of creating a European competition order, or Wettbewerbsordnung. Competition policy was considered as being at the basis of a legally protected common market governed by a regime of fair competition.

During von der Groeben’s term of office important groundwork was accomplished. Within the field of competition policy the Commission first focused on cartel policy. Article 88 of the EEC treaty provided for authorities in the member states to take over responsibility for the application of Articles 85 and 86 concerned with restrictive practices and monopolies until the EEC passed a regulation. The Commission tried to enforce this and asked the member states to co-operate. This turned out to be difficult as only France, Germany and the Netherlands had appropriate legislation. Hence, a regulation providing a European solution in cartel policy became a pressing need. The Commission’s proposal, submitted to the Council on 31 October 1960, envisaged a notification system and the general prohibition of restrictive practices and agreements with the possibility of applying for an exemption (provided for in Article 85(3), EEC). In this draft, only the Commission was authorised to grant permission of an agreement. In spite of strong protests against this draft by industrialists in Germany, France and Belgium and member state governments like France, these three crucial elements of the initial draft – prohibition of restrictive practices, obligatory notification of agreements to the Commission and the Commission’s exclusive authority over granting exemptions – made it into the final version of Regulation 17.

There are three main reasons why, in spite of this opposition, the Commission's view prevailed and why it obtained a unanimous Council decision on a regulation that determined the path of European competition policy for the next four decades. Firstly, the French government was against the Commission proposal as it favoured a system of legal exemption instead of the notification regime proposed by the Commission.24 In the domestic context, the French administration had traditionally been tolerant towards cartels.25 The French employers’ organization, the Conseil National du Patronat Francais (CNPF), was also in favour of a lenient competition policy and of economic integration through industrial agreements. Instead of prohibiting cartels, competition rules should encourage this kind of collaboration between enterprises.26 However, the French negotiation position was not clearly developed. While the French government criticized the Commission’s proposal, it did not come up with a convincing alternative suggestion.27 As to the French business representatives, instead of lobbying the Commission and DG IV in particular, they relied on the – in this case – passive French government officials to push through their views.28 Secondly, the Commission was successful in building a coalition in favour of its ordo-liberal approach. This coalition included the European Parliament, trade unions and, crucially, the German and Dutch governments. The Italian, Luxembourg and finally the Belgian governments also eventually rallied to the Commission’s standpoint. Thirdly, Regulation 17 was not a priority for the French government.29 When it secured major gains in the Council negotiations on the CAP of December 1961 and January 1962, the French government was in turn prepared to vote for the

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26 Idem. 2007, chapter VI-2, 6.3 D.
27 This is explained in detail in ibid., chapter VI-2.
29 Ibid.
regulation.\(^{30}\) The CAP and Regulation 17 were tied together in a package-deal and the Council of Ministers finally adopted the regulation on 5 February 1962.

In possession of the right of initiative in the Community, the Commission was able to shape the draft in conformity with the ordo-liberal preferences of von der Groeben and leading DG IV officials. The most important aim for DG IV was to realise a common line in European cartel policy. This was the lesson the Commission had drawn from the first three years of experience in competition policy, in particular with the unsatisfactory application of Article 88 by national agencies. In March 1962 Regulation 17 entered into force, attributing substantial powers to the Commission in cartel policy.\(^{31}\) The Commission was authorised to grant permission for any agreement formed after March 1962. A Court ruling could of course modify or nullify the Commission's decision. Regulation 17 clearly had an impact on the institutionalisation of DG IV as the Commission’s bulwark of economic liberalism and it determined the shape of the common competition policy. It was only replaced in 2003, with Regulation 1/2003.

1.2 Sicco Mansholt’s experience in post-war European agriculture

The historical context leading to the CAP, and the CAP itself, are among the most complex chapters in European integration history.\(^{32}\) Focusing on Mansholt’s role in post-war European agricultural policy contributes a small but vital piece to the jigsaw puzzle of the historical context of the CAP and DG VI’s administrative culture. A member of the Dutch Social democratic party PvdA, Mansholt became Minister of

\(^{30}\) Hambloch 2002: 895.


\(^{32}\) There is ample literature on the subject. Cf. for example Noël 1988 and 1995; Thiemeyer 1999; Griffiths 1990a; Griffiths and Girvin 1995a; Hendriks 1999; Knudsen 2002; Ludlow 2005c.
Agriculture, Fishery and Food Distribution in June 1945 – a portfolio he held continuously in various coalition governments until he entered the Commission in January 1958.33 One important aim of his agricultural policy in the Netherlands was to turn agriculture into an effective and productive sector of the economy.34 Meanwhile, however, in the neighbouring countries agricultural pressure groups asked for subsidies towards agricultural production and protection against more competitive foreign producers,35 which was to the detriment of Dutch agricultural exports. In his efforts to liberalise agricultural trade, Mansholt was backed by the Dutch farmers’ organizations, of which the Stichting voor de Landbouw, renamed Landbouwschap in 1954, was the umbrella organization. In the Netherlands, a country with a strong corporatist tradition, the Stichting had an important advisory role.36 There were regular meetings between the Stichting and high officials of the agricultural ministry and monthly meetings with the minister of agriculture.

As minister of agriculture, Mansholt became heavily involved in international agricultural affairs. The importance he attached to these international questions became manifest when he created a department within his ministry concerned with external agricultural relations. It was headed by van der Lee, who later followed him to the Commission. Mansholt perceived the OEEC and the United Nation’s FAO as failures. For him, the latter was too technocratic and the former did not make any progress in trade liberalisation regarding agriculture.37 Thus, he began pursuing a European agricultural policy. Inspired by the launch of the Schuman Plan in May 1950, Mansholt drafted a paragraph on agriculture which was incorporated in the

33 For biographical information on Mansholt see Merriënboer 2006.
34 Mommens 1990: 50.
35 Griffiths 1990b: 94.
37 See Knudsen 2002.
Stikker Plan in September 1950. In his plan Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker envisaged the abolition of tariffs on industrial goods among the OEEC countries.\(^3^8\) The core of Mansholt's proposal was the integration of the entire agricultural sector into a customs union and the immediate introduction of a European price level.

However, attempts to reach an agreement on agriculture remained fruitless, for example in the so-called Green Pool negotiations between the OEEC member states in the early to mid-1950s.\(^3^9\) Mansholt's position in these negotiations is revealing with regard to his ideas on European integration. Firstly, while simple trade liberalisation would have been beneficial for the Dutch economy, Mansholt favoured setting up a supranational organization, something most agricultural ministers of the other participating countries were not prepared to accept.\(^4^0\) Secondly, he - unsuccessfully - attempted to restrict the Green Pool to the six Schuman Plan countries. He thus favoured a smaller supranational organization over a larger intergovernmental one that would have provided Dutch agriculture with a larger market, possibly including Britain, the most important market for Dutch produce next to Germany. However, Mansholt's party, the PvdA, was generally in favour of including Britain in the integration process. But the British government undermined any attempt to introduce supranationality in the Green Pool.\(^4^1\) Yet, for Mansholt, supranationalism was a guarantee that necessary decisions could not be vetoed by member state governments under domestic pressure. Hence, he preferred a supranational solution to the autonomy of national governments which would too often come under the influence of interest groups, in particular in the agricultural sector. Supranational institutions, on the

\(^{38}\) Griffiths 1990b: 96-97.
\(^{40}\) Griffiths 1995: 25.
\(^{41}\) Thiemeyer 1999: 266.
contrary, would only pursue the common interest.\textsuperscript{42} Mansholt’s experience of the failure of the Green Pool negotiations enforced this belief in the necessity of supranational institutions. Moreover, his underlying interest in supranational policy-making can be seen as a calculation that only a supranational organization could put an end to the protectionist national agricultural policies so harmful to Dutch agriculture. According to Thiemeyer, ‘[w]hat Mansholt had dreamed of was a goodwill dictatorship of technocrats acting only on behalf of a common interest defined by reason’.\textsuperscript{43}

Another insight Mansholt gained from the failure of the Green Pool negotiations was that agriculture could not be treated in isolation from the rest of the economy.\textsuperscript{44} He was an experienced politician and negotiator and realised that in order to advance agricultural negotiations there needed to be some bargaining margin, preferably by combining agriculture with other policy areas. Thus, in early 1955, Mansholt’s hope of realising a common agricultural policy rose when it became clear that agriculture would be incorporated in the Benelux proposal. This proposal combined the Beyen Plan of Dutch Foreign Minister Jan Willem Beyen for a customs union, launched in 1952, and the ideas of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and his preference for continuing sectoral integration. Agriculture was to be part of the common market envisaged in this proposal. When the Treaties of Rome were ratified in 1957, some kind of progress in agriculture was therefore guaranteed. Agricultural policy was locked into a particular institutional framework and linked to progress in the customs union.

\textsuperscript{42} Idem. 2005: 43.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 45.
\textsuperscript{44} Griffiths and Girvin 1995b: xxxiv.
Representing the smallest common denominator between member state
governments and reflecting their diverging views on the aims of the CAP, Articles 38-
47 of the EEC treaty on agriculture were vague and only set out some general
objectives.45 From 1958 to 1973 Mansholt was responsible for agricultural policy in
the Commission. His long experience as minister for agriculture, post-war
international agricultural negotiations and, not least, his personality all combined to
contribute to the shaping of the CAP. These factors, along with the working methods
he transferred from the Dutch agricultural ministry to the Commission, also generated
a distinctive administrative culture in DG VI. In July 1958, the Commission convened
a conference in Stresa to discuss the basic objectives of the future CAP with the
governments of the member states and interest groups such as farmers’ and consumer
organizations. The Stresa resolutions were at the basis of the proposals DG VI came
up with one and a half years later. These provided for a free exchange of agricultural
goods within the six member states, a gradual development of the CAP during the
transition period and the adoption of a common price level for many product groups.
The first decisions in agriculture had to be taken by the end of 1961, as the transition
to the second stage of the customs union was due on 1 January 1962. The first of
many agricultural ‘marathons’ started on 15 December 1961 and ended – the clock
had been stopped on 31 December to allow the negotiations to continue – in the night
of 14 January 1962. The main outcome of the negotiations was a system of market
organizations and a price policy that should guarantee farmers’ incomes. A system of
intervention buying would ensure that farmers were able to sell their produce. This
result was enshrined in the so-called Agricultural Code, setting out three principles:
‘the principle of a unified internal market with common prices permitting free

45 See for example Hendriks 1999: 141-2.
circulation of goods; the principle of community preference ensured by external protection; and the principle of financial solidarity through the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (FEOGA). The Agricultural Code was the foundation of the CAP until the EU agricultural ministers adopted a major reform of the CAP in June 2003.

The first marathon saw the birth of the so-called package deals. This is where Mansholt and his collaborators could have an important impact and facilitate a successful conclusion of the negotiations. Because he had been instrumental in post-war agricultural negotiations, Mansholt understood better than most other policymakers what kinds of proposals were acceptable for the different member states. Likewise, DG VI officials had expert knowledge and had often participated in these post-war agricultural negotiations themselves. Moreover, DG VI prepared the ground for the Commission’s proposals in intensive consultations with government officials and agricultural interest groups such as the COPA. During the first years of the Community, decisions in the Council had to be taken by unanimity. The package deals were crucial in this period as, in order to obtain a decision for a certain sector, each country had to gain something. Mansholt became a master in the art of forging such package deals, not least because he had served as a minister in various coalition governments in the Netherlands and was used to this kind of bargaining. He thus induced the Council to either accept the Commission’s package deal or to go home empty handed. On the negative side, this meant that the Commission often had to

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46 Ibid., 143; 147-8.
47 Cf. http://ec.europa.eu-agriculture-capreform-index_en.htm (accessed 16 April 2008). Among other things, this reform entails the payment of subsidies independent of the volume of production, thus avoiding over-production and a revision of the market policies, for example reducing the intervention prices for some produce.
48 Mansholt 1974: 111.
49 Merrienboer 2006: 262.
compromise and make sacrifices on the content of their proposals in order to grant each minister of the Six a ‘success’.

2. Step two: the emergence of administrative cultures

2.1 DG IV’s administrative culture

DG IV’s administrative culture was essentially an expert culture. This has to be seen in connection with von der Groeben’s ideas about modern and efficient administrations. A classical nineteenth and early twentieth century administration – fragmented and hierarchically organized – could not satisfy the needs of the contemporary world where the economy occupied an increasingly important role. A modern administration required new working methods and clear aims. Thus, von der Groeben was keen to involve experts and academics in policy-making. Because competition law was a rather recent area of economic policy in Europe, he thought that consultation and advice of external experts were all the more important. Consequently, he recruited Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, a former student of Böhm. A professor at the University of Saarbrücken, Mestmäcker had familiarised himself with cartel law of the 1920s and US anti-trust and deconcentration law during his studies in Frankfurt. At first, Mestmäcker advised von der Groeben informally. This consultancy was institutionalised when he became a special adviser to DG IV in 1962. Other advisers to von der Groeben were the German economist Hans Möller, the agriculture expert Priebe and Jacques Houssiaux, a young economist at Nancy.

51 Interview Sibylle Hambloch with Erich Mestmäcker, Hamburg, 4 October 2002.
52 Schwartz 2006: 461.
University.\textsuperscript{53} These experts mostly met with von der Groeben and his Cabinet and partly also with DG IV officials. This is another example of von der Groeben introducing an element with which he had become familiar from working in the economics ministry, into the Commission. In Germany, experts and academics traditionally served as advisers to political bodies. Von der Groeben even sought – in vain – to convince the college to institutionalise a board of economic advisers to the Commission, consisting of external academics and experts and modelled on the Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, or Academic Advisory Board, of the German economics ministry.\textsuperscript{54} The Academic Advisory Board, which had its origins in the Allied administration of the British and American occupation zones, was founded in January 1948.\textsuperscript{55} It was initially dominated by the Freiburg School with Böhm as one of the founders and Mestmäcker becoming a member in 1960.\textsuperscript{56} With his insistence on close and institutionalised contacts with the academic community and experts, von der Groeben was the exception in the Commission in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{57} DG IV, like any newly founded institution, had to acquire a good reputation. In the long-term this was facilitated by collaborating with leading experts in the field. Crucially, seeking scientific advice added authority to the Commission's and DG IV's proposals and ultimately strengthened their policy preferences. Ordo-liberal experts in DG IV thus contributed to consolidating the chosen path.

Another aspect of DG IV's administrative culture were the working methods. Von der Groeben promoted teamwork and was particularly in favour of involving

\textsuperscript{53} Houssiaux was one of the few French scholars to have published on competition policy: Houssiaux 1960.
\textsuperscript{56} Löffler 2002: 72. Löffler calls Böhm and Eucken 'political professors'.
\textsuperscript{57} While in 1958 Robert Marjolin appointed the Belgian economist Robert Triffin as adviser, he does not even mention Triffin in his biography, Marjolin 1986.
younger officials in the policy-making process and assigning them their own areas of responsibility, thus fighting not only the (as he called it) ‘horizontal but also vertical isolation’. The Commissioner organized regular meetings with DG IV officials and members of his Cabinet, where current topics and problems of competition policy were discussed openly. These meetings resembled the table ronde organized by Mansholt in DG VI. To von der Groeben, teamwork was particularly important in a multinational administration because the different economic and political developments in the member states and the resulting repercussions for EEC-level policy-making would require constant collaboration between Commission officials of several nationalities. VerLoren van Themaat had similar working methods. He held regular meetings at DG IV level and weekly meetings with the directors and he also created ad hoc working groups.

Lastly, DG IV’s autonomy became part of its administrative culture. Compared to other DGs in the Commission, DG IV stands out because of the direct influence it could exert on the economy of the common market. Early policy decisions such as Regulation 17 were at the basis of this autonomy. Crucially, the Commission’s independence in this sector was subsequently extended with the help of Court rulings, strengthening the Commission’s position.

62 Interview K.S. with the assistant to director-general VerLoren van Themaat.
64 For example two landmark decisions were: Commission vs Grundig & Consten, Cases 58/64 and 56 [1966] European Court Reports (ECR) 299; Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation vs Commission [1973] ECR 215 (Continental Can).
2.2 DG VI's administrative culture

DG VI's administrative culture was significantly shaped by Mansholt and the working methods he introduced in his DG. These working methods were partly those he had experimented with in the Dutch ministry for agriculture. Two examples of these practices are the intense dialogue with interest groups and the table ronde. Cultivating close contacts with farmers' organizations was considered vital by Mansholt, who had followed the same approach in the Netherlands. This had an impact on the internal organization of DG VI: the division concerned with non-governmental organizations reported directly to the Cabinet and the director-general without a director being interposed. The table ronde was an institutionalised discussion and consultation forum. One French official called it the 'Dutch system'. It was composed of permanent members – the Cabinet, the director-general and his assistant, Heringa and Rencki – as well as directors and officials, even lower-ranking ones, invited to participate and give a presentation or share their opinion on a given problem. The presentation was followed by a lively discussion. However, Mansholt reserved for himself the right to take the final decision. The round table of DG VI has become legendary. It epitomizes the high degree of participation of officials in the decision-making process in DG VI and seems to have encouraged dialogue and creativity. The working methods and the atmosphere in DG VI gave even lower ranking officials the feeling that they were participating in shaping and creating the CAP. In June 1962, in a note to Hallstein's Cabinet, von Verschuer underlined the importance of the round

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65 Interview K.S. with Maurice Barthélémy.
66 Information provided by Helmut von Verschuer in a letter to K.S., 4 November 2005.
67 See for example the interviews K.S. with François Muller and Giampiero Schiratti.
table for the CAP: 'It was because of the round table that DG Agriculture could
develop and push through a far-sighted agricultural policy.'

DG VI's administrative culture was also shaped by the early successes of the
CAP. Because agriculture was an important domain for most member states, the
Commission identified the CAP as a field were it could excel and demonstrate its
expertise. The policy became a priority for the Commission. According to Hallstein,
its 'life depended on the CAP'. Ludlow emphasizes the political motives of the
Commission: 'A major common policy [...] would require a degree of political and
bureaucratic activism, and a common budget high enough to emphasize that the
Commission was a political player and not just an international civil service.' The
institutional backing for the CAP in the Commission was reflected, for instance, in the
ever increasing staff numbers of DG VI. Moreover, Mansholt and DG VI were
perhaps more successful than other DGs in staging agriculture and in linking it to
progress in the integration process in general. With Mozer, a journalist and well-
networked politician as chef de cabinet, Mansholt came to be perceived as the
'European minister of agriculture'. For instance, when asked whether he was content
with the way the CAP developed, one official acknowledged that not all aspects of the
outcome were desirable. However, the important point for him was that the CAP had
been '[...] the first common policy put in place by the institutions' – the Council and
the Commission. The actual shape of the CAP was thus less important even though
the policy soon generated major, and very costly, problems. These ranged from
overproduction to the distortion of competition on world markets by EEC countries

68 BAK, N 1266/1253, Note B. von Staden to President Hallstein, 7 June 1962.
69 'Notre vie en dépend [on the CAP]', HAEU, Dep EN 720, Réunion de la Commission, 18 July 1960.
70 Ludlow 2005c: 356.
71 See for example the discussion in BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 153 session, 2ème partie,
10/12 July 1961.
72 Interview K. S. with Maurice Barthélemy.
exporting their heavily subsidised surpluses. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, DG Agriculture was seen as a successful DG, or even as the Commission's 'glamour DG'. The importance and the success of the CAP had a strong impact on DG VI officials.

3. Step three: socialisation processes in DG IV and DG VI

3.1 Socialisation of DG IV officials

There were two groups of officials in DG IV. The first group consisted of mainly German officials who were already pre-socialised, either into the ordo-liberal concept of competition or US anti-trust law, or both. Among these officials were – alongside Albrecht – Schwartz and Hermann Schumacher. Schwartz, an official and later Cabinet member in DG IV, graduated with a degree in law from the University of Freiburg, where one of his teachers was Eucken. He also studied anti-trust law at Harvard law school, and was an assistant to Heinrich Kronstein, a German emigrant professor and cartel expert at the Institute for Foreign and International Trade Law at Georgetown University in Washington. In March 1961, Schwartz drafted an overall concept of European competition policy for von der Groeben, which served as a basis for DG IV's activities. Schumacher was the son of the economist Hermann Schumacher who had been Eucken's mentor. He became the director of the Directorate for Cartels and Monopolies. Not far from the ideas of these three Germans were those of director-general VerLoren van Themaat who had a longstanding

73 Michelmann 1978b: 162.
74 This was published under von der Groeben's name in the EC Bulletin: von der Groeben 1961.
experience in competition policy at the Dutch economics ministry. This group of officials participated in the development of DG IV’s competition policy and served, alongside von der Groeben, as role models to the second group of officials. This second group was constituted in the main of younger and/or non-German officials, like the Italian Pappalardo, who had to familiarise themselves with the predominant competition conception in DG IV and in particular with the Freiburg School and its protagonists such as Eucken and Böhm. Their writings were part of the underlying competition conception in DG IV, but were not, for example, part of the university curriculum in Italy. Soon, these officials reached a high level of expertise in the matter, however.

Leadership by role models is important for facilitating socialisation processes. In contemporary interviews, conducted by Michelmann in the mid-1970s, officials emphasized ‘the importance of leadership in the early EEC phases for the subsequent patterns of policy development in the various DGs’. In DG IV von der Groeben and VerLoren van Themaat had an excellent reputation as the founders of the European competition policy. Because they were regarded as successful leaders, they served as role-models. Their success triggered processes of imitation and social learning. Moreover, frequent and direct contact with these European role models was crucial for motivating DG IV officials. Von der Groeben’s working methods facilitated such contacts. He created an atmosphere of open-mindedness and discussion. At least during the first and crucial years, when competition policy was shaped, officials were received and heard by the Commissioner on a regular basis. The feeling of being able

76 Interview K.S. with Aurelio Pappalardo.  
77 Michelmann 1978b: 170.  
78 Cf. the interviews K.S. with DG IV officials and also Michelmann 1978b and Cini 1994.  
to contribute to the decision-making process was important and created a strong sense
of solidarity with the aims and values of DG IV. According to the available
eyewitness evidence, this facilitated the formation of an *esprit de corps* among the
civil servants, especially during the founding period, when the Commission was still a
rather small administration.\(^{80}\)

DG IV's autonomy and a sense of 'being different' were deeply engrained in
the self-perception of DG IV officials. Pappalardo believed, for example, that
competition was different from other services in the Commission: 'DG Competition is
an exception in this "mega-mechanism" still today. The competition regulations are to
a large extent applicable without consent of the Council.'\(^{81}\) DG IV 'celebrates its
autonomy from the Council', as Michelmann put it.\(^{82}\) The officials took pride in what
they perceived as their effective and important policy sector. Similarly, the idea of
being the 'judges' of the Commission was propagated by some officials.\(^{83}\) After all,
DG IV had judicial functions and its rulings affected enterprises and the governments
themselves. Their judge-like tasks had an influence on the officials and their relation
with the outside world. DG IV officials nurtured an image of the incorruptibles of the
Commission,\(^{84}\) or the Commission's watchdog. For the 1980s Michelle Cini's
observations correspond to these findings: the officials shared a certain vision of the
world, separating good from bad and seeing themselves as missionaries, spreading the
values of competition.\(^{85}\) The French director in DG IV, Armand Saclé, qualified

\(^{80}\) See the interviews K.S. with former DG IV officials.
\(^{81}\) Interview K.S. with Aurelio Pappalardo.
\(^{82}\) Michelmann 1978b: 78.
\(^{83}\) Interview K.S. with Kurt Ritter.
\(^{84}\) See for example ibid.
\(^{85}\) Cini 1996: 465.
competition as a *Geisteshaltung*, or mind-set.\textsuperscript{86} This statement coming from a leading French official in DG IV who did not have a background in ordo-liberalism is an indicator for the successful adoption of DG IV's competition ideology by its officials.

Network formation was another form of socialisation through which actors outside the Commission were familiarised with the leading competition concept of the Commission. At first especially the directorate concerned with cartel policy focused mainly on an academic exchange, something which Scheinman confirms: 'Some Community pundits have dubbed the cartel sector as “l'Université”, especially in view of its tendency to draw heavily on independent experts in the academic community.\textsuperscript{87} The academic nature of the discussions in DG IV left the officials with the impression that they were the only real experts in the matter in the Community. This resulted in the development and the nurturing of a culture of expertise within DG IV, which then became part of the officials' self-perception. The situation seems to have changed during the 1970s, however, when DG IV officials appear to have become more accessible and consulted more broadly with (external) professionals concerned with competition policy.\textsuperscript{88} The reason for this could be that by then a community of competition experts had formed, consisting of national civil servants, lawyers and academics, which collaborated closely with DG IV, not least because competition policy was beginning to have a tangible impact. From 1958 onwards DG IV organized so-called cartel conferences with representatives of national administrations, and Regulation 17 provided for a committee for cartel and monopoly questions. It is likely that these forums facilitated the incremental formation of a transnational competition network. The participants were socialised into this competition community and

\textsuperscript{86} ACDP, I-659, 001/1, Aufgaben der Wettbewerbspolitik in der EWG, Niederschrift über die Besprechung bei Herrn von der Groeben am 12.6.64.

\textsuperscript{87} Scheinman 1971: 212-3.

\textsuperscript{88} Michelmann 1978b: 63.
developed ‘shared causal beliefs and policy aims’ that eventually resulted in their backing of the Commission’s competition policy. It is thus plausible that the socialisation of DG IV officials into a certain concept of competition was followed by the constitution of an expert network transcending the Commission.

Moreover, socialisation appears to be a long-term process, which is reinforced over time. The powers DG IV obtained through Regulation 17 certainly intensified the impact of certain socialisation factors. For instance, the factor of autonomy certainly grew in importance after Regulation 17 entered into force as this regulation constituted the basis of DG IV’s independence. Hence, a policy and its effects impact on institutionalisation and fuel socialisation processes.

3.2 Socialisation of DG VI officials

Negotiations and initiatives in the agricultural sector in post-war Europe had led to the creation of an internationally socialised and networked group of agricultural experts. When setting up his DG, Mansholt could fall back on this network. The appointment of the director-general, the Frenchman Rabot, is one example. On the one hand, Rabot’s appointment was a politically motivated decision. The French government, having a strong interest in the CAP, insisted on providing the Director-General for Agriculture. On the other hand, Rabot had been Director of the International Relations Directorate in the French agricultural ministry and participated in the Green Pool negotiations. In 1955 he became Secretary General for Food and Agriculture in

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the OEEC. Rabot was thus a well-known figure in the post-war international agricultural negotiations and was also known to Mansholt. He had an important role in recruiting personnel for DG VI. In a Commission meeting, Mansholt emphasized that his director-general had succeeded in putting together an apt team of collaborators. It is very likely that Rabot relied on pre-existing contacts and networks. For instance, the Frenchman Guy Amiet had been deputy secretary general at the Green Pool negotiations from 1952-1955. Amiet had also worked for the OEEC like his future colleagues in DG VI, the Italian Adolfo Pizzuti, the Belgian François Stroobants and the German Krohn. Likewise, Rabot’s assistant, the German von Verschuer, had participated in the Green Pool negotiations where he got to know Rabot. Von Verschuer had also taken part in the Val Duchesse negotiations in 1956 where he met van der Lee. The fact that already in January 1958 Mansholt and van der Lee considered him for a post in DG VI shows that he was the young, experienced and enthusiastic type of expert the Commission sought to employ. In addition, Mansholt brought van der Lee, his first chef de cabinet, and Heringa, DG VI’s future deputy director-general, from the Dutch ministry of agriculture.

These highly skilled technical experts shared the view that Europe needed a common agricultural policy and they had confidence in their own problem-solving capacity. The knowledge and previous experience of DG VI officials were an important asset for the Commission on which it relied and which it utilised. While

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93 HAEU, DEP EN 322, Réunion de la Commission, 23 February 1962. See also chapter B1.
94 BAK, N 1266/1254, CV Guy Amiet, CV Adolfo Pizzuti, CV François Stroobants.
95 See interview K.S. with Helmut Freiherr von Verschuer.
officials were partly pre-socialised in negotiations and organizations dealing with agriculture before entering the Commission, their positive identification with DG VI and its aims were further advanced through leadership and participatory working methods. Firstly, for the officials the direct contact with European role models was important. The personality of Mansholt seems to have made a deep impression on the officials of DG VI. His success in building the CAP and his professional and physical strength – he was reported never to get tired during Council negotiations – gave him prestige. In Mansholt, Mozer admired the 'endless patience of an otherwise impatient character who is obsessed with his mission'. 97 Therefore, his collaborators would not only see in him the 'rooted farmer' but also a great politician. 98 The image Mansholt had among his collaborators was thus one of a down-to-earth farmer who became a successful politician because he resolutely fought for two interrelated causes: the CAP and European integration. This went down well with his staff, many of whom had a farming background and had studied agriculture. One official explained the skills and the assertiveness of Mansholt by comparing the successful CAP with the transport sector, where the Community had made less progress: '[...] Had Mansholt been responsible for transport, then we would have had a Common Transport Policy.' 99 Likewise, the deputy director-general Heringa was highly esteemed for his expertise and assiduousness. He was responsible for the market organizations. One official called him 'the engine of the common agricultural policy' and that through his example they were encouraged to work 'Saturdays and Sundays'. 100 Interestingly, Heringa was not a strong Europeanist, according to van der Lee. Nonetheless, because

98 Ibid.
99 Interview K.S. with Hans-Broder Krohn.
100 Interview K.S. with Maurice Barthélémy; see also for example the interviews K.S. with Günter Fitterer, Brussels, 14 April 2004, François Muller and Georges Rencki.
of his know-how he served as a role model. Director-general Rabot and his assistant von Verschuer also belonged to this circle of leading officials who inspired enthusiasm and loyalty. 101 In the mid-1970s, Michelmann detected nostalgia among officials for the Mansholt era. They feared that DG VI might lose its status as the 'glamour DG' of the Commission. 102 However, even in the mid to late 1970s, leadership was given very high marks in DG VI. The 'leading positions have gone to capable men, thus leadership is excellent,' wrote Michelmann. 103 The tradition of good leadership introduced in DG VI in the 1960s thus seems to have persisted.

In the development of the CAP proposals, the Commission not only relied on the officials' expertise, but also on their contacts. This could be the intimate knowledge of a national administration, an interest group or of an international network. For successful policy-making at the European level it was vital that Commission officials possessed the necessary contacts or were able to forge links with the actors in question. As shown in chapter BIII, these contacts and special knowledge were an important source of information and a tool in Community policy making. One official recounts that in order to prepare a decision, Mansholt sent leading officials into their home countries to convince their nationals of a particular proposal. 104 For instance, in the highly contested question of the common cereals price, Krohn met with a high ranking official of the German agricultural ministry to discuss the German standpoint on this question. He reported the outcome of the meeting to Mansholt who was therefore up to date in this matter and could adjust the negotiation position of the

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101 Cf. for example the interview K.S. with Raymond Craps.
102 Michelmann 1978b: 162.
103 Ibid., 139.
104 Interview K.S. with François Muller.
Commission accordingly. Krohn also suggested possible ways of dealing with the German delegation in the negotiations.105

The CAP was the 'success story' of the Commission and the officials were aware of it. In contrast to other supranational policy areas the Commission dealt with, the CAP had an immediate impact on individuals and the economy in the member states. Whereas other DGs were mainly concerned with studies that did not have a direct impact, DG VI produced most of the Community’s legislation and administered large agricultural funds. In interviews, leading staff of DG VI emphasized the importance of the CAP for the Community and for the functioning of the common market.106 One official explained that the legal texts they wrote had a large impact on Europe.107 Working in a small expert group and being under the impression of making an impact is prone to create solidarity with the institution. Crucially, in the Commission the CAP was considered as leading the way to increased powers for the Commission in other policy areas.108 The Commission and the officials in DG VI were convinced that the CAP was the key to European integration. In his study of the Kennedy Round, Coombes concludes that DG VI officials were more organized and had a stronger predetermined departmental standpoint to defend than others.109 Not least, they were inclined to defend this departmental standpoint as they had contributed to developing this position within DG VI. 'In the case of Agriculture administrative style happened to favour support of the “departmental philosophy”', Coombes found.110

105 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 114, Document n.a. [Krohn], undated.
106 Michelmann 1978b: 60; see also interview K.S. with Maurice Barthélémy.
107 Interview K.S. with Maurice Barthélémy.
110 Ibid.
Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that a re-evaluation of the role and impact of institutions, institutional cultures and actor socialisation can contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of the early EEC and of how Community policies came into being. Such a view on Community policy-making needs to take into consideration the historical context of a policy area and the pre-socialisation of individuals. Both factors help explain the nature of early decisions elaborated within the Commission’s services and adopted in the EEC. These early decisions often had a disproportionately strong impact in that they implemented a particular path that was difficult to revise later on. One of the factors which helped to reinforce a path was the emergence of administrative cultures. These were often based on pre-cultures and early decisions as demonstrated for DG IV and Regulation 17, and/or on pre-socialised and cohesive groups of officials as in DG VI. New officials were socialised into these administrative cultures. They internalised the values and aims that were an integral part of these cultures. Socialisation processes also affected individuals and institutions outside the Commission, for example through network formation. According to Antje Wiener the EU creates ‘interactive spaces for elites who then take an active role in diffusing norms, ideas and values through interactions back in their respective domestic contexts’. This shows that the role of supranational institutions in diffusing and stabilising norms and practices is important and surpasses the realm of the supranational administration. Even though DG IV and DG VI dealt with entirely different policy areas they still contributed in important ways to creating path dependencies.

However, the situation both DG's faced in their respective policy areas differed fundamentally. The first difference concerns the role of pressure groups. In competition policy, pressure groups were not as clearly defined and not as well organized as in the agricultural sector. Business lobbies at the national and European levels such as the CNPF and the Union des confédérations de l'industrie et des employeurs d'Europe (UNICE), respectively, were hesitant to embrace the Commission's proposals for Regulation 17 which they considered as too rigid. However, they did not develop a common strategy to push through their view, nor did they come up with a coherent alternative proposal. Also, it is likely that the implications of the European competition policy as conceived by DG IV were not entirely foreseen (or foreseeable) and understood by some business lobbies and member states' governments. The Commission was thus able to shape the common competition policy with the help of a coalition in favour of its approach.

Farmers organizations, on the contrary, had collaborated transnationally since before World War II. Governments of the member states and the Commission were confronted with well organized agricultural pressure groups with focussed interests. Moreover, farmers were considered an important electorate, in particular for the Christian democrats who still governed most member states in the 1960s. An agricultural policy in favour of these groups was seen as part of the post-war consensus. DG VI and the Commission mainly backed and became an integral part of this consensus. With the CAP, national protectionism and the management of the

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costly agricultural subsidies were transferred to the supranational level.\textsuperscript{115} DG VI helped to shape this important Community policy and ended up administering it.

The second difference was the degree of pre-socialisation and consciousness of officials of the issues at stake in their sector. Before entering the Commission, many of the DG VI officials had participated in post-war negotiations or had worked for international organizations dealing with agriculture. This experience combined with the collaboration with Mansholt in DG VI and the early successes of the CAP reinforced their view of a need of a European agricultural policy devised and administered by the Commission. Officials in DG IV had generally less previous experience in their subject matter. In many cases they were entirely socialised into accepting competition as the basis of the common market after they were appointed to the Commission. The outcome was similar in both DG's, however. DG IV and DG VI therefore have in common the fact that, within the Commission, their personnel – while sharing a particular generational experience – was confronted with role models, good leadership and participatory working methods. Commission staff developed a high degree of expertise that allowed them to feel as competent actors in the matter, able to influence the policy-making process. This facilitated their adopting the institutions’ norms, aims and values. It also guaranteed the continuity of the competition and agricultural policies after von der Groeben and Mansholt left the Commission.

The early decisions in competition and agricultural policy had a long-term impact in both policy areas. Regulation 17 was valid for over forty years and the many attempts to reform the CAP were only executed in a half-hearted manner because of the high political and social costs a more fundamental reform would have entailed.

\textsuperscript{115} Thiemeyer 1999: 262-3.
The first years of an organization and the first set of personnel are thus crucial with regard to getting a policy on track. In the case of DG IV ordo-liberal views on competition were introduced and prevailed, not least because of personnel continuity. VerLoren van Themaat's successors in the post of director-general were Albrecht, Caspari and Schlieder; all three were German and had been close collaborators of von der Groeben. The examples of DG IV and DG VI thus show how a particular path reinforced by a particular institutional culture can impact on preference formation in institutions and ultimately influence the shape of a Community policy.

When it came to putting its preferences into practice, however, the Commission had to rely on coalitions to get its proposals passed – coalitions formed of member state governments, interest groups and expert networks. In the incipient multi-level political system of the EEC the success of a Commission proposal depended on such coalitions for backing a particular policy. At the same time, the Commission and its staff played a pro-active part in forging coalitions in favour of its proposals.
Conclusions

The Bosboom report of 1959 was the first in a long series of (largely unsuccessful) attempts to restructure and rationalise the Commission’s administration. This resistance to reform led to a situation in which the structures introduced in the 1950s and 1960s were only seriously challenged by Vice-President Neil Kinnock’s Task Force for Administrative Reform\(^1\) – perhaps the most radical and successful reform to date. The process was triggered in October 1999 and resulted in a number of important changes, among them the introduction of new staff rules in 2004, after the old statute had been in place for over 40 years.\(^2\) This latest reform certainly aimed at improving the efficiency of the Commission, but also at changing its culture\(^3\) – a culture formed and engraved in the institution since the late 1950s.

In the light of the longevity of administrative structures, cultures and the continuity of Commission staff, this thesis makes a significant contribution to EU history by analysing the origins and elements of these structures, cultures and the background of the administrations’ staff. With its original combination of administrative and prosopographical history and an outlook on how administrative cultures can impact on EEC and EC policies, it contributes to a better understanding of the functioning of the EEC and, ultimately, to writing a supranational history of Europe. The following sections will sum up the main findings of these three dimensions of the thesis. The final section will address how the findings could be utilised for further research.

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1. European bureaucracies – an integral part of Europe’s supranational history

The chapters on the administrations of the High Authority and the Commission systematically analysed the set-up of the internal organization, the introduction of working methods and recruitment mechanisms. All three dimensions produced elements of a distinct European administrative culture. Put under close scrutiny, many of these elements, or main features, of the administrations are linked to the aim of gaining legitimacy for the new supranational institutions.

The central idea of supranationality often had to be traded in for legitimacy. The principle of collegiality, introduced by the ECSC treaty and upheld in the High Authority by a decision of the college in late 1953, has become a core feature of the European administrative culture. Decision-making in the college, where nationals of all member states were represented, should increase the legitimacy of decisions.

Juggling between supranationality and the perceived national interests of member states was one of the characteristics of the European bureaucracies. In the administrative domain, a variety of interests of member state governments, political parties and interest groups had to be accommodated. Staff recruitment was in this respect an important and highly sensitive matter. The thesis examined these recruitment patterns and what was at stake for the Commission and the High Authority, on the one hand, and member states and interest groups, on the other.

Although both the High Authority and the Commission were entitled to recruit personnel independently, at the beginning they lacked the necessary administrative structures and had to rely on a pre-selection of possible staff by member state governments. Also, concessions had to be made when it came to the nationality of staff and special interests of a member state in a policy area. Both administrations observed the distribution of posts according to an informal national balance. This
could obstruct careers, but it does not seem to have gravely affected the motivation of staff. On the contrary, as each member state was represented in the administration according to a certain quota, the national balance was seen as enhancing the legitimacy of the European administration. It became another of its core features.

The European administrations were not created from scratch. Instead, they were built on a variety of traditions of national administrations and international organizations and on experiences of individuals. In some cases, these experiences could reach back into the inter-war period. The thesis has demonstrated that the founding presidents of the High Authority and Commission, Monnet and Hallstein, had a strong impact on the internal organization of the administrations. When shaping them, they took into account pre-existing models – be it the Tennessee Valley Authority, the French Planning Commission or the Auswärtiges Amt. Designing the administrations along the lines of well-known models increased their legitimacy; this was particularly the case for the Commission, which incorporated elements of the French and the German administrations. However, at the High Authority, Monnet’s ideal of a small and flexible administration could not be upheld, as the tasks of the High Authority expanded and became more complex. This model thus failed, lost its legitimacy and did not become a core feature of the European administrative culture.

The Commission’s administration grew rapidly in size. This was, to a certain extent, intended by Hallstein and his colleagues. One of the consequences of the Hallstein presidency, though, was that the Commission became a fragmented administration. The nine DGs turned into organizations with distinctive administrative cultures. This affected the legitimacy of decision-making in the college, as decisions were prepared rather autonomously within the DGs.
Both the High Authority and the Commission had to deal with efforts of national governments, political parties and interest groups to transpose certain political and economic concepts or policies to the European level. The CAP is one example, competition policy another. In the High Authority, German officials, who were convinced social market economists, were promoted by the German government to counterbalance the supposed statism of Monnet and his collaborators. Likewise, von der Groeben and his collaborators in DG IV were the bulwark of economic liberalism in the Commission. Moreover, in the High Authority, potential candidates were brought forward by industrial organizations and trade unions. It seems that the recruitment strategy of the High Authority and the Commission, was geared towards incorporating these groups into the administration. The aim was to reproduce a miniature image of member states' societies at the European level. This, again, served the aim of increasing the legitimacy of the European bureaucracies.

The administrations became more autonomous in their staff policies once they adopted a personnel statute. This was an important step towards an independent supranational civil service, introducing a career system and the guarantee of life-long employment, similar to the national civil service. Moreover, the statute facilitated the formation of a group identity and identification with the institutions. While practices such as parachuting, detachment or the national balance continued, the thesis has shown that conflicting loyalties of officials were a minor problem in the European administrations. There are few cases where officials were either fierce defenders of their country's alleged interests or – the other extreme – renounced all ties with their home country. This was mainly because many officials thought that the promotion of European policies in the High Authority and the Commission was in the long-term interest of their home country. As Peterson rightly writes, 'to contrast national and
international attachments, or more crudely, to assume that one must be stateless to serve an international master, is to accept a monolithic notion of nationalism, or of identity. A requirement for statelessness of officials would again have undermined the European administrations’ legitimacy.

This legitimacy also depended heavily on the expertise of leading staff. Expertise seems to have been the main opportunity for European officials to make an impact and it became part of the European administrative culture. Arguably, this feature became even more pronounced after the crisis of 1965/66, when the Commission adopted a strategy of keeping its (political) profile low in order not to loose its legitimacy. Expert governance could also undermine the Commission’s legitimacy, however, and the Commission was regularly accused of suffering from a ‘democratic deficit’. This criticism was not geared exclusively towards the Commission. The expert culture extended to member state administrations and non-state experts, meeting, for example, in Community committees. The success of the expert culture depended not least on role models such as Monnet, Hallstein and Mansholt. Expert culture, however, needs to be combined with political leadership within and outside of the Commission in order to be effective and legitimate.

The internal legitimacy of the High Authority and the Commission vis-à-vis their staff was enhanced by a founding myth. The thesis has shown that the early years of the European administrations were not only crucial in terms of setting up administrative structures and establishing working methods, but also by generating such a founding myth. Monnet and, to a lesser extent, Hallstein as the founding presidents were crucial in this respect, as they cultivated and at the same time became part of the founding myths of the High Authority and the Commission. A founding

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4 Peterson 1974/5: 2.
myth is important for an institution’s history and the values emanating from it, and in the case of the High Authority and the Commission it facilitated the officials’ adoption of these values. Regarding the Commission, in particular, the first period was extremely successful and almost euphoric. During this period of creation and creativity, important capital was accumulated for motivating the administrative staff. This legitimised the institution and its actions and resulted in establishing a durable relationship of trust between officials and the Commission. Being able to look back at the halcyon days of the beginning was important as officials deplored that, after a couple of years, the administration of policies replaced the early period of innovation. With the loyalty developed during the early phase, officials remained reasonably motivated – as for example the Poullet report showed for the early 1970s – even when, during the 1970s, progress in European integration stagnated in many areas. The regained optimism and the progress made under the presidency of Jacques Delors reminded many officials of the early Hallstein years.

In summary, many features of the European administrations were a response to member states’ concerns that they could become an unaccountable ‘technocratic Areopagus’5. It was a major aim of the European bureaucracies to be accepted as serious and competent interlocutors. This was also achieved by recruiting able staff.

2. Towards a prosopography of the European Union

This thesis is the first systematic study of European civil servants and thus introduces European bureaucrats into the historiography of the European Union. It contributes to answering the question who the first European high officials were, whether they shared a strong European esprit de corps and, if so, what the factors were that led to

this team spirit. In order to analyse and compare the biographical background and attitudes of officials, the concept of generation proved to be a useful tool. Some High Authority and most of the Commission officials examined here belonged to the 45er generation. The thesis has shown that these officials shared one crucial experience: World War II. Profoundly marked by this experience, many of them had idealistic motives for entering the Commission from which a strong *esprit de corps* could flourish. A united Europe, after the experience of extreme European disunity, was the positive aim with which they all could identify. Moreover, the educational and professional background of Commission officials of DG IV and DG VI, respectively, were relatively homogeneous. This is an important finding with regard to the internal cohesion of the different DGs and, ultimately, their policies.

The High Authority officials, on the contrary, were more heterogeneous. The thesis has demonstrated that the High Authority personnel was split into two groups: technicians, mainly of the century generation, and younger generalists belonging to the 45ers. This shows that the choice of personnel was adapted to the respective ‘mission’ of the administration. The High Authority needed experienced technicians to draw up and administer the common coal and steel policies. These coal and steel experts did not necessarily have to be convinced Europeans. The Commission attracted mostly younger individuals, often from national administrations and often with previous international experience. While these did not necessarily need to be convinced Europeans either, their younger average age and the dominant war experience made them more receptive to socialisation pressures within the Commission.

The thesis reached limits in the attempt to analyse the biographical background of the High Authority technicians. The lack of source material inevitably
circumscribed the conclusions concerning this group. It would go too far, for instance, to claim that these officials generally had less European spirit than their colleagues of the 45er generation. The existing source material suggests, however, that a number of these technicians was primarily interested in finding and working for a solution for the European coal and steel industries, and was less concerned with European political unification. Another problem encountered in this research was how to show the effects of Europeanization of officials. This is a problem any research concerned with individuals and socialisation processes will encounter. In the case of European officials, one would ideally have documents available dating from before their entry into the European civil service and documents from while they served in the European administration, and from which a change of attitude is clearly visible. This is hardly ever the case. The thesis has therefore attempted to overcome this difficulty by using a wide range of source material and interviews. Based on this material it has developed a framework for analysing Europeanization mechanisms, taking internal and external factors into account that could facilitate Europeanization.

The thesis has confirmed that there was not one homogeneous European identity that supplanted national, regional, local or institutional identities, but that identities of European officials were composed of multiple elements. It was in the interest of the High Authority and the Commission to employ officials who could switch between their identities. However, based on factors such as the shared generational experience, a similar socialisation in their home countries, combined with factors they encountered in the European administrations such as career opportunities, expert culture, living and working in Luxembourg and Brussels, the presence of role models and participatory working methods, European civil servants developed a group
identity. Many saw in Europe an answer to the question 'who are we', or, how shall 
we organize our European societies after the catastrophe of World War II? For some it 
was more a question of idealism, for others it was more a matter of rational choice. At 
the same time, they all grappled with the difficulties encountered daily when trying to 
'make Europe'. National and cultural stereotypes had to be overcome and it seems that 
the most effective way to do this was by working together for a common cause with 
which they could all identify. This did not necessarily have to be something as far-
reaching as the United States of Europe, but it could well be a policy such as the CAP. 
Social integration within the European administrations and beyond is thus a crucial 
factor in the European integration process. Likewise, when studying the 
Europeanization of societies or societal actors, European institutions should not be left 
out of the equation as they can be seen as a microcosm of social integration and 
possibly as a precursor of the Europeanization of member states' societies.

3. Institutions and institutional cultures: crucial for understanding EC policies

The High Authority and the Commission in particular were major actors in the 
European integration process. European policies could only be as good as the 
European administrations' administrative staff and organization. The concept of path 
dependence, used in historical institutionalism, proved to be a useful tool for 
conceptualising the research questions linked to the emergence of European 
competition and agricultural policies. Departing from the idea that institutions cannot 
always be controlled but develop their own agendas, this thesis has demonstrated in a 
three step model how particular paths in competition and agricultural policies were 
implemented and which factors increased the likeliness that these paths remained

6 Trunk 2007: 8.
practically unchanged and unchallenged for a long period of time. As shown for the DGs IV and VI, exploring the role of, and the link between, historical context, institutions, institutional cultures and actor socialisation can contribute to a better understanding of the origins and paths of Community policies.

4. Threads for further research

The findings of the thesis and the conceptual tools that were utilised open up threads for future historical research. To start with the last chapter, the three steps developed to analyse path dependence, namely context, formation of an institutional culture, and the socialisation of internal and external actors into these cultures, could be fruitfully applied to other policy areas. More studies along similar lines would, firstly, add up to a more comprehensive picture of the origins and developments of Community policies. Some work has already been done by Véronique Dimier on DG Development. This line of research could be pursued, for example, for DG External Relations or DG Economic Affairs. Such studies could, secondly, clarify whether DG VI and DG IV were exceptions in the Commission. In particular DG VI was at the centre of attention whereas in other DGs arguably not much happened during the first years of their existence. It would remain to be examined in what way socialisation processes occurred in DGs that were considered less successful such as transport or social policy. This could contribute to isolating the interests at stake and to answering the question why no European social or transport policies emerged.

As to the Community bureaucracies, an obvious line of research would be to pursue the history of the Commission into the 1970s. Considered as a period of stagnation in the integration process, it could be interesting to analyse how this

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7 Dimier 2004.
stagnation affected the administration, the policy-making capacity of the Commission and, last but not least, the officials. It seems likely that the administrative problems inherited from the 1950s and early 1960s were one of the roots of this inertia and lack of momentum. Other possible explanations could be the loss of legitimacy of the Commission as a consequence of the empty chair crisis 1965/66, which had resulted in increased mistrust of the member states towards the Commission, or the lack of effective leadership in the Commission. Moreover, scholars of public administration such as Downs argue that administrations experience life cycles, that is, ups and downs. In this respect it is possible that the Commission experienced a downward development during the 1970s, while rising again to become more of a policy entrepreneur under the Jenkins presidency and, even more so, in the mid-1980s, under Jacques Delors.

The approach developed in this thesis for analysing socialisation mechanisms could be applied to other EC institutions, committees or even other international organizations. This would put the Commission and the High Authority into a wider perspective of the founding of international organizations after World War II. International bureaucracies with an independent staff developing supranational loyalties only began to emerge in the last century with the 'spirit of Geneva', at the League of Nations. This was certainly a source of inspiration for Monnet and for his aspiration that something similar should develop in Luxembourg at the High Authority. A line of research could therefore investigate how far the European administrations were unique and in what way the European civil servants were exceptional. It is likely that it was not only the European administrations that had the power to redirect loyalties. Other permanent secretariats of international organizations

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such as the IMF or the UN had this 're-socializing power' as well. International organizations founded after World War II probably also attracted a very motivated staff. Highly idealistic individuals such as the writer Iris Murdoch entered the UN in the mid-1940s. This may correspond to the European spirit of the first European civil servants in that material gains were less important than a certain spirit of adventure, or even idealistic motives such as promoting world peace. The EC administrations therefore have to be placed in context and compared with other international organizations in order to establish their uniqueness. The 45er generation may well have been dominating in these other administrative contexts as well.

The generational approach could be applied in further research. A crucial question would be how the Commission's administration changed under the influx of officials who grew up in post-war Europe and for whom World War II was not a dominating and life-changing experience. Analysing the '1968' generation as a relatively cohesive group seems particularly promising. What were their motives and expectations when working for 'Europe' and were they different from those of the 45ers? Did they have strongholds in the Commission such as in DGs dealing with more recent and 'modern' policy areas such as environmental or regional policies?

When pursuing the aim of writing a supranational and transnational history of the EU it is certainly necessary to explore further the interplay between different actors in the European Union – Community, state and non-state actors. Being able to explain the complex system of transfer of ideas – and also ideals – from Community level to the member states and vice versa could add to the understanding of the emergence of a European polity. Moreover, the outreach of the Commission's administration and its role in the process of Europeanization of member state societies

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is still largely unexplored. It is likely that European high officials who were socialised into defending supranational integration and the powers of the High Authority and the Commission in the Community conveyed these attitudes to the outside, for example, in negotiations with national administrations or in committees operating at the European level. Hence, the officials would act as translators and facilitators and they would participate in the transfer of the European idea and of European unification as an ideal. The interdependence of Community and national officials must have played a role in this process. There was a frequent exchange of personnel between Brussels and ministries in the capitals of the Six. It is likely that the close collaboration with, and the exchange between, the European and the national administrations has contributed to a 'bureaucratic integration' of Europe. This is inextricably linked to the emergence of transnational expert elites in Europe, as Haas already argued. Commission officials were part of transnational networks or even instigated and facilitated their formation. For such research, the network approach could be a useful tool. The importance of networks has briefly been evoked in chapter BIII for DGs IV and VI. Networks or expert groups such as the Monetary Committee were sometimes formally created by the EEC treaty. These networks brought together important state and non-state actors, acting within a well-defined context of contacts. The Monetary Committee, for instance, was composed of national and Community officials and central bankers. A study of this epistemic community from its inception in 1958 could shed new light on Community governance on the one hand, and the origins of Economic and Monetary Union on the other. It is likely that shared experiences and expert knowledge led to the creation of trust and shared values

11 See ibid.
12 Haas 1968: 18.
13 For an introduction to the network concept see Kaiser 2008 and Heard-Lauréote 2005.
and norms also in this context and not only among the European 'new race of men' in the High Authority and the Commission.
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